Global Brief #13 by Louis Fishauf Design Ltd.

Everything’s really connected to everything

EDITORS’ BRIEF

The return of Indigenous algorithms and the rise of new ideas about how the world works

COVER ILLUSTRATION: CHRIS BUZELLI

altogether obvious. Finally, C. Raja Mohan from New Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation critiques India’s ‘Asia game’ amid the recent border tensions with China, calling on New Delhi to reinvent the ‘strategic autonomy’ once played so well by Nehru. In Tête à Tête, GB interviews Roméo Dallaire, former UN commander in Rwanda and now Canadian senator, about the good, the bad, the ugly and the possible in relation to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, as well as the wisdom of a similar intervention in today’s Syria. GB asks former Israeli Supreme Court dynamo Aharon Barak about the proper limits of courts and judges in the context of wars and brokered peace. In Query, Louisa Dris and Chérif Dris examine the various positions of Arab states on the major conflicts in the region – Mali and Syria. Donald M. Ferencz from the Global Institute for the Prevention of Genocide updates us on the progress of the still somewhat vexed push to criminalize aggression (illegal or capricious wars) at international law. In Nez à Nez, Frédéric Charillon of the Institut de recherches stratégiques de l’École militaire (IRSEM, in the French Ministry of Defence) and Laval University’s Gérard Hervouet debate whether it is in fact Asia or the Middle East (Western Asia) that is more important to today’s Europe. In The Definition, UN special adviser on genocide prevention Adama Dieng, Baye Moussa Samba of the Dakar municipal government in Senegal, and John W. McArthur, formerly of the UN Millennium Project, explain the sources of Africa’s still-considerable public health challenges. In Strategic Futures, Brookings’ Diana Villiers Negroponte, Roberto Newell Garcia of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, Manuel Balan of McGill University, and GB’s own Alejandro Magos look forward to the Mexico of 2020. In Situ reports come to us from the University of Texas at Austin’s Virginia Garrard-Burnett in Guatemala City on the genocide trial of former General Efrain Rios Montt. Joseph Chinyong Liow and Joseph Franco, both of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang University, wax optimistically about the progress of peace negotiations between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines. GB visits Israel’s Cabinet Room to witness the many ‘kitchen cabinets’ that form effective oppositions to the executive branch. Douglas Glover closes the book in Epigram Roméo Dallaire joins GB online as one of our elite Geo-Bloggers. Enjoy your Brief. | GB

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hat do ancient Indigenous precepts about so-called ‘webs of relations’ mystically linking people and non-people together across space and time have to do with international affairs? No one has asked. And yet prior to European contact (and assimilation into European ritual), Indigenous people worked within a quite complex system of ‘international affairs’ among various nations and tribes that each had interests and bottom lines and varying capabilities to defend these. There was a far more profound sense among the players in this Aboriginal game that the general strategic dance was to be enduring and continuous over an extremely long period of time. As such, the game was, for all intents and purposes, indefinite, and the deportment of the parties to it more harmonious and proportional – in peace as in war – than that of modern states, for whom many games (especially war) were and remain definitively one-off and therefore zero-sum in character. The Aboriginal idea of the indefinite game was hegemonic in North American strategic behaviour until the early 19th century. But it is little known or understood today. As the Idle No More movement protests longstanding Aboriginal grievances, it is also a proxy for the rising assertiveness and effectiveness of Indigenous players not only about discrete socioeconomic causes, but also as eventual rule-setters – once again – in 21st century notions about how people ought to relate to the world, as well as to other people (and non-people), groups and countries in the world. Vladimir Popov has the One Pager position in this issue, comparing the lot of the Russian man in 2013 with that of the late Soviet man. In the lead Feature, Douglas Sanderson of the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law posits the return of the Indigenous people of North America to centre stage in the continent’s political and strategic debates – and with this, the rising currency of Aboriginal philosophical constructs involving a ‘web of relations.’ David Skilling of Landfall Strategy Group in Singapore writes in praise of small states and their prospects in a world that appears to favour the big players. Canadian Forces College professor Miloud Chennoufi navigates the sinews of Syria’s complex opposition factions – who are they? What do they want? And what’s to be done by all sides? Jeremi Suri of the University of Texas at Austin tells us how the individual matters more than ever in today’s international relations – but in ways that are not

N O .1 3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF & PUBLISHER Irvin Studin

SPRING •SUMMER 2013

D E PA R T M E N T S

MANAGING EDITOR Sam Sasan Shoamanesh ART DIRECTOR Louis Fishauf ASSOCIATE EDITOR Michael Barutciski

EDITORS’ BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ASSISTANT EDITOR Marie Lavoie JUNIOR EDITORS Roxanne Hamel,

ONE PAGER

Iulia Hanganu, Milos Jankovic, Avalon Jennings, Stephanie Kot, Jolie Lemmon, Jaclyn Volkhammer ASSISTANT PUBLISHER Ernest Chong WEB MANAGER Aladin Alaily VIDEOGRAPHER Duncan Appleton WEB DESIGN Dolce Publishing PRINTING RJM Print Group

Vladimir Popov | Russian vs. Soviet achievements. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ADVISORY COUNCIL

IN SITU

Virginia Garrard-Burnett | Guatemala cannot rebuild. . . . . . . . . . . . 6 J.C. Liow and J. Franco | Toward a southern Philippine peace. . . . 24 TÊTE À TÊTE

Kenneth McRoberts (Chair), André Beaulieu, Tim Coates, David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Drew Fagan, Dan Fata, Margaret MacMillan, Maria Panezi, Tom Quiggin

Roméo Dallaire | Catastrophes and the refinement of the thrust. . . 8

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Louisa et Chérif Dris | Mali et Syrie: réactions dans le monde arabe? . . . 36

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Aharon Barak | The judge as geokrat and maximalist. . . . . . . . . . . . 26 QUERY Donald M. Ferencz | What’s the future of capricious war?. . . . . . . . . 50 IN THE CABINET ROOM Dusan Petricic | Israel’s many kitchen cabinets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 NEZ À NEZ Frédéric Charillon vs. Gérard Hervouet L’Asie est pour l’Europe plus importante que le Moyen-Orient . . . . . 46 THE DEFINITION “The principal cause of Africa’s public health challenges.... . . . . 60 STRATEGIC FUTURES “In 2020, Mexico... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 EPIGRAM

Douglas Glover | The individuals and the anonymous. . . . . . . . . 64

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Glendon School of Public and International Affairs The Glendon School is Canada’s first bilingual (English and French) graduate school of public and international affairs. It combines a comprehensive bilingualism with a focus on both public and international affairs. Adopting a global perspective, the School explores the relationship between public institutions and their larger environment. Its purpose is to advance research on public and international affairs; provide a high-quality bilingual master’s programme; and offer innovative professional development programming. L’École de Glendon est la première école bilingue d’affaires publiques et internationales au Canada. Établissement d’études supérieures unique en son genre, l’École est axée sur le bilinguisme anglais-français et spécialisée à la fois dans les affaires publiques et les affaires internationales. On y explore, dans une perspective mondiale, les relations entre les institutions publiques et le contexte général dans lequel elles fonctionnent. Le mandat principal de l’École consiste à faire progresser la recherche sur des questions d’affaires publiques et internationales, à offrir un programme de maîtrise bilingue de grande qualité ainsi qu’un programme de développement professionnel novateur.

www.glendon.yorku.ca/gspia

F E AT U RES

TOWARD AN ABORIGINAL GRAND STRATEGY Wampum diplomacy may be dead, but North America’s Indigenous people are once again power players BY DOUGLAS SANDERSON

IN PRAISE OF THE SMALL STATES Strategic coherence and ruthlessness are allowing many smaller countries – from Singapore to Israel – to succeed in turbulent times BY DAVID SKILLING

OPPOSITION SYRIENNE: COMPOSITION ET RESPONSABILITÉS La Syrie brûle. Qu’est-ce qui se passe sur le terrain? Que faire? PAR MILOUD CHENNOUFI

ON GREAT MEN (AND WOMEN) IN THE 21ST CENTURY Fewer great men, and less greatness – but more powerful leaders, and many accidental heroes BY JEREMI SURI

INDIA MUST RAISE ITS ASIAN GAME Border tensions have underlined problems in Sino-Indian relations and in Delhi’s search for ‘strategic autonomy’ BY C. RAJA MOHAN

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Some see a university. We see a world of possibilities. At York University, our interdisciplinary approach engages diverse viewpoints and crosses traditional barriers to create new ways of learning. Explore how at www.yorku.ca

On Russian and Soviet Potential and Achievement

ONE PAGER

No great post-Soviet achievements for Russian civilization – so far BY VLADIMIR POPOV

between 2003 and 2011 – ultimately exceeding 1995 levels. In 1995, Russia was ranked 14th and 15th, respectively, in math and science out of 59 countries. In 2011, it ranked sixth and seventh, respectively, after South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Slovenia and Finland. The USSR once ambitiously compared itself to the US. It was proud of its status as the world’s second superpower, aspiring to become the premier superpower. But today’s is an age of diminished expectations in Russia and for Russians. The country must, for now, settle for more realistic comparisons with other developing countries. To be sure, Russia is richer than Sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries. It is roughly on par in per-capita income with countries in Latin America, East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, life expectancy in Russia is lower than in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as East Asia. And while Russian educational levels are manifestly higher (although not as high as in East Asia), distribution of income is often worse than in these regions. In 2013, comparisons with the USSR are not flattering for Russia. As one Russian journalist put it: Of what could Russia have been proud in the 19th century? Great literature and arts – Pushkin and Dostoyevsky, Repin and Tchaikovsky. Of what should Russia have been ashamed in the 19th century? Serfdom and tsarist repression, the Pale of Settlement for the Jews, and the poverty of the peasantry. Of what could Russia have been proud in the 20th century? The attempt to built a just society – the first-ever state of and for the workers and peasants – free education and health care, avant-garde arts, the elimination of illiteracy, the defeat of fascism, space travel, Nobel prize winners, ballet. Of what should Russia have been ashamed in the 20th century? Stalin’s purges and labour camps, the mass famine of 1932-1933, totalitarianism, the crushing of dissidents. Of what should Russia be ashamed in the 21st century? Corruption and bribery of state officials, oligarchic capitalism, the deindustrialization of the economy, declining R&D, income inequality, deterioration of health and education, high mortality rates, the clericalization and cultural degradation of society. Of what could Russia be proud in the 21st century? So far, nothing. It is not number one in any area. And it does not, based on all of the evidence, yet have the ambition to change this basic reality. | GB

Vladimir Popov is an adviser in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN, and Professor Emeritus at the New Economic School, Moscow.

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ow is the Russian man doing in 2013, nearly a century after the Russian Revolution and just over two decades after the fall of the USSR? Moscow, Europe’s biggest city, has more dollar billionaires than any other city in the world. All told, there are 84 Muscovite billionaires, collectively worth US $367 billion. In the USSR, of course, there were hardly any millionaires, let alone billionaires. But there also were no homeless – and no unemployed – people.Today’s Russia has plenty of both. The market reforms of the early 1990s led to Russia’s ‘transformational recession’ – an unprecedented collapse of national output. From 1989 to 1998, real GDP fell to 55 percent of pre-recession levels – levels to which Russia would not return for another 10 years. By that time, the 2008 financial and economic crisis would hit Russia hard. Only by 2011-2012 would Russia’s GDP finally exceed the levels of the late Soviet period. Even though Russia’s real output did not increase for over two decades, average living standards improved due to ballooning resource rents driven by higher world prices for the country’s oil and gas exports. Between 1995 and 2012, the value of mineral products – mostly oil, gas and metals – produced annually by Russia increased by over $500 billion on the strength of commodity price increases alone. Personal consumption went up. But provision of public goods – from health care to education and law and order – fell markedly. The shadow economy and corruption rose. Income inequality rose significantly. And yet, after the painful transition years of the 1990s, economic growth and relatively stable political leadership have meant that life in Russia may be gradually returning to normal. The number of murders, having hit a sky-high peak in 2002, has since declined by over 60 percent. The number of suicides has also been on the decline. The national birth rate, which struck a 50-year low in 1999, has begun to rise, as has the number of registered marriages. (The divorce rate peaked in 2008.) Russia’s population, having fallen from 148.6 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2009, started to grow from 2010 for the first time in nearly 20 years. Income inequality has been stable since 2007. Even the quality of post-Soviet Russian education may be improving. According to the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) among eighth graders, Russian students’ scores fell between 1995 and 2003, but improved

Guatemala Cannot Rebuild

IN SITU

The new century’s first successful intra-country genocide prosecution has been annulled. We start again… VIRGINIA GARRARD-BURNETT reports from Guatemala City

L Virginia Garrard-Burnett is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin. She is author of, among other books, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala Under General Efraín Ríos Montt,

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1982-1983.

ast March, an unprecedented legal saga opened in Guatemala: the trial of retired General Efrain Rios Montt and his former chief of intelligence, General Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez, for genocide and crimes against humanity (see the Tête à Tête interview with Roméo Dallaire at p. 8, and the Query article by Donald M. Ferencz at p. 50). This would be the first-ever genocide trial to be held in Guatemala, as the country struggled to assign legal responsibility for the 36-year long armed conflict that ended in December 1996. That conflict, between armed Marxist insurgents and the Guatemalan military, killed nearly 200,000 Guatemalans – the vast majority (upward of 80 percent), according to two post-war truth commissions, at the hands of their own government in a counterinsurgency campaign conducted in the early 1980s. This period is now known as La Violencia. La Violencia hit its nadir between 1981 and 1983, when General Rios Montt served as both head of state and the de facto head of the Guatemalan army (the extent to which Rios Montt’s authority actually extended to the military and its actions was one of the key issues at trial). The violence struck particularly hard against Guatemala’s large Maya indigenous population – especially the Ixil Maya – men, women, and children who lived in a remote, mountainous area of the country where the guerrillas enjoyed support, and whom the Guatemalan military believed to be ‘100 percent communist.’ Although the legal parameters of the genocide case related strictly to the Guatemalan military’s scorched-earth campaign against the Ixiles in the early 1980s, Rios Montt was being tried both for having had command responsibility and, in the effective spirit of a show-trial, as a living symbol of the more comprehensive Guatemalan military Cold War project. (Although Rodriguez was a co-defendant, his low public profile in Guatemala made him very much an auxiliary to the case.) Three key factors – absolute impunity for perpetrators of war crimes (mainly on the right, but also some on the left), the rapid rise in common crime, as a well as a concomitant decline in the rule of law (seen most recently in violent spillover from neighbouring Mexico’s narco-trafficking; see Strategic Futures at p. 62) – have left Guatemalans unable to move forward in rebuilding their country. The election of Guatemala’s current president, Otto Perez Molina, speaks to this paralysis. The motto

of his successful 2011 campaign was the “mano dura,” or “iron fist” – part of a get-tough attitude toward crime in one of the world’s most violent countries (Guatemala’s murder rate is among the top ten in the world). The fact that Perez Molina is himself a former general who commanded troops for a time (he was then army major) in El Quiché – the state in which the Guatemalan army conducted well over 300 massacres during La Violencia – sent shudders through the human rights community when he assumed the country’s presidency in January 2012. In the meantime, the clamour of genocide deniers continues to grow in Guatemala. These deniers are led by operatives on the political far-right, who continue to maintain that the Guatemalan military’s actions in the early 1980s were not genocidal, but rather necessary to save the nation from communist takeover. The right is also calling for the prosecution of former guerrilla leaders for acts of violence committed during the armed conflict. The Rios Montt trial riveted the Guatemalan public, who could scarcely believe the spectacle of the General on trial. (Rios Montt’s daughter, Zury, is today a powerful national politician.) At 86 years old, Rios Montt maintains his acuity and his military bearing. He remained expressionless through the various damning depositions of legal and human rights experts, and even throughout the testimonies of massacre survivors. In the trial’s first two weeks, some 120 Maya Ixiles told of rapes, the killings of family members, large groups of people in community centres set afire – all at the hands of the Guatemalan military. And forensic experts testified to the exhumation of no fewer than nine mass graves containing scores of people located just outside a single Ixil village. About a month into the trial, things shifted dramatically – both inside and outside the courtroom. Dozens of Ixil Maya – many of whom had belonged to ‘self-defence patrols’ enlisted by the army to keep order during the armed conflict – were brought into the capital in buses draped with signs saying “there was no genocide” and decrying “hairy hippies and foreigners” (a reference to human rights observers). On April 18th, Rios Montt’s entire defence team, maladroit as it was, stormed out of the trial – leaving the General alone to face a formidable team of prosecutors. On April 19th, Yasmin Barrios, the young head of the three-person

team of judges hearing the case, suspended the trial. The trial resumed on April 30th. What of President Perez Molina, who had up to this point stayed rather aloof from the trial? At the trial’s opening, he too had expressed the opinion that there had been no genocide (“no hubo genocidio”). However, he had also said that he would not intervene in the case out of respect for the legal process.

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / LUIS SOTO

In May 2013, General Efrain Rios Montt's conviction on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity was annulled by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court.

Three key factors – absolute impunity for perpetrators of war crimes, the rapid rise in common crime, as a well as a concomitant decline in the rule of law – have left Guatemalans unable to move forward in rebuilding their country. a military prison, where he was denied even the visitation of family members – including his brother, Mario Rios Montt, a retired former auxiliary bishop of Guatemala City. Rodriguez Sanchez, the other defendant, was absolved and released. But General Rios Montt’s punishment was shortlived. On May 20th, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court overturned his conviction on a technicality. Lawyers for both sides say that the entire trial may have to be repeated. The appeal process could potentially go on for years. If one of the purposes of the trial was to allow Guatemala to move beyond its traumatic past, that goal remains elusive. | GB

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A prosecution witness told the court that Perez Molina – then a military commander – had ordered the burning of Maya villages. Elsewhere, in Spain, where a similar case against Rios Montt is being built in absentia, sources say that there is also a mounting body of evidence against Perez Molina. In a recent interview, Perez Molina spoke of the Rios Montt trial as “a very emblematic case that has polarized Guatemalan society and revived the period of the armed conflict.” There is no great cause for national optimism. In late April, the Guatemalan government ordered 3,500 troops into four indigenous communities. These were sent to establish ‘peace and stability’ because local people were protesting the opening of the Canadian-owned Escobal silver mine in San Rafael Las Flores – about an hour southeast of Guatemala City. Charging that organized crime groups – including the Mexican-based Zetas drug cartel (which has in recent years begun to operate freely in Guatemala, and against which Perez Mo-

lina has promised to take strong punitive action) – had duped local people into crime and violence, the government proclaimed, on May 2nd, a 30-day state of siege for four townships around the mine. On May 10th, the court sentenced Rios Montt to 50 years in prison for genocide, and 30 years for crimes against humanity – all told, an 80-year sentence for an 86-year old man. He was sent immediately to

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PHOTOGRAPH: CP IMAGES / FRED LUM / THE GLOBE AND MAIL

Catastrophes & the Refinement of the Thrust GB exchanges on the wisdom of Libya, the doability of Syria, and other candidate-theatres with Canada’s leading soldierstatesmen ROMÉO DALLAIRE GB: Was Libya a good intervention? RD: No. Next question. GB: Why not? RD: Because we went in it half-assed. Let us set

GB: Were the deficiencies in the NATO intervention doctrinal? Were they military? Were they political? Were they analytical?

RD: First of all, there was a political problem relating to a deep aversion among Western states to military casualties and engagement in humanitarian interventions – a problem that goes back to Bill Clinton in 1993 and the Mogadishu intervention. This aversion has remained a major stumbling block for countries that are countenancing intervention – that is, they are still not gaining much traction with their populations in respect of having to spill blood in order to save others in foreign lands in cases in which there is absolutely no direct national self-interest at play. At the same time, the middle powers – Germany, Canada, Japan and others – are not stepping up with possible solutions that would not necessarily require the full scale and weight of NATO. NATO should be the option of last resort. What we really want is a regional capability for engagement – reinforced under the aegis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. We want to get regional players that have not yet proven themselves – like the EU (see the Nez à Nez debate between Frédéric Charillon and Gérard Hervouet at p. 46) – involved before we get the permanent five members of the Security Council stumbling over each other, and thereby preventing an innovative and timely solution. The second major problem is that the Security Council just does not have the smarts to handle a scenario that has gone to crisis. It has no strategic planning capacity whatever. It has no strategic command and control capability whatever. And so once it delivers its mandate to a military force – a UN force or a NATO or regional force – it loses complete control of the situation. In the Libya case, I asked Canadian General Bouchard, the commander of the NATO air forces: “What information were you feeding to the Security Council as your operations were evolving, so as to prevent members from being caught by surprise when the regime is suddenly toppled?” He said, first of all, that he had no communications with the UN – that is, that his chain of command was within the NATO structure. Second, Bouchard said that NATO headquarters were not feeding the information to the UN Security Council because there was a rather loose presumption among NATO countries that the permanent five countries knew exactly what was happening on the ground in

Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian senator, was Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda in 1993-1994. His latest book is They Fight Like Soldiers; They Die Like Children – The Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers.

