Former Teacher’s Defamation Claim Dismissed Due To Ministerial Exception.

Rosenbaum Yeshiva of New Jersey (RYNJ) is an Orthodox Jewish school. One defining feature of Orthodox Judaism is a commitment to specific principles of behavior and conduct, such as restrictions on physical contact between unrelated people of different genders.

In 1988, Shlomo Hyman was hired as a Judaic studies teacher at RYNJ. His role as a rebbe (a rabbi who is an elementary school teacher) and Judaic studies teacher reflected his background and training as a rabbi. Hyman used titles of rabbi and rebbe and exclusively taught Judaic studies classes during his employment at RYNJ. Through his position, Hyman received an annual parsonage allowance from RYNJ. Parsonage is a tax benefit for rabbis and other religious figures that allows them to accept a portion of their salaries in the form of payment for their living expenses.

Hyman signed a new employment agreement each year, in which he agreed to abide by certain policies and standards of conduct for teachers that embodied the Orthodox Jewish religious standards and rules. Hyman also acknowledged receipt and understanding of the Staff Handbook, which set out standards of conduct for RYNJ teachers. The handbook said that teachers, in particular those who teach Orthodox Jewish religious law and practices, were expected to conform to the school’s religious principles, such as refraining from touching students of the opposite gender that are in the third grade or older.

In February 2019, RYNJ learned of allegations of inappropriate interactions between Hyman and his former female students. After these allegations, Hyman was placed on administrative leave and the Yeshiva Board of Directors (Board) began an investigation into the allegations, hiring an outside law firm to conduct the investigation.

In May 2019, the law firm presented its findings to the Board and Head of School. The findings were that Hyman intentionally touched fifth and sixth grade female students, including massaging girls shoulders, touching girls on clothed parts of the body that he should not have touched, placing stickers on or near their chests, and creating classroom games that caused him to touch them. RYNJ terminated Hyman’s employment for violating the Orthodox Jewish standards of conduct set out in the Staff Handbook.

The Head of School informed the community via email that, following an independent investigation, Hyman was terminated for conduct that was unacceptable and inconsistent with how a rebbe should interact with students. The email was spread through the entire school community and similar Jewish communities. Hyman’s picture appeared on Jewish websites and the allegations were disseminated by bloggers. Hyman alleged that he was branded as a pedophile among the Jewish community, impacting the possibility of him obtaining future employment in education.

In November 2019, Hyman sued RYNJ alleging a number of claims, including breach of contract, age discrimination, and defamation. The complaint said RYNJ conducted a “sham investigation” into “baseless allegations.” Based on the sham investigation, he was wrongfully terminated, and the malicious email to the school community falsely branded him as a pedophile in order to reduce the school’s payroll and to rebuild RYNJ’s image and reputation that the school does not take a casual view of pedophilia.

RYNJ moved to dismiss the complaint due to the ministerial exception. During the hearing, Hyman admitted he was a minister within the ministerial exception and agreed to dismiss the age discrimination claim. The judge granted RYNJ’s motion and dismissed the entire case, finding that since Hyman admitted to being a minister and the claims involved RYNJ’s employment decision, the judge could not allow the suit to continue under the First Amendment. Hyman appealed.

On appeal, Hyman argued that the ministerial exception only shields against employment discrimination claims, and does not apply to his defamation claims. He argued that the trial court’s logic would mean that a minister could never bring an action against their employer for any tort because his status as a minister alone would preclude the tort claim. Further, Hyman was no longer an employee of RYNJ when the school emailed the letter, so he argued that it was not an employment claim.

RYNJ argued that the ministerial exception applies because Hyman is a minister and the defamation claims arise out of the school’s decision to terminate his employment as a religious studies teacher. The defamatory statement was RYNJ’s explanation of its employment decision. Ruling on the defamation claim would necessarily require a review of RYNJ’s termination decision, which is what the ministerial exception prohibits. Further, the letter was drafted in consultation with religious authorities, so a secular court would have to call into question a religious judgment regarding employment. RYNJ argued that the fact that Hyman was no longer an employee does not matter because a judge would still have to second guess RYNJ’s decision to terminate a religious teacher.

