Trump Sparks Furor in Washington

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As the team bus arrives, the French airforce display team performs a fly-over during the France team victory parade on the Champs Elysees (following their victory over Croatia in the 2018 FIFA World Cup Final the previous day), July 2018 ,16 in Paris, France. (Getty Images)

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A worker pries up molten cast iron from a blast furnace at a plant of Dongbei Special Steel Group on July 2018 ,17 in Dalian, Liaoning Province of China. China›s crude steel output rises by six percent in the first six months of 2018, released by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

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Trump Sparks Furor in Helsinki, Then Says He Misspoke At a summit intended to repair strained Russian-American relations, the U.S. President irks even his supporters 10

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In addition to Democratic opposition voices, liberal-leaning media, and Republicans opposed to the Trump presidency, criticism also arrived from some leading Republican figures and conservative media that had generally supported Trump criticism also arrived from some leading Republican figures and conservative media that had generally supported Trump.

The setting of the initial comments — the TrumpPutin summit — had been an effort to improve relations between the two powers strained by war in Syria, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, and a U.S. Government determination that Moscow sought to manipulate the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. Shortly before the summit convened, the U.S. special counsel tasked with investigating the alleged election interference indicted 12 Russian intelligence officers on charges of hacking the Clinton presidential campaign and Democratic National Committee.

U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin speak to the media during a joint press conference after their summit on July 2018 ,16 in Helsinki, Finland.

(Getty)

One day after a controversial July 16 public appearance with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump seemed to retract a statement he had made by Putin’s side rejecting U.S. intelligence reports that Russia meddled in the U.S. elections.

In response to reporters’ questions as to whether Trump accepted the U.S. intelligence community’s finding that Russia did in fact hack the elections, Trump said, “I don’t see any reason why it would be [Russia]. … They said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin; he just said it’s not Russia. … President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today.” Challenged to name any actions for which Putin should be held accountable, Trump declined to do so, instead castigating the U.S. special counsel’s investigation, Democrats, and liberal media.

The turnaround capped a -24hour torrent of criticism in the United States following Trump’s initial comments. In addition to Democratic opposition voices, liberal-leaning media, and Republicans opposed to the Trump presidency,

Among prominent Democrats who condemned the President for his statements, Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer said, “In the entire history of our country, Americans have never seen a president of the United States support an

by Joseph Braude*

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American adversary the way President Trump has supported President Putin. “For the president of the United States to side with President Putin against American law enforcement, American defense officials, and American intelligence agencies is thoughtless, dangerous and weak.

The president is putting himself over our country. … Millions of Americans will continue to wonder if the only possible explanation for this dangerous behavior is the possibility that President Putin holds damaging information over President Trump.”

Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, an outspoken critic of the President’s, shared similar sentiments: “The damage inflicted

by President Trump’s naiveté, egotism, false equivalence and sympathy for autocrats is difficult to calculate. But it is clear that the summit in Helsinki was a tragic mistake … No prior president has ever abased himself more abjectly before a tyrant.”

More surprising were statements of denunciation from Mr. Trump’s supporters. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, also a Republican, Tweeted, “President Trump must clarify his statements in Helsinki on our intelligence system and Putin. It is the most serious mistake of his presidency and must be corrected — immediately.” The Wall Street Journal editorial page, for its part, dubbed the news conference “a personal and national embarrassment,” and said the President had “projected weakness.”

In response, on July 17, during an appearance in the White House Cabinet Room, Trump read a prepared statement to journalists. While repeating his familiar assertion that there had been no collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign, he said, “I accept our intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia's meddling in the 2016 election took place.” He then adlibbed an additional observation: “It could be other people also. A lot of people out there.”

With respect to remarks the previous day, he

explained, “In a key sentence … I said the word ‘would’ instead of ‘wouldn’t.’ The sentence should have been, ‘I don’t see any reason why it wouldn’t be Russia.’”

President Trump did find some support at Breitbart, the rightwing online news site which championed his campaign. Columnist Joel Pollak argued that the summit was a foreign policy victory for Washington: “Putin complained about the U.S. pulling out of the Iran deal, but he was quiet about reports that

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the U.S. had killed hundreds of Russian military contractors in Syria (without losing a single American). Putin also said nothing about U.S. airstrikes against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. He dared not complain. That is because, far from being weak, Trump has been tougher than his predecessors toward Russia, letting his actions speak louder than his words.”

But a more widely held view was expressed by former Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim, himself a Republican: “It may be premature to

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assert that Donald Trump, America’s wrecker in chief, is determined to undermine the Western alliance. Yet his behavior throughout his European visit points in that direction. Should he succeed, he will have accomplished what Putin and his Soviet predecessors could only have hoped for in the wildest of their dreams.” *Middle East specialist Joseph Braude is the author of Broadcasting Change: Arabic Media as a Catalyst for Liberalism (Rowman & Littlefield). He is Advisor to the Al-Mesbar Center for Research and Studies and tweets@josephbraude.

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International Media Reacts to Trump-Putin Summit Trump had «projected weakness.»

While Trump’s comments seemed to leave most U.S. media outlets—even conservative-leaning ones like Fox New—agog, the rest of the world was also watching.

Newspapers around the world were united in their assessment of which world leader came out on top as they ran different photographs of the same scene on their front pages on Tuesday morning -- US President Donald Trump and Russia›s President Vladimir Putin standing side-by-side at a news conference following their two-hour meeting in Helsinki. < photograph of the two leaders shaking hands. < Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal, which is owned by Rupert Murdoch, declared the news conference «a personal and national embarrassment,» asserting that

In the US the morning after, the New York Post went with a headline of «See No Evil» with «Prez gives big Bear hug to wicked BFF Vlad, jabs US intel,» at the top of the page.

< The morning after in the UK, the Daily Mirror tabloid newspaper ran coverage of the summit on its front page, labeling Trump «Putin›s poodle» and quoting former CIA Director and career intelligence officer John Brennan who described the US President›s performance as «nothing short of treasonous.»

< The New York Times devoted much of its front page to the story leading with the headline «Trump, with Putin, attacks 2016 intelligence» above a

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Russian Media Reacts Triumphantly

< The Guardian in London highlighted the backlash against Trump’s “treason”.

< The Financial Times focused on Trump’s defense of Putin.

< Russia’s political and media establishment heralded the highly anticipated summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Helsinki as a victory for Russia in breaking down Western resolve to treat Russia as a pariah and a heartening step forward, with the Kremlin leader as the more prominent figure. “The West’s attempts to isolate Russia failed,” read the headline on a report on Monday’s summit meeting in state-run newspaper Rossiisskaya Gazeta. The front page of a major paper in Helsinki, Kaupallehti, ran the headline “Trump 0 – Putin 1” The reactions were largely in line with what the Russian media said in the hours before the meeting. Russia›s largely Kremlinfriendly TV networks, websites and newspapers portrayed Trump as a political maverick who is being unfairly targeted by his own compatriots. There was a recognition that the summit did not produce any breakthroughs on issues such as Syria, Ukraine or arms control. The Kremlin, in the run-up to the summit, had played down expectations of major progress. Instead, the focus was on the symbolism of the leader of the world’s biggest superpower sitting down one-on-one with Putin after four years of international isolation triggered by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. “It’s funny to recall the nonsense from Obama et al about Russia being a weak ‘regional power’,” Alexey Pushkov, a member of the upper house of the Russian parliament, referring to former U.S. President Barack Obama.

“The attention of the whole world is focused today on Helsinki and it’s crystal clear to everyone: the fate of the world is being decided between Russia and the United States, the leaders of the two major powers of our planet are meeting,” Pushkov said in a Twitter post on Monday. Asked by reporters in Helsinki how the talks had gone, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: “Magnificent... Better than super.” After their joint news conference in Helsinki, Russia media also took some swipes at U.S. journalists for focusing on alleged Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election that brought Trump to power. «To me, it›s the only question that interests the American press,» reporter Yegor Kolyvanov said on NTV, a Kremlin-controlled national TV channel. «Putin assured the entire world that he did not interfere,» declared Olga Skabeyeva on state channel Rossiya1-. The channel›s report gave clear precedence to Putin, running lengthy excerpts of his comments, with fewer, shorter soundbites from Trump. < In Finland, which played host to the summit, newspaper Kauppalehti used a soccer analogy in its headline: «Trump 1-0 Putin,» along with a photo of Trump holding a soccer ball given to him by the Russian leader.

The summit happened a day after the World Cup -- hosted by Russia -- came to an end. < In France, Le Monde topped its front page by calling Trump Putin’s best ally: < Publico in Portugal said Putin gave Trump what he wanted, and Trump gave him much more in return. < The biggest selling Swedish-

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language newspaper in Finland, Hufvudstadsbladet, carried a picture of a smiling Putin next to Trump with the headline: “Trump was my favourite”.

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Europe in the New Era of Great Power Competition How the EU Can Stand Up to Trump and China

By Alina Polyakova, Benjamin Haddad In the run-up to last week’s NATO summit and the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, European leaders could hardly hide their anxiety.

In recent weeks, Trump has gone on a rhetorical warpath against the United States’ greatest allies. In a rally in June, he claimed that the EU “was set up to take advantage of the United States.”

Earlier that month, Trump attacked German Chancellor Angela Merkel as she was facing a rebellion in her own coalition over immigration. “The people of Germany are turning against their leadership,” he tweeted. Trump also reportedly asked French President Emmanuel Macron to leave the EU in order to get a better bilateral trade deal with the United States. These latest attacks came on the heels of Trump’s refusal to join the G7joint statement, his imposition of new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum from U.S. allies, and his proposal to readmit Russia to the G7-. On the eve of the meeting with Putin, the U.S. president called the European Union a “foe.” The message seems clear: “America first” means Europe alone.

