British Tribes

Iran’s Maximum Defiance Strategy

A Weekly Political News Magazine

Mem u Zin: A Cornerstone in Kurdish Identity

A Weekly Political News Magazine

Issue 1774- November- 15/11/2019

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Issue 1774- November- 15/11/2019

The Rise and Fall of Lebanon’s Beleaguered Saad Hariri www.majalla.com

British Tribes www.majalla.com

Editorial

A Weekly Political News Magazine

It has been said many times before; Brexit has been the most divisive event in modern political British history. While division in the British political sphere has existed for centuries, never before in the modern era has this division greatly reflected on the public sphere. Like politicians within and outside parliament, most members of the public have passionate views on Brexit, whether they oppose or support it. In many ways, Brexit has done something that no political event has done before; it has turned the diverse yet homogenous British society into a tribal one. As expected, both tribes are blaming each other for the mess the country finds itself in, and no one is willing to take some of the blame. This week’s cover story by Bryn Haworth reflects on this tribalism, and how it differs from previous political tribalism within the British Isles.

Recently Iran has taken a massive step towards its growing nuclear capacity, as it started injecting uranium into centrifuges in Ferdow. This effectively turned Ferdow into an active nuclear site, thus posing more danger for regional neighbors. Yasmine El-Geressi writes on this recent development as she reflects on how the US is running out of viable non-military nuclear measures to persuade the Islamic Republic into negotiating a new deal. In spite of this, the US is still adamant on not using military force; as such a measure can have disastrous consequences for both sides.

After 14 years since the last election in the Palestinian territories, the troubled country seems to be preparing for a new election set to take place as early as February 2020. The last parliamentary election in 2007 saw the beginning of the divide within Palestine as Fatah won the vote in the West Bank, while Hamas won in the Gaza Strip. While the prospect of new elections is good news, there are still several challenges such as the participation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, something both sides see as necessary. Yasmine El-Geressi writes on these new elections as well the challenges the Palestinian Authority will face in organizing them.

Every culture has a number of folktales and epics that they identify with.

The Kurdish nation is unique as many of its members cite Mem u Zin as the one epic that defines their cultural heritage and identity. Mem u Zin is a love epic written by Ehmede Xani almost 350 years ago, and it centers on two star crossed lovers who are kept away from each other due to external circumstances. Ali El Shamy reviews Feryad Fazil Omar’s English translation of the epic, as he reflects on how the characters of Mem and Zin symbolize the Kurdish nation and state and how external circumstances keep them apart.

We invite you to read these articles and more on our website eng.majalla.com.

As always, we welcome and value our reader’s feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments on our website.

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www.majalla.com/eng

Editor-in-Chief

Ghassan Charbel Editorial secretary Mostafa El-Dessouki HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Ltd 10th Floor Building 7 Chiswick Business Park 566 Chiswick High Road London W4 5YG Tel : +44 207 831 8181 Fax: +44 207 831 2310

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A Weekly Political News Magazine

08 UAE, Egypt Plan 20$ bil ion Spending on Social, Economic Projects

Issue 1774- November- 15/11/2019

20 Will there be Palestinian Elections after 14 Years?

24 Let Russia Be Russia

09 Donald Tusk Tells UK Voters: Don't Give Up on Stopping Brexit

32 Without Democracy, China Wil Rise No Farther

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38 Yes, Elsa and Anna Wear Pants in ‘Frozen 2’

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Anti-government protesters place candles by razor wire outside the government headquarters in Riadh Al Solh square, on November 2019 ,6 in Martyrs› Square, Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty)

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An amazing murmuration of starlings appears in the sky on November 2019 ,6 in Gretna Green, Scotland.

The spectacular displays take place during the winter months in the UK before the birds land to roost. (Getty)

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eekly news Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company and Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund will use the funds to establish joint strategic investment projects, specialized funds and investment tools, in a number of sectors, Egyptian presidential spokesman Bassam Rady said in a statement. He did not say how much of the 20$ billion would be contributed by each country. The projects would benefit both countries but there were no more details.

Tenuous Truce in Gaza as Islamic Jihad, Israel Differ on Terms

IAEA Confirms Iran Launched Nuclear Enrichment at Underground Fordow Plant

Iran has begun enriching uranium at its underground Fordow site in the latest breach of its deal with major powers, the UN nuclear watchdog confirmed on Monday, adding that Tehran’s enriched uranium stock has continued to grow. Iran is contravening the deal’s limits on its nuclear activities step by step in response to Washington’s withdrawal from the accord last year and its renewed sanctions on Tehran.

Tehran says it can quickly undo those breaches if Washington lifts its sanctions. n a quarterly report, the International Atomic Energy Agency policing the deal confirmed Iran’s announcement last week that it had begun

enriching uranium at its Fordow site buried inside a mountain, something prohibited by the deal. “Since 9 November...9, Iran has been conducting uranium enrichment at the plant,” said the confidential IAEA report, obtained by Reuters.

UAE, Egypt Plan 20$ billion Spending on Social, Economic Projects

The United Arab Emirates and Egypt plan to jointly invest 20$ billion (15.63£ billion) in economic and social projects, under a bilateral project announced by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan on Thursday. Sheikh Mohammed made the announcement on Twitter during a two-day visit to the UAE by Egypt’s President

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Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad and Israel declared a halt to hostilities across the Gaza Strip border on Thursday but a lasting ceasefire appeared tenuous as they differed on terms. Islamic Jihad said an Egyptianmediated truce went into effect at 0330 GMT, about 48 hours after Israel triggered the exchange of fire by killing the Iranianbacked faction’s top Gaza commander in an air strike, deeming him an imminent threat.

Occasional rocket fire from Gaza broke the calm that ensued, but the ceasefire largely held as night fell.Gaza medical officials have put the total death toll from the two days of fighting at 34 Palestinians, almost half of them civilians and including eight children and three women. Hundreds of rocket launches by militants had paralysed much of southern Israel and reached as far north as Tel Aviv, sending entire communities to shelters. Dozens of Israelis were hurt.

Russia Sets Up Helicopter Base in Northern Syria After U.S. Exit

Russia has set up a helicopter base at an airport in the north-eastern Syrian city of Qamishli, the Russian Defence Ministry’s Zvezda TV channel said on Thursday, a move designed to increase Moscow’s control over events on the ground there. Two Mi35- helicopter gunships were shown flying low over desert terrain before landing at the new base, which is protected by mobile Pantsir surface-toair missile systems.Only three helicopters, including an Mi8- military transport helicopter, have so far been deployed at the new facility, Zvezda said, but more will follow. Russia has two permanent military facilities in Syria, an air base in Latakia Province used for air strikes against forces opposing President Bashar alAssad, and a naval facility at Tartus on the Mediterranean

Trump Impeachment Inquiry Moves Ahead, with Pivotal Witness Looming

The Democratic-led impeachment inquiry against President Donald Trump moved forward on Thursday with preparations for the appearance of another central figure former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch - in the investigation’s second public hearing. Two career U.S. diplomats, William Taylor and George Kent, testified on

Wednesday in the first televised hearing of the House of Representatives inquiry that threatens Trump’s presidency even as he seeks reelection in November 2020. Taylor, the acting ambassador to Ukraine, offered an account

in the general election with a call for anti-Brexit campaigners to keep fighting in the month before Britain goes to the polls. In what he openly conceded was an unconventional move, the outgoing president of the European council made a pointed intervention in the UK’s general election debate with a thinly veiled message of solidarity for those seeking to unseat Johnson’s Conservatives. Reflecting on his five years in his role as a top EU official as it comes to an end this month, and following a speech on the life of the journalist and philosopher Hannah Arendt, Tusk said he felt empowered to be honest about his feelings.

Election Gift for PM Johnson: Brexit Party Stands Down in Conservative Seats

Prime Minister Boris Johnson won the most significant boost of the British election campaign to date when Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party pulled out of 317 Conservativethat linked the Republican president more directly to a pressure campaign on Ukraine to conduct investigations that would benefit him politically, including one into Democrat Joe Biden. The public hearings follow weeks of closed-door interviews with current and former U.S. officials about Trump’s dealings with Ukraine. U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Thursday that President Donald Trump already has admitted to actions that amount to bribery.

Donald Tusk Tells UK Voters: Don't Give Up on Stopping Brexit

Donald Tusk has given his implicit backing to Boris Johnson’s opponents

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held seats in a bid to prevent opponents of Brexit controlling the next parliament. The move dramatically increases the chances that Johnson will stay prime minister, and then finally deliver on the 2016 referendum result to take Britain out of the European Union. Farage said Brexit was in peril, so he would focus his party’s efforts at unseating opponents of leaving the EU - primarily in seats held by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. A week ago, Farage had promised to field 600 candidates unless Johnson went for a “no-deal” Brexit. But on Monday, he said his party will now “concentrate our total effort into all of the seats that are held by the Labour Party, who have completely broken their manifesto in 2017,” he said.

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British Tribes

Tribal is a Word One Hears all the Time these Days. To Understand Why, an African Tribeswoman Would Have to Visit Britain and Go Native

by Bryn Haworth Things here have become very tribal of late. The term has probably never been so fashionable. I just consulted the views of the Observer columnist, Andrew Rawnsley, and yet another example appeared in his very first paragraph: ‘Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn have at least one thing in common – a lot of people think each is unfit to be prime minister and many of those believing this belong to their own tribe’ (my italics, 10 November 2019) So it seems appropriate that the National Gallery is staging a Gauguin exhibition, and that Channel Four has been treating us to a simple tale of everyday British folk whose house is replicated in the middle of the Namibian desert and they are woken up (to the dismay of the male of the group) by a cock crowing and a view of mud huts as far as the eye can see. The controversy over Gauguin is so well-rehearsed that the National Gallery took it as read – just a routine case of the exploitative colonialist hiding in plain sight – but if you wanted real, live controversy, of a kind that doesn’t just set the social media abuzz with inanities, but which receives a full-throated chorus of harrumphing from every liberal-minded columnist who gets wind of it, you would undoubtedly choose The British Tribe Next Door. What were they thinking? Or smoking, as the Independent put it. The programme was so utterly, predictably bad, it caused outrage even before it came on. Sometimes, with a fast-moving media churn like we have today, the only guarantee of getting heard is to speak up before a thing’s actually happened. Ideally, opinion writers are already outraged by the next scandal; the present one’s old news. Thus, Afua Hirsch condemned the programme,

sight unseen, as a hopelessly misbegotten exercise in reverse anthropology, hence the use of the phrase ‘British tribe’. She felt compelled to pitch her own version instead: ‘I have an idea for a British TV series. It involves finding an African society with a history of regarding Europeans as a profoundly inferior race… Then find a small-town family, from County Durham, say, to perform stereotypically “English” culture to entertain them… but make sure the African characters are equipped with various gadgets and a familiar value system.

We’ll follow their love lives, clothing preferences and personality quirks in minute detail’ (Guardian, 28 August 2019).

The aim of all this would be the avoidance of what Hirsch calls the ‘tits and spears’ account of African life. You don’t visit a semi-nomadic tribe in Namibia if you have issues with bare breasts and spear carrying; you head for the chic boutiques of Senegal where the kids all have smart phones. The worry is that, just possibly, you’ll find an unhealthy vogue for skin bleaching.

At least the spear carriers have a proper disdain for modern life.

But, according to Gaby Hinsliff (also in the Guardian), that’s the nub of the problem. The programme – which she actually watched, through her fingers one imagines – peddles ‘the spectacularly dated myth that all Africans live in mud huts and wear tribal dress’. We see the tribe’s poverty and simplicity through a romantic lens. It’s all of a piece with idealising the poor, or the asceticism of monks (I’ll come to that in a second) or the old cliché of the noble savage, Henry Thoreau and (cue cringes) The Good Life.

Others were less forgiving. The Independent called it anachronistic and condemned its ‘implicit’ racism. There’s only one thing worse than the implicit kind. The New Statesman, meanwhile, railed against ‘possibly the most offensive reality

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Scarlett Moffatt flanked by two Himba women

TV programme to have been aired this side of the Millennium.’

Whoa, steady on. We are talking about a genre most liberals consider an abomination, and this is worse than any of that? I predict it will be very goggled at indeed, in that case – we could be looking at the idea that dragged the under-forties back to the boring old goggle box, heralding the end of smart phones as we know them.

