Briefing Room: October 2022

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victories

LCW Successfully Upholds A Peace Officer’s Termination For Dishonesty And Excessive Force.

LCW Partner Jennifer Rosner and Associate Attorney Danny Ivanov succeeded in upholding a county’s termination of a peace officer. The officer was accused of using excessive force during a pursuit, and subsequently lying about his actions in both his supplemental police report and investigative interview.

The case began on May 5, 2020, when a passenger in a vehicle involved in a pursuit fled the vehicle. After deputies apprehended the fleeing passengersuspect, the officer kicked the suspect’s head and left side of his body. When the suspect turned his head, the officer then kicked him three more times in the face. The officer later placed his knee on the suspect’s head. When the suspect cried out in pain, the officer slapped him and said: “Shut up, shut your mouth.” The officer’s force caused bleeding and facial fractures that required medical attention. The officer filed a supplemental report that falsely indicated he kicked the suspect four to five times in the arm, shoulder, and upper torso, and not the head and face.

The arbitrator found that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that the officer’s use of force was inappropriate, unnecessary, and unreasonable. The kicks to the face and head were unreasonable because they were not applied to arrest, prevent escape, or overcome resistance. The arbitrator rejected the officer’s claims that he did not intend to kick the suspect in the face or head, and that he did not recall kneeling on the suspect’s head. The arbitrator cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386 (1989), in deciding it was irrelevant whether the officer used force in good faith or maliciously. In Graham, the Court determined that an objective reasonableness standard applied to

a civilian’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force when making an arrest.

The arbitrator also found that the officer had acted dishonestly by not properly documenting his use of force and by omitting relevant information pertaining to where the officer applied the force on the suspect’s body. The arbitrator noted that regardless of the officer’s intentions, he still misrepresented and omitted information concerning the incident, which violated the department’s policy against dishonesty.

LCW Successfully Upholds The Removal Of An FTO Assignment For Delayed And Inadequate Response To A 911 Call.

LCW Partner Scott Tiedemann and Associate Attorney Alex Wong convinced the Superior Court to uphold a City Manager’s decision to remove a police officer from his premium-paid, Field Training Officer (FTO) assignment.

The case began on May 16, 2018, when the City’s police department received a 911 call from a teenager. She was home caring for her younger sibling while her neighbor was outside her house yelling that he had “f…ed up.” The call was logged into the CAD system, along with the information that the neighbor- subject had previously been convicted for substance abuse and involuntarily committed to a mental facility.

At approximately 4:43am, the FTO received the call from dispatch and responded he was “enroute to call.” The teenager’s home was 1.2 miles from the police station, and no more than a 5-minute drive. The FTO and his trainee did not arrive at the home until 15 minutes later because they took time at the station to “wrap up” lunch, re-organize chairs, set the alarm, and use the restroom.

The FTO had been to the subject-neighbor’s house because the subject had previously “barricaded” himself in his home and the officer had spent 45 minutes to coax the subject out. Once the FTO and his trainee arrived at the 911 caller’s home, only the trainee got out and inspected the location with a flashlight. When the trainee did not see anything, he returned to the car. The officers did not contact either the teenager who called in the complaint, or anyone at the neighbor’s residence. They marked the call “completed” four minutes after they arrived on scene.

After an investigation and an advisory hearing, the City Manager decided to permanently remove the officer from his FTO assignment. The officer appealed his reassignment to the California superior court.

The court reviewed whether the City Manager’s decision was a prejudicial abuse of his discretion. An abuse occurs if an administrative decision: was not reached in the manner required by law and the agency’s rules; was not supported by the findings at the hearing; or if the evidence at the hearing did not support the decision’s findings.

The court found that any errors in the decision-making process did not prejudicially affect the officer’s rights. The court found that the weight of the evidence supported the City Manager’s decision. First, the 15-minute delay was not justified because a minor had called 911 at 4:43 am to report that a tall, young man was outside her house ringing her doorbell and cursing. The CAD notes also indicated that the man had convictions for substance abuse, failure to appear and probation violations. Because the officer had not identified any good reason to delay the response, the evidence supported the finding that his 15-minute response was a neglect of duty.