These recent debacles reflect not only a growing rift between the United States and western Europe but also a new reality: Europe, divided internally, is losing agency on the world stage, and the Trump administration, acting as a predator more than as a partner, is tempted to exploit this weakness. As great powers compete for

influence across the globe, Europe, like the Middle East or Latin America, will become another battleground.

In a speech in June at the Heritage Foundation unveiling the administration’s Europe strategy, A. Wess Mitchell, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, put it most directly: “Europe is indisputably a place of serious geopolitical competition. . . . We have to take this reality seriously. . . .

America has to take it seriously.” Seen from Europe, this presents an existential challenge. European countries rely on the United States’ continued security commitment and leadership. With the latter gone and the former at risk, Europe will need to unify at home and undertake some savvy diplomatic maneuvering abroad if it is to continue to pursue its interests on the global stage.

For Europe, learning how to live in the new era of great power competition is not just about managing an unpredictable U.S. president with a special disdain for multilateral alliances; it is a question of survival.

AMERICAN PREDATOR In an extraordinarily short time, Trump has begun to pivot the United States away from 70 years of U.S. foreign policy, which promoted European integration as a bedrock of U.S. security.

Now that Washington aims to compete in Europe rather than alongside Europe, it will try to pick off European countries by

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Leaders inspect the demonstration flight within the 2018 NATO Summit at NATO headquarters on July 2018 ,11 in Brussels, Belgium. (Getty Images)

dangling bilateral trade deals in front of them, such as the one Trump offered Macron. As the international relations expert Thomas Wright has argued, this could include using the United Kingdom’s weakened post-Brexit position to pressure it into signing a free trade agreement with the United States over one with the EU. The United States, in a predatory stance, will also exploit its greatest leverage, its defense and security commitments, to get short-term deals on trade. It will dole out defense dollars to the most loyal while punishing those who stand up to it. For 2019, Congress committed 6.3$ billion toward the European Deterrence Initiative, an increase of 1.8$ billion from 2018. Those funds, which are aimed at deterring Russia, disproportionately go to U.S. military forward presence and readiness in eastern Europe.

But at the same time, the Pentagon is assessing the costs of U.S. military presence in Germany and the potential impact of withdrawing the 35,000 U.S. troops currently positioned there.

These seemingly contradictory impulses—significant spending increases on European defense coupled with concerns over costs associated with keeping U.S. troops in Germany—make sense from the perspective of a United States interested in breaking up Europe rather than preserving it.

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European countries rely on the United States’ continued security commitment and leadership.

On the political front, the United States is moving to undermine European leaders who do not fall in line. Trump’s visit to the United Kingdom in July, during which he disparaged British Prime Minister Theresa May in a tabloid interview, revealed how such a strategy could play out in real time. The United States is undercutting Merkel by empowering far-right forces and fanning the flames of the immigration debate. The Trump administration is disregarding democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, much to the chagrin of the EU, which is looking for ways to punish those states for their increasingly illiberal policies. Hours before tweeting about the German migration crisis, Trump was on

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a call with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in which they spoke about the importance of border defenses. That conversation likely prompted Trump’s subsequent Twitter attack on Germany.

In the pursuit of bilateral relationships, the Trump administration is actively sowing divisions in other multilateral institutions as well, including NATO and the G7-.

EUROPE THE WEAK Europeans should take heed of this new reality. In just the last month, European leaders have been unable to sway the United States on major issues affecting their interests, from tariffs to the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Worse still, despite announcing measures to save the JCPOA, European leaders have limited options to shield their own companies from renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran. Major European companies, such as Allianz, Peugeot, and Total, have already announced their withdrawals from Iran. What’s more, the Trump administration has threatened to impose sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, a move that would effectively end the project, in which Austrian, Dutch, French, and German energy companies hold significant stakes. That would be a harsh move by the United States, but European countries would have no obvious recourse.

The current moment harkens back to the Suez crisis in 1956, when France and the United Kingdom belatedly realized their loss of influence in the Middle East. Attempting to intervene to overthrow Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser after he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden saw their ambitions thwarted by the combined opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Europe’s predicament is even more concerning. Suez showed that Europeans couldn’t reshape other regions without the assent of great powers; now, they are faced with the prospect of losing agency over their own continent, too.

If Europe wants to be an actor rather than a chessboard on which great powers compete, European leaders must take responsibility for defense and security and play up their economic strengths.

So far, Europeans have pursued the path of least resistance: holding firm on their positions but toning down the rhetoric to avoid alienating Trump. Macron, in particular, has relied on his charm to build a personal relationship with Trump. In April, Macron’s approach seemed to be paying off when he became the first foreign dignitary to be invited on a state visit to Washington during Trump’s presidency. But despite the Trump-Macron “bromance,” he walked away empty-handed: the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and imposed tariffs on the EU just weeks after Macron’s visit. Merkel has taken a more principled approach, which has only earned her Trump’s ire. Leaders of other countries, including the Baltic states, have adopted some of Trump’s rhetoric on defense spending and emphasized their own good behavior on meeting NATO’s two percent target. Yet they too know that their only option is to wait and see as major decisions about their future are made without them.

RESURGENT EUROPE? European leaders might assume that they can just wait this administration out. That would be a mistake. Trump’s policies, as harmful as they are to transatlantic relations, are also a response to European weakness and division. Previous U.S. administrations valued the transatlantic relationship and the common ideals that bound the two sides together, especially during the Cold War. But past U.S. presidents also had no illusions about Europe’s dependence on the United States. To remain relevant, Europe must learn how to play to its strengths in the face of great power competition.

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NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) foreign ministers attend a working dinner at the park of the Cinquantenaire during a NATO Summit in Brussels, on July 2018 ,11. (Getty Images)

Since the end of the Cold War, European elites and policymakers have believed that their model of multilateral decision-making, soft power, and institutional interdependence represents the future of international politics. In a best-selling book published in 2005, the political scientist Mark Leonard asserted that this European model would “rule the 21st century.” The EU’s predecessor, the European Community, was built on the ashes of World War II and premised on the idea that interdependence, cooperation, and integration would lead to convergence on liberal democracy. Today, that premise seems misplaced: Europe is becoming the exception, not the norm, as the British commentator Janan Ganesh recently put it.

If Europe wants to be an actor rather than a chessboard on which great powers compete, European leaders must take responsibility for defense and security and play up their economic strengths. Investing in European defense will necessarily go along with some decoupling from the United States. New efforts such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund move Europe in the right direction but still fall short of achieving military autonomy. A more militarily independent Europe would also prove a more attractive partner for the United States, which still needs European cooperation in fighting terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Ambitious countries such as France could take a more assertive role in regional conflicts such as the Syrian civil war, rather than waiting for U.S. leadership. Germany, which is Russia’s largest trade partner, could flex its economic muscle to

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push back against Putin. Europe should continue to engage the United States and push for its interests, but first and foremost, it should seize the moment to develop a vision for Europe’s role in the world.

To be sure, the current U.S. approach to Europe is shortsighted. The web of alliances and common values that undergird transatlantic relationships form a much stronger counter to China and Russia than do raw economic or military resources. The Trump administration will get its way on European investments in Iran and might even manage to negotiate more favorable trade conditions with the EU. But the short-term gains of acting like a predatory and divisive power in Europe will be offset when Europe looks elsewhere for friends. In a speech last month, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called for deeper European defense integration, a welcome step, and has pushed for a broad European approach toward Russia, against the wishes of some in his own party. So far, Germany has held strong on the issue of Russian sanctions, but as right-wing populists with pro-Russian agendas gather strength across Europe and China tries to peel off European countries with economic enticements, an antagonistic U.S. strategy could drive Europe farther east. Without European support, the United States will find it difficult to compete with China and Russia in other theaters. Yet if Europeans truly want to make their case heard in Washington, they need to start at home.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Standing Up for Democracy American Values and Great-Power Competition

By Richard Fontaine In its 2018 National Defense Strategy, released in January, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump correctly identified great-power competition as the United States’ central security challenge. In recent years, rival states such as China and Russia have increased their ability to project power and undermine the U.S.-led liberal international order, even as Washington has struggled to respond. Beijing and Moscow, moreover, share a vision of a global order more conducive to their own forms of authoritarian governance. As a result, today’s great-power competition is a contest not just of nations but of political systems.

Thus far, the Trump administration has largely focused on great-power rivalry in terms of economic and military might.

Its strategy documents have outlined the loss of the United States’ competitive military edge as other states have made major investments in new power projection technologies.

Washington has used tariffs and other penalties in order to fight China’s mercantilist economic practices, while Congress and the administration have imposed sanctions on individual Russians accused of international transgressions.

These responses, however, are not enough. To overcome its geopolitical rivals, the United States must go beyond building a stronger military or enforcing economic rules; it must double down on its support for democracy around the

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Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping see a contest of systems under way between liberal democracy and centrally guided rule. liberty in the United States is tied to the destiny of freedom abroad, and presidents as different as Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan have actively worked to defend and extend the ranks of free nations.

For the United States, supporting democracy is a matter of both values and interests. It helps mobilize the American public around U.S. foreign policy and provides direction to Washingtonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s international efforts beyond narrowly construed national interest. History shows that democracy promotion is also a powerful way to advance global stability. Democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another, the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; closest allies are democracies, and its most reliable trade and investment markets are those in liberal societies. A world in which the institutions of liberal democracy are strong is safer for the United States than one in which autocracy is on the prowl.