It’s for words like ‘implicit’ that I read the opinion writers so avidly. That and the interior monologue of the liberal voice of the nation that starts by discussing a tribe in distant Namibia and ends by referring to an ancient sit-com that involved middle class people abandoning the rat race to rear goats in their back garden. There really are people who live in mud huts. There are plenty of others that don’t. Personally, having seen them for myself, I have never quite got over the desire to move to one of these huts at some point, when the life in England finally becomes unbearable. I could use a little of the Himba attitude to life as well. They seem humorous, in a candid sort of way and, as I always hoped, very vain about their lifestyle and appearance.

The women try unsuccessfully to induct La Moffatt into their aesthetic, which involves a lot of ochre, no bras, a leather skirt that wouldn’t be out of place on the Kings Road in the late Sixties, but she is too shy. Meanwhile, their menfolk are candidly alarmed when the male of the British family is given some cows to look after and promptly loses them. There are interesting revelations about polygamy, numerous lovers on the side, a conviction that England is a place of eternal winter. I don’t see what’s so racist, even implicitly, about a British family getting to know some people with a different skin colour who live entirely different lives. Everyone gets on famously once the cows are

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recovered and the Englishman successfully identifies the ones he mislaid. I mean, yeah, it was a damned silly idea to build a replica of a British house in the desert. But we can be a silly bunch in more harmful ways than that. We’re Love Island, after all. We’re the ones who, having become an entire continent’s favourite destination, suddenly preferred to be its pet hate. We’re punks. We’re drama queens. Like that curmudgeonly defector, John Cleese, we used to walk silly walks, now we talk silly talks.

And who could say we haven’t got a lot sillier lately? Any Himba woman would find the joke rapidly wearing thin if she had to spend a month in Durham, even if they gave her a replica mud hut made out of plywood for her stay. ‘There must be something in the water,’ she’d sigh. ‘God knows, I’ve seen plenty of that element in recent weeks. They say that, even by local standards, there’s been a very great deal of rain. Mind you, I reckon I could get used to it with time, but this slow drip, drip of liquid from the heavens is accompanied by the even slower, infinitely more annoying drip of their politics. They’re all so grumpy the whole time. They’re divided into more tribes than you can shake a spear at. I thought the British people were supposed to be tolerant and friendly, but they scarcely even emerge from their little hovels. They live like troglodytes in their caves where the only sound is of stalagmites growing, very slowly, in the dark. It really is the land of eternal winter. I can’t wait to get back to the desert and having to fetch filthy water from a hole in the ground, ready to jump out if a snake appears. I’ve had enough reverse anthropology to last me a lifetime.’

The Himba woman would be right, of course. The most commonly heard phrase these days is a month’s rainfall in one day, as if the climate itself wanted to get things over with and

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move on to the next scandal. The effect has been like Chinese water torture for an entire nation, estranging us from what few wits we ever had, and all compounded by a certain catastrophic meteorological event called Brexit. Sometimes it seems this was the real purpose of the referendum: to replace every other topic of conversation. People have even given up speaking about the weather. Speaking about the ‘climate’ doesn’t count, and besides, unless they are gluing themselves to some means of public transportation or other, they tend not to express an opinion on the climate, as it’s become hopelessly political.

In fact, they hardly dare speak of anything, for fear of getting someone’s back up.

I remember reading once that Trappist monks, the ones who observe a strict vow of silence, do say the words “Soon, brother, soon!” when they meet. This condensed utterance can be interpreted thus: “Soon, brother, this seemingly interminable labour of existence will be at an end and we can shuffle off into eternity, a blessed release that cannot come too soon, if you ask me, because in all honesty, I’ve had just about enough of… etc.”

This would then be followed by a long list of complaints – about the food, the company, the cold nights, the dog Latin, the lack of basic creature comforts, the thankless grind and the whole concept of serving as a lightning rod for the sins of the laity. It would be exactly like the first interview that Harpo Marx gave after long years of pretending to be a mute and communicating with toots on a horn. The hapless interviewer couldn’t shut him up. Equally, it really isn’t any surprise that the Trappists are so laconic (see my note on this word at the end of the article) – it’s a choice between that or a potentially endless stream of verbiage.

The motto over the doors of their monasteries should be ‘Don’t

We’re the ones who, having become an entire continent’s favourite destination, suddenly preferred to be its pet hate. We’re punks.

We’re drama queens. Like that curmudgeonly defector, John Cleese, we used to walk silly walks, now we talk silly talks.

get me started!’

This is the predicament we Britons are in: like Brexit monks, we are dying to blurt out our complaints, but we have divided into two tribes whose complaints are diametrically opposed.

The remain voters want to complain that the leave voters got us into this appalling mess, while the leave voters want to accuse the remain voters of being obstructive and lingering out the agony. Whatever way you look at this, it doesn’t offer promising material for the country’s customary pastime of cheerfully directionless conversation.

And yet, when people do actually speak, which is an increasingly rare occurrence, they cannot resist talking about Brexit. It’s the return of the repressed, an act of defiance against the Brexit superego. Like children in bunk beds with strict orders to stay quiet after the lights go out, they cannot resist chattering, only being adults, they do so in a circumspect way. To avoid raising any hackles, they grumble that Brexit hasn’t been settled yet, without revealing how they would like it to be settled.

British politeness. Permit me to digress briefly on that thorny topic. You see, the concept of two tribes in Britain is not as novel as it seems. The country regularly splits in two at the slightest provocation, bifurcating over almost every subject that comes up. Correction: every subject. There is a Tory position and a Labour position on everything, from the correct pronunciation of the word ‘scone’ to the hyperactive lifestyle of the royal family.

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Silly

The entire Oxford English Dictionary is split along party lines.

The single exception to this universal tribalism was always the weather, which is why the weather has traditionally been the safest topic of conversation. Safety is key here. When you live in a tribal context such as this one, you never know who you might be speaking to, friend or foe, so the British devised their own version of “Halt, who goes there?” which amounts to pretending you are not the least bit curious about whether a friend or foe is in the vicinity. That way, you can behave as if we’re all friends.

Other parts of the world are not so fortunate when it comes to this kind of hypocrisy. I was often accused of being a hypocrite on my travels, but I shrugged the criticism off, like all valid criticism. Hypocrisy is an underestimated vice. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, people are no more tribal than us, but you seldom hear pointless conversations about the weather. This is surprising, since the weather there is remarkably similar to ours: incessant rain. Surely, you would think, this could provide ample scope for inconsequential exchanges of the kind that grease the wheels of social intercourse and keep Brits from tearing each other’s throats out with their bare teeth. But no, tragically the weather is a neglected topic over there, and the tribal disputes are becoming more deadly for two reasons: the arrival of guns, and the availability of cheap bootleg versions of Rambo. The latter have circulated widely in that rain-soaked land, though it’s a mystery how, given the almost total absence of video players.

Without our addiction to banal conversation and hypocrisy, and with readier access to guns and poorly-scripted action movies, we Britons would probably have gone the same way by now. As it is, there’s been plenty of loose talk of civil war,

The founder of the Trappists with a favourite interlocutor

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but exclusively among opinion writers. It’s counter-intuitive, yet over the past few years Brexit has taken the place of the weather as the polite topic of choice for placating strangers and alleviating the pregnant pauses of daily life. It has become the ultimate meaningless noise, the human equivalent of a humming fridge, so vacuous it makes Rambo sound articulate, and no one is obliged (or even allowed) to say anything substantive on the subject unless they are in the presence of members of the same tribe, which is never easy to determine as there are no agreed vetting procedures. We could, of course, wear badges like politicians, but it’s when you start parading your loyalties that the real trouble starts. Rosettes are not merely fashion death, like pink suits; they’re the actual root of all evil.

The only people (apart from politicians) rash enough to address the Brexit topic seriously, head on and in public, are members of the ever-expanding pundit tribe. Brexit has spawned a multitude of these. There is a pundit epidemic. It has gone on so long, this state of affairs, I would not be surprised to learn that some of them are the progeny of pundits, and that the pundits are actually breeding at a faster rate than the rest of us. No doubt procreation comes easily to them. After all, pundits can dispense entirely with chat-up lines and go straight into disquisitions on the precedents for proroguing parliament that require both interlocutors to stay together and, eventually, occupy the same bed if they have any hope of reaching some kind of satisfactory conclusion. I imagine they talk into the small hours before collapsing in exhaustion, then make love wordlessly at break of day. This would explain the slightly slept-in look of your average pundit.

Recently, I heard one such political pundit from the New Statesman – like all of his tribe, obsessed with the convolutions of Brexit – deliver an explanation of the current situation in a panel discussion. Clearly, this particular commentator’s reputation proceeded him, exactly like that of a garrulous drunk in the local pub. As a consequence, his fellow pundits seemed to recoil as he began, aware of the verbal carnage about to be unleashed.

They were not mistaken. The explanation was so complex, and became such gibberish after the initial half minute, I would have begged him to stop had I been on the panel, for fear of imminent mental collapse. As it is, on one of the few occasions I’ve knowingly chosen to keep tabs on the political scene, I had my trusty remote control in hand, index finger hovering over the mute button. The moment I realised he was a danger to himself and to civilised society, I gagged the bastard.

There’s no mute button for the demented climate, of course.

Sadly, as soon as the pundit fell silent, I could hear again the dripping sound of the ongoing deluge. But I did at least derive some solace from being able, at will, simply by pointing a remote control with deadly accuracy, to render any pundit alive completely speechless. Better men than me have resorted to firearms for less.

Before I so rudely interrupted him, I managed to gather this much from the New Statesman’s man: that someone calling himself ‘prime minister’ had attempted to suspend parliament,

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then failed, then decided to secure a deal with the Irish (in a hotel on the Wirral favoured by newlyweds, though I may have made that bit up) and then, at the first hint of trouble from parliament, engineered a general election before the deal could be waved through by honourable members, and all because he had no election campaign if parliament obligingly waved it through, which it looked like doing. Now, I can’t swear, since I have developed a protective tendency for amnesia, but I think that’s the point where I pressed the mute button and the climate crisis, right on cue, resumed in all its fury.

If you will permit me to rewind to the proroguing of parliament that (according to the Supreme Court) never happened, it was around that time I really began to feel queasy about the man who we are laughably expected to call prime minister. The Boris dreams began, alternating with bouts of insomnia. I quickly acquired a slept-in look and my inner pundit began to gibber, inwardly. It was also around this time, I’m convinced, that I heard a previous employer of the man-now-calling-himself-primeminister, one Max Hastings, reflect that England was going through its ‘Weimar phase’. It even felt that way for a moment, with the prospect of food shortages, riots, the total breakdown of social norms, until parliament passed the Benn Act to prevent us from crashing out of the European Union. Hang on, though… was that before or after the attempted proroguing? Who knows anymore? But, at some point, we had the unalloyed pleasure of hearing John Bercow, the Speaker, declare the prorogation ‘irregular’ and an example of government by fiat, then tell a member of the government who dared disagree that he didn’t give a ‘flying flamingo’ for his opinion.

Anyway, if this is our very own repeat of the Weimar period, a certain amount of auto-satire by the elite is in evidence, notably in the form of Rees-Mogg, the Leader of the House, who showed his contempt for the debate on the Benn Act by laying at full stretch across the front bench.

Actual satirists are humbled by the talent of such self-satirists, and maybe that is the crucial way in which England differs from Weimar: in Berlin at that time, there were grimly serious

political monsters on the one hand, and then there were mocking cabaret artists. Here, in merry old England, it’s the parliament that provides the best jokes and no one would be seen dead watching cabaret. A television channel devoted to parliament, unimaginatively named the Parliament Channel, has drawn record audiences. Parliament is more popular than the average reality show. Along with his saucy line in flamingo euphemisms, the previous Speaker had a way of calling for order that made his face go red and his fans go weak at the knees. He was pantomime, cabaret, music hall and wordy Shakespeare rolled into one compact, overactive bundle. Little wonder, then, that honourable members, having been upstaged for the best part of a decade, made sure his replacement, Sir Lindsay Hoyle, had a voice more soporific than a cetacean’s. The Leader of the House need never be startled out of his beauty sleep again.

