Special Issue of AIW's Al-Raida | Vol. 47 No. 1 (2023)

the pioneer

Editorial

Dina Abdul Rahman

A Word from the MEPI-Tomorrow’s Leaders Executive Director

File

Lina Kreidie

A Note to Our Students

Rena Haidar

The Gender Agenda of Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon: Intervention Constraints and the Absence of Cooperation and Action

Tonia Chahine

Listen to Women: Gender Bias in Clinical Pain Management

Melissa Bou Zeid

The Influence of Quotas on Promoting Women in Decision Making Positions

Maria Abi Akl

Unpaid Care Work in Lebanon: A Barrier to Women’s Economic Empowerment

Lynn al Jamal

Reallocating Soft Power in Sports: From Political Agendas to Sustainable Peace and Development

Rita Mroue

Automation and Gender

Shella Marcos El Douaihy

Women in Financial Technology: A Lack of Participation in Blockchain

Kassem Fattah

Queer Coding and Misrepresentation in Arab Media

Wafic Khalife

Social Media: A Curse or a Blessing?

Reina Al Sayegh

The Aftermath of Sexual Assault in Warfare: Analysis of UN Security Council Resolution 2467

Gheed Khiami

Inclusion of Women in Negotiations: The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board and the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group

Lyne Sammouri

The Role of Palestinian Women in Israel-Palestine Peace Negotiations

A Word from the MEPITomorrow’s

Leaders Executive Director

I have been working on MEPI Tomorrow’s Leaders-funded programs since 2015. By far, the Tomorrow’s Leaders Gender Scholars (TLS) program has been one of the most powerful and impactful to date.

Since 2020, LAU enrolled almost 400 TLS scholars, all of whom have successfully completed the one-year program requirement. Our TLS alumni not only completed two gender courses as part of their bachelor’s degree requirements, but they also attended a series of seminars and workshops on gender issues and produced policy papers to be considered for publication; all of this while being active ambassadors to raise awareness on issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion within their scholarly disciplines and communities. Wow!

Today, we at LAU are proud to say that we are graduating a new generation of changemakers: interdisciplinary leaders who are empowered and well-equipped to make the changes needed for a better tomorrow. It is the new generation of what I would call Inclusive Leaders!

This effort would not have been possible without the continuous support and trust of our partners at the United States Department of State and the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), who never lost the faith in the youth of the region. Also, the precious support of many valuable LAU departments, staff, and organizations was essential to the success of the program, including LAU’s School of Arts and Sciences and its esteemed faculty and Writing Center, the Arab Institute for Women and the staff of Al-Raida, and LAU’s SDEM unit led by Vice President Elise Salem. Lastly, it goes without saying that we all owe a major debt of gratitude to the TLS administrative team. A message of gratitude goes out to our amazing and fearless team, led by Dr. Lina Kreidie, Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss, and Ms. Tania Bou Arbid. Thank you for going above and beyond the call of duty for our amazing TLS students.

This publication is the culmination of the best work of the 2021–2022 cohort of TLS students. We are very proud to see their hard work come to life through this issue of Al-Raida. Congratulations to all.

Dina Abdul Rahman Executive Director, MEPI-Tomorrow’s Leaders Programs at the Lebanese American University

A Note to Our Students

Lina Kreidie

The Gender Agenda of Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon: Intervention Constraints and the Absence of Cooperation and Action

Rena Haidar

Listen to Women: Gender Bias in Clinical Pain Management

Tonia Chahine

The Influence of Quotas on Promoting Women in Decision Making Positions

Melissa Bou Zeid

Unpaid Care Work in Lebanon: A Barrier to Women’s Economic Empowerment

Maria Abi Akl

Reallocating Soft Power in Sports: From Political Agendas to Sustainable Peace and Development

Lynn al Jamal

Automation and Gender

Rita Mroue

Women in Financial Technology: A Lack of Participation in Blockchain

Shella Marcos El Douaihy

Queer Coding and Misrepresentation in Arab Media

Kassem Fattah

Social Media: A Curse or a Blessing?

Wafic Khalife

The Aftermath of Sexual Assault in Warfare: Analysis of UN Security Council Resolution 2467

Reina Al Sayegh

Inclusion of Women in Negotiations: The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board and the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group

Gheed Khiami

The Role of Palestinian Women in IsraelPalestine Peace Negotiations

Lyne Sammouri

A Note to Our Students

Lina Kreidie MEPI-TLS Academic Director

You are published!!

You are today’s and tomorrow’s change makers.

Our dear second cohort of Tomorrows’ Leaders for gender equality. This a big leap towards gender equality in terms of advocacy and policy recommendations. We are so proud of you and your passion to meet all the challenges facing you, your community, and the world even as the road to equality and social justice is long and hard. Stand up strong for equity, equality, and all human rights.

Accomplishments and progress require the vast support of open-minded and courageous people and institutions. Our Tomorrow’s Leaders students have exactly that. Thanks to the Middle East Partnership Initiative at the United States Department of State for providing our students and our institution with the financial and ideological support to pursue the Lebanese American University’s (LAU) commitment to human rights and other liberal values. Thank you to the MEPI-TLS team, both in Lebanon and abroad, for your remarkable support for and implementation of this program. Without your dedication, our students would not have the tools that they need to pursue a bright and gender equitable future for us all.

Finally, to our students: Remember, prosperity happens only once social justice has been achieved. Fly high, stay connected, and keep us posted as you move forward beyond the borders of our LAU campus. We salute your work.

The Gender Agenda of Civil Society Organizations in

Lebanon: Intervention Constraints and the

Absence of Cooperation and Action

Rena Haidar Political Science and International Affairs Major

Abstract

Lebanon’s vibrant civil society has shaped different aspects of the country’s political, economic, and social landscape. This paper aims to explore two main constraints obstructing the efficacy of local CSOs working on issues related to gender and women’s rights. The first constraint is the polarization between CSOs, and the second is the absence of networking and cooperation. The paper’s main recommendations for CSOs highlight the importance of strengthening cooperation between CSOs themselves, and between CSOs and the government. As for the state, the paper’s recommendations focus on how to create a bridge of cooperation with CSOs that are committed to action. Finally, the paper emphasizes that a strong, centralized agenda to gender and women’s rights can facilitate the coordination between and the efficacy of CSOs working to promote gender equality in Lebanon.

Introduction

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Lebanon are a driving force in the fight against gender discrimination and inequality. Lebanon’s poor ranking on the Global Gender Gap Index—145 out of 153 countries—is reflected in the large number of CSOs in the country dedicated solely to issues of gender inequality and women’s rights. The critical influence of these local CSOs on gender inequality makes them critical actors in the field of gender equality; it is thus important to assess and evaluate their approaches to gender equality and the efficacy of these approaches.

The latest data on the number of registered CSOs in Lebanon as of 2014 show that over 8,000 organizations currently operate in Lebanon: 62% of these CSOs operate at the national level, while the rest operate at the community level. Further, 40 % of beneficiaries of CSO programming are women (Beyond Reform and Developent [BRD], 2015). This huge number, which we can expect to have increased after the Beirut port explosion and the worsening economic crisis, highlights the importance of the work done by CSOs. Importantly, many of these organizations work specifically on issues of gender and women’s rights, including well-known organizations like ABAAD, KAFA, HELEM, SHIELD, MOSAIC, Seeds for Legal Initiatives, FE-MALE, Dar Al Amal, Arab Institute for Women, RDFL, CeSSRA, Haven for Artists, and many others.

The large number of organizations working on issues related to gender inequality and women’s rights means that there is a large spectrum along which CSOs define what counts as “gender equality,” and how organizations believe that this goal can be achieved. At one end of this spectrum is the achievement of full gender equality at all levels of society, including in politics. Some CSOs have chosen to fight for gender equality in certain sectors only, for example political rights, while others have chosen to focus on shifting societal attitudes toward gender as a way of eventually ensuring gender equality. The variegated approaches used by CSOs to attain gender equality, and the different understandings of what are the best strategies to achieve it, have made the actual goal of achieving full gender equality ultimately quite difficult. How can we achieve gender equality if CSOs and other actors do not actually agree on the best methods for achieving equality? What does this mean for the work of local CSOs in practice? These are the questions that are at the heart of this paper.

CSOs working on gender issues in Lebanon face various barriers. Despite their continuous efforts to thrive amidst the dreadful financial and political crises in Lebanon, their efforts to promote gender equality are driven backward by several constraints. The first constraint that this paper presents is the lack of a unified agenda driving the work of CSOs focused on gender inequality. The second constraint facing these CSOs is the absence of a constructive network of cooperation with formal government institutions which should be supporting this work. After discussing the implications of these constraints, the paper will present some recommendations for both CSOs and for government institutions to enhance their approach toward gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and women’s political and socio-economic empowerment.

Separate Agendas, Separate Ideas: The

Lack

of a Unified Strategy Among Gender CSOs

Cooperation, networking, and engagement in any field makes actions and results more structured and efficient. Similarly, if CSOs in Lebanon could set similar priorities in their work on women’s rights and gender equality, they could accelerate their goals and make results more sustainable and efficient. The fact that gender issues are “divided” into certain sub-focuses presents an important barrier to collective work and organizing. For example, the number of organizations focusing on the LGBTQ+ community is minimal compared to the ones working on women’s rights issues more broadly. Similarly, there are fewer organizations working on women’s political participation than there are organizations working on gender-based violence (GBV). Thus, it is important to ask what could happen if all CSOs in Lebanon shared the same

vision and approach towards women’s and gender issues, and what gains could be achieved from this unity or solidarity.

The lack of cooperation between CSOs working on gender and women’s rights issues might also be tied to the lack of an organizing structure at the national level. Such an organization can help put actors in touch with each other and can give organizations more information about what they are working on (Lebanese Humanitarian and Development Forum [HDF], 2022). A report by the UNDP highlights that there is no directory for gender actors in Lebanon which facilitates access to their work, publications, announcements, and other important issues (UNDP & CRI, 2006). In addition, a mapping of 75 gender actors done by the Centre for Social Sciences Research and Action (CeSSRA) shows that 65 of these actors are in the capital Beirut, while the rest (10 actors) are spread over three other districts (CeSSRA, 2020). Their geographical concentration in Beirut compared to their relative lack across the rest of the country presents another limitation to the work of gender CSOs in Lebanon (CeSSRA, 2020).

A unified agenda for CSOs means that their programmatic interventions would not overlap or duplicate another CSO’s work. Knowing what the main priorities are in terms of gender equality and women’s empowerment eases the work of CSOs, directs their focus, and structures their approach. This unified agenda can take the form of a national strategy; a national strategy does exist in Lebanon but is not implemented. In fact, two national strategies exist, one focused on women’s rights and the other on GBV. The GBV national strategy plan was established by the Office of the Minister of State for Women’s Affairs (OMSWA), and it only tackles GBV (ABAAD, 2020). The OMSWA aimed to work closely with civil society actors to implement this national strategy plan, but its work has gradually diminished ever since its establishment (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], 2020).

A National Action Plan (NAP) on women, peace, and security was also created in Lebanon and endorsed by different stakeholders from government institutions to civil society, and others. This NAP was based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (UN Women, 2019). The aim of this NAP was to create a structured plan to enhance women’s political and social participation, representation, and inclusion. Interestingly, this NAP was established with the help of only three CSOs, which is a very small number compared to the number of CSOs working on gender inequality in the country. The NAP also proposed only one suggestion on advancing networking and cooperation between civil society and the government. The NAP suggests that there should be a platform, or a portal enabling leaders in the civil society to communicate and partner with women parliamentarians (National Commission for Lebanese Women [NCLW], 2019). There are, however, a few important gaps in this proposal, including the limited political will to implement this strategy.

While these two national strategies are important, focusing on GBV or women’s social and political empowerment as separate issues are only piecemeal strategies for fighting gender inequality. Instead, CSOs should consider promoting a unified national plan that foregrounds several simultaneous and equally important goals as part of a holistic plan to fight against gender inequality.

Another potential reason for the lack of a unified agenda among gender CSOs is related to financial donors. CSOs primarily operate through the funding they receive from international donors. The findings of an assessment done on the needs of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Lebanon highlights that donor funding does more than just provide cash: It also forms and structures the full governance of the organization, which includes the mission, vision, and basic guidelines or policies (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2009). Knowing that the financial resources of nearly all CSOs are from international donors, it can be deduced that the priorities and objectives of an organization rely heavily on what the donors want or ask from the recipients of their funds.

Networking and cooperation between CSOs could ultimately alter the quest for gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Setting out similar priorities between gender actors can make the process of achieving gender equality more sustainable and more effective. A solid example of this is the first ever feminist civil society platform created by civil society actors and activists in Lebanon after the Beirut port explosion in 2020 with the help of UN Women. The Feminist Civil Society Platform (LFSCP) includes 50 members, and its main aim is to consolidate the status of women in different sectors and fields. The platform succeeded in convening different signatories to bring up important concerns about the status of women to the forefront of civil society debates. The most recent demands by the members of this platform were about the underrepresentation of women in government institutions, notably as the general elections were approaching in Lebanon. A statement by the signatories also affirms that they will monitor and hold accountable any unequitable and unjust approaches toward women in the political realm (LFSCP, 2021). Again, it can be argued that once gender actors work collaboratively and unify their demands, their efforts may have a far-reaching impact on the government and on society more broadly. The feminist platform is a great pathway towards a more unified gender agenda; however, if its members will not integrate or revisit their own approaches to gender issues, the platform will become ineffective.

The Absence of Networking and Collaboration between CSOs and the Government

The long history of civil society actors in Lebanon makes them important stakeholders in relatively all aspects of the social, political, and economic arenas of the Lebanese state. Nonetheless, the Lebanese government seems to primarily depend on CSOs to achieve certain goals, rather than choosing to work with CSOs as collaborators. While networks and points of contact do exist between the government and CSOs, their existence is primarily rhetorical and often does not amount to concrete action or policy. Further, government funding of CSOs, particularly those working on gender, is lacking, which exacerbates any forms of cooperation and communication between the two stakeholders and increases dependency on international donors (AbouAssi, 2019).

In 1998, the National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) was established and was endorsed by the Council of Ministers. This was the first ever official entity to represent the fight for women’s empowerment in the government, and it serves as the country’s official national women’s machinery (NCLW, 2022). The main objectives of this institution include creating equal opportunities for men and women to prosper in Lebanese society, and to mainstream gender in public institutions across Lebanon.

NCLW mainly works with inter-governmental organizations and UN agencies and is not seen to have adequate networking with local CSOs. This makes it even harder for CSOs to build close relations with government institutions and it denies them the chance to interact and coordinate with other stakeholders. The role of NCLW is very critical for the work of CSOs on gender and women’s rights. Thus, fostering effective partnerships and coordination between the two stakeholders should be a primary focus for CSOs. In other words, a strong working relationship between NCLW and local gender CSOs is key to fighting for gender equality in a sustainable way.

Various laws still exist in Lebanon that block gender equality and women’s empowerment. Among these laws are the personal status laws, labor laws, the national social security law, the nationality law, and others. To challenge these laws, networking between CSOs and the government is needed. CSOs have done ample research, projects, and programs concerning these laws. However, due to the lack of constructive government connectivity and cooperation, the efforts of these CSOs often go unacknowledged by the government. For this reason, among others, stakeholders must work together and cooperate closely to improve the status of women, and to codify gender equality. A strong working relationship between gender CSOs and government actors can facilitate this work and can help to keep gender inequality on the agendas of various government actors.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The quest for gender equality and women’s rights in Lebanon begins at the local level. CSOs have been continuously working on providing women and gender minorities in Lebanon the opportunity to voice their concerns and to participate equitably in society. For this, assessing and evaluating the extent to which CSOs are properly working on gender issues requires rethinking their agendas and unifying them into one focused agenda. Furthermore, for the work of these CSOs to be legitimized and translated into policymaking, cooperation and networking with the government must be reinforced and nourished.

For CSOs to establish a more holistic and unified agenda which sets out their main priorities related to gender and women’s rights issues, this article suggests the following recommendations:

• Establishing a yearly forum for CSOs which only involves organizations that work on issues related to gender and/or women’s rights. The aim of this forum would be to articulate a unified agenda among these actors, which could be updated each year based on the different challenges and circumstances faced by these actors.

• CSOs must work closely on addressing the issue of their locations and who their beneficiaries are. Knowing that nearly all CSOs operate in specific districts and locations, and that this dictates the extent of their influence, CSOs must adopt a strategy that targets beneficiaries in their areas of operation and in districts where access to CSOs working on gender equality has been limited. They could open temporary offices, implement projects, and network with existing CSOs in those districts that may help them work toward gender equality.

• CSOs should lobby for the implementation of the NAP and provide evidence-based knowledge and reviews on its effectiveness and limitations on a yearly basis.

• CSOs must adopt new approaches with the donor community that limit their

influence on how gender programs and projects should be implemented and who the beneficiaries of these programs should be, in order to ensure that local needs are met and responded to. This approach must be shared by all CSOs to prevent the duplication of work and program interventions.

For the government and its respective institutions, the below recommendations are presented concerning strengthening the ties between civil society and government actors on issues related to gender and women’s rights:

• Government financing of CSOs working on gender and/or women’s rights must increase. This can alter the dynamics of dependency on the international community for aid and could also create new forms of cooperation between the government and local actors.

• The government should modify the current NAP and add to it a new detailed section that deals with civil society cooperation.

• The NCLW should strengthen its ties with CSOs and should aim to collaborate more often with programs and projects that require full-scale engagement from all gender stakeholders or actors in Lebanon.

Civil society in Lebanon has been and remains a key player in the fields of human rights, gender equality, humanitarianism, refugees, education, development, health, and so much more. As a result, shedding light on the dynamics of CSOs in Lebanon is important to better understand how they contribute to enhancing gender norms and what their limitations are. This paper only addressed two of the limitations and challenges obstructing CSOs, but there remain other challenges that require exploration. While this paper relied on existing research and different observations made on the work of CSOs on gender equality and women’s rights in Lebanon, future research should include primary data collection, which requires interviewing CSO employees and exploring their relationship with other local actors on this specific subject matter.

The elimination of gender gaps in Lebanon requires the full cooperation of all stakeholders, specifically government actors and civil society groups. CSOs on their own cannot alter the status quo and change discourses on gender. The limitations and challenges that CSOs face on a legal and institutional level are impeding their progress and making it almost impossible to achieve their goal of gender equality in Lebanon. Building a unified agenda and strengthening collaboration between CSOs and government actors are two key strategies for advancing the fight against gender inequality in Lebanon.

references

ABAAD. (2020). Mapping gender-based violence programmes, services, and policies in Lebanon. https:// www.abaadmena.org/documents/ebook.1626097663.pdf

AbouAssi, K. (2019). The third wheel in public policy: An overview of NGOs in Lebanon. In A.R. Darwood (Ed.), Public administration and policy in the Middle East (pp. 215-230). Springer Science+Business Media. http://www.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-1553-8_12

Beyond Reform and Development. (2015). Mapping civil society organizations in Lebanon. https:// eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf

Centre for Social Sciences Research and Action. (2020). Gender actors map. https://civilsocietycentre.org/map/gen/gender-actor

Lebanon’s Feminist Civil Society Platform. (2021). Lebanon’s Feminist Civil Society Platform calls for ensuring a fair and equitable space for women in the political sphere. https://arabstates. unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20Arab%20States/Attachments/ Publications/2021/09/Lebanon%20Charter/LFCSP_STATEMENT_ENGLISH-2.pdf

Lebanon Humanitarian and Development Forum. (2022). Representation. https://www.lhdf-lb.org/ en/representation

National Commission For Lebanese Women. (2019). Lebanon National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. https://nclw.gov.lb/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ Lebanon-NAP-1325-UNSCR-WPS-Summary.pdf

National Commission for Lebanese Women. (2022). Mission and vison. https://nclw.gov.lb/en/ mission-and-vision-2/

UN Women. (2019). Understanding the role of women and feminist actors in Lebanon’s 2019 protests. https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/12/gendering-lebanons2019-protests

UNDP. (2009). Assessment of capacity building needs of NGOs in Lebanon. http://www.undp.org.lb/ communication/publications/downloads/Capacity%20Building%20Needs%20 Assessmentfor%20NGOs.pdf

UNDP, & Consultation & Research Institute. (2006). Mapping of gender and development initiatives in Lebanon. http://www.undp.org.lb/WhatWeDo/Docs/Lebanon_Gender_Strategy.pdf

UNFPA. (2020). Lebanon: Review of health, justice and police, and social essential services for women and girls survivors of violence in the Arab States. https://arabstates.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/ pub-pdf/lebanon_3-12-2020_signed_off_1.pdf

Listen to Women: Gender Bias in Clinical Pain Management

Tonia Chahine Biology Major

Abstract

Research demonstrates that cultural barriers obstruct fair pain management between men and women. The nature of the healthcare gender bias has deleterious effects on women’s overall wellbeing. Erroneous perceptions of women as being “histrionic” or having “temper tantrums” have a long history in the medical field. Consequently, physical pain in women has been often mismanaged, with most of it being attributed to women being “overly emotional.” Women pay the price: When their pain is constructed as theatrical, they risk being misdiagnosed which results in inadequate healthcare treatment. The aim of this paper is to explore gender bias in pain management, and to track the different cultural hubs out of which such misconceptions emanate.

Introduction

The Problem

Medicine is said to be a talent: the talent of resolving the complexities of the human body. Therefore, patients expect their providers to be interested in their concerns and to take care of their pain as it is supposedly a physician’s lifelong mission. Similarly, patients expect their providers’ evaluation of the pain they are experiencing to be unbiased. Chronic pain is a symptom that can affect anyone: It is not restricted to certain races, religious communities, or certain genders (Samulowitz et al., 2018). Unfortunately, despite their similar experiences of chronic pain, men and women do not receive similar medical care and attention. However, women are entitled to adequate healthcare treatment free from gender bias: As Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) outlines, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.” This paper analyzes the discrepancy

between pain management strategies of male and female patients and argues that women’s pain is being overlooked in clinical settings. This issue will be theorized using an intersectional analysis that approaches the topic through the lenses of history, current events, and other key perspectives, such as psychology.

What is Healthcare Bias?

