The majalla, 1536, English,

Saleh’s

Returning to Normality?

Tipping Point

Jawad al-Bulani,

Steven Heydemann

Iraqi Minister of Interior

Hit First Manuel Almeida

What Lies

Beneath Issue 1536, 11 December 2009

By Mohammad Saif Haidar

Editorial Cover Saleh’s Tipping Point Steven Heydemann

Returning to Normality?

Jawad al-Bulani, Iraqi Minister of Interior

Hit First Manuel Almeida

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Issue 1536, 11 December 2009

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to The Majalla Digital, this week W elcome our issue brings to you an analysis of the different forces of play in the conflict in Yemen.

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Issue 1536

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Contents 08 Geopolitics Saleh’s Tipping Point

11 In Brief Around The World Quotes Of The Week Magazine Round Up Letters

18 Features What Lies Beneath

25 Debate The Future of The Houthis

30 Ideas Money Can’t Buy Me Love THE MAJALLA EDITORIAL TEAM London Bureau Chief Manuel Almeida Cairo Bureau Chief Ahmed Ayoub Editors Stephen Glain Paula Mejia Dina Wahba Wessam Sherif Daniel Capparelli Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Webmaster Mohamed Saleh 11 December, 2009

06

35

35 People Interview

Jawad al-Bulani, Iraqi Minister of Interior

Issue 1535, 4 December 2009

Profile

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, former Chief Justice of Iran

43 Economics Gulf Economics

Don’t Judge a Book by its Cover International Investor

Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words

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51 Reviews Books

Unsolved Mysteries Readings Reports

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Geopolitics

Saleh’s Tipping Point Why the Saada uprising is no longer just another conflict The conflict in Yemen between President Saleh’s government and the Houthi rebels in the northwest governorate of Saada has officially gained a new dimension in November 2009. In particular, the last wave of this uprising is threatening to undermine the fundamental ruling formula of Saleh’s regime.

N

ovember 2009 may well be remembered as a tipping point in Yemen’s grinding five-year campaign against a loose coalition of several-thousand poorly-equipped rebels in the northwest Saada governorate.

What began in June 2004 with antigovernment demonstrations in Saada and Sana’a, organized by members of the Houthi clan as a response to the erosion of Zaydi dominance in the sect’s traditional heartland, has now taken on a more ominous character. This sectariantribal uprising, which at first seemed much like previous conflicts between tribes and the central government, now threatens the fundamental ruling formula of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime.

Since his rise to the presidency of Northern Yemen in 1978, Saleh has governed through the manipulation of tribal politics and the careful management of patronage networks.

For Saleh, as for his predecessors, informal bargaining is used to balance competing interests. Access to Saleh’s patronage, his support for local actors, and the provision of public services are all benefits to be extended or withdrawn in exchange for compliance, loyalty, or simple acquiescence to the regime.

Relations between Sana’a and the provinces have been managed largely through quiet negotiations between rural tribal elders and Saleh’s representatives.

When these break down, the result is typically a short, contained burst of violence: force is a tribal bargaining tactic more than a fundamental challenge to Saleh’s authority.

For many years, this formula served Saleh well, including in the Zaydi-dominated province of Saada. During the 1990s, Saleh’s regime permitted new space for Zaydi political mobilization, and made new overtures to the Zaydi leadership.

He permitted the formation of a Zaydiled political party, al-Haq, which secured the election of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi to Yemen’s Parliament.

In 1997 a militant faction of al-Haq that included Houthi leaders established a youth movement, al-Shabab alMumineen, which reportedly sent several hundred members to Iran in the mid-1990s for religious instruction and then on to Lebanon for training in guerrilla tactics by Hezbollah. Such 11 December, 2009

Steven Heydemann activities would have been difficult to arrange without at least tacit consent from the Saleh regime.

At the same time, however, Saleh also tolerated, and perhaps supported - the growing power of the Sunni Islah Party in the northwest during the 1980s and 1990s, including the efforts of Salafist militants linked to Islah who actively mobilized anti-Zaydi sentiment among Sunni tribes. Throughout the 1990s, Islah-Zaydi competition intensified in and around Saada, with Saleh continuing to relay on his usual ruling strategy to preserve an increasingly frayed local balance of power.

By the early 2000s, the old ruling formula was no longer sufficient. In 2004, tribal-sectarian tensions spilled into an open confrontation between Zaydi militants led by members of the Houthi family and the central government.

Even as the conflict escalated, however, the regime has been painfully slow to adapt either its political strategy or its military tactics. It has been unable, either through bargaining or intense coercion, to bring the conflict to a close. The government’s sixth offensive campaign, “Operation Scorched Earth,” was launched in August 2009 but has been no more successful than the five campaigns that preceded it.

Instead, the conflict has exposed deep divisions within Yemen’s ruling elite, in particular its military and political leadership. It has revealed the limits of Yemen’s military capacity and of the army’s dependence on tribal alliances in its operations against the Houthi. It has turned Saleh’s future into a subject of active discussion in qat chews across Sana’a. And last month, with the escalation of Saudi and Iranian engagement in the conflict,

Yemen’s internal affairs have acquired a dangerous regional dimension, spilling over into the broader rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. No less serious, the conflict has caused a massive humanitarian crisis, forcing tens of thousands of Yemenis, perhaps as many as 200,000, to flee areas affected by the fighting. Thousands of internally displaced have crowded in Saada city, dependent on the International Red Cross and Red Crescent for food and shelter.

What does all of this mean for the U.S.? In Washington, the escalation of the conflict is a troubling indicator that President Saleh’s future can no longer be taken for granted. Since 2001, the U.S. has cultivated Saleh as an ally in the war on terror, looking to him to suppress local supporters of al-Qaeda, with uneven results. Anti-terrorism remains Washington’s central preoccupation but the reality of just how precarious Saleh’s position could become is quickly taking hold. With Saleh facing serious challenges to his authority not only in the north but among resurgent secessionist movements in the south, with Saudi Arabia and Iran both more actively engaged in the Houthi insurgency, and with signs of growing internal frictions, there is growing uncertainty about how best to secure U.S. interests in Yemen.

Thus far, with its attention focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with prospects fading for positive U.S. engagement with Iran, the Obama Administration is betting on Saleh. It has increased its military assistance to Yemen, and in September 2009 President Obama directly expressed U.S. support for the Saleh regime. This approach is likely to continue, and is certainly the path favored by Saudi Arabia. Yet like Saleh’s Arab allies and his local supporters, the possibility that his regime has hit a tipping point at which it could begin to unravel is very much in the minds of U.S. policy makers.

Steven Heydemann - Vice President of the US Institute of Peace and a visiting Professor at Georgetown University in Washington 08

In Brief Around The World

Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Letters

Deadly Baghdad blasts threaten to blow up the Iraqi elections H ours after the Iraqi parliament approved the Parliamentary Election Act, a wave of deadly blasts rocked Baghdad, the Iraqi capital. 127 people were killed and a further 448 were injured.

The attack was carried out using 5 boobytrapped cars driven by suicide bombers.

Various locations of the Iraqi capital were targeted, including a police patrol in the Doura district and buildings belonging to the Iraqi government. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs buildings were severely damaged in addition to the destruction of many shops and houses. The streets of Baghdad became empty of pedestrians. A U.S. helicopter flew over the sites of the attacks. Qasim Talat, an official spokesman of the Iraqi army accused Issue 1536

al-Qaeda of launching the attack.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sent a cable of condolence to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and expressed his anger over the brutal crimes. Robert Gates, spokesman for the White House, denounced the recent explosions in Iraq, and described the amendments made by the Iraqi Legislative Council on the electoral law as a step in the right direction.

"Some see these [amendments] as a threat to them", added Gates.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown also condemned the attack. "While there are still a lot of challenges, Iraq has recently witnessed many security, political

and economic positive changes" added Brown. He stressed that his government would work alongside the Iraqi government to continue making progress.

Iraq's parliament had approved, at an emergency session last Sunday night, a law regulating the legislative elections.

The House of Representatives voted unanimously to amend the election law, which increases the number of House seats to 325 from 275. This led experts to consider recent bombings as part of a plot to destabilize security and threaten stability before the Iraqi elections. Faraj alHaidari, Chief of the Election Commission said that the elections are scheduled to be held on the 6th March 2010.

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In Brief - Around The World

Around The World 1 Cyprus Cyprus President Demetris Christofias said Cyprus government decided to impede Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union. Cyprus blames Turkey for its failure to comply with a protocol agreement to extend recognition to Cyprus along with other countries which joined the European Union in 2004.

3

4

3 USA President Barack Obama ordered to delay moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. "It is necessary, in order to protect the national security interests of the United States, to suspend for a period of six months the limitations set forth in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995", said the President.

4 France

2 Russia Visiting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that Russia would help build four more nuclear reactors in India, in addition to the nuclear power plant in Kudankulam that is scheduled to be launched next year. Both countries agreed to boost cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy sector, while finally ending a dispute over a warship overhaul.

11 December, 2009

France's Defense Minister Herve Morin announced that France would be involved in training local security forces and institutions in Afghanistan.

Morin's words came as a response to a report which revealed that the United States had asked France to send an additional 1,500 troops to Afghanistan.

5 Ramallah Visiting Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh said that establishing an independent Palestinian state is in Jordan's interest.

Foreign Minister Judeh’s message came after a meeting in Ramallah with Palestinian President Abbas.

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In Brief - Around The World

8 Iraq

2 10

6

1

9

5

8

Khalid al-Attiya, deputy speaker of Iraqi Parliament said that the election deal reached by Iraqi lawmakers is a great achievement for the country. His words came shortly after Iraqi lawmakers approved plans to hold parliament elections. The vote followed marathon talks by political leaders to break an impasse over balloting provisions that would satisfy the nation's rival groups.

9 North Korea

7

President Obama's special envoy to North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, visited Pyongyang to find out if the North Koreans are willing to return to international talks aimed at dismantling their nuclear weapons program. Bosworth began the highest-level contact between the Obama administration and North Korea.

His mission is to determine if the North Korean government will reaffirm its four-year-old commitment of getting rid of nuclear arms and participating in the six-nation negotiations in Beijing.