American Flag (Getty Images)

world. Authoritarian powers such as China and Russia are working to subvert democracy where it exists, snuff it out where it is new, and keep it away where it is lacking. They see their assault on democracy as a matter not of values but of strategic advantage, whereby they can enhance their own power by eroding the internal cohesion of democracies and the solidarity of democratic alliances. Beijing and Moscow are on the offensive; meanwhile, Washington is hardly playing defense, much less doing what it needs to: championing a robust agenda for protecting and enlarging the free world.

A CONTEST OF SYSTEMS Washington has not always been indifferent to the fate of democracy. The Founding Fathers understood that the fate of

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The importance of democracy to U.S. interests helps explain recent Chinese and Russian activities. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping see a contest of systems under way between liberal democracy and centrally guided rule. Xi offers China as an alternative model for developing countries that can deliver economic modernity without political choice, while Putin argues that Western democracies are decadent, lacking the discipline and vigor of his technologically empowered dictatorship. Both project their authoritarian models in order to subvert free societies, weaken U.S. alliances, and gain geostrategic advantage.

Sensing that a divided United States poses less of a threat to Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s imperial ambitions, Moscow seeks to damage the democratic practice that lies at the core of American life. Through disinformation and interference, it works to sow distrust in elections and institutions, pit social groups against one another, and undermine the notion of truth on which democratic discourse depends. In dozens of Western countries, Russia has employed cyberattacks, fake news, propaganda, and social-media manipulation to undermine open societies, while providing material support to illiberal social and political groups, including radical populists on both sides of the ideological spectrum.

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China takes a more subtle, long-term approach. In countries such as Australia and Greece, Beijing has used its economic weight to lean on corporations and civil society groups to limit speech China finds objectionable. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative threatens to catch countries in a web of debt dependency and increased corruption. Similarly, China’s development of a new “digital Silk Road,” a plan to promote information technology connectivity across Eurasia, may well export Beijing’s Orwellian domestic surveillance regime.

Through such moves, China is deploying what the National Endowment for Democracy terms “sharp power,” designed to “pierce, penetrate, or perforate the information and political environments in the targeted countries.” In other words, Beijing is building political influence in target countries and constructing an expansive, illiberal sphere of influence that is hostile to U.S. leadership.

RESETTING WASHINGTON’S PRIORITIES China and Russia’s influence campaigns require a U.S. response—for reasons not of Wilsonian idealism but of hardnosed realism. Democratic nations must defend themselves against a form of ideological assault they have not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, the United States should push back against authoritarian influence in three ways: by making existing democracies more resilient, by protecting and supporting fragile democracies, and by expanding democratic choice in countries where it is today unknown.

The top priority should be to make open societies more resilient and capable of defending themselves against external threats. During the Cold War, U.S. grand strategy revolved around protecting democratic strongpoints in Asia and Europe. Today, the United States must first defend itself against autocratic penetration and subversion, while also looking to protect allies and partners such as Australia, France, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. Just as Washington would view any military intrusion into

Democratic nations must defend themselves against a form of ideological assault they have not witnessed since the end of the Cold War

these countries as an unacceptable infringement of their sovereignty, so too must it view political interference as a hostile act worthy of a collective response.

The second priority should be to protect fragile nascent democracies—countries that have recently democratized but where democracy is still under assault from internal or external forces. Ukraine is an important example: both its government and a majority of its population support democratic consolidation and integration into the West, yet Moscow is pursuing hybrid war to subvert the country’s sovereign institutions. Other important fragile democracies include Bangladesh, Georgia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tunisia, which face threats as diverse as Russian aggression, Chinese economic coercion, and violent non-state extremism.

The third priority should be encouraging democratic openings in autocratic environments. Washington may lack the leverage to mitigate repression in countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, but there are other places where democratic practice may find more fertile ground, including Angola, Belarus, Central Asia, Ethiopia, and Venezuela.

Washington’s objective in these countries should be not to foment regime change but to support local actors working to incrementally expand democracy.

VALUES AND INTERESTS Many in Washington now believe that autocratic resurgence

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in intelligence and other resources devoted to countering state-sponsored threats to democracy.

Washington will also need to recast threats to democracy— and their solutions—as challenges to be faced in cooperation with its allies. Russian meddling in Europe should be an issue for NATO, while Chinese interference in Australia should be dealt with as part of U.S.-Australian treaty commitments. By viewing such external assaults not just as a matter of domestic politics but also as an attack on alliances, Washington and its partners can better share information and resources and coordinate joint responses.

Close up of the United States Capital Building Dome (Getty Images).

is simply a fact of life. Pointing to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they argue that the United States has a poor record of promoting human rights and democracy, and say it should be careful what it wishes for—during the Arab Spring, for instance, the fall of autocrats ushered in not liberal democracy but instability and violent extremism. Yet the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were launched in the name of national security, not democracy promotion, and the Arab Spring was more a product of local dynamics than of anything the United States said or did. Moreover, these arguments ignore the reality that in an interconnected world, the health of U.S. democracy depends in part on the strength of democracy in other countries. A policy agenda of supporting democratic practice abroad does not distract from the imperatives of great-power competition; on the contrary, it is part and parcel of engaging the contest.

To that end, Washington should invest in defending democracy around the world. This will require, among other things, protecting elections, government institutions, and the media from cyberattacks and imposing material costs on those who use digital tools to foster division and distrust. It means devoting significant intelligence resources to understanding adversary activity and proactively defending against their assaults on U.S. institutions. This February, for instance, the then director of the National Security Agency, Mike Rogers, admitted that his agency lacks the presidential authority to disrupt Russian meddling in the 2018 election. This problem requires immediate remedy, as does the vast underinvestment

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Supporting nascent democracies will require a panoply of diplomatic and economic measures, together with the patience to see through long-term efforts. A good start would be for Washington to stop treating institutions that focus on conditions in fragile democracies—such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, or USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance division—as strategic backwaters, less worthy of attention and resources than those more explicitly focused on national security. On the contrary, leaders in both the executive branch and Congress must understand that such institutions, which have been studying these questions for decades, are tip-of-the-spear instruments that better equip the United States for today’s hybrid environment of great-power competition.

When it comes to the hardest cases, it will be critical not to give authoritarian challengers a free pass on internal repression. U.S. leaders have traditionally spoken out in favor of human rights and democracy in closed societies, including those with regimes with which they must do business. Yet today U.S. officials often defer to the governments of authoritarian countries, which are treated as unitary actors despite the fact that these undemocratic regimes do not speak for their citizens. In this contested space, Washington must consistently speak up for human rights, political freedoms, and minority protections, both generally and with respect to specific countries. The people of those nations will remember it.

Efforts to support democracy should emphasize not a missionary vision of spreading “American” values around the world but, rather a hard-edged, practical strategy of empowering countries to protect their own sovereignty. No nation wants to be part of another’s sphere of influence, and nationalism remains a potent force. By mobilizing to protect against the establishment of authoritarian great-power spheres of influence, the United States can offer a vision that appeals to both the values and interests of countries around the world.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Ukraine's Promising Path to Reform A Narrow Focus on Corruption Overlooks Remarkable Progress

By Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander J. Motyl At the recent G7- summit, U.S. President Donald Trump was reported to have told fellow world leaders that “Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.” Small wonder: for years, U.S. government officials and their European counterparts have publicly castigated Ukraine for dragging its feet on corruption.

So too have Western media outlets, whose narrative often echoes the fictitious Russian talking point that Ukraine is a failing, if not failed, state.

Although corruption is a serious problem, the West’s obsession obscures the progress that Ukraine has made in dramatically reducing its scope. Many Western observers have also ignored the other enormous positive changes that Ukraine has experienced

since the Euromaidan revolution of 14–2013, which ousted the corrupt, pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, triggering Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its invasion of the Donbas in the country’s east. Since then, any hopes that the Kremlin had of keeping Kiev under its thumb have been lost, as Ukraine has set itself on a firm pro-Western, pro-reform course that is probably irreversible. It is no exaggeration to say that, contrary to its image, Ukraine has experienced more positive change and done more things right than any other European state in recent years.

DECOUPLING FROM RUSSIA, EMBRACING THE WEST In almost every sphere, there is evidence of remarkably

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For the first time since independence in 1991, Ukraine possesses a genuine army capable of defending the country

Exterior Of Government Building Against Sky, Photo Taken In Kiev, Ukraine. (Getty Images)

successful reforms and development in Ukraine. For the first time since independence in 1991, Ukraine possesses a genuine army capable of defending the country. At the time of the Russian invasion in 2014, the country had some 6,000 battle-ready troops. Now it has one of the best armies in Europe, numbering over 200,000 volunteers and professionals. It has refurbished formerly out-of-service tanks and armored personnel carriers, developed new missiles, and produced new heavy artillery.

Ukraine also possesses a combat-ready national guard of 60,000, a reformed police force, and a revamped security service that has successfully interdicted a number of Russian-financed efforts at promoting terrorism on Ukraine-controlled territory.

The country is also finally developing a functional state apparatus,

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both nationally and locally. The government has trimmed its bureaucracies, increased its salaries, and clearly defined various functional authorities. Ukraine’s ministries employ roughly as many civil servants per capita as do Germany’s and Poland’s.

The days of a bloated apparatus prone only to bribe-taking and indolence are gone. Decentralization of authority has proceeded apace, and local budgets have doubled within the last two years, leading to improved roads, schools, and cultural centers.