Second, the court found that the weight of the evidence showed that the officer’s decision to remain in the car while the trainee searched the area also violated numerous Police Department policies. Most importantly, letting the trainee search alone in those circumstances was inconsistent with both officer safety and the need for an FTO to demonstrate the right way to do police work.

The court concluded that the City Manager’s decision to remove the officer from his FTO assignment and pay was within his discretion and consistent with good cause. The court noted that the FTO is an important assignment that is responsible for training new officers in Department policies and procedures. The officer’s misconduct reasonably supported the decision to remove the officer from his FTO assignment due to his failure to meet those high standards.

new to the Firm!

We are pleased to announce that Ronnie M. DeCesare, has joined Liebert Cassidy Whitmore as our newest Executive Director. Ronnie has over 20 years of leadership experience in the legal industry with a proven record for strategic business successes. He remains a committed leader who believes in fostering internal collaboration that ultimately provides our clients with the best legal counsel and superior service levels.

James P. Bonnie, an associate in our Fresno office, uses his public agency experience to represent his clients in all employment and labor law aspects, including litigation, employee discipline, administrative hearings, and investigation.

Cindy Allen, an associate in our San Francisco office, has dedicated her career to providing top tier representation to public education agencies. Cindy specializes in special education, Title IX, and student discipline issues.

due

process

State Agency’s Skelly Letter Failed To Provide Employee Adequate Notice Of Discipline.

One summer evening in 2017, Sergeant Steven Rodgers, a Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) employee, was working an evening “contraband surveillance watch” shift at the Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit (SHU). Contraband surveillance watch is a procedure for monitoring inmates suspected of hiding drugs or weapons inside their body. The inmate is physically restrained and placed in a cell under constant observation until they excrete the contraband, or 72 hours has elapsed. The restraints prevent the inmate from accessing and re-ingesting the contraband before staff can retrieve it. Each watch is divided into shifts that a sergeant supervises. At least twice during the shift, the supervising sergeant is required to help the officer ensure the restraints are secure and comfortable. Pelican Bay’s policy states a preference that these checks occur at the beginning and end of every shift, though it is not mandatory.

At approximately 10:00 pm that night, correctional officers Angulo and Palafox began their shift and requested Rodgers to conduct the first restraint check. The officers’ testimony differs as to what happened next.

Angulo and Palafox said Rodgers allegedly told them he was “too busy” at the time. At approximately 10:30 pm, Palafox again asked Rodgers to do the check, to which Rodgers told Palafox to “pencil whip” (a military term that means to forge or falsify) the form to show the check as completed. Rodgers also allegedly said if anything happened, he’d “take the hit”. The officers then contacted another Sergeant, who contacted Rodger’s supervisor Lieutenant Vanderhoofven. The officers said they asked Rodgers again at 11:15 pm to conduct the restraint check, at which point he “became irritated” for repeatedly asking him. Around midnight,

approximately two hours into the shift, Rodgers conducted the restraint check and discovered one of the inmate’s leg cuffs were not double-locked.

At around 2:00 am, Lt. Vanderhoofven visited the facility to discuss proper procedures with Rodgers after hearing Rodgers was “refusing” to conduct the check. After the Lieutenant left, Rodgers allegedly returned to the watch area and angrily asked the officers, “Which one of you mother f…ers spoke to another sergeant about this?” The next morning, at approximately 5:30 am, Sergeant Reynoso arrived to take over as supervising sergeant and the officers asked him to do the check with them. When Rodgers arrived approximately 10 minutes later to do the final check and discovered it had already been completed, he became upset again and said, “What the hell, you trying to have another sergeant do my job?”

Rodger’s version of events is different. He states he never neglected his duty to perform the restraint checks, but that he simply was too busy to perform the checks at the times the officers repeatedly asked. Rodgers was angry the officers were falsely accusing him of neglecting the restraint checks when Rodgers was simply telling them that he would conduct the checks later.

