Turkey: A Naval Power on the Rise?

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, Economic and Social Studies Volume 7 Autumn 2018

Turkey: A Naval Power On The Rise?

BY YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES A Publication of VUZF UNIVERSITY and LEDRA COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF M.A. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS in co-operation with CYPRUS ARMY OFFICERS ASSOCIATION LAW SCHOOL OF BRISTOL UNIVERSITY/ALEXANDER COLLEGE And ERPIC European Policy and Investment Council

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

EDITORIAL SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD

Members of the Board

Savvas KATSIKIDES

Professor of Social and Political Sciences/University of Cyprus

Christodoulos PELAGIAS

Doctor in International Politics, Lawyer

Panayiotis IFESTOS

Professor in International Relations and Strategy of VUZF University and Ledra College Nicosia, Cyprus Emeritus Professor in International Relations and Strategy at the University of Piraeus, Greece

Achilles C. EMILIANIDES

Professor of Law Head of the Law Department of the University of Nicosia

Gagik HARUTYUNYA Executive Director of Noravank Foundation

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

SUPPORTING EDITORIAL TEAM Elena PANAYIOTOU

BSc in Economics MBA Masters in Business Administration Head of Business Administration & Finance Ledra College, Nicosia, Cyprus

Marina KOZANIDI

BA in European Studies and Modern Languages MA in Applied Translation Studies Lecturer in Foundation course in Digital Marketing Department Ledra College, Nicosia, Cyprus

Charis KYRIAKOU

BSc in Business Management, University of East Anglia MSc in Advanced Business Management, University of East Anglia Lecturer in Digital Marketing Department Ledra College, Nicosia, Cyprus

Anastasia KALLI

BEng in Computers Engineering and Communications PGD in Management Lecturer in Mobile & Web Applications Development Ledra College, Nicosia, Cyprus

Demetrios MELIDES

BA in Greek Philology BSc in Computer Science MA in Digital Media and Communications Lecturer in Digital Marketing Department Ledra College, Nicosia, Cyprus

Elina Yvonne JORDAN-SHEHADEH LLB Honours in Law Newcastle University, United Kingdom

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

Copyright:

Dr Yiannos Charalambides

Legal Responsibility:

Dr Yiannos Charalambides

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be copied, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or means, without the prior expressed permission in writing of the publishers of the journal.

ISSN 1986-4698 Graphic Designer: Eleni Kyprianou gd.kneni@gmail.com PUBLICATION ADDRESS: VUZF UNIVERSITY AND LEDRA College Department of M.A. in International Relations, Global Economy and Strategic Studies, 13 Langada str., 2023 Strovolos, Nicosia, Cyprus Gusla Str. 1, Sofia 1618, Bulgaria Eurodialogue is a periodic journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the address below: 13 Langada, 2023 Strovolos, Nicosia, Cyprus The journal can be acquired by contacting the editors.

The full responsibility regarding the content of the articles belongs exclusively to the authors

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

Acknowledgement I owe special acknowledgments to the Cyprus Army Officers Association for its support to my work I also heartily thank my friend Lt. Colonel Dinos Stylianou for the composition of the main maps in this monograph and thus helping me to complete successfully my work

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

This monograph is devoted to the soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the National Guard and the Hellenic Forces who sacrificed their lives for freedom

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

Contents Preface......................................................................................................... 12 Abstract....................................................................................................... 14 General Introduction.................................................................................. 16 Introduction.............................................................................................................16 The aim.....................................................................................................................17 Chapter 1 Cyprus under Turkey’s Shadow......................................................................18 1.1 Turkey’s advantages and security....................................................................18 1.2 The strategic importance of Cyprus for Turkey............................................20 Chapter 2 A Forward Operating Base..............................................................................25 2.1 Turkish Strategic Objectives............................................................................25 2.2 Turkish long hand, military power and energy game..................................26 2.3 The fragmentation of the Cypriot EEZ...........................................................34 Chapter 3 Troops in Cyprus and Federal System............................................................36 3.1 Turkish Base......................................................................................................36 3.2 Reasons of failure.............................................................................................36 Chapter 4 Naval Forces and Turkish Strategic Plan........................................................40 4. 1 The control of chokepoints and the aircraft carrier....................................40 4. 2 Naval design.....................................................................................................48 Capter 5 Recommandations...........................................................................................53 5.1 Cypriot Strategic Options................................................................................53 Chapter 6 Epilogue............................................................................................................62 6.1 The Illusion of Appeasement and the Naval Power.....................................62 Bibliography................................................................................................ 63

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

The maps created for the purposes of this monograph The data, which are contained in the maps presented in this work, are, mainly, derived from: 1. Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements submitted in the UN. 2. The content of the Law of the Sea. 3. The national claims. Some of them are included in NAVTEX and NOTAM issued by Turkey for research or aeronautical military exercises. In addition, vector archives (shp) have been used. These vector archives have been published by government and agencies. In some cases, where it was necessary, georeferenced of maps and diagrams have been made. In excluding the delineation of the EEZ between the Republic of Cyprus with Egypt, Lebanon (not ratified by the Lebanese Parliament)and Israel, the boundaries of the EEZ/Continental Shelf of the other states, represented on the maps, constitute the intermediate line between them. In fact, these boundaries should be seen as indicative and not as binding ones. The accuracy of the maps and their quotations is proportional to their scale.

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

Preface This monograph best describes Turkey’s strategic efforts to consolidate itself as a regional power. Thus, it pursues to play a leading role not only in the South-East Mediterranean region but also in the regional and global system. The scientific question that this research deals with is the following: Turkey: A Naval Power on the Rise?

In the context of a volatile political environment, stigmatised by hostilities and wars among nation-states, and by constant changes of national borders in the wider region of the South-East Mediterranean and the Middle East, Turkey upgrades its Military Forces constantly. Therefore, it communicates a clear message to its neighboring countries: Turkey does not have any inhibition to impose its national interests and strategic goals by using strength and, in fact, its war machine. Naval Forces are of paramount importance.

This book is a comprehensive analysis about Turkey’s strategy, which aims to become a regional power by dominating in the sea. Therefore, it is a research, which focuses on the issues of Navy Warfare, with Ankara attempting to control the Aegean Sea as well as the South-Eastern Mediterranean maritime region and some of the main chokepoints. This work describes the way that Turkey peruses to encircle Greece and Cyprus in order to control the gas resources that have been recently discovered in the aforementioned maritime regions. The same applies to the Ionian and Crete Seas. Furthermore, the author explains how Turkey’s policy attempts to fragment the EEZ of Cyprus and why Cyprus is of utmost important for the Turkish strategic plans.

This work offers the reader a sufficient knowledge about the Turkish strategy, the role that Israel plays as a regional power and where the relations between Ankara and Washington stand. Simultaneously, the reader can also understand why Turkey establishes Military Bases beyond its borders, in Qatar and Somalia, and the way that a geopolitical and strategic triangle is shaped, with one edge lying in Cyprus. Of course, the role of Russia cannot be ignored.

Thus, in this monograph the role of Russia is analysed in the context of the “Pendulum Policy” followed by Turkey and through the strategic axis that Moscow established with Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, the role of NATO is described in relation with the solution of the Cyprus issue and especially with the right of interferences and the full withdrawal of the Turkish troops.

The author concludes this book with concrete proposals for a strategy to address Turkey’s expansionist policy. These proposals should be included in the context of an alternative strategy based on legal, political and military pillars with the 12 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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aim of preventing the Turkish threat and defending the Republic of Cyprus.

The author explains why the policy of appeasement has failed and why the time comes to be replaced by the strategic concept of deterrence. These proposals stem from the experience and the scientific knowledge of the author in European and Strategic Studies. His work is based on facts and the norms used by the Real School of Thinking. The author presents the Turkish strategy, goals and threats while, at the same time, he proposed policies and measures that should be taken

by Cyprus and Greece in the frame of a reliable strategy. These policies and measures should be taken so that Greece, Cyprus and other countries such as Israel face the Turkish revisionist strategy successfully, exploit the gas resources safely and prevent external threats. This is a strategic recipe to create regional political stability and safeguard the legal status of the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of the International Law. For the reasons mentioned above, the Board of Cyprus Army Officers Association has decided to patronage this book along with Universities, Colleges and ERPIC with the hope of being used as a scientific instrument for the academic society, military officers, ordinary people and the politicians in Cyprus, Greece and abroad. This work is a foot for thought, especially for the policy makers and the construction of a reliable national strategy.

Ioannis Malliotis Captain of Infantry President of Cyprus Army Officers Association

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Abstract

Dear reader This work examines whether Turkey pursues to become a Dominant Naval Power in the context of a wider strategy through which it aspires to render itself as an indisputable Regional Power. Facts and documents come to verify the truth while maps and graphics show the records and the activities of the Turkish Forces in the Sea, on Air and at land. Simultaneously, all these facts depict how such a Turkish Policy affects Ankara’s neighboring countries including Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Energy, and particularly the hydrocarbon resources, which have been discovered within the EEZ of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, shape an electrified geopolitical environment. Beyond these countries, Greece is also a key actor due to the hydrocarbon resources which probably exist in the Aegean, Grete and Ionian Seas.

This research also focuses on the Turkish policy, which aims to install Military Bases abroad and specifically in Qatar and Somalia as well as on the way that a “Triangle of Devil” is shaped, with Cyprus being one of its edges. In this regard, we examine the way that Turkey attempts to play an important role in the sea routes. Thus, it pursues to control or to have a say on the political games, which develop through significant strategic chokepoints such as Hormuz, Bosporus and Suez.

Cyprus is in the vortex of these developments and Turkey already uses the northern occupied part of the island, and particularly the port of Famagusta as a Forward Operating Base, which has a complimentary role to that of Mersin. By this logic, we come to answer the question whether Cyprus can be used by Ankara as a Military Operating Base in case of a crisis and war against Egypt and Israel. Simultaneously, the more powerful Turkey is, the more reliable its deterrence against Israel and Egypt is. The same applies to Cyprus, Greece and Israel, which face a permanent Turkish threat. The more powerful Turkey is the more aggressive it might be if its neighboring countries have not built a reliable deterrence. A relevant additional question is whether the ground is fruitful for the establishment of a tripartite alliance (Cyprus, Greece, Israel). The strategic scene of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and beyond is related to the solution of the Cyprus issue and the options about preventing the Turkish threat. Thus, we do not only deal with the Turkish strategic goals but also with the policy followed by the Cyprus governments throughout the years. In this regard, we examine whether such a policy has failed or not and whether alternative options exist in the frame of a new strategy.