The economy, which contracted by more than 20 percent in 15–2014, is finally growing this year at a respectable 3.5 percent clip. To be sure, Ukraine needs to grow at twice that rate to catch up with its neighbors to the west, but the important thing is that it has finally lifted itself up from the depression that followed the Russian invasion. The government has fixed the banking sector and—together with a burgeoning number of Chinese investors— is spending huge amounts to fix roads and railroads, modernize airports, dredge ports, build new highways and tunnels to the West, and invest in renewable energy. Ukraine’s IT sector is booming and has become one of the largest and most dynamic in the world. Its agricultural exports (grains and poultry, in particular) are growing steadily and, with large segments of productive land currently fallow, there is further huge upside potential. Next year should see a massive sell-off of remaining state-owned enterprises and, quite possibly, the privatization of land, which would immediately bring hundreds of millions of dollars into state coffers and further reduce the scope for corruption.

Indeed, in contrast to Western criticism, Ukraine has made great strides in reining in corruption. A series of gas pricing, procurement, banking, and tax system reforms have restored as much as 6$ billion per annum in revenues formerly stolen from the state, according to a soon-to-be-released study by Ihor Burakovsky, an economist from Ukraine’s Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, an independent think tank. The study points to the drastic reduction in corrupt gas price arbitrage, transparent online bidding for government contracts, the closing and tight control of allegedly corrupt banks, and a clampdown on money laundering, which the Yanukovych regime’s tax administration colluded companies to facilitate. Small wonder then that the black market’s share of the Ukrainian economy has dropped from an estimated 50–40 percent to around 33 percent.

Ukrainians are also increasingly paying their taxes; the practice of getting paid under the table, although still widespread, has

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been significantly reduced in scope.

While all this change has been taking place, Ukraine has raised its military and security expenditures to approximately five percent of GDP, fought a war with Russia and its proxies to a standstill, introduced far-reaching reforms of its health, pension, and education systems, and still managed to remain democratic. The Ukrainian media are still free to harshly criticize the government, and the country’s opposition parties are vocal, vibrant, and well-funded. To be sure, Ukrainian democracy is imperfect.

The parliament is frequently raucous and undisciplined. The government can be sluggish. The courts are unreliable. The president, although a supporter of new reforms and anti-corruption institutions, has resisted pressing for corruption prosecutions.

Vigilantism and far-right groups do not pose a threat at present, but could if stability were to unravel. All in all, however, Kiev has stuck to the democratic rules of the game, despite the fact that war, rapid change, and economic penury often incline states toward authoritarianism. Ukraine’s commitment to democracy is especially striking in comparison to the significant backsliding that has taken place in Poland and Hungary, both EU members long touted as exemplars of irreversible democratic transitions.

Ukraine is also experiencing a breathtaking cultural revival.

Its film industry is back, after being moribund for over twenty years. Publishing is booming and books are selling briskly, despite Ukrainians’ relatively low salaries. Music, art, theater, poetry, and prose are experiencing a renaissance, while Ukrainian identity is consolidating—without xenophobic consequences. A 2016 survey by the Pew Research Center, for instance, showed that Ukraine’s level of anti-Semitism was the lowest in all of central and eastern Europe.

Even the ongoing war in the Donbas has offered an unexpected boost for Ukraine, as it has galvanized Ukrainian identity and patriotism, moved the government to adopt needed reforms, and removed a reactionary, pro-Russian, anti-Western, and antireform electorate from the political calculus. The conflict has also reduced the power of billionaire oligarchs, who have lost key assets in Russian-occupied areas and seen state pressure increase

All of these changes have set Ukraine well on the way to meeting its strategic goal of decoupling from Russia and embracing the West.

against some of their rent-seeking schemes. Dmytro Firtash’s gas empire has been smashed, while Rinat Akhmetov’s and Igor Kolomoisky’s hold on their bailiwicks in southeastern Ukraine has been seriously weakened.

All of these changes have set Ukraine well on the way to meeting its strategic goal of decoupling from Russia and embracing the West. It is now able to defend itself against any Russian aggression short of a full-scale war, and has freed its economy from dependence on Russia’s, with the result that Ukraine will soon become a full-fledged member of the world economic system.

Of course, there is still work for Ukraine to do. This includes, first, coordinating its reforms better, so as to avoid duplication, contradictions, and the loss of stability that comes with too much changing too quickly. Second, the government obviously needs to tackle remaining corruption, especially in customs services and state enterprises. The way to do that is not to focus only on prosecuting individual wrongdoers but to increase efforts to address the structural and institutional sources of corruption.

Officials take bribes and steal not because they are morally deficient but because they earn too little and control access to scarce resources. Continuing to raise salaries and reduce government control over key areas is thus the best policy prescription. Third, Ukraine needs to accelerate its annual economic growth to five or six percent in order to sustain necessary military expenditures, protect itself from Russian predations, and present itself to

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made forcefully by the late political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in the 1960s, holds true today. The very last thing a rapidly changing society needs is a political system that is being undermined from within, by internal critics of corruption, and from without, by a West that underestimates Ukraine’s rapid pace of change and a Russia that appreciates that, unless stopped soon, Ukraine will leave its orbit forever.

Delegations arrive for a working session of NATO leaders and the delegations from Ukraine and Georgia at the 2018 NATO Summit on July ,12 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. (Getty Images)

Europe as fiscally independent and worthy of closer integration.

THREATS TO SUCCESS If Ukraine’s reformist project fails, it won’t be for insufficiently tackling corruption. Rather, the two most immediate threats to the country’s continued positive development are the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections and Russia.

Petro Poroshenko is without doubt the best president that independent Ukraine has had. He’s hardly without flaws, but it has been under his watch, and in no small measure thanks to his initiative, that Ukraine has reformed as much as it has.

Despite a strong record, his reelection next March is by no means guaranteed. Meanwhile, most alternatives to him, including Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Lyashko, Volodymyr Zelensky, and Yuri Boiko are populists, demagogues, untested outsiders, or politicians with close links to former President Yanukovych.

Worse still, his party will likely lose its majority in parliament, leading to legislative fragmentation and possible paralysis. If a populist replaces Poroshenko and the Rada fragments, Ukraine’s reforms will stall and another popular rebellion will become more likely.

In their narrow focus on corruption, many experts in the West forget that rapid socioeconomic change of the kind Ukraine has experienced since 2014 can be destabilizing in the absence of strong and stable political elites and institutions. This insight,

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It is unfortunate that the demands the International Monetary Fund is making on Ukraine present the current leadership with serious dilemmas. The IMF is insisting on a strong anticorruption court, which is a desirable end, but it is also pushing for an inflexible 40 percent one-time increase in gas tariffs, which would be politically ruinous for Poroshenko and the gradual reformists now in charge of government. Unfortunately, the IMF has a long record of focusing only on macroeconomic reforms without considering their effects on already impoverished populations able to express their discontent by voting or taking to the streets. A precipitous wage hike on the eve of the presidential campaign would propel public anger, strengthening outsiders and populists. An end to the IMF’s program of support could lead to currency devaluation and inflation as well as potential default on debt, which would only propel populist alternatives and set back current gains.

The most serious immediate threat remains Russia and its aggressive president, Vladimir Putin. Whereas corruption can reduce Ukraine’s long-term viability, only Russia can destroy Ukraine overnight. Will Putin increase internal subversion efforts, escalate the fighting in the Donbas, or invade some other part of Ukraine? The costs would be high, as Ukraine’s security forces are demonstrating effectiveness and the armed forces are a battle-hardened and professional force that would fight back fiercely. But Putin, facing the twilight of his career and sensing that NATO may have become a paper tiger, may just be tempted to initiate a “quick little war” in order to sustain his popularity.

The consequences of such a misadventure could be disastrous for Ukraine—and for Russia as well as, ultimately, for Europe.

With a clear-eyed view of these threats, the lesson for the West should be obvious. Western governments and international financial institutions must abandon their nearly exclusive focus on corruption and broaden their view of Ukraine to include the many positive things happening in the country. The West needs to continue to support Ukraine economically, diplomatically, and militarily. This is so not only because Ukraine is the only thing standing between Europe and Putin’s Russia but because, as a rapidly Westernizing country that has made remarkable progress over the past four years, Ukraine simply deserves it.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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A New Military Strategy for Japan Active Denial Will Increase Security in Northeast Asia

By Eric Heginbotham, Richard Samuels Japan confronts an increasingly difficult security environment.

Despite the current media attention on North Korea, a very real but largely one-dimensional nuclear threat, Japanese strategists are concerned primarily with the broader and more multidimensional challenge posed by the rise of China and its territorial ambitions in the East China Sea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been more forward-looking regarding security affairs than his predecessors. He has moved to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, reorganize its security policymaking institutions, and increase its military budget after a long period of decline, while loosening some restrictions on its military forces and enhancing

Japan’s intelligence capacity. These measures, however, can only marginally slow a shifting balance of power. A rethink of military strategy, one that looks to buttress deterrence even in the absence of military dominance, is urgently required.

Japan’s current approach might be labeled a strategy of “forward defense” and is centered on defeating aggression as quickly as possible at the outer limits of Japanese territory. To execute that strategy, it has built traditional maneuver forces designed to fight decisive battles. Although forward defense was entirely reasonable during the early post–Cold War period, it is a poor fit for an evolving environment in which China would enjoy significant advantages at the outset of a conflict. To mitigate its

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Over the past 20 years, China’s military modernization has increased the magnitude and nature of Beijing’s strategic challenge to Tokyo with the country’s economic expansion, increasing by an inflationadjusted 665 percent from 1996 to 2017 and now totaling some 153$ billion. Japan’s defense budget, in contrast, grew by only 22 percent during the same period. At 47$ billion, it is now less than one-third the size of China’s.