Healthcare bias refers to the ways that sociocultural norms and expectations, including those surrounding gender, are embedded within the healthcare sector. These biases affect societal approaches to medical care. Healthcare gender bias is implicit, which means that it stems from external pressures that people unknowingly acquire during and assimilate into their own lives. In other words, healthcare bias is the byproduct of the cumulative effects of traditional norms and cultural practices surrounding gender. Unfortunately, this societal “training” that physicians receive throughout their lives negates efforts in their formal educational training that attempt to teach them to approach their work through an objective lens. In other words, while physicians are trained to be objective in their work, they will always project their subjective biases. Many of these biases revolve around normative and stereotypical understandings of how men and women should behave and the ways that they deal with pain.

Briefly put, gender bias in healthcare reinforces the idea that women’s reasoning capacities are limited and therefore, their pain perception is exaggerated and hysterical. This stereotypical mindset prevents many women from securing the medical services they need and deserve, including an accurate and timely diagnosis, as well as receiving effective treatment. Gender bias also endangers men’s health. In most cultures, the emphasis on masculinity and “strong” men has led to a resistance on the part of some men to seek medical help, as this is sometimes seen as a sign of weakness. The problem of gender bias in healthcare has additional consequences. For example, this bias promotes a lack of interest in researching the female body and the various symptoms and disorders that women may experience. This lack of knowledge can lead to distorted perceptions, which can result in inaccurate diagnoses and treatment recommendations. It is clear that the consequences of gender healthcare bias can be much more severe than people might think.

Historical Background

Gender bias in healthcare has a long history. Widespread social stereotypes about how women perceive, express, and tolerate pain are not recent. These stereotypes about gender roles date back as far as ancient Greece, as Cleghorn (2021) points out, and women are still paying the price today. Women’s pain was and still is frequently linked to emotional or psychological issues rather than physical ones. In fact, hysteria, which has its roots in ancient Egyptian and Greek medicine, became popular in the 18th and 19th centuries as a way to describe any female sexual or emotional conduct that males regarded as dramatic, insane, or unfeminine (Raypole, 2022). Hysterical complaints were a prominent reason for women’s forced hospitalization long into the 20th century. It was not until 1980 that the diagnosis of “hysteria” was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (Tasca et al., 2012). The historical duration of this example of gender bias points to the overall seriousness of bias in healthcare. The longer such practices continue, the more rigid and impactful they become, further distorting women’s diagnosis and treatment.

Cultural Discourse and Illness Narratives

Women have been wearisomely accused of being too “hormonal,” too sensitive, and too dramatic. Khakpour (2018) explains her journey with Lyme disease in her book Sick: A Memoir. She discusses how her symptoms were dismissed by her doctors as a psychiatric issue, which delayed her diagnosis and her access to treatment. Khakpour writes that, “in the end, every Lyme patient has some psychiatric diagnosis, too, if anything because of the hell it takes getting to a diagnosis” (p. 130). While some cultures portray women as dramatic patients who exaggerate their medical pain, others envision women as having a “high tolerance” to pain. An important example of this type of normative cultural discourse that contributes to gender healthcare bias among physicians is related to childbirth. Many people believe that since women are able to give birth, a process that can be exceptionally painful, other types of pain that they might experience are somehow minor and incomparable. Not only is this a dangerous bias, but it defines all women according to their ability to reproduce, which is something that not all women choose to do during their lifetime.

Literature Review

In general, the literature shows that there is a discernible existence of gender healthcare bias against women in particular. Much of the literature on gender healthcare bias underscores the extent that implicit gender bias prevents women from receiving adequate medical support and treatment. Most studies emphasize the idea that women are not receiving the attention, credit, and respect they deserve from their doctors, while others point to the fact that most clinicians unconsciously regard their female patients as unduly emotional or as exaggerating their discomfort. The following literature review presents a brief overview of some of the most important research findings about gender healthcare bias.

His Diagnosis Drives Her Insane, Literally

Previous work highlights that women with chronic pain are frequently mistrusted and psychologized by their healthcare providers. In their study, Samulowitz et al. (2018) found that a medical provider’s prescribed treatment was influenced by the similarity or difference between their own sex and that of their patient. They go on to suggest that women received less effective pain relief, as well as more antidepressant and mental health referrals, than men. Alspach (2012) suggests that prejudice related to a patient’s gender does exist in healthcare, especially among older male physicians, which explains some of the disparities in patient management. These disparities include taking women’s symptoms less seriously and attributing them to emotional rather than physical causes and referring women less often than men for specialty care, even women with higher risk factors. This is in line with a recent study by Greenwood et al. (2018) on women’s mortality rates, which argues that “most physicians are male, and male physicians appear to have trouble treating female patients” (p. 5).

Only Gender?

Raine (2000), on the other hand, argues that disparities in healthcare outcomes are not always attributable to gender healthcare bias. Raine notes that such disparities are also related to important variables such as differences in disease prevalence and severity, as well as patient preferences. While this may be true, Samulowitz et al. (2018) affirm that disparities in men’s and women’s care cannot be attributed to distinct medical needs. In

their systematic review, FitzGerald and Hurst (2017) found that implicit bias based on patient characteristics does affect healthcare professionals. The review, however, makes no mention of any specific bias or patient characteristics, which might include race, gender, socioeconomic status, or something else. More studies are needed to accurately determine the types of bias that influence healthcare professionals.

Fortunately, however, some of the literature on gender bias in healthcare does point to potential solutions. Raypole (2022), for example, argues that it will take a large-scale shift in medical research methods as well as the systems that reinforce prejudice to affect such a change. This will be a difficult task. Relatedly, virtue epistemology—an approach to medicine wherein the medical doctor is just concerned with finding the truth, and only the truth, without having to consider other variables or be driven by their emotions and prejudices—could be used to combat healthcare gender bias in clinical decision-making (Marcum, 2017).

Analysis Manifestations of the Problem

Is it possible that some women are exaggerating their pain, forcing medical professionals to downplay their symptoms? Maybe. However, this cannot be generalized, especially because of engrained gender norms and stereotypes as discussed earlier. Therefore, it is important to explore the problem from the perspective of the clinician and to analyze how the physician’s own gender identity influences their appraisal of female pain. For example, a female physician may be more understanding, as well as experienced with and receptive to women’s pain, particularly menstrual pain. This is not to say that compassionate male doctors are not available. Nonetheless, one can never completely understand what another person is going through unless they put themselves in their shoes. It is worth noting, however, that despite being female, doctors may still retain prejudices towards other women. The findings from this literature review reveal that there is no individual standpoint from which the problem can be addressed, assessed, and eliminated. Rather, the problem of gender bias must be acknowledged at the structural or macro level.

On a psychological scale, when a doctor minimizes women’s worries or pain, they unconsciously infantilize them, insisting that they know more about their bodies than they do themselves. This is often very frustrating for patients. Patients who are regularly exposed to this type of treatment and dismissal may lose trust in healthcare professionals and forego regular health screenings. This can result in late diagnosis, which can be fatal in some cases. According to a shocking new survey, a third of Australian women may have postponed getting medical care because they are afraid of appearing melodramatic or tiresome. Rapana (2018) observed that about 40% of women fear being labeled “drama queens” or hypochondriacs if they speak up when something does not seem right. Additionally, a poll conducted by Pink Hope, a preventative health resource for breast and ovarian cancers, indicates that one in three women really shunned medical guidance for this reason (Rapana, 2018).

Proposed Policies and Solutions

One might assume that there are almost no viable solutions for an issue arising from culturally entrenched gender biases, or that the solutions will take too long to implement

or that they will be ineffective in the short-term. These beliefs must not prevent policymakers and other stakeholders from working to limit the manifestations of gender bias in healthcare by raising awareness about the issue among clinicians and other healthcare providers. Medical training should confront the reality of gender bias and provide professionals with the needed skills to avoid making healthcare decisions based on stereotypes and gender-biased beliefs. If they are sensitized to gender bias, clinicians can learn to listen to women’s symptoms and reconsider any diagnosis or therapy that is not working for them. Incorporating university courses or seminars on the psychology of women’s pain and on gender more broadly into the medical school curricula, for example, is an important starting point for addressing gender bias in healthcare.

Moreover, increasing the number of female healthcare practitioners should be a component of any strategy hoping to challenge healthcare gender bias. This is because, as described in earlier sections of this paper, female medical professionals can have additional insights into the symptoms of their female patients based on their own personal experiences. If more female students are empowered to join the healthcare industry, they may become part of the solution.

There are numerous other policies that could help combat healthcare gender bias. For example, it is vital to create healthcare facilities and centers that are entirely femalefocused, with only females having access to them. These centers would not only focus on treating women, but they would also focus on collecting data about female health issues. Such research is important for addressing the lack of knowledge about women’s various health problems and the overall lack of interest in female health issues. Various stakeholders should be involved in creating and financially supporting these research and clinical centers including governments and international donors.

The effort to improve healthcare treatment relies not only on the efforts of providers and others, but also on the attempts of women themselves and healthcare advocates to reshape public attitudes towards bout women’s bodies and healthcare. This is particularly important concerning the ways that mental health impacts the body, given that mental healthcare is stigmatized and, worse, is often treated separately from physical health and wellbeing. Chronic stress, for example, can cause stomach cramps and painful headaches, and vice versa. As a result, knowing how to approach these issues as interrelated is key. In other words, advocacy efforts must be accompanied by awareness-raising campaigns so that women are aware of gender bias, how to challenge it, and what to do when they need medical care. Women must be masters of their own bodies.

Conclusion

Gender healthcare bias against women exists, particularly in cultures where women are viewed as second-class citizens, weak, overly sensitive, and histrionic. Although the solutions are long-term and difficult, this does not invalidate their usefulness; they are meant to raise awareness about the problem and inform people that it happens. Gender bias in healthcare actively harms millions of women who put their faith in their healthcare professionals to help them. A woman must always remember that she is the expert of her own body. Some doctors may dismiss her symptoms, but it does not rule out the possibility that they are real. When it comes to their health, women should

be persistent and forthright until their doctors are willing to listen. While there are many healthcare professionals struggling to correct gender bias in the field every day, it is important to continue raising awareness about the issue so that women can have access to substantive and equitable health care.

references

Alspach, J. G. (2012). Is there gender bias in critical care? Critical Care Nurse, 32(6), 8–14. https://doi. org/10.4037/ccn2012727

Cleghorn, E. (2021). Medical myths about gender roles go back to ancient Greece. Women are still paying the price today. Time. https://time.com/6074224/gender-medicine-history/ FitzGerald, C., & Hurst, S. (2017). Implicit bias in healthcare professionals: A systematic review. BMC Medical Ethics, 18, 1–18. https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-0170179-8

Greenwood, B. N., Carnahan, S., & Huang, L. (2018). Patient–physician gender concordance and increased mortality among female heart attack patients. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(34), 8569–8574. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1800097115

Khakpour, P. (2018). Sick: A memoir. Harper Perennial.

Marcum, J.A. (2017). Clinical decision-making, gender bias, virtue epistemology, and quality healthcare. Topoi, 36, 501–508. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9343-2

Raine, R. (2000). Does gender bias exist in the use of specialist health care? Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 5(4), 237–249. https://doi.org/10.1177/135581960000500409

Rapana, J. (2018). 1 in 3 Aussie women suffer from “drama queen syndrome.” Body and Soul. https:// www.bodyandsoul.com.au/health/womens-health/1-in-3-aussie-women-suffer-from-dramaqueen-syndrome/news-story/5d670e883465b521376d60ca69fb9803

Raypole, C. (2022, January 19). Gender bias in healthcare is very real—and sometimes fatal. Healthline. https://www.healthline.com/health/gender-bias-healthcare

Samulowitz, A., Gremyr, I., Eriksson, E., & Hensing, G. (2018). “Brave men” and “emotional women”: A theory-guided literature review on gender bias in health care and gendered norms towards patients with chronic pain. Pain Research & Management, 2018, 1–14. https://doi. org/10.1155/2018/6358624

Tasca, C., Rapetti, M., Carta, M.G., & Fadda, B. (2012). Women and hysteria in the history of mental health. Clinical Practice and Epidemiology in Mental Health, 8, 110–119. https://doi. org/10.2174/1745017901208010110

The Influence of Quotas on Promoting Women in Decision Making Positions

Melissa Bou Zeid Pharmacy Major

Abstract

Gender discrimination is keeping women from participating in politics on equal footing with men. To modify this, several countries and stakeholders have implemented gender quotas to promote women’s representation in political institutions. However, time has proven that quotas are double-edged weapons with both negative and positive effects. This paper seeks to analyze the pitfalls of gender quotas and will introduce potential solutions that can increase the productivity of quotas.

Introduction

Angela Merkel, one of the most authoritative female leaders in the world, has proven that women can manage decision-making positions. Her foreign policies, and her economic and energy reform propositions have helped her to reach the top of Forbes’ list eight times (Conolly, 2015). And yet, it is apparent that women are still underestimated when it comes to their political competencies. The underrepresentation of women in politics is a global problem. In fact, only 7.8% of the CEOs of the largest companies and corporations in Europe are women, while only 31 women held executive roles across these organizations (Catalyst, 2022). As a result, governments, boards, and administrations are dominated by men. While gender-related associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders have worked toward breaking the existing glass ceiling for women in leadership roles and in politics, they have mainly focused on implementing quotas, which can be controversial, hard to implement, and in some cases, have mixed results. In general, gender quotas exist in three major forms. The first one is known as a “reserved seat quota,” which allocates a specific number of places for women in parliaments. The second type is a “legislative quota,” which mandates that a set number of a political party’s nominees are women. The third and final type of quota is known as a “voluntary party quota,” where parties themselves are responsible for ensuring that women are equally represented among their candidates (Bush, 2011). While some argue that quotas are vital for preserving spots for women in parliaments and in politics more broadly, opponents claim that they are unmeritocratic and inefficient (Robbins & Thomas, 2018). These disagreements

over the worth of gender quota systems highlight the need for further investigation and research. Accordingly, this policy paper will investigate some of the reasons why quotas might be ineffective. The paper draws on a rigorous literature review and current evidence from gender quotas around the world. The paper concludes with a discussion about how to navigate the disagreements over the effectiveness of gender quotas and offers several recommendations.

Why Gender Quotas Might Not Work as Well as We Hope

Traditional critiques of gender quota systems revolve around two primary issues, first, that quota systems are unmeritocratic, and second, that they “work against” the ideological basis of electoral democracy—in other words, that people are “forced” to vote for these candidates, and political parties are “forced” to select women candidates. The critique that gender quota systems are unmeritocratic is problematic for several reasons. First, the criteria used to define “merit” are uncertain and overgeneralized (Murray, 2015). Further, a “neutral” list of objective qualities that a desired candidate should have does not exist. Rather, the definition of merit changes depending on voter communities and preferences. Finally, the implementation of a quota system is not shown to affect the merit of those who get elected, as many leaders with low educational or skill levels, those who are corrupt, and those who have cheated the system for any number of reasons are frequently still able to enter politics irrespective of whether a gender quota system exists.

Additionally, rivals of gender quotas sometimes base their arguments on inaccurate historical and political perspectives. For example, quotas, especially in Europe, receive great opposition and antagonism because political leaders claim that this policy was adopted by the Soviets, even though this myth has long been disproven by research on the subject (Dahlerup, 2004). Another argument used to contradict the usage of quotas is that they may violate the historical norms and values of a country. Yet, such an argument is not convincing. For example, there are millions of acts that are performed daily that go against the norms and values of society. Further, these norms and values change, and have changed historically. In this case, the implementation of a gender quota system might be a change for the better.

More serious concerns about the efficacy of gender quotas revolve around traditional political culture, and how newly elected women leaders would fare in this environment. For example, some critics claims that gender quotas might further stigmatize women because those already in positions of political power would feel that women were “forcibly” placed into politics in a way that challenges the status quo. This would only exacerbate current forms of gender stereotyping and discrimination, as women are already underestimated and undervalued in the political arena. For instance, a woman who was placed on an industry’s board only for publicity and because of a quota might be viewed unprofessionally and therefore further marginalized, which could lead to damaging psychological outcomes (He & Kaplan, 2017). They will also suffer from the negative treatment she receives from her male coworkers, who believe that they were “forced” to cooperate with her because of their company’s publicity stunt. Further, psychology suggests that even though male workers might believe in the gender equality agenda, they might be demotivated to collaborate with women when it is imposed on them (He & Kaplan, 2017). Something similar might

occur to women members of parliament elected because of a quota system. Relatedly, quotas affect the workplace’s general stability. This is because organizations must accommodate to new rules and regulations that might not be welcomed by everybody. From a psychological perspective, this generates internal conflicts, for what is seen as a gain for some (women) is perceived as a loss for many others (men).

Note. Image taken from International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2019.

Moreover, according to a study conducted by Gender and the Economy (He & Kaplan, 2017), only 5% of the 500 prominent CEOs of 2016 were women, despite the introduction of quotas. Based on these numbers, it is estimated that at least 30 years are needed for women’s representation to reach 30% (He & Kaplan, 2017). A few important examples of this slow upward growth can be found in countries that have adopted a gender quota system. For example, the implementation of gender quotas at the municipal level in Spain were shown only to increase the number of women on political party lists. Meanwhile, the number of women that were eventually elected to the position of mayor or into other political positions with decision-making power did not increase. In fact, prior to the introduction of quotas, the percentage of female mayors was equal to 13% in 2003. Twelve years later, this number increased by 6% among the municipalities irrespective of whether the municipality had mandated gender quotas (Bagues & Campa, 2017). Additionally, “reserved seat quotas” implemented in the Arab region (see Figure 2, below) often reserve a minimal number of seats for women candidates, tempering the effects of such gender quotas even further (Welborne, 2010).

Figure 1

The challenges faced by women in boards and industries, even after the implementation of different gender quotas

Exploring Alternative Strategies Strategy 1: Secularization

Even though quotas seem unsuccessful in promoting women in decision-making positions, several initiatives can be mobilized to increase the effectiveness of quotas, whether major or minor. One solution proposed to render the employment of quotas more efficient is to promote secularization in countries where religion and politics are closely intertwined (Dahlerup, 2004). This is because the pre-existing norms and traditions embedded within various religious communities might reinforce gender roles and stereotypes, leaving women in a disadvantaged position. This is particularly true in the case of Lebanon, where men are seen as leaders while women are restricted to their gendered roles as “caregivers” and face many barriers that prevent them from entering the political sphere. Implementing a quota system will not sufficiently address this system and the gender discrimination it enforces. Relatedly, imposing such a major change would not be appreciated or understood by many, which could lead to conflict. Instead, promoting secularization can help to better secure gender equality at the core of society, which can lead to better women’s political representation over the longterm.

Strategy 2: Targeting Unconscious Bias

Another suggested strategy to increase the efficacy of quota implementation is the targeting of unconscious biases that contribute to gender inequality (Mishra, 2018). For instance, the prevailing theories that women cannot hold serious leadership positions because of family duties, their responsibilities as wives, or their responsibilities as mothers can and must be amended. To a certain extent, such a solution might succeed in eradicating the negative outcomes of quota application in both the short- and long-

Figure 2

Table depicting the inconsiderable representation of Arab women in the political sectors even after the employment of numerous quotas

Note. Image taken from Welborne, 2010.

term. However, the work of undoing unconscious bias takes years of hard work and effort, making this solution time-consuming even though it is necessary in the fight to get rid of gender inequality (Kuschmider, 2021).

Strategy 3: Defining Merit-based Criteria

Another strategy includes redefining the credentials, requirements, and qualifications of leadership roles before employing quotas as a way of challenging the idea that quotas are unmeritocratic systems that unfairly promote women (Mishra, 2018). However, finding common denominators between males and females in terms of leadership qualifications and requirements that can satisfy an entire voting community is not plausible. Furthermore, having male and female leaders with identical capabilities would effectively work to keep various other communities out of political leadership. For example, people without access to higher education, poor people, and people who do not have specific credentials will all be kept out of politics, which challenges the core goal of democracy, which is to represent a diverse voter body. In other words, diverse voting communities would not be well-represented with such a list of qualifications and requirements for entering politics. For example, forcing the Lebanese parliament to include the same number of men and women, all with similar educational and cognitive qualifications and experiences, would be disadvantageous. While their similarities might facilitate their ability to work together to address political problems, they might also disregard problems that do not directly affect them. For example, as privileged politicians, they might not feel an urgency to advocate for strong anti-poverty laws even if many of their constituents are in need of such policies. Thus, the decisions of a board or a parliament composed of leaders with identical backgrounds would be controlled by unconscious biases. Therefore, it

Figure 3

The Different Forms of Unconscious Bias

Note. Image taken from Suarez, 2019.

can be safely concluded that pinpointing the criteria for meritocracy is a double-edged solution, which can have both positive and negative results.

Strategy 4: Strengthening Women’s Rights in Everyday Life

A final strategy to increase the effectiveness of quotas is related to the status of women more broadly. If women are not financially, socially, and educationally ready, the implementation of quotas will not work. Accordingly, to stimulate women’s participation in the public sphere in general, and in decision-making positions and politics in particular, stronger welfare systems must be developed. Welfare systems can help to ensure the education, training, and employment of women, while orienting them towards being socially and financially independent. As a result, women would be empowered and might more readily exercise their rights to participate in politics and beyond. Moreover, welfare systems assist in housing and childcare, especially in low-income areas. Therefore, what might be a burden on some women and a cause for their lack of participation in multiple fields, such as childcare and family care, will be diminished. According to Orloff (1996), welfare systems applied in 20 different industrialized countries supported the presence of women in economic and political sectors. Therefore, welfare systems can significantly and positively impact quota systems because they support the social rights of women and encourage them to participate in politics and the public sphere.

Recommended Solutions to Render Quotas more Effectual

To increase the efficacy of gender quotas, various policies, initiatives, and strategies can be used. First, gender activists and professionals can provide mentorship programs and sessions that teach political leaders about the advantages and disadvantages of quotas. Then, those responsible would get the chance to further understand when and how they should rely on gender quota systems. This way, officials can learn how to properly track the implementation of gender quotas and can simultaneously implement other policies that can help strengthen women’s empowerment in the political sphere.