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After a meticulous research about the efforts of Turkey to raise itself as Dominant Naval Power, the author comes to propose strategic options and measures, which can be taken so that Cyprus, Greece and Israel achieve stability and increase the index of their deterrence. The policy that the Republic of Cyprus should follow and the role that NATO plays in the regional level are of utmost importance while, at the same time, the Russian policy cannot be ignored, particularly after the efforts of establishing an alliance along with Iran and Turkey, called by the US as the “axis of evil�.

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General Introduction “Being on the most beautiful geographical location and surrounded by seas on three sides, Turkey has the ability to develop an advanced maritime nation with its industry, trade, and sports. We need to know how to benefit from these capabilities; believe that seafaring is the greatest ideal of Turks and try to achieve it in a short period of time.”

Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK Introduction The international system is a vibrant organisation in permanent evolution, with nation - states being its main structural factors. As no global and regional government exists the international system is dominated by anarchy. This reality offers the opportunity to the great and regional powers to exercise policies with the aim of filling the gap of power existing in the international system, by using their economic and commercial means and/ or their military strength. Balance and imbalance of power, conflicting or convergent national interests play a crucial role for those nation-states which attempt to consolidate a peaceful political environment and/or restructure the international political scene in the context of a revisionist strategy. If nation - states lose the dominant structural role that they have in the international system and if a global or regional government is established, then a new international system will be shaped with new characteristics. It will not be a structural change but a mutation of the global system. Since nation-states hold their dominant role and their sovereignty, the analysis of the incidents and developments, which occur in the regional and global system, should be based on the norms and principles of Realism and particularly on the balance of power. Certainly, each case has its own unique characteristics and identity.

The discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea triggers the shaping of a new geopolitical environment. The impetus for the establishment of new alliances is evident, while new crises and tensions are likely to erupt when national interests and strategic goals are in conflict. Cyprus issue is a special case and during the current era, the island finds itself in the vortex of significant developments, mainly linked with the Turkish national strategy, which is based on the concept of raising Ankara as a regional power.

In this regard, Cyprus is a part of the Turkish strategic puzzle, which goes too far, up to Qatar and Somalia where Turkey has already established Military Bases. The negotiations about the solution of the Cyprus question have failed in Grans Montana on July 7, 2018. However, the efforts continue. In July 2018, the Secretary General sent a new envoy, the American Jane Holl Lute, to hear once again the political views of the parties involved and whether a fertile ground exists for a new initiative (Philenews, 2018). Mrs. Lute has experience in 16 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

international affairs but she does not have the magic stick to solve the Cyprus issue on her own. What she should do is to avoid the mistaken step taken by her predecessors who created a political climate of unexcused euphoria and allowed the negotiations to continue in a forlorn hope of finding a settlement.

During the meetings with the leaders of the two Communities and Turkey, she asked for new ideas and alternative procedures. Having in mind the failure of the procedure in Grans Montana, Mrs Lute seeks to find alternative options regarding the recipe and goal of the negotiations. That is whether the political system will be a federation, a loose federation, a confederation or the model of the two independent states. Of course, one may allege that there exists another alternative option, which points to the restoration of the unitary state of the Republic of Cyprus. The legal order of the Republic of Cyprus is constantly violated by the Turkish troops since 1974 and therefore the viability of the solution should be based on the restoration of the legal order in the frame of the Constitutional and administrative structures in line with the values and principles upon which the EU is founded. To obtain this goal, a new strategy is needed and some other strategic variables should be met. Such variables are among others the upset of the existing balance of power and the establishment of strategic alliances based on common energy interests. Diplomatic and legal advantages within and outside the institutional framework of the EU should be used. The national interests and the strategic goals of the great powers should be taken into consideration. A small state such as Cyprus should have the ability and skills to align its interests with the ones of the regional and great powers.

In this regard, it is also important to know how to exploit its geopolitical and geostrategic position in order to achieve its strategic national goals.

The aim One of the main issues on which the settlement of the conflict is to be built is that of security. Nevertheless, the parties involved have not found a common ground yet.

The Turkish side insists that the position, which has been put on the negotiating table by the Cyprus government about zero troops to stay on the island, cannot be accepted. In the context of a compromise, the Turkish side proposes, among others, the establishment of a permanent Military Base to the model of the British one (Iliadi, 2018). The security topics concerning the Cyprus issue are relevant to the Turkish strategic ambitions and goals. The issue we analyse in this work is whether Turkey pursues to raise itself as a Dominant Naval Power. This development is an integral strategic part of its permanent goal to become a regional power.

Accordingly, a relevant question is set: Is Cyprus a strategic locus, which is necessary to be militarily controlled by Turkey? The answer will help us to better understand, not only the Turkish policy, which is of utmost importance but the entire regional strategic power game.

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Chapter 1 Cyprus under Turkey’s Shadow 1.1 Turkey’s advantages and security We refer to the Cyprus issue as one of the central strategic points, because it is an unresolved conflict, which does not only affect the Greco-Turkish relations, but also the geopolitical developments occurring in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Such an effect has been dramatically increased due to the hydrocarbons discovered within the Cypriot, Egyptian and Israeli Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Charalambides, 2018 pp. 7-15).

Moreover, the geopolitical location of Cyprus is of fundamental significance.

This strategic view can be grounded on real facts such as the British Bases and the Turkish troops, which are illegally stationed in Cyprus since the invasion of 1974. If Cyprus was not so important for the strategic plans of the United Kingdom and Turkey, then no reason would exist for the British and the Turks to avert the Union (ENOSIS) of the island with Greece (Charalambides, 2011, pp. 82-84, 377-384). By 1967, when the Greek Junta withdrew the Military Division from Cyprus, ENOSIS was the dominant, official, political position of the Greek Cypriots who founded this legal and political concept on the right of Self Determination, article 1 paragraph 2 of the UN Charter. On June 26, 1967, the House of Representatives issued unanimously a resolution supporting the Union (ENOSIS) with Greece (Papapolyviou, 2017). As no concrete strategy had been designed, a thousand of mistaken decisions had been made, and therefore, the Greeks doomed their national goal in failure and the dream turned into a nightmare.

On July 20, 1974 on the pretext of the coup conducted by the Greek Junta on July 15, 1974 the Turkish troops invaded Cyprus and the political and geopolitical situation changed dramatically. Ankara imposed, by the use of force, an illegal de facto partition of the island. The Turkish and British goal to establish a federal system is, now, the basis for the negotiations with the aim of finding a solution. Cyprus issue is not only a problem steaming from the conflicting interests of the two Communities of the island, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, but it is mainly an issue of security, which is relevant to the service of the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of all the parties involved (Greek, Turkey, Britain, the US, Russia and the EU).

Therefore, if the primary issue of the solution is that of security, which is pertinent to the right of interference and the status of the guarantors, the expectation about a settlement is not as hopeful as the UN would like to be.

Let us examine the current political and geopolitical status quo and the strategy of Turkey, which is, by definition, the key, which opens the door to the solution of the Cyprus problem due to its military strength. This military

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strength is depicted in Turkish troops, which are illegally stationed in the northern part of the island since the invasion conducted in 1974. The essential issue is not only what Turkey did in the past, but also what is the Turkish policy and goals for the current era and the future. Thus, the question is what are the reasons for which Turkey persists to stay in Cyprus. As the Turkish Cypriot leaderships are under Turkish influence and control, the solution of the Cyprus question does not depend on their goodwill, but on the way that the Turkish national interests can be better served. In addition, the Turkish strategy aims to control, even partially, the gas resources, which have been discovered in the Cypriot EEZ, and therefore to facilitate Ankara to raise itself as a regional power (Charalambides, 2018 pp 198-202). In this regard, Turkey considers Cyprus as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and a source of economic wealth.

Simultaneously, it aspires to become a Dominant Naval Power prevailing over a maritime region from the Black Sea up to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and thus controlling not only the chokepoint of Constantinople (Bosporus) and Dardanelle Strain, but via Aegean and Cypriot Sea, the Suez chokepoint too (Turkish Naval Force, 2018, pp. 9-12).

Before the discoveries of gas and oil at the south sea of Cyprus, Turkey had the absolute control at the north. Cyprus, therefore, was included in the Turkish military and geostrategic operational plan before the discoveries of gas resources. In the current era, the Turkish war machine takes a step further and pursues to be the master of the maritime area around Cyprus and beyond. To achieve this goal, Turkey exploits the following advantages: 1. The Republic of Cyprus has no military fleet and the Greek government, which enjoys, along with Turkey and the United Kingdom, a status of a guarantor, has no political intention to get involved into a crisis for the sake of the Greek Cypriots (United Nations, 2018). Greece still suffers from the historical trauma of the Minor Asia catastrophe in 1922 and the new one which occurred in 1974. This is a political, phobic syndrome, which comes out as a political tenet, “no crisis no war”. The strategic concept of “no crisis no war” is correct, but the political formula that Greece chose to achieve such a tenet is wrong. Why is it wrong? Because it founded its tenet on the concept of appeasement and not on the basis of deterrence.

Even if one argues that this tenet works in the context of deterrence, such a deterrence is not as reliable as it should be in order to prevent effectively the Turkish threats, extending from Thrace through the Aegean Sea to Cyprus.

Most of the time, such a tenet -“no crisis no war”- functions against any consideration and Turkey has the chance to win diplomatic and other battles with the shadow of its power. However, if the Greek government followed a reliable preventive strategy, then it would have much more chances to avert a crisis. Simultaneously, it would have the opportunity to press Turkey to abandon its adamant political stance by following a flexible policy. Thus, 19 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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the solutions to the various Greco-Turkish problems could be found easier.

Even the current economic crisis and the dispute which erupted between Turkey and the US are both pertinent developments from which Greek and Cyprus have not obtained essential political benefits as no relevant concrete strategy exists. A likely benefit may result by coincidence.

2. Although Greece is one of the three guarantors, it finds itself as being too far from Cyprus and no adequate measures have been taken to minimise the distance. Greece did not dispatch either Naval or Air Forces to the island in the context of a preventive strategy. This political practice reflects in a joint decision taken by both the Cypriot and the Greek governments. As Turkey threatens both countries permanently, this decision has been proven to be wrong and thus should be reviewed in light of the new geopolitical developments, taking into consideration the Turkish strategic plans (Skai. gr, 2018). Both countries should examine seriously the option of reviving the Single - Defence -Doctrine, which worked for a short period (19931996). It had an inglorious end under the Turkish pressure. In fact, it had been sacrificed on the altar of the negotiations and the appeasement.