They once asked Peter Cook whether he thought satire had any political effect. “Absolutely,” he replied. “The greatest satire

The solution (to Brexit) could not be more obvious: the people’s will must be called upon to uphold what was the will of the people before the will of the people so rudely intervened.

Oh, really, Jacob, you’re such a slouch!

Sticking it to Mein Herr

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of the twentieth century was the Weimar cabaret, and they stopped Hitler in his tracks.” Now, with Cook long dead, one wonders if he grossly underestimated himself. Back then, you could puncture their pomposity, but our current lot aren’t nearly pompous enough.

They’re just preposterous. Contemporary satirists (such as John Crace) feel they’ve been reduced to mere ‘transcribers’ by the greater satirical talents of those in power. Like the rest of us, there’s a growing sense that they, the professional satirists, have become the butt of the joke. In the British re-run of Germany in the thirties, the cabaret artists really have come out on top, only it’s Boris Johnson cavorting like Liza Minnelli.

The forthcoming election may well confirm the prediction of another German satirist: just like Bertolt Brecht accused the communist regime in 1953, our jocular rulers have decided to dismiss the people and appoint a new one. We got it right in 2016, of course, and it was ‘the will of the people’ (well, just over half of those who bothered to vote) to leave the European Union, but since then we, the people, have elected a zombie parliament which has thwarted our previous will. The solution could not be more obvious: the people’s will must be called upon to uphold what was the will of the people before the will of the people so rudely intervened. With this in mind, the people are being dismissed in order that a new one, which is actually the old one, can be appointed, only this time we shall have a soft-spoken Speaker and a proper majority Conservative government, so there’s no danger that the will of the people might be wrongly interpreted by a biased red-faced imp or thwarted by duly elected zombies.

What lessons can we possibly take away from all this? Well, firstly, there will be doctorates in it for future constitutional historians.

Secondly, the will of the people is not always the people’s actual will. That’s why the European Union have a habit of asking the same question until they get the right answer. Oops, the less said about

that, the better.

Suffice to say that we cannot be trusted as far as our own politicians can throw us, but aided by targeted advertising and a few suppressed reports on Russian interference, and abetted by concealing the fact that Dominic Cummings learnt everything he knows, even the thing about returning to the scene of the crime, from a character called Raskolnikov, the Great British electorate will finally get the correct answer and vote the best satirists back in with a thumping majority.

Except, of course, that will also be the wrong answer, since as a tribe the Great British electorate can be relied upon to mistake their best interests for the interests of the other tribe who, let’s face it, know far more than they do about their best interests. This is what Friedrich Engels, another well-known German satirist, described as ‘false consciousness’ and it has prevailed throughout the country’s short history of universal suffrage. The joke is always on the people.

If you didn’t laugh, you’d cry.

But hey, let’s not get ahead of ourselves here. No spoilers. The election has only just been called, and it looks like being a real battle of wills… of the people. The big question is which of these two tribes will emerge the victor. My money is on the funniest tribe. Britons, like the readers of lonely-hearts ads, always reward a GSOH. Which brings me, with almost uncanny circularity, back to Gauguin, that well-known joker and implicit colonialist. Here he is, anticipating by eighty years or more the naked piano player in Monty Python: Gauguin displays a hitherto unsuspected talent for self-parody One thing I thought I knew for sure about Gauguin was that he lacked a sense of humour, but then I also thought, once upon a time, that politicians were serious people. What I do know is that Gauguin never visited these shores, so despite all his travels in the Caribbean and the Pacific in search of an escape from civilisation, he never encountered a tribe with two heads on their shoulders, or a land of two tribes with one will between them. He could have saved himself a lot of hassle. We were right here, a short ferry trip away.

GLOSSARY GSOH = a good sense of humour Laconic: the word derives from a region of ancient Greece known as Laconia, which contained the city of Sparta. Its inhabitants had a reputation for verbal austerity and pith. The story goes that after invading southern Greece and receiving the submission of other key city states, Philip II of Macedonia turned his attention to Sparta and asked, menacingly, whether he should come as friend or foe. They replied “Neither.”

Losing patience, presumably with the protracted means of communication of the day as much as with the Spartans’ brevity, Philip sent another message: “You are advised to submit without further delay, for if I bring my army into your land, I will destroy your farms, slay your people, and raze your city.”

This time, the Spartans sweetly replied: “If.” Philip II never invaded Laconia, and nor did his son, Alexander the Great.

Gauguin displays a hitherto unsuspected talent for self-parody

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Iran’s Maximum Defiance Strategy

Tehran is Taking Staggered Steps Away from its Own Compliance of the Nuclear Deal

by Yasmine El-Geressi In perhaps his most symbolic breach of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said last week that his country had begun injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at Fordow, making it an active nuclear site. On Monday, the international confirmed that Iran was once again enriching uranium at the underground facility —

a site ringed by anti-aircraft guns — despite the nuclear deal calling for it to be repurposed into a research center. This marks a significant, decisive escalation of the Islamic republic’s nuclear activity. Additionally, the IAEA found that Iran is enriching uranium above the prescribed cap and has also increased its stockpile of the material above the limits set by the deal. Many experts say that these new developments could put Iran within

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a year of break-out time to a nuclear weapon.

MAXIMUM DEFIANCE Last year, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, casting doubt over other signatories› ability to maintain the accord. The agreement established a framework under which Iran would curb its nuclear program in exchange for Western countries dropping paralysing sanctions. EU member states, including Germany and France, have called on Iran to stick to the deal despite the US withdrawal. The U.S. replaced that pact with a -12point program aimed at reining in Iran’s aggressive regional behaviour - including ending all work on its nuclear and missile programs and cutting off its support to its allies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon - dismantling its nuclear capacity and modifying the regime in Tehran. But Tehran has continued to steadily erode the deal by taking incremental steps towards violating its commitments.

• In May, Iran announced it would no longer be committed to a -300kilogram cap on its stockpile of uranium hexafluoride enriched to 3.67 percent in the crucial isotope U235-.

• In June, Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium exceeded the limit set under the agreement.

An Iranian flag flies in Iran›s Bushehr nuclear power plant, during an official ceremony to kickstart works on a second reactor at the facility on Nov 2019 ,10. (AFP)

• In July, Iran breached a cap on the purity of that uranium, enriching it to levels slightly closer to weapons-grade, increasing from 3.67 percent to 4.5 percent. (Enrichment to more than 90 percent is needed for a nuclear weapon.)

• In September, Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, announced that his country was cancelling its commitment to a timetable for resumption of unrestricted nuclear research and development.

Iran began using quicker-spinning, more advanced centrifuges than allowed under the JCPOA, potentially shortening the time to produce enough high-enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Rouhani also cancelled the accreditation of an inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal.

The idea is to put pressure on America to end its

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They believe that Iran lashing out proves that the strategy is working and that ultimately, Iran will have no option but to negotiate as it is left with very few good cards to play in response to Trump’s hard-line policy. campaign of “maximum pressure” under which Trump has imposed harsh economic sanctions on Iran, has spoken boldly of ending Iranian aggression and hostility and increased America’s military presence across the Middle East, including basing troops in Saudi Arabia for the first time since the aftermath of September 2001 ,11.

Washington says it’s strategy is designed to force Iran to return to the table to negotiate a new, more sweeping deal which covers Iran’s ballistic missile program and its role in Middle Eastern conflicts.

But while the sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy, they haven’t had their desired effect so far. The Iranians are emboldened. They downed an unmanned American aircraft and, according to U.S. intelligence, attacked Saudi Arabian oil installations with impunity.

Iran says it can quickly undo its controversial breaches if the remaining parties of the deal find a way to honour its terms, despite US sanctions. It has also said that it would be willing to negotiate if the sanctions are removed. Some Iranian commentators have even hinted that, without sanctions relief, Iran might leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in order to regain negotiating power vis-à-vis the U.S. Nevertheless, the US administration says that its strategy is working, and some analysts seem to agree. They say that sanctions Trump imposed on Iran and its oil have deprived the regime of a substantial amount of money that would have normally been used to fund the country›s influence

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in the region and attack US interests. They believe that Iran lashing out proves that the strategy is working and that ultimately, Iran will have no option but to negotiate as it is left with very few good cards to play in response to Trump’s hardline policy.

“Iran is playing a high risk game of brinkmanship because the more Iran increases nuclear enrichment, the more the Pompeo/Netanyahu camp and their supporters can claim that Iran must be stopped military,” Nader Hashemi, director of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver told The Independent.

“Iranian leaders have calculated that gradual withdrawal from the terms of the JCPOA will force Europe to come to Tehran’s rescue with sanctions relief,” he added.

MAXIMUM DIPLOMACY Iran’s maximum resistance strategy is also aimed at pressuring the remaining parties to the deal particularly France, Britain and Germany, which say they still hope to save the accord - to respond.

In a joint statement on Monday evening, those three countries’ foreign ministers said they were “extremely concerned” by Iran’s enrichment at Fordow. In their statement, the EU said their side has «fully upheld» their commitments under the agreement, including lifting the sanctions they had imposed over fears Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons. They warned Tehran

The Iranian public and political class has observed in dismay Europe’s inability to fully live up to the staunch words of support its leaders pronounced.

they might trigger a dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the deal. Under the terms agreed in 2015, the move would start a -30day deadline for the signatories to resolve the problem. If the issue remains unsolved, it could be directed to the UN Security Council and eventually trigger the «snapback» of sanctions lifted under the deal.

Europe’s position is vital as the other signatories, Russia and China, are allies of Iran and unlikely to start the process under which sanctions could be reimposed. A senior EU official has said the bloc was pursuing a strategy of “maximum diplomacy not maximum pressure”, in a swipe at the US policy. France, Germany and the UK have been working for months on measures to help counter the sanctions, but the scale of the punitive measures has meant the so-called E3 have struggled to keep

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U.S. President Donald Trump announces his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in the Diplomatic Room at the White House May ,8 2018 in Washington, DC. (Getty)

Experts suspect the Trump administration is hoping that Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the nuclear deal will set off alarms across the world, especially in Europe, and help bring more countries on to the American side of this conflict. live up to the staunch words of support its leaders pronounced. Iranian Ambassador to the UK, Hamid Baidinejad, has dismissed European arguments that it is difficult for them to circumvent the US sanctions. “They have taken commitments that are defined in very clear terms and they should be able to implement those commitments,” he said.

MAXIMUM RISK

finance and trade channels open.

Tehran is frustrated by the slow implementation of INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges), a barter mechanism created by European signatories earlier this year to enable European companies to do business with Iran without using the US dollar. The Trump administration has warned EU nations not to use INSTEX and European businesses have avoided participating in it, fearing US penalisation. A French proposed 15$ billion line of credit also hasn’t emerged, although European officials still believe there is a chance to save the deal and find a way to move President Macron’s proposal forward.

The Iranian public and political class has observed in dismay Europe’s inability to fully

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There is not much left to sanction in Iran, and short of military conflict, there is not a lot more pressure that can be applied. Experts suspect the Trump administration is hoping that Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the nuclear deal will set off alarms across the world, especially in Europe, and help bring more countries on to the American side of this conflict. Tehran’s strategy is likely to keep the pressure on the US and Europe until one of them budges.

But one slight misstep or misunderstanding on either end could jeopardize the fragile USIranian relationship and tilt the two countries to war — which neither side wants. A significant incident involving U.S. forces or U.S. allies could result in retaliation by Washington, which has twice already (after the drone downing and Abqaiq attack) come close to the brink of a military clash with Iran. Iran and Israel are also on a knife-edge, with Israel far less reluctant to take military action.

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Will there be Palestinian Elections after 14 Years?

There are Few Obstacles to Clear before Palestinians Head to the Polls 20

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by Yasmine El-Geressi While Israel has held two inconclusive elections this year, the Palestinian Authority could be heading toward its first parliamentary and presidential elections in 14 years, something that until recently was not seen even as a remote possibility. While Palestinian factions sound increasingly optimistic that the vote will take place and have been holding indirect negotiations in an attempt to reach an agreement, there are still quite a few obstacles to clear before Palestinians head to the polls.