Additionally, quotas should undergo trial phases and should continuously be studied. For instance, gender quota systems can be implemented in municipal governments and then, based on whether this trial was successful, be subsequently implemented at the national level. For instance, the Spanish electoral quota was first applied on a minor group of participants and was then extended to a larger group (Bagues & Campa, 2017). Thus, quotas can be studied and tried before their use at the national level. This can reduce the potential drawbacks of a gender quota, which can consequently give officials the chance to prevent these problems.

Relatedly, another solution could be the creation of small committees responsible for the development and oversight of gender quotas. For example, if the quota involves the health industry, a committee formed of doctors, pharmacists, and nurses should be the one to decide how it should be applied. Thus, the suggested quota would be tailored to fit the specific context in which it is implemented. Subsequently, this specialization would increase quota efficiency, decrease its unfavorable missteps, and promote equality and equity.

Conclusion

Although the aforementioned policies are capable of rendering quotas more efficient, their viability in countries such as Lebanon is still questionable. Real-life examples prove that quotas are inefficient and that women are still relying on “balancing acts” to step over societies’ gender stereotypes to access leadership roles and, once they secure these roles, to flourish therein (Zheng et al., 2018). In Lebanon, women’s rights and feminist advocates have long argued for the use of a gender quota system to guarantee women’s equal representation in parliament. Most recently, ahead of the 2022 parliamentary elections, a proposal was drafted that would reserve 26 seats for women out of the 128, 13 for Muslims and 13 for Christians (Tabbara, 2021). However, the proposal was rejected by parliament, resulting in only 15% women candidates (out of 1,043 registered candidates), and a total of eight women elected to parliament (Houssari, 2022). It is important, therefore, to keep pushing for a gender quota system in the short-term while simultaneously working to implement some of the strategies suggested in the previous sections to remove gender inequality and discrimination that prevents women from entering politics to begin with.

All in all, conflicts related to gender equity, equality, and discrimination are still apparent. On the one hand, gender quotas, which have been implemented since the early 20th century, have positively influenced women’s involvement across different sectors to varying degrees. Yet, their drawbacks suggest that quotas necessitate amendments to render them more effective and beneficial. Thus, the importance of these other policies cannot be understated, as women’s underrepresentation in politics is a major issue plaguing women around the world.

references

Bagues, M., & Campa, P. (2017, September 9). Electoral gender quotas fail to empower women. VOX, CEPR Policy Portal. https://voxeu.org/article/electoral-gender-quotas-fail-empower-women Bush, S.S. (2011). International politics and the spread of quotas for women in legislatures. International Organization, 65(1), 103–137. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000287

Catalyst. (2022, March 1). Women in management (quick take). https://www.catalyst.org/research/ women-in-management/

Conolly, K. (2015, January 7). Ten reasons Angela Merkel is the world’s most powerful woman. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/ten-reasons-angela-merkel-germanychancellor-world-most-powerful-woman

Figure 4

The Advantages of Specialized Quota Committees

Note. Image prepared by author.

Dahlerup, D. (2004, October 22). “No quota fever in Europe?” [Conference paper]. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)/CEE Network for Gender Issues Conference, Budapest, Hungary. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242554715_No_ Quota_Fever_in_Europe

He, J., & Kaplan, S. (2017, October 26). The debate about quotas. Gender and the Economy. https:// www.gendereconomy.org/the-debate-about-quotas/ Houssari, N. (2022, March 16). Over 1,000 candidates register for Lebanese elections. Arab News. https:// www.arabnews.com/node/2043931/middle-east International Finance Corporation. (2019). Women on board in Lebanon. https://www.ifc.org/ wps/wcm/connect/7435b2c5-04a3-4201-abe2-3f2133b4b8a6/Women_on_Board_in_Lebanon. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mN5USK2

Kuschmider, R. (2021, August 11). How to unlearn unconscious bias. WebMD. https://www.webmd.com/ balance/features/how-to-unlearn-unconscious-bias#:~:text=Because%20unconscious%20 biases%20are%20based,to%20a%20person%20or%20situation

Mishra, S. (2018, August 13). Women in the C-suite: The next frontier in gender diversity. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/13/women-inthe-c-suite-the-next-frontier-in-gender-diversity/

Murray, R. (2015, December 7). Merit vs equality? The argument that gender quotas violate meritocracy is based on fallacies. London School of Economics (LSE). https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ politicsandpolicy/merit-vs-equality-argument/

Orloff, A. (1996). Gender in the welfare state. Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 51–78. http://www.jstor. org/stable/2083424

Robbins, M., & Thomas, K. (2018, December 5). Women in the Middle East and North Africa: A divide between rights and roles. Arab Barometer. https://www.arabbarometer.org/?report=women-inthe-middle-east-and-north-africa-a-divide-between-rights-and-roles

Suarez, S. (2019, May 28). Four reasons companies can’t afford to ignore unconscious bias in the workplace. Grand Rapids Chamber. https://www.grandrapids.org/blog/diversity/unconscious-biasworkplace/

Tabbara, R. (2021, October 25). Women’s representation in parliament: A tale of plentiful proposals but limited political will. L’Orient le Jour. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1279197/ womens-representation-in-parliament-a-tale-of-plentiful-proposals-but-limited-political-will. html

Welborne, B. C. (2010). The strategic use of gender quotas in the Arab world. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/MZ/ifes-the-strategicuse-of-gender-quotas-in-the

Zheng, W., Kark, R., & Meister, A. (2018, November 28). How women manage the gendered norms of leadership. Harvard Business Publishing Education. https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/H04NZTPDF-ENG

Unpaid Care Work in Lebanon: A Barrier to Women’s Economic Empowerment

Maria Abi Akl Biology Major

Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the impact of unpaid care work on women’s economic empowerment (WEE) in Lebanon and to propose a policy solution and a plan of action. The paper begins with a literature review of the causes and effects of unpaid care and highlights previous policies with the aim to produce policy recommendations in Lebanon. Unpaid care has its roots in the discriminatory social norms that judge care as a woman’s responsibility. This view has various repercussions on women, most notably, it hinders women’s economic empowerment. To address these issues, this paper highlights the need for a multidimensional policy centered around the recognition, reduction, and redistribution of unpaid care work. Some of the proposed recommendations include tackling discriminatory social norms through the educational sector and the media, increasing the government’s investment in time-saving infrastructure, and the ratification of non-transferable parental leave policies.

Introduction

Unpaid care work refers to the activities that help meet the various needs of families or community members, whether material, developmental, emotional, or spiritual (Chopra & Sweetman, 2014, as cited in Rost, 2021). Caring for children, the elderly, and doing household chores such as cooking, cleaning, and even fetching water, are a few examples of unpaid care work. Unpaid care work is difficult labor that is essential to any household’s everyday operations, and it is also necessary for strengthening and renewing social bonds between family members and the community (Chopra et al., 2014). Such activities are categorized as work since a person could be paid to do them (Ferrant et al., 2014).

Unfortunately, such work disproportionately falls on the shoulders of women, particularly the marginalized in developing countries. In fact, part of the slow and uneven progress of gender equality and women’s economic empowerment (WEE) programming can be attributed to women’s higher share of unpaid care work (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). Around the world, women spend three times as much time doing

unpaid care work as men do, ranging from 1.5 times in North America to 6.7 times in South Asia (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). In fact, around 4.1 hours are spent by women every day on domestic work and unpaid care as opposed to 1.7 hours for men, a contribution by women that is estimated to be worth around $11 trillion (Diallo et al., 2020). To respond to this growing problem, Goal 5.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) specifically targets girls and women’s unequal share of unpaid care work (Moussié & Alfers, 2018). Particularly, governments are urged to recognize the importance of unpaid care work through infrastructure, public services, policies for social protection, as well as to encourage shared responsibilities in the household (Moussié & Alfers, 2018). Moreover, this target is also considered a prerequisite for SDGs 1, 5, 8, and 10, which target gender equality, the reduction of poverty, inequality, and sustainable development through decent work, respectively (Hammad et al., 2019). The significance of the problem of unpaid care work lies in the lack of recognition and attention attributed to this type of labor, resulting in ineffective solutions, the persistence of the problem, and women increasingly suffering the repercussions. Additionally, unpaid care work often leads to the violation of human rights, especially for women living in poverty, including the rights to education, decent work, social security, health, and the right to enjoy scientific progress, which all ultimately contribute to the hindrance of WEE, as this paper will demonstrate.

Multiple stakeholders are involved in the issue of unpaid care work, first and foremost women and girls, who bear the direct consequences. Other stakeholders include men and boys who can also contribute to unpaid care work. On a national level, the government has a crucial role to play. In Lebanon, this includes the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and even the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private companies, and the educational sector can all play key roles in challenging unpaid care work.

Primary research was not performed in this study. Instead, a cause-and-effect approach was applied during the literature synthesis and review, in which the causes and effects of the problem were gathered, reviewed, and synthesized from several sources. Additionally, this paper reviewed both former and current policies related to the problem of unpaid care work with the intention of making several recommendations to ameliorate the problem going forward.

Literature Review

The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of unpaid care work on WEE in Lebanon and to propose, in addition to previous studies, recommendations and policies to tackle this issue. The proposed hypothesis is as follows: Unpaid care work represents a barrier to WEE in Lebanon. Studies have been conducted to shed light on unpaid care work and demonstrate its impacts on several levels and in multiple countries. This paper adds to the existing body of literature by specifically analyzing the impact of unpaid care work on WEE in Lebanon.

Causes

The causes of unpaid care work have been investigated by researchers around the world. Routine housework takes up the majority of women’s unpaid care time, followed by caring obligations, but this varies depending on a country’s economic growth

(Ferrant & Thim, 2019). Unpaid care is prevalent in all countries but especially in poor and developing countries. Women performed more unpaid care in poor households due to lower-quality infrastructure, larger families, and a reduced ability to purchase care services (Razavi, 2016). In low-income countries, up to 14 hours each day are allocated by women in rural areas to unpaid care work (Oxfam International, 2020). However, inequalities in caring obligations remain even in households with greater wealth and education, as women dedicate more than 60% of their time to housework and care, regardless of their work status, pay, or education levels (Ferrant et al., 2014). Social norms influence gender roles by defining which behaviors are socially appropriate and acceptable: In most societies, paid work is perceived as a masculine task, whereas unpaid care work is recognized as a woman’s duty (Ferrant et al., 2014). Girls and boys are assigned different household and care responsibilities from an early age (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). Women’s domestic and care responsibilities change over time, with unpaid care work increasing significantly when they marry and have children, with more time spent on childcare and household chores during motherhood (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). Furthermore, mothers-in-law often pressure young and newly married women to “show their value” by completing more difficult chores (Marphatia & Moussié, 2013). While marriage and parenthood result in higher amounts of unpaid care work, the opposite is true for men; although fatherhood results in more time spent on childcare, men’s time spent on ordinary housework actually reduces after a child is born, as the mother staying at home with the child performs the majority of household tasks (Ferrant & Thim, 2019).

In Lebanon, gender inequality is severe. In fact, according to the Gender Gap Index, Lebanon is ranked 135 out of 144 nations (Avis, 2017), and is ranked third to last in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with only Syria and Yemen having worse gender gap scores, ranking at 142 and 144, respectively (Avis, 2017). In a study on the impact of socialization on gender discrimination and violence in Lebanon, results revealed that from an early age, boys are given entitlement over their sisters by society and parents (Avis, 2017). The way that boys are raised gives them superiority and dominance over women. According to one study, when questioned about the characteristics that make up a “perfect” woman, respondents primarily mentioned being “obedient,” “devoted to her family,” “being a good housewife and mother,” and “maintaining the reputation and dignity of her spouse,” but qualities linked to education, for example, were rarely mentioned (Hamieh & Usta, 2011, p. 14 as cited in Avis, 2017). These ideas confirm that discriminatory social norms are a major contributing factor to unpaid care work.

Effects

Unpaid care has tremendous consequences that mostly affect women. Due to unpaid care work, women around the world are left with little time on their hands to pursue an education, find a decent job, be active members in their communities, or voice their opinions in society, which works to keep them trapped at the lower end of the economy (Oxfam International, 2020). They have a lower probability of engaging in paid work, and those who do are more likely to be limited to informal or part-time jobs, causing them to earn less than their male counterparts (Ferrant et al., 2014). This in turn leads to the dependence of women on someone else, mostly their spouses, for their income, hindering WEE. Entrenched gender norms dictate that women are more likely

to sacrifice their paid jobs for the sake of unpaid care (Mercado et al., 2020). This is reflected by labor force participation rates in Lebanon, which is 23.5 % for women and 70.3 % for men (UNDP, 2016, p. 6, as cited in Avis, 2017). Women worldwide prefer flexible and less-regular work as it permits them to care for their children (Moussié & Alfers, 2018). However, flexible work is often poorly remunerated (Qi & Dong, 2015). Eventually, more time spent on unpaid care work leads to reduced time for paying jobs, education, rest, and self-care (Rodriguez, 2021), which compromises women’s access to their human rights and their economic empowerment. Regarding the right to education, disproportionate care responsibilities can lead to girls and women dropping out of school or university, limiting the time and energy they can dedicate to education and extracurricular activities, and limiting their progress and opportunities (Public Services International [PSI], 2021). Unequal unpaid care might also prevent women from entering the labor force, or it might push them to accept low-wage, informal, and unstable occupations with little or no social security, thus hindering the rights to decent work and social security (PSI, 2021).

Unpaid care can be demanding, both physically and emotionally, negatively affecting women’s health (PSI, 2021). Psychological problems such as depression and anxiety, as well as physical and emotional distress could all result from this immense workload and the lack of respite for women (Seedat & Rondon, 2021). In addition, lack of access to technologies and services, such as suitable energy sources or piped water, can jeopardize their right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress (PSI, 2021). In conclusion, the unequal distribution of unpaid care work due to discriminatory social norms jeopardizes women’s rights to equality and non-discrimination (PSI, 2021). Finally, on a long-term scale, children will see their mothers at home and start internalizing the idea that the household is where women “belong,” thus further engraving and strengthening the discriminatory social norms that are at the root of unpaid care work.

Policy Synthesis

Several stakeholders are working to challenge the issue of unpaid care in various ways. At the level of national structure and policy, the Lebanese government has taken important steps outlining its commitment to gender equality. First, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was ratified by the Lebanese government in 1997, but with reservations on Article 9, paragraph 2 on women’s nationality, and items (c), (d), (f), (g) of Article 16, as well as Article 29 (Avis, 2017; OHCHR, 2020). Women’s equal rights to men’s in marriage, divorce, and family problems, were denied by these reservations, as well as their ability to pass on their nationality to their children and their foreign spouses (Avis, 2017). These reservations prevent the full implementation of CEDAW and limit its effectiveness. Second, Lebanon has a national women’s machinery, known as The National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW), whose mandate includes fighting for gender equality (Avis, 2017). The Lebanese government has also mandated the recruitment of gender focal points (GFP) in all ministries and public institutions to support gender mainstreaming across all sectors (Avis, 2017). The NCLW and the GFPs are Lebanon’s official structures for addressing gender issues, and they reflect the Lebanese government’s efforts to institutionalize gender equality (Avis, 2017). Yet, it is clear from the lack of effective action taken by the Lebanese government that they

do not carry much authority to implement policies and remain consultative in nature. A lack of commitment to women’s empowerment in various sectors and an ongoing lack of effective policies prioritizing gender equality hinder GFPs’ abilities to affect long-term change (US Agency for International Development [USAID], 2012, as cited in Avis, 2017). The consultative nature of NCLW also limits its capabilities, as it lacks the capacity to directly propose legislation or reform policies (Avis, 2017).

Moreover, specific laws, regulations, or action plans that acknowledge the burden of unpaid care work inside households are absent from Lebanese labor policies (Sugita, 2010). This could be related to the lack of ratification of the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (1981, No.156), the Employment Act, and similar laws for the rights of workers with family responsibilities (Sugita, 2010). There are no institutional mechanisms in place to help balance work and family responsibilities, such as flexible time, part-time, teleworking, paid and unpaid leave, and workplace care centers (Sugita, 2010). Similarly, Lebanon has not enforced parental leave policies that are up to international standards, according to the Arab Institute for Women (AiW) (Tabbara, 2022). In 1994, Lebanon’s Labor Code was amended to include mandatory maternity leave of seven paid weeks, which was later increased, in 2014, to 10 weeks, although the International Labour Organization (ILO) advises a 14-week minimum period (Tabbara, 2022). However, there are no mandated days off for fathers (Tabbara, 2022), as paternity leave is not provided under the law (Takieddine & Abou Ali, 2021). As such, the mother has to bear the burden of childcare alone, or the majority of it at the very least. Yet, the father, who is as much involved in conceiving the child as the mother, does not participate equally in providing this care. In January 2018, a draft law for a paternity leave of three days was proposed and accepted by the Council of Ministers, however it has not yet come into force due to the Lebanese Parliament’s failure to enact it (Takieddine & Abou Ali, 2021).

Such initiatives are helpful and needed. In contrast to the government’s lack of action on parental leave, companies such as Diageo and Zomato have provided their employees in Lebanon with maternity and paternity leaves exceeding the legal minimum: A fully paid maternity and paternity leave of 26 weeks as of July 2019 by Diageo, and a paid parental leave of 26 weeks to all Zomato’s employees, both men and women (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2019). Companies taking action, especially in the absence of governmental policies, represents an essential step forward in tackling the problem of unpaid care work.

Most recently, the AiW has proposed legislation that would require companies to give mothers 15 weeks of maternity leave and fathers 10 days (Tabbara, 2022). Meanwhile, the Lebanese American University has started to implement these policies as of March 2022. The NCLW has secured the support of seven MPs to support the draft law, but it has not yet been examined in committee (Tabbara, 2022).

Policy Recommendations

Despite measures taken by various stakeholders to tackle unpaid care work, the problem persists, highlighting the need for additional actions and a multidimensional policy. Paying women for unpaid care is not the solution to adopt. This could exacerbate the issue even further as it would encourage women to remain at home

since they are getting paid, but their careers, economic empowerment, and status in various fields might be affected by such a policy. Having a child is a choice that both parents make, and neither of them should face the burden of caring for the child or children alone. If the care is equally divided among parents, then women would not be forced to make significant and detrimental sacrifices to perform all of the care work necessary to raise a child or children. The compromises would be minor and would not hinder their economic development as is the case with women being the only ones performing care work. To reach that, the multidimensional policy should be centered around the “3Rs” framework—Recognizing, Reducing, and Redistributing—developed by the feminist economist Diane Elson (Ferrant & Thim, 2019).

Recognition

Measurement and valuing are essential. To determine this information concerning care work, researchers and governments, as well as other stakeholders, must start by collecting time-use data (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). This information is critical for understanding and acknowledging the amount of time dedicated to unpaid care work and its economic contribution to the entire economy (Ferrant & Thim, 2019). The media should be involved in shedding light on this issue and promoting equal roles and responsibilities among parents, which could be accomplished by creating advertisements, documentaries, or even programs that tackle unpaid care work. In addition, it is necessary to break the stereotypical norms that shape household chores and childcare as the primary responsibility of women, girls, and mothers. This might entail having webinars and awareness programs for women’s rights and gender equality that focus on the importance of shared care work. Such trainings should be accompanied by public awareness campaigns concerning unpaid care work. There should also be joint efforts between various ministries to take action on the issue of unpaid care work, WEE, and human rights. This should include developing school curricula that discuss unpaid care work and its unequal burden on women and girls.

Reduction

The restraints on women and girls’ time can be reduced by countries investing in timesaving infrastructure (Ferrant et al., 2014). This might include state-sponsored childcare facilities, after-school programming for young children, and a strengthened welfare system.

Redistribution

The Lebanese government can promote the redistribution of unpaid care work by ratifying a national law for parental leave, which is a long-term leave that allows one or both parents to care for their child after the end of maternity or paternity leave (The MenCare Parental Leave Platform, 2016). This leave should be non-transferable among parents, meaning that it is specifically allocated for the father or the mother, with no possibility of transferring it to the other parent, thus preventing the traditional norms from exerting their power against women (The MenCare Parental Leave Platform, 2016). Moreover, the current Lebanese maternity leave of 10 weeks should be extended to 15 weeks to meet both ILO and CEDAW standards. The Lebanese government should also remove all restrictions on the CEDAW convention to ensure its full implementation and ratify its Optional Protocol. Flexible working hours and teleworking, which the government can endorse, would also enable parents to work while caring for children

or other dependents. Finally, to improve the work-life balance of employees, especially women, increasing access to child and elderly care, as well as public services is needed (Ferrant et al., 2014). When the individuals needing care are being cared for by third parties, primary caretakers will have more time to pursue their own needs and interests. Such care services should be affordable, especially for the low-income families, and should be free of charge for those who cannot afford them at all.

