Borgmann in Cyberspace Revisiting Borgmann’s device-paradigm
24-06-2009 Filosofie van Nieuwe Media en Communicatie Lieke Mandemakers, 3000680 Werkgroep 1, M. Roepke. 1
Table of Contents
Introduction
p. 3
Borgmann’s theories
p. 5
Reconsidering Borgmann’s definitions
p. 8
Conclusions
p. 13
Literature
p. 15
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Introduction
The last decades have seen significant changes and progression at a technological level. In rapid succession the internet and mobile and visual technology have developed to become a big part in the lives of our citizen. The possibilities these aspects of technology bring with it have made possible the creation of something not seen before: digital culture. This digital culture has been scrutinized and analysed by academics extensively. Because of it being a complete new aspect of the modern age, the positives and negatives need to be considered and explored.
An aspect of this digital culture can be called online culture. Online culture has been a source of debate ever since it became apparent. The culture of online worlds, be it forums, games, blogs, auction-sites or any other form of communication between people and a sense of community, is one that offers unique possibilities but also new dangers. Online culture is one to be explored, as it still harbours a lot of secrets for us. There are countless of issues that arise thinking about online culture, and all of these issues need to be addressed.
One of the things often asked about online culture is the fact whether or not it supplies us with an opportunity to really connect with people. When we’re involved in ‘social’ acts on the internet, are we really being social? Are we really connecting and building relationships with other people, or can we consider contacts over the internet as a façade, a weak simulation of meaningful contacts outside online culture? Can we consider activities in an online culture meaningful? This fear of losing important aspects that are part human nature through technology is apparent in a lot of academics. Technology has in many ways been considered a threat to meaningful interaction with other people, as well as oneself. In this perspective technology destroys our relationship with nature, and acts as a barrier in discovering ourselves or the reality of ‘being’. One of the most important theorists in whom we recognize this perspective must be Heidegger. He’s sees technology as an all-consuming ‘Gestell’, a system of interconnectivity and unity, which encompasses everything (Ijsseling, 1994, 28-30). Within this system, man has become infinitely powerful, but the individual has lost all of his power (Ijsseling, 1994, 29). Another philosopher who is fairly pessimistic in this way in his views on technology is Borgmann. Basing his views on technology on Heidegger’s vision, he sees technology as an omnipresent factor in everyday life. It affects human beings whether they approve or not. Like 3
Heidegger, he sees man as completely dependent on technology. He speaks of the deviceparadigm, in which he distinguishes between thing (something that requires the user to engage with and understand it) and device (a tool with a purpose, often of which the process is not understood by the user). Unlike Heidegger though, Borgmann sees a way for man around these harmful effects of technology and the device paradigm in the form of focal practices (Tijmes, 1997, 121-127). These focal practices consist of ways in which we can get back in touch with our nature, our truth. They incorporate a definition of meaning (Tijmes, 1997, 127). Borgmann mentions a couple of examples of focal practices in the form of gardening, sports and hiking. He sees these practices as a direct opposite of technology. However, in my eyes, we should look closer to this focal practice theory in relation to newer technology. Do the two, by definition, rule each other out? Borgmann’s theory stems from 1984. A time in which digital culture had not yet come into existence. Yet, this online culture could shed new light onto this older theory.
In this paper I would like to explore the boundaries of Borgmanns theories. In which ways do they still apply to newer technology, namely online culture? Can we so easily dismiss the possibility of focal practices in technology, or does this theory need revising? Can online culture serve as a platform for focal practices? In order to address this issue I shall be dividing it into three subsections. The first section will be addressing Borgmann’s theory in detail. Including a description of the device paradigm and the ways in which it has its base in Heidegger’s notions of technology. I will attempt to retrace Borgmanns’ steps and define what exactly makes a focal practice, and how it fits into our everyday lives. In the second section I will be looking at the above-mentioned theories through the eyes of modern times. I shall try and establish a relationship between focal practices and online culture. In this way I will test the boundaries of Borgmanns vision and see if it can be warped into the 21st century. The third section will entail a conclusion on the subject, and attempt to answer the questions we have found to be so important to answer.
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Borgmann’s theories.
Albert Borgmann was born in 1937, in Freiburg, Germany. He has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Montana since 1970, specialising in the philosophy of technology.
