Lebanon's Economic Crisis Deepens

Democratic Presidential Hopefuls Air Foreign Policy Differences Over Syria Withdrawal

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Editorial

A Weekly Political News Magazine

www.majalla.com/eng For the past week, mass protests have been held throughout Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens flooded the streets of the country as soon new taxes were announced by the government. In a through back to the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrations, the protestors are calling for the government to step down, and for a transitional nonsectarian government to come in place until new elections are held. The protests have been a long time coming since the country’s economic structure has been dwindling for the past few years, and unemployment has been on the rise. Recent shortages of American dollars and new taxes have only been the straws that broke the camel’s back.

This week’s cover story by Yasmine El-Geressi focuses on the current situation in Lebanon, as she notes the lack of sectarian divide in the protests, a rarity that might just help maintain the movement’s momentum.

Ali El Shamy writes on the ongoing Brexit saga. This past week, the British parliament made a major breakthrough when it passed the Withdrawal Agreement Bill into the second reading, this marked the first time the legislative branch passed a Brexit deal. Nevertheless, it was one step forward and two steps back for the government since parliament soon rejected the Prime Minister’s timetable which would ram the deal before the October 31 deadline.

In accordance with the Benn Act, Johnson begrudgingly asked the EU for an extension, and if it is granted the UK will likely have a new deadline of January 2020 ,31.

Google has just launched its latest flagship smartphone the Pixel 4, while the company did boast some features such as advanced night sight photo capture and a 90Hz screen refresh, it still falls short in comparison to its other competitors. Ali El Shamy writes on the Pixel 4’s specs and how they compare to those of other flagship phones, namely the iPhone 11, the Samsung S10 and the OnePlus 7 Pro. We invite you to read these articles and more on our website eng.majalla.com. As always, we welcome and value our reader’s feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments on our website.

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Editor-in-Chief

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30 Dashing Kurdish Hopes Wil Not Bring Erdogan Peace

Issue 1770- October - 18/10/2019

24 ISIS Is Already Rising From the Ashes

20 Iran, the Unitary State

34 Google Launches Pixel 4

How George Harrison rescued ‘Monty

38 Python’s Life of Brian’

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The Kidney Stone Diet:

50 How a Caliphate Ends 3

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Protests Continue to Sweep Lebanon, Rejecting PM Hariri’s Reform Package

Lebanese President Michel Aoun said on Thursday that he was ready for dialogue with protesters to find the best solution for saving the country from financial collapse In response to nationwide protests over and suggested a government reshuffle was economic crisis in Lebanon, Prime Minister on the table.

Saad Hariri agreed on Sunday a package of reforms with government partners but was rejected by protesters who have been Trump Says Turkey’s Ceasefire in expressing outrage at the country’s ruling Northern Syria Now Permanent, elite have called for their resignation Sanctions Lifted and the return of money they say has U.S. President Donald Trump said on been looted from the state. Lebanon’s Wednesday a ceasefire in northern Syria highest Christian Maronite authority and is now permanent and lifted sanctions a prominent Druze politician threw their on Turkey as a result, rejecting criticism weight behind the groundswell for change, of his decision to pull out U.S. troops calling for qualified technocrats to be that allowed Kurdish allies to come included in any government shake-up. under attack. In a White House speech,

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Trump described the truce as a “major breakthrough” negotiated by a team led by Vice President Mike Pence. Trump said he instructed Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to rescind sanctions imposed on Turkey after it attacked the Kurds “unless something happens that we are not happy with”. The speech failed to blunt attacks from U.S. lawmakers over Trump’s abrupt decision early this month to withdraw troops out of northeastern Syria to clear the way for the Turkish incursion. Congress was still working on a sanctions package of its own to punish Turkey for its crossborder offensive.

Russia Says Syrian Kurd Forces Pulling Back from Turkish Border

Kurdish forces have begun withdrawing from areas near the Turkish frontier in Syria, Russia’s deputy foreign minister was quoted as saying on Thursday, following a deal between Moscow and Ankara that ended Turkey’s cross-border military offensive. Under Tuesday’s accord, sealed by presidents Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdogan in the Russian city of Sochi, Russian military police and Syrian border guards are required to remove all Kurdish YPG militia 30 km (19 miles) from the Turkish border over a roughly six-day period. Russia will send a further 276 military policemen and 33 units of military hardware to Syria in a week to help implement the deal, RIA news agency cited a defense ministry source as saying.

believed to be Chinese, British police said on Thursday, adding that raids had been carried out at three properties in Northern Ireland.

Republican Lawmakers Disrupt Democraticled Trump Impeachment Inquiry

cons of a Christmas election, responsibility Republican lawmakers, encouraged by Benjamin Netanyahu Tells Israeli President he Cannot form Government for the timing of Brexit has passed to other President Donald Trump to get tougher in Benjamin Netanyahu has informed Israel’s president he has been unable to form a coalition government after talks with his political rival and former army chief Benny Gantz broke down. In a video statement published on Monday evening – the day of his 70th birthday – Netanyahu said he and his Likud party had worked “incessantly” to forge a “broad national unity government” with Gantz’s Blue and White party, but ultimately failed.

Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving leader, made the announcement just two days before the deadline to return the mandate to the president, Reuven Rivlin, who in turn intends to task Gantz, the head of the opposition, with the job of putting together a new government. It would be the first time in over a decade that anyone but Netanyahu would be given the chance to head the Israeli government. But the move does not necessarily end Netanyahu’s political career, nor his chances of leading the country’s next administration.

European capitals: Berlin supports a threemonth delay, while Paris is pushing for a shorter one.

39 Found Dead in Truck Near London

British police found the bodies of 39 people inside a truck at an industrial estate near London on Wednesday and arrested a driver on suspicion of murder. The discovery of the bodies - 38 adults and one teenager - was made in the early hours after emergency services were alerted to people in a truck container on an industrial site in Grays, about 20 miles (32 km) east of central London. Police said the trailer had arrived at nearby docks having traveled from Zeebrugge in Belgium and the bodies were found just over an hour later. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry said while the vehicle was registered in Bulgaria by a company owned by an Irish woman on June 2017 ,19, it had left the next day and never returned.All the those in the container are

EU Mulls Delay as Britain Says Johnson's Deal is the Brexit Endgame

The United Kingdom will ultimately leave the European Union on the terms of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s deal, a senior Downing Street source said on Thursday, as EU leaders mulled offering London a three-month flexible Brexit delay. Johnson was forced by parliament on Saturday to send a letter to European Council President Donald Tusk requesting a delay until Jan 31. He did so reluctantly, sending an unsigned photocopied note, but the correspondence was accepted. As British politicians discuss the pros and

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fighting Democrats’ attempts to impeach him, on Wednesday disrupted the US House of Representatives impeachment inquiry and prevented a Pentagon official from testifying. The Republicans stormed into a hearing room where Laura Cooper, the U.S. defense official who oversees Ukraine and Russia matters, was due to testify behind closed doors and began yelling, lawmakers and aides said. The impeachment inquiry focuses on Trump’s request for Ukraine to investigate a domestic rival - Democrat Joe Biden - for his personal political benefit. In a dramatic confrontation during an escalating probe that threatens Trump’s presidency even as he seeks re-election next year, Capitol police were called in to clear the room and bring order, a Republican congressional aide said. A witness inside the room said the Republicans brought cellphones into the high-security facility where electronic devices are forbidden.

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Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Deepens The Current Uprising Cuts Across Sectarian Divisions that Historically Made Mass Mobilisation Difficult 10

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Shunning political affiliations and transcending religious divides, just a sea of Lebanon’s cedar-crested flags are carried by protesters all over the country who have borrowed a slogan from the 2011 Arab uprisings that translates as “the people want to bring down the regime.”

WHY ARE THEY PROTESTING

Lebanese demonstrators gesture as tires burn during a protest against dire economic conditions in the industrial zone of Dora on the northern outskirts of Beirut, on October 2019 ,18.

(Getty)

by Yasmine El-Geressi Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese continued staging their extraordinary revolt against their politicians after Prime Minister Saad Hariri proposed a list of reforms approved by his cabinet on Monday. The measures, which promised to cut politician salaries by 50 percent, investment in power plants and to tax banks to help reduce public debt, were described by Hariri as a “final coup”, noting that no government in Lebanon’s history had taken such steps before.

But the PM’s reform package failed to appease the Lebanese people who see promises of good behavior as too little, too late, underscoring the erosion of trust between officials and citizens when it comes to the public purse.

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Going on since October 17, the protests were sparked by the government’s announcement of a fresh round of taxes, including on WhatsApp, to address the country’s public debt - the world’s third-highest debt to GDP, currently standing at about 86$ billion, or 150 percent of its gross domestic product - exploding popular discontent unprecedented in its nature and scale. Many Lebanese use the internet communication service in place of the nation’s dysfunctional telecommunications sector.

Economic problems have long plagued the diverse Middle Eastern country, home to 6 million people and 18 different religious communities. For years, anger has been brewing over the country’s economic stagnation, corruption, the looming currency crisis and a deterioration of basic public services, which have roots in decisions made after the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. Lebanon’s current account deficit stands at an eye-popping 25 percent, meaning it imports far more than it exports, spends more than it saves, and relies heavily on foreign remittances to stay afloat. As economists have noted, the top 1 per cent now controls a quarter of all national income while the poorest half of the country owns just a tenth. As one Carnegie Endowment scholar puts it, about 3,000 people in Lebanon make as much as more than 2 million. One in four Lebanese people are unemployed, including one in three young people who find themselves economically excluded and politically disenfranchised.

In recent weeks, anger rose over the sudden shortage of dollars – raising fears over the supplies of medicine, wheat and fuel, and in September, the country’s government declared an economic state of emergency.

The Lebanese pound has been pegged at 1,500 to the

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dollar since 1997, but a shortage of dollars at local banks has led to the black market exchange rate rising to about 1,650. Last year, international donors pledged 11$bn of aid and loans to boost Lebanon's economy. In return, the government committed to implement reforms that would help reduce its debt. Hariri blames parties in his coalition for obstructing reforms required the aid pledged by international donors.

Lebanon's public infrastructure, which was already stretched before more than one million refugees arrived from neighbouring Syria, is ailing. Electricity and water supplies are disrupted daily and piles of uncollected garbage on the streets. We saw it in 2015, during the “You Stink” protests where people were angry with the government, accusing it of weakness and ineffectiveness during a time of need – citing the crisis over uncollected garbage as a symbol of governmental failures and corruption. This burst into full view again when wildfires ravaged the country earlier this month. Firefighters were unable to keep up because their equipment was out of service the government had not allocated funds for maintenance. Luckily, rains brought many of the fires under control.

