Jason Greenblatt Interview

Trump’s Secret Middle East Peace Plan

Iran’s Vague JCPOA Warnings

A Weekly Political News Magazine

A Weekly Political News Magazine

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Issue 1747 - May - 10/05/2019

Issue 1746 - May - 03/05/2019

Summer at Cambridge www.majalla.com

Jason Greenblatt: Many Arab Leaders want progress, and the Palestinian Authority will be judged harshly for passing up prosperity and peace www.majalla.com

Editorial For the past 70 years, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been at the center of Middle Eastern politics. It is a conflict that has sparked three major wars in the region, various uprisings from Palestinians and retaliatory actions from Israel. The conflict is unique since it is the only one where extremists on both sides think the other does not have the right to exist.

As a result of these circumstances, finding a viable solution to the conflict has been a real challenge for Palestine, Israel, the rest of the Arab states and the United States. Today, the Trump administration has been forging a new peace plan which it hopes will bring an end to the conflict. This week’s issue of Majalla explores this new plan and how effective it could practically be.

This week’s cover story focuses on the Trump administration’s new peace plan. Not much from the plan has been revealed, but statements from Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt have given us glimpses of the plan which has a political component that focuses on the status of Jerusalem and an economic component that aims to help Palestinians build up their economy. The article further explores many events that might have implications on the plan, such as the reelection of Benjamin Netanyahu and the US’s declaration of Israeli authority over the Golan Heights.

Moreover, reactions from the Arab states and the European Union are explored as well as various leaks surrounding the plan that have recently been uncovered.

The second cover story by Ali El Shamy takes a historical look at the previous Arab-Israeli peace talks and the breakthroughs that have materialized over the years. The first event explored is the Camp David meetings which paved the way to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Further events are mentioned, namely the 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Saudi Arabia’s Arab Peace Initiative which offered normalized relations between the Arab states and Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal of lands it occupied during the 1967 war.

Mustafa El-Dessouki interviews Jason Greenblatt, the White House’s Special Representative for International Negotiations and one of the key orchestrators behind the Trump administration’s Middle East peace plan.

In the interview, Greenblatt answers questions regarding the Palestinian Authority’s rejection of the plan, how recent decisions regarding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights will affect the plan and whether or not he received input from Arab leaders while coming up with the blue prints for the plan.

Hanin Ghaddar writes on recent developments in which the US has deployed naval ships near Iran. The writer explores the possible options the Iranian regime has, such as restarting negotiations with the US. However, the writer notes that this time the regime is stuck between a rock and a hard place, and any action it does take will not help it in the slightest.

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A Weekly Political News Magazine

30 What It Means to Be Iranian in America

Issue 1747 - May - 10/05/2019

22 Will Iran Retaliate to the US’s Extreme Pressure?

14 Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives through the Years

32 38 The Chinese Enlightenment at 100

48 Disney Remakes Face First Struggles

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Donald Tusk: How the Son of a Polish Carpenter became an EU Statesman 3

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52 How to Take Back Your Own Power in Relationships

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Faithfuls in traditional clothing hold snakes to place them on the statue of Saint Domenico during an annual procession in the streets of Cocullo, a small village in the Abruzzo region, on May 2019 ,1. (Getty)

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Thailand's newly crowned King Maha Vajiralongkorn is carried in a golden palanquin during the coronation procession on May 2019 ,5 in Bangkok, Thailand. (Getty) 7

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Iran Rolls Back Nuclear Commitments Under Pact Abandoned by Washington Iran announced on Wednesday it was scaling back curbs to its nuclear programme under a 2015 deal with world powers, and threatened to do more — including enriching uranium to a higher level — if countries did not shield it from U.S. sanctions. A year after Washington pulled out of the nuclear deal with Iran, President Hassan Rouhani unveiled measures that do not appear to violate the deal’s terms yet, but could do so in the future if Iran were to persist on the course he set out.

Rouhani said Tehran would halt a programme to sell excess enriched uranium and heavy water to other countries, an arrangement used under the nuclear deal to keep its own stockpiles below permitted caps. And he threatened that in 60 days

Iran would resume enrichment of uranium beyond the low level permitted under the deal, unless the five other powers signed up to it find a way to protect Iran’s oil and banking industries from U.S. sanctions. European countries said on Thursday they wanted to preserve Iran’s nuclear deal and rejected “ultimatums” from Tehran.The spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said on Thursday that Iran wants to bring its nuclear deal with world powers “back on track” after the US unilateral withdrawal. Emmanuel Macron later said that the Iran nuclear deal must be saved and that the accord’s signatories should do all they can to ensure that the Islamic Republic respects it.

US Sends Aircraft Carrier and Bomber Task Force to ‘Warn Iran’ The Trump administration has deployed an aircraft

carrier strike group and bombers to the Middle East in response to troubling “indications and warnings” from Iran and to show the United States will retaliate with “unrelenting force” to any attack, national security adviser John Bolton said on Sunday. The deployment of the warship was based on claims of possible attack on US forces stationed in the region, unnamed US officials are quoted as saying. Bolton - who has spearheaded an increasingly hawkish U.S. policy on Iran - said the decision, which could exacerbate problems between the two countries, was meant to send a “clear and unmistakable message” of U.S. resolve to Tehran.

Gaza Ceasefire Halts Fighting Between Israel and Palestinians Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza stopped firing just before dawn as a ceasefire took hold and suspended some of the deadliest fighting since a war in 2014. While neither side announced an end to a three-day battle that killed 23 people in Gaza and four in Israel, both Israel and Hamas, which controls the strip, signalled an end to hostilities. The violence abated after Palestinian officials said Egypt, Qatar and the United Nations had mediated a truce, and just as Gazans were preparing to begin the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Israel’s military lifted restrictions on residents living in the south near the enclave, reopening roads and schools. Hamas’s radio station in Gaza, Al-Aqsa, reported a ceasefire.

Syrian Government Captures Strategic Town From Rebels-Residents The Syrian government has captured the town of Qalaat al-Madiq in northwest Syria, some of its residents and a war monitor said on Thursday, as

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projectile was fired at about 4:30pm (8:30am BST) from the northwest town of Sino-ri, in an easterly direction, the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. Analysts say the North is trying to increase pressure on the US over its failure to make concessions.

it pushes into the biggest remaining revel territory under a massive bombardment. Syria’s army, backed by Russian air power, launched ground operations this week against the southern flank of the rebel zone consisting of Idlib and parts of adjacent provinces. The area is nominally protected by a Russian-Turkish deal agreed last year to avert a major new battle. Qalaat al-Madiq was the rebel area closest to the Russian Hmeimim airbase at Latakia, which insurgents have previously targeted with rocketfire.

North Korea Tests Multiple Rocket Launchers North Korea has conducted a “strike drill” for multiple launchers, firing tactical guided weapons into the East Sea in a military drill supervised by leader Kim Jong Un on Saturday, the North’s state media reported on Sunday.The purpose of the drill was to test performance of “large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons by defense units,” the Korean Central News Agency said. On Thursday, less than a week later, South Korea’s military said that North Korea fired an unidentified projectile. The

U.S., Japan, India and Philippines Challenge Beijing with Naval Drills as Trump Threatens Tariff Hike In fresh show of naval force in the contested South China Sea, a U.S. guided missile destroyer conducted drills with a Japanese aircraft carrier, two Indian naval ships and a Philippine patrol vessel in the waterway claimed by China, the U.S. Navy said on Thursday. While similar exercises have been held in the South China Sea in the past, the combined display by four countries represents a fresh challenge to Beijing as U.S. President Donald Trump threatens to hike tariffs on 200$ billion worth of Chinese goods. The week of joint drills comes after two other U.S. warships sailed near islands in the region claimed by China on Monday, prompting a protest from Beijing, which said the action infringed its sovereignty.

US House Panel Holds Attorney General in Contempt Over Mueller Report A Democratic-led House panel on Wednesday approved a measure to hold U.S. Attorney General William Barr in contempt for refusing to hand over an unredacted copy of the Mueller report on Russian election interference even as President Donald Trump invoked the legal principle of executive privilege to block its disclosure. The judiciary committee took the rare step as tensions rose over Special Counsel Robert Mueller's findings.

Throwing down another challenge to Trump, the

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House of Representatives Judiciary Committee voted to recommend that the full House cite Barr, the top U.S. law enforcement official and a Trump appointee, for contempt of Congress after he defied its subpoena for the complete report and underlying evidence. The confrontation escalated a clash between the Democratic-controlled House and Republican president over congressional authority under the U.S. Constitution to investigate him, his administration, family and business interests.

Prince Harry and Meghan Markle Welcome Baby Boy Meghan, the Duchess of Sussex and wife of Britain’s Prince Harry, gave birth to a boy on Monday, the seventh-in-line to the throne and described by his proud father as “absolutely to die for”.The baby was born in the early hours of the morning weighing 7 lbs 3oz (3.26 kg). Harry and Meghan announced on Wednesday they had named their newborn son Archie as they showed him off to the world, saying their “little bundle of joy” was magic. In a post on their Instagram account accompanying a picture of the parents with Queen Elizabeth, her husband Prince Philip and Meghan’s mother Doria Ragland, the couple said the seventh-in-line to the British throne would be known as Archie Harrison Mountbatten-Windsor.

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Jason Greenblatt to Majalla: Many Arab leaders want progress, and the Palestinian Authority will be judged harshly for passing up prosperity and peace

by Mostafa El-Dessouki Jason Greenblatt serves the White House as Assistant to President Donald J. Trump and Special Representative for International Negotiations. A lawyer by trade and son of Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe, he has worked for Mr. Trump for the past 22 years.

Previous posts included executive vice president and chief legal officer to the Trump Organization. Greenblatt is presently one of only four administration officials with access to the President’s Middle East peace plan.

In Greenblatt’s exclusive interview with Majalla — his first in any Arabic-language publication — he responded to preemptive criticism of the plan and shared some of its underlying principles. He addressed its relationship with prior peace efforts, including the “Arab Peace Initiative,” and situated the plan and its prospects in the broader context of the struggle to achieve security and prosperity across the region.

Q: What do you say to those in the region who do not support your plan or peace efforts?

A: It would be the rare person who doesn’t seek peace.

So everyone should support the peace effort itself, unless they are against peace or against improving Palestinian lives. As to the plan, at this point, no one can honestly say they are against the plan because they haven’t seen it.

There are those who might not like our current policies, and we understand that. But that does not mean they can then honestly say they are against the plan which they have not yet seen. We’ve asked everyone to continue being patient and to not prejudge the plan. We believe we have developed a plan that is detailed, realistic, fair and implementable; one that will enable people to live better lives. Once everyone sees the plan, they’ll understand why it has taken us this long to release it. We do hope everyone will keep an open mind so that there can be a meaningful dialogue once the plan is released.

Q: The Palestinian authority refuses to meet with you and has said that it will not even consider your plan.

What will you do if that is the case?

A: It’s difficult to understand why the Palestinian Authority would refuse a plan they haven’t seen.

Palestinians deserve dignity, opportunity, and a better way of life. Once they have had an opportunity to read and digest our plan, people should ask themselves: will this plan make the lives of Palestinians and Israelis better? And we think that it will. So, when the time comes, our hope is that the Palestinian Authority will act professionally, give the plan a serious look, judge it on its merits, and engage constructively on it. All Palestinians, in both the West Bank and Gaza, deserve nothing less. I believe that history will judge the Palestinian Authority harshly for passing up an opportunity that could give the

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We respect Arab leaders who put their predominantly youthful populations first. the youth, are tired of this conflict. More and more, they are looking forward toward what they hope is a brighter future. Ultimately, we believe this plan will be the most exciting and comprehensive opportunity they’ve encountered in their lifetimes, if they choose to pursue it. The alternative will just be more false promises and mere political statements which do nothing to help Palestinians. As for the regional leaders, I have respect for many of the leaders in the region and I can see how many of them want to try to move forward as well. I think many of them are putting their own people and national interests at the top of their agenda, which is important. The demographics of some of these countries skews very young, and these leaders recognize the need to take care of their own populations. We are here to work with them on that endeavor. We do want to help Palestinians, but we also want to work with the region to allow them to succeed with their own populations as well.

Q: Is your peace plan an "economic peace," as some have said?

US envoy to the Middle East Jason Greenblatt (L) with U.S. President Donald Trump (R).

(Jason Greenbelt, Twitter)

Palestinians something so very different, and something so very positive, compared to what they have today.

Q: In past media statements you’ve said that the Palestinian leadership is holding on to old traditions and previous, failed initiatives. Is this the right time to launch a peace plan with Abbas, who himself is the contemporary and heir of those same traditions? Do you believe that younger leaders in the region have a better understanding of developments?

A: There will never be a perfect time to try to make peace, but the status quo does not work for anyone – people are suffering; the region is suffering. We hope that the leadership will be able to put down their calcified talking points long enough to read through and consider our plan. We also hope the people will be able to read our plan and discuss its many positive elements. In the last two years, after much discussion with ordinary Palestinians, we have found that the people, particularly

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This is not an economic peace. The plan suggests what we think is the best and most realistic way to resolve all of the core issues. But we also believe the economic portion of the plan is of vital importance. In order to have a sustainable peace, we believe Palestinians must be given significantly better opportunities and a better way of life. Our economic plan will provide this. But the economic vision we present cannot exist without the political component, nor can the political component succeed without the economic component. The two support and complement each other. Together, our comprehensive plan could create the first real opportunity for the brightest future Palestinians have ever had.

Q: Does your plan take into account the “Arab Peace Initiative?” Is it the basis of your plan?

