Sunday, 15 May, 2011
Pakistani Army While the character of civilians has been questioned by the men in khaki throughout Pakistan’s history, let civilians now question the character of the men in khaki
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By Hashim bin Rashid
or the second time in Pakistan’s history as a State its armed forces have come to be roundly criticised amongst mainstream discourse. The first time was after the East Pakistan debacle in 1971. This second time it comes after Osama bin Laden was allegedly killed in a one-sided US operation in Abbotabad in 2011. Both times it has been criticised for the wrong reasons. Each of the debacles it was criticised after it should have been criticised for. Whence it was criticised in the former East Pakisan for an operational failure, a failure to protect national borders, it should have been criticised for a strategic failure, causing the East Pakistan debacle. Similarly whence it is being criticized in the Bin Laden debacle for an operational failure again, the breach of national borders, it should be criticised again for a strategic failure: the alleged harbouring of militants within its borders by the US and others.
We have turned to criticise the Pakistan army under the very frames of reference it has pushed down our throats. We have criticised the armed
to Pakistan) were bound to put it on a tight rope if it contradicted US interests. Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s promise to the US, “Our army can be your army,” before entering into SEATO and CENTO, before being ignored during the 1965 war, was a promise that the army overtly remained uncomfortable with. But it continued to tow the American line to secure the massive grants of aid which allowed it, in its own words, to equip itself. Others remained more skeptical of the behemoth the US was actively aiding create in Pakistan, a behemoth whose crudest and most confused form took root in the Zia era. Since then (but not strictly then) the army has fostered and nurtured Islamist militants – albeit for the first half under US funding and for US strategic interests. At that time they were the ‘mujahideen’ or freedom fighters. These relationships were cultivated to, overtly, provide ‘strategic depth’ (General Musharraf ’s
The threatened cutting off of aid by some US legislators may well (over the long run) prove a blessing in disguise – very well disguised, no doubt – but it will allow the country to be rid of this ‘opium of the elite’ By Khawaja Manzar Amin
T
he most discerning ob ser vat io ns on the latest (till last reports) crisis confronting us are to be found not in the oped pages of the leading national newspapers, but in their letters to the editor section. That does not paint a very flattering picture of the level and quality of our anthill of experts, political analysts, politicians with ghost writers and the president himself. As
much aware of the grave perils threatening their birthplace as their somewhat somnolent brethren back home, Pakistani expatriates from all over the world are making known their strong views, fears and general dissatisfaction at the way events are being handled in the homeland. In fact, the unilateral targeted assassination of Bin Laden well inside Pak territory and its fallout on future Pak-US relations remain the focal talking point, both here as well as in the Diaspora. One writer, while favouring the incompetence over complicity argument, compared Bin Laden’s
undetected concealment with the US intelligence failure in Iraq over the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction, upon which the Coalition of the Killing fell upon that unfortunate country and destroyed its infrastructure, even watching passively as priceless artifacts were looted from the museums of this mother of all civilizations. How many hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis perished in that premeditated venture, built on a false premise, and fed voraciously on lies, with the help of willing ‘poodles’ and on the orders of hatchet-faced profiteers of the military-industrial complex and
As for US-Pak relations, it is clear that the end is nigh, or at least the end of the ‘highs’ their contractors. The question naturally arises, how could the numerous US and the European secret services (not to forget the murderous Middle Eastern one), with all their Humint resources, sophisticated gadgetry on earth and eyes in the
skies and in space, fail to get their facts right (as indeed also in the curious case of 9/11), thereby causing death and destruction on a Chingizid scale? Or was it all done at the behest of the ‘chosen people’, one of whose ex- prime minister, since long in a coma, on being asked when action should commence against Iran, answered without a seconds pause ‘the day after Iraq’. Another writer rubbishes the ‘graphic picture’ fable of the dead Osama by recounting that when Saddam Hussain’s sons Uday and Qusay were killed in 2003 by
Illustrated & Designed by Babur Saghir
Off with their Aid
2 Of outstanding fiction and prose 4 The Saint’s Caldera
Criticism within the army’s frame of reference:
forces under the ‘discourse of national security’. It is good. It is in fact the best thing that could have happened. The one refrain those of us who were critical of the army’s economical and political muscle would get was: who else can secure our national borders? This was the same refrain used to justify our exploitative relationship to the US and the same used to justify the massive budget allocation to the armed forces of Pakistan. The generals have rested their own case. And the verdict, from the civilians, is clear. But this is not just a falling apart of the discourse of national security. It is also the falling apart of the military’s 60 year strong relationship with the United States of America, a relationship it has sustained consistently to the extent that it has been accused of offering itself as a mercenary army to the US. Despite the attempt by the army to constitute and argue for a set of interests separate from American interests, the army’s real paymasters (asked in the Musharraf period to directly pay for army wage for maintaining an army presence in Waziristan) and hardware suppliers (the US has historically and still is the major supplier of arms
the review
Taking stock of the