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the scene. When Gaddafi had declared that he was going to crush the cockroaches and destroy the rats, it was definitively a gesture of intended destruction, annihilation, elimination. There was no desire to bring back a modicum of security or proper governance to Libya. He was just going to wipe out all those who had created problems. That then opened up the same door as it did in Rwanda with the extremists – meaning that we could intervene with the new doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P); but intervene deliberately, not half-heartedly. Intervening deliberately meant that we would establish a clear demarcation line between Gaddafi’s forces and the non-Gaddafi constituencies – that is, the population that needed protection. Once the population received the needed protection, there would be an opportunity for its members to articulate how they saw the future of Libya. We would be holding Gaddafi in check. In so doing, we would have prevented the massive arming or rearming of the Libyan rebels and the mobilization of large numbers of mercenaries. Recall that the rebels – if the term is apposite – were essentially members of the very population that needed protection, and who had to bleed to different fighting factions to ultimately win the conflict. Today, post-Gaddafi, these factions are torn among themselves. Some have bled more than others, and some have decided to remain armed, while others have not. But for the record, there was never an attempt in the NATO-led intervention to, first and foremost, prevent catastrophic disintegration of the political-security situation on the ground. And second, once Gaddafi was out of the exercise, there was and remains no serious attempt to re-establish order such that the country may be rebuilt. And to be sure, the country must be rebuilt if we are to avoid further catastrophes.

TÊTE À TÊTE

Libya, and that the permanent five were, among themselves, accordingly providing their input into the deliberations of the Security Council. In other words, NATO gets the legal mandate and runs with it, pushing it to what it sees as its maximum limit. In turn, the Security Council is nearly held to ransom because it has no capability for command and control and no strategic planning, and no ultimate control over the employ of assets on the ground in order to ensure that NATO does not go beyond its mandate.

GB: In retrospect, was there a bona fide R2P justification for the intervention?

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RD: Yes, absolutely. That is what really burns me.

Nobody even wanted to use the term R2P. I do not remember any government saying that this was an R2P exercise. They went through the different phases of R2P as best as they could. They did a reasonable assessment of the six criteria needed for the possibility of deploying forces. That assessment checked out. But the actual implementation of R2P – that is, putting boots on the ground in a timely fashion in order to prevent the scenario from becoming catastrophic, and from ultimately destabilizing the whole region – was poor and half-baked. That is where we failed.

RD: If we look at Canada as an example, the country is currently projecting – through its government – a policy or posture to the effect that it will do things in its national self-interest, but that it will not do much else. It might throw a bit of cash at something for humanitarian purposes, but it does not wish to get deeply engaged. So the term R2P is in Canada, for all intents and purposes, eradicated in official circles. Canada will intervene, but it will intervene on the premise of ensuring that the Americans are intervening, or that NATO is intervening. Outside of that, we are not going to see Canada move very much. The other middle powers – even the smaller ones, like the Netherlands – are not articulating R2P because there is still debate in these countries in respect of the fundamental doctrine of our era. This doctrine has revolutionized the whole concept of sovereignty, and has in fact rendered state sovereignty no longer an absolute. Of course, R2P may be drawing these countries into scenarios in which they do not wish to be involved. So they do not wish to acquiesce overtly – explicitly – to R2P, which comes with manifest obligations to action. And all countries naturally want room to manoeuvre. But then it falls on us to ask these countries: if not R2P, then what was the basis for the intervention in Libya?

GB: Were you supportive of the toppling of the GB: Whence the aversion to using the phrase ‘R2P’?

Gaddafi regime? PHOTOGRAPH: STEPHANIE GIGG

RD: No. GB: Why not? RD: Because it created the scenario in which we find ourselves. From the start, I thought that we had to have contingency plans such that we could escalate the forces in order to meet the requirement of boots on the ground. I was not getting any traction in respect of this argument. And this is due to the fact that everyone on the intervening side thought that Gaddafi was morally despicable, and that we had to get rid of him. As a consequence, there was no mechanism within the R2P framework – within the Security Council or within NATO – to prevent the situation on the ground from running away on us after Gaddafi was removed. Instead, we should have treated Gaddafi as a proper belligerent – that is, as head of one belligerent side (the Libyan government at the time). On the other side, the protected civilians (through the R2P intervention) would have coalesced into some sort of political process. (We would presumably not need to arm these civilians, as we would have been providing the security.) This could, in principle, have led to a political discussion between both sides. One could imagine that, in the context of such a political process, Gaddafi could potentially be bought out. We might even have made him an offer, in the idiom of Charles Taylor, to the effect that he would get immunity in another country – which could then lay the groundwork, some years later, for delivering him to the International Criminal Court. But the very idea behind the exercise would be to remove him from the overall dynamic – that is, to cut the head of that force, thereby permitting Gaddafi’s subordinates to start making deals.

GB: Is there an international shortage of political talent or is there a problem of will and courage to make successful interventions in the R2P context?

to be protected. Moreover, the fighting forces have been so immersed in urban conflict that you would probably need hundreds of thousands of troops. After all, there is nothing that is more costly than trying to establish an atmosphere of security in an urban environment through the use of armed force. Having said this, there should be strong consideration given to establishing safe or protected areas for the general population that has still not been engaged, or that has been able to withdraw into camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Indeed, we could reduce the size of the refugee camps by creating much more effective IDP camps – including by preventing armed parties from recruiting out of these camps.

GB: So you are talking about strict civilian protection, rather than outside military intervention?

RD: Yes. Military intervention might have been possible a year ago when the urban fighting was still very embryonic, the rebel forces were just gearing up, overflow from Libya was still small, and Iranian involvement was not yet fully formed. This confirms the basic fact that timeliness and timing are critical if we are going to credibly talk about preventing situations on the ground from catastrophic disintegration (as compared to preventing a mere crisis). When the window closed in Syria, I felt that the aim of the exercise should be to try to extricate the civilian population from the grips of the various belligerent parties. In so doing, we might work out a deal to the effect that the belligerents cannot have access to the displaced population until there are parameters established for the future governance of the country. Of course, that would still have required a fairly large number of troops, as we are still talking about millions of people who need food and protection. In the end, also, IDPs put more pressure on belligerents to come to a result than do refugees. (Refugees often quickly become someone else’s problem to solve.)

It is difficult to identify the population that is to be protected. Moreover, the fighting forces have been so immersed in urban conflict that you would probably need hundreds of thousands of troops.

RD: This era – the post-Cold War – needs new rules GB: Are you presuming that any military intervention today or tomorrow would be counterproductive?

RD: If you are intervening to stop the fighting in

article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 30)?

Syria, then you are wasting your rations. If you are intervening to stop the overt conflict and battles, then you are wasting time. You are going to take massive casualties. Worse still, you will never have the resources and the numbers to implement any stabilization scenario. The effort will again be half-assed: you may need 100,000 men, but you may only get 20,000, which would be useless. (continued online)

RD: My gut feel is yes. The question is: can you apply

For the rest of the interview with Roméo Dallaire,

it? It is difficult to identify the population that is

visit: www.globalbrief.ca

GB: Is Syria today an R2P case (see the Feature

PHOTOGRAPH: COURTESY OF ROMÉO DALLAIRE

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of the game. R2P is one instrument in this regard. However, I am not convinced that there is, at present, sufficient political maturity internationally to properly reckon with the doctrine. The concept is above the leaders. They have not learned enough to be able to apply it. And so this era is in dire need of new statesmanship – that is, people who can take risks; people who are flexible; people who are innovative; people who demonstrate humility.

Classical wampum diplomacy may be dead and gone, but North America’s Indigenous people are once again power players Douglas Sanderson

BY DOUGLAS SANDERSON

is Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.

TOWARD AN

ABORIGINAL

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GRAND STRATEGY

uropean explorers were startled by the architecture, economies and cosmopolitan empires that they encountered in what they termed the New World. From present-day South America, through Mexico, and into core North America, the continents teemed with Indigenous people. Brutal conquest moved quickly in South and Central America, but in North America, British, French and Dutch explorers and settlers had to adapt to the pre-existing diplomatic protocols and norms of Indigenous nations. For three centuries, the business of treaties for land, war-making and peace-brokering was all conducted according to Indigenous procedures and expectations. Contagion, more than any other factor, made possible the eventual ascendancy of the settler people. Indigenous communities succumbed en masse to diseases to which they had no previous exposure, and thus no immunity. Settler governments, in turn, implemented policies aimed squarely at the extermination of Indigenous people in the Americas – with notorious consequences: massive theft of Indigenous lands, wholesale displacement of Indigenous communities, confinement to poverty-stricken reservations, and the standing up of a residential and boarding school system that, by force of law and arms, systematically taught entire generations of Indigenous children to be ashamed of their cultures, robbed them of their languages, and estranged them from their families and the lands that had sustained their communities from time immemorial. And yet today, in the year 2013, Indigenous people are resurgent: their claims to protection of their lands and interests are increasingly being heeded by the courts (see the Tête à Tête interview with Aharon Barak at p. 26). Indeed, these Aboriginal interests are intersecting decisively with the economic interests of states and the profitability of major companies. The Indigenous political philosophy that once dominated diplomatic protocols is returning to prominence – not only among and for Indigenous people, but as a hard lesson for domestic and foreign investors who have forgotten that their ancestors arrived in a complex web of pre-existing relations that is now assuming a 21st century integument. Europeans arrived in the New World cold and hungry. They entered a world of thick forests, seas overflowing with fish, and vast tracts of land inhabited by a rich, diverse, cosmopolitan Indigenous

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ILLUSTRATION: CHRIS BUZELLI

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population that had, in the context of a dense network of political relations, been engaged in inter-tribal trade and international diplomacy (and war) for hundreds – perhaps thousands – of years before the first European set out across the Atlantic Ocean. Lacking the force of arms, numbers and local knowledge, the settler people could do little but submit to the incumbent diplomatic, political and strategic order. As such, Indigenous diplomatic practices dominated interactions between Indigenous nations and the settler people for three hundred years – until such time as the settlers determined that they no longer needed Indigenous allies to survive and thrive on Turtle Island (the name given by Indigenous people to the continent that the settler people call North America). Prior to the 19th century, in the unfolding drama of the early and middle contact periods, Indigenous nations were, in relation to the settler people, variously military allies, political partners and independent actors. Diplomacy was undertaken according to Indigenous protocols, and alliances with Indigenous nations were often the difference between war and peace, victory and defeat. The Dutch, English and French all entered this New World not as masters, but as students. Europeans lacked the necessary ken to sustain their communities – ignorant as they were of the cycles of weather, the soil and growing seasons, as well as the animal and fish migrations of Turtle Island. In order to survive on Turtle Island, settler people had to take up the customs and habits of the Indigenous nations who met the settler people on the shores of a bustling Indigenous empire. In contrast to the cold, wet and utterly dispiriting experiences of early settlers, the Indigenous residents of Turtle Island were manifestly at home in their own cosmopolitan empire. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, First Nations had developed a robust set of diplomatic norms to govern their relations with one another. The political order into which Europeans entered was based neither exclusively on consent, nor on conflict, but on a considered and measured balance of both. Conflicts were not uncommon between Indigenous nations, and wars were frequently brutal and bloody. Peace, however, was a very well-regulated part of the strategic and diplomatic landscape. When one nation defeated

another, a condolence ceremony would be held by the victor in order to recognize the losses of the defeated. Among the Haudenosaunee, the victor would use wampum belts to literally ‘wipe away the tears’ of the defeated. (From these ceremonies comes the phrase ‘to bury the hatchet’ – because a hatchet would be buried by both parties beneath a tree of peace.) Defeat meant not subjugation, but a realignment of political interests. The victor was said to be the big brother in the relationship, and thus was afforded some political say over the actions of the little brother. However, as big brother, the victor was also expected to look out for his weaker sibling. Too often today we forget that from the late 1490s (the arrival of John Cabot) until the earliest decades of the 1800s, international diplomacy on Turtle Island was conducted according to Indigenous – not European – protocols. These diplomatic protocols, known as wampum diplomacy, involved the exchange of belts and strings of beads called wampum in a complex set of customs, interactions and expectations that governed the relations between nation-states. Wampum were not merely gifts: the exchange of wampum signaled intention and certified agreements. W ampum served as mnemonic devices that, in their beaded patterns, encoded the contours of commitments between parties. The language of Indigenous international diplomacy is tied directly to the land and the various ‘other than human beings’ – animals, plants, trees, rocks, insects – that inhabited Turtle Island, bound together in an all-pervasive ecology. Indigenous nations regarded themselves as part of these landscapes, and divided themselves into family clans based on animal totems in order to represent their place in the geography and spirit of the land. This set of relationships between Indigenous communities and the land and animals around them was known as the web of relations. When Europeans arrived in Turtle Island, the presumption of First Nations was that these newcomers would have to be welcomed and brought into the existing order of things – that with help, the Europeans would eventually find their own place in the web of relations on Turtle Island. For three centuries, that is largely what happened. Indigenous diplomatic protocols in the form of wampum or pipe ceremonies dominated virtually every meeting between the Europeans and Indigenous people. The British rapidly came to understand that wampum diplomacy was necessary in order to broker treaties of peace and friendship with Indigenous people, conduct land sales, and negotiate safe passage in potentially hostile territory. And so while the British never fully mastered the art of wampum diplomacy, they became effective practitioners of Indigenous diplomacy through the ritualized presentation and reception of wampum belts and beads.

enous rights (or title) to their traditional lands. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was signed by 144 nations, affirming the cultural, linguistic, political and economic rights of the world’s Indigenous people. The interconnection between Indigenous people and their lands has been recognized in unique ways. In New Zealand, for example, the Whanganui River itself has legal standing to sue in domestic courts under an agreement between local Indigenous groups and the New Zealand Crown. Implicit in these domestic and international orders are Indigenous understandings not only of their rights against others, but of Indigenous peoples’ continuing place in the web of relations. The demographic dominance of the settler people has not altered Indigenous political philosophy, and Indigenous people thus reassert their rights in order to perform their roles as stewards of the land, and as actors within a web of relations that the settler

Indigenous diplomatic practices dominated interactions between Indigenous nations and the settler people for three hundred years – until such time as the settlers determined that they no longer needed Indigenous allies to survive and thrive on Turtle Island. people too often regard merely as a landscape from which resources (or utility, or rents) can be extracted. In Canada, recent months have witnessed a vast uprising of Indigenous people marching under the banner of Idle No More. Protesters are demanding action from governments to address the social and economic conditions of Indigenous communities and, relatedly, to obtain greater protection of their lands and resources. These protests have so far been peaceful, but frustration is visibly building. The fact is that in large countries like Canada, national infrastructure – for instance, railways and pipelines – cannot possibly be secured against an insurgent Indigenous population, across whose territory these steel ribbons stretch for tens of thousands of miles (especially when there is virtually no state presence of any kind to counter such an insurgency). What the settler people need to come to terms with now is not the conceptual contours of Indigenous political philosophy – robust and as worthy of study as this philosophy may be – but rather the practical reality of the web of relations in an evolving international order. Consider that when

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f course, the end came abruptly for the Europeans’ relationship with the web of relations. By the end of the War of 1812, Indigenous nations in Canada were no longer needed as military allies. In the US, Indigenous people were regarded not as allies, but as enemy landholders who stood in the way of national expansion (manifest destiny). Besides, by the early 19th century, the settler people had established supply lines with their home nations, and had sufficiently ‘tamed’ the geography and environment of Turtle Island to ensure their own survival. The settler people largely put aside Indigenous diplomatic protocols. They began instead to pursue diplomacy in a European idiom, using boiler-plate treaties the terms of which were set out in London, Ottawa and Washington, and the procedures of which, if they at all incorporated Indigenous traditions, did so merely as ceremony. In the US, where treaties were routinely made and then broken, the government finally settled on a programme of conquest, occupation and subjugation doled out in equal measure. To be sure, the US never regarded itself as an older brother to the conquered Indigenous nations as it would have under the rules of wampum diplomacy. The US and even the Canadian and British governments wiped their hands clean of the web of relations, and installed themselves as masters of their new world. The volte-face was complete. Indigenous people were, in the ensuing years, confined to reservations and boarding or residential schools. History books – certainly those books used in elementary and high schools – edited out any trace of the old order. Indigenous people were relegated in both popular and academic culture to prehistoric ‘savages’ to whom nothing was owed, and whose eventual extinction was both assured and desirable. The web of relations was forgotten, treaties ignored, the covenant chains rusted, and the wampum belts and beads exiled to museums to gather dust. The legacy of this neglect is today evident in the shocking socioeconomic statistics of Indigenous people, as compared to the settler people: poorer health outcomes, greater unemployment, vast overrepresentation in the prison system, communities without potable water or elementary schools, higher rates of suicide (especially youth suicide), addiction, poverty, and endemic lack of adequate housing. Despite this socioeconomic picture, Indigenous groups across the globe have begun to reassert their rights. They are aided in these efforts by domestic and international law. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand and several Nordic countries, Indigenous rights are increasingly recognized by the highest courts in the land. The courts are affirming Indig-

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In large countries like Canada, national infrastructure like railways and pipelines cannot possibly be secured against an insurgent Indigenous population, across whose territory these steel ribbons stretch for tens of thousands of miles.

global actors invest in Canadian or Australian mines – or indeed, when Canadian mining companies seek to operate in Latin America – they do so on the premise that title to the lands and resources is assured. Increasingly, that premise is being called into question, as Indigenous people use domestic and international law, the press and the mechanisms of environmental activism to shut down mine sites, end clear-cut logging, and push back against risky proposals for hosting pipelines on their territories. In these increasingly common circumstances, global capital cannot ignore the web of relations, because the global economy quite simply is, in the end, part and parcel of this web of relations: bref, European and Asian capital is now closely intertwined with the fate of Indigenous people, whose lands and resources foreign investors seek to exploit. Indeed, North American capital faces very similar uncertainties in Central and South America. The web of relations is a statement of fact about the interconnectedness of the global order. Oil requires pipelines; paper companies need forests; mining companies need not only minerals, but vast trailing ponds that blight landscapes. These and all modern investments in resources require a geography that is hospitable to development. In the past, states had the force of arms and laws on their sides. Today, we recognize that such force of arms is politically untenable and morally bankrupt. Law, in the meantime, has come to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands. Environmental activists also understand that in siding with Indigenous people, they are siding with those who will protect the clean drinking water that we all need to survive. They presume – probably correctly – that while today’s battles are over resources like gold and oil and diamonds, tomorrow’s battles will be for the aquifers and watersheds that fuel not only our economy, but our own bodies. Science, too, is increasingly coming to terms with the web of relations. Pollution is no longer framed as a regional problem; it is a global issue. Global warming is not caused by any one nation: the effects of a warming planet will be felt by all of us as sea levels rise, and the seas themselves begin failing to support the aquatic biodiversity upon which so many people around the world depend for basic sustenance. Indigenous people have long understood that we are, quite literally, all in this together. The environment, on this logic, is not some external element; rather, it is something of which we are all a part. We are all in the web of relations. None of this is to say that Indigenous people will oppose every resource development project that comes to their lands. Indigenous people will want to know that when their lands are used, they will be used in a way that spreads economic development to local Indigenous people, and that the development

itself will occur in a manner that does not destroy the lands that have sustained Indigenous people for thousands of years. Economic development matters – especially given the poverty endemic in contemporary Indigenous communities – but the web of relations is not merely a relationship among mortal contemporaries. The web of relations stretches backward and forward in time, honouring the traditions of our ancestors, and preserving the land and its riches for the generations still to come.

conomic development on Indigenous lands is clearly possible. But the old ways of doing business are over. It is no longer sufficient – or even workable – for foreign or domestic investors to work solely within the economic, political and legal frameworks of the settler nations. Permission from local communities must be sought. Their interests must be accommodated, and their concerns addressed – particularly when it comes to land and its sustainability. Indigenous people have been too long ignored, their economic interests marginalized, and their access to the basic rights of citizenship – particularly rights relating to private property and security of the person – undermined. In many cases, therefore, rather than relying primarily on states to look out for their interests, Indigenous communities are seeking and privileging direct agreements with resource companies and foreign investors. These agreements – often termed Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) – set out what are effectively contractual promises to ensure that economic development in the form of jobs, cash and infrastructure flow to Indigenous communities and citizens. IBAs represent the new order – new diplomatic protocols, as it were, for a new century. New protocols and norms will doubtless soon follow and gain acceptance, as circumstances dictate – that is, as new resources are discovered in traditional Indigenous territories, and as investors consider the option of pouring money into these projects. The new order is a return to the ancient recognition that the web of relations is both political philosophy and practical reality. This requires more than government permits and state permission. Increasingly, international and domestic investors will find that the only way to secure long-term investments is to spend time going into Indigenous communities before they even apply for permits and other approvals. In other words, talking to Indigenous leaders and their elders is now the responsibility of global enterprise. It is the only way to guarantee the safety of international investments, and the only proper way to find one’s place in the global web of relations. | GB

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Strategic coherence and ruthlessness are allowing many smaller countries – from Singapore to Israel – to succeed in turbulent times BY DAVID SKILLING

IN PRAISE OF THE

SMALL STATES David Skilling is Director at Landfall Strategy Group, a Singaporebased research and government

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advisory firm.

ecision-makers in the 21st century should not be seduced by scale. With growing competition between the US and China and calls for tighter European integration, it is often said that the world is moving into an age of big powers (see the Feature article by C. Raja Mohan at p. 54). But this obscures as much as it reveals. The global process of 100 years of political-strategic fragmentation, which has issued in an ever-growing number of smaller countries, will continue. These smaller countries are likely to be better able to navigate the increasingly complex, turbulent global environment of this new century. And while new regional and other groupings will emerge, the ongoing lowering of the decision-making centre of gravity will, alongside the transfer of power from West to East, be a defining feature of the emerging global system. To be sure, the performance and prospects of the US, China and the Eurozone have and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to have a substantial effect on the rest of the world. The decisions of Washington, Beijing and Brussels set the terms of the global debate on issues ranging from monetary and fiscal policy to progress on trade and climate change negotiations. In the developing world, scale is a particularly dominant feature: consider China and India with their billions of citizens, and also the rapidly growing large countries like Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria. The growth of these countries is changing the face of the global economic, political and strategic environment. Not surprisingly, scale is reflected in new international groupings, such as the BRICS and the G20, that convene the large economies on the premise that they are sufficiently – although, granted, imperfectly – representative of global problems, and therefore the proper locus for solutions to these problems. Of course, scale has always mattered. In a G-Zero world in which classic multilateralism is fragmenting and weakening, and in which there is intensifying competition between new sets of major powers, smaller countries have less institutional protection. Claims are therefore regularly made to the effect that there is safety in numbers: President Barroso of the European Commission recently argued that “in a world of giants, size matters” – the implication being that tighter European integration is needed for Europe to succeed and to remain relevant this century.