From the beginning of this process we’ve looked at past efforts and have tried to learn from them. Many smart and talented people have worked on this file over many years. Our approach has been to acknowledge realities and focus on speaking truth. Our plan is grounded in the

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logic and realities of 2019. The Arab Peace Initiative was a good effort for its time. I remember reading it many years ago and was very inspired for the possibilities that it held. But the Arab Peace Initiative was also short on details so we really cannot compare the two. We have decided to develop the ideas and solutions more deeply so that everyone can truly understand the many benefits they can achieve if they proceed with our plan, as well as the compromises needed to reach peace. We are under no illusions of the challenges we face in what many consider to be one of the hardest problems to solve in modern times.

Q: Have you sought out input and advice from Arab leaders in the region? And if so, can you share a sense of any input which you found worthwhile and have seen fit to embrace?

A: Over the course of the last two years, we have had many discussions with leaders in the region for insight and perspective and have heard what they have to say on the issues. We look forward to a constructive dialogue with regional leaders on the specifics of the plan once it is released. There are many talented leaders in the region and their input has been important.

They have to be willing to work together to reach this deal.

Q: Don’t the Jerusalem and Golan decisions prejudge what the plan holds for Palestinians?

A: First of all, the Golan decision is not related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In any event, these decisions were just a recognition of reality. We believe that it was important to start from a place of truth, and that includes being honest about our recognition of Jerusalem as

Jared Kushner, (C) Senior Advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump, and Jason Greenblatt (L, seated), advisor to Trump on Israel, attend the opening session of the Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East on February 2019 ,14 in Warsaw, Poland. (Getty)

Q: It appears that, by contrast to previous peace efforts where parties negotiated privately toward a plan, you will present a plan and then hope the parties can negotiate. Can you explain why you have taken this approach?

A: We decided to do things differently. We decided that it was important to develop the details more thoroughly so there would be no doubt about what the parties were negotiating. But it is important to remember that ultimately it is up to the parties themselves to come to an agreement. No other country or international organization can force a peace agreement on the parties.

The Arab Peace Initiative was a good effort for its time, while our plan is grounded in the logic and realities of 2019.

Israel›s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) meets with Donald Trump›s Assistant and Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt (L) in Jerusalem on June 2017 ,21. (Getty)

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Israel’s capital – it was the capital of the Jews in ancient times, and it has been the capital of Israel since the formation of the State of Israel. Pretending otherwise only undermines the chances of peace. There is no world in which Jerusalem would not be the capital of the State of Israel. As far as the Golan Heights – who could suggest that Israel give up the Golan Heights, an area of very strategic importance, which was used to attack Israel over and over again, and give it to a man who committed mass atrocities and who barrel bombed women and children in his own country? If leaders reflexively fall back on old talking points and positions, we’ll never have more than the status quo. Our plan is based on the current realities on the ground and we believe it offers an unquestionably better way of life for Palestinians. We are prepared for rational, logical criticism of the plan from all sides, but people should not use our policy positions to disregard our plan. How does that help Palestinians? Those who truly care about Palestinians should encourage Palestinians to read the plan and engage on the plan. That is the only way they have a chance at a good future. Disregarding the plan, or condemning the plan just hurts Palestinians. Speculating and condemning a plan that has yet to be released does nothing to advance peace. َQ: How do your peace efforts fit in the context of other issues facing the region?

Solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will move the region forward, but the threat of Hezbollah and tragedies of Syria and Yemen need their own solutions.

Traditionally, many refer to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the “Middle East Peace Process.” That name is a misnomer. The IsraeliPalestinian conflict is just one of the conflicts in the region, and solving it will not put an end to other conflicts such as the tragic civil war in Syria, war in Yemen, Hezbollah (a terrorist organization sponsored by Iran) in Lebanon, instability in Libya, terrorists in the Sinai Desert in Egypt and an Iranian regime that oppresses its own people and foments terrorism around the world. That said, ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will allow some of the region to move forward and potentially lead to greater cooperation and economic opportunity among the people of the region. There is a lot of untapped potential that a peace agreement could unleash and help nurture. But it will not resolve the problems of the region.

US President Donald Trump›s Assistant and Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt (L) with U.S. President Donald Trump (R). (Jason Greenblatt, Twitter)Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas receives US President Donald Trump›s Assistant and Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt (C) in Ramallah, West Bank on March 2017 ,14. (Getty)

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Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives through the Years How Years of Peace Talks Have Yielded Little Breakthroughs By: Ali El Shamy The Arab-Israeli conflict is arguably one of, if not the most, complicated conflicts of the modern age. It is also quite a unique conflict in many aspects, while there are regional disputes all

around the world; the Arab-Israeli conflict has fundamentalists and hardliners on both sides who both believe that the other state does not have the right to exist. In spite of this, moderates on both sides have been able to make concessions and there have been breakthroughs throughout the seventy year old dispute. While

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said breakthroughs are few and far between, they could hold the key for a future lasting peace plan between Palestine and Israel thus finally putting an end to the bloodshed.

1967: THE SPIRIT BREAKING WAR Egypt has always had a leading role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

During the 1948 War, both Egypt and Jordan provided the most manpower in the Arab League forces. Moreover, Egypt under Gamal Abd El Nasser singlehandedly took part in the 1956 Sinai War and eleven years later, Egypt led the Arab armies in the 1967 War. That last war, proved to be a big blow for the Arab states, as the three largest participants all lost territory to Israel which occupied the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. Furthermore, Egypt and Jordan were both administrating separate Palestinian territories at the time; the former was administrating the Gaza Strip, while the latter was administrating the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Subsequently, Israel occupied both these territories and the balance of power in the conflict shifted greatly in its favor. The defeat prompted Nasser to initially resign from office, but he quickly returned amid popular protests calling for his return. The 1967 defeat had another aftereffect that would not be totally felt until much later down the line; the end of the war marked the gradual decline of pan-Arab and nationalist sentiment in the Arab-Israeli conflict as Islamism and Pan-Islamism slowly, but surely, became a more effective rallying call.

SADAT BREAKS THE ICE

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, US President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin shake hands at the time of the Peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979.

(Getty)

After Nasser’s passing in 1970, his Vice President and longtime confidant, Anwar Sadat, assumed Egypt’s presidency. Sadat would then dedicate his presidency towards two goals, returning the Sinai Peninsula back under Egyptian sovereignty and finding an end to his country’s long conflict with Israel. As such, in October 1973 ,6, Egypt launched a surprise military attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula, while Syrian forces fought against Israelis in the occupied Golan Heights. Saudi Arabia would also play a role in the war, as King Faisal led the Arab members of OPEC in launching an oil embargo against the United States, which would cause the 1973 Oil Crisis. The war would last almost three weeks and finally came to an end in October 25 after a ceasefire came into effect. This war would pave the way for the eventual peace talks between Egypt and Israel, as both sides sought an end to the continued deadlock.

In 1977, Sadat, without consulting other Arab leaders, visited Israel and made a historic speech in the Knesset: “I come to you today on solid ground, to shape a new life, to establish peace.

We all, on this land, the land of God; we all, Muslims, Christians and Jews, worship God and no one but God.” This moment was a landmark moment in the Arab-Israeli conflict as it marked the first time that a leading Arab state was showing willingness to negotiate with Israel.

One year later, US President Jimmy Carter hosted both Sadat

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On March 1979 ,26, Sadat and Begin signed the treaty that ended thirty years of conflict between their Egypt and Israel, this first breakthrough proved to be a lasting one as the 1979 treaty is still in effect today. and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David as the peace talks finally came into place. Despite many challenges, both Middle East leaders finally came to an agreement which would see Israeli troops move out of the Sinai Peninsula. Then on March 1979 ,26, both leaders signed the treaty that ended thirty years of conflict between their countries and Egypt became the first Arab nation to officially recognize Israel. This first breakthrough proved to be a lasting one, as the 1979 treaty is still in effect today.

THE FIRST INTIFADA AND THE PLO’S SECRET ACTIVITIES Israel had long refused to negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLO) since it did not view that Israel had a right to exist. As such in 1979 Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, requested Norway to give him a secret back channel to Israel which refused to hold any direct talks with the group.

Then, in late 1987 the First Intifada, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupying forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, broke out. This took the PLO by surprise since it did not plan for any such uprising to happen. Moreover, other groups started to gain popularity amidst the chaos. Since the PLO’s leadership was stationed in Tunisia at the time, it was at risk of losing its leading role as the representative body for the Palestinians.

This prompted Arafat to announce the PLO’s acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 which called for peaceful resolutions towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the mutual recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied after the 1967 War. As such, for the first time in its history, the PLO had recognized Israel’s right to exist. While this did not give the PLO a place at the negotiating table in the Madrid Conference, it would have one in the next negotiation effort.

1991 MADRID CONFERENCE: LOOKING FOR PEACE WITHOUT THE PLO The Madrid Peace Conference was co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. The aim of the conference was to

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follow up the 1979 peace treaty and pave the way for similar treaties between Israel and other Arab states. Delegations from Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan took part in the conference. Israel had still refused to negotiate with the PLO, so the Palestinian delegation was represented by Palestinian members within the Jordanian delegation, who in turn had correspondence with the PLO leadership in Tunisia.

The biggest breakthrough of the conference was the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, which opened up diplomatic relations between the states as well as broad trade and security relations. Talks between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations and the Syrian and Israeli delegations did not have any lasting impacts as border disputes remained in place.

1993 OSLO AGREEMENT: THE PLO ENTERS THE STAGE The talks between the PLO and Israel would secretly take place in Oslo, Norway and its resulting agreement would be signed at the White House in 1993. This agreement was significant as it was the first direct agreement between Israel and Palestine (represented by the PLO). It also marked the first time that both sides formally recognized each other, as the Israeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, while the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist. The agreement also stipulated that Israeli forces would gradually withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and a “Palestinian Interim SelfGoverning Authority” would rule over Palestine during a five year transitional period until a permanent settlement based on UN Resolution 242 and 338 took place. Photos of Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands made front page news all over the world, but alas a lasting peace would not come into fruition. Other groups within Palestine, such as Hamas, rejected the Oslo Agreement and subsequently carried out suicide

The 1993 Oslo Agreement marked the first time that both sides formally recognized each other, as the Israeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, while the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist.

bombing operations against Israel.

2000: RETURN TO CAMP DAVID The process Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-government were taking a much slower pace than anticipated. As a result, in 2000, US President Bill Clinton invited Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to find a solution to other issues not discussed in Oslo which would be a catalyst to speed the process up. Unfortunately, the PLO wanted concessions that Israel was not willing to give. For one thing, Arafat wanted the a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders and for Palestinian refugees to have the right to return to occupied lands, he would also offer Israeli rights over the Jewish Quarter and landmarks in the Old City, Jerusalem. Instead, Israel offered the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank and extra land from the Negev Desert, however Israel was to hold on to its settlements in the West Bank. Israel also wanted to keep most of East Jerusalem, but offered Palestine Islamic guardianship of Muslim sites in the Old City and government funds toward Palestinian refugees. Both sides could not agree on a settlement and the talks broke down. This led the Second Intifada which served as the final nail on the casket of the Oslo Peace Agreement.

2002 BEIRUT ARAB SUMMIT: SAUDI ARABIA PRESENTS ITS PLAN Beirut was the venue of the 2002 Arab Summit, as with other previous summits the Palestinian issue was at top of the agenda.

During the conference, Saudi Arabia presented its plan to end the conflict, which it called the Arab Peace Initiative. Unlike previous peace attempts which involved only one or a handful of Arab states, this initiative was too involve all Arab states.

The plan was that Israel would withdraw from the Palestinian lands it occupied in 1967 and in exchange all the Arab states

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This 13 September 1993 file photo shows US President Bill Clinton (C) standing between PLO leader Yasser Arafat (R) as he shakes hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzahk Rabin. Rabin and Arafat shook hands for the first time after Israel and the PLO signed a historic agreement on Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories.(Getty)

would recognize Israel’s statehood, this marked the first that an Arab conference issues a collective endorsement of a two state solution.

RIYADH 2007: ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, TAKE TWO The 2007 Arab Summit in Riyadh focused on bringing the Arab Peace Initiative back to the negotiating table. Saudi Arabia thought that if all Arab states unanimously accepted the initiative, then it could become a breakthrough in the peace negotiations.

However, there was now a big problem, namely the rise of Hamas in Gaza, a group that would refuse any initiative brokered for the PLO and advocated for the recognition of Israel. Moreover, Libya had chosen to not to take part in the summit as the Gaddafi regime rejected the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace. In spite of this, the summit continued and the Arab states reintroduced their call for a Palestinian state based on pre1967- borders and Palestinian refugees’ right to return to occupied lands, in return for Arab recognition of Israel. However, PLO president Mahmoud Abbas, who had taken over after Arafat’s passing in 2004, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert could not come to an agreement that would satisfy both sides.

ANNAPOLIS 2007: NO NEW HOPE FOR THE NEW YEAR US President George W. Bush decided to give his own attempt at the establishing peace talks as he hosted Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis.

Other participants in the conference included Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. During the conference, both leaders promised to work together to find a lasting peace deal by the end of 2008.

Throughout 2008, both the PLO and the Israeli government exchanged maps outlining how each side thought the borders should look like. However, the talks abruptly stopped at the end of 2008, as both sides could not make concessions that would satisfy their counterparts, furthermore the breakout of the – 2008 09 Gaza War could not make any peace deal feasible at the time.

