Rollag 1/11 Volition: Spinoza vs Leibniz Introduction I have divided my paper into three parts. In part I, I will explain Spinoza’s conception of mental volition. I am using the term volition here for the sake of clarity because the phrase ‘free will’ is laden with too many preconceptions. In part II, I will explain Leibniz’ conception of volition. In part III, I will address the ‘free’ aspect of both Leibniz and Spinoza’s conception of volition. I will explain how Leibniz responds to the objection that his conception of volition is not free by clarifying what he means by our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs. I will highlight that Leibniz draws a distinction between it being necessary that we do what we choose to do and it being certain what we actually choose to. Then, I will show how Spinoza’s system allows us to draw the same distinction between what we actually choose to do and doing what we choose to do. In my clarification of what Spinoza must mean by our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs, I will highlight that this could not mean that what we actually do occurs as pre-determined, fatalistic, or inevitable, and neither that this could mean that what we actually do occurs by exactly the same necessity which is involved in God’s essence. Insomuch, my effort in this paper is to liberate volition in Spinoza’s system. I. Spinoza’s conception of Volition re Mental Actions For simplicity, I am going to restrict my explanation of Spinoza’s conception of volition to mental actions and I will not extend my explanation of Spinoza’s conception of volition to cover bodily actions. Such an explanation would be better fit for a longer version of this paper and is not necessary for understanding what is Spinoza’s conception of volition. I would need to explain further how Spinoza defines the mind/body relation and what are the limitations of bodily actions in Spinoza’s system. I will only discuss in detail what Spinoza thinks volition is
Rollag 2/11 with regard to mental actions and what he thinks are the limitations of mental actions; I will explain how Spinoza’s system can allow for liberated volition in the final section of this paper. What is Volition exactly according to Spinoza? The root of Spinoza’s conception of mental volition lies in the fact that he considers knowledge to be one and the same with power1. By mental volition, let us consider the pushing of ideas in or out of our heads; I would have liked to have discussed decision-making, but this would have needed a lengthier explanation. Spinoza thinks that when we push our ideas in or out of our heads, that this pushing is nothing more or less than an idea itself; I will note that a decision is simply an idea as well. One might think that when we push an idea in our head that we are actually affirming that the idea should be in our head; alternatively, when we push an idea out of our head we are denying that the idea should be in our head. However, Spinoza argues that affirmation and denial is involved in the idea itself and nothing distinct from the idea. 2 A noteworthy consequence of this is that we do not suspend judgment on our ideas3. What is the power of our volitions? How are we mentally active? What makes us an active agent as opposed to a passive agent with regard to our ideas is the possession of adequate ideas as opposed to the possession of inadequate ideas4. An adequate idea is a true idea, or knowledge5. An inadequate idea is a confused idea or the absence of knowledge6. It is important to note that we are also active, according to Spinoza, insofar as we are adequate causes of our effects7. For X to be an adequate cause of Y, Y must be able to be
1
(Ethics, II, Corollary Prop. 49, p. 96). (Ethics, II, Proof Prop. 49, p. 96). 3 (Ethics, II, Scholium Prop. 49, p. 99). 4 (Ethics, III, Prop. 1 & 3, p. 103 & p. 107). 5 (Ethics, II, Def. 4, p. 63). 6 (Ethics, II, Prop. 35, p. 86). 7 (Ethics, III, Def. 2, p. 103). 2
Rollag 3/11 clearly and distinctly perceived through X8. In other words, we must be able to possess an adequate idea of Y by way of X. Adequate causes are more pertinent to an explanation of bodily volition. Since mental volition can be explained with merely adequate ideas, I will not further explain adequate causes. This topic would need to be explained in detail in an extended version of this paper. As one acquires more adequate ideas, one’s power is increased; in other words, one’s power is proportionate to their possession of adequate ideas9. Since we are beings that endeavor to persist in existence, which Spinoza calls our “conatus”10, or our “essence” 11, we naturally endeavor to affirm our power of activity12. We take pleasure in affirming our power of activity13. Since accumulating adequate ideas elevates our power of activity14, we also take pleasure in acquiring adequate ideas. A snowball effect occurs; as we accumulate adequate ideas and elevate our power of activity, our desire to acquire more adequate ideas is fueled in effect starting the cycle over again. Why are our mental actions distinct from others? If action is simply the possession of adequate ideas and everyone endeavors to persist in existence, or to acquire more adequate ideas, why wouldn’t everyone come to the same actions given the same adequate ideas? Why do some people think Y given adequate idea X and others think Z given adequate idea X? The answer is that people perform unique mental actions with regard to the same adequate ideas because people’s essences are unique15. People endeavor to 8