In May 2018, CDCR served Rodgers with a Notice of Adverse Action (NOAA) stating that his salary would be reduced by 10 percent for two years, effective the end of that month. The NOAA alleged Rodgers: (i) neglected his duties by “refusing to perform” the inspection at the beginning of shift; (ii) treated his subordinates in a “discourteous and disrespectful” manner when he angrily, and with profane language, “confronted and intimidated” them about reporting his neglect of duty to another sergeant; and (iii) “misused [his] authority” when he directed the officers to “pencil whip” their inspection documentation, thereby “instructing them to fill in inaccurate information regarding the restraint inspections on official records.”

Rodgers requested a hearing. The hearing officer largely credited Rodgers’ testimony over the officers’ testimony. The hearing officer found the allegation that Rodgers had refused to perform a timely restraint check at the beginning of the shift was unsubstantiated. This is because Rodgers repeatedly said he would do the check later because he was tending to other duties. Palafox’s watch form corroborated Rodgers’ testimony that he performed the check approximately 45 minutes into the shift. The hearing officer concluded the document falsification allegation was unsubstantiated, because he credited Rodgers’ testimony to “pencil in” the form, not “pencil whip” it.

The only specific allegation the hearing officer upheld was the discourteous confrontation charge. The hearing officer found that Rodgers had been angry and used profanity, but for a different reason than what was alleged in his NOAA. He found Rodgers was angry because Rodgers believed the officers had falsely accused him for a neglect of duty he had not committed; Rodgers did not believe the officers had accurately reported any misconduct because Rodgers had indeed completed and/or was willing to complete the required restraint checks.

Despite upholding only the discourteous confrontation allegation, the hearing officer concluded the fullproposed salary reduction of -10% for the next two years was an appropriate penalty. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld the hearing officer’s findings, Rodgers timely challenged the decision in superior court. The superior court denied Rodgers’ challenge and Rodgers appealed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with Rodgers that the SPB decision violated his procedural due process right to notice of the basis for the disciplinary penalty. The Court found that Rodgers was not notified that he was to be disciplined with a 10% reduction in salary for two years based on a single allegation of misconduct. Because the hearing officer found Rogers engaged in only one of the several charges of misconduct listed in the NOAA, Rodgers lacked appropriate notice that only one charge could subject him to the full penalty proposed.

The Court rejected the SPB’s argument that the penalty should be upheld because the hearing officer found that Rodgers’ discourteous treatment of the officers was likely to recur and could chill the officers’ willingness

to report any future misconduct. The Court said the problem is not with the charge of discourteous treatment; the problem was with the NOAA’s description of the basis for that charge. The NOAA advised that the discourteous treatment charge was premised on an underlying neglect of duty; CDCR claimed Rodgers angrily confronted his subordinates for reporting a refusal to perform the beginning-of-shift inspection. But that is not what the hearing officer found. Instead, the hearing officer found that, having properly discharged his duty to perform the restraint inspection, Rodgers angrily confronted his subordinates because they’d wrongly accused him of shirking his duty.

The Court reiterated that it was not condoning Rodgers’ behavior or saying it was not punishable. The hearing officer did find that Rodger’s decision to confront his subordinates with anger and profanity was unprofessional, discourteous, and violated CDCR’s policy on treating other employees with respect. But the issue before the Court was not whether Rodgers committed any misconduct, it was whether he was on notice that his alleged actions could subject him to the proposed penalty. To answer that question, due process requires the Court to compare the facts alleged, to those found true after an evidentiary hearing. In the NOAA version, Rodgers engaged in grave misconduct, contributing to a culture of silence that fosters corruption. The hearing officer rejected that theory, however, and found Rodgers simply failed to keep his temper in check and treat his subordinates with respect when confronting them over a misunderstanding. Given the significant difference between the two kinds of misconduct, the Court concluded Rodgers lacked notice that his actions could subject him to the imposed penalty.

The Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to order the SPB to set aside its decision sustaining the disciplinary action.

Rodgers v. State Personnel Board (Department of Corrections), 83 Cal.App.5th 1 (2022).