2010s: THE LOST DECADE In many ways, the 2010s can be seen as a lost decade in ArabIsraeli peace negotiations as no big breakthrough occurred despite the fact that many peace negotiations happened throughout the decade. Moreover, major events such as the 2014 Gaza War and the United States’ decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem proved to be barriers towards establishing a lasting peace deal. A few months after US’s decision to move its embassy, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia hosted an Arab League Summit which issued a statement affirming continued support towards the Palestinian cause and the support for a Palestinian state based on pre1967- borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Amid heightened tensions, the Trump administration is on the precipice of announcing a new peace plan. Little is known from the peace plan, but from Jared Kushner’s few statements, it seems to be a plan based on economic concessions and economic development, which differs greatly from different plans which were politically based. As it stands, the Trump administration has not set a date for its announcement of the plan, but has set its sights for a

A picture taken on December 2017 ,9, shows the participants in the Arab Peace Initiative meeting in Cairo. In 2002, Saudi Arabia proposed a peace initiative offering Arab countries' recognition of Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and the creation of a Palestinian state. (Getty)

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Trump' s Secret Middle East Peace Plan

And What it Means for Key Regional and International Players

Majalla - London Developed in secrecy for the past two years, the Trump administrations’ long-awaited peace plan to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is set to be unveiled sometime in June. US officials responsible for the peace process - Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser, along with

Trump’s longtime lawyer Jason Greenblatt, have provided few details about the plan they hope will provide a framework for renewed dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Kushner has assured that the proposal is “very detailed” and will hopefully represent a “comprehensive vision” for peace that will include “tough compromises for both.” Here is a look at what we know about the deal so far and how some of the key

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regional and international players have reacted to it.

WHAT IS IN THE PLAN?

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (R) meets with Jared Kushner, Senior Advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump, on June ,21 2017 in Ramallah, West Bank. (Getty)

The Middle East proposal, which has been delayed for a variety of reasons over the past 18 months, has two major components.

It has a political piece that addresses core issues such as the status of Jerusalem, and an economic part that aims to help the Palestinians strengthen their economy.

According to Kushner, the economic ramifications of the plan will not just help Israelis and Palestinians, but the entire region — including Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. He has said that emphasis on the economic aspect, alongside the political aspect, will improve opportunities especially for the Palestinian economy, which has been hindered due to the lack of a peace agreement.

The scope of the economic investments are new to the peacemaking efforts, but experts say that whether it will materialise is dependent on attracting enough donors to deliver on the economic targets, particularly as Trump has demonstrated throughout his presidency that he is not prepared to provide serious American dollars in foreign assistance.

In a Sky News Arabia interview earlier this year, Kushner said that the political dimension of the plan would focus on “resolving the border issue.”

“The goal of resolving these borders is really to eliminate the borders,” he said. “If you can eliminate borders and have peace and less fear of terror, you could have freer flow of goods, freer flow of people and that would create a lot more opportunities.”

Kushner also expressed the need for unified rule over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which are currently split between the internationally recognised Palestinian Authority and Hamas respectively The idea of a two-state solution has been in trouble for a long time, but Kushner indicated during a conversation at the Washington Institute on May 2 titled “Inside the Trump Administration’s Peace Effort: A Conversation With Jared Kushner”, that the US is pulling back from longstanding mentions of it. “If you say ‘twostate’. It means one thing to the Israelis, it means one thing to the Palestinians,” Kushner said. “We said, ‘you know, let’s just not say it. Let’s just say, let’s work on the details of what this means’,” he said.

In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to directly answer questions from members of Congress on whether or not the administration is committed to a two-state solution. He also ducked a question about Netanyahu’s pledge to annex parts of the occupied West Bank, and the Trump administration has yet to provide any statement on the issue.

During the discussion at the Washington Institute, the senior advisor offered vague details about what the plan would entail, calling it an “in-depth operational document” that is “realistic, executable…and will lead to both sides being much better off.”

"We've put together, I would say, more of an in-depth operational document that shows what we think is possible, how people can live together, how security can work, how interaction can work,

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Even if Netanyahu’s statement on the West Bank came as no surprise, Israeli actions to carry it could drive Fatah, the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority, to a more militant stance. and really, how you try to form the outline of what a brighter future can be,” said the White House senior advisor.

Asked if it would cover the final status between Israelis and Palestinians, he said: “That’s correct, we will.”

Kushner said that Trump wants the group to "really try to solve this" in a lasting way. Asked why now, he said, "I don't think there's ever a perfect time to do this," but they think "now is a good time to put something out there." He said that recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel made his job "harder," but will help a peace agreement in the long term.

LEAKS OUTLINE DETAILS OF TRUMP’S PLAN While Kushner recently stated at the Washington Institute that he is “very proud” that his team have been able to keep the plan a secret in a “leaky environment” in the Trump administration, an Israeli newspaper published a leaked document 7 May detailing the elements of Trump’s plan. The document has not been confirmed by American, Israeli or Palestinian authorities but the paper states that it was circulated between officials in Israel’s Foreign Ministry, although the newspaper could not confirm the identity of the drafter or authenticate the details of the peace plan.

According to Yisrael Hayoum, the main points of the agreement are as follows: - A plan for a two-state solution that includes a tripartite agreement which will be signed between Israel, the PLO and Hamas. A Palestinian demilitarised state called “New Palestine” will be established in the occupied West Bank and Gaza and cedes all territory held by Israeli settlements and settlement blocs to Israel.

- Jerusalem will be a shared capital for both Israel and New Palestine. The deal is underscores Jerusalem “will not be divided.”

The Palestinians in Jerusalem would become citizens of “New Palestine,” but receive the same services as Israeli residents of Jerusalem from the Jerusalem municipality, governed by Israel.

The status quo at the holy sites will remain and Jewish Israelis will not be allowed to buy Palestinian houses and vice versa.

- Egypt will lease territory for the creation of an airport and industrial zone without allowing Palestinians to reside on this land.

- The U.S., Europe and the Gulf states will fund the new Palestinian state, to a tune of 30$ billion over five years. This

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would be at a cost of 6$ billion a year; the majority of which 70per cent – would be paid by Gulf states, with the US contributing 20 per cent and the EU ten per cent.

- Upon signing the agreement, Hamas will hand over all its weapons to Egypt. The movement’s leaders would be compensated and paid salaries by Arab states while a government is established.

- Palestinian prisoners will be released over the course of three years. However, Palestinian refugees who today number some 7 million are excluded entirely from the document.

- If Hamas or any Palestinian bodies refuse this deal, the US will cancel all of its financial support to the Palestinians and pressure other countries to do the same. If, on the other hand, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas signs the deal but Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not agree to it, a war would be waged on the Gaza Strip with the full backing of the US. However, if Israel refuses the deal the US would cease its financial support.

WHAT NETANYAHU'S REELECTION MEANS FOR PEACE For decades, the Israeli - Palestinian conflict was the main fault line in Israeli politics and the approach to the conflict separated right from left on Israel’s political spectrum, with the left being more willing to engage and the right taking a more hardline approach. But as observed in Israel’s last presidential election in which Benjamin Netanyahu won a record fifth term, the revival of the peace process was not the main subject of the electoral debate.

Issues like security - mainly the threat from Iran - the Israeli economy, and the criminal investigations against Netanyahu dominated the headlines during the election campaign.

President Trump called Netanyahu to congratulate him after his reelection and predicted his win would increase the odds of a peace breakthrough. “The fact that Bibi won, I think we’ll see some pretty good action in terms of peace,” he said, referring to Netanyahu by his nickname. “Look, everyone said — and I never made it a promise — but everybody said you can’t have

In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to directly answer questions from members of Congress on whether or not the administration is committed to a two-state solution.

peace in the Middle East with Israel and the Palestinians. I think we have a chance. I think we have now a better chance with Bibi having won.”

However, during the already-heated campaign, Netanyahu promised that if re-elected, he would begin asserting Israel sovereignty over areas of the West Bank, starting with Jewish settlements. This was a bold move by the Israeli Prime Minister who has been emboldened by President Trump’s decisions to recognise Israeli authority over the Golan Heights, move the US embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv and impose financial penalties on the Palestinian Authority.

The move is bound to trigger condemnation from the Palestinians and the Arab world and complicate the US peace effort but during an interview with to CNN’s Jake Tapper Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that he believed Netanyahu’s talk about annexing parts of the West Bank won’t hurt Trump’s upcoming peace plan.

“I think that the vision that we’ll layout is going to represent a significant change from the model that’s been used,” Pompeo said.

In reply to a question during the discussion at the Washington Institute on whether he had discussed the possibility of unilateral Israeli annexation of areas in the West Bank with Netanyahu,

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US President Donald J Trump (L) and White House senior adviser Jared Kushner meet with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) at the King David Hotel May 2017 ,22 in Jerusalem.

(Getty)

Kushner hopes that wealthier Gulf countries will pay for the proposal’s focus on regional development but the Gulf states are unlikely to do so before knowing more sensitive political aspects of the plan. advised six secretaries of state on Israeli-Arab negotiations has said that the problem with the deal “in a right-wing government is that anything that appeals to the Palestinians, any credible peace plan, Netanyahu will have an impossible time managing with the government now emerging.”

THE VIEW FROM THE ARAB STATES

Kushner said that he hopes Israel and the Palestinians will examine the American peace plan before taking any unilateral steps on the ground, adding he had not discussed the issue of settlement annexation with Netanyahu.

Even if Netanyahu’s statement on the West Bank came as no surprise, Israeli actions to carry it could drive Fatah, the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority, to a more militant stance. The Palestinian Authority has already flatly rejected any plan put forward by the Trump administration following the President's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the moving of the US embassy there from Tel Aviv.

Netanyahu for his part has said he won't pre-judge the plan and will wait to see its contents and Kushner has said that the plan will be discussed with the Israeli government when Netanyahu forms a governing coalition. Netanyahu is in the midst of negotiating the establishment of his fifth coalition with a partner – Union of Right-Wing Parties – that is adamantly opposed to any concession to the Palestinians, even if some small steps translate into big gains for Israel. Netanyahu’s own Likud Party has also strengthened its far-right branch in recent years. Aaron David Miller, a Middle East analyst for the Wilson Center who

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In February this year, Kushner visited Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in a one week tour aimed at gauging the level of support of the economic dimensions of the plan and address Arab demands. Kushner hopes that wealthier Gulf countries will pay for the proposal’s focus on regional development but the Gulf states are unlikely to do so before knowing more sensitive political aspects of the plan.

Both Kushner and Greenblatt, who accompanied Kushner on the trip, are trying to dispel the notion that their plan is extremely biased toward Israel, which is how the Palestinian Authority constantly describes it. They hope that once the plan is published, several Arab countries will react positively to it and agree to consider it as a basis for negotiations.

Following the visit, Reuters reported that according to a source, the plan presented did not appear to take into consideration previously stated Arab demands on the status of Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return and Israeli settlements in occupied territory. Under the Arab Peace Initiative drawn up by Saudi Arabia in 2002, Arab nations offered Israel normal ties in return for a statehood deal with the Palestinians and full Israeli withdrawal from territory captured in 1967. The source said Kushner wanted to make a deal first and then agree on details.

A second source in the Gulf region told the news agency: “The Americans are still in the process of presenting various ideas and scenarios, but don’t appear to have arrived at final parameters of a plan. They know that there are final-status issues that are nonstarters for regional allies and the Palestinians alike,” referring to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

Kushner’s Arab tour did not include a trip to Jordan, - which borders the West Bank and has a majority-Palestinian population - but King Abdullah II met with the Middle East peace team in Washington in March this year. During a closed-door meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reportedly told lawmakers that he’d been given “zero visibility into the most fraught part of the plan.”

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Soon after the visit, Jordan’s king struck a defiant tone in a speech to both reassure Jordanians and warn the US that he and Jordan would not waver on Jerusalem and Palestinian statehood. Amid rumours of forced concessions in a US plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and alleged pressure from Washington, Jordan’s King Abdullah has pledged to his people he will not budge on Jerusalem.“To me, Jerusalem is a red line and all my people are with me,” King Abdullah said in an address to residents of Zarqa, north of Amman, late on Wednesday. “My position on Jerusalem is unwavering.”

“No one can pressure Jordan on this matter, and the answer will be no. All Jordanians stand with me on Jerusalem,” the king said, according to a transcript released by the Hashemite Royal Court.

“At the end of the day, Arabs and Muslims will stand with us as well.”

King Abdullah also confronted rumours of attempts to withdraw

According to Kushner, the economic ramifications of the plan will not just help Israelis and Palestinians, but the entire region — including Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon.

the right of return of Palestinians in Jordan, join the West Bank to the kingdom in a confederation, or declare Jordan the homeland for Palestinians – the various scenarios under the so-called “alternative homeland” project rumoured to be part of the US solution.

Greenblatt also issued a denial of the reports stating the peace plan would include an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian “confederation.” The White House had already denied this story before, but Greenblatt had to do so once again in light of reports in Arab media outlets. He also had to deflect another news story about how the peace plan would impact Egypt, as part of the administration’s efforts to keep those two countries from developing a negative view of it. Greenblatt said it was false that

JARED KUSHNER < Jared Corey Kushner (born January 1981 ,10) is an investor, real-estate developer, and newspaper publisher who is currently senior advisor to his father-in-law, the President of the United States.

He was born and raised in Livingston, New Jersey, alongside two sisters and a brother. An Orthodox Jew, his grandparents were Holocaust survivors who arrived in the US in 1949. He married Ivanka Trump in a Jewish ceremony on October 2009 ,25.