(Ethics, III, Def. 2, p. 103). (Ethics, III, Corollary Prop 1, p. 103). 10 (Ethics, III, Prop. 6 & 7, p. 108 - 109). 11 (Ethics, III, Prop. 6, p. 108). 12 (Ethics, III, Prop. 54, p. 135). 13 (Ethics, III, Prop. 53, p. 135). 14 (Ethics, III, Def. 2, p. 103). 15 (Ethics, III, Proof Prop. 57, p. 138). 9
Rollag 4/11 persist in existence in accordance with their own unique essence; according to each individual’s unique perspective on life, they will uniquely deem pleasurable or painful, good or bad, and act accordingly16. That it is the case that we endeavor to persist in existence in accordance with our own essence is a fundamental aspect of Spinoza’s conception of volition because it shows that we do in fact uniquely participate in the cause by which are mental actions are effected. A possible objection: The Sadist. Since endeavoring to persist in existence according to one’s own essence is a unique claim about each individual’s unique idea of what is desirable and what is pleasurable, and one is active in so far as they acquire adequate ideas as a result of what they deem pleasurable, it might be objected that there could be a man, let us call him the sadist, who deems hurting people is pleasurable and he will go around and kill people. This objection is easily remedied. It could be that the sadist exists, but that which the sadist does could not be said to be the product of the sadist in so far as he is active under Spinoza’s definition of activeness. In other words, what the sadist does would be the result of the sadist possessing inadequate ideas. A man in endeavoring to persist in his own existence will acquire adequate ideas because as we saw above acquiring adequate ideas elevates one’s power of activity. As he accumulates adequate ideas, he becomes more knowledgeable17. Since a man is active in so far as he possesses adequate ideas, a man's actions become the product of reason. A man of reason would never desire to torture and pain humans, nor would a man of reason desire to commit suicide. Thus, as far as one is active and possesses adequate ideas, one could never become a sadist. On the other hand, a man that acts by reason will foster within him virtuousness, happiness, and sociability.18 Even though there are restrictions on what reason dictates, Spinoza offers us a 16
(Ethics, III, Prop. 53, p. 135). (Ethics, II, Scholium 2 of Prop. 40, p. 90). 18 (Ethics, IV, Prop. 19, p. 164). 17
Rollag 5/11 system that defines not only how we think, but more importantly how we are able to control our thoughts19. II. Leibniz’ conception of Volition Leibniz does call his conception of volition, ‘free will’20. Not only do persons have free will, but God also has free will21. I will restrict my explanation of Leibniz’ conception of volition to persons, and I will not discuss in detail God’s free will. Since Leibniz affirms that we have free will and that mental actions and bodily actions are equally free, I will not restrict my terminology to speaking only about mental volition, but instead I will refer to Leibniz’ conception of volition in general. In Leibniz’s system, humans have free will primarily as a result of a logical consequence. Since the opposite of what occurs with regards to volition does not involve a contradiction, then the actions of persons are not necessary, but instead contingent. A key factor of our free will is that, similar to Spinoza’s system, in Leibniz’ system every individual is unique. It is by way of our uniqueness that it is the case that we are who we become as distinct from others. We choose to act based on what we uniquely deem the best.22 I will save my discussion about complete individual concepts, that by which our present is pregnant with our future, and how free will is compatible with the fact that the world could not have been otherwise than what occurs for the following section. Although, unlike Spinoza, Leibniz, in the Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics, does not elucidate what volition is; to remind you, Spinoza illuminated volition as the possession of ideas23. Leibniz, in these texts, does not address whether volition is an idea, an affirmation, or 19
(Ethics, Part III - V). (Discourse, XIII, p. 19-22). 21 (Ethics, II, Scholium 2 of Prop. 40, p. 90). 22 (Ethics, II, Scholium 2 of Prop. 40, p. 90). 23 (Ethics, II, Proof Prop. 49, p. 96). 20
Rollag 6/11 something over and above. Instead, Leibniz says only that we do have will and it is free; I will discuss the free aspect in the following section. Also, Spinoza outlines why we do what we do, and what one would do24 and could do25 should he be active, but Leibniz does not. Leibniz’ volition relies heavily on it being the case that there are contingent facts, and that the contingency does not inhibit us or force us to do or not to do any particular thing. III. Spinoza and Leibniz re Free Volition: Analyzing Necessity. LEIBNIZ: Why is our will free? According to Leibniz, even though we do have free will it is not the case that the world could be otherwise than what occurs26. At first glance, this appears to be wholly contradictory. But, Leibniz has a response. First, let me explain why it is not the case that the world or more specifically why it is not the case that our actions could be otherwise than what occurs. Everything that we have done and will do paired with everything that has and will happen to us comprises who we are, which Leibniz refers to as our complete individual concept27. God, in deciding which possible world to actualize, foresaw our complete individual concept along with all the other complete individual concepts in our world28. God compared our world to all the other possible worlds and deemed our world the best in accordance with the Good, which is understood by God but not the product of God29, and chose to actualize us30. In actualizing us, it became the case that everything that we have done and will do paired with everything that has and will happen to us is entailed throughout time by our complete individual concept31. In other 24