Lebanon hasn’t been under this much economic pressure since its bloody -15year civil war that ended in 1990 and left an estimated 120,000 killed. Increased political and economic instability could push the country to default, economists fear.

“Political and policy uncertainty will negatively impact the Lebanese economy by adding to its existing woes,” Alia Mobayed, managing director of fixed income strategy at Jefferies and a former economist at Lebanon’s central bank, told CNBC. “We are already in recession mode and the inability of the government to set a credible path to fiscal policy, while monetary conditions are very tight is adding to the economic slowdown.”

Lebanon hasn’t been under this much economic pressure since its bloody -15year civil war that ended in 1990 and left an estimated 120,000 killed.

A REVOLUTION IN UNITY Unlike previous waves of unrest – including the Cedar Revolution of 2005 – the current uprising cuts across all sectarian divisions that historically made mass mobilisation difficult. As the country ravaged during unprecedented wildfires, Lebanese of all backgrounds, including Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and Druze; rich and poor; urban and rural; took to the streets calling for the entire government to be replaced, which for decades has operated under a patronage system where top political jobs are allocated according to religion. Previous demonstrations in Lebanon were called for by party leaders and people would come to the street carrying party and sectarian flags. Some protesters resent these leaders, saying they have fostered sectarian divisions to keep them scared. The political parties now controlling the Lebanese government have dominated for decades, since the end of the country’s civil war in 1990.

But this time is different. Shunning political affiliations and transcending religious divides, just a sea of Lebanon’s

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In recent weeks, anger rose over the sudden shortage of dollars – raising fears over the supplies of medicine, wheat and fuel, and in September, the country’s government declared an economic state of emergency. cedar-crested flags are carried by protesters all over the country, from Tripoli up north to Tyre way down south, who have borrowed a slogan from the 2011 Arab uprisings that translates as “the people want to bring down the regime.”

The protesters are demanding a new emergency government of non-sectarian technocrats take power and prepare for new elections. Yet even those who follow political developments closely admit they are unsure about how the coming days will play-out. Joseph Habboush, reporter at the English-language Lebanon Daily Star newspaper told Sky News: “I’m not sure many know what will come next.

Let’s say the government packs up and goes home, who takes over?”

Lebanese demonstrators gather during a mass protest in the centre of the capital Beirut on October 2019 ,18 against dire economic conditions. (Getty)

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Democratic Presidential Hopefuls Air Foreign Policy Differences Over Syria Withdrawal The 4th Democratic Debate Yielded Some of the Most Substantive Exchange on Foreign Policy in the Race to Date 14

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by Joseph Braude Over the past two weeks, a foreign policy debate has re-emerged within the Democratic party, stemming from President Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria. Vice President Joe Biden and South Bend, Indiana mayor Pete Buttigieg have begun to articulate a more forceful defense of American leadership, while Senator Elizabeth Warren and Hawaii Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard have made the case for reducing American commitments abroad.

When President Trump announced on October 6 that U.S. troops would be departing Syria ahead of an imminent Turkish invasion, many analysts noted opposition to his decision was uncharacteristically strong among Republican members of Congress, normally deferential to a President of their own party. Equally noteworthy, however, was the near uniform opposition it elicited among Democratic congressional leaders.

Representative Eliot Engel, the Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, condemned the withdrawal as “a betrayal of our partners. It was a gift to Russia, a gift to Iran, a gift to ISIS and a gift to Assad.” Engel introduced a resolution condemning the President’s decision, which passed the House overwhelmingly 354 votes to 60.

U.S. Speaker of the House Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Senate Minority Leader Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and House Majority Leader Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD) brief members of the media outside the West Wing of the White House after a meeting with President Donald Trump October 2019 ,16 in Washington, DC. (Getty)

House speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority leader Chuck Schumer were equally scathing. In a joint statement, they condemned “the chaos and insecurity unleashed in Syria by President Trump’s disastrous decision to precipitously withdraw from northern Syria” and called on the administration “to support Kurdish communities, to work to ensure that the Turkish military acts with restraint, and to present a clear strategy to defeat ISIS.” This marks a historic shift from the Bush-era consensus within the Democratic party, which held that American foreign policy towards the Middle East was overly militarized, and that U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Iraq in order to force regional allies to “make tough choices”.

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This marks a historic shift from the Bush-era consensus within the Democratic party, which held that American foreign policy towards the Middle East was overly militarized DEMOCRATIC DEBATE The contest for the presidential nomination within the Democratic primary is meanwhile beginning to intensify. On October 15, the party held its fourth debate between rival candidates, yielding some of the most substantive exchange on foreign policy in the race to date.

Senator Warren of Massachusetts, seen as effectively tied with Biden in the early voting state of Iowa, criticized President Trump’s withdrawal from Syria with a caveat: “I don’t think we should have troops in the Middle East. But we have to do it the right way, the smart way … We need to get out, but we need to do this through a negotiated solution.”

The following day at a campaign address in Iowa, Joe Biden offered a sharp critique of Warren. He declared himself “surprised” by her position and countered that “we can be strong and smart at the same time … You don't get do-overs when it comes to national security.”

In a similar vein, Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard and Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg, both Army veterans, traded pointed criticisms over foreign policy. Gabbard demanded an end to what she referred to as the “regime change war” in Syria, and denounced American support to the Syrian opposition as “support [for] terrorists like al-Qaeda in Syria.” In response, Buttigieg declared Gabbard’s position “dead wrong” and that “the slaughter going on in Syria is not a consequence of American presence. It's a consequence of a withdrawal and a betrayal by this president of American allies and American values.”

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What Just Happened in Parliament Why Johnson Can’t Get Brexit Done

by Ali El Shamy It seems with each passing week, a new bombshell is dropped which only prolongs the Brexit saga, much to the delight of Remainers and Brexiters (at least those who dislike the deal that Johnson and the

EU have agreed to). October 22 has marked another historic milestone in this tumultuous chapter of Britain’s history, as parliament finally passed the Withdrawal Agreement Bill to its second reading, this is significant since it marked the first time parliament gave a Brexit deal its provisional seal of

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The process of a second referendum would be a timely one, for instance, the 2016 referendum took 13 months to organize. forced to make the request. This was something the Prime Minister wanted to do, so to circumvent the law he decided to send two letters to the EU; one requesting the extension (which he did not sign), one explaining why the EU shouldn’t give the UK an extension. As of the writing of this article, the EU has not yet responded to the extension request, which would require unanimous approval from the rest of the EU27- countries.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW? Immediately after parliament rejected his timetable, the Prime Minister threatened to withdraw the bill and call a general election. He has yet to do that and has instead chosen to suspend the bill and head to Brussels to discuss the extension. If the EU does not grant the extension, then Britain would not have enough time to pass the Withdrawal Agreement Bill into law and would thus crash out of the EU without a deal on October 31 at 11 PM. Johnson’s preferred scenario now would be the EU granting a short technical extension into early November to give the government enough time to pass the bill into law.

A handout picture released by the UK Parliament Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson gesturing during the Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) session in the House of Commons in London on October ,23 2019. (AFP)

approval. However, the sighs of relief in Brussels IS A GENERAL ELECTION were short-lived since parliament was quick to reject POSSIBLE? the Prime Minister’s timetable for implementing the deal, a timetable which would see Britain out of the The largest hurdle in the way of the Tory government bloc by October 31. As it stands, the country is in the is the fact that it does not have a majority in midst of another political stalemate, the government parliament, this is especially true after 21 Tory is unable to fulfill its promise of taking out of the MPs were dismissed from the party in September EU by Halloween “do or die”. It should be noted for opposing Johnson’s willingness to risk a nothat three days prior to Withdrawal Agreement vote deal Brexit and after DUP MPs fell out favor with Johnson was forced to request an extension from the him due to his Brexit deal which would place a EU as per the law legislated by the Benn Act which border between the UK and Northern Ireland. If stated that the Prime Minister needed to request the EU is generous enough to give an extension an extension in the event that parliament did not to at least January 2020 ,31, then that would give approve of a deal by October 19. Since parliament the UK enough time for a quick general election. chose to delay the vote on that date, Johnson was This won’t be an easy task since the Prime Minister

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would need approval from parliament before he can call for an early general election, and opposition MPs have previously stated that they would not vote for a general election unless Johnson puts a nodeal scenario off the table. It would be difficult to predict which direction a general election would go towards, but the safest bet would be a Conservative victory but they would probably not gain a majority and would, therefore, need to form another coalition government.

WHAT ABOUT A SECOND REFERENDUM? If the EU were to grant a longer extension, then a second referendum might be a possibility, but that would require a change in government first, either via a general election or more dramatically a vote of no confidence. The current Tory government has previously stated that it intends to respect the first vote and is therefore not in favor of a second referendum. A second referendum might be an advisory one, just like the one held in 2016, and the government would not be legally obliged to honor it. On the other hand, a so-called “confirmatory referendum� might be held in which a certain deal is placed against no-deal or even remain, this one would be legally binding though and the government would be required to honor the result.

Labour, the main opposition party, has stated that it supports holding a second referendum to allow the people to choose the path they desire. Other

The fact that a changing of guards will happen on November 1 in the EU will make the situation more unpredictable, as there’s no telling if Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel will be this patient towards Britain.

parties, particularly the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) have gone even further and have called for revoking Article 50 thereby canceling Brexit altogether. If (with emphasis on the if) Labour ends up gaining enough seats to form a coalition, then a second referendum with remain as an option might be a viable scenario, however, it is difficult to predict whether or not smaller parties would be willing join Labour in a coalition government. Earlier this year, Jo Swinson, leader of the Lib-Dems the largest small party in Westminster, stated that she would not join a crossparty coalition with Jeremy Corbyn as a temporary Prime Minister.

Additionally, the process of a second referendum would be a timely one, for instance, the 2016 referendum took 13 months to organize. A study conducted by University College London (UCL)

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Demonstrators wave lit up pro-EU flags outside the Houses of Parliament on October 2019 ,22 in London, England. (Getty)

cited that the 2011 Alternative Referendum took only 40 weeks of preparation, however, the same study also noted that that particular referendum was a simple yes/no option on the current status quo, in this case, the first past the vote system. This time there wouldn’t be a status quo to fall back on in the event that a deal doesn’t pass through parliament, therefore more weeks of preparation would be required. All in all the study also stated that if a second referendum is to be held, then a minimum of 22 weeks would be needed for the UK.