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ILLUSTRATION: GARY TAXALI

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So is ours necessarily a world of giants, with just a few nodes of economic and political decision-making? Do countries need to be big to survive and prosper? The short answer is no. Although it is certainly the case that large countries exercise considerable influence, a preoccupation with large scale obscures as much as it reveals. Large countries matter and can act to shape the global system, but it is small countries that are best equipped to adapt and prosper. To see this, it is instructive first to consider some history. A century ago, on the cusp of WW1, there were fewer than 70 independent states. The global order was dominated by empire. Since then, there has been an ongoing process of increase in the total number of countries. The unwinding of colonial arrangements and then the end of the Cold War brought spikes in the number of countries. Today, there are close to 200 countries. (The UN has 193 member states.) Small states, in the meantime, have been the clear beneficiaries of the relative openness and stability of the international system over the past several decades – including the absence of direct war between the major powers. The expansion of a global, rulesbased order has helped to remove an important source of disadvantage for these small countries – the caprice of the powerful – thereby enabling them to access international markets. The result is that small advanced countries have been the manifest winners of globalization, and are well represented at the top of economic and social rankings. To be sure, there are powerful economic and political forces at work that are changing the shape of the global economic and political environment. Frictions around globalization and the weakening of the multilateral system together create new challenges for small countries in accessing markets and advancing their interests. Such turbulence commends itself to the proposition that the larger states are better placed to absorb different species of volatility. The recent global economic malaise, for instance, has provided many examples of small states, from Iceland to Cyprus, that have been hit hard. Small states suddenly look particularly exposed relative to their larger counterparts. Indeed, history suggests that periods in which international openness retreats and instability increases favour the survival of a restricted number of larger economic, political and strategic units. So will there be ongoing centrifugal pressure, resulting in an increasingly distributed world and a lower centre of economic and political gravity? Or

will there be a process of agglomeration, with the balance shifting to the large countries and groupings? To answer this, it is important not to over-interpret the implications of recent changes in the international environment. For one thing, globalization is not reversing. The global economy is more difficult to navigate – particularly for small countries – but there is no return to protectionism. Small countries are still able to expand beyond their borders in the context of a rules-based system. Similarly, the international political environment is changing, but remains recognizable. And war between major military powers – China, the US, Russia – while certainly not inconceivable this century, is far from an immediate concern. In the context of a ‘hot’ theatre like Syria, for instance, proxy projects and militias aside, these major powers are deliberately avoiding direct confrontation with one another (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 30).

ndeed, we might say that the strong performance of small countries over the past decades has not been due principally to the particular features of the prevailing international environment, and is therefore not particularly sensitive to changes in this environment. Rather, the performance is due, above all, to the distinctive characteristics of small countries, which we take up below. And these characteristics will likely again be determinant in the ability of many small states to negotiate the challenges and opportunities of the emerging environment – even if the challenges may appear to disproportionately impact the small states. As a result, in this early 21st century, for every Cyprus, there is a Singapore, Switzerland, Finland and Israel – small, advanced states that continue to excel and impress. To understand this success, we have to look to three distinctive aspects of small state composition and behaviour: their largely consensual political economy; their strategic coherence; and, finally, their competitive discipline.

Political economy: Small countries tend to have higher levels of social capital and trust, which enable them to reach political consensus around a strategic policy direction. There is commonly a greater sense of shared purpose in small countries, which makes it easier to set policies in a way that reflects local preferences. Social consensus allows governments to take the actions required to respond quickly and flexibly to shocks, as well as those that are required to sustain competitive advantage. Witness the nimble response of many small countries to the effects of the global financial crisis: in many cases, they demonstrated a superior capacity to make hard decisions involving

the allocation of losses and risks across society. In contrast, the more complex, heterogeneous large countries often struggle to deliver the sustained political consensus required to achieve structural reform and fiscal consolidation (witness the ongoing fierce, divisive and, for now, indecisive debates in this regard in the US, Britain and France). Of course, it is worth noting that political decision-making in small countries also tends to be more streamlined and less complex than in large countries – not least because the overall machinery of government is smaller and simpler – allowing for quicker and better integrated decision-making.

Strategic coherence: Casual examination of

Competitive discipline: Small countries have a demonstrated capacity to adapt quickly to changing circumstances in ways that enable them to maintain competitive advantage. This is partly due to the

To understand this success, we have to look to three distinctive aspects of small state composition and behaviour: their largely consensual political economy; their strategic coherence; and their competitive discipline.

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small-country policy approaches shows that there is no single policy template at play in every country. Successful small countries deploy a wide range of policy models – compare, say, Singapore and Hong Kong with the Nordics. Outside of a preference for conservative macroeconomic policy, a stronger external orientation, and investment in knowledge, there are few systematic differences with large countries. However, small countries tend to be characterized by a sense of deliberate, coherent national positioning aimed at identifying a distinctive competitive posture and aligning a range of policies and a structured portfolio of relationships in support of this posture. The strong performance of small advanced economies over the past few decades is, as such, due less to policy specifics than to this ability to position themselves effectively in response to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. The successful countries are those that have a clear sense of their specific competitive advantage, and invest deliberately in support of this advantage. This clarity – on occasion, ruthlessness – of strategic focus is much easier to obtain in small countries than in larger countries that are more diverse and complex, and that tend to focus on broad macroeconomic policy rather than on delivering a coherent competitive strategy. Similarly, in the political space, small countries in increasingly contested environments – for example, in East Asia – are responding by investing in regional institutions, as well as by deliberately (promiscuously) developing and maintaining relationships with a variety of partners. At the same time, small countries can sometimes benefit from being ‘below the radar,’ because they have little ability to threaten or directly shape the regional or institutional order.

greater exposure of small countries to the external environment: the much more limited margin for error creates both a need and a pressure to respond quickly. This competitive discipline can be uncomfortable, and can on occasion lead to spectacular blow-ups. However, it also means that poor policies are less likely to be sustained in small countries. Small countries face pressure to adapt themselves to new opportunities and risks in a timely manner. They have to be serious, as it were, because the felt consequences of failure may, in the extreme cases, be existential in character and magnitude. In contrast, large countries have greater ability to continue with poor policies, as the consequences of such policies may take a long time to acquire an existential character or magnitude – if they ever reach this threshold in the first place. The exposure of small states may look like a weakness, but over time is a source of advantage that leads to better outcomes. Small countries recognize that they need to adapt to the world, rather than expecting the world to adapt itself to them – a mindset that is sometimes seen in large countries (what George Kennan called “the hubris of inordinate size”). As a result, small countries are far more focussed on the international environment, and on doing things as well as possible. This leads to a greater degree of policy experimentation and innovation –policy promiscuity, as it were – in small countries. Indeed, it is the smaller economic and political units that set the standard in terms of policy innovation in many areas, from central bank independence and public sector management reform to free trade agreements. Overall, of course, small countries are confronted with a more challenging and complex international environment. This much is uncontroversial. Small countries have exposures that are typically more acute than those of larger countries. However, the characteristics of small-country political economy, the strategic coherence of policy-making in small countries, and the responsiveness of small countries to external changes and shocks, together give them an ability to respond effectively. Small countries have economic and political systems that allow them to be purposeful, responsive and flexible. In a world of turbulence and complexity, this small-country strategic agility is likely to be increasingly valuable – and hard for larger countries to replicate. All of this suggests a more complicated story than the inexorable shift in the global system toward larger countries. Many small countries seem to be adjusting and performing well. Although there have been some high-profile small country failings – most recently, for instance, Greece and Cyprus – these instances should not be overplayed as evidence of a systemic small-country problem. Instead, the balance of evidence suggests that small countries

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Small states may not wield raw strategic power, but as an organizational form that is well-suited to this new world, they will become increasingly influential nodes of leadership in the international system.

are continuing to get their fundamentals into shape, investing aggressively (often counter-cyclically) in research and innovation, growing into new export markets, and positioning themselves in the vanguard of new trade arrangements. If anything, it seems that large countries are struggling to adapt to new economic and political realities. Large countries are finding that they have less policy autonomy and marge de manœuvre (see the Feature article by Jeremi Suri at p. 40). Established powers are experiencing the need for a measure of power-sharing with emerging large countries. And globalization is reaching further inside large economies, impacting many more people and sectors, and ultimately leading to fewer degrees of domestic policy freedom. Larger states are under ever-increasing pressure to decentralize or even federalize: the number of federal states in the world today numbers between 25 and 30, representing about 40 percent of the global population. Decentralized or federated policy units then begin to assume some of the vaunted characteristics of smaller states. As mentioned, the failure of large countries to fully adjust may take some time to manifest, because problems can remain hidden longer in large countries, and these countries have more policy levers – particularly in fiscal and monetary policy – at their disposal to compensate in the short-term. But without adapting to this new world, the medium-term performance of larger countries may be compromised. For their part, the attributes of small countries suggest that there is good reason to expect that many small countries will continue to perform well. The international system is not on the verge of a reversal of the century-long process of decentralization. Being small, with policy autonomy, will continue to be an attraction. This continuing attraction is evident in many contemporary debates, such as the debate in Europe about retaining domestic policy autonomy rather than moving to a more integrated, federal model, as well as in the ongoing independence movements in Scotland, Catalonia and elsewhere. To be sure, there are certain dimensions according to which scale matters, and matters a great deal – perhaps increasingly so: consider security, foreign market access, exchange rate arrangements, and global negotiations on trade and climate change. Of course, in war, large countries are more likely to survive strategic onslaught than their smaller counterparts, and are more likely to dictate terms post bellum. Still, for most small countries, the advantages of scale can be adequately achieved through participation in regional groupings (and alliances) – all the while retaining local policy autonomy on other issues. Indeed, smaller countries are some of the most active participants in these regional groupings: consider the small countries in Europe continuing to line up for Euro membership.

Small-state activism suggests that regional groupings may well grow and strengthen over time. A reduction in the number of independent currencies seems likely before long. Yet while the large groupings will not disappear, the number of effective decision-making units will continue to increase. This will make for a more distributed system of decision-making, with a diversity of policy approaches, rather than a model comprised of just a few nodes of decision-making. This may lead to a messier international system, but it has some advantages: greater competition, more policy experimentation and innovation, and more resilience precisely because of the diversity of national policy approaches. As such, the pressure for universal global solutions should be tempered by an appreciation of the benefits of a distributed model.

f course, what large countries do will continue to matter – for better or worse. The behaviour and performance of large countries has a major impact on all countries, and it is the large countries that exercise overwhelming influence on the shape of the global system. Being at the table, and being in a position of power, is a source of national advantage. Small countries in Asia can do little directly when their interests are threatened by China’s expansion – just as small economies are limited in what they can do in response to the massive monetary easing in the US, and smaller regional states, from Georgia to Armenia, are easily buffeted, in strategic terms, by decisions made in Moscow. Nevertheless, national decision-makers should not be seduced by scale – for, alongside the benefits of size, there are important diseconomies of scale that impact negatively on the outcomes that large countries are able to generate. Even as countries try to project a larger presence internationally, care should be taken to fully capture the benefits from distributed policy-making at home in order to ensure economic dynamism and political sustainability. The decision-making that drives competitive advantage and quality of life will best be undertaken at a more granular level. There is much talk of the shift of power from West to East, and from the state to various non-state actors. But the shift of influence from large countries to small countries should not be underestimated. Small countries may not wield raw strategic power, but as an organizational form that is well-suited to this new world, they will become increasingly influential nodes of leadership in the international system as a consequence of the superior outcomes they generate. | GB

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Positive Signs for a Southern Philippine Peace

IN SITU

The framework agreement on the Bangsamoro could soon bring a Nobel Peace Prize to the Malaysian prime minister JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW and JOSEPH FRANCO

T Joseph Chinyong Liow is Professor of Comparative and International Politics at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). Joseph Franco is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security at

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the Rajaratnam School.

he intrusion of some 200 Filipino gunmen into Sabah, East Malaysia this past February rekindled a dormant territorial dispute between Manila and Kuala Lumpur over the North Borneo territory. The incursion, which led to a series of armed clashes between the ‘Royal Sulu Army’ and Malaysian security forces, raised concerns over its impact on the Malaysia-brokered Philippine-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace negotiations – specifically, that it might delay the signing of a final agreement. Notwithstanding what has been dubbed the Lahad Datu incident, there are positive indications that the Malaysia-brokered talks between Manila and the MILF remain on track, and that a successful conclusion remains in sight. The signing of a Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on October 15th, 2012 had been hailed as a milestone in relations between the Philippines and the MILF – a Muslim rebel group that has been waging armed insurgency in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao since its formation in 1977. (The Bangsamoro is a new autonomous political region intended to replace the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.) Nevertheless, given the string of failed agreements between the Philippine government and various Mindanao-based rebel movements, including the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the Final Peace Agreement of 1996, the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities of 1997, the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, and the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain of 2008, what reasons are there to believe that the most recent Framework Agreement will not meet the same fate? To be sure, there are reasons to be skeptical: all of these earlier agreements were signed with the same hope that we see in Mindanao today; all ended in despair as conflict resumed. Having said this, the Sabah (Lahad Datu) incident is no deal-breaker: at worst, it is tangential to the Manila-MILF peace process. More importantly, though, three important factors are at play today where they were previously absent. Combined, these factors are cause for cautious optimism. First, there is a strong measure of political will today in both camps. The signing of the Framework Agreement was presaged by the report from the Philippines’ Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to the effect that there were no armed clashes between the MILF and the Philippine Armed

Forces in the buildup to the agreement. This may have simply been a result of war weariness. After all, the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine government have been fighting each other since the late 1960s. Still, the reality on the ground suggests that there has been greater restraint exercised by both sides. Senior military commanders have pointed out that the MILF headquarters, Camp Darapanan, are well within range of artillery and strike aircraft based at the 6th Infantry Division camp in Cotabato City. Had the Philippine Armed Forces chosen to use force, Camp Darapanan could easily have been crushed. Likewise, whereas MILF forces had previously been reluctant to step aside when government forces conducted operations against other lawless elements in MILF territory, this has not been the case of late; in some cases, MILF forces have even supported such operations. This restraint is not limited solely to combatants. Other stakeholders with the wherewithal to stymie the peace process have also demonstrated support. A case in point is former Filipino Vice Governor Manny Pinol, who has surprisingly expressed support for the Framework Agreement. (Pinol was once a vocal critic of concessions to the MILF. In 2008, he went so far as to call on Christians in Mindanao to take up arms against Muslim rebels.) Second, international actors have played a more sustained and positive role than in the past. Local community-level peace initiatives have been given a tremendous boost by the Malaysia-led International Monitoring Team (IMT). When it began in 2004, Malaysian facilitation of the peace process leading to the Framework Agreement was viewed with suspicion in many quarters in the Philippines. The prevailing view was that Malaysia’s involvement was driven primarily by its interest to suppress any prospect of a revival of the Philippine claim to the East Malaysian state of Sabah, which Manila has yet to officially disavow. According to this interpretation, the objective of Malaysian facilitation was not to resolve the conflict, but rather to prolong it. Hence, in order to bolster its credibility, Malaysia could not be seen as the sole international actor in the mediation process. In fact, in spite of Lahad Datu, both Manila and the MILF have been adamant in pointing out that “Sabah is not part of the agenda[,]” and that Malaysia’s facilitation has been an “institution” in the negotiations.

PHOTOGRAPH: AP PHOTO

studies further highlight that development of Mindanao can be accelerated through strategic use of the region’s human capital and the development of a tourism industry. Similar points have been made by the World Bank, which has identified the youthful urban demographics of regional centres around Central Mindanao – Cagayan de Oro and Davao, in particular – as potential hubs for technology and business process outsourcing startups.

There is no doubt that immense challenges lie ahead for Mindanao. For starters, the Framework Agreement is not yet a complete document. As of April 2013, only one annex – on “Transitional Arrangements and Modalities” – had been completed. The more critical annexes on power sharing, wealth sharing and normalization remain incomplete. Philippine panel head Miriam Coronel Ferrer projects that by the end of 2013, a Final Peace Agreement will be inked, and that the Basic Law will be completed and approved in a 2014 plebiscite. Only this can pave the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority that would provide Filipino Muslims with meaningful autonomy by 2015. The institutionalization of the newly conceptualized relationship between the Philippine government and the new Bangsamoro political entity may take several more years. Given that rogue elements of the MILF have rejected the Framework Agreement, there is also the possibility of a return to conflict. Nevertheless, for the aforementioned reasons, the Framework Agreement provides a firm basis for development, political participation and empowerment for the Bangsamoro people of Mindanao in ways that previous agreements did not. The fruits of peace in Mindanao are now there to be harvested. With the Framework Agreement in place and a Transition Commission already convened, perhaps the actors concerned finally have the right tools in their hands to do the job. | GB

Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, right, is greeted by Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels during his visit to Camp Darapanan in southern Philippines, February 2013.

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In 2008, the outbreak of violence in Central Mindanao between MILF hardliners and government forces once again called into question Malaysian-led mediation. In response, the International Contact Group (ICG) was formed in 2009. Comprising representation from Britain, Japan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, as well as NGOs like the Asia Foundation and the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (among others), the ICG managed to restart stalled talks between the two contending parties. The new series of talks culminated in a ‘secret meeting’ between Filipino President Benigno Aquino III and MILF Chairman Murad Ibrahim in Tokyo in July 2011. After this meeting, dialogue gathered pace, resulting in the signing of the Framework Agreement. The internationalization of negotiations dispelled any suspicions that the peace talks were opaque and controlled by Malaysia. There followed, in early 2012, the deployment of an Indonesian military contingent and ceasefire monitors to bolster the IMT – thereby contributing further to the legitimacy of the mediation effort. Third, and perhaps most critical, the Framework Agreement offers prospects for a reduction in income inequality and levels of relative deprivation in Mindanao. While peace must come via a political solution, it can only be sustained through tangible economic and material improvements. And the Framework Agreement portends future economic prosperity for the region. As early as 2005, the UN Development Program’s Philippine Human Development Report identified economic factors as the main driver of conflict and violence in Mindanao. The problems currently encountered by the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which was formed out of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, clearly show that the absence of significant improvements in quality of life has made communities and individuals vulnerable to extremism and violence. Mindanao’s economic potential is undeniable. The region is a natural draw for industries such as power generation and large-scale agriculture. Already, Malaysia’s Felda Global Ventures, the world’s largest producer of crude palm oil, has expressed interest in investing in Mindanao with an eye to converting the estimated one million hectares of otherwise fallow grassland to palm oil plantations. Further out from Central Mindanao, the areas of Liguasan Marsh, the Cotabato Basin, and the Sulu Sea – all part of the prospective Bangsamoro lands to be defined under the Annexes to the Framework Agreement – are potentially energy-rich areas that have elicited attention from international oil companies. Econometric studies by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) have concluded that Mindanao can “grow much faster than Luzon” if armed conflict with the MILF can be resolved. These

TÊTE À TÊTE

The Judge as Geokrat and Maximalist GB discusses the evolution of the judicial branch in the Middle East and in the new century’s wars with Israel’s most famous jurist AHARON BARAK

Aharon Barak is Professor at IDC Herzliya, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, and former Attorney General of Israel.

GB: Are there any political or strategic activities of government in the 21st century that should never be reviewable by courts?

GB: What would be the remedy if the court determined that the war or the declaration of war was unconstitutional?

AB: No, none at all.

AB: This again depends on the circumstances. In some cases, the only remedy would be a declaration to the effect that something is unconstitutional. But even a declaration has a major effect. We are, after all, telling our rulers that what they are doing is unconstitutional. In other cases, there will be more immediate, practical effect. For example, in Israel, we had a case in which the government was negotiating a peace agreement, and there was an argument to the effect that the government could not negotiate the agreement because it was in fact an interim government – that is, interim governments could not negotiate peace agreements. The Supreme Court took the case. Some of the judges thought that the matter was not justiciable. The majority of the judges – I among them – thought that the case should indeed be discussed. One other judge thought about issuing an injunction – on the premise that an interim government could not make such major policy changes. My own theory was that even an interim government could act out of necessity – as circumstances dictate. If this were an urgent matter, then even an interim government could act.

GB: What about declarations of war or peace agreements? AB: According to my theory of the law, even declarations of war or peace agreements are reviewable by the courts. The discretion given to the executive branch is, of course, very wide. Therefore, the scope of review is very limited. But take the case of peace and war. Suppose you can find that the chief negotiator or that the prime minister or the president received bribes. Do you not agree that the courts should be able to say that, under such circumstances, the agreement is void, or that the declaration of war is illegal or unconstitutional? GB: The traditional approach would be to treat this as a political problem – that is, as a problem that is for the political branch to resolve. AB: Yes, of course, this is a political problem – and likely also a criminal law problem. And if there is a criminal law element, then you have to have a court that will give due process.

