D&FA September Issue www.diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com by Maheswaran Gnanaprakasam

Volume 11 | Issue 7 | September 2013

Editor’s

Dear Readers,

Note

It is been three years since the sword of Damocles is looming over Syria. With no possibility of a consensus in sight, the humanitarian catastrophe in the country is turning out to be one of the biggest that the world has seen in the recent times. The death toll has already crossed 100,000 according to the official statistics and many believe the actual figures to be much higher. The unprecedented refugee crisis that West Asia is dealing with currently talks about the urgency of the rebel forces and the Assad government coming together on the negotiating table to put an end to the civil war. If this is not done, the present situation might soon escalate into a full blown war where there will be direct involvement of powerful international players. The United States which is leading the war against Syria along with other Western countries is steadfast on its position of not accepting anything short of a regime change in Syria. The use of chemical weapons argument that was put forth to legitimize its attack on Syria is turning out to be a desperate attempt to salvage the situation in the absence of any conclusive evidence. The uncertainties currently prevalent in the region will get resolved only if the concerned parties are willing to keep the power equation out of the negotiations. Even if the claim of the deadly sarin being used by the Assad Government proves to be true, a war is not in anybody’s interest. It will only lead to further destabilization of the region and will make a recovery almost impossible. In a situation like this, it is the people of Syria who should be given the power to decide about their future and put an end to the unimaginable miseries they were put through ever since the war started. The message of peace can be spread only by those people who had to bear the maximum costs of a war that could have well been avoided. Happy Reading! Maheswaran Gnanaprakasam Editor-in-Chief Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine Contact: mahesh@diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com Visit us at www.diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com Disclaimer The opinions/comments from writers are their own and Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs magazine does not endorse the claims made therein.

the team Editor-in-Chief Maheswaran Gnanaprakasam Consultant Editor Janaki Bahadur Kremmer Executive Editor Vijay Chand Marketing Manish Jha Design Sandeep Kumar Head Office S-442, Shakarpur, School Block, Laxmi Nagar, New Delhi – 110092 For Queries mahesh@diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com Printed and published by Maheswaran Gnanaprakasam Editor Maheswaran Gnanaprakasam Published from S-442, Shakarpur, School Block, Laxmi Nagar, New Delhi – 110092 Editorial Board Professor Greg Battye, Head, School of Creative Communication, University of Canberra, Australia Dr. Kei Koga, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Ian Taylor, Professor in International Relations and African Politics at University of St Andrews, Scotland and Chair Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University, China Janaki Bahadur Kremmer, Senior Diplomatic Journalist, Australia Professor Alexander Huang, Director, Dean’s Scholars in Shakespeare Program, George Washington University, Washington DC Takaaki Kojima, Former Ambassador of Japan to Singapore and Australia Joergen Oerstroem Moeller, Former Danish Ambassador to Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Australia and New Zealand, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore Professor Biman Chand Prasad, University of the South Pacific, Fiji, and Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Pacific Studies Tanut Tritasavit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Contents

Power In The 21st Century: Easier To Grab, Harder To Use And More Difficult To Keep

Kurds, Alawites and the Regional Implications of Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Civil War

Japan-India Security Cooperation

Socio-Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: The Ethno-Sectarian Dimension

The Three Anthems and Emerging African Diplomacy

Syria Sleepwalking Towards Partition

Chinese Strategic Footprint in Northern and Eastern Sectors of India

Cyprus A Complex Geostrategic Issue

State participation in Indian Foreign Policy: The Economic Dimension

The importance and role of the European Union in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s world integration processes

Nuclear Grand Bargain

Qualities of a Political Leader that Attract the Electorate

Egypt: The End of Illusions

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine S-442, Shakarpur School Block, New Delhi - 110092 India Tel. No. 011-32316194 Email : editor@diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com

Power In The 21 Century st

Easier To Grab, Harder To Use And More Difficult To Keep By Moises Naim

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

Pope resigns for the first time in 600 years. Masses of Brazilians take to the streets and force the government to go back on a plan to raise bus fares. A lone wayward hacker releases documents classified by the United States government, spurs global anxiety about surveillance tactics, and provokes the grounding of a plane carrying the Bolivian president. What do all these recent events have in common? They show us that power is changing, that it is shifting, and mutating. We may even say it is decaying. It has become easier to get, but harder to use and far easier to lose. All across the world we see insurgents, fringe political parties, innovative start-ups, hackers, loosely organized activists, upstart citizen media outlets, leaderless young people in city squares, and charismatic individuals who seem to have “come from nowhere” shaking up the old order. These are the micropowers: small, unknown, or once-negligible actors who have found ways to undermine, fence in, or thwart the megaplayers. Navies and police forces, television networks, traditional political parties, large banks—the large bureaucratic organizations that previously controlled their fields—are seeing their authority undermined. The success of micropowers is not an aberration – though it should be. Without scale, coordination, resources, or even a reputation, they should be quickly overcome by a dominant rival, but the reverse is increasingly true. Even when micropowers cannot defeat their rival megaplayers outright, they are increasingly able to ‘deny’ victory to larger, more advanced players in an asymmetric conflict.

Why and how is this happening? The end of the Cold War and the birth of the Internet helped enable the rise of today’s micropowers, but they were by no means the only important factors. Power is undergoing a far more fundamental mutation that has not been sufficiently recognized and understood. We need to look at deeper transformations in how, where, how long, and how well we live. These changes can be usefully imagined in three categories: the More Revolution, the Mobility Revolution, and the Mentality Revolution. The first is swamping the barriers to power, the second is circumventing them, and the third is undercutting them.

The More Revolution Ours is an age of profusion. There are more people, countries, cities, political parties, and armies. More goods and services, and more companies selling them, more weapons and more medicines, more students and more computers, more preachers and more criminals. The outpouring and abundance of everything has progressed in the face of economic recession, terrorism, earthquakes, repression, civil wars, natural disasters and environmental threats. It has improved millions of lives: according to the World Bank, between 2005 and 2008, from sub-Saharan Africa to Latin America and from Asia to Eastern Europe, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (those with incomes under $1.25 a day) plunged. Given that the past decade was marked by the onset of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1929, this progress is even more surprising. The world is expected to reach

All across the world we see insurgents, fringe political parties, innovative start-ups, hackers, loosely organized activists, upstart citizen media outlets, leaderless young people in city squares, and charismatic individuals who seem to have “come from nowhere” shaking up the old order the Millennium Development Goals on poverty set in 2000 by the United Nations much earlier than originally anticipated. One of the most audacious goals back then was to cut the world’s extreme poverty in half by 2015; that impressive feat was achieved five years early, in 2010. The global middle class has doubled from about 1 billion in 1980 to 2 billion in 2012. The World Bank reckons that since 2006 alone, 28 formerly “low-income countries” have joined the ranks of “middle-income” ones. These new middle classes may not be as prosperous as their counterparts in developed countries, but their members now enjoy an unprecedented standard of living. The overall picture is one of humanity living longer and healthier lives, with basic needs far better addressed than ever. Now, an impatient and better-informed middle class wants progress faster than governments can deliver. A newfound intolerance for corruption has transformed this middle class into a potent force to be reckoned with. India’s expanding middle class, for instance, helped catapult the largely unknown anti-corruption activist Anna Hazare to fame by flocking to him in 2011 after he launched a hunger strike. Similarly, the Arab Spring can be explained by the rapid rise in life expectancy in the Middle East and North Africa since 1980; to the “youth bulge” made up of millions of people under 30 who are educated and healthy, with a long life span ahead of them, yet have no jobs or good prospects; and, of course, to the rise of a politically active middle class. Since the exercise of power depends on imposing control over another – whether soldiers, voters, customers, workers, competitors, or believers – when the people living fuller, more fulfilled lives become more numerous, it becomes increasingly difficult to wield power over them.

The Mobility Revolution Not only are there more people today, living longer and healthier lives; they also move around a lot more, making them harder to manage. This trend changes the distribution of power within and among populations, whether through the rise of ethnic, religious, and professional diasporas or through individual vectors of ideas, capital, and faiths that can be either destabilizing or empowering. The United Nations estimates that there are 214 million migrants across the globe living somewhere other than September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Evo Morales talking to media when his plan was detained

their country of origin, an increase of 37 percent in the past two decades. Immigrants are changing the businesses, religions, and cultures of the countries in which they settle. In the United States, the Hispanic population grew from 22 million in 1990 to 51 million in 2011; one in every six Americans is now Hispanic, a demographic shift bound to transform voting patterns and political agendas. The same thing is happening in Europe, as governments have proven unable to stem the tide of immigrants from Africa, Asia, or other, less wealthy, European countries. An interesting case: In 2007, a Nigerian-born man was elected in Portlaoise, Ireland, a commuter town west of Dublin, as that country’s first black mayor. Money is increasingly mobile too. Billions of remittance dollars are sent to the home countries of immigrants, promoting economic growth and development. Worldwide, immigrants wired, mailed, or carried home $449 billion in 2010. Nowadays, remittances are more than five times larger than the world’s total foreign aid and larger than the annual total flow of foreign investment to poor countries. In short, workers who live outside their home country, who are often very poor themselves, send more money to their country than foreign investors and more than rich countries send as financial aid. For many countries, remittances have become the biggest source of hard currency and, in effect, the largest sector of the economy. The ‘brain drain’ phenomenon captures another form of mobility, as poor nations often lose many of their skilled and better-educated citizens to richer countries, lured by visions of a better life. In this way, nations are deprived of nurses, engineers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and other professionals who are expensive to train. In recent years, however, increasing numbers of these professionals have been returning to their countries of

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

origin and upending business as usual in industries, universities, the media, and politics. Perhaps the most aggressively power-transforming aspect of the Mobility Revolution is urbanization. More people continue to move from farms to cities than ever before, particularly in Asia. In 2007, for the first time in history, more people lived in cities than in rural areas. The U.S. National Intelligence Council reckons that “every year 65 million people are added to the world’s urban population, equivalent to adding seven cities the size of Chicago or five the size of London annually.” Internal migration—especially population shifts from farms to cities—can be as disruptive to power as international migration. From people to money, information, goods and services, the Mobility Revolution challenges power by weakening its captive audience. In situations where citizens, voters, investors, workers, parishioners, or customers have few or no alternatives, they have little choice but to consent to the terms of the institutions they face. But when borders become porous, and the governed – or controlled – population becomes more mobile, entrenched organizations have a harder time retaining their dominance.

The Mentality Revolution The More and Mobility Revolutions have created a new, vast, and fast-growing middle class whose members are well aware that others have even more prosperity, freedom, and personal fulfillment than they do. These new members of the global middle class hope and expect to catch up. These expectations, and the discontent they breed among those left behind, are now global. They affect rich and poor countries alike; indeed, the overwhelming majority of the world’s population lives in what could now be called rapidly changing societies. The embattled middle classes take to the streets and fight to protect their living

Together, these three revolutions are eroding the barriers that have shielded the powerful from challengers. The More Revolution helps the challengers overwhelm the barriers, the Mobility Revolution helps them circumvent them, and the Mentality Revolution helps them undermine them standards while the expanding middle classes protest to get more and better goods and services. This is a new mind-set—a change in mentality—that has profound consequences for power. The Muslim world is a rich source of examples of how the Mentality Revolution is transforming long-held traditions, from the rise of a fashion industry aimed at hijabi (veiled or covered) women to the spread of no-interest banking in Western countries that have large Muslim immigrant communities. In India, the transformation in attitudes is spreading back from the young generation to their elders. A country where divorce was once considered shameful—and women, in particular, were discouraged from remarrying—now has an increasingly robust matrimonial advertising industry devoted to listings by divorced senior citizens, some in their 80s or even 90s, seeking love late in life and without embarrassment. Mature adults are leaving the arranged marriages into which they were inducted when they were teens or young adults. Globalization, urbanization, changes in family structure, the rise of new industries and opportunities, the spread of English as a global lingua franca—these have had consequences in every sphere of modern life, but their effect has been most important at the level of attitudes. The more contact we have with one another, the greater our aspirations. One of the best examples of all three revolutions working simultaneously is the Indian outsourcing industry. Young, educated Indians who belong to the country’s burgeoning middle class have flocked to work at urban call centers and other businessprocess outsourcing companies, which in 2011 generated $59 billion in revenue and directly and indirectly employed almost 10 million Indians. Although the jobs pay relatively well, they plunge young Indians into a welter of contradictions and competing aspirations—that is, aspirations to succeed in an Indian social and economic context while sublimating their cultural identities with fake accents and names, and dealing with abuse and exploitation at the hands of affluent customers a continent away. For young urban Indian women in particular, the jobs have provided opportunities and economic benefits they might not otherwise have had, leading to lasting behavioral changes that are upending cultural norms. Never mind the lurid newspaper articles about call centers as “a part of India where freedom knows no bounds, love is a favorite pastime, and sex is recreation,” as an article in the India Times put it in 2004. Closer to the mark is a recent survey by India’s Associated Chambers of Commerce finding that young working married women in Indian cities are increasingly choosing to put off having children in favor of developing their careers.

Revolutionary Consequences Together, these three revolutions are eroding the barriers that have shielded the powerful from challengers. The More Revolution helps the challengers overwhelm the barriers, the Mobility Revolution helps them circumvent them, and the Mentality Revolution helps them undermine them. In some ways, we should celebrate the decline of traditional power because it has given us freer societies, more elections and options for voters, new ways of becoming politically active, more investment and trade, and more choices for consumers. But the decay of power also poses dangers to our wallets, families and lives. It explains why the U.S. economy is at the mercy of self-inflicted crises in Washington. It explains why European nations struggle to act together in the face of crippling economic problems, despite spending decades developing institutions geared toward collective action. It explains why fragile states that have difficulty delivering basic services are proliferating. It explains why the world is paralyzed in the effort to curb greenhouse gas emissions. The traditional checks and balance systems that were conceived to constrain excessive power now threaten to choke what little power is left. Now, gridlock and dilution are the norm as lawmakers appear keen on flexing their veto muscles. As a result, many powerful democracies have become hobbled giants, increasingly incapable of performing the minimal requirements of government. Size no longer means strength. Bureaucracy no longer means control. And titles no longer mean authority. We can only hope that the future will bring dramatic innovation in the way we govern ourselves. If not, we may risk continued disruption and interference, and we never know stability again.

about the author Moises Naim is a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He was the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine between 1996 and 2010 and was recently named by Prospect magazine as one of the world’s top thinkers. His most recent book is The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being In Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be, on which this article is based. Christina Lara provided research assistance. September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Kurds, Alawites and the Regional Implications of

Syria’s Civil War By Dr. Josef Olmert Assad at the Arab Summit

our countries were the hardest hit by the political eruption known as the ‘’Arab spring’’, Tunisia where it all started, Libya, Egypt and Syria. While there are many differences between these countries, there was, at least, one common denominator, their political stability. Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 24 years, Muammar Qadafi ruled Libya for 42 years, Hosni Mubarrak ruled Egypt for 31 years, and the Assad clan has ruled Syria for 43 years. In fact, the façade of stability has led many observers of the Middle East, not least among them foreign governments, to believe, that somehow a governing formula was found to a region of the world, known for its near-chronic instability. Of all these countries, Syria’s era of presumed stability seemed to be of special significance, as the country’s political history since independence in 1946 was marked by a constant internal struggle over the political identity of the state, which was compounded and exacerbated by foreign interference. Syria was plagued by frequent military intervention and when even the military became fragmented, the prevailing generals of the time forced a union with Egypt of Nasser in 1958, which was terminated by another group of generals in 1961. Finally, in 1970 Hafiz Assad came to power,

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

and after his death in June 2010, his son Bashar succeeded him. Syria thus seemed to have performed a complete turn –around, from a failing state to a stable one, from being in the receiving end of outside interference to become a state noted for playing an important regional role. At least, that was the dominant opinion inside and outside the Middle East. Surely, the Syrian leader believed that it was the case, and on 31 January 2011, when Tunisia and Egypt were already in a state of turmoil, he gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal, praising himself and his regime for the level of internal stability achieved in Syria, pontificating also to his fellow Arab rulers, explaining to them why he will survive, and they should follow his example. The key he said, was his anti-American and anti-Israel posture….6 weeks later, the Syrian uprising started, soon becoming a full-fledged civil war. The era of stability without real, genuine legitimacy came to its end. The interview clearly proved to be no more than a pack of nonsense, worthy of being included in any document detailing the folly and short-sightedness of leaders. With the developing civil war in Syria, a familiar feature of the past history of the country resurfaced. I refer to the connection between internal struggle and regional implications.