(Ethics, III, Proof Prop. 57, p. 138). (Ethics, III, Prop. 53, p. 135). 26 (Monadology, 60, p. 264). 27 (Discourse, XIII, p. 19). 28 (Discourse, XXX, p. 49). 29 (Monadology, 46, p. 261). 30 (Discourse, XXX, p. 50 – 51). 31 (Ethics, Part III - V). 25
Rollag 7/11 words, that I am writing this paper right now was a component of my complete individual concept before God actualized me; when God actualized me it became the case that I could not do otherwise than write this paper right now. But, if it is already the case that everything we will do could not be otherwise, then how could we be said to have free will? It appears that everything we do is necessitated by God’s actualization of our world. Leibniz reminds us, however, that the only reason why our actions are entailed by our complete individual concept is because we choose to do them according to what we think is the best course of action. I chose to write this paper right now and because of this decision I made it the case that my life right now could not be otherwise than writing this paper. Even though God foresaw that I would choose to write this paper right now, it is not the case that God decided for me that I would write this paper right now. Our actions, and similarly our complete individual concepts, are only the product of God in so far as they are actualized and not merely possible, nothing more and nothing less. God does not compel us to choose to do what we do, but instead God compels us to do what we choose to do.32 As a result, Leibniz draws a distinction between necessity and certainty. It is certain that our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs because God chose our world to be the actual world. But that our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs is not necessary because the opposite of what occurs does not entail a contradiction. Moreover, God choosing another possible world as opposed to our world to actualize too does not entail a contradiction. Thus, it is the case that our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs and similarly it is the case that our world is the actual world due to mere hypothetical necessity and not absolute necessity.33 In other words, what we actually choose to do is merely certain and not necessitated, 32 33
(Ethics, II, Scholium 2 of Prop. 40, p. 90). (Ethics, II, Scholium 2 of Prop. 40, p. 90).
Rollag 8/11 which elucidates why are actions are freely made, while it is necessarily the case that we will do what we choose to do, which elucidates why our actions could not be otherwise than what does occur. SPINOZA: A clarification of necessity in Spinoza’s system to liberate volition. Spinoza, like Leibniz, also holds that the world could not be otherwise than what occurs34 even though he has put forth a conception of volition. As with Leibniz’ system, these two ideas appear at first glance wholly contradictory. A furthering of this problem is that Spinoza often states that the world, including our actions, occurs by the same necessity that is involved in God’s essence, which necessitates God’s existence. But, I will clarify the necessity by which our actions occur in Spinoza’s system in order to liberate our volition. I will hint now to the fact that I believe that Spinoza’s system allows for a similar distinction between certainty and necessity that Leibniz utilized in order to avoid the objection that our actions are not free. Let me begin by saying a little about the background to Spinoza’s system in the Ethics. Spinoza’s Ethics is in direct response to a conception of free will as undetermined, or absolutely free35, and to a God that pre-determines or is the immediate cause of our actions36. I completely agree with Spinoza in his rejection of a conception of volition as undetermined and absolutely free. Obviously, it wouldn’t makes sense for my actions to be undetermined, especially if undetermined means being a product of chance, randomness, or moreover being uncaused. I believe that my actions are determined by my previous mental states in correspondence with many other things. With regard to absolute freedom, again it is obvious that my actions are not absolutely free. I know that I am limited in my abilities; I am not able to materialize a draft root beer right now even though I would really like to. But, I do have the ability to bring up the 34
(Ethics, I, Prop. 33, p. 54). (Ethics, I, Appendix, p. 57-59). 36 (Ethics, I, Appendix, p. 57-59). 35