WHAT DOES THE EU THINK OF ALL THIS? Evidently, the EU wanted to move on from this period and go on to the transitional period that would formally start the process of the UK’s exit

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from the bloc. Nevertheless, a BBC report by Europe expert Katya Adler has stated that the EU has both the desire to appear neutral towards the UK’s internal affairs and not running the risk of a no-deal scenario, therefore it might well grant an extension.

Indeed, European Council President Donald Tusk recently tweeted that, as per the Prime Minister’s request, he would recommend an extension to the EU27-, but there’s no telling if all heads of states will approve of it, France’s Emmanuel Macron has in particular shown no desire for more extensions.

The fact that a changing of guards will happen on November 1 in the EU will make the situation more unpredictable, as there’s no telling if Ursula von der Leyen (president-elect of the European Commission) and Charles Michel (president-elect of European Council) will be this patient towards Britain.

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Iran, the Unitary State Tehran’s Foreign-Policy Makers Act as One

by Afshon Ostovar and Ariane M. Tabatabai The drone strikes on two major Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in September left many observers puzzled.

Though officials in Washington and Riyadh blamed Iran for the attacks, aggression of this kind seemed at odds with the more conciliatory positions of the government of

Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president. Was it really in Iran’s interest to so drastically escalate a simmering conflict with the United States and its regional partners? The Houthis, Iran’s allies in Yemen’s bloody civil war, immediately claimed responsibility for hitting the oil fields, but the sophistication of the attack pointed to a state actor and, eventually, to Iran as the culprit. Though Iranian officials denied any involvement, some commentators suggested

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Current and future U.S. policy toward Iran must begin with the premise that the Islamic Republic is the sum of its parts and that to try to empower moderates or disempower hard-liners is naive. pragmatic Rouhani government. Hard-liners, particularly those within the ranks of the IRGC, execute policies designed to undermine the moderates at home and abroad, making it more difficult for Rouhani to function on the international stage.

The problem with this line of thinking, however, is that it misunderstands how decision-making works in the Islamic Republic. To see Tehran as helplessly riven with antagonistic factions is misguided. Under concerted pressure from Trump, the separate parts of Iran’s regime have closed ranks. Western policymakers must accept the reality that Iran conducts its security policy as a unified state actor.

ALL FOR ONE, ONE FOR ALL

Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei (L) meets with president of Iran Hassan Rouhani in Tehran, Iran on July ,14 2014. (Getty)

that elements of Iran’s security apparatus participated in the attacks, even if the strikes weren’t orchestrated at the level of the state.

Many experts, including current and former analysts and officials within the U.S. government, subscribe to the notion that factionalism drives Iran’s strategic behavior. This line of thinking generally presumes that aggressive actions by Iran’s military are often guided by the imperatives of the country’s contentious internal politics. Iran’s Foreign Ministry, which serves as the main interlocutor for the United States and other Western powers, appears in this light as the “good cop” to the “bad cop” of the regime’s hard-liners. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian armed forces tightly associated with the hardliners, is thought to pursue aggressive actions as a way of undercutting the legitimacy and influence of the more

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Iran’s political system consists of discrete entities and centers of power. These include the executive branch that Rouhani currently leads, the IRGC, and the office of the supreme leader, occupied since 1989 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In the context of defense and security policy, these power centers may not always see eye to eye, but they don’t operate in silos. Under the aegis of the Supreme National Security Council, different parts of Iran’s political and military establishment meet to make decisions affecting national security. Even outside this forum, Rouhani and his cabinet routinely consult and exchange information with the IRGC. During the negotiations that led to the nuclear deal in 2015, for example, Rouhani’s Foreign Ministry frequently touched base with the IRGC. The executive branch and the IRGC likewise coordinate policy in Syria, where the IRGC oversees Iran’s support of President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and conducts operations alongside Iran’s conventional army.

Above both the executive branch and the IRGC sits the supreme leader, Khamenei. The supreme leader is the

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chief policymaker in the Islamic Republic. If the supreme leader rejects an idea, no part of the regime puts it into action. Khamenei has representatives in every state institution and, most important, on the Supreme National Security Council to ensure that all arms of the regime faithfully pursue his policy objectives.

For this reason, there is little doubt that the Rouhani administration was fully aware of the Aramco attacks before they took place. Rouhani, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and the IRGC denied that Iran was behind the strikes. But the sophistication of the attack suggests that the IRGC was in charge of the operation, and it would not have acted without the unequivocal endorsement of the supreme leader’s office and the Supreme National Security Council. The supreme leader allows the IRGC to act independently within some limits when performing routine operations. An attack of this scope, however, which could have easily triggered escalation with Saudi Arabia and perhaps even with the United States, is not routine. The decision to go forward with this attack was strategic and would have involved the top officials in the country.

That the decision to target the Saudi oil fields was made by the entirety of the state rather than by the IRGC alone indicates consensus within the Iranian system.

The separate parts of Iran’s regime have met what they see as the sanctions from the Trump administration with a unified approach. The Islamic Republic has shown through numerous actions over the past six months that it will respond by force to Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions. Incidents such as the strikes in Saudi Arabia or operations against shipping in the Persian Gulf aren’t flailing attempts at retribution but instead are calculated to claw back leverage from Iran’s adversaries. This approach may already be bearing fruit. In a bid to de-escalate in the wake of the Aramco attacks, Saudi Arabia agreed to talks with Iran mediated

by Pakistan.

Western policymakers must accept the reality that Iran conducts its security policy as a unified state actor.

GROWING CONSENSUS When dealing with the United States, the various parts of Iran’s political and security apparatus have historically had a hard time reaching a consensus. Only on a handful of occasions since the advent of the Islamic Republic have these bodies managed to agree on how to approach the United States. For instance, in 2001 when Tehran’s interests aligned with Washington’s goals during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Iran chose to support U.S. efforts. Much like the 2015 nuclear deal, these moments of consensus within the Iranian regime were the exception, not the rule.

After a contentious few years before and after the nuclear deal, the regime now enjoys a new internal unity in the face of the United States. The Trump administration’s

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Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander Major General Hossein Salami (-3R) and General Amir Ali Hajizadeh (-2R) the head of the Revolutionary Guard's aerospace division visit Tehran's Islamic Revolution and Holy Defence museum during the unveiling of an exhibition of what Iran says are US and other drones captured in its territory, in the capital Tehran on September 2019 ,21.

(Getty)

maximum pressure campaign has moved Iran’s major factions closer together in setting strategic policy. In its cost-benefit calculus, Iran has settled on a path that privileges escalation over capitulation. The Aramco attacks might not be an outlier so much as the beginning of the next stage of Iran’s counterpressure campaign.

As the United States rolls out its response to recent Iranian activities, officials and Iran observers in Washington should understand the real nature of policymaking in Tehran. The more appealing narrative may be to see two camps within Iran struggling for the soul of the Islamic Republic and the future of its relations with the United States; in that view, Washington need only find ways to bolster the position of the moderates. However, in matters pertaining to national security, the regime acts deliberately and in unison. Iranian behavior today stems not from infighting within the regime but from a systemwide

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conviction in decisive action. Iran is probing for ways to increase its leverage and compel policy shifts among its adversaries. It sees its provocations as the best way to improve its tenuous position in the Middle East and in its relations with the United States.

In comparison with Washington’s Middle East policy, Tehran’s decision-making is steady and consistent.

Current and future U.S. policy toward Iran must begin with the premise that the Islamic Republic is the sum of its parts and that to try to empower moderates or disempower hard-liners is naive. Rather, Washington should strive to deal with Iran as it is, not as Washington wishes it were.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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ISIS Is Already Rising From the Ashes Turkey’s Invasion of Syria Will Fuel a Jihadi Resurgence

by Brian Katz* and Michael Carpenter* A U.S.-led military coalition succeeded in toppling the self-declared caliphate of ISIS, in Iraq and Syria

just this past March. Remarkably, only around 2,000 U.S. troops took part in this effort, a tiny fraction of those deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan at the heights of those wars. The key to success in Syria was that the

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In short, ISIS is grooming the battlefield militarily, politically, and psychologically so that it can go on the offensive as soon as the U.S.-led coalition withdraws. militants have already escaped from Kurdish-run prisons have sparked fears that extremism could rise from the ashes in Syria.

The reality is that ISIS and al Qaeda were enjoying a resurgence even before Trump’s withdrawal and the Turkish invasion—ISIS in eastern Syria and al Qaeda in the west of the country. Now, with the United States headed for the exits, the Kurds battling Turkey, and the Assad regime and its backers focusing on other priorities, no force is left to counter an extremist revival. Further conflict will only fuel radicalization, which will once again destabilize the region and pose threats to Israel, Europe, and even the United States.

Tragically, a few years from now, Syria will be right back where it was before the campaign against ISIS: suffering from chaos and conflict, with terrorism ascendant.

THE GATHERING STORM

Jihadists of former Al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham block demonstrators from approaching the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Turkey and Syria's northwestern Idlib province during a protest against the Syrian regime and its ally Russia on September 2019 ,20.

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United States worked “by, with, and through” local militia forces, namely the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose backbone was the Kurdish militia known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

And yet, with a single call to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly greenlit a Turkish assault on those same Kurdish partners, whose close ties to Kurdish militants in Turkey had long unnerved Ankara.

Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops that had been training and assisting the SDF as part of an effort to preserve the coalition’s gains against ISIS. Turkey then launched a bloody campaign to push the Kurds away from the Turkish-Syrian border. With the SDF distracted, ISIS, ever adaptive and resilient, appears poised to exploit the chaos. Reports that ISIS

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The last piece of the ISIS caliphate, in Baghouz, Syria, fell to coalition forces in March. ISIS leaders were even then busy reconstituting their group as a rural insurgency. Tens of thousands of fighters had died defending ISIS strongholds in the Euphrates River valley—but thousands of others had retreated to safe havens in the Syrian and Iraqi countryside and survived. Among these was the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

ISIS has spent recent months regrouping in rural sanctuaries, carrying out guerilla assaults on SDF patrols, and gathering its forces for later attacks on important cities and towns. In Raqqa and Dayr az Zawr, clandestine ISIS cells are collecting intelligence that will help the group plan assassinations, suicide attacks, and abductions. Such operations are meant to eliminate capable SDF commanders and to pressure Arab tribal leaders to work with ISIS instead of the SDF. In short, ISIS is grooming the battlefield militarily, politically, and psychologically so that

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it can go on the offensive as soon as the U.S.-led coalition withdraws.