Borgmann’s theories are rooted in a firm belief that society nowadays is completely subjected to technology (Tijmes, 1997, 116). Technology is apparent in almost all facets of our lives, which results in us not being able to easily escape it anymore. This negative perspective on technology in modern ages is based on Heidegger’s notions of technology. Heidegger sees technology as a way in which we interact with the world around us. He does not perceive it to be the appliances we use. Technology is a way in which humans relate to the things around them, going back to the prehistoric ages. It is not a means to an end, something we use or choose not to use. It is the very world around us, in which we situate and place ourselves. (Ijsseling, 1994, 25-26) Contrary to older technology (the Greek call it technè), technology in the modern age does not just use the inherent power of natural forces to accomplish a goal, but actually damages the inherent powers of nature in order to force something from them they would not normally give. In this way it distorts them, morphs them into whatever it is we need at that time (Ijsseling, 1994, 28). Another aspect of technology in Heidegger’s perspective is the fact that he sees technology as a ‘Gestell’. This means that technology is a system, in which all products and appliances are connected. In order to accomplish this, all products of the ‘Gestell’ are known for their unity and uniformity, they need to be able to connect to each other and thus, diversity is nonexistent. Products carry their own further existence in them, in the way in which they require others of the same kind to be fully operational (Ijsseling, 1994, 29). The products are completely dependent on each other, which makes them more successful. Man, living in this ‘Gestell’, has become more powerful than ever before. The possibilities of the uses of technology have made the power of humankind grow exponentionally, bordering to God-like. Yet, the power of the individual has diminished greatly because of the dependency on the system and the technological perks it provides us with (Ijsseling, 1994, 31). The danger of this ‘Gestell’ and the effects it has on us is the fact that it encompasses everything we know. Heidegger argues that our very ‘being’ is getting completely immersed in this technological world, to the point it dictates what is good for us. We will be completely submerged in technology, with nowhere to escape to (Ijsseling, 1994, 34-35). 5
We recognize the base values of this perspective on technology in Borgmann’s theories. Like Heidegger, Borgmann sees technology as more than just appliances and products. It is the way in which we interact with the modern world, apparent in the very fabric of our being. He recognizes and evaluates the pattern of our lives, the ways in which we sustain ourselves in our daily activities and surroundings. This pattern “inheres in the dominant way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the world; and that characteristic approach to reality I call (modern) technology” (Borgmann, 1987, 3). In this way, like Heidegger, he recognizes technology in the different ways in which we give shape to our lives, and thus relate to them.
This view on technology is the base prerequisite for Borgmann’s theories about the workings of the device paradigm. He describes this particular aspect of the technological modern age very thoroughly, regarding it as one of the most important things to consider when analysing the technological society of nowadays. Borgmann’s device paradigm consists of the notion of a division between two kinds of objects. Like Heidegger, Borgmann establishes a change in use of objects as opposed to when technology wasn’t as whole fully present in society as it is now. Where Heidegger describes the ways in which we nowadays use technology to force something out of nature it would not naturally give, Borgmann distinguishes between ‘thing’ and ‘device’ (Tijmes, 1997, 121). A technological device as opposed to a ‘thing’ serves to instantly gratify our need for whatever it is we’re using it for. In the modern age, the use of devices has become more significant than the use of things. A technological device like this only serves the purpose of instant gratification for the user. The user in turn, does not know exactly how the device works. The workings of the device stay hidden for the user, making it easier and faster to use. The device is there to cater to our need in a ‘safe, easy, instantaneous and ubiquitous’ way (Tijmes, 1997, 119). Borgmann provides us with an example in the form of a stereo set. The stereo provides us with music. As opposed to for instance a group of people with instruments, the stereo does not show us the characteristics of music being procured by a device (Borgmann, 1984, 3). The stereo set plays its music not just on festive days but whenever you want, as well as playing any type of music you want, of any kind of quality. Borgmann notices an extreme concealment in the manner of production. The physical appearance of a record or cd does not show us what kind of music they contain. He mentions the example of loudspeakers: “[they]…have no visible affinity to the human voice, to the brass or the strings whose sound 6
they reproduce” (Borgmann, 1987, 4). We don’t have complete understanding of exactly how the music came to be on that disk, and how it is retrieved from it. There is no need for an understanding of the artists, and sometimes you won’t even recognize all the instruments being played in this reproduction (Borgmann, 1987, 3). We can clearly see the stereo functions as a quick ‘fix’ for the need for music, without demanding any understanding or engagement from the user. Borgmann recognizes a division between commodity (in this case the music) and machinery (the mechanical stereo set) that is the most important feature of a technological device. He mentions that a technological device exists because it “promises liberation from some unpleasant state and domination or control of that unpleasantness (pp. 35-6)”(Michalos, 1986, 573). Yet, in doing so, this liberation actually morphs into disengagement and loneliness. Borgmann wants us to realise what the costs of technology are, and how to be aware of them. This realisation can be achieved in openness to focal practices.