Furthermore, the EU offers Cyprus ethical and diplomatic support, which is not effective enough to prevent the Turkish threat. This is a problem that the EU is not exclusively responsible. It is a matter, which is pertinent to the policy that Cyprus and Greece implement within and outside the EU regarding the solution of the Cyprus issue. In fact, Athens and Nicosia do not intend to cause high cost on the Turkish accession to the EU, having the impression or the illusion that by expressing their good will, Turkey might be flexible at the negotiating table. Most of the damages, which Turkey suffers in its accession negotiations with the EU, do not result from the political actions taken by Greece and Cyprus, but by the Turkish policy itself.

Firstly, Turkey suffers from severe democratic deficits (European Commission 2018, pp.3-4; 16-17;30-36;38-41; Human Rights Watch, 2018) and secondly, it has not adequate political intention to abide by the legal, economic and political requirements set by both sides, Turkey and the EU, in the context of the accession negotiations (Rettman and Maurice, 2018). While EU cohesion relies on democracy, the Turkish one seems to be based on democratic deficit.

1.2 The strategic importance of Cyprus for Turkey The strategic significance that Cyprus has for Ankara and whether Turkey pursues to become a Dominant Naval Power is a hypothesis, which should be proven by facts. The Turkish strategic plan, about Ankara’s military presence in Cyprus, encompasses various strategic locus of the island, where Turkish Military Forces have the opportunity to develop their units, 20 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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for the following reasons: 1. To hold the entire island under their geopolitical, geo-strategic and institutional control through the establishment of a federal political system in line with the services of the Turkish interests.

2. To be in a position to defend the northern part of Cyprus, which is under Turkish military control since 1974, having, at the same time, the opportunity to control, not only the whole island but also the wider region. In fact, the protection of the Turkish Cypriot is the pretext provided by Ankara so that the Turkish troops are stationed in Cyprus. As the former, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu maintains in his book, “Strategic Depth”: “Even if no single Muslim Turk existed there (in Cyprus), Turkey should consider it (Cyprus) as a central issue. No country can be indifferent about such an island located in the heart of the Turkish living space” (Davutoğlu 2010, pp 278279). Thus, the Turkish strategic goals include the Turkish security system and the broader Turkish strategic plan. This strategic plan encompasses the control of waters in the region of Euphrates River, the installation of the Nuclear Power Program in Akkuyu1 and the control of gas resources, even partially, existing within the EEZ of Cyprus and Greece (Hundley, 1992; De Chatel 2003). The latter did not delineate its EEZ yet due to the tacit casus belli set by Turkey around the island of Kastelorizo and beyond. The legal boundaries of the Greek EEZ are defined by the relevant clauses of the International Law of the Sea and cannot be voided unless the country - to which these legal rights belongs to - is ready to deny them.

3. To have the ability to launch an attack to the south, where the Republic of Cyprus has the territorial control. In accordance with the International and European Law, the only state on the island, which is recognised by the International Community, is that of the Republic of Cyprus. However, Turkey has a different legal and political position. During the 52nd session of the EU- Turkey Association Council, held on June 23, 2014, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu submitted a document in which he flatly stated that the Republic of Cyprus is a “defunct state” (Association Between the

1 There is information coming from the Secret Services of Germany (Bundesnachrichtendienst

– BND) that Turkey has put forward a secret project in order to produce a nuclear bomb.

This project is inspired by the model of Iranian nuclear program. However, Ankara insists that its own nuclear program is to serve only energy purposes (Ruhle 2015). To produce an atomic bomb, beyond technology, Turkey, and any other country, needs a huge economic budget while, at the same time, should, successfully, face the objections of the great powers or some of them.

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European Union and Turkey 2014, p. 59). Regarding this matter, there are relevant resolutions issued by the UN Security Council. The first one is the resolution 186, which was circulated on March 4, 1964 and makes clear that the only government that the UN recognises in Cyprus is that of President Makarios (UNHCR, 2018). There are another two resolutions issued on November 18, 1983 and on May 11, 1984. Both of them state that the declaration regarding the establishment of the so- called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is invalid. Points six and seven of the resolution 541, issued by the UN Security Council, underlines the following: “6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; 7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;” (United Nations Security Council, 2018).

Therefore, the International Community does not recognise a state which results from the use of force. Based on this legal concept, on September 21, 2005, the EU circulated a Declaration (Council of the European Union, 2005). This declaration was a legal and political document that the EU answered to a Turkish statement, which had been, already, published few days ago and underlined that the authorities of Ankara did not recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Pursuant to the official EU text: “4. The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law.

5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible” (Council of the European Union, 2005).

This declaration comes to clarify that the only state that the EU recognises in the island is that of the Republic of Cyprus, which entirely joined the EU on the basis of Protocol 10 (EU-Lex, 2018). However, the acquis communautaire has been suspended in the northern part of the island due to the existing situation, which means the Turkish occupation. The aquis can get into force in the northern part of the island after a decision proposed by the European Commission. The European Council should take this decision unanimously, probably after the solution of the Cyprus issue.

4. To use Cyprus as a Military Base from where Turkish Aeronautic Forces can gain the strategic advantage: i) to control the geopolitical region around Cyprus and the gas resources. ii) to prevent any threats that might be launched by Israel or Egypt and to have the capability to attack against them in the case of a crisis or war. Cyprus is a part of the Turkish strategic puzzle, 22 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

This map shows how the Israeli Air Forces (IAF) increased their flights within the FIR of Nicosia, reducing, at the same time, the activities of the Turkish Air Forces (TAF) in the areas which are under the control of the Republic of Cyprus.

EURODIALOGUE Turkey: A Naval Power on The Rise?

which aims to raise Ankara as a regional power. Due to the gas cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, the Israeli Military Forces increased their flights within the Cypriot FIR and, therefore, the Turkish and the British geostrategic advantages have been reduced. iii) to prevent the Greek nation from shaping a defensive shield beginning from the Balkan Peninsula and ending up to Cyprus, covering also the wider region. Ankara considers this certain region as its own Turkish Lake. As Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan stated on September 26, 2013: “The Mediterranean Sea was always a Turkish lake.

However, during the last period, as we did not get there, some found the landscape free. It is neither place for celebration nor a place for a ramble. What business Israel has to do there? Israel is not a country which is specialized in oil research�.

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This map illustrates how the Turkish Naval and Air Forces consolidate the strategic concept of the “Turkish Lake”.

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Chapter 2 A Forward Operating Base 2.1 Turkish Strategic Objectives Before continuing the analysis on the Turkish Naval Strategy, we should examine how the Turkish Naval Forces themselves define their strategic objectives. Based on the theories of Halford Mackinder and Nikola Spykman (Mackinder, 1904; Spykman, 1939; Spykman 1944) the Turkish Naval Forces support among others the following: “The Objectives of the Turkish Naval Forces Within the framework of the predetermined principles, objectives guiding and shaping the Naval Forces Strategy are defined as: • To deter the threats against the homeland in maritime domain, and if needed, to win the decisive war through joint efforts with other elements of the Turkish Armed Forces, • To protect the sovereignty rights and maritime interests of Turkey, • To secure neighbouring seas and SLOCs that carry the bulk of Turkish maritime trade, • To support the defence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and protect its vital rights and interests at sea, • To provide support, if requested, to other competent agencies/authorities within its missions and responsibilities provided by law, • To contribute to create of a stable security perimeter in close vicinity of Turkey and to global peace and stability, • To support Turkish foreign policy and defence industry objectives, • To support the Maritime Strategy of the Alliance, • To maintain and develop an active naval force to carry out all tasks that can be assigned in the foreseeable security environment.

Turkish Naval Forces Strategy Main activities required to achieve these objectives include: • Concept of use of force, • Development of force structure, • Interagency cooperation” (Turkish Naval Forces Strategy, 2016 pp. 28-29).

After the invasion of 1974, Turkey took an absolute control over the northern areas of Cyprus, in the sea, on air and at land. Cyprus is included in the Turkish Naval Strategy and particularly the northern part of the island. In accordance with the «Turkish Naval Forces»: “It is imperative to develop and sustain platforms that are capable of performing duties effectively in surrounding seas to achieve the following objectives; deterring

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maritime threats against the homeland, winning the decisive war with joint elements of the Turkish Armed Forces, protecting the sovereignty and interests of Turkey in the maritime domain, ensuring the security of our surrounding seas, ensuring the establishment of a stable security zone in close periphery of Turkey, contributing to the defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and protection of its vital interests at sea” (Turkish Naval Forces Strategy, 2016 p. 31) The discovery of hydrocarbon resources at the southern maritime area of Cyprus made the situation much more complicated. Turkey pursues to have the control not only at the north but, also, over the whole island. In this regard, the port of Famagusta is of utmost strategic importance and, therefore, Ankara has already transformed it into a Naval Base from where Turkish surface warships and submarines swoop in the maritime areas around Cyprus and beyond. It is, in fact, a Forward Operating Base, supplementary to that of Mersin. From the geostrategic point of view, we should see Famagusta together with the Peninsula of Karpas in order to understand the big geopolitical picture, which is pertinent to the energy game, evolving in the region, and the main goal of Turkey to reveal itself as a regional power.

2.2 Turkish long hand, military power and energy game Facts and documents are necessary elements for analysing how Famagusta is a Forward Operating Base used by Turkey as an exodus station for its warships. The harbour of Famagusta accommodates frigates, destroyers, corvettes and submarines, which patrol in the maritime region of Cyprus.

An oil tanker is also based there and refuels the Turkish fleet on board. This is what happened in the case of the Italian ENI’s blockade when the Turkish war fleet deprived ENI’s research vessel from exercising its legal rights in 26 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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plot 3. Therefore, the Italian ENI did not carry out its scheduled researches in plot 3 lying within the Cypriot EEZ (Reuters, 2018; Reuters 2018a).

The map illustrates how the Turkish war fleet prohibited ENI from carrying out its scheduled researches in plot 3 within the EEZ of Cyprus.

It was a message sent by Turkey to the oil companies involved in the exploitation of the plots existing in Cypriot EEZ about who is the master of the game. The warships based in Famagusta have no reason to return to Mersin for refuelling.

Therefore, they gain time for conducting their military operations and, thus, Cyprus turns into a Turkish strategic long hand in the wider region. The choice of Famagusta as a springboard of the Turkish fleet is related to: 1. The exploitation of the deposits of natural gas discovered within the Cypriot EEZ and those of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. As there is, also, a problem about the delineation of the EEZ of the Autonomous Region of the Palestinian Authorities and another one between Israel and Lebanon, Turkish military strength, and particularly the Turkish Naval Forces might play a crucial role in the future. This is what Turkey pursues to do as a regional power. It already attempts to play the role of the political guardian of the Palestinian people. Until now, it plays this role very well. Turkey trows 27 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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that the Palestinian issue is the ticket, which offers a dominant position in the Arab and Muslim World.