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GB: If a country – Israel or other – were to declare a war or broker a peace, any judicial action would presumably happen some 20 or 30 days after the war or peace declaration. This would seem quite late. What would be the practical effect of the judicial oversight?

AB: What is the practical effect of Roe v. Wade on the right to abortion when the case lasts more than nine months? What is the relevance? These are questions that every court has to face. In many cases, war will already have been declared. So be it. Take the US and the Vietnam war. The war is declared. I do not see any reason for which the US Supreme Court should not have jurisdiction to determine whether the war was constitutional – including whether the declaration was made (or not) by the proper authority.

GB: Can you envision circumstances in which a war in an advanced state is declared unconstitutional, after which an injunction is declared so as to require the executive branch to lay down arms? AB: This depends on the constitutional culture and maturity of the country in question. In most countries, a court would not issue such an injunction. However, it is not inconceivable that if, say, the German constitutional court or the Japanese constitutional court were to find the policy objectives or the conduct of the German or Japanese army unconstitutional, it would issue an injunction. I see no problem with this. In other countries, of course, even if there is a determination of unconstitutionality, there might only be a declaration to this effect. Still, as I mentioned earlier, a declaration may also be very effective. Note that we have been talking about jurisdic-

Our basic laws, which are the basis of Israel being a constitutional democracy, have not yet been finalized. They are not comprehensive.

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PHOTOGRAPH: COURTESY OF AHARON BARAK

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According to my theory of the law, even declarations of war or peace agreements are reviewable by the courts. The discretion given to the executive branch is very wide. Therefore, the scope of review is very limited.

tion, and not about the content of the jurisdiction. It is not enough that a judge should fancy that a war should not be declared – that is, that he or she as a prime minster or president would not have declared the war. This is not the question at hand. This is not the judge’s jurisdiction. So whether a war is wise or not is not a legal matter. Procedural propriety is a legal matter, however – for instance, the right organ of state must have been the one to declare a war – as might be questions relating to proportionality or reasonableness. GB: Given the complexity of these issues, would judges have to have specific training or preparatory culture in order to be legitimate in correcting or disciplining the executive on matters of war and peace? AB: What is relevant is not the training of the judiciary per se, but rather the training of the public. The entire country needs to understand that in a mature constitutional system, the legislative branch, the executive branch, and even the judicial branch have no powers unless those powers are provided expressly or implied in the national constitution. This is what is meant by constitutional democracy. And the ones who ultimately decide whether there are disputes, in the event that there is express or implied constitutional provision of such power, are the courts. GB: Yes, but do today’s judges know enough about, say, national security to be able to make those types of decisions? Surely, if this is the case in Israel, it cannot be the case in all countries? AB: Consider that whenever there is a national crisis in Israel or in other common-law countries, a commission of inquiry is appointed. Was the behaviour of the army in Sabra and Shatila legal or illegal? An inquiry looked into this. And a judge headed this inquiry – as is the case with most other commissions of inquiry. So are judges qualified to make the decisions in the context of such complex inquiries? GB: But one must presume that this would still require a particular type of culture – both a public culture and a judicial culture. Do you not agree? AB: This would require a public culture in which judges should not say that simply because one is a judge, one will decide. The judge will understand that there are limits to his or her power. The public culture would have to be alive to the basic fact that human beings have all of the rights unless these are taken away. By contrast, the executive and the legislative branches have powers only to the extent that these are given to them in the constitution. If

there is a dispute on this question, then the courts will adjudicate it. GB: What about subject-specific knowledge or expertise about war and peace and national security? Surely, whatever their constitutional powers, judges ought to have some knowledge base in order to decide intelligently in matters of war, peace or national security? AB: I was, of course, talking about the culture of a country – that is, the constitutional culture. You are asking about knowledge – and my answer in this regard is yes, obviously. In different systems, judges should know what other intelligent people in the country know. But that clearly is not enough. Judges can adjudicate only according to facts that are brought to them in a proper way. I do not see that there are any questions that, if brought in a proper way, cannot be adjudicated. A very complicated matter comes before the court – take, for example, a case wherein a submarine or a sophisticated jet has crashed, and families are suing the state for negligence. Can a judge decide in this case? Yes. This is manifestly a very complicated matter, but if the court has the evidence before it, then the judge can decide. If the evidence is not there, then he or she will acquit. GB: So you are quite confident that there does not need to be a specialized knowledge set for judges – that is, that an intelligent judge, for all intents and purposes, only needs to know his or her role, and that the facts need to be presented and then interpreted? AB: Correct. However, the judges are acting within a particular culture, and it would evidently be more complicated to convince a judge in respect of cultural matters that are foreign to him or to her. Still, my main point is that I do not believe that there are issues that are so complex that while a regular minister can apprehend them, a judge in the same legal-constitutional system cannot. GB: Which countries’ jurisprudence and courts do you most admire? AB: I am an admirer of the American courts – American constitutional law, the US Supreme Court. I am a great admirer of the German constitutional court, which has done wonderful work since WW2. I am a great admirer of the South African constitutional court, which has done wonderful work since the end of apartheid. And, finally, I am a great admirer of the Canadian Supreme Court, which does firstrate work in the context of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. PHOTOGRAPH: COURTESY OF AHARON BARAK

GB: Did you draw actively and consciously on these courts in your decisions? AB: Yes, always. GB: Did you draw beyond these courts? AB: In the beginning, when Israel was established, we were drawing a lot on English case law – because Britain has a wonderful judiciary, and the country does not have a formal constitution. When constitutional questions came up, the English courts were not the main source. We do, in exceptional cases, go to other countries. We are evidently not limited to the four supreme courts that I mentioned. I am an admirer, for instance, of the Indian Supreme Court. GB: What would be the more advanced courts that you would be interested in studying in the immediate Middle East? AB: I just do not know – regrettably. I know more about the German constitutional court than about the Egyptian constitutional court. GB: Is this due to a cultural gap, a development gap, or is it conscious ignorance? AB: I think that it is a question of language. GB: Is Israel involved or interested in judicial training or capacity-building in any country in the region – particularly after the Arab Spring? AB: I was certainly interested in such training, in my time. Israel was interested in it, but it did not materialize, unfortunately. GB: Would there be any reciprocal interest in that type of arrangement from other countries in the region?

AB: There is one Jewish religion. There are not several Jewish religions. Within the Jewish religion, you have Orthodox, you have Conservative, and you have Reform movements. Each should be supported on an equal basis. As for state support of other religions, indeed, the state should support all religions in Israel – not just Judaism. GB: What is the status of Arabs or Palestinians in Israeli law and jurisprudence today? AB: You mean the Arabs who are Israeli citizens? GB: The Arabs who are Israeli citizens, as well as those who are not. What is their status? AB: We have some 7.7 million people in Israel. Well over a million of these people are Arabs. They are Israelis. They have full Israeli rights and citizenship. They have full equality with others under the law. They vote for Knesset members. There are Arab Knesset members. Of course, human nature being what it is, there is discrimination. The state does its level best to fight this, and the Supreme Court along with it. Then there are Palestinians – in the West Bank, for instance. They are under the rules of belligerent occupation, or under the agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority pursuant to the Oslo Accord. GB: Are you generally optimistic about developments in geopolitical and also in governance terms in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring? AB: This is outside the realm of my expertise. GB: What will the Israel-Palestine situation look like in 2020?

The First Protocol to the Geneva Convention itself is not binding in Israel, as Israel is not a party to it. I came to the conclusion that those parts of the Protocol dealing with the rights of civilians constitute customary international law. Under our theory, customary international law is part of Israeli common law.

AB: Who knows? I do not know how it will look tomorrow.

AB: I have no idea. GB: What is the proper role of religion in Israeli society – legally and philosophically?

GB: Would this involve the Israeli state supporting different strands of Judaism, or would it also support religions other than Judaism?

AB: The court had a targeted killing situation. The first question that we asked was: what is the legal framework? The First Protocol of the Geneva Convention addresses the protection of civilians. That was our starting point. The Protocol also speaks to cases in which civilians are not protected, and the extent to which they are not protected. The Protocol itself is not binding in Israel... (continued online) For the rest of the interview with Aharon Barak,

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AB: The role of religion in Israel’s society should be the same as the role of religion in other advanced societies. We have many, many religious people in Israel, and they should all have the right to freedom of religion. I even think that the state can support religion without undermining democracy – provided that it does so on an equal basis.

GB: How did you come to your 2006 decision establishing the legal framework for targeted killings – hisulim – in Israel?

visit: www.globalbrief.ca

ILLUSTRATION: LISA HANEY

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LA SYRIE BRÛLE. Qu’est-ce qui se passe sur le terrain? Que faire? PAR MILOUD CHENNOUFI

OPPOSITION SYRIENNE

COMPOSITION ET RESPONSABILITÉS Miloud Chennoufi est professeur de relations internationales au Collège des forces canadiennes.

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’histoire retiendra que l’opposition syrienne en exil a commis une erreur de taille en acceptant la militarisation de la contestation. Cette erreur fut la conséquence d’un calcul inexact selon lequel l’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye allait se reproduire en Syrie à condition que l’opposition réagisse à la répression du régime par une escalade de la violence. Au fur et à mesure que le conflit s’enlisait et que l’éventualité d’une intervention étrangère devenait de moins en moins probable, l’opposition armée revendiquait des armes de plus en plus sophistiqués. Des pays de la région, animés par leurs propres intérêts, ont accepté de l’équiper, et ce sous l’œil approbateur des puissances occidentales. Pourtant, les armes fournies n’ont pas atteint le niveau de sophistication souhaitée. La marginalisation de l’opposition intérieure, la surreprésentation des Frères musulmans et la forte présence des extrémistes, notamment ceux d’Al-Qaïda, parmi les combattants ont fini par convaincre Washington que la solution militaire n’était pas souhaitable (voir le débat Nez à Nez entre Frédéric Charillon et Gérard Hervouet à la page 46). La Syrie brûle. Plus de 80 000 morts. Cinq millions – presque le quart de la population totale – de déplacés à l’intérieur du pays. Plus d’un million de réfugiés vivant dans des conditions exécrables. L’ONU rapporte des crimes de guerre, dont des actes de violence sexuelle contre des femmes et des enfants. Il ne convient plus de parler de révolution démocratique. Il s’agit indéniablement d’une guerre civile, avec des ramifications régionales et internationales. La brutalité du régime syrien, son anachronisme et ses échecs ne sont plus à démontrer. Cette évidence ne doit cependant pas occulter la lourde responsabilité qui incombe à l’opposition armée et à ses représentants politiques. Le souvenir du Printemps arabe paraît en effet lointain. Aussi lointain que la mémoire douloureuse de ces écoliers de Deraa et de leur graffiti, «Le peuple exige la chute du régime», le célèbre slogan repris en cœur pendant des semaines auparavant par des centaines de milliers de voix sur la place Tahrir du Caire. La mobilisation massive et pacifique avait eu raison de deux dictateurs, Ben Ali en Tunisie et Moubarak en Égypte. Pourquoi pas en Syrie, ont dû songer ces jeunes Syriens en ce mois de mars 2011? Le régime y vit un terrible affront; sa réaction fut terrible. Les auteurs du graffiti furent arrêtés et torturés. Les services de sécurité voulurent en faire un cas exemplaire de dissuasion. La population n’a cependant pas réagi tel qu’escompté; elle est descendue dans les rues pour protester, d’abord à Deraa même, puis ailleurs. Le seuil de non-retour avait été alors franchi. La Syrie

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L’histoire retiendra que la Libye a tout fait basculer. La militarisation de la contestation libyenne a mis un terme au Printemps arabe. Dans la foulée, elle a radicalement transformé la crise syrienne.

ne sera plus jamais pareille, même si, à l’époque, la descente aux enfers ne pouvait être envisagée avec certitude. Les manifestants pacifiques, plus nombreux de jour en jour, demandaient des réformes politiques légitimes. Ils espéraient aussi que leur détermination conduise certains centres de pouvoir (notamment l’armée) à se retourner contre le président Bachar el-Assad. Il n’en fut rien. Le régime comprit toutefois qu’il lui fallait jeter du lest. Il engagea des réformes, constitutionnelles notamment, qui ne parvinrent pas à calmer les manifestants. Aucune réforme hâtive ne pouvait être prise au sérieux après 50 ans d’un régime aussi oppressif. Les manifestants choisirent par ailleurs de maintenir la pression parce que les promesses du Printemps arabe n’avaient pas encore été déçues par les calculs politiques, sectaires et idéologiques; on ne craignait pas encore que la chute du régime transforme la Syrie en un Irak-bis avec persécution des minorités et présence active d’Al-Qaïda. Plus fondamentalement, la crédibilité des réformes était remise en cause par la répression qui s’abattait sur les manifestants, orchestrée par le régime et mise en œuvre par ses milices armées. Pendant un temps, la crise est demeurée une affaire strictement syrienne. Certes, on entendait des gouvernements étrangers condamner la répression, mais on était encore loin des stratégies d’ingérence et des machinations géopolitiques que le conflit connaîtra un peu plus tard (voir l’entrevue Tête à Tête avec Roméo Dallaire à la page 8 et l’article Query de Donald M. Ferencz à la page 50). Tout le monde était encore médusé par la vague de contestations qui a fait voler en éclats les certitudes sur le monde arabe. L’histoire devait suivre son cours. Mais au grand dam de ceux qui ont applaudi à juste titre les premiers épisodes du Printemps arabe, le cas de la Syrie se présentait quelque peu différemment. Le régime n’était pas aussi isolé qu’ailleurs; pas aussi fragile non plus. Malgré les facteurs d’illégitimité qu’il partage avec les régimes déchus (népotisme, corruption, oppression, etc.), l’armée (200 000 hommes) lui est restée fidèle. On oublie souvent que l’institution militaire a joué un rôle déterminant. Partout ailleurs où les militaires n’ont pas lâché le régime, ce dernier s’est maintenu (voir l’article Feature de Jeremi Suri à la page 40). L’opposition syrienne intérieure, constituée essentiellement des mouvements nationalistes et de gauche, regroupés plus tard sous l’égide du Comité national de coordination des forces de changement démocratique (CNCD), en ont saisi la pleine mesure. Elle avait également, peu de temps auparavant, subi la répression et savait donc de quelle violence l’État syrien était capable. Sans sympathie aucune pour le régime, elle comprenait surtout à quel point la complexité de la composition ethno-religieuse du pays en faisait un cas particulièrement délicat.

Au sein de la population syrienne, 74 pour cent sont musulmans sunnites, parmi eux des Arabes, des Kurdes, des Circassiens et des Tchéchènes; 16 pour cent sont musulmans alaouites ou druzes et 10 pour cent sont Chrétiens. Le sommet du régime est dominé par un groupe issu de la communauté alaouite, dont la famille du président el-Assad. Mais le régime en tant que tel est structuré depuis des décennies selon des alliances avec les communautés minoritaires. Ces alliances étaient motivées par la crainte du retour de la domination sunnite qui eut cours après l’indépendance de la Syrie au milieu du 20e siècle. À l’élite sunnite revenait une place prépondérante dans les activités économiques et commerciales.

ans pareil cas, toute stratégie politique de changement qui ne soit pas post-communautaire et post-idéologique risque de déchirer le pays et de faire des minorités les premières victimes. Cet aspect de la réalité politique syrienne, les aventuriers du changement par les armes en minimisent la portée et les puissances étrangères l’ignorent ou le manipulent dans leurs propres intérêts. C’est la raison pour laquelle le CNCD, par la voix de son premier dirigeant, Haytham Manna, s’est systématiquement opposé à transformer la contestation en une insurrection, et a rejeté toute intervention étrangère. L’histoire retiendra que la Libye a tout fait basculer. La militarisation de la contestation libyenne a mis un terme au Printemps arabe (contestation postidéologique, inclusive et pacifique). Dans la foulée, elle a radicalement transformé la crise syrienne. À la révolution pour la liberté et la dignité voulue par les manifestants et le CNCD s’est graduellement substituée une guerre civile qui menace désormais l’existence même de la Syrie. L’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye, naïvement interprétée ou cyniquement justifiée comme la mise en œuvre du fameux principe de la responsabilité de protéger, a été perçue de façon fondamentalement différente par deux autres acteurs de la crise syrienne, le Conseil national syrien (CNS) et l’Armée syrienne libre (ASL). Calqué sur le modèle du Conseil national de transition (CNT) libyen, le CNS a été créé en octobre 2011 à Istanbul avec le soutien de la France, du Royaume-Uni et de la Turquie. Il s’est présenté comme l’organe unifié de l’opposition syrienne et l’alternative démocratique pour la Syrie. Les Frères musulmans en dominent largement la composition, mais comme ce fut leur stratégie partout ailleurs et par souci de crédibilité, ils ont accepté de demeurer en retrait. Le CNS a connu plusieurs présidents. Aucun n’appartient aux Frères musulmans, mais aucun n’a

non plus échappé à leurs pressions: Burhan Ghalioun, universitaire laïc installé à Paris, Abdel Basset Sayda, universitaire kurde installé en Suède, et Georges Sabra, opposant chrétien de longue date. Pendant un temps, le CNS s’est opposé à l’option armée contre le régime. Burhan Ghalioun l’aura répété plusieurs fois. La stratégie était d’attendre que le régime s’effondre de lui-même sous l’effet de la contestation populaire. Mais même si l’option armée était rejetée, la stratégie du CNS empruntait à celle de l’opposition libyenne un aspect qui, en même temps, représentait un point de rupture avec les expériences égyptienne et tunisienne: le sort de la Syrie était mis entre les mains de puissances étrangères. Dans une entrevue accordée au Wall Street Journal en décembre 2011, Ghalioun envisageait au nom du CNS une Syrie nouvelle qui allait rompre la coopération militaire avec l’Iran, couper les liens avec le Hamas palestinien et le Hezbollah libanais, et s’engager dans des négociations avec Israël (voir l’entrevue Tête à Tête avec Aharon Barak à la page 26). L’objectif n’est donc pas uniquement la démocratisation de la Syrie, mais le changement de la donne géopolitique dans tout le Moyen-Orient en droite ligne des thèses néo-conservatrices. Le manque d’expérience politique de Ghalioun y était certainement pour quelque chose, car on peut se demander qu’est-ce qui pouvait justifier de tels propos alors que les manifestants faisaient face à la terrible répression en Syrie. Ghalioun avait deux objectifs: dans un premier temps, obtenir pour le CNS le statut de seul et unique représentant du peuple syrien à l’instar du CNT libyen et, dans un deuxième temps, amener les puissances occidentales à dresser le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU contre Damas. Aucun de ces deux objectifs n’a été atteint.

C’est parce que les Frères musulmans ont choisi de mettre en jeu tout leur poids que l’insurrection s’est organisée en 2012, permettant à d’autres groupes islamistes armés d’émerger.

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’une part, les puissances occidentales (à vrai dire, plutôt Washington que Paris ou Londres) n’étaient pas convaincues de la représentativité du CNS, qui avait exclu l’opposition intérieure – une exclusion qui s’explique notamment par la surreprésentation des Frères musulmans. Le problème de la représentativité était encore plus complexe; le CNS n’aurait en effet pas d’autorité sur l’ASL tant et aussi longtemps que Ghalioun continuait de rejeter l’option de la lutte armée. Sans compter le fait que la présence de personnalités non sunnites et non arabes dans l’organe dirigeant du CNS ne réussissait pas à convaincre que les minorités avaient laissé tomber Damas. D’autre part, les ambitions de transformation géopolitique exprimées dans l’entrevue du Wall Street Journal ont éveillé à Moscou et Pékin le même réflexe qui avait motivé leur opposition à l’invasion de l’Irak.