To be able to achieve this ‘good life’ as Borgmann calls it, we have to fully engage ourselves with things, as opposed to devices. These things Borgmann labels as ‘focal’ things. Focal, in this case, comes from the Latin word ‘focus’, which means hearth. In many cultures the hearth has been a central symbol for togetherness. It was often the place where important activities were performed, like welcoming a baby into the family or connecting two people through marriage. It is the place where people come together in a house, and the place where we leave pictures of our loved ones. A focal thing, as such, means an object that has a central place in our lives, an object that has meaning and purpose (Tijmes, 1997, 127). Borgmann is not very clear in a definition of what a focal thing is. He mentions they often are derived from different cultures and serve different functions, which makes it hard to pin down certain characteristics on them. He continues on to describe the ways I which, around these focal things, certain activities involving these things form. He calls these activities focal practices (Tijmes, 1997, 128). Focal practices, like things, imply a certain importance in clarifying and centring our lives. Like with things, a definition of these focal practices seems hard to establish, yet numerous examples have been mentioned. “"Focal things" or "focal concerns" are things like "temples or cathedrals,... or celebrations in which the significance and coherence of life" becomes focused (p. 159) (Michalos, 1986, 573). A cathedral would be considered a focal thing because of the fact it embodied the medieval view on life. Besides historical buildings that harbour traditions, the actual traditions themselves like religious rites can be considered focal (Tijmes, 1997, 128). Not only religious acts are mostly considered focal, acts like running, reading a book, sports, gardening and having a meal together fall 7
under the label of focal practices. A contrast is apparent to the world of appliances and devices and its availability, as well as the fact that most focal practices have no real goal or end product imbedded in the activity. The actual activity itself is the goal. In this they are fundamentally different from devices. A technological device is there to cater to the needs of man, to supply them with a product. In focal practices there is no external purpose to the activity, if there were, it would be no better than the technological devices surrounding us. Engagement is a key factor in talking about focal things and practices. Focal things and practices demand engagement in a way passive devices do not. “A focal thing is something that has a commanding presence, engages your body and mind, and engages you with others. Focal things and the kinds of engagements they foster have the power to centre your life, and to arrange all other things around this centre in an orderly way because you know what’s important and what’s not. A focal practice results from committed engagement with the focal thing” (Wood, 2003, 22-25).
An important part of focal practices is nature. In Borgmann’s eyes, nature harbours focal power and is in fact a focal thing in itself. The wilderness is untouched by human hands, and therefore the exact opposite of (human) technology. Pure nature can be an experience on its own, in which man can learn to respect it without any selfish concerns. It is important we do not judge nature by human standards, but learn from it what these human standards are (Tijmes, 1997, 129). It is these aspects that make walking and gardening for instance, a focal practice.
Reconsidering Borgmann’s definitions
Borgmann’s theories about focal things and practices are, according to some academics, severely outdated. As can be read in the first section, Borgmann focuses on mostly family or nature related activities as a focal practice. Technology then, consists of devices, which we do not fully comprehend, made for instant gratification of our needs. Yet, is this simple statement still applicable to modern technology as it is today? Online culture could offer us new insights into Borgmann’s technological culture. Starting with his rigid division between thing and device concerning the window to this online culture: the personal computer.
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Borgmann tells us that the technological devices are there to cater to our needs. They normally have but one purpose, and do not show us how they work. This results in us not understanding how exactly the device works, but nonetheless using it for fast, instant gratification of our needs. Borgmann mentions the device serves only one purpose, this being the goal, the device’s only function is to serve as a tool towards this one goal. This division between instrument and goal is very apparent in any device (Tijmes, 1997, 119).
If we take a closer look at the pc, the window to online culture, we recognize numerous aspects that do not necessarily fit with Borgmann’s definition of a technological device. As mentioned before, Borgmann sees technological devices as appliances with only one function: to cater to the need of the user. This way, the device normally only works towards one goal. An example Borgmann uses in this case is for instance a radiator (Tijmes, 1997, 120). The personal computer however, does not cater to one need only. It seems to be an amalgamation of different devices in one, and thus can cater to different needs. It has been used for contacting other people (mail, messaging), working business (spreadsheets, documents), entertainment (games, music, movies), researching, etc. This way, the computer does not easily match Borgmann’s description of the ‘one goal, one purpose’ technological device.