Rollag 9/11 memory of a good draft root beer whenever I would like. Insomuch, I do not think it is controversial that our actions are not undetermined nor absolutely free. Regarding Spinoza’s response to a God that pre-determines or is the immediate cause of our actions, Spinoza completely rejects this concept of God37. This helps us to clarify what Spinoza means by the fact that our actions occur by the same necessity that is involved in God’s essence and could not be otherwise than what occur. Spinoza denies that events are predetermined; he states that nature does not act with an end in view38. Thus, that events could not be otherwise than what occurs cannot mean that what we actually do occurs fatalistically or inevitably. It is not the case that what we actually do in the future is already planned out or set in a way in which it is now the case that we could not tomorrow do otherwise than what we actually do tomorrow. It is nice that since Spinoza’s God does not foresee our actions as Leibniz’ God because it saves me space in not having to explain the complication that arose in Leibniz’ system of God’s foresight correlated with will as free. So, what we actually do does not occur with necessity in the sense of pre-determined. However, we still need to address if Spinoza could mean that what we actually do is necessitated as God’s existence is necessitated. If Spinoza were asserting that there is a direct proportional relation of necessity from that involved in God’s essence and what we actually do, then he would have to hold that too our essence involves necessity in the same manner that God’s essence involves necessity. If what I actually do is necessitated in the same manner in which God’s existence in necessary, then it must also hold that my existence, not to mention everything else that occurs in this world, is necessitated by the necessity involved in God’s essence. But, Spinoza directly rejects this inference39. We are not necessary beings, as God is a necessary being, 37
(Ethics, III, Proof Prop. 57, p. 138). (Ethics, Preface IV, p. 153). 39 (Ethics, II, Axiom 1, p. 64). 38
Rollag 10/11 because in attending solely to our essence there is nothing that “necessarily posits [our] existence or necessarily excludes it”40. Thus, we cannot hold that it is by exactly the same necessity as that involved in God’s essence that we choose to do what we actually do. In this we can see how in Spinoza’s system we are able to draw the same distinction that Leibniz made explicit between certainty and necessity. Since what we actually choose to do is not necessitated in the sense of pre-determined, fatal, or inevitable, nor in the same sense as God’ existence is necessitated, then it is merely certain what we actually choose to do. So, how do we understand what Spinoza must mean by the fact that our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs? If it is merely certain what we actually choose to do, it must be necessary that we do what we choose to do; notice that this is akin to the distinction that Leibniz makes regarding the necessity of our actions. For example, even though my choosing to write this paper was not necessitated, it was merely certain that I would make a choice, since I chose to write this paper right now, it is a necessary fact that I am writing this paper right now and could not be otherwise. Since the world can only transpire in one way, which is the way that it does transpire, it is clearly the case that the world could not be otherwise than what does occur. However, it is merely a matter of what does happen at a particular time, what particular choices that one makes, that makes it the case that a such an event occurs at that particular time. Thus, in a minimalist reading of Spinoza, all that clearly follows from Spinoza saying that everything flows from God by the same necessity as involved in God’s essence and that the world could not be otherwise than what occurs is that it is a necessary fact that events, more specifically mental events, are determined, but the way in which mental events occur need not be necessitated. However, I will note that what reason dictates, as we described at the end of part I, is necessitated; but, this only restricts our actions in a guiding manner and does not define what 40
(Ethics, IV, Definition 3, p. 154).
Rollag 11/11 we will exactly choose to do in every situation. Insomuch, we can see that volition in Spinoza’s system need not be un-free and is understood as liberated by a clarification of what Spinoza must not mean by our actions occurring by the same necessity as involved in God’s existence and could not be otherwise than what occurs. Conclusion We have seen that both Spinoza and Leibniz put forth a conception of volition as liberated that is compatible with it being the case that our actions could not be otherwise than what occurs. In clarifying this compatibility in Leibniz’ system, I showed how Leibniz draws a distinction between it being necessary that we do what we choose to do and it being merely certain what we actually choose to do. In clarifying this compatibility in Spinoza’s system, I highlighted that Spinoza could not mean that what we actually choose to do is necessitated in the sense of pre-determined, fatal, or inevitable, and neither that what we actually choose to do is necessitated in the same sense as the necessity involved in God’s essence. By elucidating this, I was able to draw the same distinction in Spinoza’s system as Leibniz did in his system. I showed that in Spinoza’s system it is not necessitated, or is merely certain, what we actually choose to do, but it is necessary that we will do what we choose to do in effect liberating Spinoza’s conception of volition.
Bibliography Discourse on Metaphysics - Correspondence with Arnauld - Monadology. La Salle: Open Court Company, 1997. Print. Ethics Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters. Indianapolis: Hackett Company, Inc., 1992. Print.