Al Qaeda is likewise adapting and gathering strength in western Syria. The group has thrived in the chaos of Idlib Province, the last remaining opposition stronghold, which came under assault by pro-regime forces earlier this year. Once home to a mix of moderate, hardline, and extremist groups, Idlib is now a bastion of Salafi jihadis, dominated by the formerly al Qaeda–affiliated group Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). A cadre of core al Qaeda veterans split off from HTS in 2017 to form a new group called Huras al-Din. Under the direction of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, this group is dedicated first and foremost to attacking the West. It has found willing recruits among the thousands of ideologically aligned and battle-hardened fighters in Idlib.

The Assad regime has made things worse in Idlib by following its old playbook from Homs, Aleppo, and the Damascus suburbs. With the backing of Iran and Russia, Assad’s forces have sought to maximize civilian casualties in order to cow the population into submission. Such tactics have yielded shortterm battlefield victories, but in the long term, they will radicalize the local population and provide legitimacy, sanctuary, and manpower to al Qaeda.

Moreover, in order to ramp up pressure on Idlib, pro-regime forces have had to scale back operations against ISIS in central and southeastern Syria. Russia has also trained its attention on Idlib, while Iran and Hezbollah are more concerned about preparing for a potential war with Israel—all of which gives ISIS further space to regroup.

ISIS and al Qaeda have already had a chance to rebuild thanks to U.S. disengagement. Beginning in April, after the fall of the caliphate, the United States

With the SDF distracted, ISIS, ever adaptive and resilient, appears poised to exploit the chaos

reduced its presence in Syria by half, to 1,000 troops.

The Department of Defense reported in August that “the reduction of U.S. forces has decreased the support available for Syrian partner forces” and that the SDF was no longer able to “sustain long-term operations against ISIS militants.”

Now U.S. support for Kurdish forces in eastern Syria, which had included specialized training in patrolling, policing, governing, and intelligence gathering, is set to evaporate entirely as U.S. troops depart. In western Syria, the situation is just as dire: occasional U.S. air strikes used to target al Qaeda leaders in Idlib, with the help of intelligence gathered by moderate forces on the ground. But the United States cut off support to opposition fighters there in 2017 and has since then been unable to thwart the jihadi takeover.

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An armed guard walks among tents at the Kurdish-run al-Hol camp for the displaced where families of Islamic State (IS) foreign fighters are held, in the al-Hasakeh governorate in northeastern Syria, on October 2019 ,17. (Getty)

THE EXTREMIST ASCENT Turkey’s invasion of Syria now makes ISIS’s resurrection all but a fait accompli. Ankara’s overriding aim is to annihilate the Kurdish protostate of Rojava in northern Syria, which is currently a bulwark against ISIS domination of that region.

Faced with such an existential threat, the YPG will surely use its close connections to Kurdish militants inside of Turkey to intensify the Kurdish insurgency there. The YPG will thus shift its attention from suppressing ISIS to fighting Turkey.

Already, the SDF appears unable to secure the thousands of ISIS fighters in its custody. Nor can it keep hold of the tens of thousands of ISIS family members it has been holding at the al Hol refugee camp under minimal security and almost no

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international support. If chaos engulfs northeastern Syria in the coming months, ISIS could once again seize swaths of territory for a new caliphate and send fighters across unsecured borders to carry out terrorist attacks.

The Turkish onslaught is also driving the SDF to cut a deal with Damascus. The Assad regime aims to reassert its sovereignty across Syria and to prevent additional foreign incursions. As such, the Syrian government shares with the SDF the view of Turkey as a common enemy, and the two have collaborated on occasion throughout the civil war. In Aleppo in 2016, they worked together to eliminate what remained of the Syrian opposition in the east of the city. In exchange for regime support against Turkey, and perhaps some sort of semiautonomous status for Rojava, the YPG may be willing to let Assad

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fly the Syrian flag and exercise nominal authority in Kurdish-controlled cities. Already, the Kurds seem ready to cede control of the northern towns of Manbij and Kobani, the sites of pivotal battles against ISIS, to regime and Russian forces.

Such a deal will further propel ISIS’s resurgence.

Many Sunni Arabs in eastern Syria rebelled against Assad and viewed the YPG as usurpers. For this population, a YPG deal with Damascus will not go down well. ISIS will have a new narrative to propagate, positioning itself as the vanguard of Sunni Arab resistance–whether against the Turks, Kurds, Assad, or all of the above.

ISIS will exploit Sunni Arab frustration to gain popular support no matter what the SDF chooses to do. Prior to the Turkish invasion, the SDF, with U.S. encouragement, was improving its relations with the Arab population under its control. The counterISIS campaign had devastated the region’s Arabpopulated areas, and the locals there were skeptical of the YPG, but the group was making strides toward better and more inclusive governance. As the YPG battles Turkey, however, such governance efforts will collapse and tension will mount among rival Kurdish, Arab, and possibly regime-backed factions. In 2013, when the cities of Raqqa and Dayr az Zawr revolted against Assad, ISIS exploited the resulting anarchy by positioning itself as the only group capable of providing security and justice. Such will likely be its game plan today.

THINGS FALL APART Who will own this jihadi cauldron once the

If chaos engulfs northeastern Syria in the coming months, ISIS could once again seize swaths of territory for a new caliphate and send fighters across unsecured borders to carry out terrorist attacks.

United States withdraws? The answer is probably no one. After eight years of war, culminating with Idlib, the Syrian army lacks the manpower and the motivation for another fight. Iran and Hezbollah are also weary of war and would be willing to fight a resurgent ISIS only if the group threatened key cites in western Syria and along the Lebanese border. Moreover, allowing a jihadi threat to fester in Syria will enable both Shiite powers to justify a continued counterterrorism presence there, whose real purpose is preparing for a conflict with Israel.

Nor does Russia have much incentive to take on the resurgent jihadis. Russian President Vladimir Putin mainly wants to become the Middle East’s indispensable power broker. He cares less about refugee flows, growing extremism, and regional instability. To the contrary, the more precarious Syria becomes, the more leverage Putin will have in the region.

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Rebel fighters, part of the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield alliance, pose with an Islamic State group flag as they advance on February 2017 ,20, towards the city of AlBab, some 30 kilometres from the Syrian city of Aleppo. (Getty)

As Pentagon officials, we both participated in negotiations with Russia for a cessation of hostilities in Syria in 2016. Russian military and intelligence officials at the negotiating table understood that the Assad regime’s brutal military tactics were radicalizing Sunnis and driving them toward groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda. But Moscow saw winning the war for Assad as its primary goal, and the growth of terrorist groups as a bigger problem for its adversaries—Europe and the United States—than for itself.

After decades of U.S. involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts that have produced untold casualties, drained economic resources, and cast the United States as an occupying power, Americans are rightly wary of getting bogged down in unending wars or engaging in untenable nation building. But the U.S.-led coalition that toppled ISIS’s territorial caliphate earlier this year was among the most efficient and cost-effective in history. Not only has the Trump administration

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thrown away its hard-won gains by withdrawing U.S. troops and abandoning Kurdish partners; it has all but guaranteed the reemergence of an extremist threat to the region, to Europe, and to the United States.

Soon, the United States will have to reckon with the disastrous consequences of this decision. *BRIAN KATZ is a Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, he served as Country Director for Syria in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a military analyst focused on the Middle East at the Central Intelligence Agency. *MICHAEL CARPENTER is Managing Director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2015 to 2017.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Dashing Kurdish Hopes Will Not Bring Erdogan Peace Sanctions, Insurgency, and a Cold Shoulder Await

by Henri J. Barkey

in large part from the achievements of the Syrian Kurds.

Only a few months ago, Kurds in the Middle East were optimistic. They enjoyed a newfound international recognition, and a major political breakthrough glimmered on their horizon. Their confidence sprang

The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) mostly dominated the multiethnic umbrella militia group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces. That group

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had worked for almost five years in close alliance with the world’s premier superpower, the United States, to defeat ISIS. The affiliation was extraordinary, from the Kurdish point of view, because the Kurdistan Workers’ Party was initially behind establishing the militia. Based in Turkey, that party has long battled the Turkish government, and it is on the U.S. terrorist list. In the Syrian territories that the militia forces liberated, Kurds quickly established their own governmental structures and institutionalized their rule.

The Kurdish success in Syria came some two decades after an autonomous, internationally recognized Kurdish entity, the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, solidified in Iraq. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, Washington sought to stop Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein from massacring the country’s Kurdish population. The result of U.S. efforts was de facto Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, which would eventually lead to the KRG. In the period from 2014 to 2019, the United States appeared poised to once again midwife a Kurdish entity, this one under different circumstances and with less far-reaching powers, in Syria.

A Syrian protester gestures during a demonstration in the northern Syrian town of Hasakeh on October 2019 ,12, against the Turkish offensive on Kurdish-held towns.

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Within the space of a single week in October, Syrian Kurdish dreams have been cruelly dashed. Without informing even his own military, U.S. President Donald Trump gave Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the green light to invade northern Syria. First he pulled U.S. Special Forces back from the TurkishSyrian border, allowing Turkish troops and allied jihadis to start an offensive. Soon afterward, the White House announced that all 1,000 U.S. troops would leave Syria. All of Kurdish-controlled territory—not just the -20mile security zone Turkey had claimed it wanted to control—will now be open to Turkey’s advance.

The Syrian regime in Damascus has announced that it, too, will enter northern Syria, perhaps at the invitation of the region’s Kurds. What was recently Kurdish territory will likely be divided between Ankara and Damascus, an outcome that marks the end of the dream of Kurdish autonomy, at least for the time being.

POISONED CHALICE Both Trump and Erdogan face powerful headwinds.

Trump’s reckless decision has been almost universally condemned, including in Washington and even among some of the president’s most die-hard supporters.

The last time the Kurds garnered this much attention

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The Kurdish success in Syria came some two decades after an autonomous, internationally recognized Kurdish entity, the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, solidified in Iraq. and sympathy was at the end of the Gulf War, when Iraqi forces had cornered them along the Turkish border. But today, unlike in the 1990s, social media draws public attention to the dire conditions afflicting Kurdish civilians and to the wanton killings on the part of Turkey’s air force and allies. Even the U.S. secretary of defense acknowledged that Turkey appeared to be committing war crimes. A number of European countries have stopped arms deliveries to Ankara as a consequence—and more important, the U.S. Congress is likely to introduce harsh sanctions on Turkey.