Conclusion

Unpaid care work is a significant problem that has been present for a very long time, and one that has gone unnoticed for far too long. This issue stems from the entrenched and stereotypical norms that relegate women to housework and deem men’s careers more important than women’s careers. It is undoubtedly women who have disproportionately shouldered the burden of unpaid care, which prevents them from enjoying their full human rights and has limited their economic empowerment. Several steps can be taken to solve this problem using the 3R approach: recognition, reduction, and redistribution. This includes using time-use surveys, tackling discriminatory gender norms through education and the media, and investing in time-saving infrastructure. Ideally, Lebanon should focus on lifting reservations to the CEDAW convention and adopting its Optional Protocol, ratifying several laws such as a non-transferable parental leave, extending maternity leave, adopting flexible working hours and teleworking, and increasing access to public services, including child and elderly care, to fight the issue of unpaid care work. Through these steps, Lebanon can work toward eliminating the unequal division of unpaid care work and can achieve gender equality and WEE.

references

Avis, W.R. (2017). Gender equality and women’s empowerment in Lebanon. K4D. https://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/175-Gender-Equality-and-Womens-Empowerment-in-Lebanon. pdf

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. (2019). Lebanon: Companies boost equality in the workplace. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/lebanon-companies-boostequality-in-the-workplace/

Chopra, D., Ekeoba, P., Nesbitt-Ahmed, Z., Moussié, R., & Sherpa, M. (2014). Policy advocacy for women’s unpaid care work: Comparing approaches and strategies in Nepal and Nigeria. Gender & Development, 22(3), 475–494. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2014.963323

Diallo, B., Qayum, S., & Staab, S. (2020). Covid-19 and the care economy: Immediate action and structural transformation for a gender-responsive recovery. UN Women. https://www.unwomen. org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/06/policy-brief-covid-19-and-the-care-economy

Ferrant, G., Pesando, L. M., & Nowacka, K. (2014). Unpaid care work: The missing link in the analysis of gender gaps in labour outcomes. OECD Development Centre. https://www.oecd.org/ dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_work.pdf

Ferrant, G., & Thim, A. (2019). Measuring women’s economic empowerment: Time use data and gender inequality. OECD Development Policy Papers, 16. http://www.doi.org/10.1787/02e538fc-en

Hammad, M., Tabet, K., Mortada, H., Menhall, N., & Hanna, J. (2019). Counting on women’s work without counting women’s work: Women’s unpaid work in Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt Oxfam Policy & Practice. https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/counting-on-womens-workwithout-counting-womens-work-womens-unpaid-work-in-jord-620811/

Marphatia, A.A., & Moussié, R. (2013). A question of gender justice: Exploring the linkages between women’s unpaid care work, education, and gender equality. International Journal of Educational Development, 33(6), 585–594. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2013.05.005

Mercado, L., Naciri, M., & Mishra, Y. (2020). Women’s unpaid and underpaid work in the times of Covid-19. UN Women. https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2020/06/ womens-unpaid-and-underpaid-work-in-the-times-of-covid-19

Moussié, R., & Alfers, L. (2018). Women informal workers demand childcare: Shifting narratives on women’s economic empowerment in Africa. Agenda, 32(1), 119–131. http://www.doi.org/10.1080/ 10130950.2018.1427690

Oxfam International. (2020). Not all gaps are created equal: The true value of care work. https://www. oxfam.org/en/not-all-gaps-are-created-equal-true-value-care-work Public Services International. (2021, December 10). What does care have to do with human rights? https://publicservices.international/resources/news/what-does-care-have-to-do-with-humanrights-?id=12549&lang=en

Qi, L., & Dong, X.Y. (2015). Unpaid care work’s interference with paid work and the gender earnings gap in China. Feminist Economics, 22(2), 143–167. http://www.doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2015.1025803

Razavi, S. (2016). Redistributing unpaid care and sustaining quality care services: A prerequisite for gender equality. UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/ publications/2016/3/redistributing-unpaid-care-and-sustaining-quality-care-services

Rodriguez, L. (2021). Unpaid care work: Everything you need to know. Global Citizen. https://www. globalcitizen.org/en/content/womens-unpaid-care-work-everything-to-know/ Rost, L.A. (2021). “By sharing work we are moving forward”: Change in social norms around men’s participation in unpaid care work in northern Uganda. Oxford Development Studies, 49(1), 39–52. http://www.doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2020.1869926

Seedat, S., & Rondon, M. (2021). Women’s wellbeing and the burden of unpaid work. BMJ. http://www. doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1972

Sugita, S. (2010). Social care and women’s labor participation in Lebanon. Al-Raida, 128, 31–37. http:// www.doi.org/10.32380/alrj.v0i0.69

Tabbara, R. (2022, January 27). Lebanese mothers and fathers push for expanded parental leave. L’Orient Le Jour. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1288966/lebanese-mothers-and-fatherspush-for-expanded-parental-leave.html

Takieddine, M., & Abou Ali, L. (2021). Lebanon: Labour and employment comparative guide. https:// www.mondaq.com/employment-and-hr/883124/labour-and-employment-comparative-guide The MenCare Parental Leave Platform. (2016). 10 ways to leave gender inequality behind and give our children the care they need. http://men-care.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ParentalLeave-Platform-web.pdf

Reallocating Soft Power in Sports: From Political Agendas to Sustainable Peace and Development

Lynn al Jamal Business Major

Abstract

Sport is more than just a game. Beyond trophies and glory, it’s a geopolitical game played by businesses and governments. Being cross-cultural, profitable, and influential, sport has become a sought-after tool of geopolitical soft power. However, sport is being used to coverup human rights abuses by states and to “clean up” a state’s reputation. To counter this, a Sustainable Peace and Development Sports Policy (SPDSP) should be developed. Such a plan can help ensure that sport foregrounds sustainable development goals and targets.

Introduction

Sport is changing the world. Today, sport is a key player in the game of geopolitics, where it is commonly used as a diplomatic tool. While the field of play appears to be commercial, the points scored count as diplomatic or political. Targeted investments in certain sports, teams, or sporting events are commonly used by countries to strengthen their global reputation. In other words, countries can shift their public image to one affiliated with a winning sports team, supported by most of the populace, and away from a negative public image attached to their violent foreign policy strategies or their racist and sexist internal policies. Drawing on the popularity of sport, and its power as a consumer-driven industry, states can use their influence in sport as a tool of soft power to create, improve, or “clean up” their public images. Such tactics are increasingly important in the realm of international foreign policy.

In order to challenge the growing influence of state actors in sport, this paper argues that a Sustainable Peace and Development Sports Policy (SPDSP) should be developed and implemented. Such a plan must include peace action plans (PAP) and development

action plans (DAP) that are aligned with the United Nation’s (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the governing, regulating, and operational levels of sport. SPDSP offers an alternative approach to soft power use in sport through a shift in investments from pure business and diplomacy toward universal and sustainable development while depoliticizing and detokenizing human rights in this industry. Changing Models of Sport

Sport, known today for its competitive structure, governance, fanbase, and more, goes back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Europe, sport developed in relation to a social democratic framework. Meanwhile, in the U.S., sport was quickly commercialized and regulated in response to its economic potential. This neoclassical sports model was further reinforced during the post-World War II era and during the Industrial Revolution, as commercial focus on this booming industry grew. The growing influence of the market on sport, however, demands a new analysis of sport around the world as a potential tool of diplomacy. As Chadwick (2022a) writes, a more useful way of thinking about sport is through the lens of geopolitical economy, which can help track not only how states are investing in sport and why, but the ways that certain investments and attachments to different teams or clubs can impact international foreign policy and the public image of various states.

The employment of soft power in sport is a tool to create, improve, or wash clean a state’s public reputation. This is possible because of the industry’s influence and strength around the world. The growing market share of sport and its successful convergence with industries like entertainment and media at the consumer level have led to its use as a strategic tool to build international relevance and favorable images that then work to cover up some of the negative international and domestic policies that states choose to enforce (Cafiero & Alexander, 2020). Team acquisition, sponsorship portfolios, world rankings, hosting global sports events, and other commercially viable activities in sport are all mechanisms that states can use to modify their global images and influence. Winning on the field, appearing on it—in the form of advertisements, for example, or on team logos—or hosting an event, such as the FIFA world cup, are all becoming the “off-field” equivalent of scoring a “diplomatic goal.” Create a beautiful, world class stadium and people will forget some of the human rights violations the country has committed. Sponsor a well-known and winning team, and perhaps there will be less pushback from that team’s supporters regarding a country’s policies. All of these things have happened because of state involvement in sport.

Several different strategies exist when it comes to soft power in sport. “Seduce and shock,” for example, is one of the templates employed by states. Seduce and shock occurs when a country either hosts an important sporting event or becomes an important sponsor of a specific team, and later follows this with a political move that goes against the international community’s wishes or demands. As Chadwick (2022b) writes, seduce and shock techniques are seen when event hosting nations “seduce” the international world through their state-of-the-art facilities, but later “shock” with negative policies or stories. This was the case of the 2014 Winter Olympics, held in Sochi, Russia, when several Russian athletes were accused of violating anti-doping regulations. Similarly, and more recently, Qatar, the host of the FIFA World Cup 2022, was accused of covering up hundreds of egregious labor violations against the workers

who were constructing the new state of the art facility for the World Cup. And yet, the World Cup was hosted as planned by Qatar.

Sport for Diplomacy versus Sport for Development and Peace

The scope of soft power in sport extends beyond the commonly cited tactic of garnering global attention by staging considerable and elite sporting events (Grix et al., 2019), and other business activities like sponsorships and ownerships. Rather, it encompasses a range of intra-state approaches and operates at both the local and global levels. This highlights the importance of developing and using a Sports for Development and Peace (SDP) model for achieving diverse human rights and development goals through sport. A Sustainable Peace and Development Sports Policy (SPDSP) is a framework centered around redirecting the monetization of political agendas and foreign policies through sport toward the monetization of peace and sustainable development (Dudfield & Dingwall-Smith, 2015). SPDSP takes a step outside the traditional franchise model of the sports industry and offers an inclusive and intersectional model established on the incorporation of peace and development at the core of sports governance and operations. It is a multidimensional policy framework inspired by Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) that aims to elevate marginalized groups, developing countries, and underserved sectors and economies in sport. Broadly, FPP aims to “scrutinize the destructive forces of patriarchy, colonization, heteronormativity, capitalism, racism, imperialism, and militarism” that are supported and perpetuated by nations utilizing soft power in sport (Center for Feminist Foreign Policy [CFFP], 2021).

Why Do We Need a Sports for Development and Peace Framework?

Gender equality, anti-racism, the inclusion and rights of the LGBTQ+ community, democracy, and treatment of migrant workers, alongside other matters related to human rights, peace, and development, have become a key factor in determining the ability of states to participate in various sports events such as the Olympics. However, this has often led to a more tokenistic approach to human rights, rather than a sustainable and long-term shift in domestic and international politics that will protect the rights of vulnerable groups. For example, it was not until very recently, following the murder of George Floyd, that the sports industry in the U.S., and others around the world, started to speak up against racism. However, declarations made by and across media actors and organizations fail to be in line with the reality of black people, since these declarations often focused primarily on black people in sport, rather than the impacts of racism as a structural issue affecting all parts of society (Agyemang, 2020). In Saudi Arabia, tokenistic human rights in sport have presented the country as a gender equitable place vis-à-vis its promotion of a female ambassador for Formula One racing. However, the country is still one of the most gender inequitable countries in the Arab region and the world. Recently, Qatar’s use of soft power diplomacy in sport prior to the upcoming FIFA World Cup has allowed it to position itself as an important global player, meanwhile, it banned the presence of rainbow flags representative of LGBTQ+ rights (Associated Press, 2020). Additionally, the country has not taken responsibility for the many labor violations it has perpetuated against a class of migrant laborers tasked with building the new stadiums. Finally, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nearly every sporting platform has shown solidarity with Ukraine by adding the Ukrainian colors or flag to their uniforms, their stadiums, and other sports paraphernalia. Meanwhile, support for Palestinian athletes and teams is treated with

hostility because it is considered a “complex” or “exceptional” problem (Baroud, 2022). This issue is simply the politicization of human rights, which has begun to dominate sport around the world.

To move beyond such tokenistic approaches to human rights, and to prevent such soft power tactics like the “seduce and shock” politics of various states, a SPDSP is needed. Foregrounding diversity and inclusion can help to promote human rights with the aim to make substantial and long-term change. One of the most skilled footballers of our time, Mohamed Salah’s activism and reputation both on and off the football pitch has been linked to reduced crimes in Liverpool induced by islamophobia by 19% and cyberhate by 50% (Wells, 2019). This example shows that sport can contribute to peace and sustainable development.

Developing a Sustainable Peace and Development Sports Policy SPDSP will be put into practice through peace action plans (PAPs) and development action plans (DAPs), in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNCSR 1325), which identifies four focus areas: participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery. All action plans are then reviewed, approved, measured, and monitored by the SPDSP Coordination and Planning Committee (CPC) which is responsible for ensuring coherence across and among different sports, nations, and stakeholders to widen and deepen the impact of these plans. It will have bodies responsible for SDP in each sport for each country applying the SPDSP. The CPC will be representative of all countries and the committee itself will adhere to intersectionality and inclusion.

PAPs will be developed by the upper governing body of the sporting event and will be based on an evaluation done by both the government and local governing bodies of the sport to evaluate the biggest contributors to peace and anti-peace within the geographic reach of the sport. The SPDSP body responsible for this sport in this country will then provide an instructive framework to be applied. In addition, the entities responsible for the PAP and the national action plan (NAP) of the UNCSR 1325, in countries where both are operational, should collaborate to find common grounds of operation between the two action plans which would ultimately strengthen the implementation and effects of both plans. It is suggested that a total of 17 DAPs will be developed per country to meet the specific needs of each location. The DAPs should be modeled after the UN SDG.

An important part off any SPDSP includes monitoring and evaluating the involvement of local and regional partners, for example business partners. Ideally, partners should have or should establish a diversity, equity, and inclusion department or desk to help mainstream these principles. Other ideas include collaborating with local women’s and human rights civil society organizations to ensure that all SPDSP plans are up to date. Sample DAP targets might include:

5.1: Put an end to all sorts of discrimination against women and girls throughout every level and aspect of the sports industry and matters in operations with it.

5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence, bullying, and hate speech against all women and girls in sports spheres (athletes, workers, and fans).

5.3: Eliminate sexist practices in the sports industry as a whole. This should include

reforming parental leave policies and amending legislation to support equal access to healthcare for both men and women.

5.4: Recognize and value the female presence in the sports industry by an at least 40% quota for female candidates for all departments and bodies available in the sports industry based on merit. 50% of this quota will check the intersectional and inclusive requirements of the SPDSP.

5.5: Ensure women’s full participation in, and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, sports, and business aspects of the industry.

5.6: Ensure universal access to girls and female sports by collaborating with local TV and online channels.

5.7: Ensure universal awareness about the important roles that women can play in sport beyond being an athlete.

5.8: Ensure universal awareness and education of issues and matters pertaining to women’s rights in sport. This might include following the lead of global campaigns such as the “Her Game Matters Too” campaign.

5.9: Ensure all public schools accomplish the mandatory trip of all classes to various female sporting events in the local area.

5.10: Ensure that each club or team has a monetized cyber fanbase that promotes interest and increased watch of female sports through a points/post or tweet program where points can be counted as rewards.

5.11: Ensure that investments in female sports are increasing during every quarter of the year and collaborate with states and other businesses to provide incentives when needed.

5.12: Establish and ensure the successful implementation of programming that supports the development of women and girls in support. A good example of this type of programming is the “Get Her Involved in Sports” scholarship and development program.

Conclusion

Sports may seem like a paradoxical avenue to accomplish sustainable development. SPDSP, however, makes human rights and development a universal goal that can be achieved through the universal attractiveness of sport. The extensive reach of sport, and the huge numbers of people following various sport teams and clubs can be a powerful tool for the dissemination of human rights and gender equality. For that reason, the development of an SPDSP is necessary to move beyond a tokenistic approach to human rights in sport.

references

Agyemang, K. (2020, November 5). Do Black lives really matter in the sport industry? Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS). https://www.iris-france.org/151343-do-blacklives-really-matter-in-the-sport-industry/ Associated Press. (2022, April 16). “Demonstrate LGBTQ views in a society where it is accepted”: Qatar official ahead of FIFA World Cup. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/fifaworld-cup-2022-qatar-gay-rights-rainbow-flag-7868801/ Baroud, R. (2022, March 8). FIFA’s hypocrisy in Palestine and the need to isolate apartheid Israel. Jordan Times. https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/ramzy-baroud/fifas-hypocrisy-palestineand-need-isolate-apartheid-israel

Cafiero, G., & Alexander, K. (2020, March 9). Qatar’s soft power sports diplomacy. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/qatars-soft-power-sports-diplomacy Center for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP). (2021). Feminist foreign policy. https:// centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/feminist-foreign-policy

Chadwick, S. (2022a). From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new geopolitical economy of sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 22(5), 685–704. https://www.doi.org/1 0.1080/16184742.2022.2032251

Chadwick, S. (2022b, March 18). The geopolitical economy of Russia’s “seduce and shock” war with sport. Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS). https://www.iris-france. org/165946-the-geopolitical-economy-of-russias-seduce-and-shock-war-with-sport/ Dudfield, O., & Dingwall-Smith, M. (2015). Sport for development and peace and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Commonwealth Secretariat. https://www.sportsthinktank.com/ uploads/cw-sdp-2030agenda.pdf

Grix, J., Brannagan, P. M., & Lee, D. (2019). Entering the global arena: Emerging states, soft power strategies and sports mega-events. Palgrave Macmillan.

Wells, A. (2019, June 4). Study: Mo Salah’s popularity has reduced islamophobia, hate crimes in Liverpool. Bleacher Report. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2839411-study-mo-salahspopularity-has-reduced-islamophobia-hate-crimes-in-liverpool

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 1325 (31 October 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325.

Automation and Gender

Rita Mroue Mechatronics Engineering Major

Abstract

Automation and artificial intelligence (AI) are taking over various aspects of human life. Automation is making systems operate automatically without human intervention and artificial intelligence is designing systems able to do tasks requiring human intelligence. Automation and AI have produced important changes in different sectors including industry, military, marketing, agriculture, and even transportation. These changes are expected to lead to a redistribution of labor roles that might widen the gender gap, increase unemployment, lead to instability, and contribute to a lack of security. Therefore, a question arises: How will automation and AI affect gender equality in general and specifically in the Arab region, a region known for high levels of inequality? The main goal of this paper is to examine whether automation could create new forms and kinds of careers that are equally available for all.

Introduction

Over the last several years, we have been hearing the words artificial intelligence (AI) more and more frequently, as discussions focus on robotics and automation as well as the utopic future they will bring. Automation and the use of AI have been linked to job creation, increased job efficacy, and various other important benefits. However, an important question emerges: Are such advances really without risk? Given the hierarchical organization of society around gender and sexuality, race, migration status, and disability, among others, it is important to examine how automation and the increasing prevalence of AI will affect marginalized populations. Toward that end, this paper focuses on the following question: How will automation and AI affect gender equality in general, and specifically in the Arab region, a region known for high levels of inequality and consequently, war and violence? To answer these questions, this paper will draw from a rigorous literature review as well as the results of a survey distributed to Lebanese university students.

The issue of gender equality within automation and the emergence of AI is critical. If we transition into an automated future with gender equality in mind, we would be making major social and political progress. Addressing the topic of gender equality and automation allows us to assess and acknowledge the many benefits of automation and

AI without compromising the well-being of marginalized groups, including women and the LGBTQ+ population. Studying this relationship between gender and automation and AI will help us to ensure that automation and AI would create balance and equality for all people by increasing their quality of life, improving their skill sets, and ensuring security for them and their communities in the future.

What is Automation, and Why is it Important?

Automation is the process through which a system becomes able to operate automatically with minimum human intervention; robotics falls under this category. Relatedly, AI is the ability of a computer, or a robot controlled by a computer, to do the tasks that are usually done by humans, either because they are complex or because they require the real-time decision-making capabilities of a human. Both automation and AI are already integrated in various aspects of human life. For example, in the military field, automation and AI are being used in processes related to transportation, maintenance, rescue, communication, data and information mining such as target acquisition, damage assessment, surveillance, and defensive or offensive strategizing. In agriculture, AI has improved the quality of crop yields through soil monitoring, insect and plant disease detection, intelligent spraying, which is a technique used to distribute pesticides in a measured and intentional way, and automatic weeding. Moreover, robots have started to replace farmhands because they can ensure more accuracy and a faster workflow. In the transportation sector, AI can replace human travel agents and automated systems can take the place of workers in ports, airports, and distribution centers. Most recently, self-driving cars have emerged on roads and highways across the world. Furthermore, marketing can rely on AI to make automated decisions on the distribution of campaigns to certain customers depending on their personalized likes and dislikes. Finally, robotics has come to dominate the medical field, where doctors are relying on them for precise and accurate surgeries and to perform redundant tasks, all with a much lower risk of human error occurring. These are only some of the many scientific and technological advancements we have made because of automation and AI.

From an outsider’s perspective, these drastic changes seem to improve our quality of life and our efficiency across various sectors. However, switching between two completely different ways of doing things, in other words, between human manual labor and complete automation, is not risk-free. In fact, the changes automation will bring, and those that it has already brought to many industries currently using AI or other automated processes, are expected to lead to a redistribution of roles in the labor force that will affect employment. Despite automation having the ability to create as many jobs as it destroys over time, and despite the fact that increased production due to automation has been shown to create more job growth in some instances, research shows that adding one robot to a geographic area reduces employment in that area by six workers (Brown, 2020). This is a big deal, as recent research predicts that 47% of jobs in the United States, 85% of jobs in Ethiopia, and 77% of jobs in China are at risk of automation in the coming years (Faith, 2017). However, unemployment is not the only negative outcome of increasing automation. It is important to note that jobs are already disproportionately distributed between men, women, and LGBTQ+ identified people. Work is also distributed along race and ethnic lines, class lines, and disability. Therefore, the impact of automation on jobs cannot be properly assessed without

analyzing the very different ways that people of different genders will be affected by increasing usage of AI across different economic sectors. For example, increasing automation might actually worsen the gender gap rather than ameliorating it. These are the issues that are at stake as we continue to turn toward automation and AI.

Methodology

This paper is based on a literature review, which is coupled with an analysis of the results from a survey distributed to university students concerning the effects of automation and AI on the gender gap. The survey was administered using Google Forms and was distributed electronically using WhatsApp and Instagram. Fiftysix students from various Lebanese universities participated in the study, including the Lebanese American University (LAU), the American University of Beirut (AUB), Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth (USJ), Lebanese University (LU,) Beirut Arab University (BAU), Al Maaref University (MU), Lebanese International University (LIU), the Islamic University of Lebanon (IUL), and the American University of Culture and Education (AUCE). Both graduates and undergraduates participated in the study. Of these participants, 44.6% were men, 53.6% were women, and one identified as non-binary. The ages of survey respondents ranged from 18 to 23 years old. The questionnaire started by studying the impact of automation on different groups. Then, it investigated its possible changes in the society. Finally, the questionnaire looked at the participants’ suggested solutions for minimizing any possible negative consequences of automation.

Women and Automation: Good or Bad for Gender Equality?