PALESTINIANS DIVIDED

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas speaks during the 74th United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations on September 2019 ,26 in New York City. (Getty)

Palestinians last held a general election in January 2006 and the last presidential elections took place in January 2005. Since then, Palestinians have been divided between two governments; Fatah, which controls the occupied West Bank through the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Hamas, the Islamist movement threw out Abbas’s forces and seized control of Gaza in June 2007 in the clashes that followed the polls. Attempts at reconciliation have repeatedly failed over the last 14 years and the two rivals been entangled in a bitter power struggle ever since. They have faced long standing criticism for clinging onto power without holding elections.

This time, though, sources in the West Bank and Gaza say that all signs indicate that Palestinian elections — first for parliament and then for the presidency — may actually take place as early as February 2020, after the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, whose mandate expired in 2009 and is becoming increasingly unpopular, announced plans for a vote at the UN General Assembly in September.

Hamas shocked many when it accepted Abbas’s call and both sides have since reaffirmed their willingness to hold elections.

PA officials have expressed fear that Israel would not allow any presidential or parliamentary elections to take place in neighbourhoods located within the Jerusalem Municipality boundaries as it rejects any sovereign activity by the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem.

group called The Popular National Congress, which is dominated by Abbas loyalists, said that any elections that do not include Jerusalem are rejected and doomed to failure. The head of the group, Bilal Natsheh, said that Israel would be held fully responsible for the failure of the elections if it doesn’t allow east Jerusalem residents to participate in the vote. He pointed out that Israel had previously permitted the Palestinian elections to take place also in east Jerusalem.

PA officials have expressed fear that Israel would not allow any presidential or parliamentary elections to take place in neighbourhoods located within the Jerusalem Municipality boundaries as it rejects any sovereign activity by the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem. Israel annexed East Jerusalem following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, a move condemned by the UN and the international community. It considers that the “two parts of Jerusalem constitute the capital of Israel.”

PA officials appealed to the EU to intervene with Israel so it would allow the vote to take place in east Jerusalem. The officials also demanded that Israel allow east Jerusalem residents who hold Israeli-issued ID cards to present their candidacy and cast their BUMPS IN THE ROAD ballots in the PA elections, when and if they take place.

Lawmakers are looking at “creative solutions” for the The first major obstacle is East Jerusalem, home to question of how to conduct elections for Palestinians 360,000 Palestinians and considered the capital of in Jerusalem, according to Palestinian political a future Palestinian state by the PA. In a speech in analyst Zaha Hassan of the Carnegie Endowment for Ramallah this week, marking the 15th anniversary of International Peace. the death of his predecessor, Yasser Arafat, Abbas One way is to set up polling booths outside of Israel’s said that there would be no new Palestinian elections current boundaries, Palestinian Legislative Council unless they include east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. (PLC) representative for Jerusalem, Bernard Sabella, In a related development, an east Jerusalem-based told Al Arabiya English.

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The method was tried previously during the last Palestinian elections in 2006 where voting stations for Jerusalemites were erected in Al Ram, a Palestinian town northeast of Jerusalem. However, the location requires voters to travel a longer distance.

HAMAS Since the 2006 elections, several attempts to hold an election have failed to materialize after Fatah and Hamas were unable to reach agreement on the implementation of their reconciliation accords. This bitter divide has undermined any coherent and unified national Palestinian strategy. Multiple agreements have been signed between the two, but all collapsed with both trading blame for the faltering cooperation.

Analysts have long said that new elections are impossible without improved relations and national reconciliation, but according to senior adviser to the president, Nabil Shaath, the Palestinian proposal will help resolve the current Palestinian division and stalemate and help usher in reconciliation by means of creating an elected national unity government.

“The offer for elections is to produce a representative unity government regardless of who win,” he told Arab News. “The idea combines democratic and pluralistic principles. It will not be winner takes all but a representative government based on election results.

Once a unity government is established with all parties

While there are some signs of reconciliation, hurdles remain, and if the current election negotiations mimic that of previous years, Palestinian factions will agree on an election taking place, but then disagree on details.

in it, we can move to the next step of presidential elections,” he said.

While there are some signs of reconciliation, hurdles remain, and if the current election negotiations mimic that of previous years, Palestinian factions will agree on an election taking place, but then disagree on details.

Upon returning from New York where Abbas called for elections, he formed a committee whose mission, according to official Palestinian media, is to consult with various Palestinian factions to reach an agreement on his initiative. He asked head of the Central Elections Commission, Hana Naser, to go to Gaza on October 7 to assess the reactions of Hamas and other factions. While some criticized Abbas for seeking the help of a technocrat like Nasser, the reactions of Hamas and others were positive. But despite the indirect negotiations, the PA, and the Palestinian factions, particularly those in the Gaza strip, have

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A Palestinian protester carries a national flag during a demonstration near the border between Israel and Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on December 2018 ,21.

(Getty)

failed to reach an agreement. No agreement means that elections will not take place in the Hamas-ruled Gaza strip.

Although Hamas immediately accepted Abbas’s call, it did ask or further clarifications. The core demand of the Islamist group, is an election that includes the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and the PA presidency and, most importantly, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) – the legislative component of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO.) “Hamas is likely to reject the inclusion of Gaza if the elections are limited to the PLC and exclude Abbas’ own position and the PNC. Without a PNC vote, the reordering and resurrection of the PLO would remain elusive — a belief that is shared by other Palestinian factions, ” Palestinian Journalist Ramzy Baroud wrote in Arab News.

But even if all the obstacles are overcome, some experts still doubt that either Fatah or Hamas would

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The core demand of the Islamist group, is an election that includes the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and the PA presidency and, most importantly, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) be willing to give up their power if they lose in the elections “For the plan to work, it requires a high level of political will from the top,” writes Hani al-Masri, director of the Masarat think tank in Ramallah, who is largely pessimistic about the chances of elections taking place.

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Let Russia Be Russia The Case for a More Pragmatic Approach to Moscow

By Thomas Graham Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has come into office promising to build better relations with Russia—and each one has watched that vision evaporate.

The first three—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack

Obama—set out to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and make it a partner in building a global liberal order. Each left office with relations in worse shape than he found them, and with Russia growing ever more distant.

President Donald Trump pledged to establish a close

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In the U.S. view, the Cold War had ended with the triumph of Western democracy over Soviet totalitarianism

partnership with Vladimir Putin. Yet his administration has only toughened the more confrontational approach that the Obama administration adopted after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Russia remains entrenched in Ukraine, is opposing the United States in Europe and the Middle East with increasing brazenness, and continues to interfere in U.S. elections. As relations have soured, the risk of a military conflict has grown.

U.S. policy across four administrations has failed because, whether conciliatory or confrontational, it has rested on a persistent illusion: that the right U.S. strategy could fundamentally change Russia’s sense of its own interests and basic worldview. It was misguided to ground U.S. policy in the assumption that Russia would join the community of liberal democratic nations, but it was also misguided to imagine that a more aggressive approach

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could compel Russia to abandon its vital interests.

A better approach must start from the recognition that relations between Washington and Moscow have been fundamentally competitive from the moment the United States emerged as a global power at the end of the nineteenth century, and they remain so today. The two countries espouse profoundly different concepts of world order. They pursue opposing goals in regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Ukraine. The republican, democratic tradition of the United States stands in stark contrast to Russia’s long history of autocratic rule. In both practical and ideological terms, a close partnership between the two states is unsustainable.

In the current climate, that understanding should come naturally to most U.S. policymakers. Much harder will be to recognize that ostracizing Russia will achieve little and likely prove to be counterproductive. Even if its relative power declines, Russia will remain a key player in the global arena thanks to its large nuclear arsenal, natural resources, geographic centrality in Eurasia, UN Security Council veto, and highly skilled population. Cooperating with Russia is essential to grappling with critical global challenges such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. With the exception of China, no country affects more issues of strategic and economic importance to the United States than Russia. And no other country, it must be said, is capable of destroying the United States in 30 minutes.

A more balanced strategy of restrained competition would not only reduce the risk of nuclear war but also provide the framework for the cooperation needed to tackle global challenges. Smarter relations with Russia can help guarantee European security and strategic stability, bring a modicum of order to the Middle East, and manage the rise of China. As U.S. policymakers demand that Russia moderate its behavior, they must be prepared to scale back their near-term goals, especially in settling the crisis in Ukraine, to forge a more productive relationship with Moscow.

Above all, U.S. policymakers will need to see Russia plainly, without sentiment or ideology. A new Russia strategy must dispense with the magical thinking of previous administrations and instead seek incremental gains that advance long-term U.S. interests. Rather

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than trying to persuade Moscow to understand its own interests differently, Washington must demonstrate that those interests can be more safely pursued through both considered competition and cooperation with the United States.

END OF THE ILLUSION Washington’s initial post–Cold War emphasis on partnership and integration fundamentally misread the reality in Russia, positing that the country was in the midst of a genuine democratic transition and that it was too weak to resist U.S. policies. To be sure, the premise that Russia was shedding its authoritarian past did not appear unreasonable in the early 1990s. In the U.S. view, the Cold War had ended with the triumph of Western democracy over Soviet totalitarianism. The former Soviet bloc countries began to democratize after the revolutions of 1989. The rising forces of globalization fed the belief that free-market democracy was the pathway to prosperity and stability in the decades ahead. The leaders of the new Russia—President Boris Yeltsin and the dynamic young reformers around him—declared their commitment to sweeping political and economic reforms.

Yet even in the 1990s, there were signs that these assumptions were wrong. Contrary to the dominant Western narrative, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked not a democratic breakthrough but the victory of Yeltsin, a populist, over Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who ironically was a more committed democrat, having overseen what remain the freest and fairest elections in Russian history. Russia had few enduring native democratic traditions to draw from and only a shaky sense of political community on which to base a wellfunctioning democracy. To make matters worse, the state institutions fell prey to rapacious oligarchs and regional barons. Ruthless cliques competed, often violently, to carve up the assets of a once totally nationalized economy.

Political chaos spread as old-time Communists and Soviet patriots battled more progressive forces.

The disorder intensified throughout the 1990s to the point that many observers feared Russia would crumble, just as the Soviet Union had earlier in the decade. The task of restoring order fell to Yeltsin’s successor, Putin. Even as he packaged his plans in democratic rhetoric, Putin made clear in a document called “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” (released on December 1999 ,30) that he intended to return to the traditional Russian model of a strong, highly centralized authoritarian state. “Russia,” he wrote, “will not soon, if ever, become a version of the United States or England, where liberal values have deep

historical roots. . . . For Russians, a strong and sturdy state is not an anomaly to be resisted. To the contrary, it is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and driver of any change.”

U.S. officials were not blind to the obstacles to democratic reform or to Putin’s intentions, but in the afterglow of the Cold War victory, they insisted that partnership with Russia had to be grounded in shared democratic values; mere common interests would not suffice. To build public support for its policies, each administration assured Americans that Russia’s leaders were committed to democratic reforms and processes. From the 1990s on, the White House measured the success of its approach in large part in terms of Russia’s progress toward becoming a stronger and more functional democracy, an uncertain enterprise over which the United States had little influence.

Not surprisingly, the strategy collapsed when it proved impossible to bridge the gap between that illusion and Russia’s increasingly authoritarian reality. For Clinton, the moment of truth came when Yeltsin installed a new government of conservatives and Communists after the 1998 financial collapse in Russia; for Bush, it came when Putin cracked down on civil society in reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004; and for Obama, it came when Putin announced in 2011 that, after having

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Arab Spring unfolded in 2011, Obama declared that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian client, had to go. Washington also paid little heed to Russia’s objections when the United States and its allies exceeded the terms of the UN Security Council–backed intervention in Libya, turning a mandate to protect an endangered population into an operation to overthrow the country’s strongman, Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Both the Bush and the Obama administrations were brought crashing down to earth. The Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008 demonstrated to the Bush administration that Russia had a veto over NATO expansion in the guise of the use of force. Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014 shocked the Obama administration, which had earlier welcomed the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian Ukrainian president. A year later, Russia’s military intervention in Syria saved Assad from imminent defeat at the hands of U.S.-backed rebels.

WILL TO POWER

served as prime minister, he would reclaim the presidency.

The second flawed premise—that Russia lacked the strength to challenge the United States—also appeared sensible in the early post-Soviet years. Russia’s economy contracted by nearly 40 percent between 1991 and 1998.