Trump and Erdogan underestimated how intensely observers would react, not just to the callousness of the betrayal but also to the ferocity of the Turkish onslaught. To the U.S. Congress, military, bureaucracy, and press, Trump’s move was baffling. The Kurds were allies who had sacrificed 11,000 of their own—why would the United States unceremoniously dump them, potentially leading some 12,000 battle-hardened ISIS fighters and 40,000 of their family members to break out of the prisons in which the Kurds were holding them?

What Trump might have thought was a favor he offered to Erdogan may in fact be a poisoned chalice. Back in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, and the United States responded with an embargo that severely affected relations between the two countries.

The sanctions Congress now contemplates could be even more devastating, both because they appear to be much more wide-ranging and because the Turkish economy is more globally integrated and therefore far more vulnerable to external pressure.

The Turkish president may soon find himself in a political vise. Most of the Turkish population, except for the Kurdish minority, stands shoulder to shoulder with the Erdogan government and approves of the

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invasion. Erdogan cannot backtrack in response to sanctions, but legislation that is veto proof will tie Trump’s hands. For this reason, the Trump administration has announced its own complement of sanctions to dampen the public anger and head off more draconian congressional ones.

A sanctions-induced economic calamity for Turkey will not be good news for the United States. Turkey would likely respond by moving further away from Western institutions and even completely breaking from them. Erdogan could seek to avenge himself by pushing some of the three million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey into Europe. He could even make another play for Cyprus. Erdogan might not survive such a confrontation with the West, but the damage to the relationship would still take decades to heal.

COMMON ENEMY NUMBER ONE The Kurds, for their part, have been betrayed before.

But this time, Kurdish success in Syria had elevated expectations throughout the region. The fact that defeat now comes in the form of a Turkish invasion and the return of partial Syrian regime control will certainly subdue regional hopes.

Outside of Syria, the Turkish Kurds will be the most affected. They had become savvy political actors even under repressive conditions. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party is the third largest in Turkey’s parliament and recently swept most municipalities in the country’s Kurdish regions (Erdogan sacked almost all of its elected mayors). The party was

A new conflict will start, chewing up people and resources in a zerosum game much like the Kurdish struggle against Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, only now the adversary will be Erdogan.

critical to defeating Erdogan’s candidate in the 2019 municipal elections in Istanbul, a must-win city for the president and his party. Yet the opposition party whose candidate emerged victorious in that election abandoned the Kurds and rallied around the flag when the Turkish army began its invasion of Syria.

The Kurds are undoubtedly weakened, but Erdogan’s growing absolutism is weakening him as well, in that it leads him to miscalculate in ways that alienate Turkey from its allies. The incursion into Syria may be such a case. As ISIS fighters escape their detention, they breathe new life into an organization that had never really disappeared. Europeans are terrified by the possibility of jihadis returning to cause mayhem on their streets. They will blame Turkey for the renewed security risk.

Ankara may miss those allies when it confronts a burgeoning security problem of its own. After all, the fighting will at some point subside, and Turkey will control significant chunks of Syrian Kurdish territory.

Rather than accept this new status quo, the YPG may engage in a guerrilla war, perhaps even with the

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This picture taken on October 2019 ,16 from the Turkish side of the border at Ceylanpinar district in Sanliurfa shows smoke rising from the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain on the eighth day of Turkey's military operation against Kurdish forces.

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encouragement of the Syrian regime. A new conflict will start, chewing up people and resources in a zerosum game much like the Kurdish struggle against Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, only now the adversary will be Erdogan.

The Kurds in Iraq will face a dilemma. Economically, they depend on Turkey. But they have survived numerous massacres and cannot but be sympathetic to the plight of their kinsmen a few dozen miles away.

Just as Kurds everywhere loathed Saddam, Kurds in Iraq and elsewhere will likely feel the same way toward Erdogan.

The end of the last century and the early decades of this one witnessed a Kurdish awakening that no Turkish invasion will undo. I argued in my earlier piece in Foreign Affairs that nation building is a slow process. Defeats can be at least as edifying and invigorating as successes. In the early twentieth century—the age of the all-powerful state—attempts to eradicate whole cultures proved unsuccessful. In the twenty-first century—the age of information—the state is still powerful, but societies are also capable of keeping ideas and identities alive. There is little reason to think that the idea of a Kurdish nation is likelier now to fade away.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

Syrian regime forces raise a national flag and an image of President Bashar al-Assad at Tabqa air base in norther Syria's Raqa region on October ,16 2019. (Getty)

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Google Launches Pixel 4 Latest Android in the Market Fails to Meet All the Hype 34

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Many online reviews have noted that the smartphone has a disappointing battery life, since Google opted for a 2,800 mAh battery which is unreliable if you’re a heavy phone user. month ago.

NEW 90Hz SCREEN DISPLAY Something that the Samsung S10 and the iPhone 11 lack is a 90Hz screen refresh, as both rely on a 60Hz display screen. Meanwhile, the Google Pixel phones have a 90Hz screen display, which in laymen’s terms makes screen refreshing faster and scrolling quicker. It should be noted that users can switch to a 60Hz display, which can be useful for preserving battery life. This isn’t the only smartphone in the market to offer this new spec, as the OnePlus 7 Pro also has such an advanced screen display. In spite of this, reviewers have noted that a 90Hz screen display will probably not be the enticing feature that will persuade common consumers to buy the Pixel 4, as tech enthusiasts will probably be the most excited about a smartphone screen display that slightly refreshes quicker. Moreover, it is possible that Apple and Samsung’s next year’s flagship phones will have 90Hz screen displays, thus making the Pixel 4 not as competitively viable anymore.

ONLY A DUAL CAMERA? The new Google Pixel 4 smartphone is displayed during a Google launch event on October 2019 ,15 in New York City. (Getty)

by Ali El Shamy As Google launches its Pixel 4 and Pixel 4 XL, it vies to take market share away from the leading three smartphone giants, namely Samsung, Apple, and Huawei. During its unveiling, Google hyped up its latest smartphone focusing heavily on its camera however reviews are pouring in stating that its camera stills falls short of that of Apple’s iPhone 11, which was released just one

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While the Samsung S10 and the iPhone 11 both rock a triple rear camera, the Huawei Mate 30 Pro has a quad camera on its backside. Surely Google would have wanted to one-up its competitors by giving the Pixel 4 a more impressive camera, right? Well, Google failed to do so since its latest flagship only has a dual rear camera, one wide lens and one tele-lens but some tech enthusiasts will be disappointed to know that it doesn’t have an ultra-wide lens. Moreover, Google boasted over

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the phone’s night sight mode which according to the company can capture clear photos at night and even capture stars in the night sky (apparently it can also take pictures of the Milky Way on a clear night). While that might seem impressive, a YouTube review compared the phone’s night sight mode to that of the iPhone 11 Pro Max and found that the iPhone was actually more capable of capturing clearer photos at night (though the IPhone’s astronomical abilities weren’t put to the test). The same review also found that photos taken by the iPhone were clearer and that backgrounds tended to blur more in the Google Pro. However, the Google Pixel does have dual exposure controls which can enable users to adjust the camera’s brightness and shadows; as such users will not be forced to wait until after the photo is taken to modify the brightness or shadows of a photo.

BATTERY LIFE COULD BE BETTER As users rely heavily on their phones, it is little wonder that battery life is a huge deciding factor when it comes to phone purchases. Many online reviews have noted that the smartphone has a disappointing battery life, since Google opted for a 2,800 mAh battery which is unreliable if you’re a heavy phone user. One reviewer in Droid Life stated that he can get 4-3 hours of usage on other phones before their batteries drop to 30 to 20 percent, but the Pixel 4 fails to even meet that minimal requirement. According to another review on The Verge, users can prolong battery life by dimming the brightness, not using battery

The Google Pixel 4 can be unlocked with your face even if your eyes are shut. In other words, anyone can unlock the phone while you’re asleep.

eating apps and switching the refresh rate to 60Hz, which only says that heavy phone users should probably stay away from the Pixel 4.

MAJOR SECURITY FLAW Another odd choice that Google opted for was a lack of a fingerprint lock system, something that has been an industry standard for that last few years. Instead, the only quick unlock system in place is face unlock. While this isn’t necessarily a bad thing, the same YouTube review I cited earlier discovered one major security flaw in the

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Iphone 11 is presented in iSpot Apple store in Galeria Krakowska shopping centre in Krakow, Polandin on 30 September, 2019.

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face unlock system, namely the fact that it can be unlocked with your face even if your eyes are shut. In other words, anyone can unlock the phone while you’re asleep; all they need to do is just hold it up to your face. Google did address the issue stating that it would provide a system update that would rectify this bug, but it did not give an exact timeline as to when.

GOOGLE DIDN’T DO ENOUGH It’s unusual that Google did not exert more

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effort in its latest flagship phone, tech junkies will not be impressed with the phone’s underwhelming specs (save for its 90Hz screen refresh), and the more gimmicky features, such as astronomical photo capture, will not likely entice casuals to buy the phone. Meanwhile, the really casual users (those who only use smartphones for making calls and sending messages) will probably opt for a cheap model that gets the job done. All in all, if Google wants a larger share of the market it will have to try harder next year.

A Weekly Political News Magazine

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Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia’s Peacemaking Prime Minister www.majalla.com

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How George Harrison rescued ‘Monty Python’s Life of Brian’ And How the Film Launched His Career as a Producer 40

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The unlikely side effect was not just that “Life of Brian” was indeed completed and became a global hit commercially but that HandMade Films continued to produce other projects and became an important force in British cinema during the 1980s. of the project, leaving Goldstone, who also produced the troupe’s debut feature film, “Monty Python and the Holy Grail,” and the Pythons flummoxed about what to do.

“Eric and I came to New York, and then we came out here and started going through everybody we knew,” Goldstone, 76, said this week from his home of more than a decade in Oxnard. “We went to Mike Medavoy, at United Artists at that time, and he said he would put up half the money, but that we’d have to get the other half from others.”

Enter a Beatle to the rescue: guitarist, singer and songwriter George Harrison.

“Eric said George had always been a huge Python fan, and Michael Palin and Terry Gilliam had become friendly with him,” Goldstone said. “So Eric said ‘Why don’t we see whether George could help?’ We went to his house in the Hollywood Hills, and I can’t remember if we had sent him the script or if he had read it, but he said, ‘Yeah, I’ll do it.’ And that was it.”