The Syrian Internal Struggle and Neighboring Countries The Syrian uprising started in Der’a, a small town in the South of the country, situated in close proximity to the borders with Israel and Jordan, a sensitive region by all accounts. The region was an example of tranquility for decades, in fact from the end of the 1973 Syrian-Israeli war, the border between these two hostile countries was the quietest of all of Israel’s borders. While a detailed analysis of Syrian-Israeli relations is out of the scope of this article, it is significant to note, that successive Israeli governments have come to believe that this state of affairs will maintain itself so long as the Assad clan remains in power. As of 2011, things have started to change, as the Assad regime’s hold over Southern Syria gradually deteriorated, and recently became extremely precarious, when Sunni rebels, among them Jihadists, from Jabhat Al-Nusra (the victory front) became very active, and after 4 decades of peace, some incidents, though still local and minor in nature seem to suggest, that troubles may be ahead, and the internal mayhem in Syria could very well drag Israel into the fray, much to the chagrin of the Israelis. They are very worried also about the situation concerning the chemical weapons possessed by the regime, and the possible transfer of these weapons to the hands of undesirable elements, both inside and outside Syria. According to reports, never formally confirmed in Jerusalem, the mighty Israeli air force attacked some depots of chemical and other advanced weapons, thus serving notice about Israel’s concerns. While the situation in South Syria has not still developed into a full-blown regional conflict, that in other parts of Syria definitely is moving in that direction. The Syrian civil war has long become an arena of a regional, important struggle, the one between Sunnis and Sh’iites. It is already called the Sushi war, but nothing light about that. In far away Pakistan, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, even Egypt whose Sh’iite population is meager, less than 1% out of 85 millions, Sunnis and Sh’iites fight each other. Syria has become the latest to witness this struggle, as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq under Nuri Al-Maliki (who for over 20 years was a political exile in Damascus, during the Saddam Sunni dictatorship) and Hizballah of Lebanon all came to the aid of the Alawite-dominated regime of the Assad clan. Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, in fact the rest of the Sunni Arab world, surely the Sunnis of Lebanon support the Sunni rebels. The last public appearance of the now-deposed Mohammed Morsi was in a hall covered with flags of the Syrian rebels. The added complication of all that, is the existence of ethnic and religious minorities on both sides of the Syrian border with other countries, a situation which in the past led to foreign interference by countries manipulating Syrian minorities against their government. But the other side of that coin is also true, that is the negative impact of the troubles involving Syrian minorities over their brethren in neighboring countries. Lebanon is an example of that side of the problem. The constant fighting in Tripoli in the North is between Sunnis and Alawites, and the troubles in Tripoli have the potential of spreading all over Lebanon, in fact, there are already troubles in Sidon, and growing tension in Beirut. Recently though, the bigger problem seems to be the rapidly deteriorating troubles in North-East Syria, with its sizeable Kurdish

population, and in North-West Syria, the Alawite home ground, and with that the role of Turkey, and to a lesser extent, that of Iraq is coming to the fore.

Kurds, Syria, Iraq and Turkey Kurds constitute about 10% of Syria’s population, over 2 million people, and are divided into two distinct sub-groups. One consists of Kurds who settled in the big cities of Syria, such as Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, and to a large extent have gone through a process of Arabization. The three first military dictators of independent Syria were all of Kurdish origin. Then there is the bulk of the Kurdish population, mostly concentrated in the Syrian Jazeera, the North-Eastern province of Syria. Mostly still organized along tribal lines, basically a population whose inclusion in the boundaries of Syria after WW1 reflected colonial interests, and by no means was the wish of the people themselves, who were torn apart from their ethnic brothers, though not necessarily, their tribal compatriots, who remained under Turkish and Iraqi sovereignty. Altogether the Kurds are the largest single ethnic group in the Middle East still without a state of their own, deprived of their right of self-determination. The entire saga of the Kurdish nation is beyond the scope of this article, but what is relevant is the current state of affairs among the Syrian Kurds and its regional implications. The Kurds of the Syrian Jazeera have been subjected to a sustained campaign of forced Arabization executed by the Damascus governments, particularly the Ba’ath regime since 1963, yet the campaign failed to achieve its goal, though for many years the Jazeera Kurds were called the ‘’silent minority ‘’of Syria. One of the reasons which enabled the Kurds to survive was the fact, that on occasions, the Damascus Government of the day took advantage of the Kurds and activated them against both its Turkish and Iraqi adversaries, by encouraging their cooperation with their brothers behind the borders. The Hafiz Assad regime in particular, supported the anti-Turkish Kurdish P.K.K [the Kurdish Workers Party], until the blatant Turkish ultimatum in October 1998 to invade Syria, at a time when Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation was at its height, seemed to have convinced the older Assad that the stakes were too high. Soon afterwards the P.K.K leader, Abdallah Ocalan, until then a respected guest of Hafiz Assad found himself in a Turkish jail, where he rots to this very day. A coincidence? Not really, rather a testament to the political acumen of Hafiz Assad who realized the limitations of his power. Another senior Kurdish leader, the Iraqi Jalal Talabani , leader of the P.U. K (the Patriotic Union of Kurdisrtan, who is the current president of Iraq) a ceremonial position, held a Syrian diplomatic passport until 2004. The Jazeera Kurds , while mostly quiet , still rose up twice against the Assads, first in 1986 and later in 2004. In both cases, they were brutally suppressed in the best, rather worst Syrian tradition….however, in both instances, they did not enjoy any support from the Arab- Sunni population of Syria. Clearly, the religious connection[the Kurds are Sunnis] was less significant than the difference of ethnicity. The lesson was learnt in Kamishli , Hasacha and other Kurdish centers in the Jazeera. By and large, the Kurds DO NOT participate in the Sunni-Arab revolt against the Assad regime. They sit on the fence, though for all intents and purposes, their militias (and in a typical Kurdish way, September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Barazani, son of the legendary Mula Mustafa Barazani, a proAmerican leader, who in the past was rumored to have connections with Israel, is naturally interested in the welfare and safety of Syrian Kurds, but he also has two other interests in mind there are quite a few of those), are in virtual control of North-East Syria. Bashar Assad’s regime is no more there, and with that the regional pot is boiling. The Sunni-Jihadist Jabhat Al-Nusra is engaged in a battle with the Kurdish militias, trying to gain control of their area. This is basically both a punitive measure against the Kurds who do not participate in the Jihad against Bashar Assad, but also an attempt to create a free corridor enabling Sunni Jihadists from Iraq to flock into Syria in order to help their co-religionists there, much the same as the Shi’ite Iranian-controlled militias flock from Iraq to Syria, to help the Alawites, and with the support of the IraqiSh’iite government. Now, a new player threatens to join the battle, and this is the Kurdish Iraqi leader, Masud Barazani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party[KDP], the largest Kurdish political/military faction in the semi-independent Kurdish enclave of Northern Iraq. Barazani, son of the legendary Mula Mustafa Barazani, a proAmerican leader, who in the past was rumored to have connections with Israel, is naturally interested in the welfare and safety of Syrian Kurds, but he also has two other interests in mind. He does not want the fighting in Syria to spill over to his domain, thus put in danger the peace and stability in the Kurdish enclave, and with it the relative economic prosperity there. Beyond that, he is fully cognizant of the Turkish dimension of all that. Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms are traditional enemies. According to the Kemalist doctrine which dominated Turkey until recently, the Kurds were considered to be ‘’Mountainous Turks’’, and bloody Kurdish revolts in 1925, 1930, 1937 and as of the 1960’s were a constant challenge to the Kemalist idea of ONE nationality in Turkey. The P.K.K , the largest anti-Turkish Kurdish militia have been supported from Syria (as noted above), but also by Iraqi Kurds. Contrary to the Kemalist ideology, the AK government has showed relative openness towards the Kurds, and Erdoghan whose prime ideological consideration is Islamic, try to come to some accommodation with the Kurds , if not for any other reason, than on the basis of the common Islamic heritage. He and his government do not need any uncontrolled Kurdish eruption in Syria, one which can lead to a mass exodus of refugees to Turkey, and altogether to a renewed restiveness in South East Turkey.

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

Add up to that the internal disquiet in Turkey as became so apparent recently, and we can see a clear Turkish interest to contain the violence in North-East Syria. What can the Turks do about that is not so clear, as they lack real influence over the Kurds and are not friendly towards the Jihadists, since the horse they have gambled on in Syria is the more moderate Free Syrian Army[FSA], but they surely are on the alert to prevent with whatever means they have an out-of-hand violence in North-East Syria. It is the same fear and interest which leads Erdoghan also to try and prevent an out-of-hand eruption in North-West Syria, the Alawite homeland.

Turks and Alawites On the eve of WW2, Turkey annexed a Syrian territory , known as Alexandretta , claiming to have a Turkish majority in the region, and getting support from France and Britain, which wanted to ensure Turkish support in the upcoming world war. The League of Nations gave its seal of approval, and among the annexed population, there were tens of thousands of Alawites, who through this arbitrary act of super-powers strong arm tactics were cut off from the rest of their community in the Syrian side of the border. The rise of the Alawite community from its historic

In the last two weeks, there was a turn to the worse. The Sunni rebels in Syria opened a direct, surprising attack on the Alawite hinterland in North-West Syria, and they caught the regime by surprise. Among the villages attacked is Kardaha, the Assad clan home village

position of being the religious pariahs of the Syrian ethnic/religious mosaic to a position of domination is one of the subjects not covered here, but the fact is ,that as of 1970, the once-despised Alawite community is in control in Syria, and with years passing, the Turkish Alawite community grew to hundreds of thousands, though a minority in the former Alexandretta region, called by the Turks the Hatay province. Interestingly enough, the Assad regime was careful, even at times of tension with Turkey not to unleash the Turkish Alawites against the Turkish government, unlike what they did with the Kurds. No doubt, there was an element of communal solidarity here, the desire of the 3 million Alawites of Syria and their leaders not to compromise their brothers by inciting troubles in a state like Turkey, which has never been known for its benign attitude towards minoritiesâ&#x20AC;ŚBut now it is all different. Turkey positioned itself, rhetorically at least, in the forefront of the struggle against Bashar Assad , and the former is a desperate man, besieged from within and pressured from the outside, and when survival is on the balance, even deeply-held patterns of behavior tend to change. Some months ago, scores of Turks were killed in Reyhanli, a town in Hatay, 70 miles away from the Mediterranean, not far from the Syrian border. It was not established until now who exactly

was behind the bloody terror attack, but fingers were aimed at the Syrian regime and local Alawites, in an area where since the beginning of the Syrian civil war there were already other sectarian incidents, undoubtedly prompted by the Situation in neighboring Syria. In the last two weeks, there was a turn to the worse. The Sunni rebels in Syria opened a direct, surprising attack on the Alawite hinterland in North-West Syria, and they caught the regime by surprise. Among the villages attacked is Kardaha , the Assad clan home village. As the offensive escalated, an interesting coalition was formed in order to put pressure on the rebels to slow their advance and evade any large-scale sectarian massacre. The US , Saudi-Arabia and Turkey are , according to reports, lining up to force the FSA out of the Alawite region. No, there is no sudden outburst of humanitarian concernâ&#x20AC;Ś it is the fear of the Americans and Saudis, and in the background , the Israelis, that the beleaguered regime in Damascus will resort to the use of chemical weapons in its hour of desperation, in an attempt to save the Alawite community. Turkey however has in this case the same interest which it has with regard to the Kurdish situation, and this is to prevent a mass exodus of Alawite refugees, an extension of the fight into its own territory, in sum, another element of internal instability. Ironically enough, the Bashar Assad regime may stand to gain, at least in short term from all that, but this is just a temporary relief. The regime has already irreversibly lost control of large parts of the land. There is no more one Syria, there are some, and that is exactly why what happens in Syria is having such a damaging impact on regional stability. Â&#x201E;

about the author Dr. Josef Olmert Dr. Josef Olmert offers a rare combination of talents: a top Middle East scholar, former peace negotiator, political insider, published journalist and author, as well as a seasoned public speaker. He is currently an Adjunct Professor at USC-University of South Carolina. September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

India-Japan Heads at the recent Japan-India Summit

Japan-India Security Cooperation By Kei Koga and Yogesh Joshi

hen India and China confronted each other in the highlands of the Himalayas this April, the reverberations could be heard in Tokyo. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during his visit to Japan in the last week of May to coincide with 60 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, relayed the concerns regarding an “assertive” China and the changing power dynamics in the region in no uncertain terms. Indicating India’s growing realism, Singh further asserted that “historical differences persist despite our growing interdependence; prosperity has not fully eliminated disparities with and between nations and there are continuing threats to stability and security in the region,” Singh could not have been more correct in explaining the relations the two Asian democracies have with their bigger neighbor, China. The 4,200-kilometer Himalayan land border between India and China is Asia’s largest border dispute, over which the two states went to war in 1962. Meanwhile, China’s recent behavior towards Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) has been seen as extremely aggressive. Economic interdependence has not helped

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ease tensions. Despite the enormous trade volumes between Japan and China, standing at about $330 billion in 2012, the aftermath of the 2010 boat collision and China’s aggression over the disputed islands illustrated that interdependence is no cure when it comes to peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. Worse, Beijing has often used the trade asymmetry with Japan to its own advantage, stopping the supply of commodities such as rare earth metals on which Japan depended. With its growing military and economic capabilities, the continued rise of China is now politically overshadowing established powers like Japan and rising states like India in equal measure. This disparity of relative power growth has created a perception of a slow but certain shift in the balance of power in Asia towards Chinese hegemony. As these asymmetries grow, smaller states have started hedging against China. In the IndiaJapan partnership, one can observe similar strategic maneuvers with shades of power politics. At the recent Japan-India Summit, Singh declared “Japan as a natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast region of Asia-Pacific.” Echoing him, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also repeatedly emphasized his 2007

remarks, “Confluence of the Two Seas”, which highlighted the maritime security and cooperation between the two countries. China was clearly alarmed by this development, evident in the commentary that appeared in the Communist Party organ, Global Times. Calling Japanese “petty burglars” and “international provocateurs,” it warned India of getting close to Japan “at its own peril”. Clearly, Beijing has not missed the emerging balance of power in Asia. In fact, an Indo-Japanese entente against the growing influence of China in Asia is not a recent phenomenon. Japan and India have been cooperating on defense and security issues since 2001, when the bilateral Comprehensive Security Dialogue was inaugurated. Further institutionalization of bilateral security cooperation continued, with the two countries issuing the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India” in October 2008, and commencing the bilateral ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue in 2009. Still, there seemed to be an implicit strategic consensus not to create antagonism with China. During his first term, Abe sought to enhance strategic relations with India, fundamentally driven by the balance of power in Asia, hedging against China’s uncertain future. More cautious was India, then Asia’s rising star – the world’s most populous democracy with two decades of high economic growth backed by the liberal reforms from the early 1990s. Its foreign policy became more pragmatic and New Delhi eschewed unnecessary strategic provocations vis-à-vis China. This was well illustrated in 2006, when Abe called for a “concert of democracies” – the U.S., Australia, India and Japan – to join hands in the Asia-Pacific. India and Australia were the first to back away from the arrangement lest it provoked China’s ire. What has changed since then is the perceived strategic environment in Asia-Pacific, driven by both the rise in China’s relative power compared to neighbors such as India and Japan and the relative decline of the United States. Clearly, Beijing’s willingness to wield its growing power has complicated matters for Tokyo and New Delhi when it comes to disputed territories. Even if China’s growing power and its aggressive foreign policy was not enough, the war-weary and financially stretched America – the traditional guarantor of stability in the region – has raised pulses in both Tokyo and New Delhi. Despite strong assertions from Washington and the promise of a “rebalancing” to the AsiaPacific, emphasized by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the recent Shangri La Dialogue, most states in East Asia understand that they can no longer rely entirely on the United States for their security, given U.S. defense spending cuts over the next decade. Another important change lies in Indian attitudes. Whereas Japan’s concerns about China have been consistent, India has always sought to avoid getting boxed in by Asia’s balance of power politics, to maintain strategic flexibility. But this also makes India vulnerable when power asymmetries widen. This sense of vulnerability, thanks to the extremely rapid accretion of Chinese power, has prompted India to look to Japan. It is in this context that the recent visit of Prime Minister Singh becomes crucial to the current regional flux. Both India and Japan decided to further enhance security cooperation. They agreed to regularize and increase the frequency of maritime defense exercises, while India agreed to purchase the US-2 amphibious

aircraft for reconnaissance along its maritime frontier. Moreover, to enhance science and technology cooperation, the two countries agreed to step up cooperation in cyber security. They also inked a number of economic agreements, whereby Japanese capital would be invested in mega infrastructure projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor and the Mumbai metro project. With these announcements, bilateral cooperation has widened and deepened. Given other growing areas of cooperation such as bilateral coast guard and naval exercises and the rapid institutionalization of the US-Japan-India Trilateral Dialogue, Japan-India channels of communication have expanded, bolstering bilateral political and diplomatic confidence. This seems to follow the initiative that Abe set out in his 2012 article to establish the “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” However, it is still not clear how India and Japan will respond to the “assertive” rise of China in the future. The uncertainty lies in two fundamental differences. One is their threat perception: while India fears China’s potential threats from land, Japan sees threats in the maritime arena. To fill these gaps, the first step would be to conclude the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), to correctly assess the changing strategic landscape in East Asia and deepen understanding of each side’s threat perception. This could enable India and Japan to evaluate the possibilities and limitations of security cooperation. The second difference is their approach towards nuclear weapons. Although Japan and India agreed to step up efforts to conclude a civil nuclear agreement that would allow Japan to export its nuclear plant, Japan is concerned that India has yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the course of negotiations, the first step would be to promote such a deal, in which India’s CTBT signature, not ratification, becomes the decisive factor in concluding the civil nuclear agreement. In light of the global and regional security implications, the two countries should take cautious steps to further their bilateral security cooperation. Carefully crafted, India-Japan security cooperation would provide the region with a new strategic tool for maintaining stability in East Asia, a condition that will be crucial if Asian economies are to maintain their impressive growth in the decades to come. Kei Koga is a research fellow of International Security Studies at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School and Yogesh Joshi is a research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