The once feared Red Army, starved of investment, became a shadow of its former self. Russia was dependent on Western financial support to keep both its economy and its government afloat. In these circumstances, the Clinton administration for the most part got its way, intervening in the Balkans and expanding NATO without serious pushback from Russia.

This premise, however, became less plausible as Russia’s economy rapidly recovered after Putin took office and restored order by clamping down on the oligarchs and regional barons. He subsequently launched a concerted effort to modernize the military. Yet the Bush administration, convinced of Washington’s unparalleled might in the “unipolar moment,” showed little respect for renewed Russian power. Bush withdrew from the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, expanded NATO further, and welcomed the so-called color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, with their anti-Russian overtones. Similarly, the Obama administration, although less certain of American power, still dismissed Russia. As the upheavals of the

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Today, nearly everyone in Washington has dropped the pretense that Russia is on the path to democracy, and the Trump administration considers Russia to be a strategic competitor. These are overdue course corrections. Yet the current strategy of punishing and ostracizing Russia is also flawed. Beyond the obvious point that the United States cannot isolate Russia against the wishes of such major powers as China and India, this strategy makes some grave mistakes.

For one thing, it exaggerates Russian power and demonizes Putin, turning relations into a zero-sum struggle in which the only acceptable outcome of any dispute is Russia’s capitulation. But Putin’s foreign policy has been less successful than advertised. His actions in Ukraine, aimed at preventing that country’s westward drift, have only tied Ukraine more closely to the West while refocusing NATO on its original mission of containing Russia. Putin’s meddling in U.S. elections has complicated relations with the United States, which Russia needs to normalize to win greater foreign investment and to create a long-term alternative to its excessive strategic dependence on China.

In the absence of concerted Western action, Putin has inserted Russia as a major player in many geopolitical conflicts, most notably in Syria. Nevertheless, Putin has yet to demonstrate that he can bring any conflict to an end that consolidates Russia’s gains. At a time of economic stagnation and spreading socioeconomic discontent, his activist foreign policy now risks overstretch. In these circumstances, Putin needs to retrench. And that imperative should open up possibilities for the United States to turn to diplomacy and reduce the burden of competition with Russia while protecting U.S. interests.

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Another flaw in the current strategy is that it imagines Russia as a pure kleptocracy, whose leaders are motivated principally by a desire to preserve their wealth and ensure their survival. To work, this policy assumes that sanctioned officials and oligarchs will pressure Putin to change his policy in Ukraine, for example, or unwind Russia’s interference in American domestic politics. Nothing of the sort has happened because Russia is more like a patrimonial state, in which personal wealth and social position are ultimately dependent on the good graces of those in power.

U.S. policymakers are also guilty of not reckoning seriously with Russia’s desire to be perceived as a great power.

Russia is indeed weak by many measures: its economy is a fraction of the size of the U.S. economy, its population is unhealthy by U.S. standards, and its investment in the hightech sector is far below U.S. levels. But Russian leaders cling to the conviction that to survive, their country must be a great power—one of the few countries that determine the structure, substance, and direction of world affairs— and they are prepared to endure great ordeals in pursuit of that status. That mindset has driven Russia’s global conduct since Peter the Great brought his realm into Europe more than 300 years ago. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders have focused on restoring Russia’s great-power status, just as their predecessors did after the national humiliation of the Crimean War in the 1850s and then again after the demise of the Russian empire in 1917.

As Putin wrote two decades ago, “For the first time in the past two to three centuries, [Russia] risks sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states.

To prevent this, we must exert all our intellectual, physical, and moral forces. . . . Everything depends on our ability to grasp the dimensions of the threat, to rally together, and to commit to this long and difficult task.”

Part of that task is countering the United States, which Putin sees as the primary obstacle to Russia’s greatpower aspirations. In contrast to what it imagines as Washington’s unipolar ambitions, the Kremlin insists on the existence of a multipolar world. More concretely, Russia has sought to undermine Washington’s standing by checking U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East and has tried to tarnish the United States’ image as a paragon

There should be some redlines regarding Russian behavior; for instance, U.S

of democratic virtue by interfering in its elections and exacerbating domestic discord.

RUSSIA’S WORLD In its quest for great-power status, Russia poses specific geopolitical challenges to the United States. These challenges stem from Russia’s age-old predicament of having to defend a vast, sparsely settled, multiethnic country located on a landmass that lacks formidable physical barriers and that abuts either powerful states or unstable territories. Historically, Russia has dealt with this challenge by maintaining tight control domestically, creating buffer zones on its borders, and preventing the emergence of a strong coalition of rival powers. Today, this approach invariably runs against U.S. interests in China, Ukraine, Europe, and the Middle East.

No part of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has loomed larger in the Russian imagination than Ukraine, which is strategically positioned as a pathway into the Balkans and central Europe, blessed with tremendous economic potential, and hailed by Russians as the cradle of their own civilization. When a U.S.-supported popular movement in 2014 threatened to rip Ukraine out of Russia’s

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orbit, the Kremlin seized Crimea and instigated a rebellion in the eastern region of the Donbas. What the West considered a flagrant violation of international law, the Kremlin saw as self-defense.

When they look at Europe in its entirety, Russian leaders see at once a concrete threat and a stage for Russian greatness.

In practical terms, the steps Europe took toward political and economic consolidation raised the prospect of an enormous entity on Russia’s borders that, like the United States, would dwarf Russia in population, wealth, and power.

Psychologically, Europe remains central to Russia’s greatpower sensibilities. For the past three centuries, Russia has demonstrated its prowess on Europe’s great battlefields and through its grand diplomatic conferences. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, for example, it was the Russian emperor Alexander I who received the key to the city of Paris. Europe’s consolidation and the continued expansion of NATO have had the effect of pushing Russia out of Europe and diminishing its voice in continental affairs. And so the Kremlin has accelerated efforts to exploit the fault lines within and between European states and to stoke doubts in vulnerable NATO members about their allies’ commitment to collective defense.

In the Middle East, Russia has returned after an absence of some 30 years. At first, Putin intervened in Syria both to

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protect a long-standing client and to prevent the victory of radical Islamist forces with ties to extremists inside Russia.

But after saving Assad and seeing the absence of a strong U.S. role, his ambitions grew. Russia decided to use the Middle East as an arena to showcase its great-power credentials. Largely bypassing the un-sponsored peacemaking process, in which the United States is a central player, Russia has teamed up with Iran and Turkey to seek a final political resolution of the crisis in Syria. To reduce the risk of a direct conflict between Iran and Israel, Russia has strengthened its diplomatic ties to Israel. It has rebuilt relations with Egypt and worked with Saudi Arabia to manage oil prices.

It has also grown closer to China in developing a strategic counterbalance to the United States. This relationship has helped Russia resist the United States in Europe and the Middle East, but the greater concern for Washington should be how it enhances Beijing’s capabilities. Russia has aided China’s commercial penetration of Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Middle East. It has given China access to natural resources at favorable prices and has sold the country sophisticated military technology. In short, Russia is abetting China’s rise as a formidable competitor to the United States.

Moscow’s more assertive foreign policy today is a reflection not of the country’s growing strength—in absolute terms, its power hasn’t increased much—but of the perception that U.S. disarray has magnified Russia’s relative power. The country’s behavior is also driven by a persistent fear that guides Russian foreign policy: the sense that in the long run, Russia will fall dangerously behind both the United States and China. The Russian economy is stagnating, and even official projections see little hope for improvement in the next ten years. Russia cannot invest as much as its two competitors in the critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence, bioengineering, and robotics, that will shape the character of power in the future. Putin may be pressing hard now, at the time of Russia’s heightened relative power, to better position the country in the new multipolar world order he sees emerging.

BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE The challenge Russia now poses to the United States does not echo the existential struggle of the Cold War. Rather, the contest is a more limited competition between great powers with rival strategic imperatives and interests. If the United States was able to reach accommodations with the Soviet Union to strengthen global peace and security while advancing American interests and values, surely it can do the same with Russia today.

Beginning in Europe, U.S. policymakers should give up any ambitions of expanding NATO farther into formerly Soviet spaces. Rather than courting countries that NATO is unwilling to defend militarily—note the limp responses to Russian attacks on Georgia and Ukraine—the alliance should strengthen its own internal cohesion and reassure vulnerable members of its commitment to collective defense. Halting NATO expansion

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eastward would remove a central reason for Russia’s encroachments on former Soviet states. But the United States should still cooperate on security matters with those states, a kind of relationship that Russia tolerates.

So far, the United States has insisted that the possibility of NATO membership remains open to Ukraine. Washington has categorically rejected Russia’s incorporation of Crimea and insisted that the conflict in the Donbas be brought to an end on the basis of the agreement signed in Minsk in 2015, which stipulates a special autonomous status for separatist regions inside a reunited Ukraine. This approach has made little headway. The Donbas conflict continues, and Russia is putting down deeper roots in Crimea. Distracted from reform by the struggle with Russia, Ukraine is beset by corruption, political volatility, and economic underperformance. The recent election in Ukraine of a new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, whose supporters now dominate the parliament, has created an opening for a comprehensive resolution of the crisis. Two tradeoffs are essential. First, to allay Russian concerns, the United States should tell Ukraine that NATO membership is off the table, while deepening bilateral security cooperation with Kiev.

Second, Kiev should recognize Russia’s incorporation of Crimea in exchange for Moscow’s acceptance of the full reintegration of the Donbas into Ukraine without any special status. In a comprehensive agreement, Ukrainians would also receive compensation for lost property in Crimea and Ukraine would be afforded access to offshore resources and guaranteed passage through the Kerch Strait to ports on the Sea of Azov. The United States and the EU would incrementally ease their sanctions on Russia as these arrangements took effect. At the same time, they would offer Ukraine a substantial assistance package aimed at facilitating reform in the belief that a strong, prosperous Ukraine is both the best deterrent against future Russian aggression and a necessary foundation for more constructive Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Such an approach would be met initially with great skepticism in Kiev, Moscow, and elsewhere in Europe.

But Zelensky has staked his presidency on resolving the Donbas conflict, and Putin would welcome the chance to

Russia has aided China’s commercial penetration of Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Middle East

redirect resources and attention to countering spreading socioeconomic unrest in Russia. Meanwhile, European leaders are suffering from Ukraine fatigue and want to normalize relations with Russia while still upholding the principles of European security. The time is ripe for bold diplomacy that would allow all sides to claim a partial victory and accommodate the hard realities on the ground: NATO is not prepared to accept Ukraine as a member, Crimea is not going back to Ukraine, and a separatist movement in the Donbas is nonviable without Moscow’s active involvement.

A smarter Russia strategy would also better reckon with the implications of the Kremlin’s military intervention in the Middle East. It is Iran—not Russia—that poses the main challenge there. When it comes to Iran, Russia has diverging, but not necessarily opposing, interests from those of the United States. Like the United States, Russia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons—that was why it supported the nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2018. Like the United States, Russia does not want Iran to dominate the Middle East; Moscow seeks to forge a new equilibrium in the region, albeit with a different configuration than the one sought by Washington. The Kremlin has worked to improve relations with other regional powers, such as Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, none of which is especially friendly with Iran. Russia has paid particular attention to Israel, allowing it to strike Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. If the United States deferred to Russia’s limited security interests in Syria and accepted Russia as a regional player, it could likely persuade the Kremlin to do more to check aggressive Iranian behavior. The Trump administration is already moving in this direction, but a more vigorous effort is warranted.

Washington must also update its approach to arms control.

What worked for the last 50 years no longer will. The world is shifting toward a multipolar order, and China in particular is modernizing its forces. Countries are developing advanced conventional weapons capable of destroying hardened targets once vulnerable only to nuclear weapons and cyberweapons that could put at risk nuclear commandand-control systems. As a result, the arms control regime is breaking down. The Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, which the president described as an obsolete relic of the Cold War, and in 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which it had derided as ineffective and out of date.

Nevertheless, the United States should prolong New start—the strategic arms reduction treaty signed in 2010 that is set to expire in 2021—a move that Russia supports despite the Trump administration’s hesitation. The treaty

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fosters transparency and trust between the two countries— essential qualities in a time of strained relations—but it does not restrain the accelerating arms race in increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons. The most promising systems—hypersonic weapons and cyberweapons, for example—fall outside the New start treaty’s purview.