6 Italy Italian Economic Development Deputy Minister Adolfo Urso said Italy and India are set to re-launch a bilateral partnership and further commercial ties between the two countries in 2010.

Urso added that China and India have revolutionized the world's economic growth and that Italy must concentrate its commercial focus there.

Issue 1536

7 Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, powerful cleric called on Iran's warring political factions to stand together against foreign pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. Rafsanjani said.

"The enemies will step up their evil-doing if they feel we do not have the same voice�, he said, referring to a new UN nuclear watchdog resolution condemning Iran over its nuclear projects.

10 Ukraine The acting finance minister of Ukraine, Ihor Umansky, has signed a letter of guarantee that certain weapons contracts will be developed with Iraq. The deal between Ukrainian defense industrial companies and Iraq is said to be approximately worth $2.4 billion USD. 13

In Brief - Quotes Of The Week

Up In Brief - Magazine Quotes OfRound The Week

Quotes Of The Week

"It is my intention to finish the job."

President Obama on sending more troops to Afghanistan.

"History has shown us that when there is a need for radical social change, asking those in power nicely to relinquish some control doesn't get us very far."

British activist Dan Glass on the Climate Change conference in Copenhagen.

"We are asking all people to come to universities so we can have one voice to protest at the coup d’Êtat." Student statement issued by a group going under the name "Green university students of Iranian universities."

"Until there is some clarity in debt restructuring, there won't be any serious share buyers."

Julian Bruce at EFG Hermes Holding in Dubai on the continuous fall of Dubai's stock market.

11 December, 2009

1

Magazine Round Up 1 The Newsweek No Exit President Obama declared that he will be withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan by 2011. This article tells you not to believe it. America is involved in a very difficult situation and conditions in Afghanistan are likely to worsen. The author examines the unfavorable situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and weighs the options that the United States has in order to secure a smooth exit. America should work more with its Afghani and Iraqi partners. The lesson the author puts forth is that "Conflicts are easier to get into that to get out of".

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3 The Economist

2 2 Time Nicolas Sarkozy: A French Paradox

An Iranian nuclear bomb, or the bombing of Iran?

The options to deal with an Iranian nuclear program are grim. Diplomacy has proved fruitless and negotiations have lead to a dead end. This article explores the different solutions and scenarios to each case. A military strike against Iran will cause instability in a volatile region and would have grave consequences. At the same time, a nuclear armed Iran would shift the power balance and have unfavorable results.

It may come down to "Sophie's Choice" for those trying to deal diplomatically with Iran.

Nicolas Sarkozy is highly criticized in an article in this week’s Time magazine. He is called indecisive and ideologically schizophrenic.

The French president's actions, it is argued, regularly contradict themselves and stir many controversies even amongst his allies. "Who is Nicolas Sarkozy?"

That the answer depends on when you study him, argues Time. The article further notes that this has led French voters to complain that this is not the leadership they voted for.

Cover of the Week

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4 4 The New Yorker Letter from Mogadishu, “The Most Failed State”

Somalia's president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was called

by Clinton as the “best hope” his country had in some time.

The article asks the reader to consider what he presides over as a government. Somalia is an open battlefield with the violent Islamist guerillas among them; the Shabaab group wreaking havoc in the country and creating political instability. The writer provides a brief history of Somalia from its colonization

by Italy until its status as a failed state. The interviews and facts integrated in the article render it an informative read.

Cover Of The Week

Businessweek Why Dubai matters?

In the light of the latest crisis that Dubai is facing, this article asserts that Dubai will pay a price for its debt woes. We should not get caught up in the drama and forget why Dubai matters.

Dubai has been an example to its Gulf neighbors— as an open economy it has attracted many foreign investors and created an economic experiment that is unprecedented in the whole region.

Dubai stands out as an open and diverse economy in a region that has long been very dependent on its oil industry. The article explores the manifestations of the crisis and the basis of Dubai's economy in general.

Issue 1536

15

In Brief - Letters

Letters Better Safe Than Sorry

LAST ISSUE

I think Van Rompuy is the right man for the job. I think he will be a great help for the European Union to overcome the three fundamental problems that the EU faces today.

These problems include the inability to set precise goals; poor follow-through and perhaps poor coordination and crisis management.

These problems require a specific type of leadership. Mr. Rompuy has the qualities needed to address the specific shortcomings of the EU at the moment.

Radhwan Al-Buhairi, Saudi

The Death Throes Of Khomeinism If the EU is to survive as a credible socio-economic forum at least in the sight of Arabs and Muslims it would be immensely beneficial it isolates Blair completely. His lies about Iraq are a disgrace to theUK. His ostensibly singular focused association with George Walker Bush tests the very edifice of what the EU stands for. Frankly he is nothing but a liability to both EU and UK. The world is better off without Blair and those of his ilk.

Nishthar Idroos

11 December, 2009

I have doubts that the elections results were fair. So, there are protests against an allegedly stolen election. Unless there has been a sea change in Iran, the theocrats may well get away with this soft coup for the moment. But the regime's legitimacy will take a critical hit, and its ultimate demise may have been hastened, over the next decade or two. These are just my speculations.

Mustafa AbdulHafeez, Libya I think that the Iranian elections revealed to what extent the Iranian regime abuses its people's human rights. The dispute over the elections results exposed the illegitimacy of the Iranian regime. Every one is now certain that the results of the elections were rigged in favor of Ahmedinejad. I believe the country is heading for more divisions and instability.

Seham AbdulSatar, Egypt 16

In Brief - Magazine Round Up

Issue 1536

15

Features

11 December, 2009

18 18

What Lies

Beneath

By Mohammad Saif Haidar

Issue 1536

19

Features

What Lies Beneath

Uncovering Yemen’s Saada conflict

Mohammad Saif Haidar

All signs indicate that Iran is playing a vital role in supporting the Houthis. Yahya Al-Houthi, the political representative of Houthis abroad, implied, in one of his press interviews, that his group has opened channels of communication with members of the Iranian government. Also, the infiltration of Saudi Arabia by Houthi elements revealed the close relationship between the Houthis and al-Qaeda. importantly, they were dedicated to creating a young generation of religious preachers that would be culturally, morally, and spiritually prepared to raise awareness and advocate virtue, according to the vision of the Zaidi sect.

The stage of armed confrontation

A recent picture taken near Aden shows a man using a surveying instrument as a telescope as armed southern Yemenis watch. Š getty images

T

he Houthi phenomenon belongs to the Zaidi school of thought, which dates back to 1986. This school of thought first emerged in the governorate of Saada, where the largest concentrations of Zaidis in Yemen exist.

In Saada, the "Youth Union", a body aimed at teaching the Zaidi doctrine to its adherents, was established.

Houthis represent an underground rebel movement that seceded from the Zaidi sect. It is religiously and politically based on the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon. It embraces the ideas and beliefs of the Twelver Shiites and was first led by Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi. Its members adopted the name, "Al-Shabaab Al-Mominin" (the organization of Youthful Believers).

The year 1990 witnessed the unity of Yemen which paved the way for a multipartisan system. The "Youth Union" restructured itself into the "Truth" Party (Al-Haq), which now represents the Zaidi community in Yemen. Hussein 11 December, 2009

Badr Eddin Al-Houthi, the son of Badr Eddin Al-Houthi, was one of the most prominent political leaders of this party.

Despite the absence of Badr Eddin Al-Houthi from the Yemeni political arena, his ideas continued to spread, particularly in Saada and its surrounding areas since the late 1990s. Meanwhile, his son Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi seceded from the "Truth" Party and formed a private group known as the "Youthful Believers". This group was at first an intellectual and religious group.

It was founded in 1990 and continued to practice politics in secret while preaching religion on the surface. But in 2002, the group adopted an opposing stance towards the government.

According to its former SecretaryGeneral, Muhammad Yahya Salem Azzan, the group's objectives at that stage were focused on providing the youth with a good education of Zaidi principles, developing their creative talents in various fields. More

In 2004, the Youthful Believers began a phase of armed confrontation which marked the beginning of the Houthi Group as a rebel force. These militias fought five wars against the Yemeni army over a period of more than four years. These wars resulted in a major national crisis, the consequences of which have become clear during the current sixth war.

Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi had visited Iran with his father and stayed for several months in Qom. In addition, it is known that he was deeply influenced by the Khomeini revolution in Iran.

He attended many sessions on security and politics in Lebanon organized by Hezbollah. He has a strong relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and raised slogans of support for Hezbollah. He led a rebellion against the government of Yemen, and was killed in the first war (2004), aged 46.

The second leader of the Houthis is Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi. Having surpassed other prominent figures in the movement including a number of his elder brothers, Abdul-Malik took command of the group after the death of his brother Hussein.

Presently, the conflict in Yemen has become the main concern for many observers in the region, particularly since the insurgents are believed to be strongly connected with Iran. Observers have tried dissecting this relationship 20

Features and the circumstances in which it developed, by evaluating the beneficial relationship between the regional power and the insurgents it supports. These two actors do not share a common structure or function, nor are they geographical neighbours.

The prospects for the formation of a strong "organic" relationship that is based on a high degree of trust, between the Houthi group, with its Zaidi revival trend, and Iran seem unlikely.

This is mainly due to the fact that Yemen’s Zaidis are traditionally opposed to Iran’s Twelver Shiism.

However, since the Islamic revolution, Iran has been trying to promote itself as the "only" legitimate umbrella for all the Shiites of the region. Yet, the nuanced interests of the Houthis and Iran do not help in understanding the context in which a symbiotic relationship between the two grew. It is a multidimensional and complex context that is not necessarily mutual. It has grown over a relatively long period, and more specifically, during the last two decades.

Iran's secret support The relationship between the Houthis and Iran might have started at an early time. Some say that it goes back to the early 1980s, when many Yemeni Zaidis were influenced by the Iranian revolution. This relationship, however, has become influential and functional only in recent years. This does not mean that no relationship existed previously.

It only means that it was a limited intellectual relationship through nonofficial Iranian channels.

Hussein Al-Houthi was influenced by Iran's revolutionary discourse and its political ideology; not necessarily its religious ideology. This led to a shift in the movement's trend. The group started to focus on organized polarization under a strong inclination towards rebellion.