Members of the British comedy team, Monty Python, during the filming of their controversial film 'The Life of Brian', (from left) John Cleese Michael Palin and Graham Chapman.

by Randy Lewis Once upon a time, a couple of desperate English filmmakers embarked on a quest to find a champion, and to their everlasting surprise, discovered one where they might have least expected it.

It was the late 1970s, and producer John Goldstone and Monty Python’s Flying Circus founding member Eric Idle trekked across the Atlantic with caps in hand to scramble together the money to make “Monty Python’s Life of Brian.” EMI Films had summarily backed out

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Through Harrison’s manager, Denis O’Brien, a boutique company, HandMade Films, was set up to handle the financing. HandMade was created initially with the sole goal of seeing “Life of Brian” to completion. Harrison put his English estate, Friar Park, up as collateral against a bank loan for about 2$ million that covered the other half of the film’s overall 4$ million production budget, Goldstone said.

“We went to Denis and said ‘We want the same deal we had with EMI, which gave us full control and the final cut,’” Goldstone recalled. “He said ‘Fine — OK,’ and

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that was kind of that. It was terribly straightforward.”

The unlikely side effect was not just that “Life of Brian” was indeed completed and became a global hit commercially but that HandMade Films continued to produce other projects and became an important force in British cinema during the 1980s.

The company made enough films to merit its own celebratory festival, dubbed The (Other) HandMade’s Tale Film Festival, which runs through Oct. 20 at Laemmle’s Ahrya Fine Arts Theatre in Beverly Hills.

It is organized by English producer, humorist and Beatles authority Martin Lewis under the umbrella of the ongoing Mods & Rockers Film Festival, marking its 20th anniversary this year.

That’s just one of several anniversaries “The (Other) HandMade’s Tale” series is acknowledging: This year is the 50th anniversary of the Python troupe, which also included John Cleese, Graham Chapman and Terry Jones, and the 40th anniversary both of “Life of Brian” and the creation of HandMade Films.

Among the projects earning a spotlight are additional Python pictures including Terry Gilliam’s “Time Bandits” (1981), “Monty Python Live at the Hollywood Bowl “and Michael Palin’s “The Missionary” (both 1982) as well as Malcolm Mowbray’s “A Private Function” (1984) and director Neil Jordan’s acclaimed early film “Mona Lisa” (1986).

The latter film earned a best actor BAFTA award for relative newcomer Bob Hoskins, who had established

Harrison put his English estate, Friar Park, up as collateral against a bank loan for about 2$ million that covered the other half of the film’s overall 4$ million production budget.

his star credentials a few years earlier with “The Long Good Friday,” which was distributed by HandMade and also featured a breakout performance from Helen Mirren.

Various principals will take part in Q&A sessions before or after many of the screenings, which began this week with “An Accidental Studio,” a documentary about HandMade Films by Terry Jones’ son Bill Jones and his film collaborator Ben Timlett. Lewis will extend the festival briefly into November with a

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George Harrison in 1974. (TNS)

strategically timed screening of HandMade’s 1986 flop musical “Shanghai Surprise” starring Madonna and her then-new husband Sean Penn, to coincide with her residency at the Wiltern Theatre. It will screen Nov. 18 — one of Madonna’s nights off during the Wiltern run — at the Laemmle NoHo theater in North Hollywood, and tickets go on sale Monday. Lewis has invited her to be guest of honor for what he believes to be the film’s first major L.A. screening since it premiered in 1986.

“Saturday Night Live,” is currently emceeing a tour for the Bootleg Beatles. He acted and played music in various Python projects but was aced out of a more prominent onscreen role in “Life of Brian” because of the financing imbroglio.

The full schedule of screenings and special events can be found at the Mods & Rockers official website.

“Because of EMI pulling out its money and George stepping in, it was delayed six months, and by that time I was doing a British television series called ‘The Innes Book of Records,’” Innes said. “I got a call from the (HandMade) film office because they had done the credits early on and I had already been given this huge credit. They said, ‘You’d better get down here and do something.’ So I ended up being the Samaritan being chased by gladiators and having a heart attack,” he said with a laugh. “It didn’t really stretch my talent.”

Goldstone, Medavoy and Lewis co-hosted a private reception Monday night in Hollywood that drew several of Harrison’s friends, family members and associates including the Who’s Pete Townshend and his wife, composer Rachel Fuller, actress Kathy Bates, lyricist Tim Rice, producer-talent manager-musician Peter Asher and Harrison’s sister-in-law and former HandMade executive Linda Arias.

Lewis also pulled together an ad-hoc band consisting of musicians who played with Harrison on different projects: guitarist Laurence Juber, bassist Nathan East, keyboardist Greg Phillinganes, drummer Jim Keltner and singer Bird York, who teamed on performances of four of Harrison’s best-known songs.

But the surviving Python members were MIA for various reasons. Lewis noted that Palin recently had heart surgery and is unable to attend the festival. Idle had to cancel a recent appearance in England because of an unspecified “family emergency” and also is not expected to attend. Gilliam, the troupe’s lone American member, renounced his U.S. citizenship years ago in political protest and is precluded from visiting more than 30 days a year, a number he’s already used up in 2019. Terry Jones is battling dementia and makes few public appearances.

English musician Neil Innes, sometimes referred to as “the seventh Python” because of his close association with the comedy ensemble, spoke about Harrison and HandMade in a separate interview. He was a friend and confidant of Harrison through his membership in the Bonzo Dog Doo-Dah Band, a collective of art student-musicians that played around England roughly at the same time as the Beatles.

Innes, also known for his role as one of the Rutles, the Beatles sendup band created on the Python spinoff TV show “Rutland Weekend Television” and featured on

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“I was so looking forward to playing the soldier who was trying not to laugh at Michael Palin (as Pontius Pilate) because I knew I could take him on,” Innes, 74, said from his home in southwest France.

“I wish I could (be) there” in the States for the HandMade Festival, Innes said, adding that he is supportive of the effort because “A lot of people don’t know that side of George, who was much more of a Renaissance man than people think. He had a feeling for all kinds of things and, by golly, we all sure miss him.”

After turning out nearly two dozen films through the 1980s, HandMade was sold to new owners in the early 1990s. But Innes underscored the important role HandMade played in sustaining British cinema during turbulent years.

“There were not many victories at that time,” he said, “so it was great when HandMade went on to make more films. ‘The Long Good Friday’ was another one.

George stepped in and rescued that,” another case of EMI Films getting cold feet, Goldstone said, when producer Sir Lew Grade considered the gangster film too violent.

HandMade distributed it to much acclaim and followed it by producing “Mona Lisa.”

“I think some American suits wanted to have Bob Hoskins’ voice dubbed,” Innes recalled, “but George resisted it. HandMade Films was a real player. More people should know about the film-connoisseur Beatle.”

Originally published in the LA Times.

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Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia’s Peacemaking Prime Minister Majalla - London

unrest broke out between the two religious communities he actively engaged in a peace Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia's Prime Minister forum for reconciliation. in April 2018, the first Oromo to lead his In 1993, he joined the Ethiopian army, where country. The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic he first worked in the intelligence service and group, had never been in prominent positions rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. After the of power in the East African powerhouse which Rwandan genocide of 1994, he was deployed as has a population of more than 100 million a member of the United Nations peace mission people. Grievances over their economic and and later served in the border war between political exclusion drove nearly three years of Ethiopia and Eritrea. anti-government protests across the country of Abiy first moved into politics in 2010 and which Abiy became one of the central figures quickly rose within the ranks of the Oromo of. He is most widely recognised for his People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO). He success in thawing relations with Eritrea, the was elected to the House of Representatives, breakaway republic with which Ethiopia had and in 2015 he became the Federal Minister remained on a war footing since the country of Science and Technology in Addis Ababa. gained independence in 1993. He won this Soon after, he returned to his native province of year’s Nobel Peace Prize for his achievement Oromia to take up the position of the Head of the OPDO Secretariats. Abiy was also given the as a peacemaker.

Abiy was born in the town of Beshasha in the job of leading the Oromia Urban Development historic Kaffa Province (in the present-day and Planning Office. It was through this role Jimma Zone, Oromia Region) of Ethiopia on that Abiy became closely associated with the 15 August 1976. Raised by his father, Ahmed issue that would eventually catapult him to the Ali, a Muslim Oromo, and his mother, Tezeta Prime Minister’s Office.

Wolde, an Orthodox, Christian Amhara, the Land grabbing from Oromo’s was deemed values of tolerance and understanding across necessary by the then federal government in divides were instilled in him at an early age. order to implement the plans to create the Abiy is the 13th child of his father and the Addis Ababa Special Zone. While initially, sixth and youngest child of his mother, the most Oromos remained silent, there was an fourth of his father's four wives. His childhood undercurrent of discontent brewing. Starting name was Abiyot ("Revolution"). When violent from 2015, Abiy became one of the central

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figures in the fight against illegal land grabbing activities in Oromia Region and especially around Addis Ababa. The protests inevitably shifted towards a demand for political reform.

While embroiled in trying to resolve the tensions, in 2017, Abiy received his PhD as a Doctor of Philosophy from the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University.

Following three years of unrest, on 15 February 2018, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, announced his resignation, triggering the first ever contested leadership election. On 2 April, Abiy was sworn in by the Ethiopian parliament as Prime Minister of Ethiopia. During his acceptance speech, he promised political reform; to promote the unity of Ethiopia and unity among the peoples of Ethiopia; to reach out of the Eritrean government to resolve the ongoing Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict after the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and to also reach out to the political opposition inside and outside Ethiopia. His inaugural speech inspired hope and renewed collective sense of purpose in Ethiopia.

In the first few months after he came to power, Abiy lifted the state of emergency and ordered the release of thousands of prisoners, allowed exiled dissidents to return home and unblocked hundreds of websites and TV channels .

In June 2018, Abiy ended the -20year state of war with Eritrea by agreeing to give up disputed border territory, in the process normalising relations with the long—time foe.

The two countries signed a “Joint Declaration of Peace and Frienship” declaring an end to tensions and agreeing, amongst other matters, to re-establish diplomatic relations; reopen

direct telecommunication, road, and aviation links, and facilitate Ethiopian use of the posts of Massawa and Asseb. The pace of the rapprochement and highly emotional scenes of families reuniting after decades of separation further consolidated Abiy’s success.

Since the Eritrea deal, Abiy – the youngest head of government in Africa – has also been

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involved in peace processes in other African countries. This has included helping to broker an agreement between Sudan’s military leaders and civilian opposition after months of protests.

Abiy’s office said the Nobel Peace Prize was testimony “to the ideals of unity, cooperation and mutual coexistence that the prime minister has been consistently championing”.