Another important aspect of the definition of the technological device by Borgmann is the fact that man often does not know exactly how the device works. We use the device normally by simple means (on/off buttons) without realising how it will actually supply us with the finished product (Borgmann, 1987, 3). This definition should be reconsidered with the upcoming of online culture. More and more people are learning about the workings of their personal computers every day. Online culture has made for an open, communicative society of sharing and grassroot policies. A new participatory culture can be seen, and it makes for better understanding of our machines. As Jenkins mentions in his article Interactive audiences? The collective intelligence of media fans this new participatory, online culture consists of three aspects: People can more easily annotate, archive appropriate and recirculate new media with new tools. Sub-cultures promote the DIY-aspects of new media, and horizontally integrated media conglomerates encourage the flow of images and ideas from consumers (Jenkins, 2002, 1). People learn from other people online, technical problems get solved within this spectrum of users in the online culture, because they learn to do it
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themselves.1 People have grown to understand the workings of their own personal computer to a higher extent than Borgmann describes in his device paradigm. Also, we can recognize the social aspect Borgmann nostalgically values in ‘things’ (as opposed to devices) in this development of understanding in online culture. The social activity of the production of warmth in a house (it included the whole family) we can recognize in the teaching of the computer workings online to other people (Tijmes, 1997, 120). It involves interaction with other people, and working together to find a solution for certain problems.
A last note to consider applying the ‘technological device’-label on a personal computer is the aspect of the technology doing its ‘job’ while hiding its own presence. The devices work while hiding their inner workings to human beings. This way they cannot remind us of the activity itself, and we don’t have to think about anything else than the product. We will not even think about the possible process behind our product (Tijmes, 1997, 119). The personal computer though, is more complicated than that. In Bolter and Grusin’s famous article Remediation. Understanding New Media we read about the notion of remediation; the ways in which newer forms of media seem to imitate older forms (Bolter & Grusin, 2001, 44-45). We recognize this in the computer, remediating the book (online texts), radio (music), television (video’s and show), etc. This aspect of remediation brings with it two specific ways of remediating; in accordance to a tradition of hypermediacy or immediacy. The desire for immediacy becomes apparent for instance in most films. The movie is produced in such a way that it had the least amount of chance to break the viewers world of that film while watching it. The interface is as invisible as possible, so that viewers concentrate on the content of the medium, not the medium itself (Bolter & Grusin, 2001, 2223). Hypermediacy then, is the opposite of this. The medium reveals itself to the user, and reminds the user constantly of its presence. This form of remediation becomes especially apparent in “the heterogeneous “windowed style” of World Wide Web pages, the desktop interface, multimedia programs, and video games” (Bolter & Grusin, 2001, 31). This includes a big part of the online culture in general. The process is important here, not the end result. 1
Commonly, all forums have a section for ‘technical discussion’ Here they can find an answer to any technical issues they’re encountering. We see this more at game sites, for instance at http://forums.worldofwarcraft.com/board.html?forumId=11110&sid=1. The player community or the moderators normally supply the answers. Besides help with particular computer functions like running a game, there are also countless of general computer-help forums to be found. An example of this is located at http://www.techsupportforum.com/. Here a user can find answers for any technical problem he or she encounters using the personal computer. It is then discussed or solved by members of the community.
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This goes against Borgmann’s notion of a technological device always hiding its inner workings from the user, it is apparent the personal computer in many ways deliberately shows the process of its workings, instead of hiding it in favour of ‘easy use’ for the users. In doing this, the computer established a link with the user and the process of production, and this reminds the user of the fact he is using a device.