Policymakers need to develop a new arms control regime that encompasses novel, rapidly developing technologies and includes other major powers. Although it is necessary to bring China into the process at some point, the United States and Russia should take the lead, as they have before—they possess unique experience in considering the theoretical and practical requirements of strategic stability and corresponding arms control measures. Together, Washington and Moscow should develop a new arms control regime and then bolster it with multilateral support.

On strategic nuclear issues and other matters, the United States cannot prevent the rise of China, but it can channel growing Chinese power in ways that are consistent with U.S. interests. It should make Russia part of this effort rather than drive Russia into China’s embrace, as the United States is now doing. It is impossible, of course, to turn Russia against China; Russia has every reason to pursue good relations with a neighbor that has already surpassed it as a major power. But the United States could deftly encourage a different balance of power in Northeast Asia that would serve U.S. purposes.

To do so, U.S. policymakers should help multiply Russia’s alternatives to China, thereby improving the Kremlin’s bargaining position and reducing the risk that its trade and security agreements with Beijing will be tilted heavily in China’s favor, as they are now. As U.S.-Russian relations improve in other areas, the United States should focus on removing those sanctions that prevent Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. investment in Russia’s Far East and that block joint ventures with Russian firms in Central Asia. Increasing Russia’s options would give the Kremlin greater leverage in dealing with China, to the United States’ advantage.

U.S. efforts to moderate competition on regional issues could incline Russia to curb its electoral meddling, but the problem won’t go away easily. Some level of interference, from Russia and from other states, is unavoidable in today’s interconnected world. Because European democracies face similar challenges, the United States should work with its allies to develop joint and reinforcing responses to these cyberthreats. There should be some redlines regarding Russian behavior; for instance, U.S. officials should take a strong stance against hacking that aims to weaponize stolen information or corrupt data, including voter rolls and vote counts. With better-coordinated exchanges of intelligence, the sharing of best practices, and occasional joint action, the United States and its allies must harden critical electoral infrastructure, push back against Russia with criminal prosecutions and targeted sanctions, and,

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when appropriate, launch cyber-counterstrikes.

Russian propaganda outlets, such as the television channel RT, Sputnik radio, and social media accounts, pose a trickier problem. A confident, mature, and sophisticated democratic society should be capable of containing this threat with ease without frantically trying to shut down offending websites and Twitter accounts. Amid hyperpartisan rancor in the United States, however, the media and the political class have exaggerated the threat, blaming Russia for domestic discord and dangerously narrowing the room for critical debate by insinuating that opinions that might align with official Russian preferences are part of a Kremlin-inspired influence campaign. A more constructive approach would be for the United States and other democracies to foster greater awareness of the arts of media manipulation and help raise the critical reading skills of their publics, without dampening the vigorous debate that is the lifeblood of democratic societies. Some Scandinavian countries and Baltic states have devoted considerable effort to these tasks, but the United States has lagged behind.

As the United States hardens its systems and educates its citizens, it should also involve Russia in establishing rules of the road in cyberspace. Even if such rules are not fully observed in practice, they could act as a restraint on the most troubling behavior, much in the way the Geneva Conventions have constrained armed conflict.

On all these issues, the proposed mix of accommodation and resistance takes into account the hard realities of Russian interests and American power. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the ones U.S. administrations have pursued since the end of the Cold War, which misread Russia and refused to recognize U.S. limitations. In many ways, this strategy would represent a return to the tradition of U.S. foreign policy before the end of the Cold War. That grand tradition was forward-looking, pursuing foreign policy with patience over time and satisfied in the short term with incremental gains. The United States did not fear making accommodations with Moscow because it was confident in its values and its future, aware of its great power but mindful of its limitations and respectful of its rival’s power. This subtle understanding marked the strategies that all U.S. Cold War–era presidents pursued to master the challenge from Moscow. By recapturing the virtues of its past, the United States can master that challenge again today.

THOMAS GRAHAM is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and served as Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

This article was originally published in the November/ December 2019 issue of Foreign Affairs Magazine and on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Without Democracy, China Will Rise No Farther Beijing Can’t Compete With Washington Until It Reckons With Its People

by Jiwei Ci

to U.S.-Chinese relations both depend more on the country’s democratization than on just about anything else.

China has been busy rising, and an alarmed United States has been busy repositioning itself. Neither shows much interest in what is arguably the most important test now confronting China’s leadership, which is whether and how it will respond to internal pressures to democratize. Perhaps that is because neither realizes that how far China rises and what happens

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is apparently so confident in its ability to deliver economic growth and the nation’s “great rejuvenation” that it has dispensed with the search for democratic legitimacy. The United States, having observed recent political developments in China, seems happy enough

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to follow the CCP in writing off the country’s democratic prospects. On this shared understanding, the supposed rivalry between China and the United States has taken on the dimensions of a contemporary Cold War. The calculation seems to stand to reason. No one can plausibly argue that China is making democratic progress under Xi Jinping, whose administration has rolled back almost all of the proto-democratic steps of its predecessors, such as term limits on the office of the president and the division of functions between party and government. Observers of Chinese affairs have generally concluded that democratization has lost the momentum it once had, and that the wait for its resurgence— along with the policy of engagement that the United States once based on it—can be declared over.

But take a closer look. Focus not on China’s recent political trajectory but on the dynamic of its society. There one clearly discerns the shape of what Alexis de Tocqueville called a democratic social state—an entity distinct from a democratic political regime, but arguably as important.

Protesters walk on an image of Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Causeway Bay area in Hong Kong on October 2019 ,1, as the city observes the National Day holiday to mark the 70th anniversary of communist China›s founding. (Getty)

A democratic social state is one in which a historically fixed hierarchy has given way to formal equality of status and opportunity. Four decades of reform since the late 1970s have achieved something close to this in China. No longer is class a basis for the exclusion of masses of people (“class enemies”) from rights and benefits. Relations are growing ever more equal between men and women, parents and children, city and countryside—even, to a lesser degree, between rulers and ruled, although this last relation lies outside the strictest scope of “society.” None of these relations has yet become even nearly fully equal, but a passionate push to make them so is clearly driving social change.

Such change has brought de facto freedoms in the private sphere—one of the most powerful engines of China’s rise— and a formal equality of opportunity that are characteristically modern and bourgeois. Today’s virtually unlimited freedom of private enterprise, for example, would have been unimaginable in the 1970s, as would have been the exercise of consumer agency for which today’s middle-class Chinese are famous.

At the same time, gender discrimination in education and employment is increasingly hard to practice openly and even harder to justify in terms admissible in public discourse.

The importance of the profound democratization of Chinese society cannot be overstated. “One has to understand,” Tocqueville famously writes in Democracy in America, “that equality [first developed in society] ends up by infiltrating the world of politics as it does everywhere else. It would be impossible to imagine men forever unequal in one respect, yet equal in others; they must, in the end, come to be equal in all.”

Tocqueville is careful to say “in the end,” likely meaning, “not necessarily immediately, but without indefinite delay.” For the

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Xi Jinping’s administration has rolled back almost all of the proto-democratic steps of its predecessors, such as term limits on the office of the president and the division of functions between party and government. mismatch between a democratic society and an undemocratic polity will give a divided character not only to a country’s normative order but also to the personality structure of its citizens. The longer this mismatch lasts, the more difficult it will be to maintain social stability and political legitimacy.

Chinese authorities are already paying a gargantuan material and psychological price just to keep the country stable and governable. That the present leadership encounters little resistance to its increased repression and blunt propaganda may indicate that it occupies a position of strength. But, equally, its willingness to use repression, even at the risk of encountering resistance, is a clear sign of its heightened anxiety. For an undemocratic political regime to manage a democratic society without compromise is an unnervingly tall order.

THE LAST GENERATION Some scholars argue that there is little reason to fear for the legitimacy of a ruling regime under such circumstances. They claim that with economic prowess and national rejuvenation, an atrophying communist system can sustain its legitimacy even when it governs an ever more bourgeois, democratic society.

They are mistaken. Performance by itself does not confer legitimacy on a regime, so much as it helps to make its relative absence matter less. Such is increasingly the case in China today.

How much longer can the CCP hold on without democratizing?

The short answer is: only as long as the current leadership is in charge, at best. Xi Jinping is an extraordinary leader in that he effectively keeps in check contradictions that would otherwise produce irresistible momentum toward fundamental change or collapse. Xi is able to do this not merely because he possesses special personal attributes but because he belongs to the last generation of leaders who can draw legitimacy from the communist revolutionary legacy. That legacy is one both of doctrine and of exceptional determination to keep the CCP in power at all costs, including the kind of cost incurred in June 1989.

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When Xi’s generation departs the political scene, the CCP will mark a watershed in its political evolution. Those who come after will be a different breed of leaders. They will not be able to maintain Xi’s level of control of the party, the military, the media, and the private sector. And what they will lack is exactly what will be necessary—what is now necessary—to keep the party united, the country stable, and democratizing forces at bay.

There is no reason to believe that political affairs will not resume their ordinary course in a post-Xi China. And an ordinary course entails, above all, that democracy reappear on the list of things that ordinary citizens can openly care about and peacefully strive for. The idea that the democracy project is dead and buried in China is as far-fetched as earlier expectations of a smooth-sailing democratic evolution. Indeed, the present leadership may be the last one capable of governing China with a reasonable degree of authority and stability in the absence of democratization.

PREPARING FOR CHANGE China is far from ready for a democratic political system, even after four decades of profound democratic change within its society. The country does not have a democratic tradition that it can organically draw on as its own. Moreover, even in the reform era, Chinese citizens have never had the chance to develop the kinds of habits and civic skills that give a newly created democracy a reasonable chance of success: among these are respect for the rule of law, the willingness to compromise, and the capacity for self-restraint. China will need a substantial period of preparation for democracy—and it will need this well before dire necessity precipitates a democratic transition.

Preparation of this sort requires strong leadership, for, as is well known, an autocratic system is liable to make itself dangerously vulnerable precisely when it undertakes reform.

For the current CCP leadership to assume such a responsibility would require both that it be aware that such preparation is

How much longer can the CCP hold on without democratizing? The short answer is: only as long as the current leadership is in charge, at best.

necessary, and that it be willing to act. Even then, the process of democratic preparation and transition will not be easy. The party will therefore deserve encouragement and support, just as it will need persuasion and pressure if the requisite awareness and willingness are not forthcoming. Moreover, the CCP must somehow be persuaded and pressured to leave enough space for reasoned persuasion and peaceful pressure in the first place.

For all of these reasons, those who advocate democracy must not pit their political cause against the CCP. If democracy alone can save the Chinese government, providing it with a new legitimacy to replace the no longer plausible communist one, then only the CCP is capable of steering China toward democracy. That the CCP is indispensable because it has not allowed any other group to acquire the political capacity and experience necessary for governing a country as large and complex as China is not to its credit. All the same, this indispensability is now an objective constraint that cannot be circumvented.

Nor do foreign actors have any good reason to undercut the CCP, as they stand to benefit from a stable and prosperous China. Attempts to weaken or embarrass the party in the name of supporting democratic causes, whether in Hong

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Flags with images of the 70th anniversary of the People›s Republic of China, seen in the center of Qinzhou. On Friday, October 2019 ,18, in Qinzhou, Guangxi Region, China. (Getty)

Kong or mainland China, are less likely to help than to hinder democratization. Such attempts may signal moral support, say, to segments of the democracy movement in Hong Kong, but in so doing they risk putting off many more Chinese who are otherwise America-friendly and pro-democracy, and without whose support democratic reform in Hong Kong is unlikely to get very far. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, if passed and signed into law, is almost certain to have this effect.

Among the legions of ordinary Chinese who both cherish their country and support democracy, high-handed pressure from foreign powers will almost certainly produce a defensive impulse to put nation before democracy. Similarly, the escalation of hostility between China and the United States is sure to stir up nationalism. There is nothing like nationalism pitted against a democratic hegemon to dampen democratic sentiments. Whose purposes, exactly, does this dynamic serve?

A MIXED BLESSING FOR THE UNITED STATES China’s need for democratization is fundamentally endogenous: China’s own reform has created a largely democratic society without a complementary democratic polity, and the mismatch will eventually require that the state democratize in order to preserve its legitimacy.