The desire was further reinforced through the campaign launched by the United States against international terrorism, following the 911/ attacks.

Al-Houthi viewed this campaign with great suspicion, considering it a war against "Islam and Muslims."

As a result of his growing sense of Issue 1536

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (R) speaks with a tribal official during the inauguration ceremony of the newly built liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Balhaf on the Gulf of Aden on November 7, 2009. Š getty images

power, the spread of his movement and its increasing strength, Al-Houthi began to train the young members of the movement for combat. He started creating educational channels away from the supervision of the Yemeni state.

He began to incite the members of the movement against official institutions, describing them as illegitimate organizations.

In a parallel trend, Al-Houthi and the elements of his movement launched their famous slogan "God is Great, death to America, death to Israel, the curse on the Jews, victory for Islam".

This slogan, which became widely associated with the group, and the way it was launched - by repeating the slogan in the mosques after prayers and writing it on the walls in the streets and public squares - made it clear that it was drawn from a non-Yemeni source, most likely to have originated from Iran. It was also very similar to the approach adopted by Hezbollah. It is a mobilizing method

aimed at continuously inciting the members of the movement, and making them feel unique and distinguished from the members of other political parties and groups. It also reflects totalitarian methods of political recruitment.

Al-Houthi next began to search for supporters and backers, both internally and externally, for his armed organization. The rugged mountains of the northern province of Saada, near the Saudi border, were the Houthis safe haven. The rebels started stockpiling weapons in abandoned caves scattered across these mountains.

The author of the book "Flowers and Stones: The Shi'ite Revolt in Yemen" mentions that Al-Houthi has managed to obtain huge material and logistical assistance from local and foreign parties, including Shiite associations and organizations that have extensions in Iran or ties with it.

21

Features According to the same source, some of the most important parties that have provided material and intellectual support to the Houthis are: Ansarin Foundation (Iranian Qom), Abu alQasim al-Khoei (London), Zaid bin Ali Foundation (Jordan), Thaqalin Foundation (Kuwait), Al -Bait Association (London), organizations controlled by Hezbollah, Sadeq Shirazi (Kuwait), Al-Alfein Company (Kuwait), branch of Al-Bait Foundation (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq), and the Al Association (Kuwait).

Moreover, the Houthis received aid granted by the Iranian embassy in Sana'a, and one aid bill amounted to $650,000 dollars. The Iranian embassy also donated support to summer centers worth 22,381,000 Yemeni riyals between 2000 and 2002. Some of this money has been allocated for financing a number of educational courses, particularly in the province of Saada, where the Houthi movement is based.

Some sources allege that Hussein AlHouthi was using the funds he obtained to pay some of his supporters. He also focused on providing social aid and charity, especially in areas dominated by his movement and supporters.

Houthi’s declarations into question. The political representative of the Houthis abroad, Yahya Al-Houthi, implied in one of his press interviews that his group has opened communication channels with the Iranian leadership. He stated that he sees Iran as a "hope for the humiliated people in oppressed nations." He also stressed that "All those who belonged to the Prophet's House should prove the credibility of their fellowship by following the Prophet's teachings, and apply them in reality."

Unprecedented and biased coverage by the Iranian official media of the events of Saada has boosted the accusations that Iran is supporting the Houthis. The media featured TV channels like AlAlam, Tehran Radio, and other satellite channels close to Iran such as Al-Manar, Al-Zahra, Al Kawthar and others.

It is certain that Iran has a clear interest

in increasing the strength of the Houthis, who are ideologically close to it and could be recruited - one way or another - to achieve different objectives that would help promote Iran’s national interests.

Against this backdrop, the information reported by sources in the Eritrean opposition is particularly important.

They revealed the existence of a training camp for members of the Houthis under Iranian support and supervision in Dengolo, east of Ginda in central Eritrea. In addition, the implicit Yemeni government accusations against Iran of backing the Houthi insurgents and providing them with weapons through the Midi port - on the Red Sea at the north-west tip of Yemen - have recently increased. There was also information about an Iranian request to the Yemeni government to activate the Midi port in the form of Iranian investments, but

Although the movement was shaken violently, almost to the brink of collapse, by the death of Hussein Al-Houthi in 2004, it quickly regained its balance after his younger brother Abdel Malik al-Houthi assumed command.

He worked on the reconstruction of the movement, assuming the same approach and discourse adopted by Hussein.

There is no doubt that the process of rebuilding the movement, despite its complications in the beginning, also necessitated searching for supporters inside and outside Yemen. Moreover, it resumed relations with supporting parties, which had become disconnected during the temporary collapse of the movement, after the death of its founder.

These associations have developed and become stronger than ever.

Al-Houthi's confession Despite the repeated denials by Abdel Malik Al-Houthi of any Iranian role in supporting his movement, recent evidence has grown putting Malik Al 11 December, 2009

Sheikh Abdullah Ben Hussein Al-Ahmar, the leader of the Yemeni Islah party Š getty images

22

Features the Yemeni government rejected this request.

Moreover, the media reported that in late October the Yemeni navy detained an Iranian ship loaded with anti-armor weapons, off the coast of Midi. The same sources reported that the ship was on its way to unload its cargo of weapons near the "Harad" area to deliver them to the insurgents. The ship was also carrying weapons experts and trainers to replace Iranian experts and trainers believed to be injured or killed in the fighting.

Relationship with al-Qaeda The infiltration operations carried out by Houthi elements inside Saudi territories also revealed the close relationship between the Houthis and al-Qaeda.

Groups of the latter have also infiltrated Saudi territories alongside the Houthis after previous coordination between the two sides.

The relationship between the Houthis and al Qaeda is not new. Several Yemeni officials have confirmed that the collaboration between the two organizations, which they note, share an interest in creating chaos and instability in Yemen, has existed since before the recent developments in the ongoing war in Saada.

Moreover, the Saudi forces have detected the presence of sophisticated and non-traditional weapons, some of them anti-armor, the presence of which confirms that the Houthis are receiving support at the highest level. In addition, the Houthis follow methods and tactics known to be used by Al-Qaeda such as hiding in women's clothes and some other tricks to penetrate areas behind the front lines of the Saudi army.

Eritrea and Somalia The support received by the Houthis is not limited to Iran and al-Qaeda, but also comes from Eritrea and Somalia.

The arrest of Somalis by Yemeni and Saudi forces near their joint borders, while they were smuggling weapons to the Houthi insurgents in Yemen, is evidence of such connections.

One Eritrean opposition leader and an official in the Eritrean Democratic Issue 1536

Alliance, Bashir Ashaq, told the French AFP news agency that Iran uses Eritrea as a base for transferring weapons to the Houthi insurgents in the Yemeni Saada province. He pointed out that the weapons are delivered to the coastal cities of Eritrea, mainly the city of Assab, from where they are then transported by the Houthi rebels to Yemen during the night. In addition, some press reports revealed that dozens of jihadists crossed the Gulf of Aden to Yemen a few months ago; they are believed to have since joined the ranks of the rebel Houthi group in Yemen.

The reports suggested that there is also evidence that the pirate gangs have established ties with local officials in Somalia. There is a strong relationship between pirates and human traffickers to Yemen, where they exchange information. When the traffickers return from transferring Somali refugees to the coast of Yemen, they participate in some piracy operations. Yemen has announced the presence of Somali fighters among the Houthi insurgents in Saada, seven of which have been arrested.

countries of the Middle East, but some of its tools are invisible.

Iran’s hand no longer invisible Iran has called for a political exit to be found on what is happening in northern Yemen, implying its willingness to recognize the Houthis as a political force in the equation of Yemen. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki expressed his country's concern about the situation of Shiites in Yemen. He was quoted by the Iranian Student News Agency ISNA, on August 27, as saying during a meeting with the Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran that "Iran supports good relations between the Yemeni government and Shiite Houthis in the country." He added: "The Yemeni government and the Houthis can acquire the support of each other through constructive interaction."

All these factors support the possibility that there are Somali groups trafficking weapons to the Houthi insurgents in Yemen.

Mehdi Snaii, member of the Committee on National Security and foreign policy of the Iranian Parliament said: "The Iranian Foreign Ministry studied the subject, but the parliament is expecting it to deal with the Yemeni issue in a special manner, because we reject tension in neighboring countries and putting pressure on the Shiite minority in the region".

Up till now the Yemeni government has not formally charged the Iranian government of backing the insurgents directly. However, Sanaa understands that there is a hard line Iranian leadership that has assumed power in Tehran since 2005. Moreover, since the arrival of Ahmadinejad to the presidency, propaganda against the Sunni minority in Iran has escalated notably, as they consider its members potential agents for Saudi Arabia, and allies of the Sunni extremists in Iraq.

In any case, the relationship between Iran and the Houthi group seems clearer and less ambiguous today and indicates the presence of mutual interests between the two parties. These parties have converged on implementing ambitious geo-strategic projects that go beyond the issue of "justice and equality" and "defending the vulnerable and the oppressed". In the case of the Houthis, the rebel group is aspiring to form an independent Shiite principality in the north of Yemen.

One of the most important and complex dimensions in understanding the Iranian role on the foreign scene is that there is a hidden side to this role that is not conducted through the official state tools. It does not allow the state to be implicated directly, despite serving its foreign objectives to a great extent.

This aspect has created confusion in the political arena and decision-making circles in many world capitals. The Iranian presence is evident in many

In the case of Iran, this relationship goes beyond seeking the Yemenis’ interests and preventing fighting among them.

Iran believes that it is a historic moment for it to regain its role as a major regional power, with extensions everywhere it can reach. Yemen is no exception.

Mohammad Saif Haidar – Journalist and researcher at the Saba Centre for Strategic Studies 23

Debate The Future of The Houthis Who has the power to end the conflict in Saada?

This debate discusses several issues regarding the future of the Saada conflict, and the prospects to put an end to it. How strong are the Houthis considering that they have been able to hold out until now; the accusations of foreign support to the rebels; why does this support exist in the first place; Yemen’s government engagement with the Houthis; and the possible outcomes of both the conflict and of the Houthis desperate attempts to infiltrate the border of Saudi Arabia are among the topics of discussion between the four analysts invited by The Majalla.

