International Security and Terrorism: Group Report
Terrorism as a subjective threat: did the United States overreact to 9/11?
International Security and Terrorism: Group Report 6061184 & 6054609
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Contents Part One: Framing the Question……………………………………………………………………………………………..….pp.2-4 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p.2 What is Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.2-3 Measuring Risk……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.3-4 Part Two: An Objective Threat……………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.4-6 Risk and Reaction……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.4-5 The Precautionary Principle……………………………………………………………………………………….pp.5-6 Part Three: A Subjective Threat…………………………………………………………………………………………….…….pp.6-8 Psychological Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………..pp.6-7 Encouraging Fear………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….p.8 Part Four: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p.9
List of Figures and Illustrations Fig. 0,Cover Photo, (New York City Police Aviation Unit, 2001). Fig. 1, Lifetime chance of death by cause, US 2008 (National Safety Council, 2012)………………………p.4 Fig. 2, Dread risk and unknown risk (Marshall et al. 2007:308)………………………………………………………p.7 Fig. 3, George W. Bush is told about 9/11 (Agence France-Presse, 2001)…………………………….………....p.8 Fig. 4, Cover of the New York Times on 12/09/2001 (NYT, 2001:1)………………………..……………………….p.9
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Part One: Framing the Question Introduction The 9/11 terrorist attacks induced change within the United States, terrorism became the priority of policymakers and the homeland security department was formed, leading to the ‘war on terror’ and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The date marks the beginning of an ‘age of terror’.1 In this report we argue that the United States has overreacted to 9/11 due to the extent of the subjective threat of terrorism; this is the concept that terrorism, by creating fear and uncertainty, leads to excessive and disproportionate reactions. After considering complications in measuring risk, we conceptualize the terrorist threat posed by 9/11 and compare this to the US reaction. We then consider why the US may have overreacted to 9/11 by evaluating how the subjective threat of terrorism has affected the public through the creation of psychological terror, which is encouraged by politicians and the media. We acknowledge alternative motives for the US overreaction, such as to achieve other political motives or to maintain a strong international image in the wake of their arguably declining hegemony, however these reasons are not the focus of this report which concentrates on classifying the terrorist threat. Evaluating the US response to terrorism is important because it influences power, money and even threatens lives in the case of a military response (Jackson et at., 2011:125) and the fear created by the response to terrorism may also have a psychological effect on populations (Friedland & Merari, 1986:234).
What is Terrorism? A broad and encompassing definition is that terrorism is the use or threat of violence with political aims and motives, with a target which is bigger than the immediate victims of violence (Lutz & Lutz, 2008:9). There is a terminological difficulty in creating a more concise definition of terrorism due to wide variation in the use of the term (Schmid, 2011:39). Therefore, instead of deliberating the possibilities for a universal definition, we will create a more specific and relevant concept of terrorism by considering the key features of our case study. In literal terms, the 9/11 attack was perpetrated by the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda and suffered by the United States. It caused the deaths of
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Some interpret this rhetoric as an extreme exaggeration (Mueller, 2005:478).
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2,977 people and the collapse of the World Trade Centre (CNN, 2013). Based on these facts, 9/11 was an act of violence by a sub-state group, the perpetrator had a wider aim, the target was a national landmark and the act caused many fatalities. An important counterpart of these features in relation to this report is the dramatic nature of the attack; the magnitude and high profile of the attack created shock and therefore became the focus of mass media attention. This is a common feature of terrorist acts; even before 9/11, Diana Taylor argued that terrorist attacks were purposely theatrical because they have symbolic aims (1990:165). The wider aim or ‘symbolic’ aim of a terrorist group means that attacks have the object of gaining as much attention as possible, A further clarification of our interpretation of terrorism is Security, ‘in the subjective objective sense, measures the absence of threats to previously acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’ (Wolfers, 1952:485)
the distinction we make between objective and subjective terrorism. This idea is grounded in Arnold Wolfers’ original definition of national security, which distinguishes between real ‘objective’ threats and imagined ‘subjective’ threats. In
the objective sense, terrorism may be a threat because of the actual use of violence, and in the subjective sense, terrorism may be perceived as a threat because it creates fear that violence will be used.