(This article first appeared in the Diplomat. Full text of this publication is available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/17/ japan-india-security-cooperation/?all=true)

about the author Kei Koga is a research fellow of International Security Studies at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Yogesh Joshi is a research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Se tem Sep September ember b 20 ber 2 2013 013 13 | Diplomacy Diip Dip iplom lomacy lom acy c & For Foreig Fo Foreign eign eig nA Affairs ffa airs rs Ma M Magazine agaz aga g in gaz ine ine

Socio-Economic Reconstruction in Iraq The Ethno-Sectarian Dimension By Christine Martin & Sulaiman S. Wasty

Muslim Brotherhood protests in Iraq

“A 20-year old Iraqi has seen nothing but sanctions and war”

ectarianism is a buzzword when it comes to discussions regarding factors of instability in the Middle East. Although many scholars and professionals assume that sectarianism shapes interactions and policies, it is unclear whether the failure of socioeconomic reconstruction in Iraq can be attributed predominantly to its rise in the post-invasion period. Efforts to mitigate prevalent ethno-sectarian tensions and violence of present-day Iraq have failed to tackle underlying factors of insecurity and instability. The symbolic inclusion of disparate political interests in Iraq’s 2005 constitution—through the adoption of a ‘consociational’

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model—unsuccessfully minimized inherent ethno-sectarian cleavages and conflict. Similarly, recent economic management policies have focused exclusively on achieving a transition toward market-led growth without alleviating the persistent grievances of the disenfranchised population. This analysis, (1) provides a profile of the country’s socioeconomic indicators and ethnosectarian composition, (2) critiques the consociational model instituted in Iraq and demonstrates that sectarianism is a result rather than a cause of instability, (3) exposes the underlying socioeconomic roots of tension undermining reconstruction, and (4) suggests crucial areas that ought to be at the center of policies implemented by Iraqi decision-makers and the international development community.

Since the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the occupation forces sought to reverse his pragmatic inclusion of Sunnis into government positions and army ranks by institutionalizing powersharing along ethno-sectarian lines. The US-led coalition relied on a primordialist definition of ethno-sectarian identities and supported the implementation of a consociational democratic model in Iraq B. Iraq’s Socio-Economic Indicators Iraq today classifies as a middle-income country, possessing enormous resources and potential as the world’s fourth largest oil producer. Yet, its development and socio-economic profile depicts the conditions prevailing in a mid-conflict developing country in the aftermath of a prolonged occupation and sanctions. For Iraq to achieve sustained progress, it is necessary to consider the various socioeconomic factors and their implications for the country.

C. In Search of Political Legitimacy: Experimenting with a ‘Consociational’ Model The increase in ethno-sectarian violence since 2003 has pushed many scholars and professionals to claim that the rise of societal divisions on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and tribal origins—further exploited by political leaders— fuels political instability and jeopardizes reconstruction efforts. Sectarianism undoubtedly impacts the stability of Iraq, yet the argument that solving sectarianism suffices to stabilize Iraq is inadequate because it is far more the outcome of political and economic tensions confronting the state. The consociational approach has important shortcomings but Iraq is mainly a victim of an Iraq that remains fragile and where violence is again on the rise. There are two dichotomous political systems that deal with the incorporation of ethno-sectarian identities in a society. A ‘liberal’ system, such as civic nationalism, de-emphasizes ethnosectarian diversity in politics by ‘superseding current ethnic identities with a common, overlapping identity.’ It is important to note that the Baathist’s structure of power and values resonated among many Iraqis, and thus the regime benefited from popular support irrespective of its leadership. The period following the end of the monarchic rule reinvigorated solidarity, especially after 1963, in most sections of Iraqi society. Political figures benefited from reinvigorated nationalistic sentiments, and similarly to other political leaders in the region at the time, the late Saddam Hussein gradually adopted an approach that emphasized the distribution of essential services and benefits based on tribal and ethno-sectarian affiliations to solicit popular loyalty to his rule. Saddam Hussein instrumentalized identities and undermined Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamist narratives previously promoted by the central government to advance his own agenda. The alternative to a nationalist system is ‘consociationalism’, an ethnic conflict resolution framework popular in pluralistic societies transitioning to democracy. Andrew Finlay explains the consociational system as “a mode of liberal governmentality that is informed by and cultivates particular forms of ethno-national subjectivity.” Consociation embraces pluralism in politics, and

it is expected that it ‘recognizes segmental cleavages explicitly and turns them into constructive elements of a stable democracy that encourages ethnic elites to cooperate.’ Since the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the occupation forces sought to reverse his pragmatic inclusion of Sunnis into government positions and army ranks by institutionalizing power-sharing along ethno-sectarian lines. The US-led coalition relied on a primordialist definition of ethno-sectarian identities and supported the implementation of a consociational democratic model in Iraq. The governing authorities concluded that to avoid conflict a diversity of identities ought to be explicitly recognized in politics. The new political setting solidified the fragmentation of cross-sectarian relations and entrenched divisions that escalated into a civil war in 2006 in Baghdad and continue to permeate through the country. The present-day Iraqi governance structure is modeled on consociationalism, where the country’s constitution explicitly includes ethno-sectarian groups based on demographic representation. Despite its purpose to mitigate ethno-sectarian tensions, the consociational model adopted in Iraq failed to address underlying causes of instability and insecurity. During the first post-Saddam elections in December 2005, the major political parties competing relied on ethno-sectarian identities to amass support and secure seats in government. While secular and cross-sectarian parties also participated in the election process, they failed to gather significant votes. Sunni groups perceived the rapid inclusion of Shi’a and Kurds in politics pushed by the United States and newly-returned exiles as threatening. Among the many negative repercussions of the attempt to erase Iraq’s political legacy and break the past damaged and undermined the reconstruction effort, the de-Baathification process further marginalized Sunnis from the political arena. It was used to disqualify opponents from running in the elections. It also destroyed the state apparatus by massively pulling-out trained professional resulting in a nationwide structural vacuum. As a result, prominent Sunni figures encouraged constituents to boycott the first democratic elections of the country. The outcome has been greater exclusion and fragmentation. Sunnis participated massively in the 2010 election process, which was a noteworthy improvement from previous democratic elections. Nonetheless, many political figures continue to instrumentalize their identity to advance their agenda, and violent attacks continue to plague religious sites and groups. Moreover, regional actors interfere in Iraqi domestic politics by supporting different ethno-sectarian groups and giving them independence from the central government, which undermines September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

efforts to strengthen national unity. The consociational model in Iraq enables political figures in Iraq and in the region to capitalize on their identities instead of having to address crucial socioeconomic factors hindering reconstruction efforts. Unsettled disputes over territory further challenge the unity of the country as regional and central governments fail to agree on resource distribution and border delineation. For example, the battle over Kirkuk and other areas delineating Kurdish ‘territory’ illustrates the symbiotic relationship between ethno-sectarian tensions and socioeconomic reconstruction. After 2003, Kurdish political leaders worked rapidly to establish their autonomy and dissociate their territory from the remainder of Iraq. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the Iraqi constitution legally supported the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and encouraged its increased authority. Meanwhile, as the Shi’a majority government consolidates its grip on power, the central government’s willingness to compromise with the KRG diminishes. To reinforce its dissociation from Iraq, the KRG modified the academic curriculum to emphasize the uniqueness of Kurdish culture and the relevance of Kirkuk to its history and legacy. The Kurdish government also bilaterally signed oil exploration deals worth US$500 million without Baghdad’s consent. Kirkuk is economically and symbolically instrumental to the KRG to establish the independence of Kurdish territory. Failures to agree on the Election Law in Kirkuk delayed the 2010 elections. The politicized debate over the identity of Kirkuk illustrates the need for a national census, and

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demonstrates the continuous struggle between ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq to control resources and secure power. Though its autonomy was originally encouraged, oil reserves located within Kurdish territory complicated the decentralization process. The referendum advocated in the TAL and the Iraqi constitution has yet to take place. In the meantime, the Kurdish regional government and the central regime continue to compete to control Kirkuk and other challenged territory. The conflict prevents long-term planning and undermines foreign direct investment, while maintaining the identity debate at the center of reconstruction efforts. Another important example of institutionalized ethnosectarianism is the constitution stipulation that the Iraqi President ought to be a Kurd, the Prime Minister a Shi’a and the Speaker of the Council of Representatives a Sunni. Essentially, the consociational model adopted in the 2005 constitution defined and encouraged the distribution of power to each group based on inherited traits rather than merit. The result is a political system further entrenching differences between ethnic identities, and reinforcing divisions. To de-politicize ethno-sectarian identities that hinder Iraq’s sustainable reconstruction it is pivotal to focus on national socioeconomic improvements. In sum, efforts aimed at seeking a democratic stabilization have placed ethno-sectarian identities at the center of politics, and reinforced sectarian divides. The chosen consociational model in Iraq not only failed to dissolve tensions, it contributed to them. The current political model differs tremendously in its formal

inclusion and recognition of ethno-sectarian identities from the model previously adopted by Saddam Hussein, yet the outcomes are similar: corruption, clientelism, disenfranchised youth and women, nepotism, and patronage. Those factors undermining socioeconomic reconstruction are the same that exacerbate ethno-sectarian tensions. Sectarianism is an issue in Iraq but it will persist as long as the leading causes of unrest prevail.

D. The Present Economic Policies—A Failure in Economic Governance The Iraqi economy has long suffered from institutional weaknesses and a legacy of state control over the means and distribution and production. In 2011, Iraq ranked 166 out of 183 countries as a place to do business. The Iraqi government’s Anti-Corruption strategy at most is ineffective, the need for transparency and accountability is evident, just as Rule of Law reforms and infrastructure development are inevitable to generate sustainable growth. The challenges of private sector development and the diversification of economy are enormous though not insurmountable. The focus has been on solving sectarianism to enable economic growth to take place but the relationship between sectarianism and socioeconomic reconstruction is symbiotic. Issues listed below affect employment opportunities and comprise some of the root causes of instability in Iraq. The Iraqi government succeeded in sharply reducing inflation and containing recurrent spending, while increasing capital expenditures to accelerate the recovery process. The national economy benefited from high oil prices, and to a lesser extent, an increase in production generated an estimated US$80 billion of revenues last year. Unfortunately, the global financial crisis caused a deterioration in the country’s fiscal balance in 2012 due to the declining trend in oil prices. The economic reliance on oil and subsequent dependence on high prices highlights the imperative importance of economic diversification and the promotion of private sector development. Recent improvements in access to education and health services have not yet translated into significant welfare gains for the people of Iraq. Despite massive investment in education, the labor force has not fully recovered from decades of turmoil. The brain drain effect resulting from sanctions and war further hinders the recovery process. The Iraqi Red Crescent estimates that as many as 50 per cent of Iraqi’s doctors and 70 per cent of medical specialists exited the country. The repercussions of massive emigration of professionals complicate the reconstruction process. Another important challenge to economic recovery is the psychological trauma inflicted on the Iraqi population. Significant attention must be paid to cater to the psychological needs of the population as well as an effort to encourage the return of exiles and to train skilled professionals. Electricity demand exceeds unreliable supply, which is a major obstacle to economic development and domestic stability. With Iraqi receiving only eight hours of electricity on average daily, the repercussions impact all aspects of life and exacerbate frustrations. In addition to less than adequate access to electricity, access to clean water and sanitation is the lowest in the region because of poor water management and years of unpredictability and a decreasing rate of trans-boundary water

flow from neighboring countries. Basic services shortage has growing human consequences for food insecurity, water quality, health, economic livelihoods and environmental degradation. Inadequacies of social services contribute to social unrest and discontent, while impeding sustainable reconstruction. In essence, a serious problem such as unemployment is caused by socioeconomic challenges that remain unaddressed. Yet the repercussions also exacerbate ethno-sectarian tensions. Iraq’s reconstruction is complicated by low quality and unreliable delivery of essential public services (including infrastructure), a burgeoning population of disaffected youth, and widening rural-urban income disparities. The primary concern of top-down economic policies with sectarianism issues target symptoms rather than consequences of conflict. Sectarianism is but one factor affecting instability and insecurity. Socioeconomic issues are a priority that would allow a reduction of sectarian tensions, while promoting reconstruction and recovery.

E. Implications for Policy Reforms There are numerous areas that require further attention to yield sustainable socioeconomic reconstruction in Iraq. The following section analyzes the main recommendations to be prioritized by Iraqi decision-makers and the international development community. The task of decreasing sectarianism by addressing underlying socioeconomic problems in Iraq is complex and challenging. Nonetheless, addressing them would generate meaningful improvements and enable sustainable reconstruction efforts. Finding the Right Balance in the Constitutional Structure The ethno-sectarian recognition explicitly granted in politics should be replaced by a system instead promoting national unity. The formal move away from consociationalism towards meritocracy would facilitate the selection of political representatives for their expertise and professional experience rather than traditional affiliations. Revising the constitution to de-emphasize consociational politics as a means to achieve stability is a necessary step toward sustainable progress. Of course, the political resolution of territorial disputes is an important first step in promoting reconciliation and unity. As previously mentioned, the development of the oil sector currently undermined by territorial disputes diminishes resources available for socioeconomic reconstruction.

Community Development, and Local Government Strengthening To promote capacity-building and grass-root initiatives necessitate strengthening citizen participation, supporting local businesses, and equipping women to succeed as entrepreneurs. A major part of the problem stems from a duplication of efforts by the international community, and a lack of involvement of beneficiaries and underestimating indigenous capabilities. Further, it is imperative for the large international investors to assume corporate social responsibility for assisting in institution and capacity building of Iraq. An excellent example of communal efforts has been the restoration of historic religious sites across the country (as in the case of Al-Askari shrine in Samarra) where different religious denominations are promoting harmony and September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

To promote capacity-building and grass-root initiatives necessitate strengthening citizen participation, supporting local businesses, and equipping women to succeed as entrepreneurs. A major part of the problem stems from a duplication of efforts by the international community, and a lack of involvement of beneficiaries and underestimating indigenous capabilities extensive community ownership of related projects. The impact of such reconstruction efforts are twofold: (1) the restoration of damaged infrastructure, and (2) the promotion of cooperation and trust between ethno-sectarian groups. Community projects encourage civic nationalism and de-escalate ethno-sectarian tensions, while advancing socioeconomic reconstruction.