Š getty images

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Debate

The end of Houthis does not mean the end of rebellion Evident confusion in the way the Yemeni government deals with the crisis There are several factors that multiplied the power of the Houthi movement. The Yemeni state is weak and unable to exert influence on all territories of the country. It suffers from an escalating lethal combination of crises and security and political tensions. This means that the roots of insurgency will remain, even if the Houthi rebellion lost the war and disappeared from the scene.

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t times the Houthis claim they are fighting in self defence, other times they say they are fighting to obtain their rights as a marginalized group in Yemen. However, they, like other rebel movements, do not appreciate or even recognize the concept of a state.

The Houthi movement belongs to the Zaidi sect which has Hashemi origins. This Zaidi sect is a revival movement; Zaidis believe that they risk losing their identity in Yemen.

The Houthi movement transformed into an opposition group against the Yemeni regime because the "New Zaidis", including Houthis, felt alienated from the State. More specifically, they felt that the State deprived them of their former status and did not pay attention to their security or economic development.

The 1962 revolution replaced the Hashemite Imamah ruling system where the political and spiritual leader came from the "clan of Hashim", with a republican system.

The revolution thus restructured the country politically and socially. By doing so, however, it changed the system the Zaidis were accustomed to. Consequently, the followers of the revival Zaidi sect consider that the republican system is both antiHashemite and anti-Zaidi.

The rebel leadership has since succeeded in taking advantage of the violence of the conflict itself. More importantly however, there has been evident confusion on the part of the Yemeni state with regards to the tactics it employs in the conflict with the rebels.

11 December, 2009

Moaaz Al- Ashaby The goals of the Houthis, as of now, do not include launching terrorist attacks against Western or foreign interests, either within or outside Yemen. In addition, there is no concrete and conclusive evidence linking the Houthis with any other terrorist groups in Yemen, despite much talk about a close relationship between the Houthis and al-Qaeda terrorist activists in Yemen.

It is interesting to note that the rebel Houthi movement is not completely homogeneous. This characteristic has made it an amorphous form, resulting in complete failure of any attempt to dismantle and destroy it. The Houthi movement is composed of various political and social groups. In different political circumstances, these groups would have been competing and clashing with each other.

Mores specifically, the movement consists of four rebel groups: a group that embraces a clear intellectual doctrine and establishes direct and indirect political ties with Iran and upholds anti-West slogans; a small but significant group that seeks to defend the Hashemite and Zaidi identity; a group of mercenaries who are motivated by purely financial motives; and a group of tribesmen who enjoy an obvious political weight and had been involved in the insurgency as a reaction to the violent attacks that the state has launched against them. This has forced them to try and defend their families and villages in the face of indiscriminate

violence, which the Yemeni forces resort to in various conflict rounds against the rebels.

The Houthis' claim that they are fighting to defend themselves seems to have lost its meaning and credibility over the last war. They have expanded their battlefield and opened new fronts that have reached al-Jawf province in the west and gone beyond the YemeniSaudi Arabia borders in the north.

Their clear alliance with Iran has also made them lose much of their political credibility, both inside and outside Yemen.

However, the Houthis have undoubtedly benefited from the mistakes of the government in dealing with them, particularly the government’s inability to resolve the protracted military confrontation in Saada. Yemen is a weak state, unable to exert influence over all territories of the country. It suffers a lethal combination of crises and security and political tensions, not to mention hard economic challenges. There is much doubt regarding the ability of Yemen to resolve the Houthi rebellion crisis. Even if the government succeeded in wining the war and the Houthi insurgents disappeared from the scene, the roots of insurgency would remain.

It is quite possible that a new rebellion might emerge and announce its presence. The Yemeni state will then be forced to engage in another confrontation.

Yemeni researcher and political analyst 26

Debate

The Beginning of the End Inherent Problems for the Houthis The Houthi rebels succeeded, to some extent, in giving the impression at home and abroad that their strength is difficult to defeat. Yet an in-depth review of this organization and the course of battles indicate that they are not as strong as they might appear. The rebels were simply benefiting from the mistakes of the regime that could be described as catastrophic. One of its most important mistakes was the absence of the state from the Saada province over the past years.

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outhi rebels seek to prove they are strong enough to achieve their own political project, which begins with achieving self-rule even if not declared, and ends with the restoration of the Imam rule which fell nearly five decades ago. No other convincing explanations can be found for the continuation of the war.

The current war, the sixth of its kind between the Yemeni state and the Houthi rebels, has raised many questions on the actual strength of the rebels. It has also hinted at the possibility of the Houthi’s achieving a military victor, and using that as capital for a future political arrangement.

The Houthi rebels have succeeded, in giving the impression at home and abroad that they are a popular movement and a strong military organization. The mountainous nature of Saada comprising an area of 11375 square kilometres, or roughly the size of Lebanon, has contributed to making the war more difficult than expected, especially after the rebels resorted to using the methods and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Although these factors and others showed that the rebels were an impregnable organization difficult to defeat, an in-depth review of this organization and the course of battles indicate that they are not as strong as they appear.

The rebels were simply benefiting from the mistakes of the catastrophic mistakes of the regime, such as the absence of the state from the Saada province. When the state authority is absent, ordinary citizens have to comply with Issue 1536

Abd Al Ghani Al Mawri any armed group in order to avoid falling into the clashes that might cost them their lives.

The first war, which ended in 2004, with the killing of the founder of the Believing Youth, Hussein Al-Houthi, could have been suitable to end the insurgency if the outcome of the war had been invested to assert the state authority, and taking decisive measures in this regard. For example, the presence of the army in Saada at the time was necessary, as it could have prevented the insurgents from moving easily to develop their power, as well as doing good intelligence effort to learn everything possible about the rebels. You cannot win a battle against an ambiguous foe.

Since that date many developments have occurred: the rebels managed to develop their combat and tactical capabilities; they also developed their political and media performance; and they took advantage of tribal and political differences, managing to make significant breakthroughs in this regard.

However, this does not mean that the rebels have become an invincible power. On the contrary, it does not seem that the rebels will be able to survive for a long time.

The Yemeni forces have cut their supply routes and avoided some of their past errors. Moreover, the Saudi army participated in the war, and imposed a full naval blockade on ports that could supply the rebels with weapons. All these factors are important developments towards settling the war.

Apart from field developments that run against the rebels, we can say that the armed insurgency that started effectively in 2004 carries its own elements of destruction within. The reason is that it reflects a sectarian project, despite the rebels attempted to say otherwise.

This point is precisely their real weakness, as when any project lacks a national character it becomes fragile and non-viable. In addition, the lack of constitutional legitimacy and the insistence on a military showdown with the state are two additional reasons that deprive the rebels of accessing any popular support, thus exposing the group politically.

However, this exposure is not found within the insurgency only, but also abroad. For reasons related to intense allegiances in the region, and the desire of Arab and Western countries to prevent any Iranian expansion in the region, one can say that the rebels have been put in a very embarrassing situation.

Even the admirable performance of their fighters has become a source for concern. No one will allow the victory of this model in Yemen. But luckily no organisations similar to the Houthis are capable of replacing the state, as even the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon failed to do so. On the few occasions that the armed militias were able to control everything, they condemned themselves to a rapid fall.

Yemeni journalist 27

Debate

The Houthis war against the Yemeni regime "Zaidis" struggle with an Iranian decision The sectarian portrayal of the conflict in Yemen between the government and the Houthi insurgents is questionable when one considers their shared identity as Zaidis. Recently, however, the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the conflict has successfully allowed for the portrayal of the conflict as sectarian in essence.

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t is unclear whether it is accurate to describe the conflict in Yemen between the government and the Houthi insurgents as a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites – even if, as a result of Iran’s influence, the Houthis decided to frame the conflict in this light, by involving Saudi Arabia in the confrontation. The insurgents managed to frame the conflict in a sectarian light by provoking Saudi Arabia after having invaded its territory and having killed a number of its soldiers and civilians.

However, once we take into account the sectarian make up of the conflict we see that, in fact, both warring parties in Yemen are Zaidis. This means that the authorities represented by the president of the Republic, army leaders, security commanders, military troops and even tribes on both sides are all Zaidi Yemenis and they belong to the Zaidi sect, proportion to Zaid ben Ali ben Al-Hussein. This doctrine was introduced to Yemen by Imam Al-Hadi Yahya ben al-Hussein in 282 A.H. However, the religious sectarianism adopted by the first Houthi rebel leader, Hussein al-Houthi, revealed that the Houthi political project contradicts the religious philosophy of the Zaidis. Zaidis are moderate Islamists, yet Al-Houthi aimed to imitate Iranian policy notorious for its rejection of Shiite Imams that are moderate Muslims.

In terms of the ideological influence that Iran has had on the Houthi movement, one must begin to explore Hussein Al-Houthi’s relationship with Iran. Hussein al-Houthi stayed with his father, Badr Al-Din in Tehran after their dispute with 11 December, 2009

Hussein Sabra President Ali Abdullah Saleh. They were influenced to a large extent by the Iranian policy which advocated for political sectarianism as a means to confront corrupt Arab regimes, a belief the Houthis adopted.

Tehran tended to support the Houthi’s political, media and military move In Yemeni mosques, starting from the Grand Mosque in Sanaa, Hussein promoted the slogans "Death to America, Death to Israel". He justified this by saying that his movement needed a slogan that the people would rally around and that would provoke the regime, expose it and draw it towards confrontation.

Hussein al-Houthi had founded the Youthful Believers group, which received money, books and positions from the president to overcome an important problem that worried the regime. The most dangerous one was the Salafist group led by extremist Moqbel Al-Wadi'i who did not accept any dialogue or reconciliation with all the sects and other Islamic movements. His worst move came when he destroyed the shrine of Ibn Hidroos Shafei in Aden after the unification between the north and south.

At the political level there is a conflict between the sectarianism adopted by the Houthis as a price they offer in exchange for material, military, political and media support from Iran. At the social and national levels, the Houthis, and their Zaidi supporters are fighting a Zaidi regime which has been adopting the same doctrine since the Imamate era

to the Republican one. That is, one can deduct that the sectarian aspect of the conflict is artificial since both the government and the Houthis are Zaidis. On the other hand, Iran’s influence creates an incentive for the conflict in Yemen to be framed as sectarian.