The most effective argument for democracy must be one that is prudential, making clear to China’s rulers and citizens that, and how, democracy is a necessary and beneficial means to their own ends. Such an argument is more effective than one that attempts to show what is morally desirable about democracy in itself. In the real world, democracy makes better sense, to invoke Immanuel Kant’s well-known distinction, as a hypothetical imperative than a categorical one.

China could falter badly in the foreseeable future if it does not democratize, and it may be unable to democratize successfully if it does not start democratic preparation well within the current administration. There is no surer recipe for a major legitimation crisis than to prolong by repression a mismatch between a democratic society and an undemocratic political regime.

The repressive measures require an exceptionally determined leadership, but the conditions for reproducing such leadership will disappear before very long.

Democratization alone is capable of making the political system accord with the new balance of power between rulers and ruled that will prevail by the time of the next leadership succession.

If China fails to answer the call of democracy between now and then, it may well fail as a state—even if, one hopes, the failure will not amount to collapse. China will not rise much longer or much further without significantly democratizing in the process.

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Recent events in Hong Kong fit well into such a projection. A nondemocratic China has great difficulty in matching its rising power with moral and political appeal. For this reason, foreign powers believe they can legitimately lend moral support to Hong Kong’s anti-government protests, and the protesters—not least the violent ones—are emboldened to fight on. The domestic balance of power is thus decisively altered. Moreover, because of Hong Kong’s special status vis-à-vis the United States, China has to be cautious about applying repressive measures, with the result that even maintaining social stability and normal administration in the city is proving an intractable challenge.

The near impotence of the Chinese state in the current crisis shows in no uncertain fashion that a nondemocratic political identity is the Achilles heel of an otherwise strong and rising China.

Under the circumstances, the apparent rivalry between China and the United States is misconceived. The United States need not fear China’s further rise as a so-called authoritarian capitalist state. Such progress is unlikely, and China is likelier to rival the United States for global leadership if it resolves its internal contradictions by democratizing.

China, for its part, should not take America’s strategically motivated support for democratic causes as a reason to balk at democratization. Continued repression will only erode the freedoms that have helped make all the advances of the reform era possible.

A Chinese failure to democratize will hurt the interests of foreign capital, not least American capital. But ultimately that failure would be a gift to the United States, in that it would take China out as a potential long-term peer competitor. The interests and motives on both sides are far from transparent—even to the actors themselves unless they are prepared to think straight.

The recrudesce of the Cold War between the two countries has no rational basis in the reality of those interests and motives properly understood. To form a view of China, and of U.S.Chinese relations, on the basis of China’s recent, superficial political behavior is shortsighted. To have such a view inform policy can be dangerous.

Let China democratize for its own reasons and at its own chosen pace, if it has the vision and prudence to do so. Let the United States strike, in its disposition toward China’s democratization or absence thereof, what balance it will between the interests of American capital and the objectives of the American state. But let neither labor under—still less act prematurely and precipitously on—the illusion that what is taking place between the two nations is already a bona fide rivalry whose outcome will shape the twenty-first century. For this to happen, China must first show itself capable of rising to its domestic democratic challenge.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

A Weekly Political News Magazine

Issue 1774- November- 15/11/2019

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The Rise and Fall of Lebanon’s Beleaguered Saad Hariri www.majalla.com

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Yes, Elsa and Anna Wear Pants in ‘Frozen 2’ And Yes, It’s a Big Deal

by Christi Carras Queen Elsa and Princess Anna accomplish several impressive feats in “Frozen 2” — outrunning giant rock monsters, freezing the sea, uncovering mysterious family history. But, perhaps most impressive of all, they do it while wearing pants.

What might seem like an insignificant quick change actually marks a major shift in the Disney princess canon, which almost never lets its heroines swap skirts for pants — with the exceptions of Jasmine’s billowy turquoise bottoms and Mulan’s army uniform (though she isn’t technically royalty).

At the November 7 premiere of the highly anticipated sequel, the film’s cast and creative team discussed the cultural impact of the sister duo’s new looks and how they transform the traditional Disney princess image.

“The princesses are all things; they’re all times; they’re all outfits,” said co-director Jennifer Lee

on the red carpet at Hollywood’s Dolby Theatre.

“Everyone sort of represents when the film was made and what the film’s trying to show. These two women I’m proud of, they are carrying the weight of the kingdom on their shoulders … so they’re going to wear what’s right for that, and I love that you can wear anything.”

“Frozen 2” follows Elsa (voiced by Idina Menzel) as she sets off on a journey to discover how she came to possess her icy powers, accompanied by her fearless sister Anna (Kristen Bell), ice vendor Kristoff (Jonathan Groff) and their trusty sidekicks Olaf the snowman (Josh Gad) and Sven the reindeer. Along the way, the gang must depend on one another as they encounter dark forces at play in the enchanted forests and seas beyond Arendelle.

“This time, they didn’t have to flee their kingdom in the wrong dress very fast,” said Lee, who’s also chief creative officer of Walt Disney Animation Studios. “They had a chance to choose, and, of course, you’re going to wear pants when you hear

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Princess Anna (Kristen Bell) and Queen Elsa (Idina Menzel) prepare to enter an enchanted forest in «Frozen 2.»

(Disney/IMDb/TNS)

the words ‘enchanted forest.’”

“They’re going on a big adventure,” added producer Peter Del Vecho. “It’s going to be very physical, so it makes sense.”

Evan Rachel Wood, who voices the sisters’ mother, Queen Iduna, in flashbacks and has been known to defy red carpet expectations with pant ensembles of her own, sees the updated costumes as a natural evolution informed by changing societal norms.

“They’ve done a really amazing job of still keeping the Disney feeling that we love, but just with a more modern feel,” Wood said. “The girls are still beautiful and still women, but they’re just able to do a lot more now that they’re in pants.”

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What might seem like an insignificant quick change actually marks a major shift in the Disney princess canon, which almost never lets its heroines swap skirts for pants.

Their modernized outfits are part of a growing trend for Disney, which has also dressed Elsa in pants on Broadway and recently debuted a new and improved Bo Peep, no longer encumbered by

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a stiff crinoline skirt, in “Toy Story 4.”

According to Clark Spencer, president of Walt Disney Animation Studios, keeping up with the times continues to be a key goal for the company, whether that means turning a kids movie about talking animals into a commentary on race relations (“Zootopia”) or putting its heroines in pants.

“We always have to think to ourselves, whatever we’re putting into our films is representing the world today, as much as it may be set in different times,” Spencer said on the red carpet. “So I think for (co-directors Lee and Chris Buck), it was the exciting thing of saying there is more than one way to be a princess.”

Another timely topic featured in the fairy tale is the role of the environment, which practically plays its own character by helping the friends on their adventure when it feels respected — and hurting them when threatened or trespassed.

The ecosystem and its crucial purpose was a theme that came up often when plotting the narrative beats of the film, according to songwriter Kristen Anderson-Lopez. The “Let It Go” hitmaker returned to write the sequel’s tunes — including Elsa’s new power ballad, “Into the Unknown” — along with her husband, Robert Lopez.

“It’s something that the filmmakers and the

Another timely topic featured in the fairy tale is the role of the environment, which practically plays its own character by helping the friends on their adventure when it feels respected - and hurting them when threatened or trespassed.

storytellers all really talked about, that climate change in particular is a big serious issue,” Anderson-Lopez said. “Climate change and nature out of balance is something that might give Elsa real purpose. Could that be why she has this power? That was something that we talk about, and it could be maybe something else we talk about in the future, I hope.”

Nature has always been vital to Groff’s Kristoff, who works in the ice business and depends on seasonal changes to make a living. But this time around, the Broadway and “Mindhunter” star said the earth and its precious resources impact everyone.

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Actresses Evan Rachel Wood, Kristen Bell, and Idina Menzel attend the world premiere of Disney›s «Frozen 2» at Hollywood›s Dolby Theatre on Thursday, November 2019 ,7 in Hollywood, California. (Getty)

“A huge theme of the movie is that water has memory, and the idea of not trying to force the environment into your world, but try to respect the environment around you, which we have the ability to do every day,” he said. “Every sort of character … is connected to this idea of taking care of the world around you and not taking things for granted, and also respecting the power of the environment.”

Also among the premiere’s attendees were “Lose You to Love Me” singer Selena Gomez and additional cast members Sterling K. Brown, Martha Plimpton, Jason Ritter, Rachel Matthews, Jeremy Sisto, Hadley Gannawa and Mattea

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Conforti. Plus, appearances from Panic! At the Disco’s Brendon Urie and Weezer’s Brian Bell and Rivers Cuomo, who all contributed to the sequel’s soundtrack.

The night was a festive affair, complete with lots of autumn leaves, snowman cupcakes, snowflake chandeliers and photo ops with Anna, Elsa and Olaf — which Urie and his wife took advantage of at the after party, as did many little Elsas and Annas who got the chance to meet their heroes in pants.

“Frozen 2” skates into theaters Nov. 22.

Originally published in the LA Times

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The Rise and Fall of Lebanon’s Beleaguered Saad Hariri Majalla - London Saad Hariri was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 18 April 1970, and is the son of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his first wife Nida Bustani, an Iraqi. He is multilingual and holds dual Lebanese-Saudi citizenship, and his wife, Lara, the mother of their three children, is from a prominent Syrian family. He graduated in 1992 from the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University with a major in Business Administration.

Hariri returned to Saudi Arabia where he managed part of his father›s business in Riyadh until his assassination in 2005 when a parked van packed with about 1,800kg of explosives was blown up as his motorcade passed close to the Parisian-designed St Georges hotel in central Beirut. Twenty-two other people were also killed.

Rafic’s death thrust Hariri onto the political stage. Critics at the time chided him for his lack of political experience, but he became one of the most important figures in Lebanese politics.

Hariri took over as the leader of his father’s political party, the mainly Sunni Future Movement, in 2005. He is seen as «the strongest figurehead» of the March 14 movement, named to commemorate the day in 2005 when massive anti-Syrian protests and Western support which opposed Syrian influence in Lebanon’s affairs and led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 after a -29year presence.

In 2009, he led the March 14 coalition to victory and was named prime minister. Shortly after, he made a bridge-building visit to Syria, evidently intended as an act of statesmanship placing

national interest above personal considerations.

However, any notion of conciliation soon evaporated. Eighteen months after leaving office in 2011 after ministers aligned with Hezbollah resigned due to political tensions arising from investigations into the assassination of his father for which Hezbollah operatives had been accused of orchestrating, he was named in an arrest warrant issued by Bashar Al Assad’s authorities accusing him and others of arming and financing opposition groups. This move that prompted Hariri to describe Assad as a «monster». He had already moved to Paris citing safety concerns.

After three years living overseas, he returned to Lebanon unannounced on 8 August 2014 and he was designated Prime Minister on 3 November 2016 as part of a deal that ended 29 months of political stalemate. The deal included Hariri’s support for the election of Michel Aoun as president; Aoun was a member of the March 8 bloc, which consisted of Hezbollah and its allies.

The deal and the political stability of Lebanon were threatened in November 2017 when Hariri unexpectedly resigned as prime minister while on a visit to Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah, which he called “Iran’s arm” was the focus of his resignation speech. Lebanese officials found the circumstances behind the resignation to be suspicious and President Aoun refused to accept his resignation and demanded that Hariri return to Lebanon to discuss the matter. Hariri was allowed to return to Lebanon several weeks later, where he immediately suspended his resignation.

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In May 2018 Lebanon held its first legislative election since 2009. Hariri’s party lost 12 seats, partly due to supporters’ disappointment in the concessions he had made in order to break the political stalemate of 16–2014, and his March 14 bloc lost its majority in parliament.

The March 8 bloc received a majority of seats, and Hezbollah was in a position to shape the government and its affairs in unprecedented ways.

The new cabinet struggled to juggle national unity and stability with the severe financial crisis and national security. With the country burdened by one of the worst debt balances in the world, confidence in the economy had disappeared, investors faced a poor outlook, and consumers were forced to tighten their belts as the government undertook austerity measures.

Lebanon is heavily dependant on foreign aid and money sent home by expatriates.