2. The preventive role that Turkey intends to exercise against Israel. It is a common secret that Turkey aims to become a regional power, and thus to replace, even partially, the relevant dominant role of Israel. Syria is of paramount importance for the security of Israel and Turkey. For the last few years, the great and regional powers have been planning to pass

Graphic source: Steve Austin, 2014

energy pipelines through its territory. From the strategic point of view, Syria is an apple of discord. At this point, we underline that the war in this country broke out when President Bashar - Al Assat refused to consent to the construction of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline and signed, in 2009, a memorandum of understanding about the establishment of a pipeline from Iran via Iraq to Syria (Charalambides, 2018, p.103; Costigan, 2017, pp. 4-5; Ahmet, 2013). Simultaneously, Damascus announced a bid for the licensing of the energy plots lying within the Syrian continental shelf and the most promising ones have been offered to Russia (Katona 2018). The Americans estimate that these deposits are very rich in natural gas, if not immense.

Time will show and the relevant researches.

Beyond the Kurdish issue, there are many reasons that Turkey wants to have a strong say in the new Syrian regime, in the post Bashar-Al Assad era.

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The map shows how important the East\Med pipeline is as an energy and strategic arc on the basis of the Heartland Theory. What Cyprus can do is to take a decision and design a specific policy in the context of concrete alliances and the service of common interest. The map also illustrates how Russia attempts to invade Europe and Asia by using its energy divisions (gas and oil pipelines). However, Russia is surrounded by the US Forces and the American Alliances.

The East\ Med pipeline is not only a tube which can channel gas but it is also a geostrategic arc which can be included in the wider regional security system. (Charalambides 2018, p. 281-289)

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The same applies to the US, Russia, Israel and Iran. Apart from the Syrian energy plots, we should underline that the only Base that Russia has in the region is that of Tartus, over Suez, which is one of the central chokepoints through which the great powers aim to control the sea and energy routes.

The US has an evident advantage regarding this power game due to its naval superiority (GlobalFirePower, 2017) and the capability to encircle Eurasia, the Heartland and particularly Russia (Charalambides, 2018, pp. 280-290).

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3. The geopolitical developments. Turkey understands and plays very well the energy and geopolitical game. Based on a strategic plan, which combines the control of the port of Famagusta and the Karpas peninsula, it pursues to achieve a number of geopolitical and strategic advantages listed as the following: A. Security Provision at the Military Base of Mersin and the pipelines, which end up in Ceyhan. These topics are pertinent to the political views supporting the construction of a pipeline connecting the Cypriot plots with the Turkish coasts. The question is whether such a pipeline can offer a geopolitical and geostrategic advantage to Turkey at the expense of Cyprus. Accordingly, we should refer to the case of the Kurds in Iraq as an example that shows the political and strategic philosophy of Turkey and the way it acts. When the Kurds organised and carried out a referendum on September 23, 2017, about establishing their independent state, the Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan warned them by stating that if they did so in northern Iraq, he would turn off the taps of the gas pipeline which passes through the Turkish territory (The Guardian, 2017). As the Turkish President underlines: “After this, let’s see through which channels the northern Iraqi regional government will send its oil, or where it will sell it” and he added: “We have the tap. The moment we close the tap, then it’s done” (Bektas and Toksabay, 2017).

Power is the magic word. When a state has military strength, it has the upper hand. In order to put an end to the problems that it faces with Ukraine and avoid the use of military means, Russia opted for bypass roads such as the “Nord Stream” 1 and 2 and the “South Stream” of which the construction has been postponed due to the Crimea issue. In this regard, the “Turkish Stream” turned into one of the main Russian alternative options (European Commission, 2017; Charalambides, 2018 pp. 42-45). If one looks at the geopolitical map, he/she realises that the construction of a pipeline from Cyprus towards Turkey renders the natural gas resources of the island and the state of Cyprus itself as hostages of the Turkish military strength. As Turkish warships have the geopolitical and strategic advantage to patrol around the maritime area of the Cypriot EEZ, no reason exists for Ankara to remove new forces from the Base of Mersin. The Turkish warships can do their job from Cyprus. When the Turkish fleet should patrol or prove its dominant role, it has the advantage of an already existing Forward Operating Naval Base in Cyprus. Therefore, Turkish Naval Forces gain time and have an operational advantage and strategic depth. Turkey can use additional Naval Forces from Mersin, if it is necessary to accomplish its military missions or to successfully impose the “gunboat diplomacy”.

B. Naval domination should be accompanied by reliable Air Forces. At this point, it is important to maintain the geographical proximity existing between Cyprus and Turkey and the ongoing works at the illegal airport of Tympou.

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Therefore, the geographical proximity offered Turkey a strategic advantage and thus until now, no Turkish military aircrafts are permanently based in Cyprus. It takes only few minutes for the Turkish military air jets to fly from Turkey to Cyprus2. The works at the illegal airport of Tympou is to be concluded in such a way so that the airport can be used for military operations in case of a crisis. We do not only refer to a crisis, which might erupt in Cyprus but to conflicts, which might break out in the wider region too. Turkey wants to gain a geographical strategic advantage against Israel and Egypt via Cyprus in the fields of Naval and Air Forces. At this point, we should underline that Cyprus is the only way out for Israel. Accordingly, Turkey attempts to close the gate through which Israel can breathe geo-strategically.

C. Containment of the military actions and operations that other states may undertake in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Turkey pursues to extend its strategic plan beyond the existing strategic goal, which is the transformation of a maritime area, beginning from Marmaris and ending up to Alexandretta, into a Turkish Lake. Now, it aspires to dominate the southern and western maritime areas of Cyprus. If one takes into account that Turkey doubts the sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean Sea and particularly in Kastelorizo, he/she concludes that Turkey seeks to make itself a Dominant Naval Power. This is an evolution, which proves the political intention of Turkey to consolidate itself as a regional power. Under these conditions, Ankara expects to control or to have a political say in matters concerning the entry and exit of Suez, which is one of the central chokepoints of the waterways. Thus, it upgrades its geopolitical position and becomes either more necessary for the great powers or more annoying.

2 The truth is that the Turkish Forces use from time to time the military airport of

Lefkoniko. Turkey earmarked the airport to be a NATO Base. However, it does not have yet the infrastructures required by NATO. In parallel, Tympou has better infrastructures and thus it can also be used for military operations, mainly outside Cyprus. We refer to operations which might be conducted outside the island because Tympou is within the range of the weaponry of the National Guard. Tympou airport hosts military transport aircrafts from Turkey on a permanent basis (C-130, CN 235 and C-160). Thus, Tympou operates in complementary to the military airport of Lefkoniko.

The more options the Military Forces have during a wartime the more chances they have to achieve their strategic goals. Despite Cyprus has not its own Air Forces, it has alliterative options to act in the case of a war. If military aircrafts come from Greece, they have the options to use the Military Base of Andreas Papandroy in Paphos, the infrastructure of the International Airport in Laranka, even some parts of the highway, let alone Turkey which is a regional power.

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2.3 The fragmentation of the Cypriot EEZ All these mentioned above are related to the trisection of the Cypriot EEZ, between the two equal constituent states in the context of a federal political system on the one hand and Turkey on the other. Only 30% of of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus has been delineated and agreed with its neighbouring countries such as Israel and Egypt.3 These agreements are signed with the aim of serving the joint interests of the states involved.

Therefore, if a federal system is established, the Greek Cypriots will be lucky enough to have a rate of less than 15% of the Cypriot EEZ. At this point, a relevant question is raised: What does the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci mean when he refers to gas co-operation? Does he mean a cooperation between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots or between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey? Based on facts, we conclude that the cooperation will be between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey.

This view is founded on the contracts, which had been illegally signed on November 2, 2011 by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot Authorities for the exploitation of naturalgas resources (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; The so called TRNC, “Deputy Prime minister And Foreign Minister”, 2013).

These resources concern the ones, which lie within the EEZ of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Such a maritime region is not limited to the northern occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, but it also extends at the southeast. Thus, Turkey does not only attempt to exploit the gas resources, which might exist within its continental shelf, but to exploit the gas deposits, which might exist in the EEZ of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and, in fact, in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. It is more than obvious that Ankara plans to pursue the re-delineation of the EEZ of Cyprus with Egypt, Lebanon, Israel and Syria. This is not an arbitrary political view. On the contrary, it is based on a theory devised by Dr Cihat Yayci. His work bears the title: The problem of Maritime Areas in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Turkey (Yayci,2012).

3 This is what General (rt) Andreas Pentaras stated in Paphos on March 22, 2018. He

expressed this view during his analysis about the existing situation in the EEZ of Cyprus.

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This map has been presented by Dr Cihat Yayci in the context of his proposal about the proper policy that Turkey should follow in the Cypriot EEZ and beyond. The map shows how the EEZ of Cyprus should be fragmented among Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon. This is a strategy through which the Turkish military elite attempts to align the Turkish national interests with the ones of its neighbouring countries by pushing them to turn against the weaker actor, namely Cyprus.

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Source: Article written by Dr Cihat Yayci bearing the title: The problem of Maritime Areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey (Yayci, 2012).

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Chapter 3 Troops in Cyprus and Federal System 3.1 Turkish Base Turkey aims to hold its troops in Cyprus for the service of its own national interests. The establishment of a permanent Turkish Military Base in Cyprus is a strategic design presented by Ankara as a compromise and a kind of retreat when the Greek government and the Republic of Cyprus claim for the full withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island and the abolishment of the rights of interference and the status of guarantors. Publicly, the Greek and Greek Cypriot position is, “Zero Turkish Troops, Zero Guarantees” (Kalantzis, 2017). The Turkish proposal focuses on the establishment of a Military Base in Cyprus. When Turkey refers to a Military Base, it does not clarify yet whether such a Military Base is to be located only in one specific area or more. The British have, for example, one Base in Agios Nikolaos, and another two in Dhekelia and Troodos. Each one has its own strategic usefulness. Consequently, any Turkish Base will be integrated into Ankara’s wider strategic regional operational plan for the years to come. Such a Base will serve land, naval and air forces, while airborne and terrestrial radars and cyberwar units will function too. Therefore, in Cyprus there will be permanent military units, which will be strengthened by Turkey in no time depending on the operational goal, and with the port of Famagusta continuing to be a strategic Naval Base. Of course, Turkey has another Naval Base, which is located in Bogaz. However, the Port of Famagusta is bigger and more appropriate to host the Turkish fleet.