First, Jurgen (2019) touched on the nature of women’s jobs and how they correlate to automation. He indicated that since women are more likely to occupy jobs that require social skills, such as jobs in the health and education sectors, they would not be greatly affected by automation, perhaps even not at all, because those kinds of jobs are not easily automated. Moreover, the author cited findings to support his claim: Men under the age of 25 have a 46% rate of potential automation of their jobs compared to 26% for women. Similarly, Carmignani (2022) notes that women can better resist the automation of work compared to men due to their overrepresentation in industries such as education, care work, and nursing, where automation cannot fully replace a human being. Carmignani also emphasized how automation might positively benefit women’s employment rates. He points out how professions that historically had more women have grown because of newer technologies that paved the way for distance learning and training, networking, and more flexible work arrangements, all of which have been shown to support women in the workforce. He also added that even though automation will not completely put an end to the gender gap in the labor market, women will benefit from the automation of the labor market, potentially even more than men. According to Lara (2019), the expected loss in skilled workers due to automation in the manufacturing and technology sectors can serve as an opportunity for women to infiltrate these historically male-dominated sectors. However, Lara also emphasizes that we need to focus on increasing the number of women in AI development for fear that the automated world will be infused by gender biases because of its creation by sectors and organizations dominated by men. Badran (2019) similarly claims that technological change will create new types of jobs, which is an opportunity for both women and men to access more equitable jobs. As Faith (2017) argues, automation in fields historically

dominated by poor working conditions, such as agriculture, can relieve women from some of the most exploitative work around the world.

Job Loss: The High Stakes for Women

Concerning job loss, both Faith (2017) and Gilmore (2016) presented data that states that men will gain one job for every three job losses, while women have a lower rate of one job gain for every five job losses. In fact, according to Gilmore (2016), since automation will greatly affect office and administration spaces, online shopping, checkouts, and bookkeeping, women—who historically dominate these types of jobs due to gender stereotypes that dictate the types of job women are “best suited for,” among other reasons—risk facing higher unemployment rates. Faith (2017) gives a specific example, highlighting how 89% of salaried call center staff in the Philippines are at risk of losing their jobs. In the Arab region, Badran (2019) pointed out how the gender imbalance in the Arab labor market might be exacerbated in an automated world due to the types of jobs women historically occupy. Meaning, because women are pushed into care sectors, for example, where automation cannot replace human labor, they might become further entrenched in these gender stereotyped roles. According to a recent 2018 study by the International Monetary Fund, 9% of employed men were at risk of unemployment compared to 11% of women (EIGE, 2020). Furthermore, Madgavkar et al. (2019) emphasized that due to the displacement of jobs caused by automation, women will find it harder to transition than men and may not find new opportunities due to the barriers they face. Likewise, Lara (2019) also discussed the transition required by women after automation. She goes on to argue that while this may shield women from the impact of automation, preexisting gender inequalities will make it more difficult for women to reskill and adapt to these shifts in the labor market.

To conclude, because automation and AI build on preexisting inequalities without actually addressing them, it seems unlikely that they will be able to overcome gender inequality. As Roberts et al. (2019) point out, this is already happening given the very limited number of women working in automation and AI. In their study of LinkedIn profiles, they were able to identify that of those profiles where the person worked in AI, only 22% identified as women. However, if gender equality is taken into consideration when AI is being developed, and if gender is centered in automation processes, it might lead to better outcomes.

Analysis and Discussion

This section analyzes the results of the survey conducted and discusses the case of the Arab region. First, it was found that the four sectors most affected by automation and AI according to respondents are industry (73.2%), agriculture (55.4%), transportation (53.6%), and healthcare (46.4%). According to respondents, the least impacted fields are retail (12.5%) and academia (32.1%). These results are similar to the claims advanced by Jurgen (2019) and Carmignani (2022) regarding the nature of the jobs that will be the least impacted by automation. 28.5% and 25% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively, that women and LGBTQ+ folks would experience negative consequences due to automation. In contrast, 23.2% identified men, 30.5% identified women, and 26.7% identified that LGBTQ+ people would specifically experience negative consequences because of automation. 46.4% of respondents agreed

or strongly agreed that men would primarily benefit from automation. Meanwhile, 44.6% of respondents noted that women would benefit specific from automation and increasing AI, while only 28.5% thought that LGBTQ+ persons would benefit from automation and increasing AI.

The next section of the survey focused on unemployment. Based on respondents’ choices using a numerical scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing a strong agreement with the statement, 57.1% of respondents chose 4 or 5, or were strongly in agreement with the statement that men’s unemployment would increase with automation. Meanwhile, 51.8% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (selecting numbers 4 or 5 on the scale) that women’s unemployment would increase due to automation. These varied responses reflect the findings of the literature, which has not produced a definitive consensus on whether one gender is more affected than the other in relation to increasing automation.

Lastly, the survey assessed participants’ opinions about the gender gap, gender inequality, and stereotypes. First, respondents largely disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statements that “automation widens the gender gap” and that “automation contributes to gender inequality” using the 1-5 scale. 82.1% chose 1, 2 (strongly disagree) and 3 (disagree) in response to the statement that automation widens the gender gap. 78.6% chose 1, 2 and 3 in response to the statement that automation contributes to gender equality. In response to the statement about whether artificial intelligence reproduces gender stereotypes, responses varied. 32.2% chose 1 and 2 (strongly disagree); 32.4% voted 4 and 5 (strongly agree/agree); and 35.7% picked 3 (disagree). These results showcase that the participants may not be fully aware of extant gender inequalities, and the ways that automation might exacerbate these inequalities, as Lara (2019) noted. Similarly, respondents did not seem to acknowledge the ways that sexism is already encoded into current AI programming, such as the sexualization of the female virtual artificial intelligence assistant Alexa (Faith, 2017). These findings explain why 58.9% of respondents largely agreed with the statement that automation and AI will move us closer to achieving gender equality in society. To conclude the survey, respondents were asked to select one option from a provided list as a possible solution for addressing any current or future gender inequality within the field of AI and automation. Most students picked education (67.9%), while 48.2% chose reskilling to combat uneven gender outcomes from automation. 35.7% were in favor of encouraging workers to shift to careers that cannot be automated, and 1.8% picked reskilling after changing the system to one that firmly supports gender equality and equity.

While these survey findings are interesting and provide us with various avenues for exploring this topic more in-depth in the future, it is important to note that the results of this survey do not represent the views of all Lebanese students, nor do they necessarily represent the general opinion of Arab students on automation and gender equality. Further, the small sample size prevents us from claiming that the findings of this survey are reflective of a broader societal consensus. As previously mentioned, the responses of this survey regarding gender stereotypes and inequality show that the Arab region has not adequately addressed gender inequality. In fact, as indicated by Badran (2019), the gender gap in science, technology,

engineering, and math (STEM) careers in the Arab region is continuously widening, putting the region at a severe disadvantage when it comes to advancements in AI and automation that can support and promote gender equality, most importantly because of the low numbers of women and girls in STEM. Therefore, there is a need for reskilling and upskilling the Arab labor force and increasing education about gender equality. These issues must be addressed to develop automation processes that are gender inclusive.

Recommendations

To avoid exacerbating gender equality in automation processes, several recommendations have been made across the existing literature. First, Faith (2017) argues that the impact of automation on different and diverse groups in developing countries must be evaluated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other independent parties. Further, Faith advocates for an “early warning” function to help organizations and companies identify gender inequalities related to the use of AI and increasing automation. Lastly, the experiences of women and other marginalized groups must be considered as more AI is developed and as automation expands into different sectors. Finally, according to Madgavkar et al. (2019), the private sector, schools, colleges, and governments should encourage young girls to pursue careers in STEM so that they can participate directly in the work of developing AI and automating the labor force and other parts of human life.

Similar recommendations can be made based on this research and the survey results discussed above. Governments should institute programming that supports gender equality. For example, digital education opportunities as well as lifelong learning should be made available to everyone, especially girls and women, to make them more knowledgeable about automation. Furthermore, increasing women’s political participation and putting them in positions with decision-making power can help to promote legislation that guarantees gender equality. Donors and policymakers should also further women’s economic status. They can also work to lower digital inequalities that exist. In terms of the labor force, it is important to provide support and courses that can help workers with reskilling, career shifts, and the redesign of job roles as automation increases. Finally, robots and AI can be developed with respect to LGBTQ+ communities, including correct pronoun use and other activities to encourage inclusivity. Policymakers will also have to play an important role in monitoring wealth inequality as automation processes and the use of AI grows, especially since the owners of automated technologies are continuing to get richer at the expense of those whose jobs are replaced by these technologies. For example, an initiative like Universal Basic Income will ensure that those who lose their jobs due to automation are adequately protected until they are able to find another job.

Conclusion

Industrial automation is an inevitable outcome of decades of technological advances. Just as previous breakthroughs completely altered the way human beings live, automation is certainly going to produce groundbreaking consequences. Therefore, it is important to carefully transition into this new automated world instead of avoiding it or worse, approaching it blindly. On the one hand, automation presents some bleak possibilities: Jobs will be lost faster than employees can adapt and reskill,

unemployment will peak, women will be thrown to the sidelines, and the rich tech giants will only get richer. On the other hand, there are more positive scenarios: More jobs will be created, the low-skilled workforce will reskill and cohabit with the new technology, and women will thrive as automation expands. Automation might also provide another avenue for combatting gender inequality. The results of this survey, as well as the existing literature, examine these potential outcomes. In fact, it is apparent that there is no definitive consensus on how automation will impact our lives and more specifically, how it will impact gender equality. We should also note that the study has shown that the Arab region may not be completely ready to tackle this issue as people are still not fully aware of the correlation between gender and automation. However, if appropriate policies are implemented, we could launch ourselves on a journey toward a positive automated future that ensures equality for all genders.

references

Badran, M.F. (2019). Bridging the gender digital divide in the Arab Region. International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Centre de Recherches Pour le Développement International (CRDI). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330041688_Bridging_the_gender_digital_ divide_in_the_Arab_Region

Brown, S. (2020, July 29). A new study measures the actual impact of robots on jobs. It’s significant. MIT Sloan. https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/a-new-study-measures-actual-impactrobots-jobs-its-significant

Carmignani, F. (2022, January 24). Women are less likely to be replaced by robots and might even benefit from automation. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/women-are-less-likelyto-be-replaced-by-robots-and-might-even-benefit-from-automation-96728

European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). (2020). Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalization and the future of work. https://eige.europa.eu/publications/gender-equality-index-2020-report/ job-automation-use-new-technologies-and-transformation-labour-market

Faith, B. (2017). Automation, women, and the future of work. Institute of Development Studies (IDS). https://doi.org/10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii287

Fuller, G. (2018, October 23). The impact of automation on gender equality. AAT Comment. https:// www.aatcomment.org.uk/accountancy-resources/the-impact-of-automation-on-gender-equality/

Gilmore, J. (2016, December 7). Could automation make life worse for women? The Guardian. https:// www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/dec/08/could-automation-make-life-worse-forwomen

Jurgen, G. (2019, May 16). Does job automation consider gender equality? Medium. https://medium. com/swlh/does-job-automation-consider-gender-equality-67a90ed89a40

Lara, V. (2019). Will automation level the playing field for women in manufacturing and tech? The Garage, HP. https://garage.hp.com/us/en/business/automation-jobs-women-STEM-technology. html

Madgavkar, A., Krishnan, M., & Ellingrud, K. (2019, July 3). Will automation improve work for women - or make it worse? Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2019/07/will-automation-improvework-for-women-or-make-it-worse

Roberts, C., Parkes, H., Statham, R., & Rankin, L. (2019). The future is ours: Women, automation and equality in the digital age. The Centre for Economic Justice. https://www.ippr.org/files/2019-07/ the-future-is-ours-women-automation-equality-july19.pdf

Women in Financial Technology: A Lack of Participation in Blockchain

Shella Marcos El Douaihy Political Science and International Affairs Major

Abstract

The emergence of cryptocurrency and block chain technologies has dominated financial news outlets over the past two years. Given the quick rise of cryptocurrency and the predominance of men in the cryptocurrency sector, this paper examines the role of women in cryptocurrency and the possible outcomes of cryptocurrency on gender equality around the world.

Introduction

Today, we are witnessing the emergence of blockchain technology. Briefly, blockchain technology is a “distributed ledger technology that permits a range of complex digital interactions between entities without the verification and authentication practices traditionally provided by trusted third parties,” such as banks (Thylin & Duarte, 2019). A common way of valuing a blockchain is through a cryptocurrency. This article emphasizes that with the increasing popularity of this form of trading, now is the time to ensure that women have equal access to cryptocurrency and that they have equal opportunities to excel in this field. This is especially important because men continue to dominate in the cryptocurrency sphere (Bosun, 2022; Schonberger, 2022). Using a literature review, a survey, and an interview done with a female cryptocurrency trader in Lebanon, this paper attempts to theorize the absence of women in this field. It argues that challenging some of the barriers preventing women from entering this sector can create critical opportunities to improve, develop, and build intersectionality and inclusivity in the growing financial technology (FinTech) sector (Roberti, 2021).

Methods

This study combines a literature review with the results of a survey administered to youth in Lebanon. To have a better understanding of the factors constraining the inclusion of women in cryptocurrency, a survey tool was created using Google

Forms and was distributed by email and WhatsApp, as well as by various social media platforms, including LinkedIn, Instagram, and Twitter. Approximately 100 people responded to the survey, with users self-identifying as women (54%) and men (46%). The largest group of respondents identified themselves as undergraduate students (89%). The questionnaire included 13 multiple choice questions split into two categories. The first category consisted of three general questions on gender, age, and educational level. The second category included questions about cryptocurrency, including blockchain literacy, ownership of technological devices, level of risk aversion, and sources of and attitudes toward generating income. The survey also included two linear-scale questions to assess the extent of willingness of respondents to engage in cryptocurrency.

Following this discussion, this paper also presents the findings of an interview done with Mia Bou Khalil, a 21-year-old Lebanese cryptocurrency trader. In the interview, Mia shared not only the hardships and criticism she faced as a rising female trader in Lebanon, but the important milestones she has achieved as a female trader.

Gender and Cryptocurrency

Unfortunately, the quick rise in popularity of cryptocurrency was accompanied by a very limited amount of research on the subject (Bannier et al., 2019). However, the small amount of literature that does exist contains important information about the gender inequalities that are starting to pop up in the industry.

Cryptography, datamining, and computer science are three of the aspects of the field of blockchain that are considered by the World Economic Forum (WEF) to fit under the umbrella of hard and “nerdy” mathematics. Angela Walch, a research fellow at University College London’s Centre for Blockchain, links the lack of women in STEM or the “nerdy” world, specifically in technology and finance, more broadly to their absence in blockchain currency trading. Stute (2019) uses the term “unintentional inequities” to describe the type of discrimination facing girls in grade school and high school, for example, not being called on to solve tough math and science problems, which acts as a de-motivator for girls to enter STEM or FinTech. She adds that counsellors and parents’ support is also a critical factor in encouraging girls to enter the STEM field and FinTech. Stereotypes that identify women as “not smart enough” to work in STEM or FinTech, or “better suited” for non-science and non-mathematics related jobs are also to blame for the lack of women in these fields. For women that have managed to enter the field, workplace gender discrimination is rampant. In particular, the motherhood myth, which refers to the assumptions that women innately possess parental abilities and that they are, by nature, supposed to be the primary parental figure, is often used to prevent women from accessing promotions and other upward mobility in their work (Verniers & Vala, 2018). Stute’s (2019) findings also point to the undeniable social and cultural factors influencing women’s careers by considering the ways that women were treated historically in terms of intellect, property ownership, and employment.

Beyond this, Gailey (2022) says that a possible aspect of the cryptocurrency trading community that might discourage women from taking part is the “mansplaining” between the “crypto bros” and women in the field. This kind of masculine linguistic

behavior has disincentivized women from joining male-dominated crypto communities. There is also a lack of digital communities that cater specifically to women and people of color on social media platforms where traders meet to discuss issues related to cryptocurrency. In her article, de la Rey (2022) highlights several causes behind the low numbers of women in cryptocurrency. De la Rey discusses the fact that the women she interviewed wanted to spend more time learning about cryptocurrency before investing in it, as opposed to men’s choices to “wing it,” or to invest without truly understanding the mechanics of cryptocurrency. This, coupled with the fast-paced movements of the crypto markets often demotivates women from participating. De la Rey also points out that women have historically been more averse to financial risk-taking than men, another factor demotivating women from entering cryptocurrency markets. Finally, de la Rey highlights the lack of accessible information about cryptocurrency and blockchain as another barrier preventing women from investing in cryptocurrency, as well as their limited exposure to cryptocurrency platforms and social media outlets where they could readily find such information.

From another angle, international development has focused on the benefits of cryptocurrency in getting financial resources directly into the hands of women program beneficiaries (Skogvang, 2018). This is specifically important among refugee and displaced communities, who might not have access to identity papers and other important information needed to access formal financial institutions such as banks. Further, as Thylin and Duarte (2019) pointed out, in humanitarian settings, men are 70% more likely to have an individual financial account than women, with the largest gender gap on individual accounts recorded in Afghanistan and Lebanon. Access to blockchain technologies, including cryptocurrency, might help to address this huge gender disparity in conflict settings. Skogvang (2018) reviews the successes of this strategy through an analysis of the UN Women Blockchain Project to Empower Women and Girls in Humanitarian Settings, which has innovatively used the blockchain to try to increase women and girls’ access to financial resources during times of conflict. While the project is still in its early phases, Skogvang points out that more work needs to be done to address the ways that various cultural contexts can affect the use of cryptocurrency for women and girls in conflict settings.

Cryptocurrency and Gender in Lebanon

During her interview, Mia Bou Khalil expressed that she was underestimated in the beginning of her journey as a cryptocurrency trader because of her gender. Mia noted that in most cryptocurrency community chat groups, there was usually only one or two women in each group. Worse, when she would try to contribute, male users in the group would make her feel as if she is not qualified to speak or not good enough in terms of behavior. Translated from Arabic, these men would respond by saying “what’s that girl saying?” or, “what’s that girl talking about?” It was only after repeating herself several times and arguing that she was correct that the members of these chat groups started to take her seriously.

In Bou Khalil’s opinion, the bullying she faced is linked to the traditional cultural perspectives of Lebanese society. The effects of such patriarchal attitudes can be seen in the survey’s results, with an astonishing 29% of female respondents claiming that they would expect only men to participate in cryptocurrency trading. This reflects

patriarchal attitudes that believe certain genders are only suitable for certain types of work or behaviors in relation to financial trading. Survey results also documented that only 12 women were willing to partake in financially risky behaviors, in line with the findings of the literature which claims that women are more risk-averse than men. These tendencies are also part of the gender determinants that prevent women from entering cryptocurrency markets. However, most female respondents (75%) identified that they would like to engage in income generating activities. Mia Bou Khalil’s experiences, however, show that access to knowledge about certain risky financial activities, such as investing in cryptocurrency, can help to mitigate this risk-aversion. Over the course of the pandemic, Bou Khalil started to conduct her own research on the topic out of personal curiosity stimulated by a friend of hers. She proceeded to take free—and later paid—online courses about cryptocurrency, and she expressed to me that as a STEM student, specifically a physics student, she was always interested in the “how” of things and really wanted to know more about how cryptocurrencies operate inside this blockchain universe. This pushed her to conduct her own research in the field. According to Bou Khalil, the lack of knowledge about cryptocurrency, as well as other types of financial technologies, is in part the fault of the education system in Lebanon, which does not teach students about money, how it works, and how to make it. This lack of knowledge is evidenced by the survey’s findings: Approximately 36% of respondents had never heard of blockchain or cryptocurrency trading. However, and on a positive note, approximately six female respondents did report their involvement in cryptocurrency.

Policy Recommendations

Based on this analysis, several policy recommendations can be made. As noted by Bou Khalil, accessible education about financial technology, cryptocurrency, and blockchain is key to increasing the number of women participating in cryptocurrency. Importantly, these should include courses that are catered directly to women and girls. It is also essential to work on the integration of education on blockchain into Information and Communication Technology (ICT) classes that are offered at most schools around Lebanon, so that students can be introduced to the concepts sooner rather than later. This will facilitate their entry into the field of FinTech and will equip them with knowledge about various financial processes that they will encounter once they enter the labor force. Similarly, working with local organizations like Girls Got It (2016), a joint initiative that brings together five Lebanese nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that work on changing societal attitudes about women in STEM, can help promote the inclusion of women and girls in STEM. These organizations can serve as key focal points for disseminating information about FinTech, as well as integral partners for empowering women and girls in FinTech and STEM.

Empowering women and girls more broadly, especially encouraging them to participate in opportunities that would help them to achieve financial independence, can also help to get more women and girls into cryptocurrency. I include this recommendation based on personal experiences: I have just begun low-scale and short-term cryptocurrency trading recently after becoming financially independent. It is also important to promote classes that are clear and that help students to navigate some of the more complex aspects of cryptocurrency trading and blockchain. Finally, putting women in decision-making positions and empowering them at the political, social, and economic levels can give them the confidence to enter male-dominated industries and markets

like cryptocurrency. This is important for creating holistic change that can support women and girls to reach their full potential.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a lot of optimism surrounding the growing cryptocurrency field and what it can potentially offer for women and girls in the future. However, to ensure that the field develops in a gender equitable way, it is important to acknowledge how the field currently restricts the participation of women and girls. To counter this, creating programs that inform women and girls about cryptocurrency and other FinTech, increasing support for women and girls in STEM, and ending gender inequality in the workplace and in the economic sector, and all other areas of life, are all key to ensuring that women and girls have equitable access to this sector. These suggested recommendations can help women and girls feel empowered enough to enter this sector and to handle the sexism that they might face, similar to the experiences of Bou Khalil. If we work to ensure that gender equality is mainstreamed in blockchain technology and cryptocurrency trading, and across various FinTech sectors, we can help to promote women and girls’ participation in FinTech.

references

Bannier, C., Meyll, T., Röder, F., & Walter, A. (2019). The gender gap in “Bitcoin literacy.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 22, 129–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2019.02.008

Bosun, O. (2022). Gender disparity in cryptocurrency trading is still high. Yahoo! Finance. https:// finance.yahoo.com/news/gender-disparity-cryptocurrency-trading-still-100007974.html de la Rey, C. (2022, February 18). Why don’t many women invest in crypto? Chantelle de la Rey explains. SmartCompany. https://www.smartcompany.com.au/finance/why-dont-many-womenin-crypto/

Gailey, A. (2022, April 6). Six women who are changing the face—and future—of crypto. NextAdvisor. https://time.com/nextadvisor/investing/cryptocurrency/women-in-crypto/ Girls Got It (2016). About us. https://www.girlsgotit.org/about.php

Roberti, J. (2021, March 5). Women leaders in blockchain are good for business. Benzinga Crypto. https://www.benzinga.com/markets/cryptocurrency/21/03/20029506/women-leaders-inblockchain-are-good-for-business

Schonberger, J. (2022, March 25). Crypto chicks want to help women break into “male-dominated” industry. Yahoo! Finance. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/crypto-chicks-140410564.html

Skogvang, E. (2018). Blockchain: Uniting aid and trade? (Master’s thesis, University of Oslo). DUO Research Archive. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/64761/Skogvang_ masterthesis.pdf

Stute, S.S. (2019). The gender gap in patents: An exploration of bias against women in patent attainment and “blockchain” as a potential remedy (No. 2103) (Master’s thesis, Wright State University). Core Scholar Theses and Dissertations. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=3244&context=etd_all.