NOTE:

This case underscores the need to prepare a Skelly notice with great care. The public agency must not only accurately state the basis for each charge, but be able to prove the basis for each charge. In addition, if the proposed penalty would be appropriate based on any one of several charges, then the Skelly notice must specifically say so.

S.

vehicle pursuits

City Not Entitled To Immunity Because It Could Not Prove The Length Of Its Officer Training.

In 2017, a San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officer was monitoring an intersection after the SDPD received complaints of speeding motorists there. The officer observed a motorcycle: approaching a traffic light that was cycling from green to red; and then accelerating through the light after it turned red. After the officer activated his lights and siren, the motorcyclist accelerated his speed. After losing sight of the motorcyclist for a second time during the pursuit, the officer terminated the pursuit to respond to a high priority call regarding a knife threat. The officer did not tell dispatch that he had terminated the pursuit.

In the meantime, a second SDPD officer had been waiting along the highway for the pursuit to reach his location. When the officer motioned for the motorcycle to pull over, the driver instead fled. The motorcyclist proceeded through another red light and then swerved into a parking lot, lost control, and crashed into a retaining wall. The motorcyclist died at the scene. His estate initiated a wrongful death and negligence claim against the City.

The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under Vehicle Code Section 17004.7. That law

grants immunity to an agency for collisions involving vehicle pursuits, if the agency “adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits…”

The trial court granted the City’s motion and the estate appealed.

The California Court of Appeal found that the trial court was wrong to rule for the City because certain material facts were in dispute regarding whether the City was entitled to immunity under Vehicle Code Section 17004.7. The Court found that the City failed to prove it complied with the California regulations which set the standards for the required policy and peace officer training on vehicle pursuits, including an annual one-hour minimum training time requirement.

Vehicle Code Section 17004.7(b) sets the requirements an agency must meet to receive immunity for vehicle pursuits. First, this law requires agencies to provide training on an annual basis. Second, this law requires: an agency to have a written policy involving vehicle pursuits; and officers to certify in writing that they have received, read, and understand the policy. Third, this law specifies 12 “minimum standards” for creating a policy for safe conduct of motor vehicle pursuits. Finally, this law defines “regular and periodic training” as “annual training” that shall: cover each of the subjects and elements described in the law, and comply with certain training guidelines. Those guidelines require any vehicle pursuit course to include consideration of:

1) when to initiate a pursuit, 2) the number of involved law enforcement units permitted, 3) responsibilities of primary and secondary law enforcement units, 4) driving tactics, 5) helicopter assistance, 6) communications, 7) capture of suspects, 8) termination of a pursuit, 9) supervisory responsibilities, 10) blocking, ramming, boxing, and roadblock procedures, 11) speed limits, 12) interjurisdictional considerations, 13) conditions of the vehicle, driver, roadway, weather, and traffic, 14) hazards to uninvolved bystanders or motorists, 15) reporting and post-pursuit analysis. The regulations require that the training be at minimum 1-hour in length, and occur annually.

In this case, the City did not demonstrate that its vehicle pursuit policy training was at least one hour in duration in the training year prior to the incident. Instead, the evidence indicated the training was less than 30 minutes in length. Because the law and the regulations set a minimum one-hour time requirement, the Court held that the City was not entitled to the Vehicle Code Section 17004.7 immunity.

Flores v. City of San Diego, 2022 WL 4244284.

Note:

Immunity from damages resulting from vehicle pursuits only occurs when a public agency can show full compliance with many regulatory and training requirements. LCW can assist agencies to ensure their vehicle pursuit policies are consistent with the law.

discrimination

Court Denied Employer’s Request To Change Venue In FEHA Case From The Employee’s Home Office To The Company’s Office.

In October 2018, Eleanor Malloy was hired by the parent company Comprehensive Print Group as an administrative assistant. During her first 18 months at the company, her supervisor, Spencer, made offensive and denigrating comments to her based on her gender and expressed an inappropriate interest in her personal life.

