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Olga Y. Bryan, an associate in the San Diego office, advises clients on labor, employment, and wage and hour matters. She has defended employers in litigation claims for a variety of issues including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, wrongful termination, and wage and hour class violations.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules Deaf Student Can Seek Both Administrative And Compensatory Relief From School District.

Miguel Luna Perez attended schools in Michigan’s Sturgis Public School District from ages nine through 20. Because Perez is deaf, the District provided him with aides to translate classroom instruction into sign language. Perez and his parents alleged that the aides were either unqualified or absent from the classroom for hours on end. One aide allegedly attempted to teach herself sign language. Along the way, the District purportedly awarded Perez inflated grades and advanced him from grade to grade, regardless of his progress. Based on the District’s misrepresentations, Perez and his family believed Perez was on track to graduate from high school with his class, but then, months before his graduation, the District revealed it would not award him a diploma.

In response, Perez and his family filed an administrative complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging that the District failed to provide Perez with a free and appropriate public education, as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The parties reached a settlement, under which the District promised to provide all forward-looking equitable relief Perez sought, which included additional schooling at the Michigan School for the Death.

After settling his administrative complaint, Perez filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), seeking backwardlooking relief in the form of compensatory damages. The District sought to dismiss the case, arguing that under IDEA, specifically, 20 U. S. C. §1415(l), Perez could not bring an ADA claim without first exhausting all of IDEA’s administrative dispute resolution procedures. The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s holding. Perez appealed to the Supreme Court.

Section 1415(l) of IDEA notes that nothing restricts the abilities of individuals to seek

“remedies” under the ADA or “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” The statute also offers an exception about exhausting administrative processes before bringing a civil action under other federal laws. The parties disagree about what this exception means. Perez reads the exception as requiring a plaintiff to exhaust the administrative processes only to the extent a plaintiff pursues a suit under another federal law for remedies IDEA also provides. As a result, Perez argues that his ADA claim is not foreclosed because he only seeks compensatory damages, which IDEA cannot supply. The District reads the exception as requiring the plaintiff to exhaust administrative claims before pursuing another suit under another federal law if the suit seeks relief for the same underlying harm IDEA exists to address. As a result, the District argued that Perez could not bring a claim under the ADA.

The Supreme Court believed that Perez’s view better aligned with the statute’s terms. It viewed the administrative exhaustion requirement as only applying to suits that seek relief also available under IDEA. Here, Perez brought a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages, a form of relief that is not provided under IDEA. The Supreme Court noted that the District’s concern in ruling for Perez might frustrate Congress’ wish to route claims about educational services to administrative agencies with special expertise in such matters. However, that was not enough for the Supreme Court to interpret the text of the IDEA differently.

The Supreme Court reversed the holding and remanded the case back to the lower courts to determine whether the damages that Perez sought are available under the ADA.

Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools (2023) 143 S.Ct. 859.

Note:

While this case concerns a public school district and does not apply to private schools, it provides helpful guidance to private school practices on certain best practices, such as keeping parents informed on students’ progress, checking that reasonable accommodations are appropriately supporting students’ functional limitations, and uniformly and consistently applying academic standards.

Maine’s “Nonsectarian” Requirement For Tuition Assistance Payments Violates Free Exercise Clause And Student Still Has Standing In Case.

Maine’s Constitution provides that every school-age child in the state be provided with an opportunity to receive benefits of a free public education. However, as a rural state with remote geography and low population density, fewer than half of Maine’s school districts operate a public secondary school of their own. To address this problem, Maine enacted a tuition assistance program for parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own. Under the program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend—public or private—and the school district makes payments to that school to help defray the costs of tuition. Most private schools are eligible to receive the payments so long as they are “nonsectarian.”

On June 21, 2022, the United States Supreme Court held that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement for tuition assistance violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution and remanded the case back to the federal Maine trial court for further proceedings.

On September 21, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment. Makin, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Education, responded to Plaintiffs’ motion stating that the Plaintiffs no longer have interest or standing in the case and it should be dismissed as moot. Makin’s position was that Plaintiffs originally brought the suit on behalf of four public school students who professed a desire to attend a religious school. In the nearly five years that have elapsed since, however, three of the four children have graduated high school, so those parents no longer have a cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation. The fourth child, referred to as R.N., transferred in 2019 from a private religious school to a public high school, and then to a private, non-religious high school, where he is now in his junior year. Makin argues that R.N. can no longer claim that “but for” the Maine statute, R.N. would attend a religious school at public expense. R.N.’s parents acknowledge that their son gets to decide where to complete his final year of high school, and there is no evidence that he wants to transfer to a religious school.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that, consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court should enter a simple declaratory judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of the nonsectarian requirement and a simple injunction barring its enforcement. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because they have lost the opportunity to seek religious education.

The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs do have standing, and Chief Justice Roberts was careful to note the status of the children as students when the litigation commenced. Although one of the children had graduated at the time of the Supreme Court’s opinion, Justice Roberts focused equally on this student as the other student remaining in the case. The Court also noted that they are compelled to carry out the mandate from the Supreme Court, and to rule that a party does not have standing now would be contrary to the direct orders from the Supreme Court. The Court denied Makin’s motion, and after the parties submit proposed language for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction, the Court will grant the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment, Including Injunctive Relief.

Carson v. Makin (D. Me., Apr. 6, 2023) 2023 WL 2814131.

Note:

LCW previously reported on an earlier decision in this case in the June 2022 Private Education Matters. Similar cases have been filed in California, challenging California’s law that only secular private schools can participate in federal funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act that is administrated through the state. The case filed in California cited Carson v. Makin to argue that the state’s program was unconstitutional. LCW will monitor this case for further developments.