Thylin, T., & Duarte, M.F.N. (2019). Leveraging blockchain technology in humanitarian settings –opportunities and risks for women and girls. Gender and Development, 27(2), 317–336. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2019.1627778

Verniers, C., & Vala, J. (2018) Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace: The mediating role of motherhood myths. PLoS ONE, 13(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657

Queer Coding and Misrepresentation in Arab Media

Kassem Fattah Architecture Major

Abstract

The film industry has failed at representing minorities in a neutral light. Instead, the industry continues to find creative methods through which they can ingrain patriarchal, sexist, and homophobic beliefs in their viewers. This is done through misrepresentation, under-representation, queerbaiting and more recently, an effect known as queer coding. Queer coding is when a character is given characteristics that make them appear as queer to viewers, without having to directly mention this character’s queer identity. This is done through a set of actions, mannerisms, or physical traits (Greenhill, 2015). This paper will discuss how queer coding has had negative effects on the perception of the LGBTQ+ community, especially in the Arab region.

Introduction

Historically, queer characters have been invisible in mainstream media. Their existence in fictional worlds was common, but unless they were being used for the purpose of entertaining a heterosexual audience in a humorous manner, their queerness was limited to subtle acts that were associated with their queer identity. Coupled with a societal culture in the Arab region, where homophobia and sexism are dominant parts of the social order, the misrepresentation of LGBTQ+ members in media and the film industry in particular has distorted the social perception of this community. These inaccurate and distorted perceptions of queer people are at the foundation of a practice known as queerbaiting, which is when a film character is given characteristics that make them appear as queer to viewers, without ever directly mentioning the character’s queer identity. This is achieved through a set of actions, mannerisms, behaviors, or physical traits stereotypically associated with queer people, which makes the character legible as queer even though their sexuality remains ambiguous throughout the program, show, or film (Greenhill, 2015). Queer coding was frequently used as a strategy to include LGBTQ+ characters in media without facing consequences from the state or even from religious extremists (Abdel Karim, 2020). This article aims to

analyze the effects of queerbaiting and queer coding, and the misrepresentation or underrepresentation of queer characters in media, in the Arab region. The paper will do this through an intensive literature review of the topic of LGBTQ+ representation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the evolution of LGBTQ+ representation across various media platforms, and audience reception of queer characters over the years. It will also analyze the relationship between this representation and social understandings of queerness. By examining previous studies, we will see how different filmmakers have manipulated different regimes of visibility for the community and the agenda behind this representation. Building on the outcomes of the literature review, I will be discussing how queer coding has had negative effects on the perception of the LGBTQ+ community. I will argue that this misrepresentation has made being Arab and queer two mutually exclusive identities. Following this discussion, I will highlight possible policy solutions and other strategies for countering such negative media characterizations of the LGBTQ+ community.

History of Arab Media

Up until the 1970s, Egyptian cinema was synonymous with Arab cinema as it was the oldest and most prominent film industry in that region (Gaffney, 1987). In Egyptian cinema, the purpose of homoerotic and gender-queer representation in film shifted from its earlier utilization to spark social critique to its usages to depict monstrosity or mental illness. This shift took place after the Islamic shari‘a was adopted as Egypt’s primary source of legislation in 1971, and a strict censorship code was enforced (El Adl, 2014; Columbia Global Centers, 2019). Like the Hays Code that Hollywood studios adopted in the 1930s (Gilbert, 2013), the Egyptian censorship code created heavier surveillance of Arab media especially on issues related to sexuality and gender (Menicucci, 1998). In this context, queer coding was used to introduce queerness without the consequences that come with the direct representation and open labeling of characters as non-heterosexual (Abdel Karim, 2020). Using queer-coding, queerness was expressed through dress, behavior, or speech rather than plain-spoken description (Benshoff, 2005). For some filmmakers, queer-coding was a way for filmmakers to create loopholes for codes that restrict their artistic freedom. For others, it was a way to depict characters as villains, linking queerness to notions of evil and other negative social connotations. These practices, coupled with strict censorship laws, allowed Arab media to be very effective in reinforcing discriminatory views on these minorities.

After a while, filmmakers in the region and globally were no longer restricted by large studios as digital cinematography and distribution of film had given independent filmmakers “the opportunity to represent themselves rather than being represented” (Columbia Global Centers, 2019). In practice, this meant that Egyptian cinema was no longer synonymous with Arab cinema. In current Arab media, queer representation has just begun to reach important milestones. Roles depicting queer characters were stagnant for the longest time, limited to sexual predators, mentally deranged characters, or feminized male characters used for comedic purposes. Today, however, members of the LGBTQ+ community have started to see media representation that is less one-dimensional. Tracking the evolution of LGBTQ+ characters in Arab media allows us to examine the political stances adopted by government and legislative authorities in the Arab region over time regarding sexual minorities and the ways that representation in media was used to both challenge and support these views.

Queer Coding and Queer Baiting

According to some sources, queer coding in Western media has become harmless. A lot of what is considered queer coding is understood as simple fan speculation about a fictional character’s sexuality due to the absence of disclosure on the topic. This is not to be mistaken for queer baiting, which is when a character is made obviously queer, yet their sexuality is never confirmed. In other words, the character is written in this way to bait queer viewers (Keane, 2019). This understanding of queer coding versus queer baiting seems to ignore the serious history from which this concept originated. According to Radner and Lanser (1987), coding presumes that two types of audiences are on the receiving end, one of which is “monocultural”; the “monocultural” audience assumes that their interpretation of events is the only interpretation. In the case of sexuality in films, the “monocultural” audience is assumed to be heterosexual. The other audience, which is living in “two cultures,” is the minority group that is competent enough to decode the double message presented in the film, something that the majority group might miss. This does not mean that the decoding of these characters is meant primarily for queer audiences. What coding does assume, however, is that non-heterosexual persons are not considered part of the majority. This unfortunately contributes to the hegemonic power structure that works to marginalize sexual minorities, which is problematic for many reasons.

Whether or not the coding is consciously planned, it can enter a movie at almost any level (Greenhill, 2015). The director can be considered the most significant in terms of influence on how they wish their work to be perceived. However, queer coding can also enter at the writing stage, during the wardrobe fittings and trials, or even through acting. Therefore, even when characters are not intentionally queer coded, which they are most of the time, they can be interpreted as such when other associations with queerness are introduced to the character. These associations can appear in the form of queer-associated wardrobe or stylistic aspects that can make the character stand out from a heteronormative binary. It can also be part of the character’s language or vocabulary. And at its most subtle it can be at the level of the character’s storyline, which can symbolically speak to a queer audience more than it does to non-queers.

Queer Characters in Arab Media

When it comes to the gender and sexuality spectrum in the Arab region, Massad (2007) argues that “queer” and “lesbian” sexual identities are non-existent. The reason behind this is not due to their physical absence, but simply because the Arab world does not allow for the same discourses around the topics of queerness and sexuality that the Western world does. Georgis (2013), however, argues that these terminologies are Western-oriented and emerged in the West, a common argument in the Arab region. The problem with these “Western” terms is that they can be alienating to perceptions of queerness indigenous to the region. Problematically, these ideas have been coopted by various anti-queer agendas, which claim that queer persons are “influenced” by the West in a negative sense. This is often reflected in the portrayal of queer film characters, who are frequently depicted as people that have been subject to Western influence and are trying to subvert public morals in the Arab world. This type of misrepresentation can be seen in movies such as Eshaeit Hob (A Rumor of Love, 1960) and Al-Bahth an Fadiha (The Search for a Scandal, 1973) where two characters, Lucy and Rico, played by Jamal Ramses and an unnamed actor, respectively, have been

constructed as Western-influenced, upper-class individuals who act “un-manly” and are fans of Western artists like The Beatles or Elvis Presley. The characters were used as parts of the film’s comedy features and queerness was hinted at under a negative light, but it was never mentioned explicitly. But Georgis counters these claims and misrepresentations of queer Arabs as “Westernized” by stating that “same-sex Arab sexualities are neither homogenous nor sell-outs to Western hegemony” (2013, p. 237).

If not to make a heterosexual audience laugh, queer characters were painted as sexual offenders or deviants. In the movies Rasha Garea (Dare to Give, 2001) and Romantica (1996), the gay characters where sexual predators that assaulted the protagonist. In both films the fate of the homosexual characters ends with death, one through murder and the other because of an “abnormal” lifestyle. In Bedoon Raqabah (No Supervision, 2009), movie producers faced a lawsuit after including a bisexual woman who seduces and exploits desperate younger women using her age and financial prowess.

Other portrayals come in the form of pity-inducing roles, where homosexuality is a result of childhood trauma, and the characters are presented as individuals who need help. These films follow the following logic: When characters are explicitly queer, there must be a reason for the audience to accept them, or at least to allow them to be screened. This reason is some type of childhood trauma that apparently “caused” the character to “become” queer. In Imarat Yacoubian (The Yacoubian Building, 2006) and Hamam al-Malatily (Malatily Bathhouse, 1973), both openly gay characters’ identities were a result of troubled childhoods. In this way, Arab homosexuality is “justified” for gay men. It is constructed as a consequence of various issues, including being raised in a “feminine environment” (i.e., without strong male role models), experiencing childhood neglect, and in the worst cases, experiencing childhood abuse.

Absence of Queer Women in Arab Media

The marginalization of queer Arab women is more pervasive. The intersection of their two identities, their gender and their sexuality, has led to far more underrepresentation in Arab media which in turn has led to the increasing invisibility of queer women in Arab societies (Bradbury-Rance, 2019). Intersectionality is a feminist concept that acknowledges the different oppressions facing women because of their race, their sexuality, and their gender, among other social identities (Davis, 2008). Thus, the intersectional realities of queer Arab women have resulted in queer Arab women’s double marginalization. According to some sources, lesbian women have ironically benefited from this invisibility. Whitaker (2006) believes this invisibility allows lesbians more freedom in social interactions such as living together, which is not as feasible for gay men, at least not without raising some eyebrows. Most of the characteristics assigned to queer characters in Arab films are usually blurred between attributes associated with homosexual men or transgender women, which at some point merge into the same category for heterosexual audiences because of their limited knowledge about queer identities. As Abdel Karim’s (2020) analysis shows, the representation of lesbian women in the three films that were analyzed varies from the subtle exchange of glances between two queer-coded women to a more explicitly showcased relationship between two characters.

Aside from these repetitive depictions, there was not much else that could help shape the understanding of the LGBTQ+ community in Arab media. As representation in

Western media progresses, the Arab region remains static due to religious, political, social, and cultural reasons (Abdel Karim, 2020). With continuous efforts from Arab queer activists, representation has become a bit more common as cinema is used as a medium for activism. Some of the more lighthearted representations of queerness in Arab film are present in the works of Youssef Chahine, who showed LGBTQ+ characters in ways that heterosexual characters are usually portrayed. His works indirectly navigated through homoerotic love stories, without centering the characters’ development around their sexuality.

Queer Misrepresentation and Sexism

Through the effeminate portrayal of gay men and the associated ridiculing of their feminine features, women have also been harmed. It is clear that homophobia has its roots in sexism. Pharr (2002) claims that homophobia is an effective weapon for sexism. She explains this using the concept of heterosexism, which highlights the global assumption that most people are heterosexual, or that everyone should be heterosexual. This then leads to rampant homophobia, as non-heterosexual people are considered outliers, deviants, and abnormal. She goes on to explain how at puberty, boys start to taunt each other using homophobia to establish patriarchal power relations, as terms like “faggot” and “gay” strip boys of their power and rhetorically place them at the same level as women, who are conceived of as less privileged and lower than men in the hierarchy. The recurrent depiction of femininity as negative and weak, when associated with both women and queer men, reinforces the sexist views ingrained in an already heterosexist social environment. There is rarely any representation of femininity that is associated with strength, and if there is, this character is most probably being sexualized. When there is an attempt to portray women as powerful, they are usually assigned more “manly” features and associated with a masculine entourage, which is not necessarily negative until representation becomes exclusive to only this typology.

The second way heterosexism manifests in society is through the use of homophobia to control or belittle women. When women enter puberty, misogyny leads to conformity that hinders girls from reaching their full potential as they are coerced into dependency on their male counterparts for financial and physical security (Pharr, 2002). The term “lesbian” is weaponized to strip women of the “privilege” of being protected by men that heterosexual women apparently benefit from. She is a woman who has been abandoned by society as she threatens patriarchal regimes and male dominance while homosexual men, although also a threat, are portrayed as a betrayal to the patriarchy which incites more hatred from heterosexual men.

This characterization of lesbians as abandoned women, without the protection of men, resonates clearly in Arab media. As lesbians are victims of dual bias, they are absent from almost all parts of media. They face even more obstacles trying to be part of the media production phase, where they are underrepresented as directors, writers, and production specialists. They also have little to no control over media products, their messages, and their distribution. And finally, they are very rarely the audience that these media products target. This is where the difference between them and gay men comes to light: Gay men still have the privilege that comes with being a man even though they experience the disadvantages that come with being gay.

Queerness as a Threat to Arab Culture

Queer Arabs have started to question their sense of belonging, and individuals like Aya Labanieh (2021) have taken to the internet to share their sense of estrangement from Arab culture. Among queer communities, alienation is a common sentiment; queer communities frequently bond over these feelings of alienation and their lack of acceptance. This alienation is why queer communities have become so distanced not only from their heterosexual peers, but also from their own culture. Georgis (2013) shares this sentiment with most Arab queers, stating that her acceptance of her queerness was her “adieu to Arab culture,” as Arabs refused to create space for queerness in their culture. People who belong to the LGBTQ+ community have turned to Western culture for a sense of belonging and safety, which is why we can see clearer Western influence on queer Arabs. This is also the reason why Western influence has been a huge character trait associated with queer fictional characters: It is partially because Arab culture has marginalized and censored the queer community, forcing it to look for belonging elsewhere. Western society has made room for queer discovery and expansive queer identities that Arab discourse chooses to negate or criticize (Abdel Karim, 2020).

In relation to my personal experience, most members of the LGBTQ+ in Lebanon do relate more to Western culture than they do to their own, as they have all been stripped of the right to express both their queerness and their Arabness. They have been exposed to this mutually exclusive logic of belonging since their childhood, which has taught them that there is a choice to be made. This choice between culture or queerness generally results in one of two ways: An acceptance of queer identity that comes with the sacrifice of culture and family, or a suppression of queerness for the sake of acceptance and belonging, even if it is not genuine.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that an Arab queer cinema movement has begun to emerge, with depictions of explicitly queer characters in many Arab media products. However, there is also no doubt that we are far behind when it comes to how much non-Arab societies can offer us in terms of understanding sexuality and gender and the freedom to express both. With the simultaneous rise of several LGBTQ+ Arab filmmakers and alternative streaming and distribution platforms, it is becoming harder to censor the voices that have been muted for so long. Through the positive depictions of queer characters, these minorities can start to carve out a space for themselves in Arab culture. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 allowed Arab creators to reach an even wider audience, as the world turned to the internet for entertainment and connection during government-enforced lockdowns. This shift has made it even easier for Arab filmmakers to reach audiences outside of their region, something that will be beneficial for queer representation in Arab films. For queer filmmakers who have already achieved these milestones and have reached spaces that non-queer individuals reign, there is a responsibility to include fellow queer creatives in the process of making and producing media. It is a big burden to be responsible for such a huge societal change, especially when it has taken this long to even begin to shift toward acceptance. However, however no one else is going to initiate this change: The LGBTQ+ community must be at the forefront of this change to ensure long-term and sustainable shifts toward acceptance are happening in and across different media platforms.

references

Abdel Karim, M. (2020). Queer representation in Arab and Middle Eastern films. Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media, 20, 71–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.33178/alpha.20.06

Abdel Wahab, Z.F. (1996). Romantica [Film]. Dana.

Abouseif, S. (Director). (1973). Hammam al-malatily [The Bathhouse of Malatily] [Film].

Benshoff, H.M., & Griffin, S. (2005). Queer images: A history of gay and lesbian film in America Rowman & Littlefield.

Bradbury-Rance, C. (2019). Lesbian cinema after queer theory. Edinburgh University Press.

Columbia Global Centers. (2019). The (r)evolution of Arab queer cinema: Queer representation in film pre- and post-Arab uprisings [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_2iG2GXfdA

Davis, K. (2008). Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful. Feminist Theory, 9(1), 67–85. http://dx.doi. org/10.1177/1464700108086364

Dollar Film. (1960). A Rumor of Love. Egypt.

El Adl, S. (2014). Film censorship in Egypt: power and subject-making [Master’s thesis, American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/965

Gaffney, J. (1987). The Egyptian cinema: Industry and art in a changing society. Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(1), 53–75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857918

Georgis, D. (2013). Thinking past pride: Queer Arab shame in Bareed Mista3jil. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45(2), 233–251. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743813000056

Gilbert, N. (2013). Better left unsaid: Victorian novels, Hays Code films, and the benefits of censorship Stanford University Press.

Girgis, H. (2009). Bedoon Rakabah [No Supervision] [Film]. Hany Girgis Fawzy Films.

Greenhill, P. (2015). “The Snow Queen”: Queer coding in male directors’ films. Marvels & Tales, 29(1), 110–134. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/577012

Hamed, M. (Director). (2006). The Yacoubian Building [Film]. Arab Company for Cinema Production & Distribution.

Hamed, S. (Director). (2001). Rasha garea [Dare to Give] [Film].

Keane, M. (2019, October 23). Opinion: Is queer-coding really a bad thing? The Daily Eastern News.

https://www.dailyeasternnews.com/2019/10/23/opinion-is-queer-coding-really-a-bad-thing/ Labanieh, A. (2021, September 7). Was there no room for the queer individual in Arab history? Aeon. https://aeon.co/essays/was-there-no-room-for-the-queer-individual-in-arab-history

Massad, J.A. (2007). Desiring Arabs. University of Chicago Press.

Menicucci, G. (1998). Unlocking the Arab celluloid closet: Homosexuality in Egyptian film. Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 206, 32–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3012479

Mustafa, N. (1973). Al-bahth an fadiha [Searching for a scandal] [Film].

Pharr, S. (2002). Homophobia: A weapon of sexism. Chardon Press.

Radner, J. N., & Lanser, S. S. (1987). The feminist voice: Strategies of coding in folklore and literature. The Journal of American Folklore, 100(398), 412–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/540901

Whitaker, B. (2006). Unspeakable love: Gay and lesbian life in the Middle East. Saqi Books.

Social Media: A Curse or a Blessing?

Wafic Khalife Computer Science Major

Abstract

Social media gave women a place to express themselves. But in the digital space, women face virtual verbal violence and gender-based constraints such as bullying, body shaming, sexual harassment, and many others. Thus, digital gender safety in the Arab region is an important issue to address. This paper discusses digital gender safety through the concepts of sexualization, sexist language, and gender roles that women face on social media in the Arab region. The paper asks how women can be protected in these spaces, and the types of policies needed to promote women’s empowerment across social media platforms.

Introduction

The exponential growth of internet usage has led to major social changes: Today, social interaction is not only facilitated by technology but progressively dependent on technology. Social media is one key platform for these social interactions. It has become a place where people can share their opinions and express themselves freely. At first glance, social media seems to be a place for open discourse and community engagement. However, in the Arab region, and especially in Palestine, social media has become a space of gender inequality. In these spaces, women, girls, and gender minorities face several constraints. These constraints can be classified into various categories, for example, gender-based violence (GBV), racism, sexualization, sexual harassment, censorship and ostracization, and threats to their physical safety. These constraints highlight the important issue of digital gender safety on social media platforms. This paper will discuss the multiple constraints delimiting women and girls’ use of social media. It will focus on key concepts such as sexualization, sexism and sexist language, symbolic annihilation, gender roles, and gender stereotypes to understand these constraints. The paper will also propose methods and solutions that can empower women and girls to fight against these constraints to achieve gender equality in the digital world. To give more focus to this research, this paper will use Palestinian women and girls’ experiences on social media as a brief case study. Following an in-depth literature review, the paper will examine the case of

social media and gender equality in Palestine. Lastly, the paper will make several recommendations that can help make social media a gender equitable space.

Literature Review

Women from the Arab region face many barriers as social media users. These barriers are both personal, stemming from their own families and communities, and structural. Some of these constraints include strict censorship from the state and other governance actors. It is well known that many Arab states monitor social media accounts, including those of citizens, for behavior that “violates” social norms or challenges the state (de Vries & Majlaton, 2021). For example, 300 Palestinians were arrested in 2021 because of social media posts (Odeh, 2018). Censorship does not only come from the state. Instead, strict censorship laws have created an environment where people fear that their online activities might be in violation of societal norms and standards, which could consequently put their families, their communities, and even themselves in danger (de Vries & Majlaton, 2021). This fear then causes social media users to preemptively censor themselves. In certain cases, women have made fake social media accounts to avoid criticism and to feel a sense of freedom and safety, and to avoid censorship (Al Omoush et al., 2012; Radsch & Khamis, 2013, as cited by de Vries & Majlaton, 2021).