From the outset of the presidential campaign of his father-in-law Donald Trump, Kushner was the architect of Trump›s digital, online, and social media campaigns. During the presidential transition, Kushner was said to be his father-in-law›s “confidant», and one of Donald Trump›s closest advisors. On January 2017 ,9, Kushner was named Senior Advisor to the President despite having no

prior government experience. Trump tasked Kushner with the challenge of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and he also became the president›s lead adviser on relations with China, Mexico and Canada. Kushner was also tasked with leading a White House office whose ambitious remit ranged from reforming veterans’ care to liaising with Mexico. But the man dubbed the Secretary for Everything by US media suffered a reverse a year into his father-in-law›s presidency and was stripped of his security clearance. Mr Kushner›s marginalisation in the West Wing came amid reports of a power struggle with White House chief of staff John Kelly, who made the decision on downgrading his clearance. On May 2018 ,23, Kushner received permanent Top Secret security clearance.

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US President Donald Trump speaks during a retreat with Republican lawmakers at Camp David in Thurmont, Maryland, January ,6 2018. (Getty)

the U.S. plan would include a land swap with Egypt. He had to make his statement after the reports were shared hundreds of thousands of times on social media.

Jordan and Egypt, the only two Arab countries to have peace deals with Israel, have both stated through official channels many times that they will only support a peace plan that includes a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. During his visit to Washington in April, President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi pledged that Cairo will continue to support efforts to ensure “a just, lasting solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on resolutions of international legitimacy, the two-state solution and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Dennis Ross, a longtime Middle East envoy and now a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the U.S. team still has “a lot of work to do to make sure that Arab leaders aren’t surprised by what’s going to be presented, and they need to see it in writing, not verbally.”

EUROPE ON THE SIDELINES In partnership with previous US administrations, Europe has long promoted a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has consistently affirmed its support for the two-state solution, including the creation of a Palestinian state. This time around, the EU appears to be stuck on the sidelines but some leaders have come out to voice support for a two-state solution which they feel may be under threat.

EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini has warned of “abandoning” the two-state solution, contending that doing so “would bring greater chaos, not only to the Holy Land but also to the entire Middle East.”

French President Emmanuel Macron spoke of the importance of a two-state solution to the conflict in the letter he wrote to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu congratulating him on his victory in Israel’s April 9th elections. Macron spoke of the need to “decisively revive the Middle East peace process and to achieve a two-State solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security, in accordance with internationally agreed parameters,” a spokesperson for the French Foreign Ministry said in a written statement to the media.

Also in April, Former prime ministers and foreign ministers from throughout Europe, some of whom also served in senior positions in the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, called for the EU to reaffirm its support for the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in advance of the publication of U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan. The letter, sent to the Guardian, the EU and European governments, was signed by 25 former foreign ministers, six former prime ministers, and two former NATO secretary generals, and said Europe must “be vigilant and act strategically” when Trump presented the new plan.

The Palestinians requested to meet the foreign ministers of European Union member states in the coming few weeks to speak to them about the US administration’s expected peace

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This time around, the EU appears to be stuck on the sidelines but some leaders have come out to voice support for a two-state solution they feel may be under threat. plan, Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al-Malki told Palestine TV, the official PA channel.

This week the Palestinian U.N. ambassador said that the European Union, Russia and the United Nations should take action to save a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if the long-awaited U.S. peace plan doesn't lead to two independent nations.

JASON GREENBLATT

< Jason Dov Greenblatt (born 1967) was the executive vice president and chief legal officer to Donald Trump and The Trump Organization, and his advisor on Israel. The son of Hungarian Jewish refugees, Greenblatt began working for the Trump Organization in 1997, soon rising to the rank of in-house counsel and executive vice president. Greenblatt was an employee of The Trump Organization for nearly 20 years. In late 2016, Trump named has as a special representative for international negotiations and assistant to the president. He currently serves as a special envoy to the Middle East peace process. He is one of only four administration officials with access to Trump’s peace plan, alongside Jared Kushner, Ambassador David Friedman and Kushner aide Avi Berkowitz.

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Iran’s Vague JCPOA Warnings Under US Pressure, Iran Threatens to Reduce Commitments to JCPOA

by Joseph Braude President Rouhani reportedly plans to announce that Iran is reducing its commitments under the JCPOA, in response to the U.S. withdrawal last year. Some Iranian officials stressed that Iran was not leaving the agreement, even as the US ratcheted up pressure on Tehran’s nuclear program.

The ANNOUNCEMENT AND NEXT STEPS On May 7 — nearly a year after the United States under President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA — Iranian news outlets reported that President Rouhani plans to inform leaders of the P1+5 that the Iranian government will soon “reduce its

commitments” to the agreement as negotiated in 2015: “In response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States […], the Islamic Republic of Iran will announce Wednesday its decision to reduce its commitments under this agreement.”

What steps in particular Tehran may take are not yet known, as the vagueness of the initial press report indicates. The most obvious first step in the process would be to trigger Article 36 of the JCPOA, which calls for referring issues stemming from noncompliance “to the joint commission for resolution.” That measure, in turn, would trigger a -35day waiting period of consultations, which could lead Iran to declare that the U.S. was guilty of “significant non-performance” and cite that non-performance as grounds to cease discharging its commitments under the deal.

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On an operational level, matters are less clear. Some experts believe Iran may resume enrichment activities, accelerate advanced centrifuge research and development, or accumulate excess nuclear materials. Since the JCPOA was first implemented, Iranian officials have repeatedly spoken of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s directive to prepare the nuclear program for a quick rebound, should the deal falter or fail, along with a highly ambitious uranium enrichment goal of 190,000 separative work units.

International Reaction European diplomats were quick to respond.

“We do not want Tehran to announce tomorrow actions that would violate the nuclear agreement, because in this case we Europeans would be obliged to reimpose sanctions as per the terms of the agreement,” said one French source. “We don’t want that and we hope that the Iranians will not make this decision.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks during the cabinet meeting in Tehran, Iran on May 2019 ,08. (Getty)

In an apparent bid to preempt hostile international reception, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif issued a statement stressing that Tehran had no immediate plans to abandon the JCPOA. According to state media, Zarif claimed that “Iran’s future actions will be fully within the (nuclear deal), from which the Islamic Republic will not withdraw.”

In a minimally veiled criticism of US allies, Zarif noted that “the European Union and others ...

Federica Mogherini (L), European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif attend a ministerial meeting of the P1+5 countries [Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany] and Iran on September 2018 ,25 (Getty)

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Since the JCPOA was first implemented, Iranian officials have repeatedly spoken of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s directive to prepare the nuclear program for a quick rebound, should the deal falter or fail, along with a highly ambitious uranium enrichment goal of 190,000 separative work units. did not have the power to resist U.S. pressure, therefore Iran ... will not carry out some voluntary commitments.”

This follows only four days after the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it was not renewing two nuclear sanctions waivers that permit other signatories to the nuclear deal with Iran to pursue civil nuclear cooperation projects. Revoking the waivers constitutes another means of pressing Tehran to halt the production of low-enriched uranium and heavy water — a goal figuring prominently in the administration’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign to curb both Iran’s nuclear program and its aggressive regional posture.

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Will Iran Retaliate to the US’s Extreme Pressure?

Tensions Rise as the US Deploys Military Ships Near Iran

By: Hanin Ghaddar * I It is no longer debatable that Iran is hurting from the extreme pressure policy that the Trump administration launched against the Iranian regime and its regional proxies. Right before Washington revoked waivers to Iran’s five remaining oil export markets, the administration declared Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization. Soon, the US will unveil more sanctions on top of the many previous ones it imposed last year after quitting the Iran nuclear deal. These sanctions are causing a collapse in Iranian economic growth. According to the IMF, Iran has been going into a deep recession, with inflation up 40 per cent.

Consequently, Iran’s regional proxies have also been hurting.

Hezbollah in Lebanon has been facing a serious financial crisis.

Its leaders have already implemented harsh new austerity measures, which will become more severe over time.

The question is two-fold: how will Iran retaliate to the US

campaign, and more precisely, can Iran retaliate? What are the tools that the Iranian regime could use in case they decide to retaliate?

TENSIONS RISING In a sudden – yet not too surprising move this week - National Security Adviser John Bolton announced Sunday the United States is deploying the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force to the Middle East to send a message to Iran. He said in a statement that the decision had been made, “In response to a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings,” but did not elaborate.

The Wall Street Journal reported earlier that the US decided to do so based on new intelligence that suggests allied interests and American forces could be imperiled. Bolton added that the goal behind the move is “to send a clear and unmistakable message to

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Iran could wait till the 2020 US Presidential elections and hope that a new Democrat administration would come in, return to the JCPOA, and thereby ease the sanctions.

He also said drastic measures would be implemented unless the remaining signatories of the deal -- Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia -- eased restrictions on Iran's banking and oil sectors in the next 60 days. The measures include removing caps on uranium enrichment levels, and resuming work on its Arak nuclear facility.

Following Rouhani's announcement, the White House responded with new sanctions on Iran's iron, steel, aluminum, and copper sectors. In a statement, US President Donald Trump warned that "Tehran can expect further actions unless it fundamentally alters its conduct."

WHAT ARE IRAN'S OPTIONS?

In this April 2019 ,1, file photo, the USS Abraham Lincoln deploys from Naval Station Norfolk, in the vicinity of Norfolk, Va. The White House said Sunday, May 5, that the U.S. is deploying military resources to send a message to Iran.

(AP)

the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force.”

In response, Iran repeated threats to block the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a critical passageway for the world's oil exports.

However, it has not done so before and many observers see this move as unlikely.

On Monday, IRNA had reported that Tehran would restart part of its halted nuclear program – a more realistic response than blocking the Hormuz Strait - but stated at the time that they did not plan to pull out of the agreement.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani followed up the next day by announcing that Iran will partially withdraw from the nuclear deal. Rouhani said in a televised speech that Iran would reduce its "commitments" to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, but would not fully withdraw. From this week on, Iran will keep its excess enriched uranium and heavy water, rather than sell it to other countries as previously agreed to limit its stockpile, Rouhani said.

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With tension escalating to a point of no return, the US administration feels that its sanctions policy has succeeded in weakening Iran’s economy, but also in containing Iran’s retaliation capabilities. It is true that Iran has very few options on the table, none of which military confrontation. However, Iran does have a long-term strategy of dealing with sanctions and although this time sanctions are hurting more, Iran still has a few options.

One, Iran can go back to the table and discuss a new deal between Iran and the US, something that the administration is aiming for and would be considered a big win for the Trump administration.

The question here is the details of this expected deal. The US wants any future deal with Iran to be more comprehensive, that is to include – besides the nuclear program – Iran Ballistic Missiles Program and Ian’s regional operations.

The challenge is to get Iran to negotiate on these three issues, knowing that without its regional hegemony, Iran will not be able to “export the revolution,” and therefore lose the core of its very existence.

Two, Iran can wait till the 2020 US Presidential elections and hope that a new – Democrat administration – would come in, return to the JCPOA, and thereby ease the sanctions. The problem for Iran is that waiting Trump out while doing nothing might be counterproductive. There is a possibility that the next administration – democrat or republican – could realize that Iran is less threatening without a deal than with one, and might resort to continue the sanctions nonetheless.

Last but not least, Iran could escalate. If Iran decides to restart

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part of the nuclear program, it will be considered a serious escalation by the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel. This will bring to the table a serious possibility of military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, and Trump’s sanctions policy could be coupled with a kinetic action against Iran.

As for Europe, which is still trying to salvage the nuclear deal and finding ways for Iran to stay committed to the deal, will see this as an escalation and an Iranian unwillingness to pursue cooperation with Europe. In that case, European countries might start imposing more sanctions on Iran, thereby challenging its economy further.

IRAN'S HANDS ARE TIED While Iran is considering all these options, the regime still has the possibility of going after the US in the region via its proxies. Khamenei could authorize Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, to activate Iran’s regional proxies against U.S. allies and interests in the Middle East. Iran has done it before, with very little consequences on the regime itself. Usually, its proxies take the blame and pay the price.

However, things changed. As warnings of such actions reached the US, responses came out very clear. Senator Mark Rubio tweeted: “Shia militias in Iraq would not conduct large scale attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq unless directed to do so by Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Using proxies will not provide Iran or Soleimani deniability. They will be held directly responsible if such attacks occur.” He then added, “The U.S. is not looking to start a war with Iran. But any efforts by Iran to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and/or to target U.S. naval vessels or commercial shipping vessels will result in a swift, devastating & justified response.”

Iran can no longer hide behind its proxies. Iran can no longer escalate without consequences. Iran cannot impose its own rules of the game. Also, Iran cannot do nothing. Bottom line, whatever Iran does – or not do – Iran will not win this round.

If Iran decides to restart part of the nuclear program, it will be considered a serious escalation by the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel. This will bring to the table a serious possibility of military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There is an opportunity here to translate the success resulting from this policy into long-term strategies that would make sure Iran does not go back to its formerly strong position. The international community must start competing with Iran and its proxies where they’re weak. This means creating alternatives – economic and social, empower the opposition, and expose the ideological and political falsehoods of the Iranian strategy inside Iran and across the region. Many Iranians and Arab Shia are starting to realize Iran’s weaknesses and deceits. As they are looking for alternative rhetoric and leadership, the anti-Iran regional scene doesn’t seem strong enough to produce such alternatives. The International community has a role to play in this regard. * Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei holds a meeting with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran, Iran on September ,18 2016. (Getty)

Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani (C) attends Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's meeting with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran, Iran on September 2016 ,18.

(Getty)

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What It Means to Be Iranian in America

Forgetting the Revolution

By Shervin Malekzadeh* I was an immigrant before my first birthday. We left Iran in 1975 for Peoria, Illinois, home of Caterpillar; my father transferred there from the companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Tehran branch. The Iranian Revolution began in 1978, while my family was on our first return visit, our last shared visit, to the country of my birth. I was four years old.