On March 17, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic was underway. Malloy and other employees of the company began working remotely. That fall, Malloy became pregnant, and gave birth to her son the following March, 2021. In April 2021, Malloy’s supervisor requested her to work in person two-to-three times a week starting in May, 2021. Malloy replied she could not work in person for at least one month due to childcare needs. The company terminated Mallory for not returning to in-person work. Mallory filed a complaint for pregnancy and gender discrimination, sex- and gender- based harassment, interference with protected pregnancy leave, retaliation, and wrongful termination, among other claims. She filed her claim in Los Angeles County, where she lived.

On November 9, 2021, the company moved for a change of venue to Orange County, where Malloy’s employer-provided office was located. The company argued all the unlawful conduct alleged occurred in Orange County, all records were kept there, and Malloy’s employment was based there. Malloy opposed, arguing that Los Angeles County was the proper venue for her pregnancy discrimination interference and retaliation causes of action because she was working from home or otherwise at home on protected pregnancy leave when the unlawful conduct occurred.

The superior court agreed with the company, and granted the change of venue to Orange County. Malloy petitioned for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal to challenge the venue change.

The Court of Appeal sided with Malloy. First, the Court noted that the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) authorizes an aggrieved party to file a FEHA action in the county in which the alleged unlawful employment practice was committed or in which the employee would have worked but for the unlawful practices. Second, the Court noted a California Supreme Court precedent that supported Mallory’s position. The Court noted that the Legislature’s decision to afford a wide choice of venue in FEHA cases “maximizes the ability of persons aggrieved by employment discrimination to seek relief from the courts….”

Based on these facts, the Court found venue in Los Angeles County to be proper.

Malloy v. Superior Court (Comprehensive Print Group), 2022 WL 4298371.

WCAB’s Denial Of Discrimination Claim Does Not Stop FEHA Discrimination Claim.

In 2013, Gurdip Kaur, an employee at Foster Poultry Farms LLC, slipped at work while wearing company-issued rubber boots and broke her wrist. After surgery, Kaur returned to work and, despite her work restrictions, Foster Farms forced her to perform her normal job duties. Kaur struggled to perform her normal job duties, but Foster Poultry denied her requests for an accommodation. She was terminated in late 2013 but was then reinstated after contesting her termination. In 2016, Foster Poultry restructured and gave her a new job she could not perform one-handed, so she was terminated again.

In 2016, Kaur filed a petition against Foster Poultry with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) alleging discrimination for filing her claim, in violation of Labor Code Section 132(a). Her claim was heard in an administrative hearing and was eventually denied.

In 2017, before her workers’ compensation claim was decided, Kaur also sued Foster Poultry under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Kaur’s five FEHA claims were centered around discrimination due to race/nationality and disability.

When Kaur’s worker’s compensation claim was denied, Foster Poultry asserted an affirmative defense to Kaur’s lawsuit, arguing that all of Kaur’s disability related claims were barred by the legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Simply put, these doctrines generally preclude a person from re-litigating issues that were argued and decided in prior proceedings, even if the second lawsuit raises different causes of action. Together, these doctrines can be referred to as “issue preclusion.”

The trial court granted summary judgment for Foster Poultry due to its affirmative defense. Kaur appealed. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly decided that the WCAB’s denial of Kaurs’ 132(a) claims precluded her FEHA claims. The California Court of Appeal held that Kaur’s FEHA claims were not precluded.

For an issue to be precluded, the issue must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. The issue must also have been actually litigated and necessarily decided in the former proceeding. In addition, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.

The Court of Appeal focused on the first prong of the above test; whether the issues were identical. In the WCAB claim, the issue was whether Kaur experienced discrimination on account of the industrial nature of her injury. On the other hand, Kaur’s FEHA claims were broader, and centered on whether she experienced

discrimination on account of her disability, and whether she was unlawfully discharged because of her disability. Moreover, Kaur’s other FEHA claims, such as her allegations that she was not provided a reasonable accommodation and was not engaged in a good faith interactive process, involved entirely different issues from the WCAB claim. The Court further found that, in deciding the WCAB issue, the administrative hearing judge ignored certain FEHA requirements because the issue was so distinct from FEHA and involved different considerations.