3.2 Reasons of failure The negotiations in Grans Montana ended to wreck. However, the so-called “acquis” resulting from the talks regarding the solution of the Cyprus issue is still on the negotiating table and provides for the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal system based on two constituent states of equal status (Anastasiades - Eroglou, Joint Declaration, 2014; United Nations Secretary General, 2014). In fact, these two constituent states of equal status will replace the existing unitary state of the Republic of Cyprus. In light of these, we conclude that: 1. If a federal agreement is to be reached, the solution, which might result from such a procedure, is to legitimise the illegal status quo existing in the northern part of Cyprus. The Turkish condominium will extend in the south through the constitutional over-rights that both the Turkish Cypriots and settlers will enjoy through the structures of the federation. The experience

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shows that the Turkish Cypriot leadership follows strictly the Turkish political instructions. This is what happened with Mustafa Akinci, to whom the Greek Cypriots and International Community invested politically, but it was just fool’s gold. The Turkish Cypriot politicians are hostages of the Turkish military strength. This phenomenon is based on the Turkish strategic concept, which considers Cyprus as integral part of the Turkish living space. If the solution to the Cyprus issue is not in line with the values and principles of the EU, and if Turkey continues its revisionist policy, the Turkish Cypriots politicians will not feel as free as the Greek Cypriot politicians already feel when they take their decisions. Simultaneously, if a federal political system is established, the Greek Cypriot politicians will find themselves in a similar difficult position as it always happens with their Turkish Cypriot colleagues due to the Turkish military power and political influence.

2. If a federal system is to be reached, the Turkish occupation of Cyprus will continue under a new status. Firstly, the Turkish strength is always an essential factor regarding the control of Cyprus. Secondly, Turkey achieved to create throughout the years strong dependences concerning the water supply through the Pipeline of Peace (The so called TRNC, “Deputy Prime minister And Foreign Minister”, 2015), the telecommunications (TeleGeography, 2011; TeleGeography, 2013), the electricity (Daily Sabah, 2017) and the banking sector (Cyprus Mail on Line, 2018; Kathimerini, 2016). Thereupon, we should underline the legal consequences of the illegal presence of the Turkish troops in Cyprus. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Loizidou vs Turkey, issued on December 18, 1996, the Turkish government has a legal liability as to the violation of human rights in the northern part of Cyprus due to the occupation by the Turkish troops. Therefore, the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is “a subordinate local administration” to Ankara. It is, in fact, a puppet state (Loizidou vs Turkey, 1996 p. 18). This legal concept is founded in article 1 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and draws its origin from the case of Manchukuo in 1932(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2018). Thus, if a federal system establishes, the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is to be legalised. The legal and political concept of this view is the following: The so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” will turn into a “Turkish Cypriot Constituent State” of equal status as soon as the final agreement will get into force.

3. Turkey follows a constant strategy, regardless of the politicians who are in power, Erdogan or the Kemalists. Turkish strategic plans have been not designed to crack overnight. Besides, the Turkish strategy has been reinforced by the failure of the Greek Cypriot policy.

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While the envoy of the UN Secretary General Jane Holl Lute was discussing with the leaders of the two Communities of Cyprus some ideas about the way that they could resume the negotiations, the Turkish war fleet had bounded the maritime regions, which are depicted in the map. These maritime regions cover areas which are very close to Paphos, some others at the northern part of the island and the sea areas along the coasts of the Karpas Peninsula. Turkey also bounded areas in the continental shelf and the territorial waters of Syria (see also the map below).

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This failure is the result of the following reasons: A. The political establishment of the Greek Cypriots implemented a policy based on the concept of appeasement, which collapsed in Grans Montana.

However, they did not invent to propose a plan B. The Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue cannot alter in a magic way. The political power changed hands in Turkey, when Erdogan came in office in 2003, but the national strategy and goals of Turkey remained unchanged. What the Turkish politicians are doing from time to time is to adapt their rhetoric but they never abandon their permanent strategic goal to revive the Ottoman Empire. Turkey will alter its policy on the Cyprus issue if the Republic of Cyprus decides to implement a new preventive strategy causing cost to Ankara by the use of all diplomatic, legal, economic and military means, which it has available, in an effort to establish reliable alliances within and beyond the EU. Otherwise, no reason exists for Turkey to hold a flexible attitude on the solution of the Cyprus problem. Besides, during the last “social dinner”, held on April 8, 2018, between Anastasiades and Akinci, the Turkish fleet continued to “do its job” by sailing, not only in the northern Cypriot sea, but also in the southeast maritime area of Cyprus and within the wider region from the Aegean Sea to the Middle East. It also bound a part of the Syrian EEZ for carrying out its researches.

Turkey has secured the control over the northern part of the island in Grans Montana through the so-called “acquis” of the talks4. Consequently, it moves on to prevail over the south. In this regard, we present the strategic operational plan of the Turkish war machine in order to understand what the Turkish goal is. Does the “Turkish Deep State”5 want a viable, democratic solution to the Cyprus issue?

What does Ankara imply when it refers to a settlement? Does it mean a normal state or does it imply the establishment of a protectorate political system, which will be under the Turkish geopolitical and geostrategic control?

4 When the Greek Cypriot politicians refer to “acquis” of the negotiations, they mean all

the convergences achieved during the talks between the two Communities, which took place under the auspices of the UN. Of course, there are political parties such as those belonging to the Greek Cypriot opposition which advocate that the “acquis” of the talks is in contrast to the values and principals upon which the EU is founded. In parallel there is a principle regarding the procedure of the negotiations underlining that nothing can be agreed unless everything is agreed.

5 The reference to the “Turkish Deep State” means a state within a state. It consists of

influential groups of persons and interests, belonging to the army and the political and economic establishment. They act beyond the democratic institutions and legal system (judicial power) with the support of the Intelligence Service. They have connections with the mafia and they are liable for political crimes, while, at the same time, the “Deep State” is saturated by the restoration of the Ottoman Empire

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Chapter 4 Naval Forces and Turkish Strategic Plan 4. 1 The control of chokepoints and the aircraft carrier What we should examine is the role that Cyprus has in the context of the wider Turkish strategic plan. Thus, we have to refer to some of the major Military Bases that Turkey chose to establish abroad such as those in Qatar and Somalia (Al-Makahleh, 2018; Salama, 2018). It was to be said that these Bases are like another set of two Turkish long hands. Ankara has not randomly selected the location of Somalia. From Somalia, it can control, even partially, the chokepoint of Bab-El Manded and the Gulf of Aden. If we look at the map, the Turkish Military Base in Somalia is not only related to the control of the chokepoint of Bab-El Manded, but as we have already underlined, Turkey has the opportunity to control the exit and entry of Suez. To this end, it is necessary for Ankara to dominate Cyprus and use its geopolitical position.

Turkish strategy does not stop in Somalia. Ankara has also established a military Base in Qatar, expecting to play a significant role in the Persian Gulf, very close to the chokepoint located to the Strait of Hormuz. There is another Military decision made by Turkey. President Tayyip Erdogan himself announced the intention of his government to construct an aircraft carrier.

On July 3, 2017 President Erdogan stated: “We will build our own aircraft carriers. As a country that aims to become independent in the field of defence by 2023, we must move even faster,” and he added: “We are proud of our ability to build military ships, especially construction of submarines”.

As he explained “4 projects for the construction of naval vessels were in the pipeline, while 10 more projects will be signed in the coming years”.

According to an article published by Paul Iddon in The National Interests on July 7, 2017: “Erdogan’s remark isn’t necessarily far-fetched. It comes more than a year after Turkey began construction on the TCG Anadolu, an amphibious assault ship based on Spain’s Juan Carlos I. This light aircraft carrier, which Turkey aims to launch in three years time, will eventually become the flagship of the Turkish navy and may even carry six F-35B Joint Strike Fighters, which can take off and land vertically.

Turkey already has plans to become an F-35 operator and may well purchase these variants. Alternatively, the Anadolu could serve purely as a helicopter carrier, carrying TAI/AgustaWestland T129 helicopter gunships, which Turkey co-produced with Italy, along with Chinook-sized heavy-lift helicopters. Spain’s Juan Carlos I, in addition to acting as a troop-carrying ship, carries Spain’s current AV-8B Harrier jump jets” (Iddon, 2017).

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Turkey has designed a strategy, which aims to consolidate itself as a Naval Power. We present below a short list of what Ankara has already done and intends to do in the context of such a strategic movement: As already mentioned above by 2020 Turkey plans to have its own aircraft carrier.

This vessel can carry helicopters and vertical take-off aircraft. From a technical point of view, it will be able to carry 12 aircrafts and helicopters, aggressive T-129 helicopters (Turkish construction), As 532 Cougar or Ch47F Chinook transport helicopters and S-70B Seahawk helicopters that will be used for an anti-submarine war. It will also be able to host drones (unmanned aircraft made in Turkey). The aircraft carrier will have a sloping ramp and will be able to host American “invisible” stealth fighters F-35 B STOVL with a short-slash capability (The International Interests, 2018).

The acquisition of the F-35 is an issue related to the deployment of the antimissile system of S-400 in Turkey. The US put Ankara in the following dilemma: If you deploy the Russian antimissile system of S-400, the F-35 purchase will be blocked. In fact, the acquisition of the F-35 is not only pertinent to the upset of the balance of power in the Aegean Sea but it is also relevant to the supremacy, which Israel should maintain in the air.

Ruling the waves through air superiority Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian antimissile system of S-400 is a strategic development of paramount importance. Τhe deployment of the antimissile system of S-400 can upset the balance of power at the expense of Greece and Cyprus.

In this regard, Ankara establishes a reliable preventive air defense system, which offers the Turkish Air Forces a crucial advantage to conduct their operations successfully.

This is a formula, which helps Ankara to obtain air superiority and domination over the regional system.

The air superiority is pertinent to the strategic goal of Turkey to become a dominant naval power.

The nation who has an air superiority can achieve a sea domination easily. Thus, it can rule the waves.

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Encirclement of Greece and Cyprus

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Turkish Grand Strategy (See map: Encirclement of Greece and Cyprus) The Turkish strategic plan includes the control of the Aegean Sea and the encirclement of Greece through the establishment of an Islamic arc by exploiting the Albanian populations.

Turkey supports FYROM, Kosovo and Albania militarily and diplomatically and expects to have influence across the northern borders of Greece and access to the Ionian Sea. By revising the existing legal status quo in the Sea, and by using its Naval Forces, Ankara plans: 1. To cut off Cyprus from Greece. Thus, no contact point will exist between the Greek and the Cypriot EEZ. 2. To have an absolute domination over Cyprus regardless of the solution of the Cyprus issue.