Several months later came the hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy.

Both events chased us to the other side of the world.

The revolution cleaved our lives into before and after, into happy and unhappy days. Iran transformed from an exotic and ancient civilization into something ominous. Growing up in the United States required a new durability, a thicker skin to tolerate the demonization of Iranians as religious fanatics, our reputations put at risk by the crowds on the other side of the world chanting â&#x20AC;&#x153;Death to America.â&#x20AC;? Who I would be now depended on what Iran had become. I became an ambassador from a country I did not know. Invited to comment by my teachers at school, I offered the

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Demonstrators hold hands while participating in the protests on Ashura Day in Shah Reza street, during the Iranian Revolution on 11th December 1978 in Tehran, Iran. (Getty)

standard replies: the shah was good, Khomeini was bad.

Revolution had different consequences for the grownups. My parents were part of a community of new Americans in Peoria.

The group was an eclectic Midwestern congregation of Jewish, Baha’i, and Shiite Iranians who had found each other in the United States in the mid1970-s, early arrivals before the flood that would follow the revolution in 1979. The United States brought these immigrants together in ways hard to imagine happening back in Iran: laborers who worked on the Caterpillar assembly floor mixed with doctors and students from the local college, Bradley University; homemakers chatted politics with engineers. Almost every week, the group met for picnics and parties, at a different home each time. Under clouds of secondhand smoke and gossip, over plates of gheimeh and ghormeh sabzi, they danced, debated, and held off the loneliness.

The revolution brought those days to an end. Over shortwave radio during a dinner party one night, the group learned that Iran had become the Islamic Republic. The host, Teamsar, a former general in the Imperial Army (his name was his rank) and an ardent supporter of the shah, stood up to tear down the gilded portrait of the shah that had been a permanent fixture in his home.

He smashed the gold frame on the floor, sending the shattered Aryamehr, Bozorg Arteshtaran, in jagged shards across the room.

Teamsar shouted, “Marg bar shah! Marg bar shah!,” the same slogan chanted that night all across Iran: “Death to the shah!”

That was the last good night. Over the next few months, the gatherings became less frequent, then stopped. Old friends silently accused one another of working for the new regime, or worse, for the Americans. Small suspicions accumulated until they became impossible to overcome, until the group fell apart.

In the years that followed, I gathered the stories my parents and their friends left behind. I reached into my parents’ memories and made their past my own. Like so many overseas children of the revolution, I fostered an affection for a country that no longer existed: Laleh-Zar Street, late-night cabarets, weekend trips to shomal and the Caspian coast. I remembered the lost glamour of American actors on tour—Gregory Peck in Tehran, Elizabeth Taylor in Shiraz and Isfahan—a romanticized life of abundance without war or inflation or the sacrifice of blessed martyrs.

Why did I feel such nostalgia for days neither lived nor seen?

I held onto the memories of others in the mistaken belief that if things went back to how they were before the revolution, I would be accepted. I longed for Iran because I wanted to become American.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FORGETTING “The United States,” the political theorist Michael Walzer writes in What It Means to Be an American, “isn’t a ‘homeland’ ” but “a country of immigrants who, however grateful they are for this new place, still remember the old places.” To be American is to remember being something other than American. Lacking access to a fatherland over here, we keep close the land over there. How and how much one remembers the past, Walzer cautions, must remain a personal matter, a choice, not an obligation, passed

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Iran transformed from an exotic and ancient civilization into something ominous. down the generations. Being American means being able to forget.

What happens when we’re prevented from forgetting? Iranians have not been able to become Americans in the usual ways. To be Iranian-American is to be reminded, constantly, of imminent war, of the circumstances of your arrival, of your estrangement from both sides of the hyphen. Forty years of cold war between the United States and Iran has meant that the Iranian diaspora in the United States isn’t just another assimilating minority population, afflicted by occasional bouts of cultural prejudice. Rather, Iranian-Americans are trapped in a geopolitical vise because of the seemingly intractable conflict between the two governments.

Layered on top of this hostility are the varying degrees of trauma experienced by different waves of Iranian immigrants over the years. Those differences in experience make unifying the diaspora even harder.

At first, immigration from Iran to the United States was no more than a trickle. Modern Iran was not an emigrant country before 1979. With rare exceptions, Iranians who came to the United States during the 1960s and 1970s didn’t come to stay but to take education (or profit) back home to Iran. A U.S. degree was peerless back home, and for the poorly connected or the working poor, it provided the most potent means of securing a comfortable future. Even if they opposed the shah, as so many did, they planned to go back. The revolution ended those plans.

After the trickle came the wave. In the first major exodus of Iranians, in the 1980s, people fled the turn to political Islam, the growing violence, and the war with Iraq. The monarchists left first, soon followed by their erstwhile enemies, the liberals and the leftists, the partners abandoned by Ayatollah Khomeini, devoured by the revolution. They all came to wait history out, convinced that the revolution and its regime would not last.

Many arrived on tourist or student visas, while others sought and received asylum until things settled down at home. In time, they remained, resigned to their fate. The Islamic Republic did not collapse as planned. Without intending to, and with the help of a general amnesty granted by the U.S. Congress and the Reagan administration, in 1986, they became Americans.

That path was not open to the Iranians who left during the brutal repression of the student movement in the late 1990s, or those who came to the United States ten years later because of the corruption and violence of Iran under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These newest arrivals were the native born, the nasl-e sevom, or “third generation” children of the revolution.

They had seen the Iran-Iraq War and grown up entirely under the banner of the Islamic Republic. They tended to be the ones who didn’t quite fit in back home, the Westernized kids who refused the official rituals at school and dispensed with the correct

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revolutionary vocabulary or performing their piety in public.

Resistance to official Islam did not necessarily mean rejecting religious life. Many who left in the second and third decades of the revolution were practicing Muslims, just not in the manner expected by the nezam (the system).

Coming to the United States turned that sequence of identities— dissenters first, Muslims second—on its head. Whereas the Iranian government viewed them as a security threat for failing to be “good” Muslims, the U.S. government could not see them as anything but Muslims. Their presence alone was a threat to the system. Locked into a post11/9- immigration system that injected bureaucratic fear and uncertainty into their daily lives, this last wave of immigrants received conditional passage to the United States, their status predicated on the vagaries of the lottery and the follow-up interview.

Although these three immigrant waves share the exhausting experience of hailing from a “rogue nation,” their divergent beginnings deny them a common framework around which they might unify. The greatest fault line separating the generations is the question of what to do about the situation in Iran. Many of the Iranians who came to the United States around the time of the revolution are inclined to dismiss reform of the Islamic Republic out of hand. They fail to see much difference between “good” and “bad” clerics or any purpose in discerning the democratic potential in Iranian institutions, much less the latest electoral strategy of the country’s reformists. Frozen in the amber of their disappointment, they condemn the Islamic Republic as a system in constant disorder, ruled by irredeemable ideologues.

By contrast, immigrants who grew up in post-revolutionary Iran tend to be more sympathetic to political engagement with the existing system however flawed that system is. Their starting point, different from that of the older generations, is the constitution, the revolution, and, above all, the war with Iraq and the war in Syria. Even those who were in the opposition retain a formidable sense of civic duty and what the sociologist Kevan Harris describes as a “ruthless pragmatism” in regard to Iran’s future. Almost uniformly, they reject a politics of revolution, foreign intervention, and royal restoration. Better to work with a

Images of Iranian protestors marching by the millions, demanding that their votes be counted—and being arrested, beaten, or worse for doing so—made it possible for Americans to imagine themselves in the Iranian narrative.

flawed regime than with a failed state.

“I WISH I COULD GO BACK TO IRAN AND SEE MY REAL IDENTITY” That the first to arrive after the revolution were the pioneers who struggled to secure the benefits enjoyed by the subsequent generations has become integral to the story Iranians tell themselves about how they became successful Americans.

Most in this cohort responded to the trauma of the revolution by choosing discretion over confrontation, steering clear of politics in favor of pursuing economic success. If some overcompensated in the pursuit of wealth and profit, it was, in part, to prove their fidelity to the United States.

The first wave also carried with them the old class and ethnic divisions from Iran. Yet those prejudices are changing, thanks to Iranians who grew up in the United States as the children of immigrants. In the United States, hardly anyone knows, much less cares, what your father does for a living, whether a last name is Persian, Armenian, or Jewish, or whether from a powerful family or an obscure one. Azadan, Hakopian, Elghanian, and Farmanfarmaian—all are unpronounceable in the same way.

If Iran shapes how Iranians become Americans, then America offers them new possibilities for defining what it means to be Iranian.

In a wonderfully reported piece in the Los Angeles Times on the history of the Iranian diaspora in “Tehrangeles,” Melissa Etehad quotes longtime resident and dual citizen Sadra Ford: “I wish I could go back to Iran and see my real identity.” The sentiment, I suspect, has it exactly backward. Our truer selves are made here, by the second and third generations, the native-born Americans who have the ability and the desire to go beyond forgetting and remembering in order to imagine new communities and new memories. We become better Iranians by becoming Americans.

America gives us that.

MADE IN THE U.S.A., BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Being American means being able to choose to forget where we came from. Yet Iranians in the United States are put at risk of losing their status as Americans by the absence of forgetting, by the work of remembrance done by journalists and filmmakers.

So long as the news provides daily reminders of Iranian-backed Shiite militias and Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, so long as there are films about mothers without daughters, the status of Iranians as Americans will be held in perpetual abeyance, and their fate in the United States will not be their own.

The good news is that civil action in Iran continues to dictate the fate of Iranians in the United States. The rise of an oppositional student movement in Iran in the late 1990s introduced new possibilities to the existing script, stacked as it was with ayatollahs and swarthy fanatics, later revised further when protests reached

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Young U.S. citizen Revital Moghaddam, 11, originally from Iran, holds an American flag during a celebration where she received her citizenship papers, conducted by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), on July ,9 2018 in Los Angeles, California. (Getty)

out beyond the campus dorm rooms to include the broader public at the voting booth.

The failed presidential campaign of Mir Hossein Mousavi and the subsequent Green Movement, in 2009, proved to a turning point. A single summer of protest transformed ordinary Iranians into heroes in the eyes of Westerners, fit to be fêted on concert stages by the likes of U2 and Bon Jovi. Images of Iranian protestors marching by the millions, demanding that their votes be counted—and being arrested, beaten, or worse for doing so—made it possible for Americans to imagine themselves in the Iranian narrative. Suddenly, the Iranian diaspora were fellow travelers in a civilizational struggle for democracy.

Iranians in the United States had for years been defined by tropes and assumptions formed in the 1980s. Now they found themselves in new roles, pulled between the peculiar binary of an emerging, freer Iran and an Iran conventionally imagined as unmitigated evil, a regime wrapped in veils of theocracy and revolutionary protest, implacable in its hostility to the United States.

REMEMBERING How might we as Americans begin to forget a country that no longer exists? We start by paying attention. Iran today is hardly the country it was even ten years ago, much less 40. Its leaders have not succeeded in preserving the revolution as originally conceived by Khomeini, in part because they never fully determined which parts were worth saving. State and society have changed dramatically since 1979, lately at a dizzying rate.

Yet the possibility that politics has a present tense in Iran, that civil action and protest have appeared because of, not despite, Iran’s political development these past 40 years, remains outside of conventional discussion in the United States.

U.S. leaders routinely celebrate the people of Iran for their ancient culture and contributions to world civilization and for their youth and talents, their yearning to be free. That is how the current regime in Washington is able to proclaim that the United States

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stands with the Iranian people even as it promotes crippling economic sanctions that will hasten the end of the Islamic Republic, as Vice President Mike Pence did earlier this year in Warsaw, when he called on European countries to “bring the economic and diplomatic pressure necessary to bring the Iranian people … the peace, the security, and freedom they deserve.”

That the audience met Pence’s comments with uncomfortable silence seemed not to matter to an administration wrapped in its own certitude.

In spite of the Trump administration’s confidence in its strategy toward Iran, reports of the Islamic Republic’s imminent demise continue to be premature, just as they were last year, just as they were in the immediate aftermath of 1979. Political dissent in Iran is not an all-or-nothing proposition—not yet, at least. As the historian Ali Ansari recently noted, perhaps the greatest trauma of 1979 was the idea of revolution itself. Iranians steadfastly reject all future revolutions as simply not worth the cost. The widespread protests that gripped the country at the beginning of last year represented the revolution’s latter-day expression, not its demise, demonstrations made from below as politics by other means and alarming to the authorities at the top precisely because the marchers’ demands were so familiar.

Americans’ understanding of Iran remains stuck in the past; the authorities in Iran have the opposite problem. How does Iran remember a revolution that most of its population did not experience?

Remembering starts on television and in the streets, in the repeat performance of Khomeini’s arrival from exile every year on February 1, culminating ten days later with televised parades and mass rallies held across the country. State media broadcasts footage from the era, scenes and images unimaginable the rest of the year: men with Western ties and women without Islamic hijabs. Secular housewives march in the streets alongside hezbollahi students. U.S. President Jimmy Carter toasts the Iranian monarch in Tehran, and Ayatollah Khomeini meets with American journalists in France. Every year, the hapless shah comes back to life, resurrected by state media, only to be chased out of the country once again.