These notes on Borgmann’s division between device and thing concerning the computer lead to an interesting revelation. If the computer does not necessarily fit the label of ‘technological device’, is it possible that it is in fact a thing? And if this is true, does this mean a computer in certain ways can act as a ‘focal thing’ with which we engage, resulting in a focal practice? An interesting aspect of Borgmann’s focal practices is the fact that the activities’ goal is the practice itself. There is no external goal present in a focal thing or activity; the activity itself is the goal. As an example of this Borgmann mentions sports a lot (Tijmes, 1997, 130). Sports are known to be activities in which the point of the activity lies in the activity itself. There is no external goal to sports; the goal is to participate in it. In some ways sports can be considered a form of play. Huizinga was the first one to describe ‘play’. His broad definition of the phenomenon was revolutionary at the time, and still makes for interesting discussion about everything that falls under this category. He states that in playing, one enters the world of the game, which is separate from our reality. In here, specific rules apply and no external purposes or goals protrude into this game-world (Huizinga, 1949, 10-12). Play therefore, can be a lot of things, ranging from playing tag as a child, to modern sports and games. All of these played for the sake of ‘playing’, not to achieve an external goal. A comparison then, can be made between Borgmann’s sports and say, online games. Both are considered ‘play’ and both have no external purpose other than to play the game. Borgmann also speaks of ‘engagement’ being imperative in focal practices. Engagement consists of traits like “practice the acquisition of skills, the fidelity to a daily discipline, the broadening of sensibility, the profound interaction of human beings, and the preservation and development of human traditions” (Borgmann, 1987, 214). An aspect like ‘profound interaction of human beings’ is an interesting one in he light of online culture, because of the word ‘profound’. Online games like World of Warcraft2 or Warhammer3 online are played by a group of people who
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World of Warcraft is a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (mmorpg) developed by Blizzard in 1994. Based on the Warcraft-universe it was an instant hit. With 11.5 million subscribers (http://eu.blizzard.com/en/press/081223.html) it is the most popular mmorpg in history. In it, players level their characters to beat challenges together, communicating via text- and voice-chat.
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communicate with each other. There is certainly interaction between them in forms of textchat and voice-chat programs. Players conquer bosses together, which gives them a sense of accomplishment. They have managed something as a collective group, and thus form a bond with each other. This could very well constitute as ‘profound’ interaction seeing it can be considered an exchange between two people, and as Borgmann states: “people become particular persons through personal exchanges with others” (Michalos, 1986, 573). If we consider the first two aspects: the acquisition of skills and fidelity to a daily discipline we can also recognize these in the aforementioned games. Players need to have the skills to be successful in these games, which they practice by playing with their friends. When the game progresses further, players will need to put in more time to progress with their friends. This means showing up at certain days to help your friends and practice skills on certain encounters. A certain responsibility has to be present here as well, seeing as once you agree to play on a higher level like that, you can’t just leave the other players hanging. This need for clear rules and abiding by them teaches the players responsibility and can be interpreted as fidelity to a daily discipline.
One problem we encounter in looking at online culture through a focal practice perspective is the ways in which Borgmann values the importance of tradition (Tijmes, 1997, 128). Tradition is something that is hard to find in online culture because of the sheer novelty of it. It is something that needs to get formed over the years, and digital culture might be too new for it yet. This does not mean we should completely dismiss the possibility for it. Online culture can serve as a window to more traditional activities. Forums, messaging programs and other communication-tools in the online world can serve as an opportunity for traditions to be more active in nowadays society by being more present in new media.
A second reservation that can be made to online culture as a platform for focal practices is Borgmann’s theories about wilderness/nature. The device paradigm in many cases is considered to be an outdated theory about technology. Written when there was no notion yet of the online culture that is present in this day and age, Borgmann’s ideas about focal practices and the device paradigm get easily dismissed. His examples of focal practices seem antique; nature, sports, family and religion being the base prerequisite for almost all of them 3
Warhammer Online: Age of reckoning was produced in 2008 by Mythic. Focusing on pvp (player vs. player) combat it tried to rival the titan World of Warcraft, but in the end did not succeed. Nevertheless, Warhammer Online is still very popular amongst players, who level up a character to wage war on the other faction. As in World of Warcraft, the players can communicate via chat and voice programs.
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(Tijmes, 1997, 127-134). Yet is it not too easy to dismiss these examples as outdated and oldfashioned? It is necessary to look into the reason behind these examples. We can for instance argue that Borgmann’s theories are not just old fashioned, but explicitly value contact, touch and human base sense as a prerequisite for focal practices. There are certain statements that would hint at this possibility. For instance nature, as mentioned before, is an integral aspect of focality for Borgmann. He sees wilderness as challenging to technology, because of the inherent ‘otherness’ of it compared to technology. “When we avoid considering it as just a resource or recreation area, we can recognize it as truly other, beyond human” (Buttrey, 2009). Herein lies the notion that wilderness and nature can act as a focal thing because of the absence of a connection to technology. In this case focal concerns are defined by the fact that they are “concrete, tangible, and deep, with traditions, structures, and rhythms, but without functional equivalents” (Buttrey, 2009). In this case especially the tangible would pose a problem with online culture. If basic human senses like touch were important in focal practices, activities in a digital culture would not suffice. It would not offer the same experience, the realisation of the fragility and dangers of being human and using technology.