The development of China’s “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, designed to impede the flow of U.S. forces into the region and limit their operational freedom once in the theater, poses particular challenges. These capabilities include roughly 40 modern submarines, antisatellite systems, and, most important, a large and sophisticated arsenal of conventionally armed missiles.

Of China’s roughly 1,300 conventionally armed ballistic missiles, some 150 to 500 have the range to strike targets in Japan, as do hundreds of its ground- and air-launched cruise missiles. These highly accurate missile systems could destroy key nodes in Japan’s defense infrastructure, including air bases, air defenses, communications hubs, and military ports, crippling Tokyo’s ability to resist follow-on attacks by Chinese air and/or naval forces.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer ship Kurama, left, leads a troop of vessels during a fleet review at Sagami Bay, off Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, on Sunday, Oct. 2015 ,18.

(Getty Images)

vulnerability, harness the full potential of its alliance with the United States, and increase its ability to deter China, Japan should shift instead toward a strategy of “active denial”—one focused not on fighting pitched battles at the outset but on maintaining a force that can survive an initial assault and continue to harass and resist enemy forces, thereby denying them quick, decisive victories and driving up the risks and costs of military aggression

EVOLVING BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER Over the past 20 years, China’s military modernization has increased the magnitude and nature of Beijing’s strategic challenge to Tokyo. China’s military budget has grown in step

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More recently, China has also developed a formidable array of maneuver forces. It has doubled its modern fighter aircraft inventory over the last seven years, and its air forces now outnumber the combined total of Japanese and local U.S. air forces (including U.S. aircraft forward-deployed to Japan and Guam) by a margin of two to one. Given current build rates, China’s advantage in modern fighter aircraft is likely to rise to three to one by 2025. China has greatly accelerated destroyer production, and by 2025 it will operate as many destroyers as the United States and Japan do in the western Pacific—and far more frigates. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also moving rapidly to address its remaining weaknesses in areas such as antisubmarine warfare, replenishment of ships at sea, and cargo and tanker aircraft.

The overall quality of Chinese systems and training is not up to U.S. standards, though China has narrowed the gap across the board. In the event of an attack on any of China’s four main islands, Japanese and U.S. forces would enjoy inherent defensive advantages and could almost certainly repel a Chinese assault.

However, in the context of Beijing’s aspirations for greater control in the East China and South China Seas, Tokyo has cause for concern about the security of its offshore islands, where China

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is in a position to mount a serious military challenge. While a deliberate Chinese attack or invasion of these islands is unlikely, a clash there could escalate quickly.

Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain stretches some 600 miles from Japan’s southern island of Kyushu, and the disputed Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), as well as the Yaeyama Islands group at the end of the Ryukyu chain, are twice as far from Kyushu as they are from China’s continental bases. There are some 29 PLA air force and naval air bases within fighter range of the Senkaku Islands but only four U.S. and Japanese bases within the same distance.U.S. and Japanese tankers could support aircraft flying from more distant bases, but only at reduced sortie rates and with greater stress on pilots and aircraft. The comparative scarcity of nearby Japanese and U.S. military infrastructure and the proximity to mainland bases magnify the threat of a Chinese combined air and missile attack, possibly supported by submarines and surface ships.

PROBLEM OF MILITARY STRATEGY To understand how Japan should begin to rethink its military strategy, it is useful to consider that strategy in the context of three ideal-type approaches to conventional defense and deterrence: forward defense, denial, and punishment. Forward defense looks to defeat an attacker’s military forces as quickly and as far forward as possible, preferably at or near the state’s frontiers.

Denial strategies seek to prevent conquest through prolonged, active resistance, often by yielding at least some ground and avoiding a decisive battle until the balance of forces has shifted in the defender’s favor. Punishment hinges on the ability to inflict unacceptable losses on an attacker’s valued assets—for instance, by destroying targets in its home country.

During the early Cold War, Japan practiced a “shield and spear” denial strategy. Japanese forces (the “shield”) would delay and harass an invader until U.S. forces (the “spear”) could arrive.

In the 1970s, however, Japan’s military emphasis began to shift toward forward defense. By the end of the Cold War it had one of the world’s largest defense budgets, largely allocated to

Japan could employ new mobility concepts similar to those currently being tested by the U.S. military to complicate an adversary’s targeting problem

the maintenance of traditional maneuver forces (such as large warships and large formations of aircraft operating from fullservice air bases) that could engage any potential aggressor in a direct military confrontation. Despite the adoption of a “dynamic defense concept” in 2010, Japan continues to maintain its focus on forward defense. Indeed, by building an expensive amphibious assault capability for an immediate counterattack on potential adversary lodgments on Japan’s outer islands, it has effectively doubled down on that forward defense strategy.

This strategy made sense in the context of the late Cold War and early post–Cold War periods, when Japan could meet any potential aggressor on equal or better terms. With the rise of China, however, this assumption no longer holds. China’s long-range precision-strike capability poses a lethal threat to Japan’s military infrastructure and, to a lesser extent,its large military formations. Undertaking early counteroffensive action in the Senkaku Islands or southern Ryukyu chain would risk catastrophic defeat and potentially destroy Tokyo’s will or ability to continue the fight. Missile defenses cannot provide a reliable or airtight solution, especially given their high costs.

A BETTER ALTERNATIVE A better option for Japan is an active denial strategy, focused on demonstrating to Chinese leaders that any attack would likely turn into a protracted conflict, one in which U.S. and Japanese forces would enjoy clear advantages. The priority in a denial strategy would be not a quick victory but rather denying China early and decisive success, allowing Japanese forces to effectively resist until U.S. reinforcements could arrive. In contrast to Japan’s

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early Cold War denial strategy, which was built around relatively immobile and regionally organized ground forces, active denial would be dynamic and mobile and would include tactical offensive capability.

The active denial strategy has two mutually reinforcing elements: a resilient force posture and a reordering of mission priorities.

The first element, a resilient force posture, refers to the ability of Japan’s military to absorb attacks and continue to operate effectively. Resilience will require an expanded and strengthened system of military infrastructure, even if such investments leave somewhat less money available for weaponry. Civilian airports, for example, could be prepared to support air force operations, enabling the quick dispersion of Japanese and U.S. aircraft, greatly increasing the number of targets an attacker would need to strike, and reducing Japan’s vulnerability to missile attacks.

Expanding the number of ports and naval supply locations would similarly boost the survivability and flexibility of the Japanese fleet.

Replenishment ship Tokiwa's captain Yasuo Takamori (2nd R) of Japan's Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF) supplies fuel and water to MSDF's destroyer Onami (L) during an exercise in the Sagami Bay off Tokyo on September 2008 ,4. (Getty Images)

Mobility and deception can also play an important part in developing resilience. Japan could employ new mobility concepts similar to those currently being tested by the U.S. military to complicate an adversary’s targeting problem. These include “agile combat employment,” the temporary dispatch of small numbers of combat aircraft (usually two to four fighters) supported by a single cargo aircraft with fuel and munitions to austere air bases. Other sorts of mobility enhancements, such as the development of a civilian reserve fleet of fast transport ships and the naval reservists to staff them, are central to maintaining coherent defenses in the Ryukyu Islands, where the ability to reinforce positions and replace destroyed systems and expended munitions will be critical.

Active defenses against air and missile attacks are also important but should be considered in the context of the larger resiliency effort. Missile defenses, in particular, loom large in the public imagination, since they can, at least in theory, protect civilian targets. But they also absorb inordinate amounts of the defense budget, despite the fact that concealment, dispersion, and mobility are often more economical and effective strategies. Luring China to fire missiles at empty shelters or low-value targets would have the same effect as shooting down those missiles in flight or penetrating Chinese airspace to destroy them prior to launch, but the former may be achieved more cheaply.

key military and civilian assets, is associated with integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), antisubmarine warfare, and defensive antisurface warfare tasks. Modernizing older aircraft and acquiring additional -4.5generation fighters, such as the F/A18-E/F or F15-SE, would allow the small number of F35-As to serve as more effective force multipliers for the air effort.

Acquiring some number of F35-Bs, capable of operating from short runways or amphibious assault ships, would also enhance Japan’s ability to sustain an air battle while under attack in the Ryukyu Islands. In the maritime domain, supplementing its fleet with smaller and cheaper multifunction frigates would help to improve Japan’s ability to survive an initial Chinese attack in the southwestern islands.

Focusing on these tasks would require a reversal of Japan’s current budgetary priorities, which allocate 50 percent more money to the army than to either the air force or the navy. It will also require improving coordination and introducing joint commands so that the different services can function more effectively as an integrated whole.

A NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY Business as usual in U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and Japan’s own defense effort is a losing proposition. The alliance between the United States and Japan continues to serve both parties’ critical interests—among other things, it anchors the U.S. position in Asia—but it is entirely reasonable for the United States to push for Japan to increase its military spending and continue defense reform. At the same time, however, spending alone will not be sufficient to meet the evolving threat posed by China. A fundamental rethink of strategy will be critical.

With Chinese incursions into the Senkaku Islands on the rise, Japan would do well to adopt an active denial strategy that demonstrates its capacity for a viable, long-term defense of the islands. By denying an adversary the possibility of an early knockout blow and promising to turn any conflict into a protracted affair, the strategy would significantly buttress deterrence at a time when achieving dominance in areas close to China at a reasonable price is fast becoming unrealistic.