It remains to know that describing the conflict as sectarian, targeted against the Shiites is part of an official Iranian media and political campaign, to incite sedition among Arab Muslims, whether Sunni or Shiite. Through this sedition, Iran would penetrate the Arab world by supporting one sect against the other. Iran aims to achieve the goals of its slogan and spread the Islamic revolution in other parts of the region.

The case of Yemen is not the only one in which Iran supports a sectarian divide. Iran also supports the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood group in Gaza against other Sunnis in the Fatah movement in order to have a foothold in Palestine. Similarly, it supports the Maronite group of Michel Aoun in Lebanon against other Christians. Iran also aids a proportion of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims to divide the Muslim community. Finally, Iran supports the Sunni Sudanese regime against other religious and moderate Sudanese sects, such as Al-Ansar and Khatmiyya.

Thus, the conflict in Yemen is also a political struggle for Iran, which aims to control different parts of the Arab world. They may claim calling for Islamic unity, but only if this slogan serves their interests.

Chief Editor of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Sheraa 28

On the verge of an abyss Manifestations of State Failure Yemen’s political situation is complex, and despite similarities between the Houthis and the ideological foundation of Iran, the relationship between the two is not the real problem. Yemen is a failed state, and it is its internal political realities, more so than the allies of its insurgency, which present a real threat to security.

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emen's situation is complex, and available information is insufficient for making accurate analyses on the conflict. However, this does not imply that simplistic explanations regarding potential political alliances are acceptable. The fact is, political alliances between parties in different countries are not based merely on superficial similarity between two parties. Regarding the special relationship between Iran and the Houthis, one can deduce that the Houthis’ concerns have very little to do with those of Iran's interests in the region. The Houthis would not be fighting if they knew that they were fighting for Iran. Poverty and neglect, more than sectarianism, are the factors that have united people together against the government of Yemen.

In addition, sectarian identity is not necessarily a component of political identity. The fact that the Houthis have a Zaidi leadership does not mean that they have a Zaidi political identity or that they are a sectarian movement. Personal leadership tendencies and priorities do not necessarily represent the preferences and priorities of their tribal communities. Thus, the ideas of Hussein AlHouthi, or Abd Al-Malik, his brother, do not represent the ideas of all the people fighting with him.

Furthermore, the presence of weapons in the hands of Houthis does not mean that a certain state has provided them with these weapons.

In Yemen, medium and heavy weapons are available to any tribe. And, if we take into account the six wars which the Yemeni army fought without success, we can add military defeats as another source of weapons.

The most superficial explanations attribute the conflict to sectarian similarities. That is, the similarities between the Houthis and the Shia of Iran. Yet, in order to understand the events of Saada, we need to go beyond these simplistic explanations and accept that similarity does not mean consensus, coalition or support. We must assume that relations and political alliances are much more complex than we imagine.

One thing is certain, however, the events of Saada are part of a political and security

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Abdullah Hamid al-Din conflict in Yemen. Most of the analyses are made by parties of the conflict. Thus, they will not try to seek accuracy as much as they will try to tell the story from their point of view. The government of Yemen is facing a crisis of legitimacy. Most of the Yemeni opposition parties no longer see reconciliation with the government as a possibility. Instead they demand radical change.

Consequently, in an attempt to solve the legitimacy crisis it is facing, the government has tried to fabricate the Houthis' relationship with Iran to gain international and regional support to help it solve its internal crisis. However, we find that many members of the Yemeni opposition – both in the South and the North of the country, and, recently, Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar – are keen to refute those accusations against the Houthis.

Not only they do not want the government to benefit from making such accusations, but they also want to approach the Houthis as an armed force that could serve their political project or individual ambitions.

Some Arabs accuse Iran of involvement as a way of warning Tehran not to interfere. It seems that the message had been conveyed to Iran. Iran's official discourse regarding the events of Saada has changed. This change in discourse has been explained by some as an evidence of Iran's involvement in the Yemeni conflict; however, it is no more than a confirmation from Tehran that it does not have any role in this conflict.

The magnitude of Saada's crisis is a manifestation of the failure of the state. On a related note, the conflict is also a manifestation of the struggle over the future governance of Yemen between President Ali Abdullah Saleh El-Ahmer, Brigadier General Ali Mohsen El-Ahmer, and Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah El-Ahmer.

Thus, understanding the crisis and finding a solution for it starts from Sanaa, goes through Saada, and returns back to Sanaa in the end. Yemen has become a failed state.

It is not capable of providing basic services such as security, complete control of its territories, justice, and protection of public funds.

The conflict over the future of governance in Yemen is between two parties that are armed well, but their equal strength deters them from entering into a direct confrontation.

Instead, they are forced to live in a state of stalemate.

These two factors – the failure of the State and the struggle over power – led to a civil war, immediately after Hussein El-Houthi was arrested several years ago. In this war, heavy weapons, air force, and all the armed forces are being used. Therefore, attempts to understand the magnitude of the crisis based on an analysis of the Houthi forces do not help much. There is no doubt that the Houthis are a strong player in Yemen, but this only explains their holdout in the short-term. It does not explain their long-term capabilities, nor does it explain their vast deployment.

What explains this is the failure of state institutions, which led to public discontent towards the government. Therefore, the tribes have nothing to lose in their fight against the government. Instead, they might be able to achieve several gains, the least of which is the opportunity to express themselves. The power of the Houthis can also be explained as a result of the struggle over governance.

This struggle has made the conflicting parties transform Saada into something like a proxy war zone. Each party fights its opponent by involving it in the confrontation against the Houthis. The Yemeni President has managed to involve the forces of Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar in the fight. And Mohsen on his part has managed to involve the President's forces. This creates an opportunity for the Houthis to benefit and expand.

Saada's crisis should be viewed in the context of a unity crisis in Yemen, the crisis of the future of the state of Yemen, and the crisis of security in the Gulf region. More than half of Yemen's population live below poverty line, and the country's levels of unemployment have reached more than 35% percent. Yemen, therefore, does not need a crisis to exhaust its already limited resources. The collapse of Yemen, with its highly dense of population, will lead to further calamity and a real security threat for the Gulf states.

Saudi Researcher and specialist on Yemen

Ideas

11 December, 2009

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Money

Can’t Buy Me Love

By Jorge Lasmar Issue 1536

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Ideas

Money Can’t Buy Me Love Or Why concrete measures for the development of Afghanistan are necessary Jorge Lasmar The UK has implemented a system in which British troops in Afghanistan exchange financial remuneration for safety. The counter insurgency manual that outlines this practice notes that this practice is important in persuading individuals to accept the government’s authority, under the assumption that the reason behind their support for the insurgency is financially motivated. Similar strategies, however, have proved unsuccessful in the past. Moreover, tribal traditions and the belief that Islam must be defended cannot be bought with threats or money.

Soldiers prepare to deploy to Afghanistan on December 3, 2009. © getty images

T

he new UK counterinsurgency manual advises British troops in Afghanistan to exchange bullets for cash. The document emphasises that money can be an important tool in persuading individuals and groups to accept the authority of the government, as long as it is used wisely. Money, the manual claims, can also undermine community support for the insurgents.

The idea is simple. The Taliban pay local insurgents about U$15 (£7) per 11 December, 2009

day. Although this might not seem as much, this meagre salary is a far more attractive option than the prospect of un-employment in a poverty-ridden country torn apart by years of war.

The manual claims that if British soldiers can match this bid and offer amnesty, then, the Afghans will surely abandon the insurgency and stop shooting British troops.

There is some logic to this argument.

Since early 2007 the Iraqi government

has, with US assistance, incorporated more than 100,000 Sunnis into its cadres. Arguably, thousands of these Sunnis were former insurgents that agreed to lay down their weapons in exchange for cash or regular jobs.

In Afghanistan, this prospect is even more tempting as the local costs are much lower than in Iraq. Moreover, shifting tribal loyalties are legendary in Afghan history and, the logic goes, this provides Britain with an ideal opportunity to play one group 32

Ideas against the other.

There are some precedents within Afghanistan as well. In spite of strong official denials, it is rumoured that Italy has managed to reduce its death toll in the Sarubi district of Kabul by paying the Taliban.

Even private security and transport companies are adopting this strategy by paying Afghan insurgents cash in exchange for safe passage within the country. The price of safety varies greatly and depends upon the type of vehicle, what it is carrying and its route. Some accounts reveal that insurgents can demand over US$800 per truck in payment. Of course, while there is always the chance of a rival group attacking the convoy, the deal seems to be working well thus far. These deals are important for insurgent groups as well, providing them with a key financial source for funding their war against the very armies they sell safe passage to. The contradiction is even more startling as this tactic successfully guarantees that particular military supply routes remain open for foreign troops.

But even in Afghanistan, this is not a new or isolated tactic. During the Cold War both the Russians and Americans poured money into Afghanistan in a desperate attempt to buy tribal loyalties and shape local policies to match their own strategic interests. After the Cold War, the trend continued as the Taliban was offered up to US$150,000 for each of the approximately remaining 600 stinger missiles that the United States had first distributed and then lost in Afghanistan.

Various international initiatives also tried to eradicate poppy crops by giving cash to local producers to encourage them to grow alternative crops – a strategy, which proved to be unrealistic, ineffective, and yielded only temporary gains.

Privates companies have also tried to buy Taliban loyalties in the past, as in the case of Unocal which promised millions of dollars to the Taliban in the hope that it could move ahead on one of its project which proposed to construct a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan.

More recently, in October President Obama included the costs of a Taliban reintegration plan in the US$680 billion allocated to American military operations in Afghanistan for the 2010 fiscal year. This program incorporates the idea of using “money as a weapon Issue 1536

system” and aims to pay local Taliban warriors to stop fighting. While the fate of the most recent Obama initiative is yet to be seen it is of no little significance that all of the other attempts outlined above failed.

In short then, money can be but a temporary solution. Money might be capable of buying immediate security and reducing British and American casualties, but this would no-doubt be a short-lived solution.

To expect that low-level insurgents would stop fighting for money is realistic in the context of Afghanistan.