Independent Media Independent media outlets in Iraq often encounter censorship and environments hostile to journalists. Over the last years, newspapers, journals and other publications allowed for a diversity of opinions. Media diversity did not result in objective reporting, many new publications were partisan and blatantly pursuing self-interest. Foreign interference in Iraqi media encroaches on neutral reporting. Nonetheless, in this day-inage, virtual electronic communications, and public-private partnerships are crucial for promoting national dialogue and reducing youth radicalization, as long as attempts are made simultaneously to improve impartiality. The spur of independent media exposed abuses and opened a public discourse about the challenges faced by Iraqis in their daily lives.

Rule of Law and Access to Justice So far little attention is being paid to the demand side of governance: transparency, accountability and participation (TAP), despite the existence of token anti-corruption initiatives and grievance-redress mechanisms. The strengthening of judiciary is still a long way to go, and legal services for the poor and vulnerable populations hardly exist. The legal regulatory framework needs to be revamped with a focus on results rather than a mere drafting of processes and procedures for the

privileged

Assessing Changes in Popular Perceptions Behavioral patterns are often not susceptible to be monitored and evaluated by quantitative metrics and targets. The literature on development effectiveness is now taking greater cognizance of the importance of self-monitoring by the communities themselves. Increased efforts to evaluate intermediate outcomes of assisting communities - rather than activities and outputs of public expenditures - should be encouraged and facilitated by political leaders. In conclusion, the obsession with sectarianism as the primary threat to stability in the Middle East diverts attention away from underlying socioeconomic problems affecting stability and security and the necessary policies to address them. Increased sectarianism is only one of the consequences of the failure to address the causes of discontent and deprivation. The result is a failure to generate sustainable reconstruction and an exacerbation of ethno-sectarian tensions. This article sought to de-emphasize the role of sectarianism as a driver of instability, and instead present constitutional and political changes that can help dampen the society’s destructive divisions. Given the challenges, constraints, and opportunities—itemized in this paper--the task ahead may appear insurmountable; but the positive direction of change not inevitable. Christine Martin is a Research Associate at the Middle East Institute. She wrote her graduate thesis on the impact of Hezbollah on the stability of sectarian politics in Lebanon. Sulaiman S. Wasty is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. He recently led a multi-disciplinary team to evaluate United Nations’ assistance to Iraq.

about the author Christine Martin is a Research Associate at the Middle East Institute. She wrote her graduate thesis on the impact of Hezbollah on the stability of sectarian politics in Lebanon.

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

Sulaiman S. Wasty is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. He recently led a multi-disciplinary team to evaluate United Nations’ assistance to Iraq.

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

The Three Anthems

and Emerging African Diplomacy By Makumi Mwagiru

Introduction Kenya’s first general elections under the new Constitution of 2010 were held on 4 March, 2013. The major contenders in the elections were the Jubilee alliance led by Uhuru Kenyatta, and the CORD alliance led by Raila Odinga. The configuration of parties and presidential contestants in 2013 was different from that of the elections of December 2007. In 2007, Mwai Kibaki the incumbent pursued his re-election bid under the umbrella of the Party of National Unity (PNU). His main challengers were Raila Odinga contesting under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kalonzo Musyoka under the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K).

Outcome of the 2007 Elections In the 2007 elections Kibaki narrowly won the presidency over Odinga, while Musyoka was third. Those presidential results caused serious post-election violence in Kenya. The chair of the African Union, then the president of Ghana, Kufuor, nominated former United Nations secretary general Koffi Annan to mediate

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in the negotiations between the coalition (PNU and ODM-K) and Odinga’s ODM. The outcome of Annan’s mediation was a grand coalition involving the three parties. In that grand coalition, Kibaki remained the president, Musyoka retained the vice presidency, and Odinga became the prime minister. The PNU and ODM also nominated one person each to serve as deputy prime ministers. The deputy prime minister on the PNU side was Uhuru Kenyatta, while ODM nominated Musalia Mudavadi. The posts of prime minister and two deputy prime ministers did not exist under the constitution, which was amended to facilitate the grand coalition. The configuration of political forces in Kenya during the grand coalition government that was in power until the March 2013 elections was that Kibaki, Musyoka, and Uhuru Kenyatta were on one side of the coalition, whereas Odinga, Mudavadi (who also contested the 2013 presidential elections), and William Ruto (who in 2013 contested as Kenyatta’s running mate) were on the opposing side. This is the configuration and alliances of the political dramatis personae during the grand coalition government.

African Presidents (L-R) Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia, Salva Kiir of South Sudan, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, Jacob Zuma of South Africa and Joseph Kabila of Democratic Republic of Congo stand for the national anthem during the swearing-in ceremony of Kenyaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s President Uhuru Kenyatta at Kasara

Entry of the ICC Factor In 2013, politicians who were on different sides during the grand coalition government ended up on the same side. Odinga contested for the presidency under the CORD arrangement. His running mate for deputy president was his erstwhile political enemy, Kalonzo Musyoka. Uhuru Kenyatta contested the presidency under the Jubilee alliance. His erstwhile political adversary William Ruto was his running mate for deputy president. Musalia Mudavadi also contested for the presidency as a lone ranger. This configuration of the main actors in 2013 went beyond the normal musical chairs of political alliances during election periods. The reason for the 2013 alliances was rooted in the outcome of the mediation of the post-election violent conflict in 2007-2008. One major outcome was the consensus that the causes of the post-election violence must be investigated, and those responsible prosecuted. A Commission (the Waki Commission) was appointed to investigate the post-election violence in Kenya, and make recommendations. It found that some participants in the 2007 election were responsible for the violence, and suggested that these should be investigated, and if necessary prosecuted. The Waki Commission issued its official report, but annexed to it a sealed envelope containing a list of those who in its view were main suspects for causing the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/8. It instructed that parliament pass a law creating a tribunal to try such persons. It gave the sealed envelope to the mediator (Annan) with the instruction to forward the sealed envelop to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague should parliament fail to establish a local

tribunal to try the masterminds of the post-election violence. A Bill was drafted and tabled in parliament which could not agree on a local tribunal, and was defeated. The reasons for the defeat of the Bill were highly politicized. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) issued its own report of the postelection violence, and named some important politicians as having been responsible for it. That report influenced the debates on the Bill in parliament. Some not named in the KHRC report supported the creation of a local tribunal - some because they thought the process of investigation and prosecution would be faster, and others because they thought that a local tribunal would be more malleable. Some named in the report supported the ICC process because they expected that it would take forever, and hence would not hurt their political (and presidential) aspirations in the elections in 2013. Since the Kenya parliament could not agree on the creation of a local tribunal within the specified time, the mediator Kofi Annan forwarded the sealed envelope to the ICC prosecutor who indicted six prominent Kenyans for trial at the ICC for being the most responsible for the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/8. These were Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura (the then head of the public service in Kenya), commissioner of police General Ali, William Ruto and Henry Kosgei (of the ODM), and Joshua Sang a radio journalist. In the confirmation hearings at the ICC the indictments of Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto, and Joshua Sang were confirmed whilst the other three were acquitted. In 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, formerly in different political camps became the candidates for president and deputy president. They competed against Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka (also erstwhile political enemies) as the presidential and deputy presidential opponents. From this point on, the foreign policy and diplomatic aspects of the Kenyan election took centre stage.

ICC Issue in the 2013 Elections The ICC issue â&#x20AC;&#x201C; whether candidates accused of international crimes should run for the two highest offices in Kenya, and the foreign policy and diplomatic fate of Kenya should they be elected â&#x20AC;&#x201C; coloured the whole election and post-election period. The CORD candidates, Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka ran on the platform that those accused at the ICC should neither participate in, nor be elected, as president and deputy president. They argued that should the two win but be found guilty, it would put Kenya in an untenable position diplomatically. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto ran on the platform that they had not been found guilty, were sure of acquittal, and would be able to run the affairs of state while attending trials at the ICC. Western countries and the United States of America expressed their views on this issue. They told Kenyan voters that their sovereign choice during the elections would have consequences for Kenya internationally. Although the western countries claimed that they were not supporting particular candidates in the elections, Kenyan voters took a different view. This was made clear in their sovereign electoral choice. They voted for Kenyatta and Ruto as president and deputy president who won by 50% plus one vote, thus avoiding a re-run of the presidential election. September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Kenya’s new President Uhuru Kenyatta on a military land rover acknowledges greetings from supporters after he was sworn in at the Moi International Sports Centre on April 9.

Diplomacy of ICC The diplomacy of the ICC and the Kenyan elections was articulated during the pre-election period and after. The preelection diplomacy had two stages: the pre-nomination stage and the post-nomination stage. During the pre-nomination stage, the ICC was the major strategic element for all sides. All parties and their leaders supported the view that the ICC cases should be deferred. Kalonzo Musyoka, hoping to be anointed by president Kibaki as his preferred successor, undertook shuttle diplomacy to various African capitals and the UN in this pursuit. He failed to deliver, but hoped to convince Kenyatta and Ruto to bequeath to him their considerable constituencies, or to enable him to join their team as the presidential candidate. Odinga, hoping that Ruto would join him, played down the feeling that he was involved in the fate of Ruto and Kenyatta in order to have an advantage in the elections. He was largely non-committal about the prospects of the ICC candidates. In the post-nomination stage, Kenyatta conducted his own shuttle diplomacy to various African capitals in Kenya’s neighborhood. Apparently he did so to get support of their heads of state to support the African Union (AU) position that the ICC cases should be held in Africa. This would have enabled him to beat off the challenge of running the country ‘on skype’ were he elected but had to attend the trials at the ICC. The highlight of the diplomacy of ICC was during the

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presidential debates among the presidential candidates. Kenyatta argued that he respected international law and institutions. He emphasized that he would attend the ICC trial, and that it would not affect his ability to conduct presidential functions if elected. Some candidates like Odinga and Martha Karua argued that the two ICC-indicted candidates should not stand for elections as president and deputy president. And in the alternative that if they insisted on remaining candidates, they should not be elected, as this would negatively affect Kenya’s international standing and fortunes. However, it was minor candidate Paul Muite who put a spanner in the works. He argued that the problem with the ICC was that the principals of the contending parties in the 2007 elections – Kibaki and Odinga – should have been the ones indicted rather than their subordinates. These three positions were played out by the candidates in the period leading to the elections. While these Kenyan debates were going on, some western countries declared that their relationships with the Kenya government would not continue as usual were the ICC-indicted pair elected as president and deputy president. They specified the ways in which things would not continue as usual: if the pair was elected, contacts with the Kenya government would be restricted to what was absolutely minimal, which would not include direct dealings with the two leaders. However, all this diplomatic weight did not have a serious impact on Kenyan voters who elected Kenyatta as president and Ruto as deputy president.

The Supreme Court’s ruling that Kenyatta and Ruto were validly elected as president and deputy president of Kenya paved the way for their inauguration

Post-Election ICC Diplomacy Following the election the diplomacy of the ICC took a serious turn. The presidential elections were disputed by CORD, which filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the outcome. Western countries opted not to congratulate Kenyatta on his election as president on the basis that the outcome would only be known with the decision of the Supreme Court. After the court ruled that the elections were valid, the United Kingdom was put in a diplomatic quandary. It hosted a conference on Somalia in London, and became the first western country to have to show its cards on the new government. They invited President Kenyatta to the conference. Later, the US confronted a similar issue. President Obama toured Africa, but did not visit Kenya on the basis that the Kenyan president was an accused at the ICC. But it was African diplomacy at the AU that exerted international diplomatic pressure. The AU heads of state resolved that the Kenyan ICC cases should be transferred to Africa. They argued that the best venue for conducting the trials would be in Africa, and by an African court, and hence declined to support the option of holding the trials at The Hague. The diplomacies in competition on this issue became clearly drawn out.

The Three Anthems as Signals The Supreme Court’s ruling that Kenyatta and Ruto were validly elected as president and deputy president of Kenya paved the way for their inauguration. The inauguration was historical: it was the fourth time that a new president of Kenya was being peacefully inaugurated; it was the first inauguration where the president’s father was a past president; it was the first election held under the new constitution and the first time that a new president was being inaugurated with the burden of an impending ICC trial; it was the first time that an unprecedented number of heads of state from Africa attended an inauguration in Kenya, and whose protocol was deeply diplomatically symbolic. During the inauguration, three anthems were played: the national anthem of Kenya, the East African Community anthem, and that of the African Union. The three anthems signaled the theme of the emerging foreign policy of Kenya. It symbolized that in its foreign policy and survival as a state, Kenya was protected by two belts: the East African Community states, and the African Union. It emphasized that Kenya’s survival would depend on its relations with its neighboring countries, with Africa, and only then with the rest of the world.

The attendance of African heads of state and government underlined this theme. All East African heads of state – from Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi - attended. Besides these, the president of the Republic of South Sudan and the prime minister of Ethiopia, both neighbours of Kenya were present. At the larger African level, leaders of key African states also attended: the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, and the prime minister of Egypt. The playing of the three anthems underlined emerging African diplomacy. This emerging diplomacy was coloured heavily by the ICC cases against President Kenyatta and his deputy. Coming as it did soon after the resolution of the African Union heads of state, it was deeply symbolic. It was a signal that the AU would protect its own, and underlined the belief that the destiny of African states rested with Africa, and in Africa. This diplomatic behaviour was replete with images. The playing of the three anthems was a diplomatic strategy concerned with images projected by Kenya, the EAC and the AU towards actors beyond the continent. It contained diplomatic signals by Kenya, the EAC and the African Union. Given the ICC trials hanging over the Kenyan head of state, the diplomatic message being conveyed was clear. Other actors analyzing these signals now have the burden of estimating whether these signals reflect accurately what Kenya, the EAC and the AU will do in the future. The diplomatic signals contained in the playing of the three national anthems were supplemented by the speech of president Museveni of Uganda who spoke on behalf of other African heads of state attending the inauguration. His speech conveyed to the world the message contained in the signal. It emphasized the sovereignty and community of Africa and its states. This was supplemented by President Kenyatta’s speech. He said that Kenya supported international institutions, but on the basis of mutual respect; and that it should not be assumed that only one part of the world had the right and capacity to interpret treaties. The signals that Kenya, the AU, and EAC sent during the inauguration were a response to those sent earlier by western countries. Those signals – that there would be diplomatic consequences if the ICC accused were elected to the two highest offices in Kenya – escalated the diplomatic conflicts surrounding the ICC issue and made it more difficult to resolve. Clearly, the signals sent through the playing of the three anthems were intended to multilaterally decouple the meanings attached to the western ones. For the EAC, the AU and Kenya there were evidently core common interests of African sovereignty and diplomacy in altering the significance of the ICC cases for their survival. ■

about the author Prof. Makumi Mwagiru is Professor of Diplomacy and International Conflict Management, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Syria Sleepwalking Towards Partition By Sami Moubayed

nly one year ago, a two-state solution was unthinkable both for the regime or the Syrian opposition. Neither would settle for anything short from full control of metropolitan Syria with Damascus as its capital. Six months ago, however, this mood began to change, behind closed doors rather than in public. The regime insists that it would never allow it, and so does the opposition. Ordinary Syrians have started to debate the idea, saying that they would accept anything that stops the killing. When measured by a nationalistic yardstick, the two-state solution spells out disaster for Syria. Anybody who reads modern history, however, realizes that Syria’s current borders are not sacred, and have been tampered with, far too often, by different world powers. In fact they are artificial, created by the French and the British only 93-years ago. In human history, 93-years almost don’t count. The republic itself is only 81-years old. If Syrians are so divided on religion, sect, ethnicity, national identity, geography, and ideology, then forcing them to live together would be an open invitation to certain catastrophe and chaos. As it is said in the holy texts about marriage, “The most hated solution for God is divorce.” Hate doesn’t mean prohibited, it just means un-favourable. Obviously, Sunnis of Deir ez-Zour will find it impossible to live with Alawites of Tartous, and Christians of Aleppo will never be able to accommodate Islamists of Idlib. Looking the other way will make none of these groups disappear. A divorce today, or a federal democracy, might therefore not seem such a bad idea—if and only if, it ends the violence. It happened to India in 1947, which gave birth to modern Pakistan and in turn that led to modern Bangladesh. It happened to Korea in 1948. It happened to Germany in 1949. It happened to Egypt, when Sudan was carved out as an independent state in 1956. It happened to Yemen in 1969. And more recently, it happened to Sudan in 2011. The list can go on. It’s an ugly reality. It’s also a painful one, but a reality nevertheless. Looking at the bright side of it - Germany re-united. So did Yemen. In a highly alarming move last July, the powerful Kurdistan Democratic Union Party (PYD) announced that it will be declaring autonomy of “Syrian Kurdistan.” An interim government, a constitution, and parliament will follow within 3-6 months. Syrian Kurds have already set up their own police, have their colourful flag flying over government buildings, are publically using their own language, operating their own schools, and own license plates with the words, “Rojava Kurdistan” (Western Kurdistan). Legal experts have already prepared documents and a draft constitution, which will be put up before a national referendum in

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Kurdish-speaking areas. According to the London-based al-Hayat newspaper, a 21-man cabinet will be created, with ministries of finance, defense, and interior. So far the draft says nothing of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs but does ‘recommend’ a new flag and new national anthem. It also suggests that al-Qamishli become the new capital of Syrian Kurdistan. Kurdish rebels have already driven al-Qaeda from Ras al-Ain, including the border crossing with Turkey. They have also taken Ifrin, a strategic town northwest of Aleppo. Battles are ongoing between Kurds and Islamic militias throughout northeast Syria. The sudden PYD decision comes ahead of a similar ambition by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), to announce an Islamic state in north Syria very shortly.