The second element of the active denial strategy flows from the first. In keeping with the objective of resilience, Japan should establish a clear hierarchy of mission priorities: first, defending key assets that enable the government and military to continue functioning; second, isolating and striking adversary forces that land on Japanese territory; and third, counterattacking to retake lost territory after U.S. reinforcements arrive.

Equally important, a denial strategy would increase crisis stability and mitigate first-mover advantages. Japanese and forwarddeployed U.S. forces would not be optimized for immediate offensive action, diminishing Chinese leaders’ fear of attack during a crisis and reducing their incentives for striking first.

Similarly, Japanese and U.S. forces would be less vulnerable to a first strike and, therefore, also have less incentive to launch a preemptive attack. While all three governments should seek ways to ease political tensions, military factors will also influence outcomes. An active denial strategy has unique potential to improve deterrent capability while mitigating crisis instability.

The most immediate and important mission, the defense of

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Hanan al-Shaykh: “I am Tired of Being Referred to as an Arab Feminist Writer”

Acclaimed contemporary author to : “I don’t relate to what I hear about tradition, so I treat it like something to laugh with or at”

by Yasmine El-Geressi Hanan al-Shaykh is an award-winning journalist, novelist and playwright, and one of the Arab world's most acclaimed contemporary writers. She was born and raised in a conservative part of Beirut called Ras al-naba where she went to a traditional Muslim primary school for girls before moving to Cairo to receive her education at the American College. She was a successful journalist in Beirut, then later lived in Saudi Arabia, before moving to London in 1982. Her short stories and novels feature primarily female characters in the face of conservative religious traditions set against the backdrop of political tensions and instability of the Lebanese civil war while examining relationships between the sexes, power struggles and patriarchal control.

Al-Shaykh is the author of the collection I Sweep the Sun off Rooftops and her novels include The Story of Zahra, Women of Sand and Myrrh, Beirut Blues and Only in London, shortlisted for the Independent Foreign Fiction Prize, and an acclaimed memoir about her mother’s life, The Locust and the Bird.

She has written two plays, Dark Afternoon Tea and Paper Husband and published One Thousand and One Nights, an adaptation of some of the stories from the legendary Alf Layla Wa Layla –

Everyone who has a brain or half a brain would consider themselves a feminist

the Arabian Nights. Her latest work, The Occasional Virgin, was published by Bloomsbury in 2018. The frank and fearless novel follows the tumultuous lives and sometimes shocking choices of women successful in their careers but unlucky in love. It was named an Observer Book of the Year. Her work has been translated into twenty-eight languages.

Could you talk to us about your latest novel ‘The Occasional Virgin’ and the characters Huda and Yvonne ? What provoked you to write this book? I read that you were inspired by an encounter at Speakers Corner in Hyde Park in London.

The book is made up of two sections. The first section is ‘Imra’ataan ala shati’ el bahr’ (Two Women by the Sea) which was published in 2003. It is about the sea and two friends, Huda, a theatre director that lives in Toronto, and Yvonne who owns an advertising company and lives in London. They both met in Lebanon at a festival for Lebanese women with successful careers outside of Lebanon and became very attached to each other. They felt they didn’t belong to Lebanon anymore as they left when they were 17 or 18 years old and made their lives outside of the country. They decided to go to an Italian Riviera for a vacation and while they were there they went into the sea to swim and as soon as they plunged into the

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My book ‘The Story of Zahra’ was banned in many Arab countries which helped my name a lot when it got published in the West sometimes I wrote in a farcical style and I was sometimes absurd in what I wrote. It is because it was too much for me and I wanted the book to stay fictional and imaginative.

I like the way that I wrote this book because young people thought that it was written by a younger person. Readers might feel when they are reading that it is funny and that’s because sometimes I didn’t want to be serious about what I hear. I don’t relate to what I hear about tradition, so in a way I treat it like something to laugh with or at.

How did you begin your career as a writer?

I went to Egypt when I was 17 and a half years old to discover myself away from home and away from my parents. I was following the novels and characters by writers that I loved like Naguib Mahfouz, Yahya Haqqi and Yusuf Idris. Egypt during the mid60-s was the Arab country where all students from across the all of the Arab wanted to study. I spent 3 or 4 years there and I loved it. I fell in love with an Egyptian writer and while I was a student I wrote my first novel called ‘Intihaar Ragol Mayit’ (The suicide of a dead man). I went back to Lebanon when I was in the third year of my studies at the American college and I was offered a job as a journalist because of my novel which was only a manuscript. I stayed in Lebanon and didn’t complete my studies. water, all of their memories from their childhood, especially their families, religion, traditions, floated to the surface. In a way, this made them very sad about their childhood and their womanhood.

Although they became very successful in their careers, they felt an inner sadness which made them unable to commit to a family or a man and they didn’t have children although they are 30 something. The book was published in Lebanon and it was translated into German and got good reviews.

Then a few years ago, I was walking in Speakers Corner in Hyde Park and I started listening to the debate and I found myself arguing about religion and I felt that my two characters, Huda and Yvonne were with me as they talked about religion and unresolved issues in ‘Imra’ataan ala shati’ el bahr.’ So when I came back home I immediately started writing a second episode of the book as if they met again in London.

Sometimes when I hear people talk about religion in the way that they did at Speakers Corner or at religious talks and speeches, my mind doesn’t grasp or digest what I am hearing so that is why

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How did your years as a journalist influence your work as a writer?

It made me more curious and it made me more interested in women’s issues. In a way, I was competing with the male journalists in Lebanon. For example, I told my editor that I want to stay overnight with the fisherman and write about their work and I stayed with them in a tiny boat overnight. I also interviewed the last official executioner in Lebanon.

Can you point to a period in your life where your interest in advancing women’s freedoms was born?

I think it started at an early age. When I think back at my life, I feel that no one really looked after me. I was on my own because my mother left home when I was around 5 and a half years old and I had a horrible step mother. My father had a tiny shop in downtown Beirut and at an age at 10 or 11 I would be sent on my own to walk for 40 minutes to the Souks and bazaars to get my father his lunch and I would walk from one market to another and

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discover things. In a way, I was recreating myself. My childhood was so different. I was on my own all the time and lived without a mother at home. There was an issue because my mother was the one who divorced my father and it was known everywhere so my sister and I were known as the daughters of the women who divorced her husband. I started writing when I was 13 or 14 years old. I would write tiny compositions and articles and I would take them to al-Nahar newspaper and they would publish them in their weekly page for students. So I think being alone and discovering things on my own during my childhood made me want to become a writer.

Why have you shied away from the title Arab feminist writer?

It is because I am a novelist and I feel that being labeled in such a way is cliché. Everyone who has a brain or half a brain would consider themselves a feminist. It shouldn’t be an issue, it should be a must. For example, all the female characters in Naguib Mahfouz’s novels were so strong or the underdog and he was exposing them by writing about them like in his book ‘Bidaya wa Nihaya’ (A beginning and an End). Mahfouz cared for women, as did Tayeb Salih, Yahya Haqqi and Yusuf Idris. Women were important in their fiction so it is not a novelty. At the same time I got tired of hearing the Arab Lebanese woman feminist all the time. I don’t only have one title, I have four. We are equal and we should be equal. You don’t say white male writer, so why should we refer to women writers in this way.

Do you find that in the West there is sometimes more of a focus on who you are as an Arab woman writer and the courage that it takes to portray ‘taboo’ topics, rather than the literary qualities and the content of your work?

Absolutely. When I published my third novel, ‘Hekayat Zahraa’ (The Story of Zahraa), which was the first novel of mine to be translated, in France they wrote that the author is a Shia Muslim and she knows about the Shia community. At the beginning I really didn’t care, I was so happy that I was translated and published, especially that the Arab World Institute also supported me. I was the only woman among ten men to be translated. The book won prizes and then it was translated into English. In a way, it was something for them for a Shia Muslim girl to write what I was writing but now I am irritated with that and I told my French

Being alone and discovering things on my own during my childhood made me want to become a writer

publisher that you have to remove this description from my biography. I don’t want you to write Muslim, I don’t want you to write Shia, I don’t want you to write anything, just an author.

It is interesting that some of the issues that run through your work that are labelled as taboos weren’t always considered as such in Arabic literature.

Yes, they are not taboos, you are right. It is the way I write them maybe. I am direct and I don’t camouflage things. When you think of ‘1001 Nights’ and old classics like ‘Tawq al-Hamama’ (The Ring of the Dove), they were talking about these issues in the 18th Century or even before. When I wrote ‘The Story of Zahraa’ - which they are right to describe as daring because it is very explicit - I was homeless as I had left Lebanon due to the civil war and I wanted to take revenge because of what happened to Beirut and to Lebanon. I was so scared of the sniper and I fled. When I was writing it I didn’t think that I was going to publish it, I just wanted to take revenge and write about the war

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in the way that I want to write about the war so I made the girl have a relationship with a sniper and I talked about her mother’s relationship with another man and an uncle who made advances to his niece. I didn’t care. I used crude and raw language. I didn’t care for it to be literarily beautiful and poetic. I was in London and I wrote the whole book in 9 months. When I finished it I decided to publish it and 9 publishers turned it down. They said it can’t be published because of the way I talked about the relationship between the girl and the sniper and the uncle and what he was trying to do to her. I then published it with a friend of mine in Beirut during the war.

What kind of the reactions did you get?