Social media censorship also occurs through the enforcement of traditional gender norms, which dictate how women and girls can behave or the things that they can discuss on social media. Women and girls who violate these social norms often face threats to their personal safety, making them vulnerable online. Gender-based violence (GBV), sexual harassment, and bullying are common in the virtual world, leaving many women and girls feeling unsafe, especially without adequate protections from governments to protect social media spaces. This is exacerbated by the fact that many countries in the Arab region do not have substantive GBV laws to protect women and girls; many countries do not even recognize online violence and harassment of women and girls as a form of GBV (Odeh, 2018). Without legal support, survivors and victims often turn to their own families in some instances to “take care of the issue,” which can often lead to simply ignoring the incident or pretending that it did not happen (Odeh, 2018). In some cases, certain forms of online GBV, including blackmail, sexual abuse, and the non-consensual dissemination of explicit photos, are considered “shameful” to family members, something that the survivor or victim herself might then be wrongfully punished for. Further, most perpetrators of online GBV are not punished, something which is exacerbated by the fact that online users can remain anonymous using fake accounts and fake names. Consequently, this virtual sphere allows aggressors to do things that they would never dare to do in real life.

Social Media and Gender Inequality in Palestine: A Brief Overview

In Palestine, women’s freedom of expression has been almost shut down. Strict cultural norms and expectations of women to act in a certain way, such as staying at home to serve as the primary caregiver for children and families, act as barriers between women and freedom of speech (Alyan et al., 2012; Berger, 2017, as cited in de Vries & Majlaton, 2021). In addition, women in patriarchal families are the “pride” of the family and a source of family “honor.” Therefore, their actions are often read through this lens, meaning that their actions are always heavily scrutinized for

whether they are bringing “shame” or “offense” to the family’s reputation (Choudhury & Al-Araj, 2018; Odeh, 2018, as cited in de Vries & Majlaton, 2021). This patriarchal environment locks women out of society and strengthens men’s power over them. For that reason, freedom of speech often does not apply to women, especially those in the public sphere, as it is considered a violation of this patriarchal order (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, as cited in Odeh, 2018). Collectively, these constraints have worked to silence women in digital spaces and have rendered them vulnerable to violence.

Censorship of women and girls on social media in Palestine takes many forms. Kinship monitoring is when family members monitor each other’s activities on social media. Families make sure that all posts on the social media accounts of women from their family abide by traditional societal and cultural expectations of Palestinian women (de Vries & Majlaton, 2021). In some cases, families go as far as using tracking and surveillance technologies such as mSpy and other smart phone applications to monitor the calls and texts of family members under the guise of “supervision” (Odeh, 2018).

Discussion

This literature review has analyzed a few of the many constraints that women in the Arab region face as social media users. It showed that families and society more broadly are responsible for threatening women’s freedom of expression. Women’s freedom of expression is often denied or monitored through various types of censorship performed by different actors, including the state, families, and communities. It also argued that women’s vulnerability when using social media highly affects their engagement rates in virtual spaces. In fact, the increasing prevalence of GBV on social media has led women and girls to fear this space, and to mistrust the patriarchal government that chooses not to protect them from this violence.

However, social media is also a powerful tool for those fighting on behalf of gender equality in the Arab region. First, social media awareness campaigns about the importance of women’s freedom of expression on social media, as well as campaigns about gender discrimination, can lessen the current censorship that women face in the virtual space. An example of a successful campaign is the Saudi Arabian campaign about women’s right to drive (Agaral et al., 2012, as cited in Hurley 2019). Such campaigns are key to educating people about feminist issues, discrimination against women, and social injustice more broadly. Social media has made it easier to disseminate such information and awareness-raising campaigns to a much larger audience.

Second, social media has become a key tool for mobilizing protesters in response to various issues, including online GBV. Facebook has been a particularly important platform for mobilizing protesters across the Arab region (Salem & Mourtada, 2012). The growth of social media usage or interactions on major topics can influence the government and can change how governments choose to respond to certain issues (Salem & Mourtada, 2012). Importantly, social media tools, for example hashtags, have made it easier to bring certain issues to the attention of people far beyond the region. These tools must be used to raise awareness about the prevalence of GBV on social media and to demand that governments act.

An example of an initiative where the digital space has helped women is HarassMap. HarassMap is a smart phone application that allows people to report instances of sexual harassment. The application allows the user to input information about the location of the attack, which is then made public so that other users can see exactly where sexual harassment is happening in real time. HarassMap gives survivors and victims the opportunity to talk about their experiences and to work together to protect others from experiencing the same violence. HarassMap offers support and empowerment messages from fellow users to give women a sense of safety and offers them an online space free of violence and censorship.

Similarly, an Instagram account called “pervsoflebanon” has been exposing sexual harassers in Lebanon. Survivors and victims are encouraged to share details about their own stories of assault with the page, whose administrators go on to expose the harasser on social media. The goal of the platform is to raise awareness about sexual violence and harassment in order to protect others. In fact, I know people who, after reporting their experiences to this Instagram account, felt empowered because they exposed their perpetrators. They felt that reporting to this page was an important way for them to make a change following such a horrible experience.

Finally, the rise of social media has led to a movement identified as “cyberfeminism”

(Al Rawzi et al.; 2014, as cited in Tazi & Oumlil, 2020). Cyberfeminism is when a group of feminists who specialize in technology, including social media, can use the power of technology to oppose gender inequality and other social and political constraints that affect women and girls, as well as other marginalized groups (Baumgardner et al., 2011, as cited in Tazi & Oumlil, 2020). Alongside cyberfeminism, access to social media more broadly has contributed to women’s empowerment. Social media has given women and girls access to information, it has increased communication between feminists and other social networks, and it has helped to raise awareness about political and social issues (Wheeler, 2007, as cited in Beninger et al., 2016). Consequently, if policies were implemented to support the increasing use of social media by women, online aggressors would be forced to think twice before committing any offense against women because it would be a punishable crime. In this way, the state can help women become less afraid when using social media, thus reestablishing a bit of trust between women and their respective governments. This will also make social media a safer space for women. Moreover, social media platforms should themselves provide their users with an abuse-free environment, as it is their responsibility to ensure the safety of their platform for their users.

Conclusion

Access to a safe online space can empower women even more than it already has, especially if policies are put in place to fight against gender inequality in these spaces. In the Arab region, protecting women and girls in online spaces allows them to fully benefit from social media in the ways discussed above. Rather than allowing social media to remain a dangerous space for women and girls, one that is rampant with GBV, it is important for governments and other key stakeholders to fight back. It is important to challenge GBV and other types of violence that disproportionately affects women and girls, and gender minorities, across social media spaces because of how useful social media can be for empowering marginalized groups. The goal should be

to support women and girls on social media to empower themselves, fight for change, put an end to the patriarchal order, and to continue building progress toward gender equality in the region.

references

Beninger, S., Ajjan, H., Mostafa, R. B., & Crittenden, V. L. (2016). A road to empowerment: Social media use by women entrepreneurs in Egypt. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 27(2-3), 308–332. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJESB.2016.073987

De Vries, M., & Majlaton, M. (2021). The voice of silence: Patterns of digital participation among Palestinian women in East Jerusalem. Media and Communication, 9(4), 309–319. https://doi. org/10.17645/mac.v9i4.4391

Hurley, Z. (2019). Why I no longer believe social media is cool…Social Media + Society, 5(3), 1–4. https:// doi.org/10.1177/2056305119849495

Odeh, S. (2018). A violent network: Gender-based violence against Palestinian women in virtual space. Kvinna till Kvinna and 7amleh – the Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media. https://kvinnatillkvinna.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/A-Violent-Network.pdf

Salem, F., & Mourtada, R. (2012). Social media in the Arab World: The impact on youth, women and social change. IEMed. https://www.iemed.org/publication/social-media-in-the-arab-world-theimpact-on-youth-women-and-social-change/

Tazi, M., & Oumlil, K. (2020). The rise of fourth-wave feminism in the Arab region? Cyberfeminism and women’s activism at the crossroads of the Arab Spring. CyberOrient, 14(1), 44–71. https:// cyberorient.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/06/CyberOrient_Vol_14_Iss_1_Tazi_Oumlil.pdf

The Aftermath of Sexual Assault in Warfare: Analysis of UN Security Council Resolution 2467

Reina Al Sayegh Architecture Major

Abstract

Sexual violence committed during conflict has been a critical subject of feminist analysis over the last several decades. As a result of this criticism and a global rise in interest concerning the rights of sexual assault survivors and victims during conflict, several UN Security Council Resolutions have been ratified with the explicit goal of preventing sexual violence in conflict. The aim of this paper is to analyze some of the resolutions, in particular UN Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019), to assess their efficacy.

Introduction

Sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and trafficking are only a few examples of sexual crimes committed against women occurring during times of insecurity and conflict. Sexual violence has long been utilized as a weapon in conflict to achieve military or political goals. More than ever, sexual violence is one of the most serious risks to women in conflict zones. Sexual assault and violence during conflict has long-term psychological consequences for women, which can lead to major physical problems in the future. Women frequently face difficulties accessing justice; feminists have long criticized the lack of accountability for sexual violence during conflict and the impunity with which opposing military groups often perpetuate such crimes. Worse, women’s voices are often suppressed both during and after conflict, making it difficult to prosecute cases of sexual violence. Further, women are frequently denied basic reproductive healthcare services and other types of critical support following an experience of sexual assault, often due to the social stigma associated with sexual violence.

Over the years, several United Nations resolutions, notably UN Resolution 1960 (2010), have condemned such practices and stressed the need to protect women in conflict settings. Similarly, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has also worked to expand legislation to protect against sexual violence during conflict. However, several issues remain. For example, many of these UN resolutions are not legally binding, and they focus on how sexual assault in conflict undermines peacekeeping and security rather than on the consequences of sexual violence for survivors. In other words, these resolutions are not survivor-centered. Critics also point out that in most wartorn regions around the world, there is still anarchy, a lack of justice, and only minor consequences for sexual assault, leaving many women unwilling to try to prosecute their perpetrators in court. Another issue that needs to be addressed in resolutions addressing sexual violence against women in conflict is the different types of sexual violence that can occur, and how these various types are not always recognized as war crimes and hence, are not handled with the same gravity as other sexual war crimes.

The UN Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019) is another important example of the international legal framework that works to eliminate sexual violence in conflict. UNSCR 2467 confirms that sexual assault, when used or executed as a military tactic or as part of a broader systematic attack, can aggravate and prolong military conflicts and obstruct peace and security efforts. UNSCR 2467 therefore asserts that effective policies to counter and respond to sexual violence in conflict can significantly contribute to successful peacekeeping. This resolution also begins to view the issue from a survivor-centered lens. However, there are still important gaps and challenges in this resolution that emphasize the need for a more complete, bolder, deeper, and survivor-centered vision of justice and compensation following sexual assault. To ensure that UNSCR 2467 can work, it is vital to bring these issues and inadequacies to the attention of the public, as well as relevant civil society organizations and the UN Security Council to ensure that we all—meaning, governments, international organizations, local civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and activists— work collaboratively to tackle this issue. More importantly, paying attention to this issue is critical given the prevalence of sexual assault in conflict zones including Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq, among others. Sexual assault is a war crime, and it should be acknowledged as such to treat all individuals fairly and equally, as well as to safeguard all genders and human rights.

Historical Background of Sexual Assault and Humanitarian Laws

Prior to the 1990s, rape was rarely prosecuted as a war crime. This was a direct consequence of the lack of humanitarian laws criminalizing sexual assault. However, Askin (1997) notes that even before international legislation emerged, traditions and national laws banned certain actions considered to be “inhumane” or “indecent”; in some instances, this included rape and sexual violence. Finally, in 1999 a humanitarian law was established to address civilian abuse and “any damage not justified by military necessity.”

As gender equality became increasingly important at the international level, more legislation was developed to protect women and girls from sexual violence during warfare. For instance, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 in 2008, which stated that “rape and other forms of sexual assault can constitute war crimes, crimes

against humanity, or a constitutive act with regard to genocide.” The following year, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009), one of a series of resolutions that recognized the negative impact of sexual violence in conflict and acknowledged that this crime undermines efforts to achieve peace and security as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

These resolutions acknowledge sexual assault and violence during conflict as a particularly detrimental form of sexual and gender-based violence. They push governments to ratify this and other legislation that protect women and foreground peacekeeping efforts during wartime. Their main concerns include ending impunity for sexual violence in conflict by assisting national authorities in strengthening criminal accountability; increasing their responsiveness to survivors and improving judicial capacity; protecting and empowering civilians facing sexual violence in conflict, particularly women and girls who are disproportionately affected by this crime; and finally, increasing recognition of rape as a tactic and consequence of war through awareness-raising activities at the international and national levels (Bobillier et al., n.d.). Through these resolutions, the UN has also focused on its role in harmonizing international responses to sexual violence during conflict. For example, the UN has organized the Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict network which has focal points located in 13 different UN agencies that amplify programming and advocacy on issues related to sexual violence in conflict. Finally, the UN works to support government ownership of programming to combat sexual violence during conflict.

UN Security Council

Resolution 2467 (2019)

While the work of these earlier UN resolutions has been critical in the fight against sexual violence in conflict, they did not foreground a survivor-centered framework. It was not until UN Security Council Resolution 2467, adopted in 2019 as part of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS), that the Security Council called for the adaptation of a survivor-centered approach in prevention and response to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations (Chinkin & Rees, 2019). A survivorcentered approach guarantees that prevention and response to sexual violence is driven by the needs of survivors. It prioritizes the support and resources that survivors need after such a traumatic experience. Further, a survivor-centered approach is premised on inclusivity and non-discrimination. It is holistic and ensures that survivors are given access to proper healthcare as well as economic and social support.

UNSCR 2467 is also inclusive in its language. It avoids some of the restrictive language used in previous resolutions, which often resulted in various types of sexual assault being excluded. For example, UNSCR 2467 avoids framing sexual assault as only or primarily a military tactic or weapon of war, and instead emphasizes that all sexual assault that occurs during conflict requires a targeted response (Chinkin & Rees, 2019). This can include domestic violence or community-level violence perpetuated by non-military actors. The resolution also avoids narrow definitions of survivors of sexual violence and instead covers a broader population by using the phrase “victims of sexual violence,” rather than only women and girls, while simultaneously acknowledging that “women and children…are particularly targeted” (UNSCR 2467, Preamble, Operative Paragraph 32).

Despite these promising advancements, UNSCR 2467 has been met with suspicion and dissatisfaction. Two worries dominate: First, that this resolution, like the past eight WPS resolutions, will not be enforced. Second, that the lack of enforcement will consequently work to diminish the power of WPS resolutions around the world. The first step in tackling these issues is to make UNSCR 2467 legally binding. While UN security council resolutions are important for raising awareness about certain issues, especially those related to gender inequality, legal viability is important for enforcing these resolutions and ensuring that actual progress is being made toward gender equality. A second step includes updating the language used in some of these resolutions. Making language more inclusive can ensure that all types of sexual violence are included in these resolutions, which is critical to strengthening UN Security Council resolutions and fighting against sexual violence in conflict.

Recommendations

While these resolutions are critical, they will be more successful if gender equality is also mainstreamed across the social, political, and economic spheres. For example, the empowerment and hiring of women in military positions can potentially increase the number of people in the military invested in protecting people from sexual violence during conflict. Having women in positions of power in the military might also lead to an increase in reporting of sexual violence; women might also serve as powerful allies for implementing various parts of the actions and strategies outlined by UN Security Council Resolutions like 2467.

Another important strategy that can help strengthen the implementation of UNSCR resolutions targeting sexual violence in conflict is awareness-raising campaigns and trainings, especially for military and other security personnel, on issues related to gender equality. Educating military personnel can empower these organizations to properly respond to cases of sexual violence; this is critical because a proper and immediate response to survivors of sexual assault is key for getting survivors the resources that they need to start the rehabilitation and healing process. By putting this information in the hands of military personnel, these resolutions can help strengthen the “front lines” of defense against sexual violence.

Another key aspect missing from current UN resolutions is an explicit definition of the sexual and reproductive healthcare resources that all survivors of sexual violence should be given access to. These resources are especially important in conflict settings, where the healthcare system might be unable to immediately respond to survivors’ needs because of infrastructural or financial damages incurred because of the conflict. It is therefore extremely important that future UN resolutions outline the ways that sexual and reproductive healthcare infrastructure must be protected to support potential survivors of sexual violence.

Moreover, it is of great importance for resolutions to clearly outline the legal actions to be taken against perpetrators of sexual violence. This will increase the legitimacy of these resolutions; the ability to mete out legal punishment will ensure that these resolutions are taken seriously. In other words, this can help to increase the legitimacy of these resolutions. This will not only support survivors but will equally deter perpetrators, who frequently benefit from impunity. The legal framework should

include protection against any form of abuse no matter the gender or social position (citizen or military) of the person who perpetrated the act of violence. Further, these legal procedures should go into effect in all countries across the world in order to treat all citizens equally. Finally, survivors should be supported by these resolutions should they choose to pursue their abusers in court.

Conclusion

It is shocking that in the 21st century, women are still fighting for a right as basic as protection against sexual violence. Women and girls deserve a policy that legally protects them from all forms of sexual violence, and especially during conflict. It is therefore critical for international organizations like the UN to develop inclusive and substantive resolutions that encourage countries to fight against sexual violence during conflict. Such policies should be survivor-centered and use inclusive language to make sure that all survivors of sexual violence—not just women and girls—are protected and supported in the aftermath of this traumatic experience. These resolutions should also work in collaboration with other UN and international initiatives to mainstream gender equality to support women and girls both before, during, and after conflict. As conflicts continue to expand around the world, it is crucial that we take immediate action to support and protect survivors of sexual violence.

references

Askin, K.D. (1997). War crimes against women: Prosecution in international war crimes tribunals. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Bobillier, S., Sassòli, M., & Issar, Y. (n.d.). Women and sexual violence. ICRC Casebook. https://casebook. icrc.org/case-study/women-and-sexual-violence

Chinkin, C., & Rees M. (2019). Commentary on Security Council Resolution 2467. London School of Economics. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report/ commentary-on-security-council-resolution-2467/19_0496_WPS_Commentary_Report_online. pdf

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009), S/RES/1888 (2009). United Nations Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019), S/RES/2467 (2019).

Inclusion of Women in Negotiations:

The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board and the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group

Gheed Khiami Architecture Major

Abstract

Women’s political inclusion rates in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are some of the lowest in the world. Ongoing conflict worsens these low rates, as is the case in both Syria and Yemen. Importantly, this has resulted in the lack of women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and negotiating conferences and meetings. To address this gap, international organizations led by the United Nations established the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board (WAB) and the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG). This policy paper aims to study the reasons why both the WAB and the TAG have been unsuccessful in their attempts to mainstream women’s participation in peacebuilding and negotiating process. The paper concludes with several proposals concerning how to strengthen women’s inclusion and representation in peacebuilding processes.

Introduction

Historically, gender norms and expectations have created serious barriers to women’s political participation. Instead, the field of politics has been largely dominated by men who continue to propose policies that in many cases are gender blind. While hundreds of initiatives have emerged over the past several decades with the objective of increasing women’s political participation, these have had limited success in the Arab region. Today, the Arab region has the lowest rate of women’s political participation globally, with only 15.2% of the region’s parliaments containing women members. Women are also underrepresented in political parties around the region, with some parties even refusing to field a single female candidate (UN Women, n.d.). This lack of women’s political participation is heightened during conflict, as women are often

sidelined in peacebuilding and negotiating processes. This is particularly problematic as women are disproportionately affected by conflict. And yet, an important variable that affects a peace agreement’s sustainability and durability is the presence and participation of women. For example, 64% of peace agreements are less likely to fail if women participate in their creation and, similarly, peace agreements are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years with the presence of women at the negotiating table (Barsa et al., 2016).

In attempt to increase the involvement of women in politics and to have inclusive negotiation processes, the offices of the Special Envoy of Syria and Yemen have each partnered with UN Women to establish the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board (WAB) and the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG), respectively. This paper briefly reviews each of these organizations, including their successes and failures, and discusses strategies for strengthening women’s political inclusion in peacebuilding and negotiating processes in the future.

The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board

Syrian women, both prior to the war and today, are often discouraged from working in politics for several reasons. One of these reasons is the sexist mentality that deems such work as “inappropriate” for women. Another reason includes the gender discriminatory laws that are imposed on women as well as the lack of education and skills that discourage them from running for leadership positions (Ghazzawi et al., 2015). A third reason is the fear of being harmed due to the lack of security in the country.

Although Syrian women face many barriers to entering the political arena, they have made valuable contributions that have helped to secure peace in certain communities over the past 11 years of the war. Syrian women have helped to broaden the agenda of various peacebuilding processes by bringing attention to critical issues that, prior to their involvement, had been ignored or dismissed. Syrian women have also participated in work related to the release of prisoners and they have brought added attention to forced disappearances. For example, in Banias, a group of 2,000 women and children who blocked a highway left the government no choice but to release hundreds of men who had been illegally detained. Syrian women have also helped to ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid by negotiating ceasefires in local areas. Syrian women have also aided in the distribution of medical supplies, they have organized peaceful protests, and they continue to work in various sectors such as education and healthcare in order to ensure that their communities have access to their everyday needs.

Political interventions in Syria formally began in 2012 with Geneva I, where women were notably absent. As a result, Syrian women began to pressure the UN to address this gender gap and to help them create a network of women to participate in these peacebuilding processes. While Syrian women were consequently present at the second round of political negotiations, which took place in January 2014, they were still underrepresented. These peace talks ultimately failed due to several factors including geopolitical manipulation, regional instability, contrasting global interests, and constant obstruction caused by the different parties to the negotiations taking place, as well as the absence of women. At the very same moment, the UN held its first highvisibility women’s conference in the Netherlands to give Syrian women a platform

to address their concerns and to make recommendations to the Joint Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. This conference resulted in the launch of a group of diverse women civil society activists, the Syrian Women’s Initiative for Peace and Democracy (SWIPD). Finally, in February 2016, after three years of Syrian women’s hard work, Special Envoy Staffan De Mistura formed the Women’s Advisory Board (WAB). The WAB includes 12 Syrian women from different backgrounds and affiliations, who were appointed to ensure the inclusion of women and to represent women’s different perspectives. However, the WAB does not directly participate in political negotiations; rather, they advise the mediators in the Geneva peace talks.