The Court noted that in New Jersey there is no published case directly addressing whether the ministerial exception applies to cases beyond employment discrimination cases. The Court considered other jurisdictions for guidance, including a California Appeals Court case. In California, the Court ruled that the ministerial exception applied to tort claims where the tortious acts and statements are part and parcel of the termination. The California case included claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after a church terminated an employee from his position as worship director upon discovering he was a homosexual. After the worship director was terminated, the senior pastor told the congregation that the church fired the worship director because he had admitted to acts the church considered to be a sin. The California Appeals Court upheld the decision to dismiss the entire case, including the defamation claims, because the statements related to the hiring, firing, and discipline or administration of clergy. The California Appeals Court also rejected the argument that the ministerial exception has no application to statements that occur after termination if they were part of the process of termination.

Here, the Court of Appeals found the other jurisdictions’ reasoning persuasive and concluded that the ministerial exception applied to bar tort claims provided that, (1) the injured party is a minister formerly employed by a religious institution, and (2) the claims are related to the religious institution’s employment decision. In this case, Hyman conceded the fact that he was a minister, and his defamation claims were part and parcel and connected to RYNJ’s decision to terminate him. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case.

Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey (2023) 289 A.3d 826.

Note:

This case is a reminder that the ministerial exception in California may extend to claims that are part and parcel to employment termination decisions, giving religious schools more deference in making those decisions.

Court Determines The Ministerial Exception Is A Fact-Intensive Inquiry And Should Be Decided By Jury.

Faith Christian Academy is a Christian school in Colorado offering Bible-based education from kindergarten through high school. Both students and staff come from a wide array of religious perspectives. Gregg Tucker, a white male, began teaching high school at the School in 2000. Later, he taught courses on “Leadership” and “Worldviews and World Religions.” In 2014, the School hired Tucker for the additional job of chaplain, a position also referred to as the Director of Student Life. In 2017, Tucker was assigned the additional task of planning the School’s weekly “Chapel Meetings.” In January 2018, Tucker conducted a chapel meeting, which he called a symposium, on race and faith. Although the School initially praised Tucker on the presentation, the presentation was not well received by some parents and students, who threatened to pull their students and tuition dollars from the school. This prompted the School to fire Tucker.

Tucker filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), who issued Tucker a right-to-sue letter. Tucker sued the School, alleging that the School fired him in retaliation for opposing a racially hostile environment under Title VII, and alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Colorado common law.

The School moved to dismiss the action under the ministerial exception, which bars the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers. The trial court ruled that the determination of whether Tucker qualified as a minister is disputed and must be decided by a jury. The School immediately appealed.

The question on appeal was whether a decision denying a religious employer summary judgment on a ministerial exception defense is an immediately appealable final order. Appeals courts are typically allowed to assess final decisions handed down by trial courts and decisions are final if they end the case. Collateral orders are an exception to this rule. Collateral orders are opinions that do not end a case but can be treated as final and can be appealed immediately. To be immediately appealable as a collateral order, the order must conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the action’s merits, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.

The Court of Appeals determined that this order was not an immediately appealable final order. The Court of Appeals noted that the determination of whether an employer is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception is a fact-intensive inquiry that is based on the specific circumstances of a given case. Because there are genuinely disputed fact questions, the limited benefits to immediate appeal are outweighed by the costs of disrupting the ordinary course of litigation. Trial judges and juries are better equipped to resolve this type of factual dispute. The Court of Appeals dismissed the School’s appeal.

The School then challenged the Court of Appeals’ decision by petitioning the Court of Appeals for a rehearing on the issue. In a divided ruling, a majority of the Court of Appeals panel found that the underlying decision was correctly decided and denied the immediate appeal. The dissenting members of the panel said that the ministerial exception should have blocked the litigation from the outset.

The School has now petitioned the Supreme Court to weigh in on the issue.

Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel International (10th Cir. 2022) 53 F.4th 620; Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel International (10th Cir. 2022) 36 F.4th 1021.

Note:

LCW will monitor this case for future developments. This case is important because it will determine whether a determination that the ministerial exception applies is immediately appealable. If it is, this will give judges more discretion to rule on these matters without the need for a lengthy jury trial.

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