I got the best reactions, especially in Egypt because the most important writer at that time, the new wave writer, was Sonallah Ibrahim who wrote ‘Tilka al-râ’ihah’ (That Smell). Everyone welcomed and wrote about my novel and it was sold out in a few months. When I took the novel to Rozal Youssef magazine in Egypt they loved it but said that I have to cut out some of the explicit content and I said to them I won’t even cut one word.

Do Western critics and readers pick up on different themes and aspects, versus Arab readers?

Yes, I will give you the last example. I wrote a book about the life of my mother called ‘The Locust and the Bird.’ My mother had an affair and everyone in the neighborhood knew about it and eventually my father did too because her lover’s brother told him that your wife is having an affair with my brother and you better do something. My mother left home and married her lover and she wanted me to write her story. I remember my editor waking me up at night after she had finished the manuscript and she said ‘Hanan, I’m really surprised... how come your mother wasn’t killed as she is Muslim and everyone knew about her love affair?’ I said to her we don’t just go and kill people in Beirut.

But in Lebanon they were astonished, not because my mother had an affair, not because she left home, but they said ‘you wrote that you were very poor, and that you come from a poor origin, it is amazing that you are so proud and so courageous.’

My book ‘The Story of Zahra’ was banned in many Arab countries and that helped my name a lot when it got published in the West. In the West they had no idea about Arab writers and Arab woman writers; they were astonished that we existed. I remember meeting as editor at the financial times at a party after I had just published the book and when I told him that I come from the Arab world and that I have published a book, he said ‘I didn’t know that there were books written by Arab women.’ I couldn’t believe it, he is an editor!

Do you feel freer in any way when writing from outside of the Arab world?

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In the West they had no idea about Arab writers and Arab woman writers; they were astonished that we existed No, but sometimes I feel like I have lost something because I don’t like to write about the Arab world as I am not there.

Usually as I writer I get inspired by things around me, by everyday life, so that is why I write about Arabs who are living in the West like in ‘Only in London’ and in my latest book ‘The Occasional Virgin’ which is about two Lebanese women that live abroad, one in Toronto and one in England. I also wrote various short stories and two plays that were staged about Arabs in London. Even when I wanted to write about the war in Lebanon, I wrote it as letters written by someone living in Lebanon to her friend who is abroad. The subject of being self-exiled was important and so I wrote about it in my book ‘Beirut Blues’. That is why I regret in a way that I am not living in the Arab world because it is difficult for me to just have a book based in an Arab country while I am not there. I feel that I am pretending or I am being false.

If you had 100£ million pounds to spend on the development of literature in the Arab world, where would you spend it?

I would spend it in schools. I would concentrate on giving children lots of books to read. I would also provide them with different methods on how they should relate to different texts. I would encourage them to write and I would also have many prizes if they write in Arabic. I would also try to make grammar easier for them because I remember I used to hate it, it was so complicated.

I would concentrate on that and get intelligent teachers to change it slightly to make it more accessible to children. I would also commission children’s book writers so that they would write more for children because reading is extremely important. I remember reading Kamel el Kilani’s retelling of some of the 1001 nights’ stories when I was young and they were so enjoyable but we can’t always go back to our heritage, we must write about now, about what is happening in the Arab streets and about children and how they live and think. Things have to be modernized and become more contemporary.

What are you currently reading?

I am reading the most beautiful novel called Death in Spring by a Catalonian writer called Mercè Rodoreda who was born in 1908 during the period of the Franco dictatorship when the Catalan language was prohibited. I am also reading an amazing book by Palestinian writer Adania Shibli called “Tafaseel Thanwy.”

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Cress Williams as Black Lightning in the CW superhero series of the same name. His electric character is one of many African American avengers who smashed colour barriers in 2018.

(The CW)

From 'Black Panther' to 'Luke Cage' black superheroes are breaking barriers once considered impenetrable

By Lorraine Ali They fight crime in old cotton hoodies, shimmering black capes and glowing LED unitards. They can repel bullets with their bodies, leap atop speeding cars like a svelte cat or dissipate in a puff of eerie smoke, all in the name of justice.

But most impressive of all: They have a newfound power to break colour barriers that were once considered impenetrable.

From "Black Panther" to "Marvel's Luke Cage," 2018 has seen more African American superheroes in their own namesake productions run, leap and fly to the forefront of pop culture than any other time in history.

If it wasn't the blockbuster Disney film set in an African country so advanced it made America look like a developing nation, it was the steel-bending heroics of Netflix's Mr. Cage as he defended Harlem, or family man and high school principal Jefferson Pierce electrocuting

bad guys as the protagonist on the CW's "Black Lightning," or Cloak of Freeform's "Cloak & Dagger" challenging corrupt New Orleans cops and robbers with his empathic abilities.

"It used to be that one show had to be representative of all black people," says Cheo Hodari Coker, showrunner of "Marvel's Luke Cage" and a former Los Angeles Times music writer. "Now you have several black superhero narratives on television, and at the same time you also have shows like 'Atlanta,' 'Queen Sugar,' 'Insecure,' 'The Chi' and 'Power.' There's so many different elements of the black experience on television now, it takes the pressure off any one (show) to represent everybody."

Black comic book characters date to the 1970s, but on screen, they've historically been sidekicks or villains if not entirely absent from Hollywood and television's ever-increasing adaptations.

But as Ku Klux Klan rallies astoundingly have become a thing again, and unarmed black men and women are still disproportionately

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the victims of police violence, and the perpetrators of killings like Trayvon Martin's are given impunity simply because they believed a hoodie-clad teen was "up to no good," avengers of color couldn't be more timely.

Cress Williams, who plays high-voltage hero Black Lightning, lists some of the ripped-from-the-headlines issues his character was up against in Season 1: "Crime, police corruption, political corruption, drugs, police brutality."

Williams, whose versatile career stretches from "Prison Break" to "Hart of Dixie," continued: "Sometimes in a fantasy context, it's easier to look at truths because you see them from a distance. It's like 'Oh, it's sci fi or superhero,' so it's a great medium to look at some of billion worldwide after its premiere in February. our ills. Even though (our show features) a fictional city, it's kind of The film certainly set a high bar and high expectations for the other representative of so many cities across America that seem forgotten and franchise superhero projects arriving in its wake. The Afro-Latin character Miles Morales is the man behind the mask in "Spider-Man: lost. With the show, we can look at it from that safe distance."

Now there are enough avengers of color to tell several stories with the Into the Spider-Verse," Sony's forthcoming animated feature starring latitude only fantasy provides. Who wouldn't love to bend a mugger's "The Get Down's" Shameik Moore as the voice of the web-spinning gun into a pretzel as Cage has done, or terrorize those gangs that have defender. terrorized the neighborhood a la Black Lightning, or catch dirty vice As with all superheroes, Cage, Cloak, Mr. Panther and Black Lightning are conflicted, torn between their personal lives and public crime cops red-handed like Cloak?

Their recent impact on screen will no doubt be felt this week at San fighting. But for black superheroes, the idea of using violence to combat Diego's annual Comic-Con. The event will be full of fan boys and violence carries more weight given Hollywood's go-to stereotypes for girls deconstructing the genesis of Cage's powers, claiming they were characters of colour. into "Black Panther" before anyone else knew Actor Chadwick Boseman the name T'Challa, and chasing down characters accepts the Best Performance from "Cloak & Dagger" for selfies (then it's back in a Movie award for 'Black to stalking "The Walking Dead" cast members).

Panther' onstage during the 2018 MTV Movie And TV This year also brought us more black female Awards at Barker Hangar heroes, though not in lead roles. Domino on June 2018 ,16 in Santa (Zazie Beetz) brought luck to the foul-mouthed Monica, California. (Getty Images) Deadpool, the fierce Wakanda warriors of "Black Panther" kept their king safe, and Black Lightning's formidable daughters, Thunder (Nafessa Williams) and Lightning (China Anne McClain), both aided in saving their glow-in-thedark dad more than once.

Samuel L. Jackson's chilly character Frozone also returned this year in Pixar's "The Incredibles 2." He preceded the current wave of African American heroes but still has the coolest powers of the pack.

The uptick in representation could be studios and networks responding to criticism that their productions and programming have forever been whiter than the hair of "Game of Thrones'" Daenerys Targaryen. But there's also the oldest motivator in show biz Williams says that struggle is real for high school principal Jefferson Pierce (aka Black Lightning). But after so many decades of watching to consider.

"The colour Hollywood cares about the most is green," says Coker, who other superheroes save the world when his own neighbourhood was worked on both seasons of "Luke Cage." "Having more cultural heroes burning, he found that enacting change required a new approach. is lucrative. It's different than seeing your average 'expected' superhero, In his case, that meant enforcing a strong curriculum for his students by and culture is the cheapest special effect around. Or I should say it's the day and upending crime with high-voltage zaps by night.

"He has tried education as a means to positively affect his community," cheapest but most profound special effect available."

Notably it was "Black Panther," not a "Captain America" or "Iron Man" says Williams, "but sometimes you just gotta mess stuff up as well." movie, that became the third-highest-grossing film ever in America.

The production starring Chadwick Boseman made a staggering 1.3$ This was originally published by The Los Angeles Times.

But most impressive of all: They have a newfound power to break colour barriers that were once considered impenetrable

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Study shows link between teens copious amounts of screen time and ADHD

By Melissa Healy What with all the swiping, scrolling, snap-chatting, surfing and streaming that consume the adolescent mind, an American parent might well watch his or her teen and wonder whether any sustained thought is even possible.

New research supports that worry, suggesting that teens who spend more time toggling among a growing

number of digital media platforms exhibit a mounting array of attention difficulties and impulse-control problems.