This means that four-states will be emerging from Syria, not two. They might not have clear cut borders or any official status, but they would be de facto states—or enclaves This means that four-states will be emerging from Syria, not two. They might not have clear cut borders or any official status, but they would be de facto states—or enclaves. The 1st State would encompass what remains of regime-controlled territory in Damascus, parts of the Syrian midland, parts of southern Syria, and the port cities of Tartous and Latakia. With the recent victory in Homs, this state will control Homs and its countryside, Hama, the fertile al-Ghab valley, the coastal cities, the Haouran province, and of course, the capital itself, and its large vicinity. A heterogeneous state, it would include Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, and Druze. Its economic sustainability would be very difficult, as all of Syria’s riches would be in the north; the water, the oil, and the fertile territory. It can survive off trade, its two

ports, and services. Roughly speaking, this state would include 60% of Syria’s 23 million. The Second State would be a homogeneous Sunni Muslim one, although very volatile and unstable, controlled by the ISIS, Jabhet al-Nusra, and a colourful assortment of Islamic affiliates. It would have to relocate what remains of 500,000 Christians from northern Syria to State I, and what remains of dissidents in State I would theoretically want to move to State II. If this state were left to the whims and aspirations of the ISIS, Jabhet al-Nusra, and the FSA, it would become a failed state. The Third State would be a Kurdish one, wedged between the borders of Iraq and Turkey. A fourth, of course, would be controlled by the Free Syrian Army in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib, and Deir ez-Zour. Those regions, however, are contested by the ISIS and the FSA, which are already at daggers end and have started eliminating each other’s top commanders. Both would lay claim to them, resulting in deadly violence along the border with Turkey. Meaning, the Kurds would get al-Qamishli and al-Hassakeh, while Jabhet al-Nusra would take control of al-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour. The FSA gets the Idlib and Aleppo countryside. The regime keeps Damascus. Nobody takes Aleppo, which will remain a scene for violent clashes between “all of the above.” The regime insists on re-taking Aleppo and the FSA is seemingly adamant that if they cannot take Damascus, then Aleppo would become capital of their state. It took a revolt, followed by civil war, the annihilation of entire cities, collapse of the economy, destruction of Syria’s social fabric, and over 100,000 dead to make all of this happen. A horrendous price and a horrendous outcome. But then again, this is not new to the Middle East. A Syrian resident of Antioch woke up one day in 1939 to suddenly realize that he was no longer a citizen of Syria, but rather, of Kemalist Turkey. He had to live with a new national identity; a new government, a new passport, a new flag, new money, and a new language. Earlier, a resident of the Beqqa Valley also woke up one day, in 1920, to suddenly realize that he now belonged to Greater Lebanon—a new entity that had just been created. In Syria itself, this has happened before. When the French Army occupied Syria in 1920, they carved up Syria into city-states. The first was the State of Damascus (which included the city’s countryside, Homs, Hama, and the Orontes River Valley), followed by that of Aleppo (which included its countryside, Idlib, al-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour, and Abu Kamal). Then came the state of the Sanjak of Alexanderetta, and that of the Alawites. Syrians learned to live with it. It’s painful to see history being made all over again. Syrians are sleepwalking down that path again. Whether intentionally or by accident, this is where Syria is heading — atleast this is how it looks like for now. ■

about the author Sami Moubayed is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and author of “Syria and the USA: Washington’s Relations with Damascus” (IB Tauris 2012). September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Chinese Strategic Footprint in Northern and Eastern Sectors of India Soumya Awasthi

he Chinese footprint in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is a frequently debated question around the world and Sub-Continent in specific for past many years. The media and the policy analysts are keen to know which way the India China relation will turn especially when it comes to boundary disputes - be it Arunachal Pradesh where China claims around 90,000 sq. km of Indian Territory or be it the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) in the western sector with approximately 5,180 sq. km of area. The recent activities by Chinese of raising tensions in Ladakh are not molded by any unselfish motives of improving its positions on the border or lay claims to new areas. It is a well-planned strategy aimed at coercion to prevent India from improving its overall strategic posture in the region. What is more intriguing is the attachment of a Chinese military unit and an artillery firing range in the proximity of the terrain model to train its troops for high altitude operations in Ladakh sector and similarly in North East in Chinese-occupied Tibet region. These exercises are not just at the unit level but seem to be at the brigade level. One such exercise was conducted in the year 2011 when the PLA Daily reported, “At the very beginning the new type warplanes of the PLA Air Force conducted accurate strikes at the targets…shortly after seizing the commanding point the long-range guns launched full-scale shooting at the command post and the artillery position of the enemy.”

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In my opinion the Chinese are playing a smart game of confusing the Indian Leadership and creating hurdles in infrastructure development on the Indian side of the borders by time and again reinforcing their border claims. Chinese are conscious that these infrastructure developments on Indian side would enable India to mount an audacious offensive in Aksai Chin which could easily could roll down to the Tibetan Plateau and cut off the famous western Highway - main artery linking Tibet Autonomous region with Xinjiang the route. It is in this context that there is a collusive support between Pakistan and China to keep the Indian armed forces engaged and one which poses serious problem and a major strategic concern for India. During the year 2012 in a delegation level meeting with Chinese Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie, the debate on Beijing’s strategic footprint in PoK and North eastern borders was once again refreshed. The Indian Express, on 3rd September 2012 reported that Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony has submitted in a written reply to the Lok Sabha on the question of Chinese development in PoK, saying that India has asked China to stop expanding its infrastructure build up in PoK. Before this many other media reports have highlighted the issue, like the New York Times report that there were two important developments in Gilgit-Baltistan; a simmering rebellion against the Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in

has gone beyond the usual international affairs and has worked through all regional and global issues. Pakistan in order to prove its consistency with China, in 1963 signed ‘Boundary Agreement’ and ceded two most strategic locations at the northern part of Jammu Kashmir to China, namely Gilgit- Baltistan. According to China Daily.com the year 2011 was named as China- Pakistan Friendship Year to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the nation with the latest project deals and meetings at various levels. The Chinese officials on this occasion expressedChina is willing to push forward the China- Pakistan cooperative partnership to a new level.

Significance of Gilgit- Gwadar Corridor and Karakoram Highway (KKH)

Karakorum Highway at Xingiang region

the area. Another media report in October 2011 said that the Federal government of Pakistan wants to seek Chinese assistance for making two of Gilgit-Baltistan’s (G-B) airports ‘all weather’ to guarantee uninterrupted flights in the mountainous region.

Chinese Interest With such news in media, one could not stop from thinking that what could be the reason for the involvement of China in PoK, which is also known as the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Even though China is not part of South Asia, it has prodigious economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. China’s strategic policies have been vague and no one has been able to gauge through their policies, however what appears is that it has built inroads into the sub-continent via Pakistan, by taking advantage of the economic incapability of Pakistan to develop its region and managed to seek its place as a vital player in the region by offering its assistance. The Chinese policy in South Asia is a mix of strategic as well as opportunistic dimensions. We can see its strategic dimension in its relations with Pakistan and its opportunistic dimension can be seen in its relations with the rest of the South Asian countries (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and Nepal). One can witness the growing closeness between Pakistan and China as a strategic dimension, and as has been stated by the Pakistani President Asaf Ali Zardari that Pakistan- China friendship

The Chinese version of the troops entering the Gilgit Baltistan area ostensibly was to control flood. However the Indian Army reported that the Chinese Military Engineering personnel was engaged in repair/widening of KKH, construction of hydroelectric project, lying of optical fibre and building of tunnels (which could serve the purpose of hiding missiles also) The physical move in by the Chinese forces into the Northern sector is dictated by the compulsions of China’s Energy security strategy as approximately 50 per cent of the energy/oil supply comes from Middle East and 30 per cent from Africa. This energy flow for China has to pass through a naval choke point of Strait of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Strait. The Chinese fear that during a national security crisis ships carrying energy resources could be interdicted by hostile naval forces. Any disruption to this free flow of energy resources into China could derail the economic growth on which the Chinese government pursues its great power ambition. Therefore this entry into Northern sector is with the aim to create a bypass that will help them in overcoming their Malacca choke point vulnerability. Also at the moment the oil tankers from Middle East to China via Malacca Strait takes around 16 to 25 days to reach but once the Karakoram Highway is broadened and repaired then it will take only 45-48 hours for the tankers to reach China from Gwadar port. Therefore this KKH and Gilgit- Gwadar Corridor and Rail and Road network construction is a dual purpose project and holds tremendous significance. The mega project KKH is a strategic project which will provide China easy accessibility during the winters, with this project they get trouble-free passage to Pakistani ports from where they can push their trade of Chinese goods, liquor and also get smooth access to oil from Gulf with its presence in the Gulf of Aden. China is going to be the beneficiary of Gawadar’s most accessible international trade routes to the Central Asian republics and China’s Xinjiang border region. By extending its East-West Railway from the Chinese border city of Kashi to Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest, Peking can receive cargo to and from Gawadar along the shortest route, from Karachi to Peshawar. The rail network could also be used to supply oil from the Persian Gulf to Xinjiang. Pakistan’s internal rail network can also provide China with rail access to Persia. The port at Arabian Sea which links the Chinese mainland through railway and roadway is also of immense importance. September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Apart from the economic advantages for the Chinese these developments, the presaging intentions can be seen in context of shift in China’s stand on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and marks it outright support for Pakistan’s claim over PoK and the G-B area. Therefore it may lead to theatre of war where ChinaPakistan nexus will take on India in a two front war whenever the operation like situation arises and launch an attack in Siachen, also disconnect Indus Valley threatening the Ladakh region. It will provide easy access to transfer heavy arms and vehicles for military purpose for instance the Silk-Worm missiles that China bought from Soviet and sold it to Pakistan came via KKH. With this kind of accessibility Pakistan with Chinese assistance can prove to be disreputable for India, especially in the LoC. To one side from its requirement for economic and natural resources, the Chinese policy makers have also been witnessing some terrorist infiltration from the Af-Pak region, in its Muslim dominated province of Xinjiang. Therefore in order to protect its sovereign land from the occupation of the terrorists, China feels that its presence in PoK can gratify their idea of keeping watch on such activities and when time comes, it can put pressure on Pakistan to tackle the situation. China has also been miffed with the new US policy to progressively shift 60% of its formidable naval fleet to Asia Pacific region and India being called as a “Linchpin” in the US strategy. Therefore looking at this it has always given diplomatic priority to its all-weather friends; Pakistan.

Conclusion and Solution In view of the aforesaid facts about China, it can be stated that China and Pakistan are posed with a serious threat from India’s growth and its acknowledgment by some of the major powers, as an emerging or rather emerged dominant power in South Asia making the two nations thinking about strengthening their security. Hence its time that New Delhi must show some assertiveness in her actions in its border areas and build a strong fence around it. The easy going attitude of India can be a problem and may turn out to be a big loss for them. The construction of railways in KKH and Aksai- Chin by Chinese should be a message for India to tighten its laces for tough days ahead. The failure of India or rather slow development projects on the border areas in northern parts especially can be a big drawback. India must understand that the Chinese interposition in PoK will jeopardize India’s foreign policy and also the eco-system and bio-diversity of the adjacent areas will be wrecked. The melting glaciers leading to rise in the sea level, increasing humidity, flash floods and ultimately emersion of the areas around the sea. The seismic zone close to J&K and an approaching calamity would be detrimental to parts of the state, for example The Diamer Basha Dam could be one of the harmful projects affecting the entire region of J&K including Gilgit-Baltistan. Further India should be more proactive in its policies and also from time to time consult the international bodies. India must learn from Chinese method and convert strategic assets into economic opportunities. India must not ignore its North Eastern region which is a link to South East Asia on an account of geographically immediate neighbors. All the pending and behind the schedule road projects must be completed on priority basis and also India

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must involve into tri-lateral and bi-lateral talks with China and Pakistan and discuss the issues pertaining to Gilgit-Baltistan. As the facts suggests that any kind of issues of development or conflict will have direct implications on us, so New Delhi must develop and maintain its relations with the civil society of PoK. Hence, a stable situation will be favorable for India. India must reinforce itself against China’s possible strategic involvement in PoK and Tibet and also recognize the potential threat to international security, which it has become in the recent past. Also at the national level some special forces should be created from within the Indian Army including air element, to dominate and monitor and challenge any threat. Secondly, India must go a step further at the international forum and highlight the issue of illegal land grabbing by the Chinese in Northeast sector and claiming parts of Indian Territory as theirs by showing them in their national maps and visa watermarks recently . In fact the issue of stapled visas being given to people from Arunachal and J&K is also long-standing. The illegally transferred or “gifted” piece of land by Pakistan to China in the disputed area of PoK in the name of infrastructure developments and business purpose should be emphasized at the international platform. Lessons must be learnt from the Chinese advance at the Indian Borders and India must prioritize its duties, develop infrastructure at the borders, distribute the land amongst the local population both at the eastern and northern sectors, populate the areas, reactivate the nomadic herding and provide them with the equipment’s to fight the alterations in the nature. Government should encourage the local public to reside in these areas and assure full protection to them in case of any apathy. This way the sovereignty of the territory is intact and the disadvantage of leaving the land unmanned which gives the opportunity for acquisition by the adversaries is overlapped. The recent conflict related to withdrawal of troops at the Chumur Division, South East of Ladakh where the Chinese refusal to make a firm commitment about pulling their tents in return for demolition of the bunkers was not implemented by the Chinese is an example of their crafty behaviour. Therefore, India should also continue to reactivate their forces as is done by the Chinese and more so follow the tit for tat policy. The Indian troops should not vacate the post first in the name of mutual coexistence and do so only after the Chinese implement it on their side. Therefore, it can be said that with the corrective measures and tactful approach India can hope to maintain peace at its borders without direct confrontation with the opponent country.

about the author Soumya Awasthi is doing her M.Phil in Defence and Strategic Studies from University of Pune, India.