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The Kidney Stone Diet: Not as Restrictive as You May Think 46

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by Harvard Health Letter Reducing but not eliminating oxalate, salt, and animal protein in your diet can help keep kidney stones from recurring.

When you get a kidney stone, a change in diet is in order. You'll need to avoid foods that are high in certain substances -- such as oxalate -- that can lead to the formation of more kidney stones. But watch out for exhaustive lists of foods to avoid, warns Dr. Brian Eisner, co-director of the Kidney Stone Program at Harvard-affiliated Massachusetts General Hospital. "There is a lot of misinformation on the Internet regarding the relationship between the consumption of certain foods and risk of developing kidney stones."

There's no established daily oxalate limit. The American Urological Association simply recommends avoiding overly restrictive low-oxalate diets, since fruits and vegetables with oxalate may have other health benefits.

TYPES OF KIDNEY STONES Stones develop in the kidneys when high concentrations of chemicals form tiny crystals in urine and then start sticking together to form a growing stone. The vast majority of kidney stones are made of one or more of the following: Calcium oxalate or calcium phosphate. These account for %85 of kidney stones.

Uric acid. Excess uric acid in the urine may lead to the formation of uric acid stones or calcium oxalate stones, depending on other urine conditions. Uric acid stones account for about %10 of kidney stones.

Some kidney stones eventually travel through the urinary tract and exit the body when you urinate. If a stone gets stuck along the way, it blocks urine flow and can become quite painful.

After a kidney stone passes, it's important to try to prevent another stone from forming. Studies suggest the recurrence rate of kidney stones within five years of an initial stone ranges from %35 to %50 without treatment.

CHANGING YOUR DIET Dietary change starts with avoiding foods rich in oxalate. But Dr. Eisner says many low-oxalate diets go overboard. "They exclude all foods containing oxalate. They don't differentiate between high- or lowoxalate foods," he says. "Strawberries are a perfect example. They have 2 milligrams [mg] of oxalate per serving. That's not much. Eliminating strawberries won't do much to protect against a kidney stone.

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Spinach has much more oxalate. A typical serving has more than 750 mg of oxalate."

There's no established daily oxalate limit. The American Urological Association simply recommends avoiding overly restrictive low-oxalate diets, since fruits and vegetables with oxalate may have other health benefits.

Dr. Eisner advises avoiding foods with more than 75 mg of oxalate per -100gram serving, such as nuts, spinach, and rhubarb (see "Foods high in oxalate").

Foods high in oxalate Food Serving size Oxalate content in milligrams Spinach (cooked) 2/1 cup 755 Rhubarb 2/1 cup 541 Rice bran 1 cup 281 Almonds 1 ounce 122 Baked potato with skin 1 medium 97 Navy beans 2/1 cup 76 Source: Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.

OTHER DIETRY APPROACHES To help prevent recurring kidney stones, you'll also need to follow these dietary rules.

Get enough dietary calcium. Low calcium levels actually increase urine oxalate levels. Try to consume 1,000 to 1,200 mg of daily calcium, and get it from food sources like low-fat milk or yogurt rather than pills.

Reduce salt. Too much salt in your diet increases

Reducing but not eliminating oxalate, salt, and animal protein in your diet can help keep kidney stones from recurring. calcium excreted in your urine. Aim for 2,300 mg or less each day.

Limit animal protein. Eating lots of animal protein, including red meat, fish, or chicken, can increase uric acid levels in urine. "You can have two portions of animal protein per day," Dr. Eisner advises. A portion is about the size of your palm.

Drink more fluids. Aim for two to three liters (about 10 to 12 cups) of fluid per day, to dilute any crystals in your urine. "You can drink anything you want, but avoid sugar-sweetened beverages, which increase the

risk of stone formation," Dr. Eisner says. Drinking half a cup of lemon juice diluted with water each day has been shown to help inhibit kidney stone formation.

Drinking coffee, tea, beer, wine, or orange juice is associated with a lower risk for stones, according to Harvard research.

Follow a DASH diet. The Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension (DASH) diet is linked to a reduced risk for kidney stones. It emphasizes fruits and vegetables, low-fat dairy foods, dietary fiber, whole grains, and limited added sugar.

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How a Caliphate Ends On the Frontline of the Fight Against ISIS

by Anne Barnard They Will Have to Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate. James Verini. Norton, 304 .2019pp.

The origin story that James Verini tells about his new book, They Will Have to Die Now, is about guilt—his guilt for not having gone to Iraq earlier. On 11/9, in his first newspaper job, he covered the collapse of the Twin Towers. He writes that a couple of years later, he “could have, should have, gone to Iraq but didn’t.” He was, he says, “too scared.”

It’s just as well that Verini waited until 2016 to “face Iraq” and start reporting on what he calls the central American war of our time. For one thing, obviously yet still shockingly, even arriving 13 years late, he didn’t miss it. For another, he eventually learned a key lesson for a reporter: being scared doesn’t make you the wrong person for the job. Verini’s deeply reported, beautifully written first-person account results from many months on an extremely dangerous assignment. To cover the pivotal fight to dislodge ISIS from Mosul, a city of one million to two million people in northern Iraq, he embedded with Iraqi government troops, who, for all the years, money, and lives that Washington spent training

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A fighter from a local tribe keeps watch from his rooftop outpost under smoke filled skies from burning oil wells set on fire by fleeing ISIS members on November 2016 ,10 in Al Qayyarah, Iraq. (Getty)

them as U.S. proxies, tend to be cheerfully uninterested in basic force-protection measures such as setting perimeters and overwatch points.

Arriving late also means seeing the conflict with fresh eyes. Many American journalists of my generation who were shipped out to Central Asia and the Middle East after President George W. Bush’s declaration of the dubiously named “war on terror” are now pushing two decades on the beat. The intervening years have brought distance—even freedom, if one dares use that

Although most Americans fail to think much about the war’s effects on their own country.

Iraqis do not have that luxury. adventure, in 91–1990.

Verini thus arrives in medias res to a country “whose story,” he writes, “had been entwined with my country’s story for a generation now, for most of my life, so entwined that neither place any longer made sense without the other.” True, although most Americans fail to think much about the war’s effects on their own country. Iraqis do not have that luxury.

In today’s Iraq, American intervention is less an event than a condition, less an alien encounter than a problematic marriage. The Iraqi troops and civilians Verini befriends and profiles have lived lives permeated by the war far more deeply than are those of Americans who have spent entire military careers fighting it. Their generosity in trying to forge mutual understanding with Verini, “a person from the place that had made their lives a hell,” was, he writes, “humanity itself.” At first glance, his book reads like any narrative of life with the troops, full of worm’s-eye details on war’s chaos and boredom and absurdity, with vivid portraits of soldiers and their black humor. But these are Iraqi troops, and Verini intersperses the scenes with historical research from the earliest annals of war—some visible in Mosul’s own archaeological past— to records of more recent episodes that explain why many citizens offered at least passive support to ISIS. So his account of Iraqis, both soldiers and civilians, feels fresh, and it presents an occasion to examine the broader questions posed by the conflict’s recent events: What works and what doesn’t, after 16 years of attempts by foreigners and locals to pacify Iraq? What happens on the ground as the United States outsources the foot soldiering of its wars?

Is ISIS really defeated, or are years of violence in the name of fighting terrorism likely to continue unrolling new, expanding chapters of conflict with that group and others?

FROM WASHINGTON TO BAGHDAD Iraq-war-tainted word—from the post11/9- confusion in which “America, in its fear, in its shame,” as Verini writes, attacked Iraq. The original sin of the U.S. invasion and the mistakes of the occupation that we reported on are now, while not beside the point, almost as distant from today as the Vietnam War was from the United States’ first Iraq

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As he follows one mostly Muslim army into a war against another, Verini doesn’t bother with tired questions about Islam and whether there is something uniquely pathological about Arabs or Muslims. He does situate the rise of ISIS in age-old atavistic impulses. Not Islamic ones or Middle Eastern ones but human ones—the violence that springs from

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power struggles, revenge, bloodlust. In the gory battle scenes memorialized in Assyrian friezes in Nineveh, the ancient city that lay near modern-day Mosul, Verini sees parallels to the gruesome photos and videos Iraqis shared by smartphone.

“Everyone knew someone who’d been killed on the Internet,” he writes.

Verini seeks to temper the hype about ISIS, and he cuts it down to size, portraying it as just the latest insurgent group to use terrorism as a tool for political goals. He recalls that it has been over a century since jihadism became a vehicle for anticolonialism, reminding readers of the Royal Air Force’s efforts to put down the Iraqi revolt that began in 1920, a movement that, like the rebels who fought the British in Sudan decades earlier, invoked the Almighty against an occupier. “Fifteen years before Guernica,” Verini writes, “the British were bombing unarmed Iraqis.” Nor is ISIS even the first insurgent group to promote an apocalyptic worldview. He mentions the Jewish rebels who fought the Romans in the first centuries BC and AD and ultimately committed mass suicide on Masada.

As Verini notes, many news organizations milked the ISIS story for its “luridness,” yielding shallow coverage “on the same spectrum as the Caliphate’s own blood porn.” (He acknowledges “a few exceptions”; in fact, there are many brave journalists who reported with context and measure.) Some outlets, he muses, may have sought to absolve themselves of their lack of skepticism before the U.S. invasion, as if to say, as he puts it, “See, I knew all along there was something horrible lurking in the desert there.”

But it is instructive to look even more broadly at the successes and failures of writers who have tried to make sense of the chaos consuming Iraq and Syria. Too often, we approach it like the proverbial blind men assessing an elephant: the one at

I wish in hindsight that in the early years of the Iraq war, then faceless insurgents and the civilians caught between them and U.S. firepower could have contacted us directly.

the tail thinks it is like a rope, the one at the leg says it is like a tree, and so on. Each arena of the sprawling conflicts poses its own challenges of access and safety. Few people have seen every aspect from the ground, and no book has satisfyingly pulled it all together. Verini focuses on Iraq and men. A recent book by Azadeh Moaveni looks mainly at women who joined ISIS in Syria.