Those same sacred memories are rehearsed and reproduced in the classroom. First graders receive their first rites in political Islam near the end of the school year, in the closing pages of their Farsi primers. The story of Khomeini’s return is taught as a memory, and includes an image of uniformed children adorned with paper hearts bearing a picture of the late leader. The children are met with an approaching airplane showering daisies from its undercarriage over the countryside below, the timeless Persian obsession with flowers unchanged by revolution. Their eyes turn skyward to a plane that circles but never lands, promises from a future that never arrives. *SHERVIN MALEKZADEH is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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After Bashir How Sudan Can Heal From Decades of Dictatorship

By Zachariah Mampilly*

that he was being held in the presidential palace in Khartoum. Rumors circulated that Bashir negotiated Since the movement that has come to be known as the his own exit with former Defense Minister Ahmed â&#x20AC;&#x153;Sudan Uprisingâ&#x20AC;? ignited in December 2018, little has Awad Ibn Auf, the leader of the coup, to ensure that been heard or seen of Omar al-Bashir, the man who he would not be sent to the International Criminal ruled the country with an iron fist for almost 30 years. Court. But whatever guarantees Bashir extracted On April 11, after four months of ever-larger protests, proved short-lived: under pressure from protesters, the he was deposed in a bloodless coup. At first the regime military ejected Ibn Auf after only one day in power said little about his location, though reports suggested and replaced him with Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah

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Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir addresses parliament in the capital Khartoum on April 2019 ,1.

(ASHRAF SHAZLY/ AFP/Getty Images)

Abdelrahman Burhan.

The new regime has reportedly moved Bashir to Kobar prison, a notorious maximum-security facility in Khartoum. Thousands of political prisoners were detained and tortured at Kobar during Bashir’s long reign of terror. Whether his tenure there will match the length frequently doled out to his political opponents is unclear; Bashir’s future, like that of the country, remains opaque.

The uncertainty surrounding Bashir since he was toppled is, in a way, expected. Bashir remains one of the most inscrutable leaders felled during Africa’s long third wave of protest, which began at the end of the first decade of the 2000s, crested in 2011, and gained renewed strength in just the past two years. Unlike Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former president of Algeria who was overthrown just weeks before Bashir and with whom he is forever fused in the popular imagination, Bashir never inspired loyalty within Sudan. Nor did the international community view him as much of a leader, even though he clung to power for so long.

Bashir’s inscrutability was partly manufactured. He spoke fluent English, for example, but never gave interviews to the English press. Being inscrutable was a strategy that helped Bashir secure his rule in a country long defined by its divisions. His ideological inconsistency and willingness to forge opportunistic partnerships allowed him to remain in power by exploiting the broader crisis of leadership and nationalism in Sudan. Now, that legacy raises questions about how this almost uniformly reviled figure should be handled amid the uncertainty and joy of his departure. In other words, what happens to Bashir has consequences for the future of Sudan itself.

THE INSCRUTABLE DICTATOR Official biographies and political obituaries of Bashir converge around a few basic facts. He was born to a humble Bedouin farming family in the country’s riverine north before entering the military and eventually rising to the rank of commander. But beyond that, precious little is known about his personal life, and what is known is hard to reconcile with his public persona. Not for him the ostentatious trappings of Africa’s other dictators, for example, although he presided over a regime known for its corruption and amassed a personal fortune rumored to be in the billions. Despite his well-earned reputation as a ruthless génocidaire, he is a devoted family man (he doesn’t have any children of his own but helped

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Unlike Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former president of Algeria who was overthrown just weeks before Bashir and with whom he is forever fused in the popular imagination, Bashir never inspired loyalty within Sudan. raise his second wife’s children). Though he ruled Sudan for three decades, few Sudanese are mourning his departure—not even those who benefited from his largess, such as the military and the country’s narrow economic elite.

Bashir is not the first Sudanese military ruler to be overthrown by a popular uprising. Sudan’s previous military ruler, Gaafar al-Nimeiri, suffered the same fate in 1985. During his 14 years in power, Nimeiri vacillated between socialism and pan-Arabism before settling on Islamism as the best ideology to ensure his hold on power. He embraced the Muslim Brotherhood and imposed sharia law—decisions that led to widespread unrest and reignited the war in the south, which eventually cleaved the country in two in 2011.

Like Nimeiri, Bashir arrived on the political scene directly from the military. After a four-year interlude of civilian rule, Bashir seized power in 1989, aligning his regime with the populist Islamist political leader Hassan al-Turabi. For the next decade, both internal and external observers considered the wily Turabi, who earned a Ph.D. at the Sorbonne, to be the puppet master pulling Bashir’s strings. Under his influence, the regime worked to erase Sudan’s religious and ethnic diversity with a top-down—and widely resented—program of Arabization and Islamization. But Turabi’s friendliness toward Islamist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, sowed discord internally while transforming the country into an international pariah. Hoping to improve his country’s standing, Bashir negotiated secretly with officials in the United States, who warned him against continuing to support Islamic radicalism. Bashir, ever the survivor, broke from Turabi in 2000 and had him arrested.

The spotlight then shifted not to Bashir but to Ali Osman Taha, a former foreign minister and then the country’s

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first vice president. A civilian leader of the Islamist movement, Taha sided with Bashir after Bashir broke with Turabi. Knowledgeable observers viewed Taha as “the real power in Khartoum.” He was responsible for overseeing the brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur that led to more than 200,000 civilian deaths.

Taha personally negotiated the comprehensive peace agreement that ended Sudan’s civil war with the southern leader, John Garang, in 2005. At the peace ceremony in Khartoum, Taha, and not Bashir, signed the agreement on behalf of the north.

And yet it was for Bashir alone that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants in 2009 and 2010 for “genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” Despite his centrality to the Darfur campaign, Taha was never charged. Rumors circulated among regional actors that Taha was making moves to replace Bashir as president, according to reports released by WikiLeaks. But Bashir again successfully displaced his rival by demoting him during a 2013 cabinet reshuffle. The departure of South Sudan and, with it, the political and military threat the southern rebellion posed further cemented Bashir’s position. He confronted no other major challenge to his power for question of what, exactly, to do with Bashir may seem the better part of a decade—until the protest movement a distraction. But to ignore the issue could incur longthat deposed him in April. term consequences. Twice before, Sudan has failed to translate a popular revolution into an enduring RECKONING WITH THE PAST democracy. The core problem has always been the country’s inability to craft an inclusive national identity, In the midst of today’s tense standoff—between in the absence of which political elites have exploited military rulers loath to cede power and protesters still ethnic and religious divisions to secure their rule. Even pushing for an immediate civilian-led transition—the today’s protest movement, which is broad based and diverse, struggles to advance a national vision beyond replacing the military with a civilian-led government.

How the new regime handles Bashir can serve or undermine the goal of generating a national sense of purpose. Many international observers have called for the new regime to turn the ex-ruler over to the ICC to face prosecution. But such prosecutions are incorrigibly inefficient, and the spectacle of Bashir obstructing efforts to expose his regime’s wrongdoing will hardly salve the country’s trauma. Furthermore, the ICC indictment is limited to actions in Darfur more than a decade ago and does not address any of the regime’s misbehaviors in places such as the Nuba Mountains,

Sudan’s failure to reckon with its past, or to construct an inclusive national project after the last two prior popular uprisings, allowed the military to take over in the first place.

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A Sudanese protester holds the national flag with writings reading in Arabic «Civilian Only» during a rally outside the army headquarters in Khartoum on May 2019 ,2. (ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP/Getty Images)

opening its doors, but it is a signatory to the ICC; Bashir would more likely find asylum in Saudi Arabia or another Gulf country that would not be obligated to hand him over to the court. The current military rulers, who insist on retaining power even within a civilian government, might be happy to have him out of the country. But the protesters are unlikely to accept any approach in which Bashir and others are never held responsible for their actions.

where it bombed villagers from the air; South Kordofan, the site of a brutal multiyear counterinsurgency; or even the vast Khartoum metropolis itself, where hundreds were killed during an earlier spate of protests in 2012 and 2013. ICC prosecution would also personalize the country’s overlapping crises by laying Sudan’s woes at the feet of a single individual. Moreover, knowledgeable observers such as Alex de Waal and Mahmood Mamdani have suggested that the ICC might fail to convict Bashir of any crimes owing to the poor quality of both the indictment, which contains factual errors, and its substance. Alternatively, Sudan could try Bashir in a domestic court in order to reduce concerns about the perceived anti-African bias of the ICC. Both of these options are unlikely to satisfy the protesters who demand accountability for the entire regime and its numerous beneficiaries.

When Nimeiri was overthrown, he was exiled to Egypt.

Bashir, too, could be expelled to a foreign country along with his top officials. He and his regime insiders likely hoped for such an outcome in the early days of the transition. Uganda was the first country to consider

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If Bashir stays in Sudan without facing trial, he and other figures connected to the regime could be offered a degree of immunity as part of a South African–style truth and reconciliation process. This approach is both the most potentially difficult and the likeliest to yield real rewards. A truth and reconciliation process could force open a long-repressed conversation about the damage the Bashir regime has inflicted on particular people and on Sudanese society as a whole over the past three decades. Through such a process, Sudanese may finally be able to articulate a national identity that transcends the Islamist and Arabist supremacy that has long been the source of the country’s many problems. Although Sudanese often pay lip service to the diversity of the country, most also recognize that the different communities that share this vast nation know little of one another. A national conversation that allows victims to share their stories could deepen understanding among Sudan’s diverse populations. It would also foster empathy and help Sudanese craft the inclusive and democratic national identity that has eluded them for too long.

Truth and reconciliation has a mixed record in the countries that have attempted it. And any discussion of amnesty or reduced punishment for regime insiders will rankle many victims as well as protesters seeking more retributive forms of justice. But nations that seek to move forward after trauma must confront their painful histories. Sudan’s failure to reckon with its past, or to construct an inclusive national project after the last two prior popular uprisings, allowed the military to take over in the first place. A genuine truth and reconciliation process is the best way to prevent history from repeating itself once again. *ZACHARIAH MAMPILLY is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Vassar College.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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The Chinese Enlightenment at 100

How the Communist Party Seized the Legacy of May Fourth

By Dan Xin Huang* One hundred years ago, on the evening of May 1919 ,3, a group of Chinese students met inside an empty lecture hall in Beijing.

World War I had ended in an armistice the previous fall, and the victorious powers were gathered at Versailles to negotiate a peace treaty. China, which had contributed to the Allied war effort, believed that it had earned if not an equal seat at the table, then at least the right for its voice to be heard. But during their negotiations, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States secretly agreed to cede disputed Chinese territory to Japan, which had also supported the Allies. As the American diplomat Edward T. Williams wrote, “China was betrayed in the house of her friends.”

News of the decision reached China on the morning of May 2.

From rickshaw men to state ministers, Chinese citizens lapsed into despair. The nation’s youth, in particular, felt the blow like the loss of a limb. Born into the final act of imperial China, they grappled with the disparity between their lot and that of a more developed world and burned with a sense of what was at stake— an ordeal as grave as the survival of China itself. They were the

inheritors of a fallen empire. Their country’s humiliation was their anguish.

Inside the Beijing classroom, passions ran high. Students from across the country had flooded Europe with telegrams, beseeching the Chinese delegation at Versailles to salvage the country’s pride and walk away. One young man, flashing a knife, cried out that the pain was too much to bear and that he would rather take his own life than tolerate China’s weakness. A protest had been previously planned for the following week, but such was the clamor in the room, the intensity of the students’ convictions, that they knew they could not wait. They would march the next day—May 4.

“TO SAVE CHINA” The march marked the birth of the storied May Fourth Movement, a national cultural and political awakening that, over the past century, has come to symbolize the birth of modern China. It was a time of profound reflection and remarkable plurality of thought, a period of radical openness and possibility christened by historians as “the Chinese Enlightenment.” In a land of symbols

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Students of Peking University marching with banners during the May Fourth demonstrations in 1919.

(Getty)

and ceremonies, its yearly anniversary continues to evoke a powerful cultural resonance. “The movement is not obsolete . . . not merely a historical event,” wrote the state-run newspaper China Daily in 2009, on the 90th anniversary of the protest.

“The discussions and contentions over it have never ceased.”

Indeed, claims to the May Fourth legacy were recorded even before the streets had been cleared. In a poem penned the very day of the protests, a student at Peking University wrote that he and his peers had marched “to purge clear the shame from Chinese hearts and minds.” He wrote, “We’d do anything to save China.”

For the fledgling nation’s educated and elite, saving China was foremost on everyone’s mind. Once conceived as the center of human civilization, the Chinese empire had entered the twentieth century limping, crippled by an unrelenting succession of crises.

Barely a decade into the new century, the Qing dynasty collapsed, replaced by a flawed republic that quickly succumbed to corrupt warlords and foreign aggressors.

Out of these conditions, however, rose a generation of writers and scholars, trained in Japan and the West, who balked at the shackles of Chinese tradition and looked abroad for tools of progress.

Beginning in the 1910s, hundreds of new journals and magazines printed their first issues, wrestling with the most pressing subjects of their time, their insatiable appetite for modernity reflected in titles such as New Youth, New Tide, New Life, New Epoch, New Society, New Literature and Art—new everything. The collective fervor came to be known as the New Culture Movement, a swirl of ideas and activity that spurned the past, contested the future, and elevated the individual to a prominence not seen before or

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May Fourth-modern China’s most potent symbol of national expression-has been stripped of its aspirations and sanitized into a reliable party talking point. since. Culture was politics, and politics was culture. The nation brimmed with new plans for structuring life and society, while systems that had dominated for millennia were left in the dust.

If the visionaries of New Culture readied the kindling, the students on May 1919 ,4, lit the fire. The movement secured its place in Chinese history by consolidating diffuse ideals for the future under the unifying banner of nationalism: “How,” they asked, “might China rise again?” Some pressed for greater political freedoms. Others attacked the country’s Confucian heritage. Still others believed they were joining the fight against imperialism.