Syrian Women’s Thoughts on WAB

As soon as WAB was created, some Syrian women felt that they were being pushed by the UN, along with other international actors, to put their political differences aside. This resulted in a backlash from the members of the WAB; while a very political war was happening in Syria, the WAB was using politically neutral language and remained silent on crucial issues such as a call for cease-fire (Asad, 2022). This depoliticization of the WAB reinforced gender norms about women as “peaceful” rather than “political,” challenging their legitimacy as decision-making actors. As Marcell Shehwaro, a Syrian activist, pointed out, the situation in Syria is extremely political and yet, Syrian women were only offered an advisory position instead of a political one (Mahmoud, 2016).

This depoliticization of the WAB has been met with serious critiques from Syrian women and feminists. For example, when the WAB came out with a statement blaming the lack of food and aid in many parts of Syria on international sanctions, many Syrian women categorized the statement as politicized and fallacious because the inability was due to the military’s intention to starve and control these oppositiondominated towns, not because of international sanctions. As Oula Ramada, a Syrian women’s rights activist noted on Facebook in response to the statement, “I am a Syrian feminist, and this advisory board does not represent me in the slightest.” Other groups of women have critiqued the WAB selection process and have argued that the included women do not represent the women of Syria. For example, veiled women felt they were not adequately represented in the WAB, given that most women in Syria are veiled while only a few of the 12 members of the WAB are (Asad, 2022). Shehwaro, like many Syrian women, expresses another concern by saying that the WAB members do not live like regular Syrian women and thus, they do not know their struggle (Mahmoud, 2016). Dr. Mouna Ghanem, a Syrian activist and previous WAB member, notes that when she joined other Syrian women democrats at the peace talks in Geneva, they were not seen as official participants. Rather, they were considered as bystanders or observers to the process. As a result, she left the WAB; Ghanem felt like these negotiations, which did not even include Syrian women as central negotiators, were leading nowhere. Worse, she felt that the future of Syrians was being put in the hands of people that do not represent them in the slightest.

Despite all the efforts of the WAB, Syrian women remain under-represented in negotiations. At Geneva Peace talks in 2017, for example, Syrian women made up only 15% of negotiators (Bigio & Vogelstein, 2018). Even when women are included in peace talks, their role remains observatory.

The Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group

As in Syria, women’s historically limited political participation in Yemen is in part due to a discriminatory legal and social system that makes it very difficult, if not impossible for women to enter politics. As a result, Yemen’s political parties are dominated by men; so too are Yemen’s peace talks. As Rana Ghanem, a participant in peace talks, argues, the only way to begin to correct this imbalance is to implement a 30% gender quota across political institutions in the country. However, Yemeni women continue to play an active role in response to the war, with some participating directly in military action (Middle East Monitor, 2017). Others have participated in local initiatives, including the Mothers of Abductees Association, that seeks to raise awareness about forced disappearances in the country because of the conflict (Nasser, 2018).

In October 2015, UN Women and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen (OSESGY) established the Yemeni Women’s Pact for Peace and Security, which is known as “Tawafuq.” Tawafuq had 45 members, including gender specialists, activists, members of political parties, and businesswomen. The issue with Tawafuq was that although it was established to represent Yemeni women’s voices in OSESGY’s work, the description of how they would do that and what their role would entail was unclear (Gutschke, 2017). In 2016, OSESGY appointed a full-time senior gender advisor in the hopes of amplifying women’s voices and including them in peace negotiations. Unfortunately, this caused tension between OSESGY and UN Women as the two organizations had competing visions of what Tawafuq’s goals and aims should be.

OSESGY then decided to create its own version of the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, with a new special envoy in 2018. As a result, the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was established. Resembling the WAB, members of TAG were picked by the OSESGY gender advisor based on certain criteria to ensure diversity within its membership. Surprisingly, however, TAG members were not invited to join meetings organized by the special envoy. Following the failed Geneva peace talks in 2018, several TAG members were told that they would not be invited again, despite the failure of the first convention (ICG, 2021).

Yemeni Women’s Thoughts on TAG

During the 2018 Geneva peace talks, members of TAG were invited to present prepared papers. However, they were unclear about what was expected of them at this meeting. Further, they were treated simply as participants, rather than as active negotiators. Once again, TAG members were not really invited to directly participate in peace negotiations (Buringa, 2021). During that same negotiation meeting in Geneva, only one woman was present at the negotiation table, Rana Ghanem, who was there as a member of the Yemeni government’s delegation (Domingues, 2022). Without denying the importance of Ghanem’s contributions during those meetings as the only woman there, Yemeni women were extremely disappointed with the lack of women’s engagement during these peace talks. These techniques are used to include women in an indirect way in formal political processes without creating room for them to participate directly or actively (Domingues, 2022). Women should be given meaningful roles in formal negotiations, like Rana Ghanem.

Recommendations

To increase women’s meaningful political participation in peace processes, the UN Special Envoy should enforce a 30% women’s quota for all delegations participating in peace negotiations. The UN should also dedicate a certain percentage of the funds allocated to peacebuilding activities to support women’s groups and organizations to empower more women to participate in peacebuilding negotiations. As women’s roles in Yemen and Syria continue to evolve during the conflicts in each respective country, UN women should work on training Syrian and Yemeni women as leaders and decision-makers and should aim to support these women as peacebuilders and political advocates.

Additionally, groups like WAB and TAG should work on coordinating with other activist women’s groups in the country in order to mainstream a common agenda. Working collectively will give these groups a stronger foundation from which to confront and fight back against gender inequality and discrimination, and the ongoing conflict. Further, the inclusion of more women’s groups means that national level groups like WAB and TAG can better account for the views and opinions of women from different ethnic, class, and other social categories. It is not enough to have a small group of eight or 12 women members to represent millions of women. This paper suggests expanding the membership of each group to approximately 80 people. These members would not be chosen by the UN but would be elected by other Syrian or Yemeni women, respectively, using creative methods such as digital voting to ensure a democratic election process. These 80 women would represent all Syrian or Yemeni women and would, in return, vote for an advisory group made up of 10 women. That way, the new WAB or TAG council would better represent Syrian or Yemeni women at peacebuilding and negotiation meetings.

Conclusion

The inclusion of women in peace processes is vital for an inclusive process that can reflect the concerns of society. The inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes more generally ensures the long-term efficacy of such negotiations. An analysis of the Syrian WAB and the Yemeni TAG highlights how some of the formal attempts to mainstream women’s participation in peacebuilding talks by the UN have not been as successful as originally hoped. Rather, WAB and TAG appear to be more tokenistic in nature, meaning, the women members of these groups were included only as a nod to gender equality rather than with the intention of allowing these women to directly participate in peacebuilding activities. Relying on women’s advisory groups such as WAB and TAG is not enough, as these are indirect methods of inclusion that give women a voice but not a vote to affect change. Toward that end, groups resembling WAB and TAG are important and should exist, but they should be modified so that their members can have a direct role in formal peacebuilding processes.

references

Asad, R. (2022, January 26). The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board – Lessons to be learned. Heinrich-BöllStiftung. https://www.boell.de/en/2022/01/25/der-syrische-frauenrat-aus-fehlern-lernen

Barsa, M., Holt-Ivry, O., & Muehlenbeck, A. (2016). Inclusive ceasefires: Women, gender, and a sustainable end to violence. Inclusive Security. https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/03/Inclusive-Ceasefires-ISA-paper-Final-3.10.2016.pdf

Buringa, J. (2021, August 23). Strategizing beyond the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in Yemen: The importance of CEDAW. Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies. https://sanaacenter. org/publications/main-publications/14915

Bigio, J., & Vogelstein, R. (2018, February 22). Syria is devastated. Where are the women? CNN. https:// edition.cnn.com/2018/02/22/opinions/increased-womens-participation-in-un-backed-syrianpeace-negotiations-bigio-vogelstein-opinion/index.html

Domingues, E.J. (2022). Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution. Janus.Net e-journal of international relations, 12(2), 37–50.

Ghazzawi, R., Mohammad, A., & Ramadan, O. (2015). Peacebuilding defines our future now: A study of women’s peace activism in Syria. Badael Foundation. http://www.badael.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/Syria_october22.pdf

Gutschke, T. (2017). Yemeni women’s pact for peace and security, stock taking study. Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative.

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2021, March 18). The case for more inclusive—and more effective—peacemaking in Yemen. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-andarabian-peninsula/yemen/221-case-more-inclusive-and-more-effective-peacemaking-yemen

Mahmoud, Z. (2016, April 20). Women’s Advisory Board in Geneva sparks controversy. The New Humanitarian. https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/syria/articles/2016/04/20/womensadvisory-board-in-geneva-sparks-controversy

Middle East Monitor. (2017, May 9). Yemen’s Houthis recruit women to fight. https://www. middleeastmonitor.com/20170509-yemens-houthis-recruit-women-to-fight/ Nasser, A. (2018). Yemen’s women confront war’s marginalization. Middle East Report, 289. https:// merip.org/2019/03/yemens-women-confront-wars-marginalization/ UN Women. (n.d.). Leadership and political participation. https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/what-wedo/leadership-and-political-participation

The Role of Palestinian Women in Israel-Palestine Peace Negotiations

Lyne Sammouri Multimedia Journalism Major

Abstract

The participation and inclusion of women in mediation, negotiation, and conflict resolution enhances and alternates results prior to, throughout, and in post-conflict situations because women bring different perspectives to the negotiating table. However, there is a global absence of women in official peacebuilding efforts. This exclusion overlooks their abilities, and it hinders the potential to combat regional and international insecurity and other peace challenges. Using the case of IsraeliPalestinian negotiations, this study stresses the importance of including Palestinian women in peacebuilding. By synthesizing existing literature, this paper 1) examines the role of women and lack thereof at different historical stages and at multiple levels of diplomacy related to Israel-Palestine peace negotiations; 2) addresses the barriers to the effective participation of women in peacebuilding; and 3) analyzes the impact of patriarchal culture in deepening the gender gap and the tokenistic use of women in peacebuilding processes. The paper then suggests several policy recommendations framed by an intersectional feminist approach that can advocate for the inclusion of women peacebuilding.

Introduction

The predominance of men as well as the significant marginalization of women in senior diplomatic and negotiating roles is amongst the most striking patterns of contemporary politics. While it may highlight the gender stereotypical view of foreign relations as the “domain” of men, the lack of women’s involvement in peacebuilding also corresponds to broader changes in global affairs (Aghabekian, 2019). In relation to Palestine, the historical background of occupation has affected women’s participation in politics more broadly. Defined by hegemonic masculinity and power consolidation, the political system and the cycle of Israel-Palestine peace negotiations continue to keep women at the margins, even as women’s political participation has slowly increased over the last decade (Aghabekian, 2019). For instance, ever since the ratification of the Oslo Accords between 1993 and 1995, women have been present across state-building and activism; nevertheless, the official representation of these women in formal negotiation processes has been weak and low (Aghabekian, 2019).

There is evidence suggesting that peace treaties with women at the negotiating table last longer, a statistic that is calculated by comparing the number of days between the ratification of the peace treaty and the resumption of conflict or warfare (Christien & Mukhtarova, 2020). Evidence also suggests that treaties with women signatories have a significantly larger number of clauses focused on progressive change (Nerenberg, 2018). This has been attributed to the fact that women signatories are more willing to cooperate with various social and political actors (Turner, 2020). As a result, they often have significant connections to civil society organizations (CSO), have valuable information about their own communities, and often agree to support the implementation of peacebuilding treaties at the community scale.

Drawing from this evidence, this policy paper presents and analyzes the historical evolution of Palestinian women’s participation, or lack thereof, in peacebuilding negotiations. The first section presents a literature review of the issue and highlights some of the major causes and implications of the problem. The second section investigates how some internal and external policies have affected the participation of Palestinian women in senior diplomatic negotiations over time. The paper concludes with a discussion of potential policy reforms that can increase Palestinian women’s participation in peacebuilding negotiations.

Overview

As per the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), all actors, especially women, are encouraged to take part in negotiation processes, including at senior levels. UNSCR 1325 reiterates that safety, peacebuilding, and reconciliation activities are more sustainable when all members of society are equal participants in and are equally represented by peacebuilding processes (S/RES/1325, 2000). As a signatory to UNSCR 1325, the Palestinian government developed a national action plan (NAP) in 2016 to implement the resolution and to ensure that women were equally represented in peacebuilding talks and processes (Nerenberg, 2018).

Preceding the Oslo Accords, in 1991 a three-day Madrid Conference was held to jumpstart a political settlement between the occupying state of Israel, the Arab countries, and Palestine. However, during that time, the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation had no explicit Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) affiliations, and had only one woman, Hanan Ashrawi, present in the negotiation’s delegation. The Oslo Accords, which were signed 25 years ago, mark a key period and an important starting point for an analysis of women’s participation in peacebuilding processes in Palestine. Although several women activists contributed to the resistance and promotion of a peace process at the grassroots level in besieged Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, research shows that the lack of inclusion and marginalization of women at the formal negotiation table during the Oslo Accords set a damaging precedent for future negotiations and ultimately marked a turbulent and unsuccessful search for peace (Nakao, 2019).

In 1993, the chairperson of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, ratified the Oslo Agreement, titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) with the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. The DOP was based on common standards established by the occupying state and the occupied state of Palestine that established

a timetable for creating a Palestinian self-governing state over a period of five months (Nakao, 2019). The DOP was a profound paradigmatic shift and marked the end of a lengthy history of reciprocal hostility. The DOP was lauded for heralding the end of “contemporary colonialism.”

Today, however, the “two-state” settlement, a negotiated solution to the occupation vis-à-vis the construction of two states, Israel and an independent Palestine, has not only failed but remains improbable. Although countless experts have analyzed the failure of the Oslo Accords, they do not agree on the reason it began to crumble apart (Nakao, 2019). Several feminists attribute the failure of the Oslo Accords to the absence of Palestinian women from the mediation and negotiation table. For this reason, they claim, the Oslo Accord was sexist and gender-blind from the very beginning, which limited the effectiveness and the inclusivity of the Accords (Nakao, 2019). For example, the fourteen confidential diplomatic senior negotiations that characterized the Oslo process were held without the presence of women in senior decision-making positions. However, this limited involvement does not reflect women’s active role in grassroots organizing in Palestine, who have been an active part of resistance since the onset of the occupation. For example, in 2003, a group of Palestinian women led the march against the wall that had been built by the Israeli occupation in the West Bank.

Where are All the Women?

There are different barriers limiting the effective participation of women in Track One diplomacy and international negotiations. Track One diplomacy refers to formal negotiations, whereas Track Two and Track Three frequently involve non-government actors, including civil society and activist groups. Track One peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes, at both the national and international level, have historically pushed women to the sidelines because they do not use an intersectional approach. This is partially because Track One processes and negotiations focus on state-building, which is a male-dominated process (Paffenholz et al., 2015).

The lack of women’s engagement in Track One diplomacy also stems from the fact that key political actors such as the Palestinian government, international actors, and the Israeli government all contributed to a harsh socioeconomic climate for Palestinian women, which has limited women’s ability to access political spaces and positions with decision-making power. After the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA), formed primarily of men, continued to downplay women’s rights and concerns. They argued that nation-state building must be a priority, whereas women’s rights were secondary to this concern. In addition, the involvement of foreign actors, worsened by donor conditions that dictated how local actors could spend their budgets, crippled grassroots women’s rights and feminist movements. Of course, the brutal reality of living under occupation played an equally important role in fracturing women’s rights groups, as well as facilitating the continued domination of patriarchal structures in Palestine (Nakao, 2019). Finally, since most of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have been hosted by male political or military figures, women remain absent in the process and are relegated to Track Two and Track Three diplomacy (Nakao, 2019).

While some research does exist on the absence of Palestinian women in formal IsraeliPalestinian negotiations, this research is limited in its scope. Broadly, this research

confirms that women make up solely 4% of mediators and negotiators in international peace negotiations overall, which is still incredibly low. On the other hand, another study proved that amongst thirty-one international formal peace negotiations held between 1992 and 2011, only 4% of the signatories were women and 9% were negotiators (Nakao, 2019).

When addressing the low participation rates of women in peacebuilding processes, and particularly in an occupied Arab country that has been suffering from violent acts of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, war, and annexation, it is crucial to note that the participation of Palestinian women in politics has been modest. While political quotas exist—for example, Article 17 of the Palestinian Law on Local Council Elections enforces a 20% women’s quota in local political offices—only 12.9% of parliamentarians are women, while a mere 12.5% of all ministerial level positions are held by women (UN Women, 2022). This is attributed to several things, most importantly the occupation, which has made it difficult for many women to participate in politics. Second, the consensus among political groups and many Palestinians themselves is that “gender issues” and women’s rights concerns are secondary to nation-state building. Lastly, the historically patriarchal organization of Palestinian society, just as much of the Arab states region, makes it structurally difficult for women to enter the political arena. The PLO, for example, which began as a Palestinian civilian movement against the Israeli occupation, has been controlled by men. Today, women make up only 8% of the PLO’s Palestinian National Council (UN Women, 2022).

While there was a significant increase in government service under the Palestinian administration in the 2000s, Palestinians were recruited for these positions based on clientelism and favoritism rather than a defined administrative recruiting procedure. As a result, women were once again sidelined and pushed out of Palestinian political space. Today, women represent less than 50% of political administration posts, with most women placed in mid- and low-level positions (UN Women, 2022). Women are not regarded as legitimate decision-makers or political actors, in line with traditional gender attitudes that see women as passive, stay-at-home wives, mothers, and daughters rather than as political leaders. Relatedly, the appointment of some women to positions in government was often the result of their participation in traditional political groups, or with the support of male family members and friends. These affiliations made it difficult for some of these women to try to implement feminist reforms, which might be seen as threatening to traditional elites and the patriarchal system. Therefore, the process of state-building did not challenge traditional patriarchal norms, but rather resembled a “shift” from private patriarchal control within the family, to public patriarchal control organized through the state.

At the level of policymaking, the Palestinian Authority (PA) made very modest promises to tackle women’s needs. While it adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) without hesitation, the implementation of legislation to enforce the CEDAW has been uneven. For example, the Palestinian legislative system has enacted minimal regulations that identify or penalize discriminatory practices. In 2003, the PA created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) to promote and encourage Palestinian women; however, the ministry’s capacity to draw state funds to support women’s rights has been minimal.

No Peace Without Women

Because Israel-Palestine peace talks specify who obtains what, when, where, and therefore, the allocation of resources, an absence of women in these peace talks has a wide range of adverse consequences. First, the disproportionate impacts of conflict on women are completely overlooked. Peace accords negotiated and mediated by men frequently ignore gender; they typically treat men’s post-conflict demands as “human problems,” or applicable to all genders equally, and therefore do not focus on issues that particularly affect women and girls. Moreover, the national legislative and administrative framework, while frequently viewed as gender neutral, is often unfriendly to women. The sort of voting system used, how social and economic concerns are handled, as well as the interaction between current regulations and civil rights all have a particular impact on women’s rights. Thus, the absence of a gender lens has the potential to prolong oppressive practices.

The following recommendations can help to bolster Palestinian women’s participation in peace talks:

• Stakeholders should restructure the framework and methodology of all international negotiations to ensure that most of the population is able to track the progress of negotiations. They should also include a space for the opinions of women and community members in formal negotiations, and they should visualize negotiations with a sustainable end goal that is in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).

• Guarantee at least 50% active participation of women throughout all mediation processes to ensure that women’s needs are addressed and to promote openness of national reconciliation activities to the broader community.

• International civil society organizations must assist Palestinian women. This can include forming alliances with local women-led democratic organizations to raise awareness and to generate political will to address women’s interests and needs through peace-building initiatives.

• The UN should monitor and examine the application of UNSCR 1325 and should challenge any discriminatory processes perpetuated by the Israeli Occupation and the Palestinian governing forces that prevent women from participating in peacebuilding and other political processes.

• Promote understanding and sensitization initiatives via decentralized regional and local non-governmental women’s networks that educate about disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration procedures through a survivor-centered lens. These initiatives should target societal stigmas and gender roles concerning women soldiers and militarized masculinity.

• Call for the translation of the UNSCR 1325 into local languages and dialects for broader understanding.

• Ensure dedicated funding to support women’s inclusion in peace processes.

• Ensure that all mediators obtain training on gender-responsive language and ways to engage with women in the public sphere. Political negotiators should also be trained on the local context and history of the region, to ensure that any suggestions made try to work with these traditions rather that in opposition to them, when possible, with the goal to create collaboration rather than tension between local and international actors.

Conclusion

One thing is clear: There are not enough women engaging in formal Israel-Palestine peace negotiations and processes. This is detrimental to Palestinian women’s progress. What is required to achieve a meaningful and serious breakthrough in senior diplomatic discussions is more women leaders and higher rates of women’s participation in political processes. There need to be more women in positions with decision-making power to ensure that politics are more inclusive. Existing Palestinian and other international leaders must recognize the tremendous potential of including women in major diplomatic and conciliation processes. Without women, we cannot achieve peace.

references

Aghabekian, V. (2019). Demanding a bigger role: Palestinian women in politics and decision making. Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 35(3), 241–264. https://doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2019.1679948

Christien, A., & Mukhtarova, T. (2020). Explaining trends in the frequency of gender provisions in peace agreements, 1990–2019. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS). https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/explaining-trends-in-the-frequency-of-gender-provisionsin-peace-agreements-1990-2019/

Nakao, Y. (2019). A feminist view on the Oslo Process: The case of the Palestinian women’s movement [Master’s thesis, The University of Tokyo]. http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/A-Feminist-View-on-the-Oslo-Process-The-Case-of-Palestinian-WomensMovement.pdf

Nerenberg, D. (2018, September 24). What do peace processes without women’s participation produce? Less peace. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ wp/2018/09/24/25-years-after-the-oslo-accords-evidence-that-peace-processes-suffer-withoutwomen/

Paffenholz, T., Ross, N., Dixon, S., Shluchter, A., & True, J. (2015). Making women count—Not just counting women. UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/5/ making-women-count-not-just-counting-women

Turner, C. (2020). “Soft ways of doing hard things”: Women mediators and the question of gender in mediation. Peacebuilding, 8(4), 383–401. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2019.1664369

UN Women. (2022). Facts and figures: Leadership and political participation. https://palestine. unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures-0 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). S/RES/1325.