Measuring Risk A key barrier in knowing whether the US has overreacted to the threat posed by 9/11 is the difficulty in identifying the level of threat. The global policy think tank RAND suggests that a difficulty for security policy in general is that threats are often located in the future and are therefore inherently hypothetical (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009:ix). The post-9/11 threat to the US has been defined as anything from unlimited to non-existent; columnists such as Charles Krauthammer suggest that terrorism threatens ‘civilization itself’ (2004:A19) whilst academics such as John Mueller suggest that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated and that now almost no threat exists in the US (2006:2). Jackson et al. identify three methods used to measure the terrorist threat: statistically, statistically with psychological analysis and by using the precautionary principle (Jackson et al., 2011:128). This report uses a combination of these three methods; it draws upon statistical research but also considers how this numerical information has been analysed and interpreted in order to understand both the level of threat posed by 9/11 and whether the reaction from the US was
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appropriate. The precautionary principle is suggested within our analysis when we consider whether the terrorist threat may be bigger than statistics imply.
Part Two: An Objective Threat In this section, we classify the extent of the ‘actual’ or objective terrorist threat and compare this to the US’s reaction. Firstly we measure both the threat and the reaction statistically, using the number of fatalities and financial cost as indicators. Then, using the precautionary principle, we consider any reasons for which the US may believe that the objective threat is bigger than these numbers suggest.
Risk and Reaction The magnitude of the 9/11 attacks created an unprecedented level of fear; US President Barack Obama described 9/11 as the ‘worst attack on the American people in history’ (2011). Given that 2,977 people died as a direct result of the attacks (CNN, 2013), we may contextualize the extent of the threat by considering comparative death tolls. Fig. 1 shows that there are many more threatening risks than terrorism in the US, where you are more likely to die from being stung by a bee, or because of a fireworks discharge. Other studies show that even in 2001 the risk of death from causes such as homicide and even by accidental choking were higher than those of dying in a terrorist attack (Marshall et al., 2007:310). With the exception of 2001, the risk of death from a terrorist attack in the US has been virtually non-existent, in almost all years fewer than ten Americans die worldwide at the hands of terrorists (US State Department, 1997). On the other hand, Jackson et al. argue that terrorist attacks usually target property as opposed to people and may therefore have a higher financial harm cost (2011:130). The New York Times used
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research from a range of national and international institutions to find the cost of 9/11, and claims that the economic impact of 9/11 was $123 billion (Carter & Cox, 2011). The US responded to 9/11 with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the creation of the Homeland Security department. Paul Rogers classified the response as ‘vigorous and extended’ with an ‘overwhelming use of firepower’ (Rogers, 2013:221). The ‘war on terror’ has so far killed 5,281 American soldiers (Griffis, 2014) and 186,000 Iraqis (Iraq Body count, 2014). In terms of financing the war on terror, a recent study from Harvard suggests that the war has cost somewhere between $4 and $6 trillion (Blimes, 2013:1). This suggests even more loss of life when considering that this money could have been spent, for example, on health care or on tackling gun crime. Even if we disregard these possibilities as well as the detrimental impact the war on terror has had on Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s response to 9/11 has cost 2,304 more American lives and around $4 trillion more American dollars than 9/11 did. These statistics alone suggest that the US has overreacted at an extortionate level.
The Precautionary Principle The precautionary principle suggests that states should ‘Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon’ (Homeland Security, 2002:8).
actively try to prevent a threat even before there is any evidence of that threat (Jackson et al., 2011:128). The unpredictability associated with terrorism means that future
threat is unknown and therefore states have to make a decision between taking precautionary action or running the risk of being attacked; this is the security dilemma (Herz, 1962:232). John Mueller argues that al-Qaeda is unlikely to disappear (2005:491), the persistence and uncertainly surrounding terrorist groups creates the possibility that a terrorist attack could happen at any time, which may explain why a states response to terrorism is often more extreme than the act itself.2 This sentiment is echoed by the US; homeland security released statements shortly after 9/11 claiming that another terrorist attack could happen at any moment. Additionally, as the events which would have occurred if the US had ‘done nothing’ are unknown, there is a possibility that terrorist attacks would have occurred, and therefore supporters of the regime argue that the terrorist threat has been significantly reduced because of the
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Mueller references other times in history in which states have ‘overreacted’ to a terrorist threat, such as the Russian reaction to Chechen terrorism in 1999 and the US attack on Sudan after terrorist attacks towards American embassies in Africa in 1998 (Mueller, 2005:491).
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government reaction (Jackson et al., 2011:131). Other argue that the Iraq conflict has actually increased the spread of the ‘al-Qaeda ideological virus’. One study, drawing upon data from an MIPT-RAND terrorism database, found that the rate of terrorist attacks around the world by jihadist groups and the rate of fatalities in those attacks more than doubled after the invasion of Iraq (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007:1). Therefore, evidence suggests that the US has not slowed down the rate of terrorist attacks, although it would be impossible to tell whether there would have been even more attacks if the US had ‘done nothing’ in response to 9/11. Considering the number of fatalities and the financial cost does suggest that the US did overreact to 9/11. However, 9/11 represents the threat of terrorism which is now a possibility for the future, and therefore some argue that the impulsive reaction of the US was necessary in order to prevent further terrorism.