3. To encircle Greece by controlling a huge part of the Aegean Sea, reaching up to the Crete Sea. Simultaneously, by having an important influence on the northern borders of Greece, Turkey expects to shape a geopolitical arc by using the Albanian and other Muslim populations. This is a formula through which Ankara pursues to have access to the Ionian Sea. 4. To encircle Israel. To realise such a strategic plan, Turkey should control Cyprus, from the geopolitical and geostrategic point of view. Thus, Ankara gains strategic depth, closing, at the same time, the way out to Israel, which does not have any strategic depth due to its territorial morphology. The only gate that Israel has to the outer world is via Cyprus to Greece and the rest of Europe.

The Albanian issue

In 2009, when Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis was in office, Greece and Albania signed an agreement that delineated the EEZ and the continental shelf on the basis of the “middle line”. This principle of International Law of the Sea, that is to say, the “middle line”, is not accepted by Turkey. If this principle had been legalised by Albania, a precedent would have been resulted. Such a precedent would affect the legal basis on which the outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea should be solved. The main issue which remains to be solved is that of continental shelf. Under these circumstances, Ankara would be in a difficult position.

Turkey did not only press the Albanian government to void the agreement on the EEZ with Greece but there were, also, suspicions – presented by the Albanian media – about the venality of the judges who participated in the Supreme Court of Albania, which in turn issued a ruling on the matter. In October 2016 President Ali Berisha pointed out to the Albanian Parliament that Edi Rama “had challenged the Greek-Albanian agreement in the Constitutional Court on the account of a party which provided the money” (Barks, 2017; Tzimas, 2017). The outcome of this development was the delay of the researches scheduled by Greece to be carried out in plots 1 and 2 in the northern Ionian Sea. In the context of this Turkish strategy, Ankara undertook the initiative to reconstruct and modernise the military airport of Kuçovë in 2013. Some information, which was never refuted, refers to a secret protocol signed by the two countries about the use of the airport of Kuçovë by the Turkish Armed Forces. In 2017, Turkey replaced a significant number of the Russian rifles used by the Albanian Army, in particular the Russian Kalashnikov, with rifles manufactured in Turkey, such as M20, MP5, M4A1, MPT-76. Simultaneously, it has supplied Albania with anti-tank M72 LAW, armored vehicles and 40mm grenade launcher, while it is still pending the sale of M60A1 combat tanks and Cobra armored vehicles (e-Amyna, 2016; Xountalas, 2017). Turkey has reconstructed the ports of Avlona and

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Durres. The latter constitutes a regional Base of the Turkish submarines (hellenic sunrise 2, 2018). Ankara applies a similar policy in FYROM. In order to justify firstly, the agreement signed between the two countries on June 17, 2018 about the name Macedonia and other reforms on the Constitution of FYROM and secondly, the negotiations that started with the aim of solving the outstanding issues existing between Greece and Albania, the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzia provided the following political view: Greece should pull FYROM and Albania away from Turkish military and strategic dependence. On the Greek side, this political concept, about pulling FYROM and Albania away from Turkey, is correct.

However, the approach, methods and policies that the Greek government follow are under question. Many politicians and analysts in Greece argue that the Greek government did not only offer the name Macedonia to Skopje, but, at the same time, the agreement creates and legalises a Macedonian language and ethnicity, while a Turkey’s ally joins NATO (see the discussion on the Greek National Parliament on June 14, 15 and 16, 2018). Politicians and policies are judged by the results of their actions. However, one may argue that if we take for granted that the US’s main concern is to solve unsettled security issues, the Americans could discuss on a likely package deal - proposed by the Greek and Cyprus governments - to integrate both Skopje and Cyprus in NATO. If Turkey vetoed such a proposal, it would have been responsible for the failure. Certainly, such a proposal cannot be considered over a night but it is a matter of strategic decision.

Revising the Exclusive Economic Zones

The map shows how important it is for Ankara to revise the existing legal status quo in the Sea and thus to change the Exclusive Economic Zones as they have been delineated among Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. The Turkish effort to revise the legal EEZ existing around Cyprus leads to a better understanding about the strategic way that Turkey pursues to block and surround Israel by sea and land. To attain its goal, Ankara should use Naval Forces and exercise its influence over the Syrian and Palestine territories and the leaderships of these two nations. The darts, which are depicted in the map, beginning from Karpas Peninsula and going downwards up to the coasts of Egypt, are strategic wedges, which mainly turn against Israel and Egypt. Thus, the Turkish strategic goal is to control the main energy routes and the Suez Chanel. Such a strategy cannot be realised unless Turkey renders itself as Dominant Naval Power.

If Turkey intends to become a Dominant Naval Power, it should have naval and air firepower as well as Amphibious Forces, which should be able to conduct expeditionary military operations. This is what Ankara pursues to do. Whether Turkey will achieve such an ambitious strategy, time will show. What we can underline is the negative developments that occurred and plagued the Turkish economy in the summer of 2018 (Wearden 2018).

Thus, the successful outcome of the Turkish strategy does not only depend on Ankara’s political will but on the strategic plans and interests of the great and regional powers too.

The strategic rift

In the summer of 2018 the US and Israel used economic weapons in order to strike the Turkish government of which its policy was not in line with the American and Israeli strategic interests.

The strategic option of Ankara to establish a tripartite alliance with Russia and particularly with Iran, as well as the Turkish decision to follow an independent policy, which was not in line with the US strategy led the Americans to take a number of measures with the aim of weakening and chastening the regime of Tayyip Erdogan.

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Turkey as Dominant Naval Power and the “Triangle of Devil”

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The question is whether Greece and Cyprus have a strategy to make political and geo-strategic benefit from such a political and economic rift. So far, no holistic policy, but only shreds of such a strategy appear on the political horizon about a likely postErdogan era. This is a scenario that both governments should examine along with Israel and the US.

Strategic Arcs and Chokepoints (See map: Turkey as a Dominant Naval Power and the “Triangle of Devil”) This map shows the Ankara’s Grand Strategy, which aims at raising Turkey as a dominant regional power and thus to enforce an independent policy. To attain this goal, Turkey should become a Dominant Naval Power in order to control some of the main strategic chokepoints, in other words, to have a say in the geopolitical power game that the great powers and particularly the US, play through the sea routes. The “triangle of devil”, that Ankara has shaped by establishing Military Bases in Qatar and Somalia, is of paramount importance.

In this regard, it enhanced its Military Forces in Cyprus, which is one of the edges of this geopolitical triangle. Between May and June 2017, and while the negotiations were under way, Turkey deployed in the occupied part of Cyprus 77 self-propelled artilleries (T-155 mm Firtina - Storm. These type of artilleries are produced in Turkey Base- see photo page 47). In this context, the port of Famagusta has been transformed into a Turkish Forward Operating Base. (see photo page 26).

The line with the blue colour shows the East/Med pipeline upon which a strategy of deterrence can be built by Israel, Cyprus and Greece. It can be extended by the parties involved towards Italy and the rest of Europe. Investors, European funds and the allocation of Military Forces should be included in a concrete strategy of which the goal is the establishment of a reliable deterrence based on common interests and security.

As already explained in the previous map, Turkey pursues to shape a strategic arc from the Eastern Thrace to the maritime region between Greece and Italy. To carry out this plan, Turkey uses the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the state of FYROM and the Albanian populations living in the Balkan Peninsula (Tetovo, Kosovo, Albanian state) as strategic instruments for the service of the Turkish national interests. It is evident that Turkey attempts to encircle Greece having a presence not only in the Aegean Sea but at the backyard of the Greek continental state too, which means in the Ionian Sea and elsewhere. Regarding the East, the region from Marmaris to Iskenderun is a closed Turkish Lake (see map page 24). Now Turkey takes a step further with the aim of controlling, even partially, the maritime areas of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus at the Southeast. It is the way that Ankara expects to take control over the gas resources.

This strategic plan comes to explain why Turkey enhances its war fleet and constructs a carrier aircraft. The control of the chokepoints of Bosporus, Suez, Hormuz, Bab-El Manded and the capability to reach up to the chokepoint of Gibraltar are obvious signs of a state, which, intends to consolidate its role as a regional power.

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This is a satellite photo, which shows 18 out of 77 self-propped artilleries T-155 mm that Turkey deployed in the occupied part of Cyprus (Agios Vasilios) while the negotiations on the solution of the Cyprus issue were under way.

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4. 2 Naval design The Turkish Naval design includes the acquisition of at least one modern made in German submarine (type 214), which has a double casing with elastic antimagnetic steel, allowing it to sink at 400 meters, while, simultaneously, possessing stealth features with low-volume propellers and thus to be difficult to get detected by the enemy. Moreover: 1. Turkey intended to replace the TF-100 Frigate by the new TF-200, which are the most sophisticated warships to be built in Turkey.

2. In 2014 the Turkish fleet was reinforced by patrol boats with SP92 sonar and a submarine tracking and destruction systems, as well as antiair systems. Furthermore, Turkey reinforces the capabilities of its fleet with a Tank Landing Craft, which can carry 250 soldiers and 320 tons of cargo.

The Turkish Naval plan also includes an Amphibious Transport Dock, which the Turks obtained in 2013, and can carry ships, amphibious vehicles and other military means. This vessel has four helicopter simulation bases and can accommodate seven UAVs and conduct amphibious and helicopter operations (Turkish Naval Forces, 2013, pp. 36-44) Turkey does not only aim to take an advantage, and thus to dominate over the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Sea, but it goes beyond, up to the chokepoint of Gibraltar, Suez and why not to Somalia. Furthermore, the strategic role of Turkey will be increased and enhanced in the frame of NATO while the balance of power between Turkey on the one hand and Greece and Cyprus on the other will be upset, particularly in the case that Turkey acquires either the Russian antimissile system of S-400 or the aircraft F-35.

On June 20, 2018, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated that the F-35 would be delivered to Turkey by 2020 (Daily Sabah, 2018).

However, few days later, on June 29, 2018, some US Senators raised their objections about providing Turkey with such a military support. In accordance with e.kathimerini.com: “Senators from both parties introduced a new amendment that would ban the Pentagon from using funds to transfer the jets to Turkey until Washington confirms that the Russian S-400 won’t be installed in that country” (e.kathimerini.com, 2018). The Turkish Naval Power should be strengthened by air and amphibious forces and antimissile systems. This is a recipe for Turkey to become regional and Dominant Naval Power playing significant and leading role regarding the control of some of the main chokepoints (Naval Forces, 2016). This is a strategic plan, which has been, already, put forward by Turkey, with the aim of increasing its regional and global geopolitical role. Moreover, it is a strategy, which is pertinent to the ambition that Turkey has in the field of energy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Cyprus has a pivotal position for Turkey and this is the reason why Ankara militarises the occupied area of the 48 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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island. This is a policy, which minimises the possibility for the finding of a democratic solution. On the contrary, the possibilities for the establishment of a protectorate and satellite state are increased, particularly in the frame of a federal system. Besides, the establishment of a federal system in Cyprus is the main strategic goal defined by the British and the Turks since 1956 (Charalambides 2011, pp. 378-380). A federal system in Cyprus, at least, will be for Turkey the vehicle to attain its revisionist strategy with Cyprus being under a status of Finlandization6.