The Court of Appeal held that the denial of the WCAB claim did not preclude Kaur’s FEHA claims, and she could move forward with her lawsuit.

A concurring opinion cautioned that this decision should be interpreted narrowly, and that the decision did not mean that factual findings by an administrative hearing judge on a WCAB claim can never result in issue preclusion on a FEHA claim. Rather, one must look carefully at the underlying issues and findings of fact. A claim decided in a WCAB setting may indeed prevent a FEHA claim if the issues and inquiries are similar enough.

Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC, 2022 WL 4243090.

Note:

The underlying FEHA claims have not yet been decided in this case. However, agencies should always be cognizant of the many FEHA laws and regulations that require reasonable accommodation of both industrial and nonindustrial injuries.

unemployment

Employee Gets Benefits After “Leaving” Her Job For Good Cause And Not Permanently Abandoning Her Job.

The Unemployment Insurance Code provides individuals with unemployment benefits, except when they leave their most recent work voluntarily and without good cause. The California Employment Development Department (EDD) administers unemployment benefits.

In late October 2019, Reena Johar took an approved leave of absence from her job as a sales representative with Success Water Systems to care for her terminally-ill grandmother. She was gone for about a week and a half. Johar would receive job assignments from her supervisor in the form of sale appointments, which required her to travel to a customer and demonstrate the product. Upon her return from her leave of absence, she received no sale appointments for many weeks and was told business was slow. During those weeks, she was also issued a “final paycheck” and was asked to return some of her equipment. However, she continued to receive commission checks and was not told to stop communicating with prospective customers. Eventually, in February 2019, Johar applied for unemployment benefits and listed the reason for her loss of employment as a “temporary layoff.”

When EDD contacted Success Water Systems to request a written confirmation of this information, Johar’s supervisor checked the box for “voluntary quit.” This led EDD to investigate, and learn two competing accounts. Johar explained that she requested emergency family leave in October 2019, and that her supervisor advised that she could “return at any time she is able” to her job. Success Water Systems agreed that the leave of absence was approved, but stated that: the leave was not for an indefinite period; Johar failed to respond to repeated requests for a return date; and Johar was deemed absent without leave. The EDD ruled against Johar. The EDD held that Johar had indeed left on an approved leave of absence but then failed to preserve the employment relationship by communicating a date for her return.

Johar appealed this EDD decision to a full hearing before an administrative law judge.

The administrative law judge decided against Johar again, stating not only that Johar’s absence was not approved, but that she also failed to preserve the employment relationship. Important in this conclusion was Success Water Systems’ assertion that their sales representatives must be licensed, and Johar had not rectified incomplete information in her licensing application.

Johar then appealed this decision to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB). Johar entered new evidence that showed that Success Water Systems had unilaterally altered Johar’s address in her licensing application which prevented Johar from learning that her application was incomplete. The CUIAB again sided with Success Water Systems, stating that Johar voluntarily quit her job. The CUIAB did not allow the new evidence into the proceeding because the evidence had not been reviewed by EDD, the opposing party.

Johar appealed this outcome via a writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court denied her writ and dismissed her case. Johar made her last appeal to the California Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal narrowed the relevant issue down to whether Johar was entitled to unemployment benefits, or had been disqualified under section 1256 of the Unemployment Insurance Code because she left her most recent work voluntarily and without good cause. This issue is decided by determining who was the moving party in the separation. If the employer moves to cause the separation, the leaving was involuntary. If the employee moves, the leaving was voluntary. The Court of Appeal held that Johar had left her work voluntarily. She left work of her own volition to care for her grandmother. However, the Court of Appeal also held that this was for good cause, because leaving work for circumstances relating to the health, care or welfare of an employee’s family has been held to be a good cause. Success Water Systems had no formal leave of absence policy. Because Johar had received approval from her supervisor for the leave of absence, Johar affirmatively left her work voluntarily but with good cause.