Cyprus

A Complex Geostrategic Issue By Vassilios Damiras Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades, the Cypriot president, leaving bailout negotiations in March.

he history of the island of Cyprus is marked by ethnic disputes and missed political opportunities. Cyprus achieved its independence from Britain in 1960. The Kingdom of Greece, the Turkish Republic, and Great Britain negotiated the various treaties creating the republic of Cyprus. The composition of the population, based on the 1960 and 1973 censuses, is now 80 percent Greek-Cypriots and 18 percent Turkish-Cypriots, with the rest being Maronites, Latins, and Armenians. Cyprus since the Ancient times has been played a vital part on Greek culture. The inhabitants of this island has been experienced a long and tough struggle of the establishment of democratic values and beliefs. Since Ancient times Greece viewed Cyprus as an extension of Hellenic ideas and values, furthermore, viewed Cyprus as a bastion of Greek democratic values in the region. These ideas remain pronounced through the centuries. Various Greek foreign policy decision makers viewed Cyprus as an integral part of the fight of democracy in the region. In 1963, ethnic fighting erupted between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots over control of the island. In 1964, a United Nations peacekeeping force was sent at the request of the Cypriot government. Following a coup in 1974 initiated by the military junta that ruled Greece, Turkey dispatched troops to Cyprus to protect Turkish-Cypriot ethnic rights. The island of Cyprus has been divided since then. Since the 1974 crisis the UN passed a myriad of resolutions in order to find a solution to the ethnic dispute. In addition, the UN Security Council has continuously called for the withdrawal of all Turkish troops. However, the crisis continues. The division of the island of Cyprus is a destabilizing geopolitical factor in the eastern Mediterranean area.

The results of this ethnic calamity are obvious to all: about one percent Cyprusâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population were killed in the war, and approximately 142,000 people -- a quarter of the whole population -- were internally dislocated and ethnically cleansed form their ancestral homes. They became refugees in their own native country, not because of the war of 1974, per se, but because of the post-war political situation. Both sides accused each other of destroying their respective cultural and religious artifacts. Seventy percent of the Cyprus economic output was lost as a result of the invasion and partition of the island. It was a catastrophe for the population of Cyprus. There have been numerous attempts to solve the crisis. All of them failed due to ethnic intransigence. Even UN Secretary General Kofi Annanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s plan failed to bring ethnic unity to the island. The Greek-Cypriot side believed that it created permanent insecurity for them because it ignored security concerns and allowed the indefinite presence of foreign troops on the territory of an independent and sovereign nation-state, with specific rights of military intervention. This issue was the focal point for more than forty years. Finally, the plan would have established a servant state out of Cyprus, since it would have permitted foreign nationstates with rights of unilateral military intervention in its domestic political affairs. In April 2004, the citizens of Cyprus went to the polls to decide the political destiny of the Annan plan. The GreekCypriots voted down the plan in a referendum, because the plan did not guarantee security. The Turkish-Cypriots voted for the plan in a gesture of good will. Once more the Greek-Cypriots appeared to prefer partition rather than unification. In May 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union (EU). Politically as well geo-strategically was the single most significant event for Cyprus history. This political event marked a new era September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

for a unified Cyprus. Membership means economic and political freedom and promotes new challenges and opportunities for the island of Cyprus and the region. Nonetheless, the current GreekCypriot administration has introduced new a proposal for a peaceful solution. Under this proposal Cyprus would be demilitarized, but remain part of the Western security system provided by the European Union. It would end the Turkish military occupation as well as the illegal colonization encouraged by Ankara since 1974. Finally, the plan provides international guarantees for the national security of the island nation-state including membership in the United Nations. Security still remains one of the main issues for both communities. The European Union does not have the mechanisms to press for a Cyprus solution, despite the fact that Cyprus is a member state. The United States could press Athens and Ankara via NATO and various military treaties that the U.S. has with them for a Cyprus solution. An American plan needs to safeguard the human rights of both ethnic groups and secure the reunification of the island under a strong federal system which will guarantee a stable bi-zonal and bi-communal socio-political system. Finally, it needs to promote a robust economy. Greece needs to maintain in a strong dialogue with Turkey in order to press for a Cyprus solution. In addition, the Greek government needs to have close diplomatic relations with the United States. The various American governments have played a very significant role in helping to stabilize the Balkans since the end of the Cold War. Finally, Greece could assist the EU to adopt a coherent foreign policy regarding Cyprus. It is important that a new Cyprus must guarantee the natural rights of Greek, Turkish, Armenians, Maronite, and Latin ethnic groups. It is imperative to pacify and unify Cyprus, because the

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island is located in a very geostrategic and geopolitical position. A political stable Cyprus could serve as a loyal American ally in the global war on terror. The island has the natural capability to house various elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet. American military units have utilized the island during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, it can be used as a platform of special operations against terrorist cells in the wider Middle East region such as Syria and Iran. The geostrategic significance of the island is very important to American national interest. Moreover, the discovery of natural gas resources puts Cyprus as a major energy source country. Currently, the European economic crisis creates a peculiar situation for the economic and political survival of Cyprus. Adopting the U.S. dollar can create the conditions for a stable economic future. The evolution of the Cyprus economic crisis will show how the Cypriot government will weather this difficulty that creates new dimensions for the Cyprus problem. Â&#x201E;

about the author Dr. Vassilios Damiras is a consultant with a great experience in counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

State participation in Indian Foreign Policy:

The Economic Dimension Introduction The conduct of external affairs – especially economic diplomacy -- is no longer driven solely by central governments. This is true not merely of India, but the world over. It has very aptly stated in this context that: ....the international activism of sub-state governments is rapidly growing across the world, discreetly transforming diplomatic routines and foreign policy machineries. This activism has been referred to most commonly as ‘Constituent Diplomacy’ and ‘Para-diplomacy’. It would also be pertinent to mention here, that the participation by provincial governments has been classified into two types: Macroregional, which involves non-contiguous communities (e.g., British Columbia and Japan), and micro-regional, which involves a degree of geographical contiguity (e.g., British Columbia and

the Pacific Northwest states). Micro-regional paradiplomacy often occurs between communities with common boundaries (e.g., BC and Washington State). In India too, state intervention in foreign policy has attracted immense attention. Macro-regional para-diplomacy receives more attention, except when there are chief ministers belonging to influential regional parties. This is a major shortcoming, since border-states need to be looked at as interfaces with neighbouring countries. In fact in the international context, border regions have been dubbed as ‘regionstates’ and ‘gateway states’ and there are examples in both Asia and Europe. In the context of region-states it has been remarked: Region-states are seen as ‘natural economic zones’ which may be located within national borders (Catalonia or Northern Italy) or cross national boundaries, for example Hong Kong and southern China or the ‘growth triangle’ comprising Singapore and adjacent

Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat, India

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Indonesian islands. But they perform a particular function which is of growing significance in the post-Cold War world of international regionalisation, namely points of access to centres of economic activity. This article will give a brief background to the economic dimension of state participation in foreign policy, while also carefully examining the potential role of border-states in facilitating harmonious ties with India’s neighbours. Lastly, the paper brings out some suggestions and policy recommendations to ensure that participation of states in economic diplomacy is more beneficial to India in its efforts to develop closer ties with countries in the neighbourhood.

A Background To Economic Diplomacy The trend of economic diplomacy by India’s states is not a recent phenomenon but actually began to gain momentum way back in the late 1990’s. Chief Ministers like Chandrababu Naidu and SM Krishna of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka respectively were among the first to hard sell their states on foreign shores for attracting foreign investment. One of the key factors which led to this increased participation of states in economic diplomacy with the outside world was the economic reforms of 1991. In this context, it has rightly been said that ..it was in the 1990s when India has moved from command economy (Centrally Planned Economy) to a federal market economy in which states were having larger share of economic sovereignty. Over the past few years, Chief Ministers of other states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat too have followed suit. It should be mentioned here, that the Constitution of India gives the Union Government in New Delhi virtually exclusive jurisdiction over foreign and defence policy. Item 9-20 of the Union List from the 7th Schedule has clearly identified the role of Centre which includes foreign affairs matters needing their interventions with any foreign country, their diplomatic, consular and trade representations, entering into treaties, foreign trade agreements, conventions with foreign countries, extradition and so on.

Initiatives Of Border Regions In India India’s border states too have attempted to emerge as conduits with India’s neighbourhood. New Delhi’s concerted attempts to reach out to the neighbours and the commencement of Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) along with the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh’s vision of making ‘borders irrelevant’ are some of the pivotal reasons for the same. A number of states such as Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir have taken the lead in the context of strengthening economic ties with Pakistan. While recently, the Gujarat Chief Minister too has been making strong overtures for increasing trade with Pakistan pitching for energy cooperation between Gujarat and Sindh. In the context of Jammu and Kashmir, it was Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir CM, who made opening up of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad route an electoral issue in the 2003 elections. As a consequence of Sayeed’s efforts, the bus route opened up in 2005 and so did trade between the two Kashmirs. While the move to open this trade route was welcomed with great enthusiasm, logistical hurdles have acted as somewhat of a dampener both in the context of the bus service and trade

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between the two provinces. Regular procedural delays are faced while acquiring entry permits resulting in the bus services being under-utilised, as less than required number of people are been able to move across LOC border. These numbers were in the range of 20-25 initially when the bus used to ply on a fortnightly basis, the frequency of which was increased by making the frequency as weekly from 2008. In the context of LOC trade too, serious bottlenecks persist. They include limited trade volume due to a limited list and barter system, inadequate infrastructure and trade facilities, lack of communication links, absence of banking facilities, and restrictions on travel of the traders across the LoC. In recent times, LOC trade in Kashmir has shrunk from 21 items in the export list to three items including fruits, dry fruits and herbs, according to Pawan Anand, president of the J&K Chamber of Cross LoC Trade. Such a fall was due to unviable list of such items which had no demand in the market, said one of the senior official associated with such trade. In the case of Punjab, erstwhile Chief Minister Captain Amarinder Singh began the process of engagement with his counterpart Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi. Due to their efforts and support from the Central Government, a bus service began from Amritsar to Nankana Sahib in 2006. Engagement between the two provinces was taken forward by current Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal’s government in Punjab. Deputy Chief Minister, Sukhbir Badal, visited Pakistan in November 2012 and discussed a whole gamut of economic issues. The most significant feature of this visit was the decision to establish a common Business Council which would take steps for establishment of joint industrial zones, holding of business conferences and increasing trade relations which will consist of 10 members each from both sides. On April 2012, a new integrated check post opened at the Wagah-Attari border crossing, with an objective of increasing land border trade 10 times. While there would be a while before this goal can be attained there is no doubt that the ICP has helped bilateral trade. During the period from April 2012 to March 2013, exports to Pakistan went up to $1.84 billion, a growth of 19 per cent while imports from Pakistan in the corresponding period rose to $513 million, with an increase of 28 per cent - the highest ever between the two countries. The overall bilateral trade between these countries stood at $2.4 billion, which was an increase of whopping 21 per cent since last year’s corresponding period. India and Pakistan have also agreed to cooperate in the power and gas sector given the energy and power crisis faced by Pakistan. In this context too, Punjab is important due to its geographic location. Both countries have so far discussed proposals of electricity trade to import high-voltage direct current (HVDC) via link establishment to transfer 500 megawatts of electricity. Besides, India is also willing to export 400 million cubic feet of gas per day to Pakistan, through Jalandhar to Wagah via Attari, after regassification of LNG in India and pumping it through a pipeline. There have also been calls to increase trade via the RajasthanSindh route. The India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) President S M Munir urged the governments of both these countries to utilize the Rajasthan-Sindh border for cargo services and reopening of all trade routes that existed before 1965.

Conclusion and Recommendations

An effective way of making sure that cross-border initiatives are successful could be a periodic appraisal of the infrastructure at India’s borders and also holding periodical meetings of border states If one were to move beyond states bordering Pakistan, Tripura is the best example of economic and trade diplomacy between state and neighbouring country. Bangladesh which at present has a negative trade balance vis-a-vis India is seeking for 726.6 MW of power from ONGC Tripura Power Company (OTPC) amidst acute power crisis faced by the north eastern part of Bangladesh. This demand is strongly supported by Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar for the simple reason that Bangladesh allowed transportation of heavy power gears from its territory to Tripura. North Eastern states are also likely to benefit from the MyanmarBangladesh-India gas pipeline. During his recent visit to Myanmar, Indian Commerce and Industry Minister, Anand Sharma, took up this issue. One of the important steps taken with an eye on reaching out to South East Asia is the proposed international airport in Manipur, which will instigate the need for better infrastructural connectivity including rail and roads. While the steps taken over the past few years to give a greater role to our border regions are an encouraging sign, India has not been able to utilize the strategic location of its border regions to the fullest. In the context of taking a leaf out of China’s book with regard to the way it has utilized its border regions in comparison to India, it has aptly been pointed out that: “It is worth exploring the Chinese model, in how Beijing is interacting with its regional capitals, especially in the borders. Today, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces of China bordering Southeast Asia are no more perceived as border regions. Chengdu and Kunming are big cities of international standard with booming economic and intellectual activities.”

If one were to identify some of the steps urgently needed for ensuring that economic diplomacy is successful certain steps need to be taken: Firstly, the Central Government and the state governments should maintain regular contact on matters pertaining to foreign policy. Apart from the Ministry of External Affairs being in regular touch with state governments on important issues, the MEA branch secretariats at various places can establish close touch with state governments and seek their views and inputs. These branch secretariats can facilitate people in better liaison with MEA branches so as to deal with other issues pertaining to external relations, foreign trade and cultural exchanges, besides foreign direct investments. It should be responsibility of MEA to ensure these branch secretariats working best to their abilities. At present there are five such offices in Chennai, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Dharamshala. These can be increased to few more states such as Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Tripura which are showing enthusiasm in promoting economic diplomacy with neighbours. An effective way of making sure that cross-border initiatives are successful could be a periodic appraisal of the infrastructure at India’s borders and also holding periodical meetings of border states. This would help to seek their inputs on India’s neighbourhood policy. While getting all Chief Ministers might be tough, it may be a good idea to begin by having a grouping of Chief Ministers from the North-East and North-West part of India from those states that share borders with Pakistan, China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Punjab, Gujarat and Rajasthan. As has also been suggested ...that leaders like regional leaders like Rio, Mizoram’s Lalthanhawla, Assam’s Tarun Gogoi, Sikkim’s Pawan Chamling, Tripura’s Manik Sarkar and Arunachal Pradesh’s Nabum Tuki are better placed and knowledgeable to drive foreign policy that benefit the Northeast and India than bureaucrats in Delhi. They can identify some of the major obstructions especially in the realm of trade and come up with proposals for giving a thrust to the same. Local businessmen and Chambers of Commerce can be given the lead in the process to come up with out-of-the-box suggestions, as well as giving timely appraisals of lacuna in the infrastructure. This has helped in the case of Pakistan and can be tried for other borders as well. Border states which provide India a solid opportunity for bolstering economic ties, should definitely be involved in economy diplomacy so that we do not miss golden opportunities available to be encashed.

about the author Tridivesh Singh Maini is associated with the Jindal School of International Affairs, Sonepat, India

Manish Vaid is a Research Assistant with Observer Research Foundation, India

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

The importance and role of the

European Union in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s world integration processes By Manja Djuric

1. Introduction The process of regional integration began intensive development since the Second World War and since then along with globalization spreading rapidly to all parts of the world. Regional integration in developing countries is the path to accelerated economic development, as stronger interconnection and closer interdependence can not only successfully resisted all forms of external pressures, but also to restrain or remove a steadily increasing gap in development between industrial and developing countries themselves. The European Union is the most famous example of regional integration. Regional economic integration has its own path of development, which consists of four forms:

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1. free trade zones, 2. customs union, 3. common market, 4. economic union.

1.1 Free trade zone Free trade zone is the lowest stage in the development of regional integration. It implies an agreement on trade, the exchange of goods between member countries without the application of customs duties, each member country a free trade zone alone determines tariffs on imports from third countries. The agreement assumes retention between the customs authorities of the Member States, to prevent the entry of goods

from third countries via the member states with the lowest tariffs. Members of the zones must have agreed rules of origin of goods, which distinguishes which countries have duty-free treatment, which are imported from third countries and entering the regime of common customs procedures. Examples of a free trade zone by the former European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the current North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Latin American Free Trade Area (Lafta) and the Free Trade Area between Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay called (MERCOSUR).