The personal computer poses problems seen through the eyes of the device paradigm. It does not so easily and readily fit the label of technological device. Digital culture offers some possibilities for focal aspects, which indicates that Borgmann’s theories should be revisited concerning the newer media. Focality is more complicated than it might seem, it consists of many aspects that we recognize in different technological aspects, as well as in Borgmann’s examples of focal practices. Yet the fact that the device paradigm was established well before the coming of digital culture would imply that it needs to be updated concerning this phenomenon.
Conclusions
We have seen that Borgmann´s focality is not so easily applied to online culture. The versatility and diversity of online culture prohibits this. Although we cannot see literal focality this easily in online culture, we do recognize aspects of it, and it has ways of functioning as a platform for focal practices by facilitating contact for instance. Yet online culture and the personal computers that make it possible have too many different characteristics, which we cant just ignore by labeling it a ´technological device´.
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The mistake that Borgmann seems to make is to treat technology almost as a separate entity amongst us people. There can be no distinct line between thing and device if technology has become such an integral part of our lives that it actually leads us to what Borgmann considers focal practices. (For instance when it serves as a communication tool between people) Online culture itself harbors too many aspects to be simply considered either a focal practice or not. In my eyes, the distinct line between thing and device cannot be so readily made because as Heidegger and Borgmann both say: technology has been an integral part of our lives since we were born. We have been using technology since we were cavemen running around with spears, making fires. If this technology is such an important part of humanity, then why does Borgmann feel we have to escape it? If technology is not imminently threatening us to dismiss this focality Borgmann speaks of (again, by facilitating it in many ways) then why is it necessary to escape it in the first place? Borgmann sees technology in a similar way to Heidegger; it is the world we live in, and the way we interact with it. It has always been present in the ways we relate to reality, and thus has always been inside of us. In this reasoning, why would ‘the good life’ of Borgmann have to remind us of the world without technology, without this dependency? With this notion, nature or the wilderness would not be an opposite of technology, but part of it as well. When we spend time in it, even when just looking upon it, we would be reminded of the fact that it was the base of the use of our technology, the trees which we used to carve spears from, the caves where we used to find shelter.
The approach I’m advocating for here is a more neutral one. Instead of fearing technology, and feeling the need to escape a part that is so inherently ours, we could also look into the fact that it is natural to be connected with technology. It is in the very fibre of our being, has made us what we are today and in doing so, has also given us these ‘focal’ practices Borgmann cherishes so. Focality, in reality, would not exist, seeing as it is based on an escape of technology that is not in fact possible, or even desirable.
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Literature
Primary sources:
Bolter, J.D. and Grusin, R, Remediation, Understanding New Media. 4th ed. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Borgmann, Albert. Crossing the Postmodern Divide Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Borgmann Albert. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Huizinga, J, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. 1949. Ijsseling, Samuel, ‘Het wezenvan de techniek bij Martin Heidegger’, in: Weiler, Raoul & Holemans, Dirk (red.), Gegrepen door Techniek Kapellen; Uitgeverij Pelckmans 1994, pp. 21-41. Jenkins, H, “Interactive audiences? The ‘collective intelligence’ of media fans”, in: Dan Harries (ed.), The New Media Book. London: British Film Institute, 2002. Available via http://web.mit.edu/cms/People/henry3/collective%20intelligence.html. Michalos, Alex C, ‘Borgmann’s Technology’, in: Noûs, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 20 No. 4, 1986, pp. 573-574. Tijmes, Pieter, ‘Albert Borgmann: Technologie en het karakter van het hedendaagse bestaan’, in Achterhuis, Hans et. Al., Van Stoommachine tot Cyborg Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Ambo 1997, pp. 116-138. Wood, David. ‘Albert Borgmann on Taming Technology, an interview’ in: The Christian Century 2003, pp 22-25.
Secundary sources:
Buttrey, Michael. ‘Albert Borgmann vs. Technology’ Beyond the secular canopy 2009. Available via: http://buttrey.ca/michael/2009/05/albert-borgmann-vs-technology/#_ftn12
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