However, even if an employee voluntarily leaves her work for good cause, if that same employee manifests an intention to abandon her job while gone, she can be said to have been the moving party in terminating the employment relationship.

The test for manifesting an intent to abandon a job is whether the employee indicates “with the clearest terms of repudiation” that she will not be reporting to work. Here, Johar was silent in the face of certain communications, and at times indicated that she would respond to certain other communications “when the emergency ceases.” Johar was also never ordered to report to work, so she never had ignored any such order. Finally, the fact that Success Water Systems did not make its expectations clear about Johar’s return from leave, the Court of Appeal could not use those expectations to evaluate Johar’s intent to return.

The Court of Appeal therefore found that Johar did not clearly repudiate her willingness to return to work. Because Johar had left her work voluntarily for good cause, she was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Code.

Johar v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2022 WL 4139848.

Note:

This case illustrates the importance for employers to have clear, pragmatic policies, especially in relation to leaves of absence. Expectations for employees who take leaves of absence must be communicated clearly.

Did You Know?

Whether you are looking to impress your colleagues or just want to learn more about the law, LCW has your back! Use and share these fun legal facts about various topics in labor and employment law.

• Effective January 1, 2023, law enforcement agencies are responsible to complete investigations into alleged “serious misconduct” even if the officer has resigned employment.

• Effective January 1, 2023, peace officer employing agencies must report to POST any civil judgment or court finding against a peace officer based on conduct that could render a peace officer subject to a POST suspension or revocation of certification. These agencies must also report a settlement of a civil claim against a peace officer or an agency based on allegations of officer conduct that could also result in a POST suspension or revocation of certification.

• After having no leads for four decades, DNA evidence helped CA police officers arrest a man suspected in the 1982 cold case murder of Karen Stitt. The suspect was booked into Santa Clara County Jail where he awaits a court date.

For more information on some of our upcoming events and trainings, click on the icons below:

The 411 On Consortiums:

Consortium Call Of

The Month

For more

LCW has 30+ consortiums across the State! Consortium members enjoy access to quality training throughout the year, discounts on other LCW products and events, and unlimited, complimentary telephone consultation with an LCW attorney on matters relating to employment and labor law questions (including questions involving COVID-19, supervisory skills, and negotiation matters!). We’ve outlined a recent consortium call and the provided answer below. Client confidentiality is paramount to us; we change and omit details in the ERC Call of the Month.

Question:

We have a police officer who is out on FMLA leave. The officer received a subpoena to testify for a case the officer was working on. Does the officer have to comply with the subpoena while on leave? How about if the officer volunteers to comply with the subpoena?

Answer:

An officer who has been authorized to take an approved leave – like FMLA—is excused from work and all work duties. If the subpoena was properly served, however, the officer still has a duty to the court to appear. The agency should promptly inform the officer about the subpoena, and notify the attorney who issued the subpoena that the officer is on an approved leave. The officer should contact the attorney who issued the subpoena and discuss the officer’s ability to testify and any available options for the court to receive the officer’s testimony.

On The Blog

Employees Near and Far: Considerations for Telecommuting and Remote Personnel Management

By: Daniel Seitz

Telecommuting is a wonderful tool. Employees with compatible jobs can work from any location with an internet connection. They gain flexibility through ease of access. Telecommuting can reduce turnover and absenteeism, and modern technology has made remote work increasingly reliable. Yet, like any tool, telecommuting may cause issues if employers do not handle it competently. This blog post covers several topics related to remote work with the goals of informing an employer’s choice to offer telecommuting and providing some tips on effective management.

Get It In Writing

First things first, prepare a remote work policy. An employer with a written policy is more likely to manage remote work arrangements consistently. A written policy reduces the risk of confusion or misunderstandings. It is also important for counseling or disciplinary purposes if employees fail to meet requirements or expectations.

What employers include in their remote work policy will vary, depending on each employer’s operational needs, job compatibility with remote work, each employer’s technology resources, and a host of other factors. As employers write their remote work policies, they should check for consistency with existing policies. The following policies commonly overlap with telecommuting: social media use, employer-owned equipment or devices, confidentiality or privacy policies, internet use, and employee accommodations (disability, religious, etc.).