6 Filandization is a diplomatic and political process based on the rules of power. Under

this term, a powerful country influences and even impose or coercive its own political and strategic options on a smaller and weaker neighbouring country. This is a political recipe through which the stronger state allows the neighbouring one and/or ones to hold its political system in “stability�. The diplomatic and strategic options of the weaker state depend on and are regulated by the national interests and the strategy of the stronger country. Thus, the independence and sovereignty of the weaker state is always under question. The term of Filandization goes back to the Cold War Era. It means that a state has the status of Finland, which was under the influence and in fact the guardianship of the Soviet Union.

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Naval Analyses (November 25, 2015)

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This graphic shows the configuration of the Naval Forces of Greece, Turkey, Egypt and Israel. The numbers have their own importance, but they are not the only variable, which should be used for the evaluation of the readiness and capabilities that a National Naval Force has in order to accomplish its missions. Some other variables that we should take into consideration are those concerning the level of the army’s combativeness and the level of morale, training and experience that the warships crews have as well as how skilful the officers and the General Staff are.

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This is a table, which shows the Turkish Aviation Forces. By definition, Tukey cannot successfully carry out its strategic plan unless it has the ability to combine Naval, Aviation and Amphibious Forces (see the graphics of the Turkish Air Forces activities in Nicosia FIR)

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Chapter 5 Recommendations 5.1 Cypriot Strategic Options The Realists, from Thucydides to the modern ones, set forth a simple tenet: If a weak state does not want to succumb to the military or other means used by a powerful state, the less it can do is to organise its own security and establish alliances. The other option that such a state has is to raise a white flag and adapt its policy and interests to the political positions and options imposed by the powerful state or states. As the strategic concept of appeasement failed in practice, an alternative Cypriot strategy can include a number of choices such as: Firstly, the maintenance of the Republic of Cyprus in valid and the finding of a solution on the basis of what the EU decisions provide for, starting from the normalisation of the relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus.

The basic precondition for Turkey to join the EU or to achieve a “privileged partnership” is the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. In the current era, the Greek Cypriot leadership proposed to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to enjoy benefits from the exploitation of the gas recourses in the context of a federal political system based on two constituent states of equal status.

Paradoxically, the implementation of a federal political system in Cyprus is as accepting as the Turkish strategic goal set forth in 1956. It is about a dichotomous political system, which constitutes the institutional and political vehicle through which Ankara can take control over the whole island. One of these two constituent states is the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, which is recognised neither by the UN nor by the EU. The political and legal concept about a “loose federation” in conjunction with the establishment of a Residential Rotational System and the claim that the “Turkish Cypriot Constituent State” should have the competence and the constitutional power to partially sign Internationale agreements are crucial legal elements of the solution. If these legal parametres constitute fundamental elements of the constitutional order, the “new state of affairs”, in other words the solution, will be stigmatised by the dichotomy of the executive power and the sovereignty as well as by the dichotomy of the international representative.

The position of the Cyprus government should be different from the one mentioned above. Therefore, it can be set as follows: Both the Turkish Cypriot and Turkey can have benefits from the gas resources if they recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the EU and UN decisions provide for. If this position

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is unfeasible, as some Greek Cypriots politicians could allege, why do both the leaderships of the Greek Cypriot parties and the government of the Republic of Cyprus celebrate about the Conclusions of the European Council?

Accordingly, we maintain that the Conclusions issued on March 22, 2018, and on June 29, 2018, flatly state that: A. The Turkish actions in the EEZ of Cyprus are illegal. Ankara should refrain from such illegal actions, which should be immediately terminated.

B. Turkey should normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. The provisions of the Statement issued by the EU on September 21, 2005, should be respected and fully implemented by Turkey. As we have already mentioned, this Statement does not only provide for the normalisation, but it also refers to the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey as a precondition for the Turkish accession to the EU or any other legal status could be decided such as the “privileged partnership.�

Secondly, the alliances that the Republic of Cyprus should construct on economic, energy, trade and military fields, with its neighbouring countries, and particularly with Israel. A state, which wants to exploit its natural gas safely, should find the political way to build a reliable deterrence by purchasing weapons such as the Russian Kh-35UE, with a range of 260 km or the Kh-35E with a range of 130 km, the French EXOCET MM40 Block 3 with a range of 180 km and the Swedish RBS15 MK3 with a range of 200 km. We note that the EXOCET missiles, that the National Guard possesses, have a range of 70 kilometres and cannot adequately cover the width of the Cypriot EEZ and prevent external threats effectively. To buy weapons for preventive purposes and defend the EEZ of Cyprus, it is not a policy of wasting money but an investment.

At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus should study the purchase of fast attack missile crafts or destroyers and the rental or even the purchase of war fighters from Greece, with a Cypriot emblem. These military aircrafts can be stationed at Andreas Papandreou Military Base. In this regard, the Republic of Cyprus should use its comparative geopolitical and geo-strategic advantage by signing agreements with the countries involved in the exploitation of its gas resources. These bilateral or multilateral agreements concern the facilitation that Cyprus can offer to its allies in ports and airports. States such as France and Israel might have access to the Base of Andreas Papandreou and the Naval Bases of Zygi and Mari. These countries may contribute to the improvement of the Cypriot military infrastructures since they agree to use them for their own strategic purposes. This is the way that Cyprus can tie its economic, energy, commercial and military interests with the ones of the states involved in the exploitation of its gas resources. To rely only 54 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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This map shows the abilities of the National Guard to defend the Cypriot EEZ. By definition, it cannot successfully face the Turkish threat, as the range of its missile systems cannot cover the entire EEZ of Cyprus and particularly the energy plots. Thus, the National Guard should get new missile systems to protect its special sovereign rights (EEZ). Otherwise, how can Cyprus have a reliable deterrence? Having weapons is not the only criterion of a reliable deterrence. You also need alliances and the political wisdom to know how and when you should use your military strength. Or else, if a nation - state does not know how to play the game of deterrence, it runs the risk of facing a boomerang. This is what occurred in the crisis of Imia in 1996. Even though the Greek state had military power and deterrence, a complete confusion resulted between the government and the leadership of the Military Forces. Such a confused situation backfired and created cray zones in the Aegean Sea at the expense of the Greek sovereign rights.

on the norms of International Law for defending your national sovereign rights is not a policy, which can lead to a successful outcome. International Law cannot work effectively in the international system, unless it enjoys the support of military strength and alliances in the context of a reliable deterrence. The truth is that Greece faces so many economic, social and political problems and therefore depends on the German and American financial support. Under these conditions, Greece should align its national interests with those of Germany and the US. Such a policy cannot be perceived as subservient behaviour leading to the establishment of a 55 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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protectorate state. On the contrary, the art of diplomacy is to serve your national interests along with those of the great and regional powers by maintaining your national dignity. To achieve this policy you need to have concrete strategy and clear goals accepted by the nation, which should be ready to serve them, making also sacrifices, if necessary. The leaderships of nation-states should be reliable. They should be devoted to the service and realisation of the national goal, telling the truth. This is a political recipe which can make the great and regional powers cooperate with and respect the leaderships of smaller states, on the basis of mutual respect.

We refer to Greece, because these movements mentioned above should be parts of a strategic alliance, which should be established between Cyprus, Greece and Israel. Such an alliance should enjoy the tolerance or blessing of the United States while, at the same time, should be embedded in the European and the Western security system. It is necessary for Cyprus, Greece and Israel to face the Turkish revisionist policy and thus to increase the degrees of deterrence and stability. Such a strategic step is of paramount importance for Cyprus, which is a weak and tiny state considered by Turkey as a key pillar for the restoration of the NewOttoman Empire and a central locus of its strategic plan to raise itself as a Dominant Naval Power.

The legal and political duty of a state, as a sovereign actor of the international system and subject of International law, is twofold: (A) to protect its citizens within its territory and (B), to defend its borders from external threats. Otherwise, how can a state exercise its sovereignty and avoid transforming itself into a protectorate? We should also clarify the following: It is madness to advocate that a state should engage itself in a war. However, a very dangerous situation is to result if there are politicians suffering from the illusion that no need exists for their states to possess adequate military strength in order to defend their country from external threats and thus to have a reliable deterrence. Or else, how can a nation-state exercise its sovereignty in practice?

Thirdly, the prospects of the relations between NATO and Cyprus. Turkey argues that it is necessary to keep Military Forces in Cyprus for the security of Turkish Cypriots and its own. At least, it wants to establish a Military Base.

If Cyprus joins NATO, there is no reason for Turkey to maintain Military Bases or any other Forces in the island. Cyprus will be a member - state of NATO and any Base, which might be installed in the island, will belong to the North Atlantic Alliance. It will be a win - win situation and all the parties involved will participate in the same security system. Therefore, no reason exists for Turkey or any other country to enjoy the status of a guarantor or to have the right of interference. The Republic of Cyprus could currently apply to join NATO. 56 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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However, it is evident that Tukey will exercise its right of veto. In this regard, Ankara will have the responsibility about the continuation of the problems existing between NATO and the EU due to the unresolved Cyprus issue. Thus, Ankara will bear the burden of proof on the reasons that it does not allow Cyprus to enter NATO. It should also explain why it hamper the efforts, which aim at the consolidation of stability and security in the region.

A relevant parameter that we should take into consideration is Russia, which usually supports Cyprus in the UN and particularly in the Security Council. There are Cypriot politicians, who argue that Moscow would not wish to see Cyprus joining NATO. However, Russia maintains excellent relations with Turkey, which is one of the main pillars of NATO. Moreover, both the US and Russia have established cooperation in various topics and areas where they serve common interests. On its part, Germany imposes measures against Russia through the EU due to the occupation of Crimea, but, on the other, it intensifies its efforts regarding the construction of “Nord Stream 2”. Therefore, the decisions taken by states are not only based on friendship and altruism but mainly on the service of national interests. The truth is that Cyprus belongs to NATO unofficially since the British Military Bases are to be consider NATO and all the foreign Forces stationed in the island either legally or illegally are NATO’s troops, namely Hellenic Force in Cyprus, Turkish Force in Cyprus and the Turkish occupied Forces. Simultaneously, the Republic of Cyprus provides with all the necessary facilitations the NATO Forces to accomplish their missions. Furthermore, what is the problem that Russia might face if Cyprus, a friendly country of Moscow, enters NATO? In fact, it will have a friendly country within NATO as it occurs when Cyprus joined the EU. Due to the electrified relations existing between the US and Turkey, Cyprus can, now, approach NATO and the Americans easily. However, neither concrete strategy to this direction exists nor a necessary political culture, so that Cyprus comes closer to NATO. There are American analysts who argue that Turkey should leave NATO (Bandow 2016). In practice, such a strategic view seems to be difficult to be realised, because Turkey is a fundamental pillar of the American security system and neither Greece nor Cyprus propose the US reliable alternative strategic options.