1.2 Customs Union The Customs Union is a higher stage of development of regional integration. Participating countries signed an agreement on the abolition of tariffs. Customs Union covers and a free trade zone and common duties to third, outside countries, and therefore allows the mutual abolition of customs controls. A typical example is the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

1.3 Common Market The next stage in the integration of the markets of the participating makes the common market. It includes not only the integration of markets for goods, but also labor and capital between member states. So in the European Union, formerly the European Economic Community, the movement toward full

integration has led to the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Single European Act in 1986. , the harmonization of national laws, as well as a number of other measures that have contributed to the mobility of labor and capital within the market. A characteristic example of economic integration in the form of a common market is Central American Common Market (CACM).

1.4 Economic Union The last stage in the process of economic integration is the creation of an economic union. Economic union implies a common policy in certain areas or full harmonization and alignment of different regulations among member states. An example is the European Economic Union economic and monetary union with a common currency, the euro and the European Central Bank, which is responsible for monetary policy throughout the EU. Regional economic integration bring some problems. On the one hand may increase international trade and to contribute to the economic welfare of the member countries, on the other hand may be a reduction in trade between Member States and the countries that are not, and thus to a reduction in economic welfare states. Member States of the regional economic integration as a result of reduced or abolished tariffs have increased trade within their area and this effect is called trade creation (* eng. Trade creation). However, at the same time the formation of regional economic integration member countries usually pay more when buying September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

goods from other Member States than they previously paid for the same item when it was purchased by the member states. As a result there is trade diversion from cheaper foreign sources to gather sources within the Union and the effect of trade diversion (* eng. Trade diversion). Economic welfare will increase if the level of trade creation is greater than trade diversion. The effects of regional economic integration may be: 1. static, 2. dynamic Static effects of economic integration include: trade creation effects arising from the abolition of customs duties as a chance for better use of available resources. The effects of trade diversion resulting from tariff changes between the EU and third countries. Redirection of trade occurs when imports from lower cost that comes out of the customs union replace imports with higher costs from a country of economic integration. Other static effects are administrative savings and greater bargaining power. Effects on production directed by the manufacturer toward the higher producer with lower production costs. Effects on energy manifested by the reduction of tariffs in relation to third countries leads to the substitution of more expensive domestic products with cheaper imported products. Effects on trade relations imply changing the relationship of export and import prices among EU member states that have abolished the mutual duty. Static effects of economic integration are equal to the benefits of trade creation minus losses from trade diversion. The dynamic effects of economic integration are important for integration at the global level. Concentrate on relations with key sub-components of exchange, economies of scale, the effects of terms of trade and the growth of competition. Dynamic effects include: increased competition, which creates opportunities for specialization and therefore lower costs of production and the concentration of one country to the sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. “The most dynamic benefit the formation of a customs union is the increased competition that is likely to ensue ... grown the level of competition is likely to also encourage the development and use of new technologies. All of these efforts will lead to a reduction in production costs, to the benefit of consumers.” Dynamic benefits of regional economic integration include economies of scale, which occurs as a result of the formation of the enlarged market, incentives for investments to take advantage of the expanded market and to face up to the growing competition. Free movement of labor and capital leads to better utilization of economic resources of the whole regional economic integration. The main advantage of integration is that it provided a bigger market, which thus becomes economically efficient. Growth competitiveness is key to an integrated market and is always present in the major markets. The benefits of regional economic integration are significant. Proponents believe that the integration of free trade lead to faster economic growth in the expansion of internal markets, and providing companies the opportunity to expand production and achieve economies of scale. Integrated market will affect the expansion of producers’ equipment, increasing competition through open regional trade,

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European Union with twenty eight member states, and half a billion people is one of the most powerful economic and political factor in the world and the most known example of regional integration while the industries that were protected need to adopt the most efficient technology and management in order to survive.

2. The European Union in integration processes European Union with twenty eight member states, and half a billion people is one of the most powerful economic and political factor in the world and the most known example of regional integration. After World War II began a unknown form of linking the state of Europe’s integration. It is reasonable to ask why the beginning of the European integration process going on in the period after the Second World War, when the idea of European unification occurred much earlier. According Mintas Hodak answer lies in the fact that it took time for the political elite of European countries understand that the process of building a united Europe can become a means of establishing lasting peace and stability in Europe. “Instead of the earlier war to preserve national sovereignty and achieve certain national interests, has rapidly matured general belief that national interests could be more durable and better protect mutual cooperation between the European states and the partial restriction of the sovereignty of each of them in favor of achieving common goals.”(4) The idea of uniting Europe is much older than they at first seem. Following the example of the creation of the United States, in 1923. The Austrian Kalergi proposed the creation of the United States of Europe. Similar proposals to emerge in the coming years, but they were not even close to achieving. World War II brought Europe into a very difficult position, economies of European countries has been destroyed by the war and it took several years to recover. Europe was located between the two main forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. She began reporting to the idea of integration of Europe. France could not imagine an independent Germany with great industrial potential. Since its initial initiative from Robert Schumann and his declaration, the French were in favor of the disappearance of hostilities with Germany. This is supported and Pinder, “The attempt to rein in Germany, in which the French were engaged after the war from 1914 to 1918., Ended in a fiasco. More promising idea was tying Germany for some strong institutions, which would be equally tied France.” Although the United Kingdom remained on the sidelines, in respect of the Community, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was one of the exceptions. It was after the war in a speech at Zurich University when he said: “We must build a kind of United States of Europe, a first step must be a partnership

•

Only by creating a large market Europeans will once again be able to take their place and play a role in the advancement of the free world between France and Germany ... France and Germany must take the lead together.”(6) And the other four founding countries: Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the then European Economic Community have seen a means of securing peace through strong binding of Germany to the European institutions. The first step towards European integration has made six countries: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France and Italy, which were in 1951. The established common market in coal and steel. Soon followed the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which was founded in 1956. year. European Six then decided in 1957. create the European Economic Community based on the common market a wide range of goods and services. “Only by creating a large market Europeans will once again be able to take their place and play a role in the advancement of the free world.” The motive of peace which was the basis for the establishment of the Community and today affects the government and politicians of countries embarking on a path of European integration. These countries see the EU system for fifty years provides a framework for peace and is considered to be a guarantee of stability and future. There are different opinions about the reasons for integration, including Miroslav Prokopijevic believes that the essence of it is that if there is an international organization, or union, but in whether certain European countries lead the peaceful policy or not, a peaceful policy is based on the understanding that the voluntary cooperation of mutually profitable than war. As long as this view prevailed among the European countries they are living in peace, whether among them there are some forms of integration and connectivity. The six founding countries has made two major projects such as the customs union and programs for agriculture. The further development of European integration is going through expansion and further development of a common connection of the internal market through the Single European Act in 1986. years, and the creation of economic and monetary union. Delors Plan enabled the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union. The main feature of this plan is the gradual realization of the European economic and monetary union in three stages and the creation of a single currency, and the Declaration of the European Council of October in 1990. it is planned to create her. Delors Plan was named after the President of the European Commission Jacques Delor. He is best known for having proposed a three-phase approach to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU):

First stage: the free movement of capital in the European Union and closer monetary and macroeconomic cooperation among the member states and their central banks, • Second phase: launch of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to monitor and coordinate national monetary policy, stronger powers of control institutions of the European Community in particular the European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers, gradually reduce the fluctuation mechanism within courses, • Third stage: the establishment of fixed parity exchange rates, and giving full responsibility for the monetary policy of the European Union. The European Central Bank (ECB) occupies a central position in the European system of central banks, responsible for European monetary policy. Controls the amount of money in circulation, managed exchange rate, manage the official foreign reserves and ensuring price stability in the euro zone. The headquarters of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. European integration has been crowned the Maastricht Treaty 7th February in 1992. when it created the European Union. From 1 January, 1999. to 31 December 2001. The payment may have to be made in euro and national currencies, and from 1 January 2002. in member states of the European Monetary Union banknotes and coins denominated in euro are the only means of payment. Since then, the European Union is evolving as an economic power. Each country to become an economic and monetary union must meet the convergence criteria. The convergence criteria are the economic conditions set by the Treaty on European Union (1992./1993.) For assessing the readiness of EU member states to participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union.

These are the following four criteria: 1. a high degree of price stability, rate of inflation can not be more than 1.5% compared to the rate of inflation in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation 2. budget deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, 3. participation in the European Monetary System for at least two years, 4. nominal long-term interest rates should not be more than 2% over the rate in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation. The convergence criteria are known as the Maastricht criteria and the criteria for convergence. Fulfilling the criteria checked on the basis of the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Today, the economic and monetary union (EMU) consists of 17 member states, namely: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, Slovakia and Finland.

about the author Manja Djuric is a Teaching Assistant at Faculty of political sciences, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

midst prolonged domestic opposition to new nuclear projects, India has received positive gestures from three countries that have so far remained adamant to its requisites for civil nuclear energy. On May 20, in a Joint Statement during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, China and India have agreed “for carrying out bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy”. On May 29, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed over a Joint Statement with Japanese Prime Minister on the importance of such cooperation between the two countries. On June 3, the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard expressed her main aim “to get away from the problem that prevented Australia into entering uranium sale with India” and now she is “working on the safeguards agreement”. These all may be happening together coincidentally; but, if they really reach their logical conclusions, it would be a grand bargain to liberate India from the ‘nuclear apartheid’ once for all. However, the pace of the bargain and consequent achievements will depend on the degree of public acceptance as well as expediting of nuclear

energy projects at home. Secondly, India needs to stock-take the flurry of nuclear pacts it has signed so far to evaluate how many of them really shown results. Thirdly, as national elections are due in Japan and Australia later this year and in India early next year, contours of the bargains may alter in consonance with the outcomes of the poll and the ideology of political party that assumes power. Therefore, it would be prudent to scrutinize all possible contours of the respective deals in advance while addressing genuine public concerns patiently.

Contours of Sino-Indian Proposal In the 20th May Joint Statement, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged that “expansion of civil nuclear energy program is essential component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security”. Therefore, in line with their respective international commitments, the two countries “will carry out bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy”. This certainly promises a new chapter in Sino-Indian

Nuclear Grand Bargain By Dr. Sitakanta Mishra

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relations and potential of stable addition to the booming bilateral economic relationship provided both countries keep away the nuclear trade from bilateral contentious issues. In 1993, China had supplied low enriched uranium for Tarapur nuclear plant after USA in 1974, and France in 1993, stopped their supply. Ever since, there were limited opportunities for India-China cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. Though its uranium reserves comprise only one per cent of global reserves and even less than India’s, China has an ambitious nuclear energy programme underway. China – a relatively late-comer to the civil nuclear industry – is gluing to the edge of a frontline nuclear energy nation. Following a two-pronged strategy, comprising both outbound activities and domestic capacity building, Beijing is fast becoming the ‘favoured nuclear partner’ for nuclear developments across the world. Partnering in nuclear front with China will certainly help India draw lessons from its strategy to become a “favoured guest” both as an investor in international projects and as a customer for its own domestic demands. First of all, absence of any nuclear cooperation between India and China would lead to unwarranted competition as both countries are targeting the same source for uranium procurement. Secondly, cooperation in civil nuclear field would foster bilateral exchanges which will restore some balance in India’s foreign policy undertaking as it is criticized as being too West-oriented. Thirdly, since China is planning a major expansion of its nuclear energy programme and is expected to become the second biggest

In the 20th May Joint Statement, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged that “expansion of civil nuclear energy program is essential component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security consumer of the radioactive metal (around 20% of global uranium demand), New Delhi’s partnering with Beijing would help both become stakeholders in each other’s programmes. In the process, foreign companies involved in China may get attracted towards India’s nuclear energy expansion programme. However, imagining a Sino-Indian civil nuclear deal in line with the Indo-US nuclear deal at this point would be far-fetched. At the initial stage both countries can focus their cooperation on safety and security, social acceptance, nuclear information management, uranium procurement issues and may be some technical exchanges. A few small cooperative steps initially would help setting the tone of nuclear cooperation and develop mutual understanding, especially on India’s credentials for a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership for which China is found to be a stumbling block.

A Problematic Pact with Japan Indicating a major shift in Japan’s post-Hiroshima nuclear policy, the May 29th India-Japan Joint Statement has reaffirmed the importance of a civil nuclear cooperation between India and Japan. However, many in Japan view such a “pact is problematic especially in view of the fact that India is not a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)”. In fact, clause 31 of the Joint Statement gives an impression that “India, Japan differ on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)”. While the Japanese Prime Minister stressed the importance of bringing into force the CTBT at an early date, his Indian counterpart reiterated New Delhi’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear test. Moreover, the Japanese domestic critics view such a pact with India “would further undermine the effectiveness and relevance of the NPT system”. An editorial in the Japanese national daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun opined that “Tokyo should ask New Delhi to become a party to the NPT and sign the CTBT”. In protest against the start of negotiations, the 2010 Nagasaki Peace Declaration said, “a nation that has suffered atomic bombings itself is now severely weakening the NPT which is beyond intolerable”. Although an actual India-Japan civil nuclear deal may take a few more years to fructify, it is time to introspect now if Japan is really going to compromise on its principled nuclear stand with India; and if yes, then why? Second, what would be the terms of negotiation for India to win a deal with Japan while maintaining its strategic programme, reprocessing rights, and non-proliferation September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

stand? Third, what benefits, technological or otherwise, will India accrue from Japan through the deal? Taking into account Japanese economic situation in the past two decades followed by Fukushima disaster, Tokyo may come to terms with India for its potential as a huge market for nuclear energy technology. As prospects for constructing new nuclear reactors in Japan is fading as a result of the 2011 disaster, the export of nuclear energy technology is of extreme interest to roughly 10,000 companies in Japan. Experts view that “the economic trickle-down effects from exports are huge as Japan’s technology is indispensible for the US and France”. As US and France use Japanese-made parts for nuclear plants, the absence of a nuclear agreement between India and Japan slows down nuclear business deals for those two nations as well. To carry forward the deal, India may satisfy Japan by a separate bilateral pact or safeguards agreement ensuring its commitment on nuclear test moratorium and non-proliferation. As the stakes seem high for both India and Japan for such a pact, India should ensure that Japan agrees to the terms of its nuclear liability provisions for any future purchases. However, outright acceptance of, or shifting attitude towards, NPT or CTBT in their present forms would be difficult for the Indian government to convince the domestic public when national election is at the doorstep. India’s sentiments and compulsions should be conveyed to Japan in clear and sound terms. In reference to the benefits by dealing with Japan, India’s expectations for getting membership of international export control regimes like the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), etc. would be facilitated. The most important benefit India would gain through Japanese cooperation is in the area of nuclear safety by gaining Japan’s experiences and lessons derived from the nuclear accident. However, in terms of other technological benefits, according to Dr A Gopalakrishnan, Japan does not have any comprehensive nuclear reactor technology of its own today. It will either be GE-Hitachi or Westinghouse-Toshiba plants, which are mostly license-based production in Japan where technology control mostly rests with the US companies. Therefore, to get reactors from GE or Westinghouse, India has to have separate understanding or play ball with Japan as these companies have conditional agreements with Tokyo on third-country sales. Moreover for purchase of “Japanese reactors”, India may not expect or receive much financing from the Japanese themselves as Japan’s finances are in shambles in the post-Fukushima years. It would also be prudent to wait until their nuclear sector including their questionable quality control system is put back in order to repose confidence on them. Nevertheless, the Japanese interest in resuming the debate for a civil nuclear deal with India is a big leap in Japan’s nuclear policy. It is clear that Japan understands the symbolic and practical importance of a deal with India, especially after Australia lifted its ban on uranium exports to India in 2011. But the issue will remain highly controversial in Japan with formidable bureaucratic and political opposition. As a result, Abe has been consistently forced to reiterate his desire for India to sign the CTBT, if not the NPT. But there is a good chance that after the elections in the Japanese Upper House, Abe may have the political strength to push through an agreement. This would represent a major conceptual change in Japan’s nuclear non-proliferation posture as there could be wider implications than just making an

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exception for India. Equally, this would be a major breakthrough in India’s nuclear diplomacy after the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.