Russes et Chinois ne voulaient pas non plus tomber à nouveau dans le piège de laisser passer une résolution comme la 1973, qui stipulait la protection des civils par la création d’une zone d’exclusion aérienne en Libye, mais dont la mise en œuvre s’est rapidement transformée en changement de régime. De ce fait, le Conseil de sécurité, à ce jour, est toujours dans l’impasse. Ghalioun a fini par céder à la pression qui s’exerçait sur lui de l’intérieur même du CNS. Sa tiédeur à l’égard de la militarisation de la contestation n’était pas partagée par tout le monde – certainement pas par les Frères musulmans, qui avaient un œil sur le terrain en Syrie et un autre sur la Libye. En Syrie, horrifiés par la répression sanglante de leurs coreligionnaires, encouragés en sourdine par les puissances étrangères, et parfois soucieux de leur propre avenir à la lumière de ce qui se produisait en Libye, de nombreux officiers (souvent sunnites) choisirent de faire défection. Ils créèrent ensuite un commandement militaire, l’ASL. L’ASL n’était alors pas opérationnelle et n’avait pas nécessairement l’intention de le devenir. Le calcul était que les désertions allaient se multiplier dans le corps des officiers et dans le corps diplomatique. À l’instar du cas libyen, la répression devait provoquer une intervention étrangère pour abattre le régime. De même que pour le CNS, les mauvais calculs vont s’enchaîner pour l’ASL. Le nouveau calcul était que le déclenchement d’une insurrection armée ne pouvait certainement pas laisser la communauté internationale indifférente. Cette approche était partagée par des membres influents du CNS, en particulier les Frères musulmans. Le fait que des brigades entières affirmant servir sous l’autorité de l’ASL appartiennent aux Frères musulmans (la brigade Al-Tawhid, par exemple) est loin d’être le fruit du hasard. C’est parce que les Frères musulmans ont choisi de mettre en jeu tout leur poids que l’insurrection s’est organisée en 2012, permettant à d’autres groupes islamistes armés d’émerger sous l’égide de l’ASL – à l’instar de la brigade Al-Farouk ou, indépendamment de l’ASL, à l’instar des innombrables groupes qui forment le Front islamique de libération de la Syrie. Les successeurs de Ghalioun n’y voient aucun inconvénient. La répression à elle seule ne peut expliquer pourquoi les Frères musulmans ont choisi de s’engager dans l’insurrection armée. Les experts de ce groupe et de son histoire en Syrie savent que ce n’est pas la première fois qu’il choisit la lutte armée. En 1979, un de leur commando massacre des cadets alaouites de l’armée de terre, épargnant les Sunnites qui se trouvaient en leur compagnie. Trois ans plus tard, un violent affrontement armé entre les forces gouvernementales et les insurgés Frères musulmans fait des milliers de morts à Hama. Le parallèle avec les atrocités qui déchirent

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Reste la solution politique. Si elle devait avoir lieu, seuls les Syriens devraient en déterminer les termes. Ils n’y parviendront cependant pas si les acteurs régionaux et internationaux n’exercent pas sur eux suffisamment de pression.

la Syrie à l’heure actuelle est saisissant. D’abord, les insurgés islamistes attaquent les symboles du gouvernement central et liquident des dizaines de ses représentants, et déclarent la ville libérée, tout en appelant les Syriens au djihad contre l’impiété du tyran. Le gouvernement riposte avec un maximum de force. Aviation et forces spéciales affrontent les insurgés islamistes pendant des semaines. Les milliers de morts firent de Hama le synonyme d’un profond traumatisme resté gravé dans les esprits. Il n’y a pas si longtemps, personne n’aurait osé prévoir de tragédies semblables à Hama. La Syrie allait pourtant en connaître à répétition dans une guerre civile dévastatrice. Après Hama, les Frères musulmans syriens, sans suivre exactement l’exemple de leurs homologues égyptiens, qui avaient explicitement abandonné la lutte armée durant les années 1960, ont dû observer beaucoup de discrétion sur le sujet. Ils vivaient désormais en exil, notamment en Occident, ne pouvant afficher aucune velléité de violence politique, surtout après le 11 septembre 2001. C’est encore une fois la Libye qui a introduit dans les esprits l’idée que l’Occident pouvait non seulement tolérer la violence islamiste lorsqu’elle est emballé dans le discours libéral de la liberté et des droits humains, mais que ce même Occident pouvait engager sa puissance militaire en soutien à cette violence. Voilà pourquoi les Islamistes sont en retrait tant dans le CNS que dans l’ASL. Mais ce calcul s’est avéré aussi faux que les précédents. L’intervention militaire occidentale tant souhaitée n’a pas eu lieu. À vrai dire, les puissances occidentales n’acceptent même pas d’armer les insurgés (en tout cas pas ouvertement) comme le souhaitent la Turquie, le Qatar et l’Arabie Saoudite, qui le font déjà ou en facilitent l’acheminement. Le souvenir irakien est encore trop vivace pour que les Américains, qui ne cachent pas leur souhait de voir l’Iran perdre un précieux allié, cherchent à atteindre cet objectif à n’importe quel prix. Ils reviennent encore et toujours à la question de la représentativité. Les États-Unis ont à ce titre exercé une pression considérable pour que le CNS cède le pas à une organisation plus inclusive, susceptible de s’engager sur la voie d’une solution politique négociée. Ils obtiendront l’organisation en novembre 2012 lorsque la Coalition nationale des forces de l’opposition et de la révolution fut créée, mais pas la représentativité, ni l’acceptation de la solution politique. Même si son président, Ahmad Moaz Al-Khatib, un Islamiste n’appartenant pas aux Frères musulmans, est un opposant intérieur, cette nouvelle Coalition exclut toujours l’opposition intérieure non islamiste. Elle n’est pas moins dominée par les Frères musulmans que ne l’était le CNS. Quant à la solution politique, il suffit de lire la déclaration qui a accompagné la naissance de la Coalition pour se rendre compte qu’il n’en est pas question: «les

parties signataires conviennent d’œuvrer pour la chute du régime, et de tous ses symboles et piliers, et pour le démantèlement de ses organes de sécurité, en poursuivant tous ceux qui ont été impliqués dans des crimes contre les Syriens»; ou encore, la «Coalition s’engage à ne procéder à aucun dialogue ou négociations avec le régime». Le drame est que l’autorité de la Coalition n’est pas reconnue par l’ASL, qui a refusé la nomination de Ghassan Hitto, un homme proche du Qatar, à la tête du gouvernement que la Coalition devait former sans jamais y parvenir. Même rejet de la part d’une quinzaine de groupes islamistes armés actifs sur le terrain. Pire encore, la militarisation de la contestation a fait de la Syrie un nouveau théâtre d’opération pour les groupes les plus extrémistes. Le front Al-Nosra est le plus connu, le mieux financé et le mieux équipé. Ses liens avec Al-Qaïda ne faisaient aucun doute. Mais lorsque les Américains l’ont inscrit sur la liste des organisations terroristes, l’opposition favorable à la lutte armée a sévèrement critiqué la décision, alors que les Frères musulmans l’ont qualifié de décision précipitée. Georges Sabra, le nouveau leader du CNS (et futur président de la nouvelle Coalition, après la démission d’Al-Khatib), a, quant à lui, affirmé que «ce sont nos frères d’armes». Et Salim Idriss, le chef d’état-major de l’ASL, a dit d’eux qu’ils étaient les combattants les plus courageux. Quelques mois plus tard, Al-Nosra prête officiellement et publiquement allégeance à Ayman al-Zawahiri, le chef d’Al-Qaïda. La Coalition nationale syrienne n’avait pas d’autre choix que de rejeter une décision à ce point indéfendable, mais la critique n’a pas été élargie pour toucher Al-Nosra en tant qu’organisation qui ne reconnaît aucune autorité et qui nourrit ouvertement l’ambition de créer une théocratie sunnite exclusive en Syrie.

ur le terrain, cette ambition a d’ores et déjà pris forme. Les zones qui échappent au contrôle du gouvernement, à Alep et Idlib par exemple, sont administrées par des conseils locaux de la charia dirigés par des magistrats islamistes et des comités de promotion de la vertu et de la prévention du vice (autrement dit, par la police religieuse). Une rivalité oppose les Frères musulmans et le Front Al-Nosra quant au contrôle de ces structures. En ce qui a trait aux laïcs et aux libéraux qui servent de façade internationale à l’insurrection armée, ils ne sont nulle part sur le terrain. Ceux qui, à l’instar de Lakhdar Brahimi, le représentant de l’ONU pour la Syrie, s’opposent à la fourniture d’armes aux insurgés, ont devant les yeux cette réalité qui ne présage pas d’un futur rassurant. Et c’est précisément cette réalité que les partisans de la

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solution militaire perdent sciemment de vue. Ils ignorent ce qu’un observateur attentif de la Syrie n’a pas manqué de souligner, à savoir que «Bachar el-Assad n’est que la partie visible d’un iceberg communautaire complexe et son éventuel départ ne changerait strictement rien à la réalité des rapports de pouvoir et de force dans le pays. Il y a derrière lui deux millions d’Alaouites encore plus résolus que lui à se battre pour leur survie et plusieurs millions de minoritaires qui ont tout à perdre d’une mainmise islamiste sur le pouvoir». Aucune de ces communautés minoritaires ne trouve grâce auprès des adeptes de l’islamisme radical, qui tient ses membres pour des apostats. Pour s’en tenir au cas emblématique des Chrétiens (1,5 million), le souvenir de leurs coreligionnaires irakiens est encore trop frais pour qu’ils se fassent quelque illusion sur leur sort. D’après le site web d’Al-Monitor, des milliers d’entre eux ont déjà trouvé la mort durant le conflit et des centaines de milliers ont été soit déplacés sur le territoire syrien, soit obligés à trouver refuge à l’étranger. Le même site rapporte les propos de Michel Kilo, un opposant de longue date du régime syrien: «Certains groupes djihadistes ont menacé les Chrétiens dans la région d’Al-Ghab, tout particulièrement dans les villes de Mharda et d’Al-Suqaylabiyah au centre de la Syrie. Les Chrétiens du village d’Al-Masmiyya, dans le Houran (sud de la Syrie), ont reçu des menaces similaires de la part du Front Al-Nosra les accusant de soutenir le régime». D’après l’agence de presse du Vatican, 90 pour cent de la population chrétienne de Homs, quelques 10 000 personnes, ont été chassées de leurs maisons par la brigade islamiste Al-Farouk relevant de l’ASL. Au mois d’avril 2013, Yohanna Ibrahim et Boulos Yazigi, respectivement archevêques syriaque orthodoxe et grec orthodoxe d’Alep, ont été enlevés et par la suite tués par des groupes islamistes. La Syrie brûle. Le régime, parce qu’il est en place depuis trop longtemps, parce qu’il dispose de la puissance d’un État, et parce qu’il aurait pu engager des réformes politique beaucoup plus tôt, en porte une lourde part de responsabilité. L’opposition n’en est pas exempte. Et parce qu’elle n’en est pas exempte, il serait irresponsable de la suivre sur la voie de la solution militaire à travers une intervention militaire occidentale directe (selon le modèle libyen) ou indirecte (fourniture massive d’armes). Car la logique de la solution militaire laisse dans l’ombre les deux problèmes lancinants qui persisteront, voire s’aggraveront, dans l’après-guerre civile: le problème de l’extrémisme religieux et celui de la persécution des minorités. Reste la solution politique. Si elle devait avoir lieu, seuls les Syriens devraient en déterminer les termes. Ils n’y parviendront cependant pas si les acteurs régionaux et internationaux n’exercent pas sur eux suffisamment de pression. Les États qui ont choisi de soutenir l’opposition armée et d’ignorer totalement l’opposition non violente ont vu dans la Syrie l’occasion de changer radicalement les rapports de forces dans la région. La solution politique exige qu’ils se rendent à l’évidence: leurs calculs se sont non seulement avérés démesurés. Ils ont surtout participé à faire de la Syrie un désastre humanitaire. | GB

Mali et Syrie: réactions dans le monde arabe?

QUERY

Géographie, économie, idéologie et considérations politicosécuritaires y déterminent des positionnements nationaux à géométrie variable PAR LOUISA DRIS et CHÉRIF DRIS

Louisa Dris est maître de conférences à la Faculté des sciences politiques, Alger 3. Chérif Dris est maître de conférences à l’École supérieure de l’information et chercheur associé à l’IREMAM d’Aix-en-

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Provence, France.

ne intervention militaire étrangère dans un conflit interne suscite moult prises de position et rarement le consensus international (voir l’entrevue Tête à Tête avec Roméo Dallaire à la page 8). L’intervention conduite par la France au Mali et celle menée, de façon indirecte, en Syrie ne font pas exception (voir le débat Nez à Nez entre Frédéric Charillon et Gérard Hervouet à la page 46). Il existe un quasi consensus arabe pour un soutien à une intervention militaire directe ou indirecte en Syrie, afin de soutenir l’opposition armée contre le régime de Bachar el-Assad. Les seuls bémols viennent de trois États, l’Algérie, le Liban et l’Irak, qui ont émis des réserves quant à deux décisions de la Ligue des États arabes: l’octroi du siège de la Syrie à l’opposition et la livraison d’armements aux groupes insurgés. Dans le cas du Mali, le rapport pour/contre est plus contrasté et relativement équilibré avec, pour une majorité des États arabes, des positions de relative indifférence. Ainsi, les pays soutenant l’intervention française sont l’Algérie, le Maroc, l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et la Mauritanie. Ceux qui s’y opposent clairement sont la Tunisie, l’Égypte, la Libye et le Qatar. Afin d’analyser la façon dont les positions arabes se sont développées, nous utiliserons quatre paramètres: l’appartenance géographique, les intérêts économiques, l’influence idéologique et les considérations politico-sécuritaires. Le positionnement de certains pays arabes par rapport aux conflits malien et syrien s’explique-t-il par la proximité géographique? Commençons par le conflit malien. En postulant que la proximité géographique pèse de manière déterminante sur la politique étrangère des pays sahélo-maghrébins, les positions de l’Algérie, de la Tunisie et du Maroc devraient être dictées par ce paramètre. Ainsi l’Algérie commence-t-elle par exprimer ses réticences à l’idée d’une intervention militaire, avant de changer de position. Les 1 400 kilomètres de frontières sont devenus plus virtuels que jamais, d’autant que le sud algérien est le théâtre de mouvements sociaux potentiellement déstabilisateurs. Quant à la Tunisie, qui ne partage pas de frontières avec le Mali, son opposition tranche avec l’appui du Maroc, qui ne dispose pas de son côté de prolongement saharien. Il semble donc que la fragilité intérieure de la Tunisie ainsi que sa proximité avec la Lybie,

expliqueraient l’opposition tunisienne. Quoi qu’il en soit, les positions marocaine et tunisienne sont intéressantes à analyser car elles relativisent le poids du facteur géographique comme facteur explicatif – une relativisation confirmée par les positions du Qatar et de l’Égypte, d’une part, et de l’Arabie saoudite et des Émirats arabes unis d’autre part. Le Qatar et l’Égypte, en dépit d’un invraisemblable effet de contagion du conflit sur leur territoire, sont opposés à l’action française au Mali. Qu’en est-il des positionnements, par cercles concentriques, à l’égard du conflit syrien? Constitué des pays limitrophes, les positions du premier cercle (Liban, Jordanie, Irak et Syrie) sont-elles dictées par la crainte d’un débordement humain qui privilégierait l’opposition à une intervention militaire? Si le Liban et l’Irak se montrent opposés à toute intervention armée, la Jordanie y est favorable, en dépit de la présence sur son territoire de milliers de réfugiés syriens. Le second cercle est constitué de pays arabes sans frontières avec la Syrie, mais dont l’influence régionale est incontournable. Pour l’Égypte et les pays du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG), où l’effet de contagion est hautement improbable, les positions sont consensuelles. Composé des pays du Maghreb, le troisième cercle est comparable au premier de par son hétérogénéité. Contrairement au cas malien, la Tunisie soutient une intervention armée en Syrie, à l’instar du Maroc et de la Libye. Seule l’Algérie fait exception, rejoignant ainsi l’Irak et le Liban dans leur refus de reconnaître l’opposition syrienne. Si la loi de la proximité à un conflit explique la quasi-indifférence des États arabes du Machrek quant à la guerre au Mali, la proximité n’implique cependant pas des réactions similaires. Ainsi les pays de l’Afrique du Nord apparaissent-ils divisés. L’Algérie, le Maroc et la Mauritanie soutiennent l’intervention militaire française, considérant que la prise de Bamako par une alliance Ansar Eddine/ MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest) aurait un impact sur leur sécurité nationale. La Mauritanie s’engage dans le cadre d’une force internationale de paix onusienne, et le Maroc ouvre son espace aérien à l’aviation militaire française et s’implique financièrement dans la résolution du conflit. Quant à l’Algérie, elle a non seulement ouvert son espace aérien, mais a

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / AP / GHIATH MOHAMAD

actère déterminant des paramètres géographique et sécuritaire. Faut-il dans ce cas-là chercher ailleurs les motivations de ces positionnements? Examinons le paramètre économique. La position de l’Irak et du Liban vis-à-vis du conflit syrien s’explique par des considérations économiques. Partageant des frontières avec la Syrie, ces deux pays craignent de subir les conséquences économiques de la guerre civile. Le Liban est le plus susceptible de subir un impact économique dans la mesure où le transport terrestre, très florissant

avant la crise, subit les contrecoups de la fermeture des frontières. En effet, les exportations et les importations du Liban vers les pays du Golfe et les autres pays du Moyen-Orient se font à travers la Syrie. Dans le domaine touristique, le circuit Syrie-Liban-Jordanie est rompu, ayant fait chuter de 25 pour cent le nombre de visiteurs au Liban en 2011. Enfin, le secteur financier subit lui aussi les contrecoups de ce conflit. Fortement présentes en Syrie, les banques libanaises en sont les premières victimes. Elles risquent de perdre les crédits alloués au secteur privé syrien en raison des sanctions internationales qui bloquent le transfert de l’argent du Liban vers la Syrie. La Jordanie est tout aussi pénalisée économiquement, le tourisme constituant un secteur essentiel. Dans le second cercle, le Qatar est très affecté par la guerre civile en Syrie. Depuis 2005, cet émirat y a investi plus de six milliards de dollars dans les

Au sommet de la Ligue arabe à Doha, au Qatar, en mars 2013, les représentants de l’opposition ont pour la première fois siégé au nom de la Syrie.

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également fourni aux troupes françaises un soutien logistique et de renseignement. La position de l’Algérie suscite une vive polémique, car elle est qualifiée de contradictoire avec le soutien à une solution politique négociée du conflit. Cependant, face à la volte-face d’Ansar Eddine, l’Algérie doit au moins temporairement renoncer à sa position de médiatrice afin d’axer son action sur la lutte antiterroriste, d’autant que les premières répercussions sécuritaires se sont produites avec la prise d’otages du complexe gazier d’In Amenas et la montée en puissance des mouvements sociaux dans les villes du sud. Pourquoi, dans ce cas, l’Algérie n’adopte-t-elle pas une position plus tranchée, comparable à celle de la Mauritanie ou du Maroc? La politique étrangère et de défense de l’Algérie reste dictée par des principes érigés au lendemain de l’indépendance et qui, depuis, ont été sacralisés. L’usage exclusivement défensif de la force, le respect de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité des États et la non-ingérence dans leurs affaires intérieures semblent inscrits en lettres de sang. Par ailleurs, et c’est peut-être l’élément le plus significatif, ouvrir un front extérieur implique, pour l’Algérie, de garantir un front intérieur soudé. Or, mener une guerre contre une partie des Touaregs maliens, sachant que les Touaregs algériens vivent dans un contexte socioéconomique difficile, apparaît comme trop risqué. La nature des régimes concernés par cette analyse exige de compléter les considérations de sécurité nationale par celles liées à la sécurité du régime. Ainsi le soutien que le CCG, et notamment le Qatar et l’Arabie saoudite, apporte à l’opposition syrienne peut-il aisément être lié à la volonté des familles régnantes de maintenir un pouvoir monarchique quasi absolu – un objectif plus facile à réaliser si le Printemps arabe débouche sur des régimes conservateurs. C’est d’ailleurs cet objectif de politique intérieure qui explique l’empressement à soutenir l’opposition armée en Syrie et à intervenir militairement pour réprimer l’opposition pacifique au Bahreïn. Comme on peut le constater, le positionnement des pays arabes vis-à-vis de ces deux conflits est fortement contrasté. Aussi doit-on relativiser le car-

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secteurs de l’immobilier et du tourisme. Dans le conflit malien, le critère économique est particulièrement important dans le cas de l’Algérie. En effet, la guerre se déroule à proximité du sud algérien qui renferme les richesses énergétiques dont l’économie algérienne est fortement dépendante. À cela s’ajoutent les investissements de la Sonatrach (compagnie algérienne des hydrocarbures), localisés au nord du Mali et directement menacés par les groupes armés contrôlant cette région. Le paramètre idéologique peut-il expliquer qu’un État soutienne ou pas une intervention étrangère dans les conflits malien et syrien? Une réponse affirmative signifierait que les États dits progressistes et laïcs se rejoignent sur une position commune, opposée à la position des pays dirigés par des conservateurs traditionnellement pro-occidentaux, mêlant allégrement politique et religion. Il n’en est rien, mais cela ne disqualifie pas pour autant l’idéologie comme facteur explicatif. Commençons par le cas du Mali. L’Arabie saoudite, chantre du conservatisme religieux, allié traditionnel des États-Unis depuis plus d’un demi siècle, soutient l’intervention française au Mali contre Ansar Eddine, dont le leader a pourtant été en poste à Djedda. Son voisin et rival qatari, tout aussi conservateur et pro-occidental, soutient le mouvement islamiste allié aux groupes terroristes de la région. L’empreinte du Qatar explique peut-être la triple opposition des gouvernements tunisien, libyen et égyptien, tous trois issus du Printemps arabe, dans lequel le Qatar a joué un rôle prépondérant. En revanche, l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar sont partisans d’une intervention militaire contre le régime Assad, sans pour autant armer les mêmes protagonistes. En effet, les Saoudiens soutiennent les Salafistes, tandis que le Qatar soutient les Frères musulmans. Or, bien qu’appartenant à l’islamisme sunnite, ces deux tendances n’adoptent pas la même stratégie. Pour finir, le paramètre idéologique hérité de la Guerre froide pousse-t-il l’Algérie et l’Irak à se solidariser avec la Syrie, trois alliés historiques de la Russie, farouchement opposée à une intervention en Syrie? Dans ce carré, deux lignes idéologiques se croisent: l’une est d’ordre confessionnelle et relie l’alaouisme des Assad au chiisme du gouvernement irakien; l’autre est politique – la doctrine souverainiste de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures – et relie l’Algérie à la Russie. Les conflits syrien et malien sont à bien des égards un laboratoire dans lequel se révèle l’obsolescence de certains paramètres, considérés jusque-là comme des lignes directrices dans le monde arabe. Les lignes de fracture Maghreb/Machrek, conservateurs/avant-gardistes, islamistes/laïcs tombent ainsi en désuétude. S’en suivent des positionnements à géométrie variable, où le pragmatisme et le réalisme l’emportent. Les révoltes arabes y sont sans doute pour quelque chose, tant il est vrai qu’elles exacerbent la fragilité des États, mais aussi celles des régimes. Ces deux conflits cristallisent les contradictions inhérentes à l’aire géopolitique arabo-africaine, dans laquelle la violence demeure le moyen privilégié de la résolution des différends au sein et entre les États. | GB