But to expect that the insurgents will not return to the battlefield or support al Qaeda once the foreign troops leave Afghanistan is not. Scores of Afghans do fight for money and a low-level poorly-funded Taliban amnesty program already exists in Afghanistan. But there is widespread mistrust of the central government which is seen as an American puppet.

This perception was further hardened during the recent, and deeply flawed, elections.

Insurgents also profoundly distrust such initiatives. Former insurgents such as Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, Taliban’s former foreign minister, Abdul Haq Wasig, Taliban’s former minister of intelligence and many others were arrested and sent to Bagram and Guantanamo after they voluntarily defected. This experiencebased wariness has been further bolstered by the recent turmoil caused by the Pakistani amnesty program. To make things even worse, potential defectors face harassment and threats at the hands of the loyalists. From a Western perspective as well, the recent debates on issues such as the rising costs of the war and the lack of equipment for troops also prompt questions about the viability and sustainability of a security project founded upon fiscal remuneration.

As such, an effective and sustainable integration of former insurgents into mainstream politics would require a far more complex approach than simply handing out cash. The Taliban is not a homogenous, monolithic movement. While it does have a centralised leadership, in the Quetta Shura, it is still struggling to unite the myriad of groups, factions, sections and tribes spread out under the insurgents’ umbrella. If the British and Americans want insurgents to stop shooting their soldiers and protect the civilians back home, than an

agreement with both the Quetta Shura as well as the other factions, such as the Haqqani network, is essential.

More significantly, it is very unlikely that these groups can be bought. Last month, Deputy Amir Mullah Brader Akhund, voiced the Taliban reaction to this fiscal initiative affirming that Taliban fighters are not mercenaries and that this “old weapon” would fail, just as it had before.

So what is the solution? Effective local economic and social development, not cash, might be the only guarantee that individuals will not join the insurgents for economic reasons.

However, this would only be possible if the insurgents are effectively dismantled and/or an agreement with the Quetta Sura and other key insurgent groups is achieved. As the British and America government are already pushing for the withdrawal of their troops, it is possible that only an agreement can undermine noneconomic motivations for joining the insurgency. In fact, it might also be the only guarantee that these factions will not continue supporting al Qaeda after the troops leave.

As the decision of Omar to protect Bin Laden in 2001 made clear, the relationship between Taliban and Al Qaeda is more than a mere marriage of convenience. Tribal traditions and the belief that Islam must be defended cannot be bought with threats or money. The organisation and sophistication of the attacks conducted by the Haqqani network are also a clear reflection of their continued cooperation with Al Qaeda.

Moreover, the Haqqani network is steadily expanding its welfare network and providing services in areas where the central Afghan government has little or no reach. As such, it is slowly consolidating its hold and influence over local populations. Unless more concrete measures for Afghan social and economic development are taken, then more and more young Afghans will be recruited by conviction rather than mere economic drive. In this case, the Americans and British will discover once again that money won’t buy them love… or at least, not for very long.

International Lawyer and International Relations' Lecturer at PUC Minas. London-based researcher in security and political violence.

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People

Returning to Normality?

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People - Interview

Returning to Normality?

Jawad al-Bulani, Iraqi Minister of Interior Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani introduced himself, in this exclusive Majalla interview, as the most appropriate choice to confront and overcome sectarian partitioning in Iraq. He was very optimistic in his expectations that "Iraq's Unity Coalition" will be the winner in the elections, despite his fears of lack of transparency and expectations of delaying the elections until late next March.

J

awad al-Bulani was appointed as Interior Minister of Iraq by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on 8 June 2006. He is a Shia independent member of United Iraqi Alliance and was a member of the committee that drafted the Iraqi Constitution, approved by a referendum in October 2005. In this exclusive interview with The Majalla, al-Bulani expressed his belief that security is the most important achievement of the government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. He added that his ministry, the Ministry of Interior, is the one that deserves credit for this achievement.

At the same time, he pointed out that Iraq, despite being overcrowded by politicians, is currently lacking statesmen. He is certain that the best way to rebuild Iraq is to get rid of the mentality of partitioning, particularly sectarianism.

The Majalla: What is your stance on the political dispute over the new electoral law?

Unfortunately, Iraq lacks a clear vision regarding the creation of a national 11 December, 2009

consensus in the face of crises. Not enough time has ever been invested in the strategic issues concerning the process of building democracy in Iraq. This has made it difficult to reach a mutual understanding. True, there are politicians in the country, but, unfortunately, we have no statesmen. Only a few institutions were involved in the statebuilding process, or interested in the things that help the country to take steady steps towards the democratic process.

I think that what is missing from the electoral law is the existence of data, statistics, and census. Such things were supposed to be available two years before the election date.

We need to have data, a law for governing the political parties, independent media, and committed authorities that are capable of maintaining consistency in legislation.

Solutions are always incomplete. The reason for this is obvious: we need to build a stable democratic political system. But this requires the presence of political elite, to establish a national government in Iraq away from sectarian or personal interests. We must concentrate our efforts on our citizens

by establishing a political system that makes all Iraqis, without exception, believe that this system represents the true reality of their dreams and aspirations to live under the ceiling of a strong state.

The Majalla: Are you in favour of the new electoral law?

Under these circumstances we can not say that we have a new law, but just a "bill". This bill, as you know, has faced opposition. But in my opinion there were some good sides to the law and some sides that need to be reviewed. If data, statistics, and census had been available, things would have been completely different. The Iraqi parliament should have known that a national consensus on such a law needs a long time, in order to be thoroughly discussed.

The Majalla: Are there certain points in the new law that you are satisfied with?

I think that the open list system adopted by the law gives the citizens a wide choice in electing suitable candidates. If Iraqi citizens

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People - Interview vote for good candidates, this will be of great help to forming a good government.

A good parliament with patriot members means a good and strong government that can provide services to citizens and solve the problems they suffer from. The massive participation of the various political entities helps improve things.

In any case, nothing is completely perfect.

But there are acceptable things. What is important is that the election law succeeds in obtaining national consensus. This will make all Iraqis feel that the elections will be fair. I think that the new Iraq that we are aspiring to is a country where all Iraqis live happily without deprivation or misery. We want to achieve fairness and equality for all Iraqis before the Constitution and the law. The responsibility of the new political system is to achieve all these benefits to Iraqis, either in Iraq or abroad.

The Majalla: Do you think that the elections will be held on time, especially as there are fears that failure to hold them on time might lead to a constitutional vacuum?

I wish the political blocs had reached an agreement that would help hold the elections as scheduled on the 16th of January.

Unfortunately, this will not happen. They are expected to take place late next March.

However, this period is legally acceptable.

Iraqi elections are of paramount importance.

The international community and all those concerned are tracking the situation in Iraq and waiting to see what will happen. Iraq is on the verge of an important stage, so everybody should show real commitment and national responsibility.

The Majalla: You are nominated for the post of Prime Minister, what are your plans for running for the elections?

We will run for the elections through "Iraq's Unity Coalition" that includes prominent national figures from various regions of Iraq.

These figures include Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the head of the Iraqi Sahowa Council, Sheikh Ahmed Abdul-Ghafoor Samarrai, head of the Sunni Endowment in Iraq, the head of the Iraqi National Charter Assembly, and Saadoun al-Dulaimi, Iraqi Defence Minister, in addition to a large number of clan elders, political figures, professors and academics.

These patriotic personalities share the same vision to propose an important alternative in the process of building a historic political bloc able to compete strongly with the current coalitions. It will introduce a new kind of politics at the national level, which reflects the specificity of the Iraqi national project. Iraq's Unity Coalition has managed to progress steadily and strongly in many parts of Iraq. It managed to gain national acceptance. In my opinion, it has managed to gain popularity throughout the country, and to reach all Iraqis, whether in Iraq or abroad.

It is the real alternative to all the ideas and projects that were presented. The "unity of Iraq" is the political, social, economical and security alternative that the Iraqi citizen is Issue 1536

looking forward to.

The Majalla: Frankly speaking, do you think that your experience in the Ministry of Interior entitles you to obtain the trust of Iraqis to become the Prime Minster?

I think that the Iraqis are well aware of my security achievements since I took over the Ministry of Interior. The circumstances of the country at that time are known to everyone.

The size of the challenges and threats that were facing Iraq at that time was huge. The Ministry of Interior is the heart of the state.

The Minister of Interior in the whole world is one of the most important and critical positions. This is more so in Iraq, in light of the existence of rivalries and political contradictions, not to mention terrorism, which the country was facing at that time. In addition, there were militias, criminal gangs, and outlaws. I believe that gaining people's trust is necessary for being appointed in high political positions. Personal achievements alone are not enough. The Ministry of the Interior has gained the trust and love of the Iraqi people in various areas. They know him well through social communication and coexistence for many years.

In my opinion the security accomplishments have succeeded in changing the way the Ministry of Interior is being viewed. Instead of being a hopeless case, it became the Ministry that is capable of saving the Iraqis and preventing the bloodshed. We cleaned the ministry from corrupt elements and expelled more than sixty five thousand of them. In addition, we worked on increasing the capacity of internal security. I think that the success achieved is a sufficient and convincing reason to obtain the trust of Iraqis. The post of prime minister is neither the most important post in the government, nor is it more difficult than that of the Minister of Interior. The Minister of Interior in Iraq is responsible for the command of more than half a million employees in the Ministry of Interior. He is responsible for the protection of more than 37 thousand official sites in different areas of Iraq. Everyone knows that all the people of Baghdad went to sleep at four or five in the afternoon. This great city, with its great history and good people were deprived from practicing any activity or having any kind of joy. Baghdad has now returned to be the Pearl of the East.

Its people have returned to their old habits of staying late at night. This is clear evidence on the existence of security. The Ministry of Interior has achieved considerable work in this area. In my opinion it is an important achievement. I think that the Iraqi government should be proud of its security sector since there have been a lot of achievements at the security level.

The Majalla: Do you think that the elections, if held, would be fair?

First, according to our sources, there are many powers which have worries and we share them too. We also hope that the electoral process will draw the attention of the international community and

international organizations to help the Iraqis run their democratic experience without fraud or falsification of facts. There are no elections that are 100% perfect as you know, but we hope that the errors would be simple.