For China’s vocal liberal wing, calls for “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy” emerged as a rallying cry, becoming for many synonymous with the movement itself. At its heart, May Fourth succeeded because it stoked the same deep yearning in everyone—the wish to save China.

Out of the movement’s bonfire leapt one ember that would catch and ignite into its own great flame. Taking inspiration from the Russian Revolution, China’s early Marxists began as a

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fringe study group on the campus of Peking University, steadily disseminating the language of class struggle and revolution to a national audience. In July 1921, around a dozen Marxists gathered for a secret meeting in Shanghai. Buoyed by support from the Soviet Comintern, they formally established the Communist Party in China and presided over its first party congress. Among the delegates was a local cell leader named Mao Zedong. May Fourth had catalyzed a turn in Mao’s worldview: sensing the need for a more structured politics, he abandoned his previous anarchism and plunged into Marxist¬-Leninist theory. It was, he later reflected, “a critical period of my life.”

Ever since, the Chinese Communist Party has rooted its origin story in the romance and defiance of May 4. The party’s official history books trace a direct line from its founding back to the movement, which is credited with “wakening the Chinese national consciousness” and “preparing the fundamental conditions of the founding of the CCP.” Mao hailed the movement as the party’s “chief landmark,” which produced in China “a brand-new cultural force . . . that is, the communist culture and ideology guided by the Chinese Communists.” According to party lore, the spirit of May 4 was finally realized in 1949, when the communists declared victory in the nation’s civil war, announcing the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

MAY FOURTH SPIRIT The Communist Party’s appropriation of May Fourth would exert powerful effects on its rule. The movement’s intensity had made a profound impression on Mao, who spoke of it as a “cultural revolution” as early as 1940. The first decades of the People’s Republic saw a tremendous embrace of his vast nation-building project, but his plans began to unravel in the 1950s with the disastrous policies of the Great Leap Forward. As Mao’s failures

Among the delegates was a local cell leader named Mao Zedong.

May Fourth had catalyzed a turn in Mao’s worldview: sensing the need for a more structured politics, he abandoned his previous anarchism and plunged into Marxist-Leninist theory.

mounted and his grip on power loosened, he retreated into the one program he knew best: revolution.

Cloaking himself in the rhetoric of May 4, Mao launched the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1966. He called for the nation’s youth to “bombard the headquarters” of society and purge it of all “reactionary” elements, ranging from top party leaders to members of the students’ own families. He incited his “Red Guards,” impassioned young devotees throughout China’s cities, to “smash the four olds”: old thinking, old customs, old habits, and old culture. Chinese youth had formed the backbone of the May Fourth Movement, but their cause, Mao believed, had since been betrayed, and it would fall upon the shoulders of a new generation to revive the revolution. As the historian Rana Mitter has noted, the Cultural Revolution displayed many of the key features of the May Fourth Movement—“obsession with youth, destruction of the past, arrogance about the superiority of one’s own chosen system of thought”—albeit refracted through the lens of Mao’s perverse ideology.

Mao’s cult of personality was itself a product of May Fourth.

Some of the movement’s most prominent writers, such as Ding Ling and Guo Moruo, were ardent admirers of European romanticism, popularizing the idea of the transcendent hero and

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Soldiers march through the Great Hall of the People after attending a ceremony marking the centennial of the May Fourth Movement, a landmark student protest against colonialism and imperialism, in Beijing›s Great Hall of the People on April 2019 ,30.

(Getty)

of a society’s capacity to transform itself through pure faith and will. Mao embraced these inclinations and pushed them to their extreme, encouraging absurd displays of exaltation from his subjects. One young educator, after catching a glimpse of the revered leader in 1966, wrote to his colleagues: “Today I am so happy my heart is about to burst.” So monumental was the encounter that he resolved to mark the day his new birthday.

Mao’s final revolution ended with his death in 1976, and under new leadership, the Chinese Communist Party swiftly moved to distance itself from the terrors of his reign. The May Fourth Movement, however, retained its potency as a legitimizing historical symbol, soon recast to serve a new narrative.

Addressing the country in 1978, China’s new paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, promoted an ambitious reform agenda and called for widespread “thought liberation” to unchain the public from Mao’s lingering dogma. At a symposium a few months later, May Fourth was honored as China’s first “thought-emancipation movement” in the modern era.

Chinese liberals, held down for decades, sensed the changing winds. “The May Fourth spirit is democracy and science,” declared the historian Ding Shouhe, both of which “are still urgently needed for China’s modernization today.” In 1978 and 1979,

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activists took to meeting in front of a popular brick foundation in central Beijing, dressing it with big-character posters to articulate their bottled desires. Anointed the “Democracy Wall,” the site quickly attracted thousands of men and women who gathered on afternoons and weekends to rebuke Mao’s rule, condemn the party’s authoritarianism, and urge on further reforms. It proved to be too much, too fast. At the end of 1979, the party stepped in, erasing the wall and arresting the movement’s leaders. But the public’s energy could not be contained. Since openly attacking the party was no longer permitted, the movement diverted its efforts into another channel—criticizing Chinese tradition as the source of the nation’s ills.

During the 1980s, Chinese writers and intellectuals again became obsessed with the old question “How can we make China modern? How can we make it strong?” One 1988 analysis by Wen Yuankai and Ni Duan described the Chinese character as saddled by “conservative consciousness, obedience, suppressed individuality, insulation, and lack of innovative spirit.” Others heaped blame on China’s “authoritarian culture,” a carefully disguised proxy for the party’s ideology. This “cultural fever” built throughout the decade, producing hundreds of books and articles probing the sources of China’s national weakness. One scholar, Li Guizhong, called it “the second major cultural debate in modern Chinese history, the first being during the May Fourth period.”

A new fever for Western ideas added fuel to this debate. Studentorganized reading groups took root at Peking University, known as “Beida” for short, and at other schools across the country.

Young Chinese pored over the greatest Western minds—Hayek and Heidegger, Nietzsche and Weber. By the spring of 1989, as the 70th anniversary of May Fourth approached, the new generation had engineered a groundswell for change. Student activists in Beijing hosted “democracy salons,” while Wang Dan, a student at Beida, published a journal titled New May Fourth.

In April, he distributed an open letter arguing that just as Deng had established “special zones” for opening up the economy, the university “should serve as a special zone for promoting the democratization of politics.”

Claiming the mantle of their May Fourth forebears, a new cohort of Chinese youth, born during the Cultural Revolution but shaped in the post-Mao era, emerged as the galvanizing force of a national political movement. On May 1989 ,4, student leaders gathered in Tiananmen Square and issued the “New May Fourth Manifesto,” urging all demonstrators to “carry forward the May Fourth spirit of science and democracy.” Hundreds of thousands camped in the square at night; themes of rebirth and renewal once more ruled the day. The iconic Chinese television program River Elegy, first broadcast the previous summer, articulated the movement’s reawakened spirit: “It is as if many things in China ought to start afresh from May Fourth.”

Not for the Communist Party. On June 4, it deployed troops and tanks to crush the public demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, then quickly moved to impose its own narrative of events.

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Although the student movements from May Fourth and 1989 had been inextricably entwined, the party labored to disjoin them.

Speaking on May 1990 ,3, Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin dismissed the protesters as “allies of foreign aggressors.” He said, “Some of our younger intellectuals fell prey to the influence of a Western bourgeois worldview and values.”

He said, “We are confident that our younger comrades will be able to solve these problems through study and social practice.”

Subsequent commemorations have fixed the specter of the violent suppression into a cautionary tale. Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, used the 80th anniversary of May 4, in 1999, to warn against encroaching foreign influence. He said, “The Western powers still . . . promote divisions among socialist countries and developing nations.” He said, “The broad masses of Chinese young people must acquire an all-round perspective, a dialectical understanding and evolving appreciation of the ever-changing situation.” In 2014, President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Peking University during the movement’s 95th anniversary. In his remarks on May 4, he said, “Youth is a time when your values are undergoing change and maturation.” He said, “It is crucial to control this phase in a person’s development.”

THE PASSION OF YOUTH Anniversaries in China are more than remembrances; they are access points to former passions and repressed grievances, feared by the party for their potential to combust. The year 2019 brings a catalog of politically charged anniversaries: ten years since the Uighur riots in Urumqi, 20 years since the state’s crackdown on the Falun Gong, 60 years since the Dalai Lama was forced to flee Tibet. At the top of the bill is the 30th anniversary of the 1989 pro-democracy protests and, perhaps most salient, the centennial of the May Fourth Movement.

Under Xi, the Communist Party has systematically strengthened

For the fledgling nation’s educated and elite, saving China was foremost on everyone’s mind. Once conceived as the center of human civilization, the Chinese empire had entered the twentieth century limping, crippled by an unrelenting succession of crises.

its control over all aspects of Chinese civic life. At Peking University, the historic center of both the 1919 and 1989 movements, the state has fastened cameras to lampposts, built informant networks, and appointed, last fall, a new university president with sterling party credentials. May Fourth—modern China’s most potent symbol of national expression—has been stripped of its aspirations and sanitized into a reliable party talking point. On campus, a recent survey administered to select Beida graduate students tested their affinity to statements such as “[Xi is] a leader whose heart was forged by the noble struggle” and “Multiparty Western democracy is not suited to China.” One line of questioning appeared designed to root out subversives,

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Picture dated 22 April 1989 shows several hundred of 200,000 pro-democracy student protesters face to face with policemen outside the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square in Beijing as they take part in the funeral ceremony of former Chinese Communist Party leader and liberal reformer Hu Yaobang during an unauthorized demonstration to mourn his death. (Getty)

gauging what respondents thought was embodied by “the May 4th Spirit” and whether “the youth should release its passion . . . and chase youthful ideals.”

The passions of Chinese youth have always straddled a fine and fluid line. At times they have been a force to be weaponized; since 1989, an impulse to be suppressed. The party has not been shy in showcasing the fates of those it deems to have gone too far.

Last summer, security forces stormed an apartment of students and young labor activists in Huizhou, assembled to help factory workers organize for greater rights. Fifty members of the group were detained; several remained in custody into the new year—

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among them, two recent Beida graduates. Last November, the detainees’ classmates distributed flyers in university canteens but were met with general apathy, before police officers moved in to silence them. Since then, a half dozen more Beida students and alumni, along with many of their peers around the country, have quietly disappeared.

One hundred years ago, idealistic young Chinese banded together to jolt the nation’s conscience. Today, their heirs face erasure. *DAN XIN HUANG is a Beijing-based writer and a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

A Weekly Political News Magazine

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Summer at Cambridge www.majalla.com

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Needling Your Way to Healthier Skin Once Viewed with Skepticism, Microneedling Can Be an Effective Procedure to Improve the Skin Harvard Health If the idea of poking yourself in the face with tiny needles in hopes of improving your skin sounds a little bizarre to you, you’re not alone. For years, the medical establishment looked at the practice, known as microneedling, with a leery side-eye.

“I didn’t take it seriously until relatively recently,” says Dr. Kenneth Arndt, medical editor of the Harvard Special Health Report Skin Care and Repair and a founding editorial board member of the Harvard Health Letter.

Microneedling, also referred to as percutaneous collagen

induction, was first described in the literature in 1995. In recent years, not only has the technique gained acceptance, but it appears to have secured a place alongside mainstream treatments designed to improve the skin’s condition and appearance. “In the last three to five years, there’s been a lot more information, interest, and studies documenting what microneedling can do, as well as a lot of commercial development,” says Dr. Arndt.

Microneedling has also grabbed the attention of consumers.

“I think this is largely driven by social media, which makes procedures once hidden behind a physician’s office doors

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Donald Tusk: How the Son of a Polish Carpenter became an EU Statesman Majalla - London Drawing by Ali Al Mandalawi

Movement, a trade union led by Lech Walesa which opposed Soviet rule over Poland. The movement proved to be effective as Poland became one of the major states that gained independence from the Soviet Union. In 1991, Tusk would go on to become one of the founders of the Liberal Democratic Congress, which he led into the 2007 general election in Poland.

Council, Tusk worked to promote an economically competitive EU in the world stage. He also oversaw many challenges such as the European refugee crisis and Russia’s annexation -1 A Modest Upbringing of Crimea. Furthermore, since the UK voted to withdraw from the EU, Donald Francizek Tusk was born in he along European Commission April 1957 ,22 in Gdansk, Poland. He President Jean-Claude Juncker had quite the modest upbringing as his and German Chancellor Angela father was a carpenter while his mother Merkel joined Theresa May on the worked as a nurse. negotiating table to get a withdrawal -4 Donald Tusk’s Premiership deal on the through. Unlike Juncker -2 A History Student Aims to Make Tusk was elected as Prime Minister and Merkel, Tusk is quite stern on History of Poland in 2007 and would stay in the United Kingdom and its long office until 2014. As Prime Minister, delays to getting a deal through its In 1976, Donald Tusk graduated from he pursued free market policies of parliament; he also expressed belief Nicolaus Copernicus high school in privatization as well as cutting taxes that the UK only had a choice between Gdansk. He would then enroll as a to attract foreign investment and a hard Brexit and no Brexit. He also history student at the University of businesses. His policies made him controversially expressed disdain for Gdansk, which he graduated from in a rising star within the free-market the Trump administration, citing it as 1980. While at university he joined a oriented European Union. After his a “threat” to the EU. student activist group which aimed to premiership, he was elected as the new end communist rule in Poland.

President of the European Council on -6 Work and Dedication December 2014 ,1.

-3 Tusk’s hard work and dedication Opposition to Soviet Rule helped him go from being the -5 Donald Tusk’s Presidency humble son of a nurse and carpenter At the end of the 1970s, Tusk was As president of the European to one of the most important leaders an active member of the Solidarity in the EU.