Employers may also use teleworking agreements. The contents will vary, but at the very least a teleworking agreement requires the individual employee to verify he or she has read and understood the teleworking policy and procedures.

Location, Location, Location

Left to their own discretion, employees may choose to work from anywhere. The remote location matters. Cities and counties have laws that may apply to employees working remotely within their geographic boundaries. The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred many cities and counties to adopt their own sick leave policies, for example. Even before COVID-19, some cities and counties also set their own minimum wage requirements. Thus, employees working remotely from another city or county may subject the employer to new legal requirements.

The question of applicable law becomes even more complicated when employees work from a different state. California has laws on protected leaves, workplace injuries, retirement plans, mandated reporting, discrimination and harassment prevention, work hours, overtime, employee representation, tax obligations, and so forth. The same may be true of the other states from which employees perform the work. Multi-state telecommuting may require an employer to consult with legal, tax, and other professionals in both jurisdictions. As a result, compliance becomes increasingly difficult.

Telecommuting Schedules

Remote work options can be customized in many ways, but they generally fall into two categories: hybrid and fully remote schedules.

A fully remote schedule involves the employee working remotely full-time with no time spent in-person. While this option may seem less flexible since it requires a position that is compatible with fully remote work, it remains a viable option. For instance, a fully remote schedule may serve as a reasonable accommodation. It may also be necessary on a temporary basis, as many employers discovered during the COVID-19 lockdowns. Even if an employer ultimately adopts a hybrid schedule, it is still worth considering fully remote schedules in case the employer must use them as a reasonable accommodation or in response to a temporary emergency.

A hybrid schedule involves some time spent in-person and some time spent telecommuting. Hybrid schedules offer a high degree of versatility. The employer can choose whether to require certain days to be in-person, let employees choose which days are remote, or use a mix of both options. The decision will depend on the employer’s operational needs, the needs of specific units or departments, and each job position’s compatibility with remote work. The arrangement may also rely upon specific types of remote work that are available. For example, an electrician may need to make field calls but may be able to handle certain tasks remotely while on a call.

Open Communication

Whether employers offer hybrid or fully remote schedules, it is critical to maintain open lines of communication. Telecommuting employees should know how and when they can reach their supervisors and vice versa. Employees should know which forms of communication to use: phone calls, emails, text messages, video calls, et cetera. If an employee or supervisor will be unavailable for a part of the day (e.g., in a meeting), the person should use out-of-office messages or update the team accordingly. Employees should know how to reach their coworkers and supervisors in the event of a sudden development or emergency.

Ideally, the open lines of communication should appear in the teleworking policies. This will allow employers to clarify expectations and resolve any confusion before employees begin working remotely. Including communication procedures in a teleworking policy helps employers to resort to discipline when necessary, because the policy will describe expectations and acceptable conduct.

Once an employer has open lines of communication, it should schedule regular check-ins. If the employer uses a hybrid schedule, days where employees report to work in-person may serve as meeting days. If check-ins occur remotely, employers should use video conference calls and encourage employees to turn on their video cameras. Employers should plan both group and individual check-ins. This is because individual employees may want to discuss certain things that they feel uncomfortable raising in a group setting.

Feedback and Review

Expectations should not change when an employee transitions to remote work. The employee should still provide the same quality and quantity of work product while working remotely. Regular performance reviews are effective communication tools that help maintain employee performance, whether in-person or remote.

In addition to regular performance reviews, supervisors and managers should plan less formal reviews and should create opportunities to give and receive feedback. For employees with hybrid schedules, review checks or feedback can occur on inperson workdays. Video conference calls serve for employees who work fully remote schedules.

Summing It Up

Telecommuting arrangements can take many forms. This blog post considers only a few of the subjects related to remote work. Employers’ approaches and experiences will vary. However, the more planning and preparation an employer can do beforehand, the better situated it will be to support telecommuting employees.

NOTE: This post uses terms like “telecommuting,” “telework,” and “remote work” interchangeably.

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