In a group of more than 2,500 Los Angeles-area high school students who showed no evidence of attention challenges at the outset, investigators from the University of Southern California, University of California at Los Angeles and UC San Diego found that those who engaged in more digital media activities over a two-year period reported a rising number of

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On average, with each notch a teen climbed up the scale of digital engagement, his or her average level of reported ADHD symptoms rose by about 10 percent results in a level of impairment that would warrant an ADHD diagnosis or pharmaceutical treatment.

Indeed, it›s possible the relationship is reversed _ that attention problems drive an adolescent to more intensive online engagement.

But at a time when 95 percent of adolescents own or have access to a smartphone and 45 percent said they are online «almost constantly,» the new study raises some stark concerns about the future of paying attention. It was published Tuesday in the Journal of the American Medical Association.

The findings come as mental health professionals are rethinking their understanding of ADHD, a psychiatric condition that was long thought to start in early childhood and last across a lifetime. Marked by impulsivity, hyperactivity and difficulty sustaining attention, ADHD is estimated to affect about 7 percent of children and adolescents.

But the disorder is increasingly being diagnosed in older teens and adults, and in some it waxes and wanes across a lifespan. Whether its symptoms were missed earlier, developed later or are brought on by changing circumstances is unclear.

New research suggests teens who spend more time toggling among a growing number of digital media platforms exhibit a mounting array of attention difficulties and impulse-control problems. (TNS)

symptoms linked to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

The association between digital media use and ADHD symptoms in teens was modest. But it was clear enough that it could not be dismissed as a statistical fluke. On average, with each notch a teen climbed up the scale of digital engagement, his or her average level of reported ADHD symptoms rose by about 10 percent.

The results do not show that prolific use of digital media causes ADHD symptoms, much less that it

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The new research, involving 2,587 sophomores and juniors attending public schools in Los Angeles County, raises the possibility that, for some, ADHD symptoms are brought on or exacerbated by the hyperstimulating entreaties of a winking, pinging, vibrating, always-on marketplace of digital offerings that is as close as the wireless device in their pocket.

«We believe we are studying the occurrence of new symptoms that weren›t present at the beginning of the study,» said USC psychologist Adam M. Leventhal, the

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study›s senior author.

The study «is just the latest in a series of research findings showing that excessive use of digital media may have consequences for teens› well-being,» said San Diego State University psychologist Jean M. Twenge, who has conducted research on teens and smartphone use but was not involved in the new work.

Twenge›s research, published this year in the journal Emotion, explored a sharp decline in U.S. teens› happiness and satisfaction since 2012. Combing through the data from 1.1 million teens, Twenge and her colleagues found dissatisfaction highest among those who spent the most time locked onto a screen.

As time spent in offline activities increased, so did happiness.

Leventhal and his colleagues assessed the digital engagement of their -15 and -16year-old subjects five times over a two-year period _ when they first entered the study and four more times at six-month intervals.

They asked the students to think back over the last week and report whether and how much they had engaged in 14 separate online activities. Those included checking social media sites, browsing the web, posting or commenting on online content, texting, playing games, video chatting, and streaming TV or movies.

Depending on how many of those activities a student reported and how frequently he or she reported engaging in them, the researchers assigned the student a «cumulative media-use index» between 1 and 14.

Four out of five students acknowledged «high frequency use» of at least one activity, including 54 percent who told researchers they checked social media «many

Four out of five students acknowledged «high frequency use» of at least one activity, including 54 percent who told researchers they checked social media «many times per day.»

times per day.» Just over two-thirds engaged in highfrequency use of up to four online activities at some point during the study›s course.

Students were also asked whether they had experienced 18 ADHD symptoms, including problems with organization, completing work, staying still or remaining on task. If they acknowledged having any six of them, they were considered to be «ADHD symptompositive.» At various points in the study, anywhere from 4.8 percent to 6.9 percent of the subjects met this criteria.

The additional risk that came with climbing the ladder of «media use intensity» was pretty modest: about 10 percent for each step up.

But compared to the lightest users, the teens who engaged most intensively were more than twice as likely to be symptom-positive. Among the 495 students who reported no high-frequency media use at baseline, 4.6 percent were categorized as symptom-positive at some point. Among the 114 who engaged in seven digital activities many times a day, 9.5 percent were

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students may have had attention problems that did not raise any flags at the outset but were significant enough to drive their outsized use of digital media.

Since ADHD is linked to sensation-seeking behaviour, and digital media use is highly stimulating, subjects with «subclinical» attention problems might have become the study›s heaviest digital users. As the study unfolded, their symptoms may simply have become more pronounced.

To rule out other influences, the team adjusted the raw data to account for factors that are already strongly linked to ADHD, including male gender (boys are more than twice as likely as girls to have been diagnosed with ADHD), a family history of substance use, depressive symptoms and delinquency. The findings still held.

In an editorial that accompanies the study, University of Michigan pediatrician Dr. Jenny Radesky wrote that the «always on» quality of digital media may rob the adolescent brain of the ability to rest and refresh in what brain scientists call the «default mode.» Teens pining for the next hit of digital affirmation may lose the ability to tolerate boredom, she wrote, and an unending stream of notifications may reduce a child›s ability «to stay focused on challenging, nonpreferred tasks.»

Russian teenagers use their mobile phones while sitting on a bench in a park in central Moscow on April 2018 ,24.

(Getty Images)

seen to be symptom-positive during the follow-up.

And for the 51 students who reported high-frequency use of all 14 digital activities, 10.5 percent met the symptom criteria.

That twofold increase in the odds of being symptompositive «is not a small effect,» Twenge said. In effect, it suggests that if a teen who is a high-intensity digital user could be weaned from his devices, he might drive down his risk of significant ADHD symptoms by as much as half.

«Most of the time, a lifestyle change that halves the risk of a poor outcome is more than worth undertaking,» Twenge said. In the annals of disease prevention research, «the vast majority of interventions are less effective.»

But that may not fully explain the study›s results. If manic digital engagement is displacing sleep and exercise, that would readily explain a child›s slipping executive function, wrote Radesky, a behavioural developmental specialist.

Dr. Lawrence Diller, a child psychiatrist and ADHD specialist who has practiced for more than four decades in Walnut Creek, Calif., expressed scepticism as well.

«It›s attractive to think that somehow exposure to constantly changing media information might somehow either make an adolescent inattentive or distractible,» he said. «But I don›t think that›s what›s happening here.»

Moreover, she added, digital media use is something a teen can change. Genes and traumatic life experience _ both factors in a person›s risk for ADHD _ are not so amenable to behaviour modification.

Diller said he suspected that kids spending a lot of time on social media and gaming aren›t that interested in school or the chores their parents have assigned them, so they›ve simply found an alternative outlet for their energies.

The study authors acknowledged that some of the

This was originally published by Los Angeles Times.

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Kolinda: Croatia ’s Real World Cup Star

by Farah Hashem Drawing by Ali Al Mandalawi

counselor.

In the 2003 elections, she was elected to the Croatian Parliament from the seventh electoral district, as a member of the Croatian Democratic Union.

Wearing her national team’s chequered football shirt, cheering her country’s players from the VIP box, and embracing each and every player from both teams under the pouring rain, Croatia’s president won the most hearts during the World Cup final. Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, with all her modesty and enthusiasm, emerged as her country’s star of the tournament.

Besides her love for her country and passion for football, the Croatian President, 50, has had a series of successes and achievements.

Under the administration of new Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, Grabar-Kitarović became Minister of European Integration.

Here is a look at Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović’s life: Childhood, Early Life, and Education Born on April 1968 ,29 in Rijeka, Croatia, Grabar-Kitarović was raised in her family’s village where they owned a butcher shop and a ranch and grew up to be a bright and ambitious girl.

In 1993, Grabar-Kitarović graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in English and Spanish languages and literature from the University of Zagreb. She later pursued her master’s degree in 2000 in International Relations from the University of Zagreb.

In 2003-2002, she was Fulbright scholar at George Washington University.

She received a fellowship at Harvard University and was a visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Her educational journey was not over as she began her doctoral studies in International Relations at the Zagreb Faculty of Political Science in 2015.

Career Kitarović initially became an advisor under the international cooperation department of the Ministry of Science and Technology. She later joined the Croatian Democratic Union in 1993.

In 1995, she became the Head of the North American Department of the Foreign Ministry, a post she held until 1997. During this time she also attended the Diploma Course at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna from 1995 to 1996.

In 1997, she worked at the Croatian embassy in Canada as a diplomatic

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In 2005 she was nominated to become the head of the new ministry as Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.

On March 8th 2008, she became the Croatian Ambassador to the United States.

She left the post in 2011 and became Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Public Diplomacy on 4 June 2011.

In mid2014- it was announced that Grabar-Kitarović will be the Croatian Democratic Union party’s official presidential candidate and emerged successful to become Croatia's first female president-elect.

She was sworn into office on 15 February and assumed office officially on 19 February 2015.

At age 46, she became the youngest person to assume the presidency.

She is the first woman to hold the position of the president of Croatia, serving as the fourth and current president.

Personal Life She married Jakov Kitarović in 1996 and has two children, Katarina, and Luka.

Katarina is a professional figure skater and Croatia’s national junior champion.

In 2010, a scandal involving her husband occurred when it was discovered that he was using an official embassy car for private purposes. Minister Jandroković launched an internal investigation because of Jakov Kitarović's unauthorized usage of the official car.

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović then paid for all costs that occurred due to her husband's unauthorized using of the car.

She is proficient in many languages including Croatian, English, Spanish and Portuguese.

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