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Fewer great men, and less greatness – but more powerful leaders, and many accidental heroes BY JEREMI SURI

Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of five books – most recently: Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama.

he early 21st century is filled with powerful individuals – some of them heads of state, some of them activists, and some of them accidental and transitory agents of great change. Who are these powerful individuals? And what’s to be done with them in the general interest? Of course, few of today’s powerful individuals meet the standards of Thomas Carlyle’s Great Men (and Women). “The history of what man has accomplished in this world,” Thomas Carlyle wrote in 1840, “is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world[.]” Carlyle’s ‘Great Men’ were prophets, poets, priests, writers, generals and kings. They were men of action who influenced people in enduring ways. They were artists who imagined new worlds, and then helped to bring them to life. Especially in war, where he focussed on the ‘genius’ of men like Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte, Carlyle believed that individuals of superior vision, courage and strength changed the world. France, on this logic, did not conquer most of Europe in the early 19th century; rather, Napoleon overran the continent with a rag-tag French Revolutionary Army that he molded into a massive, disciplined machine. Napoleon was the great man who made modern Europe, not vice versa. In the century and a half after Carlyle wrote his widely read books, scholars have beheaded his great men. Academics, in particular, are not comfortable attributing world-historical change to figures like Napoleon, Frederick the Great or their successors. Writers from Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin to Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger have emphasized the powerful role of forces larger than the individual: industrialization, capitalism, nationalism, democratization and digitization. According to this perspective, individual leaders have little opportunity to change the world around them. Their decisions make a difference, but only at the margins of trends that they cannot control (see the Feature article by David Skilling at p. 18). The Industrial Revolution, for example, was a necessary development in the 19th century. Leaders and citizens could choose to resist it, but they would fail. The same was true for the rise of nationalism and the dissolution of European empires in the 20th century. Men like Winston Churchill tried to prevent this process, but they could not resist the power of group identities in places like Egypt, Kenya and, of course, India. The historical forces in these cases appeared to move men. Leaders reacted and adjusted to trends that they could not control. The best that they could do, according to the critics of Carlyle, was to embrace the changes in society and seize various openings. Individuals could not make history, but they could exploit moments of opportunity for nudging policy in new directions. History was not about great men in these accounts. It was about opportunists, manipulators and small men who looked large only because they knew how to ride the waves of change that they neither made nor controlled. Kissinger’s

ON GREAT MEN

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(AND WOMEN) IN THE 21st CENTURY

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ILLUSTRATION: DAVID PLUNKERT

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favourite quote on this topic comes from Birsmarck, who confirmed the limits of the individual as he described his own job as chancellor of Germany: “The best a statesman can do is to listen carefully to the footsteps of God, get ahold of the hem of His cloak and walk with Him a few steps of the way.” These were not the words of someone who felt that he could control the fate of his country or the larger landscape of international relations. Many observers of international relations have adopted the same skepticism about individual power in the context of expanding 21st century trade, warfare and cultural exchange. The world is just too complex and fast-moving for any single individual to matter very much. The forces of change are too large and the relations between societies are too diverse for talented men and women to do very much of enduring consequence (see the Feature article by Douglas Sanderson at p. 12). Even President Barack Obama – perhaps the most powerful figure in the world – appears highly constrained, especially by domestic politics, in the pursuit of his preferred agenda for nuclear disarmament, more even-handed Arab-Israeli relations, and an opening to Cuba. If the President has so little influence on the course of international affairs, how can any other individual matter? And yet the reality is that individuals matter more than ever for international affairs. Historical forces remain powerful, and institutional complexity continues to stymie efforts at rapid policy change, but contemporary globalization empowers many individuals – traditional state leaders and newer non-state actors – to exert influence over a broad international space. This is particularly true for the areas of deepest conflict across the globe. Individual autocrats – Vladimir Putin in Russia, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and Kim Jong-un in North Korea, among others – have an ability to extend threats over a very wide and diverse terrain (see the Query article by Donald M. Ferencz at p. 50). Modern weapons and communications increase their speed, scope and potential destructiveness. The same is true for many of the leaders in the US, Israel and South Korea, who respond to these threats – often with new weapons, strategic postures, and propaganda of their own. Bref, the recurring international crises of our time are driven by leaders with unprecedented technological capabilities at their disposal. This is the paradox of a world filled with large professionalized military organizations. For much of human history, the power to organize and spread violence was shared among numerous actors of varying size and capacity. Moreover, the control of military organizations was exceedingly unstable. The men with guns were rarely content to follow a single leader – especially a non-military ruler – when alternative figures could offer more resources and

glory to the armed forces. Military coups against powerful civilian leaders were therefore very frequent in human history. The institutionalization of military forces under civilian state authority in the 18th and 19th centuries, followed by the creation of a professional ethos among soldiers in the 20th and 21st centuries, has greatly increased the power of governing elites. The largest militaries in the world are today tightly controlled by civilians (see the Feature article by C. Raja Mohan at p. 54). Soldiers in these societies define themselves as military experts who should stay out of politics – at almost all costs. Military figures follow powerful political leaders – many of whom have little or no experience under arms. This is particularly true in the US, where few members of Congress or the executive branch of government have ever served in the military. Presidents and prime ministers can today rely on the loyalty of their military establishments more than ever before. They can expect their soldiers to fight hard, and with sophisticated technology, wherever they are deployed. Most of all, presidents and prime ministers can trust the men and women with guns to protect civilian power. For countries with extremely large military forces – especially the US, China and Russia (see the One Pager by Vladimir Popov at p. 5) – assured civilian military leadership means extended influence through violence (or the threat of violence) by the individual at the top of government. The figure possessing what Eliot Cohen calls “Supreme Command” is often now an individual who asserts power through reliable deployments of force, and credible threats to deploy more when necessary. In some sense, then, Max Weber’s famous state “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence” is more purely a monopoly than ever before. On the other hand, the trend toward military empowerment of the individual applies outside of state institutions, just as it does within. In the last decade, various sub-state and non-state actors mobilized military capabilities of impressive destructive potential. These paramilitary organizations had a long history, but they grew in scale and scope during the early years of the 21st century. Combining extremist ideologies with modern communications and destructive devices – many ‘home-made’ – these groups of violent actors raised the stakes for defenders of traditional state authority. Paramilitary groups destabilized inherited political institutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 30). They inspired new intrusive security measures for worldwide travel and commerce – increasing the costs of globalization for its strongest advocates. Most startling, paramilitary groups drew the most powerful and secure

governments – especially the US – into draining, unpopular and often self-defeating commitments around the globe, from Iraq and Afghanistan to Libya and Mali (see the Query article by Louisa Dris and Chérif Dris at p. 36). These paramilitary groups succeeded in shifting American priorities to the least advantageous places for the nation’s core interests. This is the clearest evidence of the contemporary challenges confronting powerful traditional institutions as a consequence of the rise of influential individual-centered groups.

In the century and a half after Carlyle wrote his widely read books, scholars have beheaded his great men. Academics, in particular, are not comfortable attributing historical change to figures like Napoleon, Frederick the Great or their successors.

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he enduring role of Osama bin Laden in international affairs captures this point. His work to organize, finance and manage Al Qaeda as a global terrorist organization transformed the international strategic landscape. Bin Laden not only planned and coordinated a series of violent attacks across the globe, but also created a worldwide threat empire – a set of terrorist “franchises,” according to Peter Bergen and other observers. Al Qaeda communicated threats through traditional and non-traditional media, recruited participants in diverse societies, and undertook a wide variety of targeted missions of killing and extortion in order to influence local policies. And, of course, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have become a virtual military government in parts of Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Mali. Al Qaeda continues to intimidate opponents, infiltrate political alternatives, and rule through violence. Its affiliates remain more politically effective than most internal and external challengers – even those financed by the US and other leading nation-states. Although bin Laden is now dead and many local Al Qaeda groups operate with autonomy, the global organization continues to express his personality and his aims. Absent bin Laden, Al Qaeda would not exist, nor would the US have spent a long, costly decade fighting a ‘war on terror’ – with very mixed results. Of course, bin Laden’s apparent successes continue to inspire others. The recent terrorist attacks in Boston and London confirm longstanding concerns about a second wave of more diffuse, unpredictable and deadly terrorism led by isolated individuals with access to the Internet and very limited resources. In Boston, the Tsarnaev brothers – 19 and 26 years old – killed and injured hundreds of innocent civilians and law enforcement personnel, and shut down one of America’s largest cities. In Woolwich, London, the grisly public murder of a British soldier by two radicalized young men sparked anti-Muslim violence in Europe’s most cosmopolitan capital. Both acts aroused profound anxieties and caused the expenditure of many millions of public dollars.

Who had more enduring influence on the behaviour of the nation: these two terrorists in Boston or the massive law enforcement apparatus that killed one and captured the other after a week of mayhem? Traditional government institutions have learned to contain the destruction wrought by individuals, but they remain hostage to the unpredictability and fear elicited by small-scale terrorists. It appears, then, that modern weapons, travel and communications have given committed individuals a major ‘first-mover’ advantage over more powerful established institutions. This is a dark story, but it has many bright spots too. The empowered individuals who can punch above their traditional weight in the contemporary international system are also figures who can persuade and inspire across cultures. More than a century ago, Weber identified the ‘charismatic’ power of a figure who appears capable of speaking and acting as others cannot. The charismatic individual articulates what crowds feel, but cannot express. She also accomplishes great feats beyond the capabilities of most humans, with apparent ease. Historically, Weber identified figures who fit this description through their abilities to electrify assembled crowds with their words, their displays of strength, or their communion with a supernatural force. Like Carlyle, Weber looked to Napoleon – as well as Jesus and Mohammed – as his models for the charismatic individual. Modern communications magnify the potential reach of charismatic figures, allowing them to expand their audience, replay their performances, and control their environment. The ability to manipulate an audience and manufacture a particular reaction has grown with creative use of film and sound technologies. Anyone who has followed the international ‘Gangnam Style’ craze, and the wide appeal of the South Korean singer Psy, recognizes the power of controlled charisma disseminated through the Internet and social networks. The same dynamic attracted international attention – as many as 100 million views – to the documentary video about Central African warlord Joseph Kony, produced by the organization Invisible Children. Human rights activists disseminated an emotional image of Kony as the charismatic embodiment of evil – the mass murderer of African children. Kony is, in reality, one among many homicidal warlords, but modern media made him into a convenient and all-encompassing devil. Similar dynamics have made charismatic international celebrities of many other diverse figures. Social media magnify this phenomenon through the easy circulation of image, sound and text from one group to another. For the first time, geographical distance does not seem to matter very much for rapid communications. Connection to the Internet and

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The great men who made the biggest impact for Carlyle were the ones who nurtured followers and successors. They did not rule from atop the mountain, but came down to the people in order to improve them and prepare new leaders to carry on their legacy.

satellite services matters most. In the past, control of territory and transportation across distance posed serious limitations for the charismatic individual; today, compelling non-traditional figures can reach a broad audience with extraordinary ease and rapidity. Social media have an immediacy that captures the emotion of the moment. They break down geographical barriers. They have a real-time rapidity that allows them to remain up-to-date – sometimes minute-by-minute. With social media, viewers can have real-time eyes and ears inside a crowd that is oceans away. They can identify with powerful individuals up close. They can also join thousands of others, communicating with an apparent directness and intimacy once only possible for those who were physically proximate to the individuals of influence (in other words, for the courts of the powerful). New groups continually assemble (and reassemble) online around the global conversations generated by a charismatic figure – even if that figure is not personally part of the discussions. Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire in December 2010, became an international martyr as his story circulated on social media. Bouazizi sparked the Arab Spring demonstrations that brought down governments in Tunisia and Egypt, and foreshadowed the subsequent crises in Libya and Syria (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 30). He showed how the unknown individual – the everyman – can become the universal individual – the model citizen – for so many viewers of social media. Bouazizi’s charisma moved people to the streets, and encouraged policy-makers – including President Obama – to embrace a series of uncertain political changes in respect of regimes long allied with the US. Julian Assange is another example of the empowered individual on the Internet and in social media. Assange has used a Wikileaks website to circulate classified US government documents to interested readers around the world. He has changed mainstream debate in the US and Europe by exposing the often duplicitous and callous nature of policy-making. He has also made it much more difficult for governments to operate in secrecy. Assange has turned the Internet and social media into popular checks on government power, and, to be sure, effective platforms for his ego. Assange created international pressure for greater government transparency, and more critical views of the ‘knowledge’ and positions promoted by powerful governments – particularly in the US. The global conversation initiated by Assange continues today, and it constrains the public support for traditional uses of legitimate state force around the world. The contemporary international system is defined by powerful individuals in state and non-state positions. It is also defined by the constant shifting of

attention and legitimacy among these individuals. One week’s charismatic celebrity is another week’s discredited dissident. And one week’s political strongman is another week’s leader under siege. Egypt’s former ruler, Hosni Mubarak, learned this lesson – dramatically – in early 2011.

oreign policy has become more uncertain and unstable because it is more individualistic. Personalities matter more than ever before, but they have short half-lives of influence. How should citizens and state leaders approach foreign policy-making in this context? How can they recognize the individualistic nature of policy in our time, while acting in ways that encourage stability and longevity? The solution brings us back to Thomas Carlyle. The great men who made the biggest impact for Carlyle were the ones who nurtured followers and successors. They did not rule from atop the mountain, but came down to the people in order to improve them and prepare new leaders to carry on their legacy. Leaders must be educators if they are to establish enduring policies. Powerful and talented individuals must persuade, inspire and improve those who support them today in order to expand the pool of powerful and talented individuals for tomorrow. This seems obvious, but it is often forgotten in many societies today. Successful individuals must build institutions that will carry on their legacies. They must invest in the schools, businesses and state organizations that will bring people and resources together for the future. Individualism, in fact, requires effective and dynamic institutions if it is to be a force for enduring change and improvement. As things stand now, powerful people are doing too little to build new institutions. They are doing too much for themselves. The individualism of our time has created a bias toward small government, laissez-faire economics, and austerity. The systematic underinvestment in institutions frees the empowered individuals of today, but it limits the possibilities for followers. As such, it constricts the potential legacies – and, ultimately, the historical importance – of these individuals, even as they are empowered. The calling of our time echoes Carlyle’s demand for great leaders, as well as Weber’s meditation on the institutionalization of the best individual qualities. We need great men and women who devote themselves to revitalizing our institutions of government and education. They must imagine improved alternatives. They must make our ugly politics bright and hopeful again. They must see themselves as part of history, just as they make history. | GB

IN THE CABINET ROOM

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ILLUSTRATION: DUSAN PETRICIC

NEZ À NEZ La grande séduction stratégique de l’Europe L’Asie est devenue pour l’Europe plus importante que le Moyen-Orient. FRÉDÉRIC CHARILLON vs GÉRARD HERVOUET PROPOSITION:

Charillon (pour): Contrairement à ce que peut

Frédéric Charillon est professeur des Universités en science politique et directeur de l’Institut de recherches stratégiques de l’École militaire (Paris). Il est l’auteur de nombreux ouvrages dont La politique étrangère de la France – De la fin de la guerre froide aux révolutions arabes.

Gérard Hervouet est directeur du programme Paix et Sécurité Internationales à l’Institut québécois des hautes études internationales. Il est aussi professeur titulaire au

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département de

science politique de l’Université Laval à Québec.

laisser entendre un certain débat sur le «pivot» de la puissance américaine vers l’Asie, l’importance de cette dernière région asiatique – importance que nul ne remet en cause – ne doit pas faire oublier d’autres arcs de crise dans les relations internationales actuelles. À cet égard, il serait vain de lancer un «concours de dangerosité» (ou de centralité) entre l’Asie et d’autres régions du monde, à commencer par le Moyen-Orient (en effet, l’Asie occidentale). En premier lieu, non seulement il serait erroné d’ausculter la scène mondiale à la seule lumière des développements doctrinaux de Washington, mais surtout il s’agit moins aujourd’hui d’un basculement complet des États-Unis vers l’Asie que d’un redéploiement de leur dispositif dans cette zone, ou d’une adaptation de la stratégie américaine à la nouvelle donne, notamment en termes d’Anti-Access/Area-Denial. Personne aux États-Unis n’a jamais dit que l’Asie devait éclipser le reste du monde, ni que la montée en puissance chinoise devait faire passer au second plan les relations avec les autres puissances. Ensuite, et plus spécifiquement, prédire la relativisation du Moyen-Orient dans les relations internationales serait bien imprudent pour plusieurs raisons. La première est que cette région regroupe – hélas – des abcès de fixation dont la dimension conflictuelle interétatique n’échappe à personne: le drame syrien et ses risques de régionalisation voire d’internationalisation (voir l’article Feature de Miloud Chennoufi à la page 30), et le dossier nucléaire iranien et les réactions qu’il suscite en Israël (voir Cabinet Room à la page 45), sont deux exemples de menaces pour la paix et la stabilité qui n’ont malheureusement rien à envier aux tensions qui pèsent sur la mer de Chine méridionale ou entre les deux Corées. Enfin, le Proche et Moyen-Orient illustrent aujourd’hui l’importance de la dimension sociale et symbolique d’un monde nouveau, dont plusieurs leçons doivent être tirées. Le rôle des acteurs non étatiques transnationaux (Frères musulmans, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.), le paramètre religieux, la revanche des sociétés et la fin des craintes des

populations d’affronter des pouvoirs politiques répressifs, l’importance de la sociologie militaire dans la réponse apportée par les pouvoirs d’État à ces défis, le ressort politique mobilisateur fort que constitue la frustration, sinon l’humiliation économique, politique et sociale, sont des phénomènes potentiellement extrapolables tôt ou tard à d’autres latitudes. Ces phénomènes affichent certes une complexité inconfortable, dans la mesure où leur caractère non étatique, leurs enchevêtrements politiques et sociaux si minutieux, interdisent quasiment l’espoir d’un recours à une stratégie d’offshore balancing. Mais il faut se résoudre à admettre que le Moyen-Orient constitue à cet égard un laboratoire des nouvelles relations internationales, lesquelles ne peuvent plus se réduire à la dimension interétatique ni au seul hard power (présence militaire, ressources énergétiques, etc.). À ce titre, la région demeure centrale et lourde de signaux qu’il faut entendre jusqu’en Asie.

Hervouet (contre): Depuis plus de 30 ans, le recentrage du monde autour de l’Asie-Pacifique est devenu une prévision à laquelle doit souscrire tout analyste soucieux de ne pas être pris au dépourvu. Le «rebalancement» de la politique américaine aujourd’hui conforte le diagnostic, mais rend aussi plus crédible le constat du déplacement avéré des centres du pouvoir économique mondial. C’est donc dans une perspective très globale qu’il importe d’observer la trame des rapports de force et de coopération dans le continent asiatique. Dans tous les registres des interactions régionales, depuis la concurrence énergétique jusqu’à celle d’une impitoyable course technologique, l’Asie semble vouloir dessiner les contours d’un système international qui pourrait, pour la première fois, ne plus être défini par les États occidentaux. La montée en puissance de lourdes masses démographiques, l’attachement farouche à des territorialités de plus en plus marquées mais aussi le retour de nationalismes exacerbés, sont quelques-uns des éléments qui soulignent, bien sûr, les attributs d’une analyse très classiquement

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / AP / NG HAN GUAN

majeur avec l’Iran, même l’implosion de la Syrie ne saurait faire vaciller l’économie mondiale. En revanche, un missile nord-coréen de faible portée touchant une île, ou une ville, sud-coréenne provoquerait un ébranlement financier considérable, sans envisager les risques incalculables d’une réplique par Séoul. Les États-Unis prennent en Asie un très grand nombre d’initiatives; elles sont destinées à catalyser les multiples revendications de leurs alliés dans la region, mais également d’autres États (voir l’article Feature de David Skilling à la page 18). Washington cherche ainsi à reprendre le contrôle d’un espace qu’il entend pouvoir encore réguler comme autrefois. Cette priorité accordée à l’Asie souligne aussi l’absence de volonté des États-Unis, mais aussi celle de l’Europe, d’intervenir avec autant d’assurance au Moyen-Orient. Les turbulences et les désordres de cette dernière région s’inscrivent dans une histoire bien documentée; ils prolongent d’une façon nouvelle la banalisation de la perception d’un état de crise permanent. Il est toutefois vrai qu’il est plus que jamais totalement vain de pouvoir en décrypter le sens à venir.

Le président égyptien Mohammed Morsi, à droite, et l’exprésident chinois, Hu Jintao, assistent à une cérémonie d’accueil au Palais de l’Assemblée du Peuple à Pékin, en Chine, en août 2012.