Part Three: A Subjective Threat In this section we argue that terrorism is a subjective threat due to the psychological effects it produces. Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare; it aims to paralyze the population with fear and anxiety, to intimidate and to induce worry and concern that is disproportional to and far exceeds the actual damage it causes (Friedland & Merari, 1986; 234). Although terrorist acts injure and hurt their immediate victims, their ultimate goal is to cause a sense of fear and anxiety, helplessness and vulnerability among the general population. As a result these acts evoke feelings of potential victimization (Krupnick, 1980: 347, Freedman, 1983; 389-401) unrelated to the actual probability of becoming a victim of terrorism (Friedland & Merari, 1986; 250). This could explain why the United States overreacted to the terrorist threat after 9/11.
Psychological Terrorism The fact that terrorist attacks are unpredictable creates a perception of uncontrollability, which affects one’s capability of coping with the threat (Klar, Medding & Sarel,1996; 229-245). Studies conducted in the United States have examined the psychological reaction to the events of September the 11th (Galea, Ahern & Resnick, 2002; 346). The findings indicate post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, symptoms with consistent depression, anxiety and a reduced sense of safety. Although the prevalence of probable PTSD symptoms was significantly higher in the New York City metropolitan area, it was shown that psychological effects were not limited to those who experienced it
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directly (Stephenson, 2001; 286). Research shows that the effects of the events on September the 11th spread throughout the country and that individuals continue to have substantial anxiety about future terrorist attacks. Fig. 2 represents how terrorism is seen by the American public as a ‘high signal potential event’ that could happen. This articulates the widespread fear that the public had to the idea of terrorism which may explain the political policy focus on counterterrorism (as opposed to a concentration on other equally dangerous threats) .
Fig. 2
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Encouraging Fear If political leaders focus their policies on terrorism, they can ‘If we were not fighting and destroying the enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our own borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in uniform are defeating a direct threat to the American people’ (President George W. Bush, 2005)
cause psychological anxiety about the threat within their country. An example of this is the Bush Doctrine, a political agenda which created a culture of fear (Furedi, 2005; 124). The phrase initially justified the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with the argument that the United States had the right to secure its own safety against countries that harbour
or give aid to terrorist groups. Naomi Klein, author of The Shock Doctrine (2008), claims that the Bush administration exploited a ‘window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock’ (Klein, 2007). George Bush’s speeches explicitly implied that the US was under immediate threat of another attack, this caused psychological terror and anxiety for the citizens of the United States, as they believed that there was an immediate threat of a terrorist attack (Glassner, 2010:234). In a similar vein to political rhetoric, media rhetoric promotes the fear of future terrorist attacks. The initial reaction of the media suggests that 9/11 was a colossal threat. In the days following the attacks, newspapers were filled with images of destruction and fear-inducing headlines; the New York Times cover, shown in Fig. 4, named 9/11 the ‘day of terror’ and ‘a creeping horror’ (New York Times, 2001:1). After the terrorist attacks of September the 11 th, Schuster et al. (2001) conducted a national survey in the United States and found a substantial increase in indicators of stress throughout the country, suggesting that media coverage communicated the emotional impact of terrorism to distant audiences. Similar effects have been found in other states in which media coverage of terrorist attacks induce widespread fear. 3 The media has the same psychological effect as political figures and institutions in adding to the
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For example, a survey of Israelis conducted shortly after a series of deadly terrorist attacks found that exposure to coverage including horrifying details of the attacks, was associated with the development of symptoms similar to post-traumatic stress disorder (Keinan, Sadeh & Rosen, 2003).
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subjective threat of terrorism by increasing the level of public fear.
Part Four: Conclusion Throughout this report, we have made two key arguments: that the US did overreact to 9/11, and that the US did so in response to the fear, evident in the level of psychological anxiety, which was created by the subjective threat of terrorism. We agree with academics such as John Mueller, who argue that the costs of terrorism can come from fear and reaction as opposed to the direct effects of terrorism (2005:478). This was communicated to the public by political rhetoric and mass media attention. These arguments to not ignore the objective threat and harm caused by 9/11, but simply suggest that the subjective threat spread further and caused an over exaggeration of the likelihood of future threat. This is an important message for critics of policy and academics, who may benefit from the awareness that policymakers are likely to respond to terrorist threats disproportionately, and also to the general public, who may benefit from the knowledge that terrorism is unlikely to directly threaten them.
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