Moreover, the independent higher electoral commission and all its employees should maintain a high level of commitment and responsibility to protect the rights of the people and deal with their votes honestly and fairly. The electoral process requires multiple efforts on the local, Arab, regional and international levels so that a certain party would not dominate and forge the Iraqis' will.

The Majalla: What is the role of the Ministry of Interior in arranging for the elections?

The Ministry of Interior is directly responsible through a government commission for sponsoring and securing the election process. There is a government committee headed by the Interior Minister Deputy for Police Affairs, who is a man with good administrative and security experience and was able to succeed in the previous election among earlier ones. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior cooperates and coordinates with other government agencies to secure the upcoming legislative elections and the protection of more than 3500 polling stations spread across the regions of Iraq and to secure the access of voters to these centers. The Ministry of Interior has also succeeded in securing the previous elections and I think that we have sufficient time and available possibilities.

The Majalla: Being one of the main contenders in the elections, do you think that you will be a fair Interior Minister to all parties in the elections?

The Iraqis know that we have acted fairly to everyone, and thank God for that. It is known that the Interior Ministry has made many sacrifices to protect all citizens from all threats and we were impartial in dealing with everyone and we will keep that trend.

The previous elections were a clear proof of the neutrality of the Ministry of Interior, and the logo of the ministry since we assumed office says that it is a ministry for all Iraqis.

It is true that conditions in the country are not perfect, but we should take into account that it is a recent experience alongside the conditions that the country has witnessed such as rebuilding ministries and institutions on a professional basis. I believe that there were positive steps made in this direction, and of course we hope that more things would be accomplished. But this requires more time. However, when there are some gaps or excesses here and there, they don’t affect the overall picture with the considerable effort exerted.

The Majalla: Being a part of Maliki’s government, what do you think of the achievements of this government?

If we want to talk about the main

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People - Interview achievements of this government, it would be "security" as the sector which witnessed most improvement, both in its infrastructure, and the fight against terrorism.

So I think that the present government can be proud of what has been accomplished in the security sector. However, we are still not totally satisfied with what has been accomplished. But I believe that challenges and threats still exist and this makes us focus continually on improving the performance.

The Majalla: Do you see any other achievements for the Maliki government, other than the security achievement?

I can not ignore the efforts of my colleagues in many sectors, but I talked about security because it is the achievement more felt by the citizens and reflected on their daily lives.

Naturally, every government has a program and a government minister is responsible for the issues of his ministry. I think that during the four years that we assumed office at the Ministry of Interior, it was considered one of the most difficult and complex ministries. It was accused and condemned. But we have transformed the Ministry of the Interior from a problem for the government to a security solution and this is the success we're talking about. But in other sectors, I think that every official can speak about the achievements in his own ministry. We do not deny that there are achievements in other sectors, but may not be noticeable. In my opinion, part of the problems faced by the political regime was the sectarian partitioning and political sectarianism which caused some failures in the service, investment and rebuilding processes. I believe the next stage should concentrate more on legislations that will help the next government serve its needs.

The Majalla: What do you think of the sectarian partitioning for higher posts?

Will you cancel this system if you assume power and what is the alternative and how?

In our next program, we hope that we will provide a real project that depends on national experts who perform their duties and responsibilities with an Iraqi spirit. I think that our main goal is to pay attention to creating a stable political system that would be effective in developing government and institutional work. This system should take into account the professional skills, experience and competence away from categories on partisan or sectarian basis.

This goal has been achieved in reality when we led the Ministry of Interior.

The Majalla: Can the popular situation in Iraq prevent the sectarian partitioning?

Well, I want to ask you a question: What happened when the Iraqis experienced the previous elections and electoral lists have been divided on pure Sunni and Shiite basis? Neither Shiite nor Sunni cities were reconstructed or witnessed an improvement in services. Thus I do not like classifying the Iraqis on sectarian basis. I do not like these classifications and I do not believe 11 December, 2009

in them, because the sectarian partitioning only produced delays. Moreover, only incompetent officials have taken charge of state matters and they neither understood administration nor leadership.

There is failure in many state utilities for seven years and the clear reason is the sectarian partitioning. This system was not limited to discriminating between Sunnis and Shiites, but also penetrated the single sect and inside the same party. The known infrastructure for partisan work has faded, so those parties have become to be recognized as groups and figures. For example, we say those people are London's group, those are Iran's group and those are Syria's group. We keep asking them "where is Iraq's group?"

I believe that Iraq has many competent personalities and capabilities and the country can be a model for national governance that is acceptable and achieve the ambitions and dreams of Iraq away from the sectarian view.

I believe that a review of these issues is needed. Iraqis today are much more aware and conscious of the means that contribute to fulfilling their interests. Nowadays, everyone skips the sectarian title and uses the national one. Of course, part of this is a political tactic to escape from the reality of some political groups. Another part moved towards enlightening and renewing its partisan activities.

The distinguished element about the "Iraq's Unity Coalition" among similar logos is its credibility with the citizens.

The Majalla: What do you think of the current government record in terms of relations with Iraq’s neighbors?

I hoped that there would be greater steps in building trust with Iraq's neighbors, and the existence of a certain vision to address some issues. I think that if we had the opportunity, we could develop our relationships in a better manner. We also hope that the next government will exert a distinguished effort in terms of relations. We believe in the future role of the Iraq's Unity Coalition as a strong player in forming the next government. I think that these issues will be discussed and put to dialogue to develop Iraq's relations.

Consequently, stalled issues should be addressed in several directions for the benefit of Iraq and the region in general.

The Majalla: What's your opinion about relations with neighbouring countries and what are the unsettled issues between Iraq and them?

Issues are solved only through dialogue. We do not want to have problems with these countries or unsettled issues. I think that many issues require some kind of rational and wise management, which are connected to the interests of Iraq with these countries.

I believe that there is always the possibility to address any issue, especially when all parties give assurances and a commitment to the principles of good neighborliness so as to enhance security, stability and

non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. As you know our region can not tolerate shocks or violent adventures, so relations should be based on a friendly dialogue and mutual cooperation. Saudi Arabia is an important country regarding its relations with Iraq in addition to Turkey, Iran, as well as the Gulf States by virtue of proximity and neighborhood. In any case, things do not continue in a tense manner forever.

The Majalla: It is said that in the Arab region, relations among interior ministries remain excellent even if the political and economic relations deteriorated. Is this the case for the Ministry of Interior?

This is 100% true, we have good relations with all Arab interior ministries, because the main security concern to all countries is the same, and there is a consensus on its main features. However, the presence of good and distinct security relations are also linked to the existence of good political relations and the issue is not devoid of political guidelines in this aspect which we seek to pursue in the future.

The Majalla: How do you evaluate the presence and work of security companies in Iraq?

Nowadays, the number of security companies has fallen dramatically, and we argue constantly about the nature of their performance, their assessment and setting mechanisms and legal regulations for the work of these companies. Thus the violations and breaches of these companies have started to recede. I consider the work of these companies as important in the framework of organizing the activities of security companies. The reason is that these security companies provide services for companies which operate in business and investment sectors and many other fields.

Generally, we have provided sufficient flexibility to deal with these companies and those who need their services in a way that does not threaten the security of citizens. We also obligate them to get licenses granted by Iraq and to comply with the Iraqi law. Â The Majalla: What is the role of the United States in Iraq in the next stage?

There is an agreement between us and the U.S. government and we have worked on training, consultancy, technical and technological matters to take advantage of their capabilities. We also have joint programs in our work, especially in the field of security. Moreover, the U.S. is a superpower which has mutual interests with Iraq. I believe that having good relations with the Americans is an advantage to the Iraqis and the region. However, it is important that these relationships should be built on the basis of mutual interest related to issues that concern both countries.

Interview conducted by Sheren Alfaedy Journalist based in Dubai

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People - Profile

The Next Ayatollah?

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, former Chief Justice of Iran In light of the rumors about Khamenei's death, a controversy over the potential successor of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has recently raised again. Since the Guardianship of Islamic Jurists is considered the foremost position in the Islamic Republic and the most crucial factor that determines the outlook for the Iranian regime, the search for a successor to Khamenei remains the main concern of the Iranians, and those who keep an eye on the future of the Islamic Republic.

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

S

ayed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the son of the cleric Sayed Mohammad Ali, was one of the leaders of the Islamic Dawa Party, which Mr. Mohammed Baqir Alsder founded in Iraq with the help of a group of clerics and other personalities in 12 October 1957.

Shahroudi was born in Karbala (Iraq) in 1948. His education was greatly shaped by a seminary on traditional Shi'a Islamic studies known as Hawza Ilmiya. He was a student of powerful religious leaders in Najaf, including Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sader.

Having been born in Iraq, Sharoudi's mother tongue is Arabic, but he learnt 11 December, 2009

Persian during his time in Iran. This experience allowed him to become a part of opposition groups in Iraq after the fall of the Shah's regime. He became the president of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq when Mr. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim held the position of spokesman of the Council in 1982.

During his work as an Iraqi opposition member, Mahmoud Hashemi Sharoudi disagreed with al-Hakim on the leadership of the council, the Iraqi opposition in general, and the Shiite opposition in particular. The Iranians intervened to settle their differences through direct mediation of Khamenei's

Š getty images

representatives and by Khamenei himself when he was the president of the Islamic Republic, was authorized by Imam Khomeini to deal with the Iraqi issue.

In the first period of establishment in 1982, al-Hakim and Sharoudi held the office of the Council presidency by rotation and exchanged presidency and "Natiqiya". However, al-Hakim, who had personal leadership qualities that surpassed Sharoudi’s succeeded in confronting the leadership of the council and abolishing the position of "the spokesman of the council". AlHakim then excluded Sharoudi from the arena of the Iraqi opposition. After

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People - Profile that, Sharoudi devoted himself to teach religious sciences and followed the approach of his mentor Mr. Muhammad Baqir al-Sader in the Scientific Hawza in Qom. As a result of his respected insight on U.sūl al-fiqh, the study of the origins, sources, and principles of Islamic jurisprudence, Sharoudi has become a prominent master of religious Hawza.