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néo-réaliste. Dans un même temps, cependant, l’Asie innove dans les multiples domaines du soft power, dans l’exportation de valeurs reformatées par des acteurs non étatiques – comme le savoirfaire de ses grandes entreprises – et excelle dans l’échange coopératif du virtuel, mais surtout dans celui plus agressif des cyber-menaces. Quant aux divers régionalismes qui, en apparence, peinent à se définir, ils s’entrecroisent dans des formules complexes – souvent qualifiées de «noodle bowl» – surtout par des analystes occidentaux incapables de détourner leur regard du modèle européen. Là encore, le régionalisme en Asie se décline en mouvements lents et imparfaits combinant toutefois, de façon originale, toutes les contradictions, mais aussi les aspirations toujours complexes des pays membres. Le Moyen-Orient n’est pas moins important que l’Asie pour l’Europe ou les États-Unis; il est tout simplement très différent car, à court terme, il n’est pas aussi porteur des grands clivages qui pourraient refonder le système international. Ainsi, au chapitre de la potentialité conflictuelle des deux régions, si l’on fait exception d’un conflit

FC: Il est certain que l’Asie détient un poids

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Personne aux États-Unis n’a jamais dit que l’Asie devait éclipser le reste du monde, ni que la montée en puissance chinoise devait faire passer au second plan les relations avec les autres puissances.

économique sur la scène mondiale qui est de nature à déstabiliser gravement celle-ci en cas de crise politique ou militaire importante. Le Moyen-Orient également, mais pour des raisons différentes, liées aux questions énergétiques: que les principaux producteurs pétroliers ou gaziers de la zone soient touchés ou non par une telle crise constitue bien entendu une différence considérable. Que l’Arabie saoudite, le Qatar ou d’autres connaissent des événements graves, et la déstabilisation globale sera forte (voir l’article Query de Louisa Dris et Chérif Dris à la page 36). Pour l’Europe, l’Asie tient économiquement une importance globale, mais la Méditerranée et le Proche-Orient et Moyen-Orient sont de l’ordre du voisinage, avec des interactions sociales, politiques, culturelles fortes. Cet ensemble Méditerranée-Golfe demeure, vu du Vieux Continent, l’espace de proximité sur lequel on devrait avoir prise (même si tel n’est pas le cas), tandis que l’on admet bien volontiers que le suivi et plus encore l’action politique en Asie-Pacifique sont davantage à la portée de la puissance américaine. L’Asie est certes dynamique et peuplée, mais le Moyen-Orient est voisin. Les deux offrent un terrain miné, mais pour les Européens, il existe une différence entre dangers lointains et dangers proches – ce qui ne signifie pas naturellement qu’il ne faille voir ces deux régions qu’au prisme inquiétant de l’obsession sécuritaire. Aux yeux des Européens, l’Asie peut paraître lointaine, marquée par des processus décisionnels opaques mais forts, tandis que la zone Méditerranée Moyen-Orient demeure familière, mais caractérisée désormais par une perte de repères, et par des processus décisionnels devenus incertains après des années d’immobilisme. L’Asie est un laboratoire pour l’avenir de la globalisation; le Moyen-Orient est un laboratoire de ce qui peut compliquer cette dernière: revanche des sociétés, décalage entre les agendas interétatiques et ceux des citoyens (revanche des enjeux, en quelque sorte), entremêlement des acteurs religieux, entrepreneurs identitaires, mouvements armés, autour du pouvoir politique. Si l’Asie réinvente la puissance, le Proche-Orient illustre les limites de celle-ci.

GH: Entre une Asie qui réinvente sa puissance et un Moyen-Orient qui pourrait inspirer – voire provoquer – la déconstruction de l’architecture du continent asiatique, l’Europe peine à se positionner. Elle projette certainement ses propres fragilités sur des espaces régionaux qu’elle ne contrôle plus. L’Europe entretient aussi une vision toujours très tenace de l’Asie «extrême orientale». Alors que les distances sont désormais bien relatives, la con-

struction maintenue de l’altérité amplifie toujours la perception des complexités et de l’éloignement. Il y a dans cette vision européenne de la puissance asiatique une répulsion légitime envers les régimes qui marchent au pas de l’oie; toutefois les démocraties brouillonnes d’autres États régionaux n’attirent pas beaucoup plus. L’Europe n’a cependant pas d’autre choix que celui de participer à l’effervescence économique de l’Asie-Pacifique; ses chefs d’État se précipitent en ordre dispersé à Pékin ou à New Delhi (voir l’article Feature de C. Raja Mohan à la page 54), tous plus soucieux de distancer ponctuellement la concurrence que de maintenir dans la longue durée des flux d’échanges, et surtout de préciser de véritables stratégies. L’Asie légitime ainsi un «devoir» de globalisation. En profitant au plus vite d’une richesse – presque toujours perçue comme suspecte – on fait aussi l’économie d’une compréhension des multiples facteurs et intentions qui la guident. Refusant toujours le débat trop risqué des compromis de l’Asie dans ses rapports avec la démocratie, l’Europe préfère les turbulences des printemps arabes. La fragmentation extrême des groupes et la dispersion des revendications sont, par une certaine proximité avec l’histoire européenne, paradoxalement plus rassurantes. Tout comme en Asie, l’Europe des États ne parvient pas non plus à articuler une politique cohérente au Moyen-Orient. Les échecs répétés d’une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) confirment l’impuissance de l’Europe à intervenir dans des espaces en pleine mutation. Il reste – et il faut s’en réjouir – qu’on constate en Europe un décalage entre l’immobilisme des gouvernements et l’intrusion toujours plus forte de la société dans les transactions internationales. L’Europe va vers l’Asie par ses milliers de jeunes entrepreneurs, éducateurs, étudiants et voyageurs toujours surpris de l’écart entre les réalités constatées et les préjugés entretenus (voir l’article Feature de Jeremi Suri à la page 40). Mais, plus important encore, c’est l’Asie qui s’invite en Europe. Courtisée pour ses investissements, elle heurte encore par ses pratiques managériales et se confronte aux ambivalences et aux nationalismes crispés de certains politiciens. L’intrusion marquée de l’Asie s’observe enfin sur les marches méditerranéennes et africaines de l’Europe. La Chine, par exemple, en proposant de déployer sa plus importante force de maintien de la paix au Mali (voir l’entrevue Tête à Tête avec Roméo Dallaire à la page 8), devrait par cette initiative inédite forcer l’Europe à «pivoter» stratégiquement et de façon urgente vers la région asiatique. (continué en ligne) Lire le reste de ce débat sur le site web de GB: www.globalbrief.ca

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What’s the Future of Capricious War? In North America and Europe, there is no war, and no prospect of war. In Asia, there is no war but very real prospects for war. Can anything be done? BY DONALD M. FERENCZ

Donald M. Ferencz is Visiting Professor at Middlesex University School of Law in London and the Convenor of the Global Institute for the Prevention of Aggression.

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hen the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was crafted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998, it included provisions granting the Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (illegal wars). However, the issue was hotly contested. As a compromise, the Statute provided that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over aggression would be delayed until further provisions could be added – defining the crime and setting forth the conditions under which such jurisdiction could be triggered. In 2010, representatives of the Court’s governing body, the Assembly of States Parties (the ASP), met at a Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda, where definitional and jurisdictional amendments were adopted by consensus – but not without strings attached. Only acts that constitute “manifest” violations of the UN Charter as to their combined “character, gravity and scale” are covered – leaving plenty of marge de manœuvre for argument as to relative egregiousness. Other than for cases referred to the Court by the UN Security Council, nationals of non-states parties will be altogether exempt from the Court’s aggression jurisdiction, as

will be nationals of states parties that elect to opt out of such jurisdiction. Finally, the jurisdictional amendments cannot become legally effective until ratified by 30 states parties and reapproved by the ASP at some point after January 1st, 2017. Assertions that aggression investigations initiated independently by the Prosecutor of the ICC or at the behest of referring states could be politicized are significantly undercut by the fact that nationals of states electing to remain outside of the reach of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction are completely shielded – other than where the Security Council refers potential aggression cases. In light of such limitations, the further delaying measures woven into the Kampala amendments smack of overkill. Still, the Review Conference’s failure to immediately activate the Court’s aggression jurisdiction comes as no surprise. The permanent members of the Security Council – and a number of other states (see the Tête à Tête interview with Aharon Barak at p. 26) – have consistently expressed the view that it is for the Council to determine when an act of aggression has occurred. What is perhaps surprising is that, despite this, the amendment package managed to retain provisions that, if activated, PAINTING: GUERNICA / PABLO PICASSO

Kellogg-Briand’s shortcomings may well have been on the mind of Robert Jackson, Chief Counsel for the US at Nuremberg, when, just days after the judgement of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), he reported on the trial to President Truman. With obvious satisfaction at what he believed represented a ground-breaking legal precedent, he wrote: “No one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law and law with a sanction.” He himself had forcefully articulated the beating heart of those principles in his opening statement to the IMT, declaring that “[t]he common

sense of mankind demands that the law not stop with the prosecution of petty crimes by little men. It must also reach those men who possess themselves of great power and who make deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion the evils which leave no home in the world untouched.” Submitting vanquished aggressors to the judgement of the law was, as Jackson so eloquently put it, “one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.” The Nuremberg Principles were affirmed by the UN General Assembly in December 1946, and the blueprints for deterring aggression seemed to be on the drawing board. The Cold War, however, had a chilling effect on efforts to codify international criminal law. Progress was largely stifled for over a generation. Following the Kampala Review Conference, efforts have been underway to achieve the requisite 30 ratifications of the aggression amendments as soon as possible – consistent with the conference’s

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could empower the Court – at least theoretically – to proceed with prosecutions for the crime of aggression even without the Council’s prior approval. Past efforts to limit war-making may prove instructive. In 1928, many of the world’s major powers famously supported the Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand Pact). The US Senate overwhelmingly approved the treaty by a vote of 85 to 1. The lone dissenter was John Blaine, a Republican from Wisconsin. He knew that the treaty failed to provide sanctions in the event of its breach, and that certain countries – including Britain and the US – had qualified their accession with declarations reserving the right to use force when, in their sole discretion, defence of their interests so required. He warned that, “weighted down” by such reservations, the treaty contained “the fertile soil for all the wars of the future.” He called it “a sham” because, without enforcement mechanisms, it was unable to deliver on its implied promise to outlaw war – an institution that he described as existing “because certain nations propose to dominate and bully the rest of the world.”

Given humanity’s long history of organized killing, one might understandably question whether it is reasonable to expect the world community to suddenly take the steps necessary to hold to account those responsible for the illegal use of force.

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resolve “to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as early as possible.” Regional ratification workshops have been held in New York, Strasbourg and Gaborone. Based on ratifications to date and pledges by dozens of countries, there is reason for optimism that activation of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction may soon be within striking distance. Although the Court cannot yet exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it can exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Some have argued – particularly while aggression remains in legal limbo – that such jurisdiction should suffice to bring charges against those who initiate illegal uses of force that result in largescale loss of civilian life. In the final analysis, of course, the Court lacks enforcement mechanisms of its own, and depends on the cooperation of states in executing arrest warrants and facilitating meaningful investigation and prosecution. Certainly, any prosecution for the crime of aggression would present significant challenges – not the least of which may relate to accessing classified intelligence materials and sources. Still, such challenges are not unique to the crime of aggression: similar challenges are present when dealing with the other core crimes under the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court (see the In Situ article by Virginia Garrard-Burnett at p. 6). These challenges can be managed if the Court is adequately supported and equipped. The ICC is complementary to national jurisdictions. This means that it is in national courts that cases are to be heard in the first instance, if possible. Consistent with this principle and with their obligation to cooperate with the Court, states parties should bring the Statute’s core crimes within their own criminal codes. It follows that in respect of the crime of aggression, domestic courts should be empowered to try their own nationals for commission of the crime. Beyond this, states generally have the right to try perpetrators of crimes committed on their territory – regardless of nationality. Of course, aggression is a leadership crime, and therefore head-ofstate immunity might present an impediment to certain domestic prosecutions. By contrast, such immunity is not recognized by the ICC, which may, in the final analysis, offer a more suitable forum for aggression cases. Ultimately, it may well be the court of public opinion that will be most influential in bringing the world closer to prohibiting the illegal use of force as a global norm. With the centenary of the commencement of WW1 approaching, and with ongoing violent conflicts prominently in the news, considerable attention continues to be focussed on the indiscriminate suffering that armed conflict invariably entails. Given humanity’s long history of organized killing, one might understandably question whether it is reasonable to expect the world community to suddenly take the steps necessary to hold to account those responsible for the illegal use of force. Indeed, it may well be that the wheels of justice, known for grinding slowly, may grind better when given a push. | GB

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Indian Army soldiers march during Army Day in New Delhi, India, January 2013.

here is much interest in the kind of contribution that India can make to the rapidly evolving balance of power in Asia (see the Feature article by Kanti Bajpai on Indian grand strategy in GB’s Winter 2013 issue). Whereas it was not too long ago that India was seen as marginal to both Asian economic growth and the region’s political order, the present interest in India’s approach to the Asian order is based on the nation’s rapidly expanding material capabilities. In nominal terms, India today has the world’s 10th largest economy, and the third largest in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. India has one of the world’s largest militaries, and is the seventh largest spender on national defence. Thanks to continuing high PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / TSERING TOPGYAL

The recent border tensions with China have underlined the fragility in Sino-Indian relations and the problems with Delhi’s search for ‘strategic autonomy’ between Washington and Beijing BY C. RAJA MOHAN

INDIA MUST RAISE ITS ASIAN GAME

C. Raja Mohan heads the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, and is a foreign affairs columnist for The Indian Express. His most recent book is Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

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economic growth rates – in comparison with the Western world – India’s emergence as a major power is inevitable over the coming years. While the country’s recent economic slowdown has raised doubts over the international expectations concerning its rise, even a modest growth rate of six percent per annum is likely to lend itself to a steady accretion of the nation’s power potential. Three important factors are today shaping Asian

geopolitics: first, the end of the long regional peace and the rise of Chinese assertiveness; second, the imminent displacement of the US by China as Asia’s dominant military power; and third, the refusal of many smaller Asian states to abide by the possible emerging rules of a bipolar geopolitical framework to be set by Washington and Beijing. How can India shape the future regional order with special reference to great-power relations in Asia? What is the underlying worldview of Delhi in this regard? Asia has, since the late 1970s, enjoyed a prolonged period of relative political stability. There have been few major regional conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The relations among the continent’s great powers have been relatively harmonious. Asia’s regional institutions, led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are certainly not as strong or as effective as those in Europe. However, ASEAN and its offshoots – the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit – have gained institutional traction. They are actively promoting the continent’s economic integration, as well as political and security cooperation. This relatively benign period, in which the region has

seen rapidly expanding prosperity, appears to be drawing to a close. New fissures within Asia – fissures that have surfaced in recent years – threaten the long peace and stability in the region. The first such fissure is the re-emergence of territorial conflicts – especially in the maritime domain between China and its neighbours (most notably Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines in the East and South China Seas). Beijing’s increasing naval assertiveness and its reluctance to accept the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in resolving the maritime territorial disputes have shaken the region to the core. The odds on the Asian bet that China’s rise will be peaceful have suddenly become longer. Second, the last few years have seen the rapid growth of political and military tension between China and the US in Asia. The source of this tension is a material shift in the balance of strategic power within Asia. The rise of China has begun to threaten US primacy in the region – until recently, a geopolitical fact of life since the end of WW2.

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Many Asian countries are unwilling to submit themselves to the discipline of a bipolar framework in Asia. That Asia’s large nations want a say in the future regional order is not surprising.

Having replaced the US as the principal economic power in the region some time ago, China may now be on the cusp of complicating US military preponderance in Asia. Washington, in response, unveiled a policy of ‘pivoting’ to Asia in 2011 (see the Nez à Nez debate between Frédéric Charillon and Gérard Hervouet at p. 46). This policy involves strengthening traditional US military alliances in Asia with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines (see the In Situ article by Joseph Chinyong Liow and Joseph Franco at p. 24), Thailand and Australia, deepening partnerships with emerging powers like India and Indonesia, more active participation in regional efforts toward economic integration, stepping up the US’s forward military presence by moving more of its military assets to the region, and devising a new military doctrine to preserve its access to the waters of East Asia. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that the pivot to Asia is not aimed at China, and is eager to build a strong cooperative relationship with Beijing. China, however, has seen the shift in the US policy as a quite conspicuous attempt to

constrain its emergence as a great power. Third, as China and the US circle each other in Asia, the region’s responses have been diverse. While many have welcomed American determination to remain engaged with Asia, there is also a deep concern at being caught in the crossfire between the US, which is seeking to sustain its primacy, and China, which is seeking to reshape the region to suit its interests. Many Asian countries are unwilling to submit themselves to the discipline of a bipolar framework in Asia. That Asia’s large nations want a say in the future regional order is not surprising. Consider the Cold War era, when Asia, because weak, was a theatre in the global rivalry between the US and the USSR. And still, the region, unlike Europe, would not accept the basic regime of the Cold War. China switched from a treaty-based alliance with the USSR in the 1950s to a strategic entente with Washington during the 1970s and 1980s. It later proclaimed an independent foreign policy, and is now obviously seen as threatening US primacy in Asia. India emphasized non-alignment, but drew closer to the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. Delhi has warmed to Washington since the end of the Cold War. Many others, like Indonesia, refused to join the US Cold War military alliances in the region or to support Soviet proposals for collective security in Asia. Today, of course, Asia is much stronger than it was during the Cold War. Washington and Beijing will find it quite hard to shoehorn the region’s states into easy categories of allies and adversaries. Whether America and China collude or confront each other, many in Asia will resist accepting the rules set by the two powers. After all, Asia is home to many large states that zealously – sometimes quite nationalistically – guard their freedom of foreign policy action. India’s response to the new dynamic between China and the US is driven by at least five competing strategic imperatives – vectors that intersect with significant changes in India’s relations with China and the US, as well as with Delhi’s expanding economic and military weight in Asia. First, India sees its economic future and prosperity in greater integration with Asia. India is now a member of all ASEAN-led institutions. It has a free trade agreement with ASEAN, and is committed to a more comprehensive trade liberalization agreement with ASEAN and its other free trade partners. Second, while India sees China’s massive economy as the engine of regional growth, it is also increasingly worried about Beijing’s growing power and ambitions. Third, while Delhi is keen to see the US counterbalance China’s power in Asia, India does not wish to be a frontline state between the two powers. Fourth, India is also concerned that the US, which it and many analysts in Asia see as being on a path of rel-

ative decline, may not be able to sustain its historic commitments to its Asian partners. Finally, India is anxious about the possibility that a weaker US might be tempted to accommodate China’s rise at the expense of the rest of Asia.

Delhi’s focus is on deepening engagement with both Washington and Beijing, while retaining a much vaunted ‘strategic autonomy’ – a contemporary variant of non-alignment that calls for freedom of action in the foreign policy arena. of a potential Sino-US rapprochement that could leave India exposed. India, therefore, has sought simultaneous expansion of security cooperation with the US, and deeper political engagement with Beijing, as part of an effort to insulate itself and secure its long-term interests in the context of the many twists and turns in the China-US relationship. Of course, amid the rise of China as a great power and the growing tension between Beijing and Washington, India has not found the pursuit of its objectives an easy task. The dynamic between China and the US, the complexities of India’s relations with both, and the domestic politics surrounding these relations have presented India with difficult challenges. On the positive side, thanks to the globalization of India’s economy, there are much broader domestic constituencies in India today for productive and broad-based relationships with both Washington and Beijing. (This disposition stands in stark contrast to that of two decades ago, when India’s elites deeply distrusted their opposite numbers in both capitals.) Indeed, there is

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o be sure, India’s potential role as a shaper of the regional balance is recognized by both Washington and Beijing. While US officials have often called India the ‘lynchpin’ of the American pivot to Asia, Chinese leaders insist that Beijing is no threat to Delhi, and are reaching out to India. In reacting cautiously to the new tensions between the US and China, India has neither endorsed the US pivot to Asia nor criticized it. Its focus is on deepening engagement with both Washington and Beijing, while retaining a much vaunted ‘strategic autonomy’ – a contemporary variant of non-alignment that calls for freedom of action in the foreign policy arena. Is this apparently prudent approach sustainable? Or might it lead to India falling between two stools? To understand where India is headed, one must recall the complex story of India’s relations with both China and the US. Delhi’s relations with Beijing have been marred by a host of unresolved bilateral disputes since India and China became formal neighbours in the middle of the 20th century, as well as by an unending competition for regional influence. India’s hopes for maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed border with China seemed on track – until recently. The spat over a Chinese incursion this past April into a territory claimed by India in the Ladakh frontier in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has cast a dark shadow over these hopes. India’s expanding economic engagement with China has provided some depth to the bilateral relationship, but the growing trade imbalance in Beijing’s favour has generated serious concern in Delhi. Meanwhile, both countries are rubbing up against each other in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. If Delhi is worried about China’s rising naval profile in the Indian Ocean, then Beijing is wary of India’s growing maritime engagement with its neighbours in the Western Pacific. In contrast to its relations with China, India did not have any direct conflict of interest with the US during the Cold War. However, Delhi and Washington found themselves in opposition to each other for decades. Washington aligned itself with Pakistan and China – India’s longstanding regional adversaries. Delhi, in turn, aligned itself with the Soviet Union in order to structure a regional balance. The end of the Cold War provided a different template for bilateral relations. Over the last decade, there has been significant expansion of economic, political,

security and defence cooperation between the two countries. Still, Delhi and Washington have significant differences on global and regional issues that cannot be mitigated in the absence of far deeper bilateral engagement. India is acutely conscious of the growing strategic gap between itself and China. Beijing’s current GDP is nearly four times that of India, and its defence expenditures are three times as large. As China continues to rise much faster than India, Delhi can only bridge the gap with Beijing with a policy that combines internal and external balancing. An alliance with Washington, then, would seem natural for Delhi. That logic, however, is constrained by political opposition from those who point to India’s traditional policy of non-alignment. The logic of a de facto alliance with the US is also limited by Delhi’s concerns about the aforementioned inconstancy of American policy toward China – that is, concerns about the fiscal and political sustainability or credibility of the pivot to Asia in Washington. On the other hand, Delhi is acutely aware of the dangers

widespread domestic consensus in India on three important propositions: first, India cannot become a junior partner to the US; second, it cannot accept a Sino-centric order in Asia; and third, it needs stronger political and economic cooperation with both China and the US. Until recently, Delhi seemed confident that the new dynamic in Asia had put India in an advantageous position. Delhi believed that India’s role as a swing state in the Asian balance of power was assured, and that both Washington and Beijing would actively seek to partner with it. This assumption about India’s centrality, however, has taken a knocking at the turn of 2013. For one, India has been hamstrung by unprecedented weakness of the government in Delhi. Although the Manmohan Singh government in its first term (2004-2009) boldly sought to transform bilateral relations with both the US and China (as well as Pakistan), it has been far less purposeful in the second term that is due to end in 2014. As in the economic realm, so too in