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Disney Remakes Face First Struggles With New Versions of ‘Aladdin’ and ‘The Lion King,’ Disney Straddles Nostalgia and Novelty 48

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In serving up these new spins on muchloved films, the studio is trying to strike a delicate balance, delivering a warm and fuzzy nostalgia fix while also offering audiences something unexpected.

President of Walt Disney Studios Motion Picture Production Sean Bailey talks about the upcoming live action Disney movie "The Lion King".

(Getty)

By Josh Rottenberg* It’s Hollywood’s version of the circle of life: Take an old movie that’s hardwired into one generation’s childhood memory banks, give it a fresh coat of cinematic paint and send a new iteration into theaters for the next generation to hopefully fall in love with just as their parents did. And no studio plays this particular circle game better than the Walt Disney Co. This summer, Disney will offer not one but two remakes of classic animated films from its catalog — each gussied up with new stars, new songs and the latest filmmaking technology.

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A live-action version of 1992’s “Aladdin” hits theaters May 24, with Will Smith stepping into the role of the mischievous, shape-shifting Genie voiced in the original film by Robin Williams. And a new take on 1994’s smash “The Lion King” from director Jon Favreau arrives July 19, employing the same photorealistic CGI that Favreau used in 2016’s “The Jungle Book.”

In serving up these new spins on much-loved films, the studio is trying to strike a delicate balance, delivering a warm and fuzzy nostalgia fix — amplified by familiar songs like “Friend Like Me” from “Aladdin” and “The Circle of Life” from “The Lion King” — while also offering audiences something unexpected.

“We really try to weigh, what is in the contract with the audience? What do they want to feel? What are specific moments that, if you are going to change or lose them, you do so at your own peril?” said Sean Bailey, Disney’s president of production. “Then you combine that with what gets us really creatively excited.”

For Disney, this strategy of revisiting and retrofitting titles from its vaunted library dates to Tim Burton’s 2010 liveaction reimagining of “Alice in Wonderland,” which grossed more than 1$ billion worldwide. In the years since, the studio has found success with new versions of “Cinderella,” “The Jungle Book” and “Beauty and the Beast” as well as the “Sleeping Beauty” spinoff “Maleficent.”

Though Disney’s most recent reimagining, Burton’s “Dumbo,” was deemed a box office disappointment when it hit theaters last month, the studio is moving full steam ahead with other remakes, including “The Little Mermaid” and “Mulan.”

As the studio has discovered, however, even with the most seemingly timeless films, certain elements may not have aged so well in the intervening years.

In the case of “Aladdin,” director Guy Ritchie’s new version tweaks the original film’s love story between Princess Jasmine (now played by Naomi Scott) and the street hustler Aladdin (Mena Massoud) to give it a female-empowerment spin.

“Jasmine’s main goal in the original movie is really to find a spouse, and in this movie there’s much more than that,” said “Aladdin” producer Dan Lin. “She really wants to help to rule

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“Jasmine’s main goal in the original movie is really to find a spouse, and in this movie there’s much more than that,” said “Aladdin” producer Dan Lin. “She really wants to help to rule Agrabah and take a much bigger leadership position.”

Agrabah and take a much bigger leadership position.”

The filmmakers took similar care to update aspects of the depiction of Middle Eastern culture that stirred controversy in the animated version. ( After complaints by the AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee, a line in the original film’s opening song “Arabian Nights” was changed for the home-video release from “where they cut off your ear if they don’t like your face” to “where it’s flat and immense and the heat is intense.”)

“We work hard to educate ourselves as much as we can with really smart people on all of the titles,” said Bailey. “As far as movies that may deal with cultural sensitivity, like ‘Aladdin’ or our upcoming ‘Mulan,’ we will bring in a number of scholars, professors and experts and we talk to them throughout the process. We’re really trying to both honor what has made the story timeless but also make sure we’re being cognizant and intelligent about the times we find ourselves in.”

With Smith’s turn as the Genie, the new “Aladdin” offers something different than Williams’ memorably manic performance.

“Robin Williams’ character was so iconic in the way the played it, and we thought, ‘Is there a way to go that both honors what he did and makes it feel fresh and new?’” said Lin. “Will had a very specific point of view … There are parts of it that are very personal to his style. We call it kind of the hip-hop genie.”

Highlighting the dangers of mucking around with a cherished property, however, early glimpses of Smith’s Genie were greeted by fans on social media with skepticism if not derision.

“There’s been a lot of controversy over the Genie: Is he too blue? Is he not blue enough? What shape does he take?”

Lin said. “You’ll see in our movie the Genie takes lots of

different forms.”

The new version of “The Lion King” — boasting an all-star vocal cast including Donald Glover as the young lion Simba alongside Seth Rogen, Beyonce and, returning to provide the voice of elder lion Mufasa, James Earl Jones — has faced even greater scrutiny. Poring over the film’s recently released trailer, some fans criticized the look and sound of the film’s villain, Simba’s uncle Scar, voiced in the original movie by Jeremy Irons and in the new version by Chiwetel Ejiofor.

While he didn’t personally grow up with the original “Lion King,” Favreau said he fully understands the reverence for the film, which, like “Aladdin,” has spawned direct-to-video sequels and a Broadway musical. Indeed, with “The Lion King” still reigning as the highest-grossing traditionally

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Naomi Scott, Will Smith and Mena Massoud attend Nickelodeon's 2019 Kids' Choice Awards at Galen Center on March 2019 ,23 in Los Angeles, California.

(Getty)

animated film of all time, the intensity of interest comes as no surprise.

“I pay attention [to the fans] because it’s their movie too,” Favreau said. “They grew up with this thing, and there’s some sort of collective understanding between the filmmaker and the audience around the world of what the essence and spirit of ‘The Lion King’ is.”

While the new “Lion King” has been widely referred to as a live-action version, in reality it’s a different kind of animal, taking the immersive computer-generated animation of “The Jungle Book” and pushing the technology even further.

“The environments are all digital, and the animals are all digital,” said Favreau. “Everything is generated by a computer — except for one shot.”

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Having now worked on two remakes of beloved Disney films, Favreau is perhaps more aware than anyone of the challenges involved. When his “Lion King” opens, he hopes fans of the original film will walk into the theater with an open mind.

“You have to enter the process with a humility and make a case for not just watching the original,” Favreau said. “You have to be additive to the experience and dimensionalize it. You have to surprise people but also deliver on their expectations. And that’s the game.” * Josh Rottenberg covers the film business for the Los Angeles Times.

Originally published in the LA Times.

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How to Take Back Your Own Power in Relationships

Six Steps to be Assertive with Your Significant Other

By Samantha Morris Worrying about what others think of us can take up a huge amount of time and energy on a daily basis. We often go round and round in circles analysing what is happening in relationships (even down to the tiniest details)as well as how both we and the other person react to each other and potentially surmising and reviewing how successful each personal and professional relationship might be.

Although there is no magic wand when configuring and

Sometimes we, and other people, can project our insecurities, past experiences, past relationships and opinions onto the other person.

finding our way around the complex web of personal and professional relationships, there are a few powerful tips which will help you to become more aware of how to take back your own power in relationships.

Here are 6 tips to help you to take back your power in both your personal and professional relationships: 1. You can’t change the other person’s responses, feelings or opinions but you can change and communicate your own: The first important message is that whilst it’s important to listen to another person’s feelings, opinions and responses, you are ultimately not controlled by them. You may be able to encourage inspire or influence someone else, however you will never be able to change their choices as to how they feel or how they react. However, the number one secret to taking back your power is that you can change and asset your own.

2. Be a boundary setter: It can be very easy to forget or lose ourselves in both personal and professional relationships due to a playing out of our own fears and insecurities. Therefore, selfish as it might sound, it is necessary to both consider the

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Couple sat down looking angry.

(Getty)

other persons feelings but ultimately and more importantly it’s important to consider what is right or wrong for you.

If something doesn’t feel right ask yourself what do you need to do to change it? How can you both communicate your understanding of the other person’s needs, whilst also communicating and asserting your own feelings and values so that there is a mutual respect of contact and boundaries?

3. Don’t play the role game: In any relationship we will always be triggered into either playing Victim, Rescuer or Persecutor roles. Perhaps you’re already familiar as to which role you tend to lean towards when feeling triggered. In relationships we often move around the triangle of all three roles in many different and complex ways depending on the dynamics between each person and how we are triggered.

However, what’s important to remember is these are old roles and triggers which will ultimately have you moving round and round in circles. Step back, become aware of what’s happening and how you’re being triggered and responding and call it’s bluff by becoming mindful of the present rather

It can be very easy to forget or lose ourselves in both personal and professional relationships due to a playing out of our own fears and insecurities. than getting sucked into past triggers and experiences.

4. Listen but also be heard: it’s really important to listen to the other person, but equally important is to be heard. Ask yourself: how can you communicate that you understand what the other person is saying? Then ask yourself what do you need to communicate? How might you feel comfortable communicating what needs to be heard? How are you currently sacrificing your needs of you don’t often speak out and why?

5. Review how much emotional and physical luggage you’re carrying: if

you’re an empathic and caring person you will ultimately be concerned about pleasing others, supporting others and worrying about other people’s welfare.

This is an amazing quality and shouldn’t be hidden. However, what happens when this is happening more often than not? Ask yourself what is happening here and why? What are your fears? How are you expending your own energy and how it is making you feel?

Could your efforts and energy be used in a more effective way without giving your soul? Also ask if you’re not refueling yourself how can you give back to others?

6. The powerful glare of projection: How someone reacts or responds to you isn’t necessarily an accurate or even realistic representation of who you are and the situation. Yes of course, we will always need to take responsibility for how we react and respond and how this can influence and impact other people.

However, sometimes we, and other people, can project our insecurities, past experiences, past relationships and opinions onto the other person. Stand back and really evaluate are these your feelings or someone else’s or a mix. Take responsibility for your own feelings and responses but also question what your fears are when you feel as though you automatically take on other people’s emotions and experiences.

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Summer at Cambridge Be Transported to an Ancient City

By Ali El Shamy England isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t known for its good weather; however summers tend to offer a different flavor for the damp country. While rain and grey clouds are still prevalent throughout the summer, there is an abundance of sunny days that makes the English countryside a heavenly getaway for those looking to vacation in

a place other than a tropical beach. Cambridge is filled green pristine fields and has a homely small urban city which houses the myriad of colleges of its prestigious university. Furthermore, the great thing about Cambridge is that it is close to London, the capital city and most popular tourist site in the UK. As such, if youâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;re ever in London, you can easily plan a day trip to Cambridge as it is only a short train

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Some colleges are vast and breathtaking, such as King’s College, while others are more moderate such as St. Catherine’s. Regardless, each and every one of these colleges has a different personality to it and each one has a quirky story behind it. place of residence and study. Just outside the college a descendant of Newton’s famous apple tree is planted for all guests to see and photograph.

William Pitt the Younger, the youngest person to ever become Prime Minister of Britain, studied and lived in Pembroke College and a statue of the former leader can be found outside the Pembroke library.

Some colleges are vast and breathtaking, such as King’s College, while others are more moderate such as St. Catherine’s. Regardless, each and every one of these colleges has a different personality to it and each one has a quirky story behind it, one such amusing tale is the one of the fierce rivalry between St. John’s and Trinity which goes back to when King Henry VIII, Trinity’s founder, executed Saint John Fischer, the founder of St. John. Most of these colleges are open to guests and tourists; however they will close their gates by 4-3 PM and will only allow students and staff inside by that point. If you have the chance, go see the evening song at the King’s College Chapel as the King’s Choir is one of the most pleasing church choirs to listen to.

MUESEUMS View inside Trinity College, Cambridge.

ride away from the capital city.

CAMBRIDGE’S COLLEGES Walking through Cambridge is walking through scholarly history, as each one of its colleges has housed some of the most brilliant minds of mathematics, science and philosophy. For instance, Trinity College prides itself as being Isaac Newton’s

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It should come as no surprise that an ancient city like Cambridge would have many museums. The Fitzwilliam Museum near Pembroke College is home to many ancient antiquities from many ancient civilizations such as ancient Egypt and Rome. While the museum isn’t as vast as the British Museum, its small size makes it much easier to see all the artifacts in one setting. For science lovers, there is the University Museum of Zoology which has a lot

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of zoological material. Both those museums are free to enter, which would make them a perfect place to take your kids.

PUNTING Like Oxford, Cambridge is famous for its

Like Oxford, Cambridge is famous for its punting. This activity is especially perfect when its sunny outside, as it gives you the chance to see the city while traversing the River Cam.

punting. This activity is especially perfect when its sunny outside, as it gives you the chance to see the city while traversing the River Cam. There are punters who can do all the work for you, but adventurous groups that enjoy doing new things can rent a punt and take turns punting.

It should be noted, however, t h a t those with

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View of the Kingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s College Chapel.

Ancient Mesopotamia artefact at the Fitzwilliam Museum.

Ancient Egyptian artefact at the Fitzwilliam Museum.

bad balances and/or can’t swim probably shouldn’t try the activity themselves.

THE CITY CENTER: MODERNITY AMIDST ANTIQUITY Situated near King’s College is the city center where you’ll find most of the modern shops you’d find in London. While it might be tempting to go to these shops, I’d say save your shopping sprees for a more cosmopolitan city and enjoy the unique sites Cambridge has to offer instead. However, I do recommend the many ice cream shops in the city as the offer the perfect treat for those warm summer days.

All in all, summer in Cambridge presents new experiences that can be enjoyed during long vacations or a short day trip, just be sure that the weather is pleasant before going.

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“Newton’s apple tree” outside of Trinity College.