Fourthly, the Republic of Cyprus should clarify whether it intends to activate article 42,7 of the EU Treaties, if Turkish fleet and drill, called as “Conqueror”, violate the special sovereign rights that the Republic of Cyprus enjoys within its EEZ. In accordance with article 42,7: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of 57 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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the security and defence policy of certain Member States” (The Lisbon Treaty, 2018).

Since now, article 42,7 of the Treaty of Lisbon has been activated only once by the French government after the terrorist attack, which took place in Paris on November 13, 2015. The activation of article 42,7 falls into the jurisdiction, competence and sovereign rights of the member-state, which is under attack. As to the way that EU functions, we should underline that the area of defence is included in high politics and the member states keep their sovereign rights, almost untouchable. This is why they have the right of veto. The state which has the legal interests and is under attack should invoke article 42,7 in explaining its legal and political view and what is the demand and the support that it needs from the EU. This is what France did in 2015. Therefore, Cyprus should make its case in the Council of the Ministers of Defence and then to the European Council.

Some of the factors that a state can quote are the following: 1. Violation of the state sovereign rights.

2. Use of force and threats, which are launched by a third country to achieve an illegal goal.

3. Occupation of an EU member-state (national territory - land, sea,air) by a third country with the use of force (military means).

4. Damages on national interests and/or EU interests with the use of military means.

5. A situation, which results from the use of military force and can threaten the regional and/or global stability and peace.

These general criteria can be enriched depending on the case. They are legally founded by the UN Charter in article 1 paragraph 1 and article 2 paragraphs 3,4,5 and 6. Besides, article 42,7 of the Treaties points to article 51 of the UN Charter, which mentions the right of self -defence and the principle of Collective Security. Pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”(United Nations, 2018a). This is the legal capstone of article 42,7.

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permanent problem, it is easy for the Republic of Cyprus to prepare the political and institutional ground about the activation of article 42,7.

Therefore, the diplomatic efforts should be done in advance and not at the time that a likely attack might be conducted by the Turkish Military Forces. The question is how many of the EU member-states would be ready to support the Republic of Cyprus in practice and mainly militarily.

On the other hand, if the EU does no react, the credibility, the values and principles of the member-states and the EU as such will irreparably injured. The same applies to its cohesion. If the EU cannot protect one of its member-states, which is under attack, there is no reason for the EU to exist. Thus, the quintessence of prevention is not to let a third state to attack against a member-state but to prevent the crisis. The Republic of Cyprus should explain before the escalation of the crisis, as soon as possible, the situation, and the EU should take diplomatic initiatives to prevent any friction, attack and crisis. A member state should take preventive measures before and not upon or after an attack and a crisis occurs.

The Republic of Cyprus is already under occupation, permanent threat and aggression. What else other than aggression might be the sailing of the Turkish war fleet and the drill for researches within the EEZ of Cyprus? The “Conqueror” is accommodated in the port of Attalia and it is in fact like a Sword of Damocles hanging over the Republic of Cyprus. If the government of Cyprus does not compromise and adapt its energy policy in line with the Turkish strategy, the “Conqueror” and the Turkish fleet has no scruple to invade in the EEZ. The Republic of Turkey is ready to participate or to support a new round of negotiations, if the Republic of Cyprus is ready to freeze or to delay its energy program even tacitly or to adapt its policy in line with the Turkish energy goals. A positive outcome, of a final round of negotiations regarding the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus issue seems to be complicated due to the economic crises from which Turkey is plagued. In October 2018 the “Conqueror” was sailing around Cyprus.

Fifthly, the construction of the East/Med pipeline. Although there are serious negative variables concerning political instability and other security issues, the construction of a pipeline connecting plot 12 (Aphrodite) with the Egyptian LNG at Idkue is legitimated to be carried out for legal and political reasons. It is a project, which ties the strategic interests of Cyprus and Egypt and seals the agreements signed by the two states regarding the delineation of their EEZ. As it is well known Turkey puts such an agreement into question. As for Cyprus, the main strategic plan that it should put forward, as soon as possible, is the construction of the East/ Med on which energy, economic and other interests are met and an alliance with Israel, Greece, Italy and the EU can be consolidated. As the 59 YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

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Minister of Energy George Lakkotripis stated, Egypt is also interested to join the East/Med (Poullados, 2018). This is a project, which cannot only be seen through the lens of economic and energy interests. By definition, matters of security emerge. The safeguard of such a project is based on the establishment of a strategic axis between Israel, Cyprus and Greece to prevent the Turkish threat. This axis also offers an alternative option to the US policy when Turkey attempts to make a blackmail in the context of a “pendulum policy�5. An energy pipeline is not only a tube, which channels gas and oil. The length and the safety of a pipeline are proportional to and depend on the range of the military strength that a state or an alliance of states have. This tenet especially applies to the states that the gas and oil resources belong to. Hereupon, it is essential whether these states are in a position to protect and defend their interests, including the gas and oil pipeline, on their own or they have to establish alliances. It would be too difficult for Turkey to cause problems or strike such a pipeline (East/ Med), if it is, partially, constructed by European funds, channelling, at the same time, Israeli gas. Since the gas transferred by the East/Med will be used for the EU energy needs, the EU and its member-states will perceive any problem, which might be caused by Turkey, as a hostile action against their interests, let alone in the case of causing damages to Israel.

In light of what mentioned above we underlined the following: As Cyprus and Israel channel the EU with gas, the the stake of the interests of Cyprus in the EU will be much higher through the East /Med than it is today. Simultaneously, such a project will counterbalance the Cyprus energy and any other commercial and economic interests with those that the EU serves through Turkey. Furthermore, the European co-funding of the project, and the security system and strength of Israel, which is a dominant regional power, will be the main security pillars of the East / Med. Security along with the involvement of foreign funds constitute a recipe of safety status in terms of deterrence. If Ankara fails to kill this

7 It is the political tactic adopted by Turkey in the following concept: It swings between

the US and Russia in order to better serve its national interests. Such a policy is enriched by risky blackmails and it is, in fact, one of the pillars on which President Erdogan pursues to build the Turkish independent policy. Depending on the best way that Turkish national interests can be served, President Erdogan sometimes keeps distance from the US and sometimes flirts with Russia. He sometimes goes closer to the US and sometimes to Russia. Currently, as his relations with the US are not as good as both sides would like to be, President Erdogan comes closer to Russia. For many analysts, this is a very risky policy, which balance on a thin rope.

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strategic plan, it is evident that - even if the Turkish geopolitical role is not, dramatically, reduced - new conditions of deterrence will be created with the aim of facing the Turkish threats.

The East / Med puts an end to the pipeline through Turkey, and pulls Cyprus out of the trap, which had been shaped by those who claim that a pipeline should be offered to Ankara as a gift with the hope of becoming more flexible at the negotiating table. The East/Med creates a new geopolitical and geostrategic environment that serves a double - headed strategic goal. If such a strategic goal has not been defined yet, it should be decided.

A. To maintain the Republic of Cyprus valid and prevent the Turkish threat and any plan, which provides for the dissolution of the existing unitary state. The political system resulting from the settlement of the Cyprus issue, should be based on the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus from the legal, political and practical point of view. What the government of the Republic of Cyprus should avoid is to implement the model of the Soviet Union and Russia. Russia is considered as the continuity of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union and its constitutional structures do not exist anymore.

Soviet Union has been dissolved and broken down into its constituent parts.

If the unitary state of the Republic of Cyprus turns into a federal system of two constituent states of equal status, how can such a two - headed political system return to the status quo ante if a crisis erupts? Which of the two constituent states of equal status is to be recognised? Will the Greek or the Turkish Cypriot constituent state be recognised or will they both be? How can a federal government, which has equal status with the two constituent states of equal status, function if one of the two constituent states withdraws from the federation?

B. To exploit safely the natural gas.

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Chapter 6 Epilogue 6.1 The Illusion of Appeasement and the Naval Power The facts, presented in this work, show that Turkey has already put forward a strategy to raise itself as a Dominant Naval Power. This is a part of the wider strategy, which pursues to consolidate Turkey as an indisputable regional power. Time will show and to what extent, whether Turkey will realise its strategic plans. The Turkish policy has essential impact on the regional and global system and of course, on the solution of the Cyprus issue, which is a segment of the Turkish strategic puzzle. The same applies to the dispute which exists between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean See and elsewhere.

It is an illusion that a viable and democratic solution can be found to the Cyprus issue or to the wider Greco-Turkish relations as long as Turkey implements an imperial policy aiming at reviving the Ottoman Empire. The finding of a viable and comprehensive solution through the restoration of the procedure followed before and upon the negotiations in Grans Montana is utopia. The policy of appeasement failed. It is rational to be said that a preventive strategy should be established, taking the sceptre from the failed policy of appeasement. Some of the pillars, that such a policy can rely on, have been mentioned above. Cyprus issue cannot only be seen through the lens of its legal aspects, but through its geopolitical dimension too. The art of diplomacy focuses on the skills that a leadership should have in order to combine and tie its national interests with the ones of the regional and global powers as well as with the geopolitical developments.

All of the above should be included in the context of military strength and concrete preventive strategy. These are crucial preconditions for a nation - state to succeed its strategic goals (Charalambides 2011, pp. 463-576; Charalambides 2018, pp. 303-312).

Turkey has no intention of withdrawing its Military Forces from Cyprus. It considers the island as its own Military Base with the aim of participating in the control of key trade and energy routes in the context of a prominent geopolitical triangle shaped by Cyprus, Qatar and Somalia. As Turkey does not wish to abandon its imperial strategy, there is no room for the government of the Republic of Cyprus to repeat history by making the same mistake and thus to get involved in a new Grans Montana or in a similar procedure. So, states and governments should be careful and bear in mind what Einstein has said, whose intelligence nobody can challenge.

He argued that one mistake can be forgiven but as he added, the conscious repetition of the same mistake is stupidity.

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