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India has been hamstrung by the weakness of the government in Delhi. In its first term, the Singh government boldly sought to transform bilateral relations with both the US and China (as well as Pakistan). It has been far less purposeful in the second term.

the area of foreign policy, the Singh government has been unable to promote new policy initiatives. Having invested much energy into resolving India’s nuclear problems with the US, the Manmohan Singh government in its second term enacted nuclear liability legislation that has complicated the prospects for civil nuclear energy cooperation with Washington. Although he negotiated an ambitious defence cooperation agreement with the US in his first term, Manmohan Singh has been unable to realize the agreement’s full potential. If Delhi has let down some of its strongest champions in Washington, it is possible that it has emboldened Beijing to be more assertive on bilateral disputes. Having made bold moves toward the resolution of the boundary dispute with China in the first term, Singh now finds the border situation heating up. He seems to have underestimated Chinese assertiveness on territorial issues. In fact, his advisers appear to have bet that Beijing’s focus on its disputes to the East might make it more amenable to resolving the boundary dispute with India, and otherwise eager to deepen a strategic partnership.

hose premises are beginning to unravel in the context of the new standoff in Ladakh. Beijing continues to tilt toward Pakistan in its unending contestation with India, and seems determined to undermine India’s influence in the rest of the subcontinent. The lack of reforms, economic slowdown, and the political weakness of the Singh government in the second term have together begun to compromise Delhi’s capacity to engage meaningfully with both the US and China. Delhi’s preoccupation with its internal problems has also generated some disappointment in Southeast Asia, whose states had been eagerly seeking a larger Indian role in the region (see the Feature article by David Skilling at p. 18). A stronger leadership at the national level would certainly help India to respond more effectively to the geopolitical opportunities coming its way in Asia. But this would not necessarily resolve the tension between the country’s competing strategic imperatives. To make the most of its new salience in Asia, India needs to redefine the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ so dear to the Indian political class and the national security elite. This requires that India return to the original non-alignment conception of the 1950s. Unlike in the more recent past, where the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has found it difficult to deal with the dynamic between the US and China, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, won economic support and technical assistance from both the US and the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War. Nehru did not see non-alignment as ‘neutralism’ or passive foreign policy, as some of the current exponents of strategic autonomy in Delhi do. Nor did he imagine India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ as tantamount to ‘equidistance’ between the rival superpowers. What he emphasized was the capacity for independent judgement on world issues, simultaneous engagement with all of the great powers, building coalitions with middle powers, and a determination to elevate India’s standing in Asia and the world. Nehru’s successors in this early new century have far greater economic heft. They are well positioned to influence the broader outcomes in Asia. For a decisive role in the region’s future, India must accelerate its economic growth, build a stronger security partnership with Washington, contain the boundary dispute with China, and strengthen ties with key Asian middle powers. In early 2013, Delhi is under pressure to demonstrate that it has the political will and strategic wits to pursue these objectives. | GB

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Jeremi Suri argues that the United States has too often forgotten this truth over the course of its nation-building history— including the American Revolution and Reconstruction as well as efforts in the Philippines, Germany, Japan, and Vietnam. Suri draws lessons from all these efforts that are particularly valuable today.” —Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University

THE DEFINITION "The principal cause(s) of Africa's public health challenges today... …are varied and multi-dimensional.

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Child mortality rates have fallen by as much as half since 2000 in Liberia and Senegal, and more than 70 percent in Rwanda.

However, it is evident that governance and leadership remain some of the most pressing challenges. This argument is made in light of the fact that there is a significant correlation between the state of public health and the ability of the state to guarantee the enjoyment and respect of social and political rights for its citizens. Most of the public health challenges in Africa stem from the failure of states to exercise prudent leadership and effective management of available resources. It is an indisputable fact that the ongoing human rights abuses and armed conflicts in most African countries have had dire consequences on the ability of these countries to create and sustain strong institutions to guarantee access to basic rights such as health, education and justice – among others. Equally apposite is the existence in most countries of state-sanctioned corruption that has led to embezzlement public funds, illegal and substandard procurement of public health goods and services, as well as the flight of talent – including much-needed health care professionals – to overseas labour markets in search of better opportunities. To be sure, Africa’s ongoing conflicts have also had a negative impact on the spread of chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS and TB, while facilitating sexual and gender-based violence against women. Such diseases and violence cause immeasurable trauma to the victims for many years and, in the case of HIV/AIDS, death (as HIV/AIDS still has no cure). What can be done to address this situation? Africa needs to create and respect institutions of governance and exercise prudent leadership to effectively manage available resources, while investing aggressively in accessible social services like health and education. States should also ensure equal participation of their citizens in the management and enjoyment of these resources. Of course, public participation cannot become a reality unless the state is committed to human rights ideals that respect the dignity and worth of each individual citizen. As experience in different countries has shown, even when conflict comes to an end, it takes decades and even generations before a state can transform itself into strong polity underpinned by respect for human rights and good governance. Better, then, that states invest their

time and resources in the prevention of conflicts through strong and accessible institutions of governance, such as an independent judiciary to adjudicate differences between citizens, and between citizens and government agencies. It is only through such institutions and such commitment to prudent leadership and respect for rights that states can meaningfully address current public health challenges and improve the social and economic welfare of their citizens.” Adama Dieng is the Special Adviser of the UN SecretaryGeneral on the Prevention of Genocide, and former Registrar of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

…remonte aux maladies infectieuses (VIH, paludisme, tuberculose, etc.), au cancer du sein et du col de l’utérus, aux affections périnatales, à l’hypertension et au diabète, à l’insuffisance rénale, aux accidents de la circulation, et aux cas de viol. Les causes principales de ces problèmes de santé publique sont malheureusement nombreuses. Elles comprennent l’absence de stratégie des gouvernements des États africains pour la mobilisation des fonds nécessaires pour développer des politiques de santé et assurer une couverture médicale adéquate et effective pour tous. Ensuite, on peut énumérer les facteurs suivants: l’instabilité des États africains avec la recrudescence des conflits armés; l’insuffisance des politiques des gouvernements dans le domaine de la promotion de la santé, de l’aménagement, de l’assainissement du milieu, ainsi qu’une certaine négligence de l’aspect préventif en matière de santé. Il y a aussi le fait que les États africains mettent la priorité sur le curatif, puis l’insuffisance de programmes axés sur la nutrition, l’alimentation, la promotion et la protection des couches vulnérables sur toute l’étendue du territoire. L’absence de programmes visant à assurer une sécurité routière adéquate et efficiente s’explique en partie par le déséquilibre dans la répartition des ressources humaines et matérielles en matière de santé au niveau des États: une grande proportion des prestataires qualifiés et les moyens modernes de diagnostic ne se trouvent qu’en zone urbaine, ce qui rend parfois le recours et l’accessibilité aux soins de qualité très difficile pour les patients venant des zones rurales. Souvent ces problèmes entraînent un retard dans le recours aux soins – c’est-à-dire que le système

de santé précaire peut difficilement assurer une prise en charge de qualité des patients. On peut citer l’exemple de l’insuffisance rénale. Afin de bénéficier d’une séance de dialyse, les malades doivent se rapprocher des zones urbaines et patienter sur une liste d’attente, compte tenu de la pénurie d’équipement médical et de l’absence de personnel qualifié. Alternativement, on se fie à la médecine traditionnelle et une automédication non contrôlée, qui provoquent ainsi des pathologies rénales. Pour pallier à ces problèmes les États africains doivent agir à plusieurs niveaux: politiques, économiques, réglementaires et institutionnels». Baye Moussa Samba fait partie de la Direction de l’action Sanitaire et sociale de la Mairie de Dakar au Sénégal.

ecology, historically low public investments, and rapidly evolving frontiers of human resource requirements, information systems and medical interventions required to tackle a shifting burden of public health challenges. But the context for these challenges is a remarkable – even historic – cascade of health breakthroughs throughout Sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. Many of these breakthroughs were commonly deemed impossible at the turn of the millennium. Spurred PHOTOGRAPH: PIUS UTOMI EKPEI / AFP / GETTY IMAGES

John W. McArthur is Senior Fellow with both the UN Foundation and the Fung Global Institute, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was previously

Bill Gates listens as a health official speaks about immunization coverage plans in the Awutu Senya district, Central Region, Ghana, March 2013.

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... is a complex blend of unique disease

significantly by global efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), six million people are now receiving life-saving AIDS treatment across the region, malaria deaths have fallen by about a third, polio is nearing eradication, and child mortality has declined by an average of 30 percent. Indeed, child mortality rates have fallen by as much as half since 2000 in Liberia and Senegal, and more than 70 percent in Rwanda. At the same time, the challenges of promoting health and strengthening health systems are typically most pronounced in the so-called ‘fragile states’ – a term currently applied to 18 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s nearly 50 countries (according to the most recent assessments of the African Development Bank and World Bank). These fragile states have seen less rapid progress than the rest of the region, averaging only roughly a 20 percent decline in child mortality since 2000, and even less in countries like the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such conflict-affected environments embody some of the world’s deepest challenges for promoting the longer-term virtuous cycles of stability and development.”

Manager and Deputy Director of the UN Millennium Project.

STRATEGIC FUTURES “In 2020, Mexico... ...will once again be the darling of

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The political and economic elites of the country will have finally put to rest, both in rhetoric and practice, Bolivar’s dream of a Latin American union.

capital markets and investors. This status will be the reward for astute decisions, but it will not come without significant political costs. The reforms currently underway in Mexico will dramatically reshape key markets (labour, education, petroleum, finance, telecommunications, etc.) – paying a growth dividend starting at some point in 2015-2016, when the economy will grow annually at a healthy six to seven percent clip. Of course, political turbulence and unrest will be another by-product of these reforms – peaking in 2014 in the period leading up to, and immediately following, the approval of the energy reforms. Economic growth will be driven by significant efficiency gains in the Mexican economy. The liberalization of key markets will be a key driver of productivity change. Productivity change will also be driven by more intense competition in product/ service markets, as well as by significant employment growth in the formal economy, as workers migrate from the informal economy in response to health and pension market reforms. Growth conditions will be bolstered by continued reliance on an open-economy model, prudent macroeconomic policies, a sound and growing financial system, a competitive exchange rate set by market forces, and gradually improving security conditions in the country. As mentioned, political conflict and unrest will have been part of the cost of the reforms. The ultimate effect of the extreme behaviour of radical political groups between 2013 and 2015 will be to have discredited key populist leaders – especially Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) – and the policies that they espouse, but not before causing mayhem, fear and discomfort for a majority of the population. The behaviour of MORENA and its followers will be in stark contrast to the ‘responsible’ behaviour of PRI, PAN and moderate PRD leaders, resulting in a public blacklash against AMLO and MORENA in the Presidential elections in 2018. In 2020, therefore, Mexico will be governed primarily by PRI and, to a lesser degree, PAN and PRD moderates. The PRI will control the Presidency, Congress and the Senate, as well as several key state governments (i.e. Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and possibly Jalisco and Baja California). There is a downside to all of this. Opposition parties

may prove too weak to successfully fulfill their role as a loyal opposition to the PRI. This will undermine the vitality and plurality of politics in Mexico. The country will once again be drifting toward a one-party system. There will be noticeable weaknesses in the governance of key sectors. Complacency due to the success of the reforms will delay the elimination of corrupt practices and undermine the balance between the three branches of government.” Roberto Newell Garcia is the Vice Chairman of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO), an independent think tank.

...can anticipate rising levels of income due to the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors. The legalization of undocumented Mexicans in the US will result in increased remittances to families in Mexico – thereby lifting many families out of poverty and providing access to education. The consequence of rising incomes will, predictably, be a significant increase in the number of families who identify themselves as middle class. Defined in marketing terms by the Mexican Association of Market and Public Opinion Research Agencies (AMAI) as the socioeconomic C and D+ categories, the middle class will account for 65 to 80 percent of urban Mexicans. (In Mexico, a middle class family is headed by someone with a high school degree, possessing a car and a computer with Internet service, and also having the ability to take one vacation away from home each year.) Family members will also seek to travel legally to the US to visit family and friends, forcing the US government to offer the Visa Waiver Program to Mexican citizens. This emerging Mexican middle class will be better educated and therefore less ignorant. The old patronage system and reliance on political patrons will break down. Citizens will become more independent. The traditional top-down dictates of the political class will give way to greater demands for participation from the grassroots. Social movements will become widespread, capturing a wide variety of causes ranging from socio-political issues, justice and human rights to environmental matters. Those aged 15 to 27 and self-identified as generacion X will play a more active role both in formal politics and social movements. In short, Mexico will enjoy democratic ferment and also increases in public protest. Mexican law enforcement will have to learn to respect these within frameworks that value and protect human rights. Demand for quality education that enables the younger and empowered middle class to participate in the knowledge economy will issue in more technical schools with standards equivalent to those of US community colleges. Combined degrees from US institutions will become available; there will be significant demand for these combined degrees. More American (and Canadian) students will be drawn to

study in Mexico. For their part, Mexican students will still find the costs of US colleges prohibitive unless more American states follow the lead of Texas and offer in-state tuition to Mexicans from border states. Demand for energy will increase with rising standards of living. Carbon-based fuels will be hardpressed to meet this demand. As a result, there will be greater reliance on solar and wind power, with the proportion of electricity derived from renewable sources increasing by approximately 20 percent. Prime jobs will be in the engineering services sector, with salaries eventually rising to US-equivalent levels. Increasing numbers of young professionals will work both in Mexico and the US – creating a more integrated citizenry in North America (as already exists in the northern half of the continent). Historical defensiveness vis-à-vis the US will diminish. However, the Catholic church and conservative social movements may grow in strength as they insist on traditional norms and symbols of national sovereignty.”

More such collaboration will be needed if Mexico is to make leaps forward in addressing its rule of law challenges. Alas, such cross-party cooperation is unlikely to continue once elections approach and the all-or-nothing mentality among political parties once again sets in.” Manuel Balan is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University.

Diana Villiers Negroponte is a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution.

… will continue to grow its economy

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / DARIO LOPEZ-MILLS

…will be seven years closer to a more meaningful integration with the rest of North America. By then, the political and economic elites of the country will have finally put to rest – both in rhetoric and practice – Bolivar’s dream of a Latin American union. This realignment will have been the result of two independent factors: first, the conviction among Mexican elites that northern integration is the best course of action; and second, the emergence of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as the preferred regional body for left-leaning South American governments. Shunned by its sister republics of the South, Mexico’s attention and capital will naturally move in the other direction. The consequences of Mexico’s realignment will be felt at both ends of the continent. In the US, Mexican companies will make solid inroads on the back of that country’s growing Hispanic market – creating jobs in economically depressed states. And as the prosperity of Mexico and that of the US become increasingly intertwined, Washington and Mexico City will be spurred to define a common hemispheric diplomacy. In South America, this will be strongly felt by the governments of the Spanish-speaking countries – particularly by those of moderate persuasion that might otherwise find themselves constrained in a Brazil-led UNASUR.” Alejandro Magos is a Spanish-language Geo-Blogger

Mexico's President Enrique Pena Nieto delivers a speech during the announcement of the National System for Climate Change at the Los Pinos presidential residence in Mexico City, January 2013.

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at a fast pace. However, this progress will be paired with persistent rule of law problems. Rampant corruption, crime, drug trafficking and, most importantly, high levels of violence in the north of Mexico are unlikely to go away. These problems will make it difficult for Mexico to translate economic growth into improved living conditions for most of its population. For the foreseeable future, wealth distribution will be a central issue in Mexico. The current trend of strong investment into Mexico (which recently took over from Brazil as one of the most attractive markets in the region) is likely to continue. Yet it is difficult to see how this will translate into improved distribution of wealth. The mid- to long-term solutions to the rule of law problems are directly related to improving the economic situation in those regions with rampant violence. Militarizing some areas and increasing funding and control over the police may result in some short-term gains in terms of diminished violence. But unless the long-term plan is to keep these zones militarized (not a particularly elegant outcome), the problems are unlikely to go away. The issue of drug trafficking is related to a global market for drugs that is beyond Mexico’s control. As long as demand endures – mainly from the US, which is unlikely to legalize consumption at the national level – Mexico will have persistent drug-related problems. Pena-Nieto’s recent reforms – notably in education – and efforts to go across the aisle for support from opposition parties are promising developments.

with Global Brief.

EPIGRAM

The Individuals & the Anonymous Great men and women debunked, but passing and accidental heroes are here to stay BY DOUGLAS GLOVER

T Douglas Glover is a Governor-General’s Award-winning novelist and short story writer. His most recent book is a collection of essays, Attack of

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the Copula Spiders.

here are individuals and there are the anonymous. Most of us are individuals to ourselves, family and friends, but anonymous to the rest of the human race. We are anonymous in crowded cities, in the vast bureaucracies of government and multinational corporations. We are anonymous in statistics, and when we are dead. We are anonymous except in the hearts of loved ones. But that memory eventually burns out as well. Before history, we are all anonymous – a tide of humanity swept up in events, lucky to die in a bed of our own with loved ones around (feeling like an individual). The idea of an individual is paradoxical, like Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit parable: look at a diagram one way and it’s a duck, tilt the paper and it’s a rabbit. Or it trembles, to use Jacques Derrida’s felicitous verb. Individual/anonymous. We strut our individuality, but we are haunted by images of the beehive and the anthill, where the individual is subsumed under the sign of the collective. Are we simply carriers of genes – worker bees in a hive? Is civilization merely an accumulation of minute anonymous gestures by replaceable minions? Or are we individuals with a particular claim on the infinite – infinitely precious (to a superior being, perhaps), with a will and the power to create and alter forever the course of history? In the cynical view, one has to be noticed – by history, by the media – to be an individual. A hiker finds a frozen corpse at the edge of an Alpine glacier and suddenly, out of the anonymous eons, an individual appears – Ötzi the Iceman. Archaeologists digging in a cellar in the early American settlement of Jamestown find an awkwardly butchered corpse and suddenly, of the myriad nameless, faceless dead, a 14-year-old girl now called Jane appears, saved from anonymity by the happenstance of excavation. But in such cases the accent of individuality is contingent, haphazard; corpses survive and are rediscovered; the individual exists only in the celebrity of chance. Out of the fevered legions, once in a while, a face emerges: someone seems to stand for a moment against the current, like a rock in the stream. The vectors change, whirling onward in some other direction, or not. Sometimes the rock is overwhelmed and carried away. The ‘great’ men and women of history come to mind: Alexander, Caesar, Hitler, Napoleon, Queen Elizabeth, Lincoln, Genghis Khan, Chairman Mao. Rattle them off. Even today, Angela Merkel, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin. All individuals,

fascinating – markers of epochs. But it is difficult to see them as ordinary individuals without the trappings of power – the accumulation of events they seemed to shepherd. More compelling are the powerless – the truly anonymous or near anonymous, who seem to act alone, without the trappings of institution. The epitome of this is the haunting moment in 1989 when an unidentified Chinese civilian stepped in front of a column of tanks on Chang’an Avenue in Beijing and briefly stopped their inexorable progress. Think of Mohammed Bouazizi, the young Tunisian street vendor who set himself afire in December, 2010, and precipitated a revolution, now called the Arab Spring, still burning its way across the Middle East. Think of little Ruby Bridges, the African-American girl who marched into the William Frantz Elementary School in New Orleans in 1960 and altered the course of the American civil rights movement. Think of Nelson Mandela in his solitary cell on Robben Island, or Aung San Suu Kyi defying the resolute generals in Myanmar through 15 years of house arrest. These examples seem heartening next to the unnumbered corpses in acid drums left by Mexican drug cartels, or the hundreds of unpublicized (thus anonymous) Tibetan self-immolations, or the millions (an anonymous accumulation) in the European death-camp ashpits. It’s comforting to think that an individual can make a glorious stand and a difference, and not just a pathetic mess like the hapless Gavrilo Princip on the eve of WW1. Celebrity is individuality without a soul. A celebrity is an individual become object of desire, become desired because he is desired – superficial; an aura, perhaps; the neon glow of being known for being known. But mass recognition has very little to do with one’s sense of oneself as an individual. It begs the question: does the individual change the current of history, or does the commentator, the media, the historian? This is a question of angle and rhetoric. Ruby Bridges was one of six African-American students who went to school that day. When Mohammed Bouazizi made a torch of himself, the Islamic world from Iran to Algeria was already aboil with unrest of one sort or another. And all those Tibetan burnings go, sadly, almost unnoticed. The great man theory of history has been debunked, and the so-called heroes of the media can, with frightening speed, become unfashionable, forgotten and anonymous. | GB