Australia’s First Non-NPT Customer If things move as planned, India will be the first customer that is not a signatory to the NPT to get Australian uranium. Normally, Canberra bans export of uranium to countries that are not a party to the NPT. Making an exception to this policy has been a quite big political issue in Australia, despite India’s strong non-proliferation credentials. In fact, after initial hesitation, Australia had agreed in principle in 2007 to export uranium to India “subject to India agreeing to very stringent safeguards and conditions”. Defending the Australian government’s decision to lift the ban on uranium sales to India, former Australian Premier John Howard spoke to Manmohan Singh (August 16, 2007) after which he announced negotiations between the two countries. But the Australian government’s chief nuclear adviser Ziggy Switkowski expected a ban on further nuclear testing by India to be part of any deal. After the defeat of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in the 2007 federal election, the momentum and willingness to cooperate with India in the civil nuclear field had waned. However, during the visit of the then new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to New Delhi in November 2009, India pressed hard for uranium sales. After ALP coming into power in 2010, Prime Minister Julia Gillard resumed the debate and turned a deaf ear to many in her own party to force a change in Australia’s uranium sale policy specifically for India. Senator Scott Ludlam views that India has a history of nuclear accidents, near misses, misadventures and it would be only a matter of time until a serious incident occurs. He argues that India is buying uranium from foreign source to lock up own domestic reserves for weapon purpose and that this would beget an arms race with Pakistan. Suffice it to say that Australia also supplies uranium to China which obviously frees up Chinese domestic reserves. Also, Ludlam views that the nuclear sector worldwide is in huge trouble at this moment and the Australian government at the behest of the mining industry are looking for any markets. India as an industrialising nation with a growing nuclear energy sector, the uranium industry lobby finds it as a green pasture. Whatever may be the motives and drivers, while aiming for and working towards a uranium supply deal with Australia (which holds about a third of world’s recoverable uranium reserves) India must be ready with defined terms of bargain. To satisfy Australia’s national resolve and non-proliferation sentiments India needs to reassure, may be in the form of a separate agreement in good faith, for peaceful use of the uranium supplied. All these have to be finalised keeping in mind the federal elections in Australia scheduled in September this year and parliamentary election in India in 2014.

Grand Bargain Side Effects In order to achieve the aspired end of the discriminatory nuclear regimes that have thwarted India’s inherent right to tame the atom and to break out from the ‘nuclear apartheid’ it is languishing in, specific deals with these three nations constitute a ‘grand bargain’ for India. The road and the process to achieve

Also India needs to mind Pakistan’s probable reactions and moves and its implications in a regional context, especially for getting through Japan and Australia’s node for exceptional nuclear deals. It is to ponder, if China will not give Pakistan an edge over India in the nuclear area this would certainly not be smooth. Beside the procedural and conditional issues for such deals, India is likely to face complicacies and would have to manage its implications on three critical spheres – domestic, regional and global. With the opening of these negotiations, India would be the target of intensive anti-nuclear lobby operating in these countries which would exacerbate the domestic anti-nuclear movement in India. Early settlement of the Kudankulam issue and enhancement of public acceptance of new nuclear projects should be priorities for Manmohan Singh government. With a comprehensive ‘nuclear information management’ network, the nuclear establishment must address all public concerns before jumping into more new projects, otherwise India’s image as a responsible nuclear power would be hampered when domestic opposition will hinder its global commitments through various deals it is signing for. Also India needs to mind Pakistan’s probable reactions and moves and its implications in a regional context, especially for getting through Japan and Australia’s node for exceptional nuclear deals. It is to ponder, if China will not give Pakistan an edge over India in the nuclear area. It has already inked a civil nuclear deal secretly with Pakistan which is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenals and missile inventory. With Chinese backing, Pakistan will leave no chance for pulling India’s leg to hinder its entry into multilateral nuclear groups. The Sino-Pak strategic nexus would be more intensive in the years ahead with the motive to frustrate India’s diplomatic maneuvers. To manage Pakistan for a soft landing in its incessant struggle for maintaining strategic parity with India should be a major diplomatic task as part of India’s current nuclear diplomacy. On the international front, India’s strategic relations especially with Japan and Australia may have provoking ramifications on global power configuration. The US has been encouraging strategic partnership between US, Japan and India and also between US, Japan and Australia. This quadrilateral equation may attract critical attention of China. On the other hand, USA has also floated the idea of a triangular strategic equation between the US, India and China which would also attract critical attention of Japan. The proposed nuclear deals alongside India’s strategic cooperation with all these actors would be a tight rope walk for New Delhi in the years ahead.

Towards Nuclear Multi-Alignment In pursuit of ensuring nuclear energy as a viable source of national energy mix, India’s ambitious nuclear energy expansion plan led to civil nuclear deals with around ten countries and a dozen industrial houses. As global leaders in nuclear energy commerce, countries like USA, France, Russia, Japan, Australia, China and a few Central Asian countries constitute India’s core and determining partners. However, inherent adversarial and competing relations among them may land India sometime in awkward situations. For example, Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May and India’s strategic partnership initiative with Tokyo has riled China. Beijing has accused Tokyo of attempting forge alliances with New Delhi to “encircle China”. The ruling Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times on May 30 came out with an opinion titled “India gets close to Japan at its own peril”. This suggests that China views India-Japan relation is “animated by a shared strategic agenda of encircling and countering China”. This would be counter-productive for India’s aspirations to get access to multilateral nuclear trading cartels. Such developments might in fact give rise to Cold War type of bloc politics which is completely against India’s foreign policy ideals. “India does not fancy a situation in which it might have to choose one nation over the other” by overlooking its national interest. Therefore, New Delhi will have to maintain equidistance from all, not getting entangled into rivalries among its partners. India must express loud and clear to all concerned that New Delhi only mean nuclear business and nothing else. India has to devise a nuclear multi-alignment strategy and insulate its nuclear dealings from global/regional power politics. In the meantime, India needs to rationalize its nuclear liability regime which would spur international cooperation in this area. However, while bargaining for grand deals with important nuclear players, India has to take cognizance of US help in achieving a breakthrough. On the other hand, to set its own house in order the scientific community has to taking along the domestic public in its quest for new nuclear projects. The need is for more associative communication in dealing with the concerns of the public. Also the public must be made understand at what stage the negotiations with global nuclear players are in and how they are progressing. As Shah Nawaz Ahmad, the Senior Advisor to World Nuclear Association (WNA) says, the public must be made to understand that nuclear negotiations take time and patience would be of immense help. Also, India has its own culture and mechanisms in the area of international cooperation. The fact that Australia, Japan and China are now willing to cooperate with India is a grand victory for Indian nuclear diplomacy. However, New Delhi has to swim across muddy waters in the years ahead as its integration into the global nuclear order is not yet a done deal. ■

about the author Dr. Sitakanta Mishra is Associate Editor, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, New Delhi

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Qualities of a Political Leader

that Attract the Electorate By Dr Yana Korobko

ew decisions are made in total isolation from others, but for the most part this first perspective views decision-making as a question of individual psychology: individual preferences, information search, memory, and choice . The main strategy of a political image creation is to determine

correctly the expectations of the public towards their leader. Building a successful image of any political leader mainly depends on understanding the attitudes and demands of the political supporters as well as the ability to show that you are the one who corresponds fully to them. First of all, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by a political image. Mauro Barisione specifies that the image of a public figure is the result of

a representation conveyed by means of mass communication and for this reason any attempt to segregate image and reality is not easy . Barisione proposes an “epistemological tool kit” of conditions that effect voting, which are: I. Structural constraints (Where) • The institutional context • The political context • The media context II. Political opportunities (When) • The opinion climate • The economic conjuncture • Systemic crisis • The campaign environment and communication flows III. Individual moderators (To whom) • Electoral indecision • Political sophistication IV. Image variables (Who) • Notoriety • Popularity • Incumbency V. Types of effects and mediating processes (How) • The direct effect • The negative effect • The indirect effect • Long term • Short term • Retrospective • Prospective VI. Quantitative assessment (How much) • Macro impact • Micro impact As we can see, a public image is made up of a set of social and statistical traits that make up a common denominator of political and personal qualities of a public figure, between which there certainly exists statistical correspondence.

The Strategy “I Am One Of You”

Democrat John Edwards

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

A public image is divided broadly into two main spheres: personal and political. One of the most effective political strategies for a public politician aiming at winning over trust of his electorate is to show that you do the same what they do, dealing with the same concerns and difficulties, and in such a way, to demonstrate that “You are one of them”.

Another personal aspect is communication style of a candidate. In this sense authority must be backed up by appearance or reality of power, which is divided into verbal and non-verbal. The first is rhetorical, dialectical capacity, argumentative logic, style, language, vocabulary, syntax, voice and tone Jacques Chirac

The strategy of “I am one of you” allows a leader to achieve people`s love. As observed, electorate likes those who are similar to them. This has been confirmed by numerous psychological experiments and political practice. However, in this case, we should not forget that, in a first place, a politician should look like a leader, and only then as “our man”.

Golden Middle Way Simplicity and modesty only evoke respect, as everyone knows that these qualities demonstrate a great man. So, everywhere there should be a golden middle way. An image of a politician also shall not be created as too simple. In opposite case there would appear a misunderstanding: “why he, who does not have any special worth, should be our leader?” The limit between simplicity and grandeur is very delicate and requires a great sense of intuition. The other side, which is exceeding originality in the policy of determining the programs and construction of the leader`s image, is also no good, as it only pushes off people. To conquer a candidate, it is useful to use one of the main concepts of marketing: “A competitive product should be like others and only a little bit better”.

Personal Values Of A Leader Among personal features of a political leader that can win over electorate`s disposition is physical appearance. The former French President Jacques Chirac was affirming that a political leader should have presentable physique and style. His case proved, that at the time of his accession to Elysée, he was demonstrating the warm side of his personality, self-confidence, sociability, calmness, reassurance; in a word, an image of a typical politician, who is close to his people, with his richness in strong and expressive gestures, all designed to fill in a social divide and to overcome climate of rejection that reigned at that time in French society (1995), as a result of long years of governing of the socialists. Another personal aspect is communication style of a candidate. In this sense authority must be backed up by appearance or reality of power, which is divided into verbal and non-verbal. The first is rhetorical, dialectical capacity,

argumentative logic, style, language, vocabulary, syntax, voice and tone. The second consists of facial expressiveness, posture, from the management of hands and arms, ability to convey to the audience positive or negative feelings. One of the most commonly hypothesized indicators of power relations involves the activity of gazing (establishing, maintaining, and breaking visual contact). There are approximately four functions ascribed to gazing: (1) seeking feedback; (2) controlling the communication channel; (3) specifying the context of an interpersonal relationship - e.g. status, attitude, or personality differences; and (4) gleaning information from distance . An example of the media prepared candidate is John Edwards (Democratic party, 2004), who tried to appear as very outgoing and friendly, however his gestures were betraying him when he was telling funny stories, shaking hands, and he could not help showing his authoritative nature. In conclusion, the positioning of a leader in the minds of the public aims at solidifying the perception that this candidate is able to do a good job as a governor. This kind of image combines substantially political and personal attributes: the candidate under these terms should “bring impression of reliability and credibility, strength and determination, competence and effectiveness and at the same time warmness and proximity to people”. There is evidence that certain electorate segments prefer to abstain from voting if such set of quality is not inherent to candidates, as these characteristics relate to their quality of leadership and problem solving capacities. A successful image of a politic leader is that of the performative candidate who is sincere and confident, and able to understand people. ■

about the author Dr. Yana Korobko is the Chief Executive of International Relations & Strategic Mediation at Middle East Connect International (MECI) Group and Vice-President of the Institute of Peace and Development (INSPAD). She is a specialist of political psychology. September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine

Egypt: The End of Illusions By Dr Josef Olmert

lack Wednesday will surely go down in the annals of Egyptian history as a day to be remembered for generations to come -- not a mean feat in a country with such long history. This is the day when the only institution still held in high esteem by the vast majority of the Egyptian population, Islamist as well as Westernized-liberal -- the Egyptian Army -- is no more. With so much blood on its hands, the Army, a near-sacred institution, surely since the “victory” in the 1973 war, will be taken by the Islamists, still the majority of Egypt’s population, to be their sworn enemy, the target for blood revenge, rather than the recipient of adulation. Nor is the liberal minority going to uphold unreservedly the traditional platitudes about the Army, as those who suppress brutally the Islamists can surely do, under different circumstances to young, disenchanted secular demonstrators. The generals, under Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, crossed the line of what was previously deemed inconceivable in Egypt, and a precedent is what it is. It can repeat itself anytime. The declaration of State of Emergency for one month only should not mislead anyone, as nothing is more permanent than the temporary in Egypt.... Mubarak instituted a State of Emergency after the assassination of Sadat in 1981 and his own accession to power, which miraculously enough was in place until 2011 and the outbreak of the Egyptian Spring. History does not always repeat itself, but the writing is on the wall. Muhamad Al Barada’I, of all people, the temporary Vice President, just resigned. He got the message, somewhat belatedly though, as he and other secular politicians invited the military to do what it finally did. And the military did it not because of the urgings of the secular politicians, but because of their own vested interest in maintaining and perpetuating their dominant position in Egyptian politics. It is always somewhat risky to predict the more distant future, but not so the immediate aftermath of the big bloodbath. A sustained Islamist struggle is coming, using the masses in the immediate future, and resorting to deadly, unrestrained terror campaign afterwards, the like of which Egypt already witnessed in the 1990s, perhaps reminiscent of the Algerian situation after 1992, though surely not identical. The military will have to be harsh in dealing with it, repression will follow, the economy will continue to deteriorate and real, representative democracy will remain an unattainable goal, noble as it is, clearly in the near future. The Islamists will resent it, the secular will lose faith, the Christians, already under savage attack will flee out; in short, it’s a bleak near future outlook. What is much safer to analyze is what already happened. I refer to the end of the illusions which surrounded the Egyptian situation ever since January 2011. The bulk of Egypt’s population did rise up against Mubarak’s ineffectual, benign authoritarian regime, but they were NOT those who brought him down. He was removed in a coup de grace by his hitherto loyal lieutenants, who believed that by so doing they could preserve their dominant political-economic position in Egypt. If the generals wished then to keep Mubarak at

Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine | September 2013

all costs, they could, but they did not try. Their illusion was that they could somehow tame the shrew, allow free democratic elections in which, even if the Muslim Brotherhood won, the military could maintain its privileges, the Islamists will act moderately and the seculars, though in opposition, will not feel totally disenfranchised. This proved so wrong, as the Islamists are what there are, bearers of a long legacy of oppression, strong believers in Shari’a as the main source of legislation, in sum, committed adherents of an Islamic state, not a pluralistic society. In an Islamic state, they do not want to assign a dominant political role to the military, as respected as it was, even in their eyes. Then came the time of the counter-revolution, upheld by the liberals in Tahrir Square, but again, the illusion was that they were powerful enough to bring down the Brotherhood. They did not, as Morsi was brought down by the military, not by the demonstration in the square. In this case, there was exposed an even bigger illusion, the sense, proved wrong, that in Egypt , uniquely among of all the Arab states of the Middle East, a formidable civic society developed, one which could support political parties with enough popular support, capable of standing up to the proven popular support of the Islamists. Egypt has had its distinct political history in the Middle East, but has still failed to create the conditions that enable secular popular movements to genuinely flourish, unless promoted from above by a dictatorial regime, as happened under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Unfortunately, the circumstances of the military intervention after just one year of a failing Islamist regime preclude the demolition of the myth that Islam is the solution [Islam Al-Hal]. The Islamists may blame Morsi for committing tactical errors, but now they have found their scapegoat, the military, and with it a renewed raison d’etre. What will be the renewed raison’detre of Al-Barada’I and the overall liberal-secular camp remains to be seen. No surprises about the Army’s, it will be restoring stability. The future of Egypt will be determined by the interplay between all these political expectations. It does not look too promising.

about the author Dr. Josef Olmert offers a rare combination of talents: a top Middle East scholar, former peace negotiator, political insider, published journalist and author, as well as a seasoned public speaker. He is currently an Adjunct Professor at USC-University of South Carolina. As Director of the Government Press Office and Advisor to then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir during the first Gulf War and the International Peace Conference in Madrid, he secured press relations for Israel with the Soviet Union and China, and represented the Prime Minister in numerous conferences and appearances in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, China, Russia, Japan and South Africa, among others. His media experience has included penning a political column for Israel’s largest circulation daily, Yediot Aharonot, as well as The Jerusalem Post, and numerous appearances on radio and TV programs at home and abroad.

September 2013 | Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs Magazine