In October, after the government announced a new tax on Whatsapp as its latest austerity measure, Lebanese across the country took to the streets in the country’s largest protests since March 2005, demanding an overhaul of the ruling class and an end to rampant corruption.

The tax was quickly withdrawn, and Hariri’s cabinet rushed through an emergency package meant to quell the protesters’ frustrations, but the demonstrations continued, and the protests called broadly on the country’s top officials to resign. On October 2019 ,29, amid the ongoing protests, Hariri and his government resigned in a move that sparked further uncertainty in a country paralysed by political dysfunction and nationwide protests.

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H

ealth

A Check on Blood Pressure Your Blood Pressure is one of the Best Ways to Measure Overall Health and Possible Risk Factors

by Harvard Men›s Health Watch There are many important health markers: cholesterol levels, blood sugar levels, weight -- to name but a few. But men often fail to use one of the most important: blood pressure.

«Your blood pressure is one of the easiest and

simplest measurements and can tell you so much about your current and possible future health,» says Dr. Randall Zusman, director of the division of hypertension for Harvard-affiliated Massachusetts General Hospital›s Corrigan Minehan Heart Center. «Yet most people don›t know their number or check it on a regular basis,

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Numerous studies have found that adopting either the Mediterranean or DASH (Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension) diet can help reduce your risk of heart disease, stroke, and other cardiovascular diseases. numbers: systolic pressure (when blood pumps out of the heart) and diastolic pressure (when the heart rests between heartbeats).

Blood pressure is measured in millimeters of mercury (mm Hg). The top number is the systolic pressure and the bottom number is the diastolic pressure. In older adults, systolic pressure typically gets the most attention, but controlling both values is important for preventing stroke and heart attacks, says Dr. Zusman.

High blood pressure causes the heart and arteries to work under greater stress. Over time, this strain can damage artery walls and promote the formation of plaque, which can make blood pressure rise even higher and potentially limit blood flow to critical organs, such as the heart, brain, and kidneys. Ultimately, this can trigger a heart attack or stroke. High blood pressure is often called «the silent killer» because you often don›t feel like anything is wrong.

But the big question remains: What level of high blood pressure needs treatment? The answer has changed over the years. so they may not be doing everything they need to lower their risk of a heart attack or stroke.»

FEELING THE PRESSURE Blood pressure helps to diagnose hypertension, or high blood pressure. Readings are recorded as two

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In 2017, new guidelines from the American Heart Association, the American College of Cardiology, and nine other health organizations lowered the diagnosis of high blood pressure to 80/130 mm Hg or higher for all adults. The guidelines also redefined the various blood pressure categories to now include normal, elevated, Stage 1 hypertension, Stage 2 hypertension,

H

ealth

and hypertensive crisis (see «Blood pressure categories»).

BLOOD PRESSURE CATEGORIES Blood pressure category SYSTOLIC (upper number) DIASTOLIC (lower number) Normal Less than 120 mm Hg and Less than 80 mm Hg Elevated 129-120 mm Hg and Less than 80 mm Hg High blood pressure: Stage 1 hypertension -130 139 mm Hg or 89-80 mm Hg High blood pressure: Stage 2 hypertension 140 mm Hg or higher or 90 mm Hg or higher Hypertensive crisis (consult your doctor immediately) Higher than 180 mm Hg and/or Higher than 120 mm Hg Source: American Heart Association and American Stroke Association.

MAKING CHANGES This more aggressive approach to blood pressure control can have multiple benefits, according to Dr. Zusman. «Besides the obvious one of further lowering your risk for heart attack and stroke, it can help men be more mindful about their blood pressure and more proactive about improving their

There are many important health markers: cholesterol levels, blood sugar levels, weight -- to name but a few. But men often fail to use one of the most important: blood pressure.

overall health,» he says. «High blood pressure is something that almost everyone can do something about.»

The new guidelines emphasized lifestyle changes as first-line treatment for lowering and managing blood pressure. For instance, numerous studies have found that adopting either the Mediterranean or DASH (Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension) diet can help reduce your risk of heart disease, stroke, and other cardiovascular diseases.

You also can further lower your blood pressure and other cardiovascular risk factors by limiting salt intake, adopting stress management techniques, getting serious about exercise, and managing your weight.

KNOW YOUR NUMBER Your first step is to get an accurate blood pressure reading from your doctor. «Most people don›t know their number, or can›t remember the last time they had it checked,» says Dr. Zusman.

If your number is high, discuss with your doctor how to adopt certain lifestyle changes and whether you need medication.

Medications are recommended for most people with Stage 1 hypertension, especially if they have other health issues, such as diabetes, high cholesterol, or obesity, says Dr. Zusman.

If have high blood pressure, check your numbers a few times a week, and consult your doctor if you notice any significant changes -- either high or low, suggests Dr. Zusman.

Home blood pressure monitors are the best way to do this. (Drugstore monitors are not guaranteed to be accurate.) «Using a monitor is an easy way to gauge your progress and also can offer motivation and encouragement to keep up heart-healthy habits,» says Dr. Zusman.

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The cost of a home monitor can vary from about not, repeat again and average the three readings.

40$ to 100$, but your health insurance may cover Keep a record of your blood pressure readings, some or all of this. Buy a machine with an arm including the time of day. cuff, which is more accurate than a wrist cuff.

Also, bring your machine to your doctor›s office to compare its reading to your doctor›s. Here are some tips on how to use a monitor and ensure a more accurate reading: • Avoid caffeinated or alcoholic beverages 30 minutes beforehand.

• Sit quietly for five minutes with your back supported and your legs uncrossed before taking a reading.

• Wrap the cuff over bare skin.

• Support your arm so your elbow is at heart level.

• Don›t talk during the measurement.

• Leave the deflated cuff in place, wait a minute, then take a second reading. If the readings are close, average them.

If

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B

ook Reviews

Mem u Zin: A Cornerstone in Kurdish Identity How Fictional Star-Crossed Lovers Represent Nation and State 48

15/11/19

The reason why many Kurds feel a deep connection to the epic is twofold, first it was one of the first significant pieces of literature to be written almost entirely in Kurdish

Writer and Head of Institute of Kurdish Studies Berlin, Feryad Fazil Omar. (Majalla)

star-crossed lovers Mem and Zin, who are prevented from embracing each other due to external factors coming in their way. What is significant about Mem u Zin is the fact that Xani chose to write the epic in his mother tongue Kurdish, rather than the other three widely used languages namely Arabic, Anatolian and Persian. Xani’s passion for the Kurdish language is also evident in his work on Nûbihara Biçûkan (The Spring of Children), a children’s Arabic to Kurdish dictionary. His decision to write in Kurdish was a risky one, due to the Ottoman Empire’s systemic efforts to oppress religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities.

In spite of the epic’s significance, the work has seldom been published up until the modern era, as no Middle Eastern government wanted the story to be published. For instance, one of the first modern publications came in 1898 in the Cairo based Kurdish magazine called “Kurdistan”, a publication that was subsequently shut down by Ottoman authorities.

The reason why many Kurds feel a deep connection to the epic is twofold, first it was one of the first significant pieces of literature to be written almost entirely in Kurdish (a few of the sentences are in Arabic and Persian) and secondly the subject matter is seen as an allegory for the Kurdish nation’s continuing quest for statehood. While several versions and translations of the tale have been published since the 1920s, for the purposes of this book review I will use the English translated version of Feryad Fazil Omar, the founder of the Institute of Kurdish Studies Berlin. In addition to his writing and work in the Institute, Omar also teaches at the Free University of Berlin.

by Ali El Shamy

Every culture has a myriad of folktales that have been passed down from one generation to the next, mostly through oration. Nevertheless, as writing became a more widely used tool a number of said tales have been written down and collected in book form. In 19th century Germany, the Grimm Brothers compilated a number of European fairy tales such as Cinderella and Red Riding Hood into a single book which became a great hit. Meanwhile, the Arabs and Persians have the 1001 Nights tales, which are made up of stories like Aladdin and Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves. While these cultures identify with these numerous folktales, MEM AND ZIN AS SYMBOLS OF the Kurdish nation seems to identify with is Mem u STATE AND NATION Zin, which was written by Kurdish poet Ehmede Xani in the 17th century. The epic revolves around two On the surface, it seems like the story of Mem and

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Zin speaking to the candle. (Mem u Zin, Feryad Fazil Omar, 2018)

Mem contemplating at the river. (Mem u Zin, Feryad Fazil Omar, 2018)

Zin is similar to that of Romeo and Juliet; two young lovers who cannot fulfill their wish of marriage due to circumstances beyond their control coming in their way. In the story, Mem is shown to be quite handsome and a talented poet and above all he is an honest man.

Meanwhile, Zin, the Prince of Botan’s sister, is shown to have an impeccable, pure and angelic beauty.

However, the fact that Mem was a clerk’s son meant that he wasn’t of noble or aristocratic birth; ergo the prince would probably not grant him his sister’s hand

In this allegory, Zin can symbolize the Kurdish nation which is kept away from statehood, i.e. Mem. What completes this allegory further is the fact that a government authority figure, the Prince, is the one that is keeping them separate

in marriage.

In spite of his lowly status, Mem was a trusted confidant of Prince Mir, but this trust was soon broken thanks to Bekir Margewar the prince’s deceitful advisor.

In the story, Bekir is conniving, cunning and often devises schemes aiming to make people fall out with the Prince and is even compared to Satan throughout the book. Funnily enough, the Prince Mir is aware of Bekir’s trickery but he still keeps him by his side. The reason for this is because the Prince views Bekir’s Machiavellian planning, which he severely lacks, as a necessary evil to keep his principality in check. As soon as Bekir finds out about Mem and Zin’s love he devises a plan in which Mem is tricked into revealing the affair to the Prince. Bekir’s plan worked and as soon as Mem tells the prince, he is imprisoned. As such, the separation of Mem and Zin can be seen as the separation of the Kurdish nation from the desired Kurdish state. In this allegory, Zin can symbolize the Kurdish nation which is kept away from statehood, i.e.

Mem. What completes this allegory further is the fact that a government authority figure, the Prince, is the one that is keeping them separate, just as state actors such as the Turkish, Iranian and Syrian governments have oppressively subjected the Kurds and kept them from getting a state of their own. Later in the epic, the

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Tacedin and his men riding to the Prince. (Mem u Zin, Feryad Fazil Omar, 2018)

Zin at Mem’s grave. (Mem u Zin, Feryad Fazil Omar, 2018)

imprisoned Mem seems to convey his own rejection of authority figures in general: “The rule of ministers and princes is a sham. For me, all they embody is a hoax, illusion” (pp. 263).

Mem’s friends also represent the Kurdish nation and its struggle. After he is imprisoned, Tacedin, Mem’s closest friend, gathers his compatriots to free Mem. Tacedin and his friends (the nation) value Mem and his freedom (the state), and they seem willing to fight a brutal battle to attain his freedom. As they rid their horses to the Prince, a passage reads: “The horses’ hooves were pounding loud upon the ground, as if to dig fresh graves for foes who’d soon be dying. On the next page, Tacedin is asking the Prince to free Mem, during which he says something notable to the sovereign: “Unless you change your mind (on Mem’s imprisonment), we’ve lost our public face. We’ll have to flee and emigrate to far Damascus. This alludes to the Kurdish diaspora’s migration patterns, as many of them flee to escape the wrath of oppressive state actors.

This tale is also one of hope, despite its tragic ending.

If you haven’t read the epic yet, you might want to turn away now because of spoilers. Mem ends up dying in prison, something that brings great sadness to Zin as well as the people of Botan. Because of

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Just as Mem died due to being separated from his beloved, Zin was destined for the same fate. Nevertheless, the two do reunite in the physical world, as they share the same grave and the spiritual world as Zin’s soon meets with that of Mem’s. this, Zin loses her beauty, essence and will to live.

It is noted that during funeral processions, Zin appeared to be extremely slender and seemed to have aged years. Just as Mem died due to being separated from his beloved, Zin was destined for the same fate. Nevertheless, the two do reunite in the physical world, as they share the same grave and the spiritual world as Zin’s soon meets with that of Mem’s. In a similar sense, though the Kurdish nation is physically separated from a state, the nation is still united in the hope that one day it will achieve the dream of statehood.