Yet neither Iraq nor Syria fully makes sense without the other. The details of the hostilities in Syria, where the conflict began not with ISIS but with President Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of a civilian protest movement, are very different from those of the war in Iraq. At the same time, Iraqis and Syrians share a sense of abandonment and abuse by their governments and the world, and their conflicts have become inseparable. The Bush administration’s misadventure in Iraq was the reason the Obama administration was unable or unwilling to take decisive action to stop atrocities in Syria: the United States was constrained by depleted resources, a war-weary population, the discrediting of its rhetoric about democracy and human rights, and its own undermining of international institutions and multilateralism. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Assad’s weaponization of Syrian extremists to harass American soldiers in Iraq helped seed what became ISIS. Assad later imprisoned some of those same fighters, only to reuse them later on. Early in the Syrian revolt,

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Members of Iraqi forces walk near a MRAP armoured vehicle used by US forces supporting Iraq troops during the operation to recapture Mosul from ISIS, at the Qayyarah military base, about 60 kilometres (35 miles) south of the city, on October 2016 ,18.

(Getty)

a need for a closely observed account of the United States’ messy alliances. The country treats Iran-backed militias as de facto allies in Iraq but as enemies in Syria, where U.S. proxies, in turn, are led by Kurdish groups that Turkey, a fellow NATO member, considers terrorists.

Moreover, combat books can only go so far in documenting the plight of civilians; in Verini’s, anecdotes of officers jauntily disregarding danger, or of the soldiers obscenely taunting one another about their sisters, sometimes blur together or narrowly avoid cheerleading. (I pine for a frontline book by a female serial embedder, such as Jane Arraf, Arwa Damon, or Kathy Gannon, although the Iraqi military lags behind its U.S. counterpart in letting women reporters take equal risks as men.)

even as he vacuumed civilian activists and army defectors into his torture dungeons, he released jihadis who went on to lead hardcore militant groups, making it easier for him to claim that the world had to choose between him and “the terrorists.”

Going back further, had the United States not invaded Iraq, the country would almost certainly not have become a breeding ground, and later a sitting duck, for ISIS. In fact, it’s possible to imagine that without the invasion, the uprisings that swept the Arab world beginning in late 2010, or at least the one that swept Syria, would have gone somewhat better. Perhaps— dream for a moment—an Iraqi revolt against Saddam Hussein could have taken root organically, in partnership with the Syrian one. Instead, in the rubble left by invasion, Iraq was riddled with Sunni extremists, who dispatched emissaries across the border into Syria to radicalize the population there.

A weak Iraq permeated by Iranian power also made it easy for Iran to recruit legions of Iraqi Shiite militants and dispatch them across the border into Syria to help Assad put down the revolt.

There is more to learn on the ground that requires the whole picture. There has yet to be a systematic study of whether the United States’ ordnance has really done better than Assad’s at sorting fighters from civilians, especially since the Trump administration loosened the rules of engagement. There is also

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To bridge these epistemological gaps, journalists have new tools: social media and other digital communications.

However misused these have been, civilians, activists, and rank-and-file fighters, in Syria especially, have turned them into an unprecedented platform to tell the story of their own conflicts in real time, making Syria arguably history’s most documented war. I wish in hindsight that in the early years of the Iraq war, then faceless insurgents and the civilians caught between them and U.S. firepower could have contacted us directly. Yet even in recent years, online communications have not been used as early or as extensively in Iraq, perhaps for as simple a reason as that different teams of reporters typically cover the two countries, and those working in Iraq were not as used to those tools. And in Syria, social media have sometimes obscured important dynamics. Before the 2013 takeover of Raqqa by ISIS and the subsequent beheadings, foreign jihadis heralded the arrival of the group with goofy selfies, making it initially appear to be a buffoonish sideshow in a crowded field of more conventional actors.

In Iraq, however, where ISIS and its predecessors had incubated for years, the group’s rise was plain to see amid Iraq’s political disorder. Journalists saw it, but strained news budgets meant shrinking coverage as the United States, briefly it turned out, withdrew.

WHY THEY FIGHT Verini does an excellent job of describing the Iraqi leg of the elephant and his starting point: guilt. He assigns much of it to U.S. policies and the leaders in Iraq and elsewhere whom those policies have supported or tolerated. Yes, the United States helped create ISIS, not in the literal way that conspiracy theorists believe but by destabilizing Iraq, ruling it clumsily, and then supporting the scorched-earth, sectarian approach of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Verini reminds readers of how, during the run-up to the invasion, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell elevated the obscure Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would found

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the group that became ISIS, to a jihadi celebrity by citing him in his famous speech before the UN Security Council.

And Verini explains how ISIS exploited the Maliki government’s corruption, bribing or co-opting officials as it raised money, infiltrated institutions, and amassed weapons, even as it denounced graft to gain popularity.

By the time ISIS took over Mosul in 2014, the group was the only real alternative to Maliki, and some Moslawis, given their lived experience, decided it was worth a try.

Amid their political, security, and economic rationales, one researcher tells Verini, “religious ideology might have been the last point of identification with the Islamic State.”

This observation hits home in the operatic story of two middle-aged, middle-class brothers in a refugee camp who initially welcomed ISIS. Abu Omar’s wife was killed by al Qaeda militants in 2005. His brother Abu Fahad, a former army medic, also lost his wife, who was killed the next year when U.S. and Kurdish troops shot up the family car at a checkpoint. After they beat him, Abu Fahad found his eldest daughter “in the backseat of the car trying to eat shards of window glass”; she had just “watched her mother’s head explode.” “Abu Fahad wasn’t a zealot,” Verini writes. “He wasn’t even particularly devout.” He continues: But he had watched his country invaded, occupied, turned upon itself; his city degraded from a “paradise,” as he described the Mosul of his youth, to a hell; his wife killed; himself and his family and friends humiliated by soldiers of the army he’d once nursed to health; his children driven mad, denigrated, denied futures. To a man like that, sane as he is, talk of a millenarian utopia, of any utopia, of any improvement of life beyond the malediction it has become, holds promise.

Verini also gives deserved attention to the heavy sacrifices and bravery of the Iraqi forces. Twenty thousand Iraqi troops died between 2014 and 2016 alone. One gunner, known as

Verini seeks to temper the hype about ISIS, and he cuts it down to size, portraying it as just the latest insurgent group to use terrorism as a tool for political goals.

“SpongeBob,” a nickname bestowed on him by his young son, had earlier survived torture by a Shiite militia, despite being Shiite himself. During the fight for Mosul, he was evaporated by a suicide bomb—recalling, in my mind, a line from the World War II poet Randall Jarrell: “When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.”

Verini travels mostly with the Counter Terrorism Service, a group of special operations forces that reports to Iraq’s prime minister and that U.S. officials viewed as the most competent and least politicized Iraqi unit. Yet at every turn, he finds the unevenness of twenty-first-century warfare—the same type of disconnect and confusion that leads sophisticated drones to hit wedding parties in Afghanistan and Yemen.

The Iraqis working on the ground beneath high-tech U.S. jets carry homemade mortar tubes, forget to take the wrapping off grenade launchers, wear misspelled shoulder patches, and shun body armor. Verini watches them work with Western special forces officers to call in airstrikes from an alarmingly exposed command post, communicating on WhatsApp. Operational security concerns aside, Verini wonders about uncounted civilian casualties. Watching impact clouds bloom across Mosul, he observes that in the Pentagon’s claim of scrupulous precision, “you had to smell horseshit.”

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Iraqis walk by the destroyed Al-Nuri Mosque as they flee from the Old City of Mosul on July 2017 ,5, during the Iraqi government forces' offensive to retake the city from ISIS fighters. (Getty)

city without destroying it, and they have met with similar results. As Verini writes, “The more Moslawis were killed, the more they resented the soldiers, and the more soldiers were killed, the more they resented the Moslawis.” In some ways, the Iraqis’ challenge is worse than the Americans’, since they need to somehow live together, to envision shared citizenship with mortal enemies.

Mosul was recaptured in the summer of 2017, and the city is now in the throes of a slow rebuilding. Today, ISIS has been defeated militarily as a territorial entity and discredited by its misrule among those who gave it a chance as a government. But the political problems that allowed it to gain a foothold haven’t begun to be solved.

And although its true believers have been dealt a setback, they are still available as recruits for decentralized attacks in Iraq, Syria, and worldwide.

Verini doesn’t dig deeply into this but cites others’ reports: one airstrike said to target an ISIS position during the battle for Mosul killed as many as 150 civilians, according to Amnesty International and local witnesses quoted in several news outlets; a New York Times investigation published in 2017 found that one in five airstrikes by the anti-ISIS coalition resulted in unintended civilian deaths, 31 times the rate the Pentagon claimed. The book also adds to growing evidence that even the best Iraqi units summarily execute prisoners.

One of Verini’s most likable characters, a chubby-cheeked major named Hassan, casually admits to one such killing and then shows Verini the body. The episode comes near the end of the book and gets short shrift. I wanted more on how Verini assimilated the execution into his understanding of his frontline companions and on how common such killings were.

AFTER ISIS They Will Have to Die Now documents the practical application of a popular theory informing much of U.S. policy: that having locals fight wars engenders less resentment. But this doesn’t always hold true. Just like U.S. forces, Iraqis have struggled with the difficulty of saving a

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As for the rest of Iraq, short of real trust, the best hope is the sharing of spoils and power. The country has a semblance of real politics—debate on governance that transcends sect— after the fight against ISIS created at least a partial sense of shared purpose. The absence of violence is a kind of success; in the city of Samarra, for instance, the Shiite militia run by Muqtada al-Sadr, who rose to prominence fighting American troops, is now keeping peace with a mostly Sunni population, partly by offering lucrative business opportunities to local Sunnis. In Syria, however, relative quiet has come through Assad’s wholesale doubling down on repression. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Lebanon’s rickety yet durable system, with sectarian mafias sharing rents a generation after the country’s own civil war ended, somehow passes as a decent outcome.

But it depends on perpetuating sectarian mistrust and precludes basic infrastructure investment, let alone a functional state, a shared political or physical public space, or meaningful levers for ordinary citizens to effect change. And that is in a country that is a fraction of the size of Iraq.

So Verini is right to talk about an entwined Iraq and America.

Indeed, it is not too far a stretch to see versions of Iraqis’ dilemmas within U.S. borders. How can armed fanatics and gunmen, who make common cause in the dark corners of social media and capitalize on its blurring of facts, be stopped? Are Americans facing their own apocalypse, from the climate? How can grievances and divisions be healed in a country, in a world, where people don’t agree on the nature of reality? And after years of fear, what concerns are shared?

Who is “them,” and who is “us”?

Anne Barnard is a reporter at The New York Times, where she was Beirut Bureau Chief from 2012 to 2018. Earlier, she served as Baghdad Bureau Chief and Middle East Bureau Chief at The Boston Globe.

This article was originally published in Foreign Affairs