He has written seven volumes on the subject. Upon analyzing his articles on Fiqh, one can gather that he has a civilized taste and a talent of deduction that enables him to be a prominent Mujtahid, or Muslim jurist qualified to interpret the law and declare Ijtihad.

This is also responsible for rendering him a well-known member in the Supreme Council of Scientific Hawza in Qom. He is responsible for all religious Hawza curricula, supervising them and protecting their Iranian identity and authenticity. Religious Hawza is the stronghold of Ayatollahs and it is the place where the Islamic revolution broke out against Shah.

Sharoudi’s ideas to develop the religious Hawza and prepare a new generation of clerics who believe in the approach of the Revolution grasped Khamenei's attention. Khamenei then brought Sharoudi closer to him in his research.

This was especially true after Khamenei was elected to be the Supreme leader of Iran in 1988. It was at this time that Sharoudi became one of Khamenei’s disciples.

However, it was difficult for Sharoudi to become fully integrated into Iran due to his background. Consequently, he made small changes to his name in order to assert his Iranian identity in the face of reformists doubted him.

By employing these calculated risks, Mahmoud Hashimi Shahroudi was able to quickly climb up the political ladder.

He was then selected by Khamenei to be a member jurist in the Guardian Council of the Constitution, that has the responsibility for qualifying candidates for parliamentary, presidential and municipal elections, in addition to the elections of the Assembly of Experts (responsible for validation or cancellation of the elections).

In addition to Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mehdi Karoubi and others, Mahmoud Hashimi Shahroudi was appointed as a member in the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. At this post his responsibilities included maintaining the identity of the Islamic Republic; appointing new chancellors; recording the principles of cultural politics of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran; determining the objectives of educational curricula, scientific research and cultural and social approaches of the country; and registering and approving Issue 1536

the main policy of the Iranian media.

Supreme Judge Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi grew up in the hands of the reformist leader of the religious Hawza in Najaf. However, after Shahroudi was appointed as head of the judiciary in the period between 1999 and 2009 – the most important stage in history of the Islamic Republic – he was ruthless in fighting the leaders of the reformist movement. He kept dozens of them in prison, and deprived their senior leaders of political and social participation by issuing "judicial rulings" against them.

When he took the helm of the judiciary, Shahroudi said that in the era of Prophet Muhammad there were no prisons.

Thus, he declared his firm opposition to "solitary confinement". These words were reiterated by Khamenei, the current Wali al-Faqih (guardian jurist), who described solitary confinement as the most severe psychological torture.

Yet, the era of Shahroudi as a supreme judge was widely considered as one of the worst stages in Iranian history characterized by the judiciary’s lost independence.

Last August Shahroudi left the judiciary to his successor, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, amid controversy over the trials of reformers who rejected the election results. During Shahroudi's time as supreme judge there had been a large number of violations of the rights of prisoners, including cases of torture and forcing detainees to confess their crimes on television. All these measures were a violation of the Constitution, Islam, and human rights.

The situation deteriorated to the point that former President Mohammad Khatami asked Shahroudi in a letter to leave the judiciary without committing further evils. He asked him to release the detainees, stop the trials, and stop the violations of the rights of people. But instead Shahroudi concluded his judicial period by sending new instructions to the courts of Iran regarding "Internet crimes". He specified articles 498, 499, 500, 504, 508 and 510 of Islamic Penal Code, as grounds for punishing those who were regarded by the courts as members of "Internet Cells", a term that applied to anyone who used the Internet to deliver information or pictures about the opposition in Iran.

The time of Shahroudi as supreme judge has been widely considered a destructive blow to the reformist movement. Politically prominent figures of the movement were assassinated, and journalists and liberal opposition members were killed, such as Dariush Forouhar and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari. People were intimidated

and suppressed for organizing peaceful demonstrations, which were approved by article 27 of the Constitution. All of this might make the Assembly of Experts chose Shahroudi as a successor to Khamenei, despite the fact that he was previously an “Iraqi”.

Deputy Leadership Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi has become once again a member of the Guardian Council of the Constitution, an institution which had a major role in rigging the presidential elections in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

He was elected by a conservative majority as Senior Vice President of the Assembly of Experts, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. Shahroudi might even replace Rafsanjani, if the scheme of the stringent conservatives is to be successful in excluding Rafsanjani on the pretext that he has been undermining the Guardian jurists during the ongoing election crisis.

Shahroudi was accustomed to being in the "Deputy leadership" since he was chosen by Mr. Muhammad Baqir alSader, along with Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, Kazem Haeri and Murtaza Askari, to form a collective leadership to succeed al-Sader in leading the Iraqi opposition after his death.

The project failed for different reasons.

But Mahmoud Hashemi introduced himself in Iran as the deputy of al-Sader.

He was the link between al-Sader and Imam Khomeini, before al-sader was executed. But he failed in taking care of al-Sader's son, "Jafar", and fought him under the pretext of protecting him from being arrested. He told him to stay at home in Qom, to which he came as the ambassador of al-Sader II, "Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sader", to open an office for him in Iran. At the time of Shahroudi, Ismail Waeli was arrested.

He was an activist in al-Sader II's office and the man entrusted with the task of helping Jafar and his wife, the daughter of al-Sader II, to move to Iran.

Following the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi believed that the vision of the first Sader, "Mohammed Baqir alSader", and his previous activities were not in the interest of the nation. Al-Sader made a mistake because he concentrated on the enlightened elites and ignored the rest of the nation. Thus, Shahroudi focused all his attention after the end of his term as supreme judge, in promoting his reputation as a religious leader.

These efforts might become a significant factor in making him a "Guardian jurist" even though this is not a condition for occupying the position. There are many competitors for the job, most of them are religious leaders, or at least that's how they are described.

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Economics Gulf Economics

International Investor

Markets

Don’t Judge a Book

by its Cover

By Mohammed Sulaiman Issue 1536

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Economics - Gulf Economics

Don’t Judge a Book by its Cover A New Economic Growth Paradigm Following the Global Financial Crisis?

Mohammed Sulaiman Beyond its face value, the global financial crisis has upset the balance in the realm of economic ideas. Ideas once enshrined as quasi truisms have now lost ground to opinions once held at the farthest fringes of the discipline. Recent developments now seem to indicate that countries less dependent on trade and foreign direct investment have weathered and will lead the world economic recovery. Yet, these events are at odds with many of the conclusions of mainstream economic theory.

Stock traders in the iBovespa future index pit during the morning session, at the Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F), in Sao Paulo, Brazil © getty images

I

n the period between the Great Depression and what is now being called “the Great Recession”, a more or less universal theory of economic growth emerged among academic economists. One of the main pillars of this theory was that other things being equal, greater economic interdependence between countries generated 11 December, 2009

higher economic growth.

Export-led growth models, and, later, growth models built on a combination of trade and foreign investment, came to dominate the academic thinking.

This academic consensus had powerful and far-reaching practical consequences. New institutions such as the World

Trade Organization were created to support the mission of advancing this academic consensus in practical ways through new and increasingly complex trade rules, and existing institutions whose missions mirrored this consensus, such as the IMF became more and more powerful. By the turn of the past century, few in power anywhere in the world questioned 44

Economics - Gulf Economics the consensus. The questions, really, were limited to trying to understand how best to execute an agenda based on export growth and foreign investment.

Even as this consensus emerged, there were (a few) important voices on the other side of the argument that warned that trade led growth would lead to a sort of “race to the bottom”. This thesis, simply put, is that as countries compete for global export revenues in order to maintain their growth rates, workers around the world are paid less and less. This leads to increasing inequality that eventually strains the system beyond its ability to cope.

In this more pessimistic view, countries that rely too heavily on exports and foreign investment to fuel their growth will eventually suffer when fickle global markets turn on them, for whatever reason.

While a select few academics and world leaders did reflect this view, they were definitely not in the mainstream. These academics also did not focus on the shocks that could and seem to have impacted small, open economies during times of economic crisis, and did not ask the question whether the benefits to growth during “normal” periods justified these extraordinary and painful shocks during crisis times.

In the period following the global financial crisis, I have not seen or been aware of any serious theoretical challenges to the dominant thinking.

Recently, however, I was struck when reading one of the central bastions of the dominant view, The Economist Newspaper. The Economist, in its outlook for Issue 1536

2010, appears to have reversed or changed its view without really admitting it.

Reviewing the Economist’s forecasts for 2010 growth in the “The World in 2010”, reveals that the Economist expects Asia and the Middle East to dominate global growth, and expects Europe, the United States, Canada and Mexico to hardly grow at all.

Most interestingly, the Economist observes that countries such as Mexico, which have greatly heightened their reliance on exports for economic growth in recent years, are among the developing countries that face the most serious growth challenges in the coming year. At the same time, the Economist notes its expectation that Indonesia, for example, should have fairly solid economic performance in 2010, largely because of its ability to fall back on domestic demand.

More generally, I believe it is fair to say that the consensus view is that with the exception of some hydro-carbon producers, the best performers during 2010 will be those that rely relatively less on export driven growth.

What is most interesting about this empirical expectation is that it is completely devoid of any theoretical context. While the Economist describes this expectation, it does nothing to enlighten us about why this should be so. Of course, on the surface it is rather easy to say that domestic aggregate demand is less elastic with respect to global economic growth than exports are, so it is mathematically plain that countries that rely less on exports will grow more this year. But that surface argument seems to lead to

a deeper question: Are countries that rely less on export-driven growth and more on domestic economic development better off during periods of recession in general? If so, might this be a better and less volatile economic model than one that generates above average growth rates during global “good times” but feels the pinch worst during recessions?

Again, the empirical evidence suggests that this theory, at the very least, deserves a great deal more attention than it has been given by academic economists.

Countries that have pursued integration most stridently are now suffering the worst. Every single one of the Euro-zone countries will run a budget deficit in excess of target in 2010. Mexico and Canada, two countries that have bought heavily into export led development models, are expected to suffer badly. And the large economies that are expected to fare best in 2010 – China and India – are expected to do so by tapping domestic demand.

So, while the world at present does not appear to have an economic growth model that explains why countries that rely less heavily on international economic interdependence are expected to perform better during this recession, our expectations for 2010 seem to indicate that this will be the case.

An economist who is currently Senior Manager for Private Equity and Real Estate at the National Investment Funds Company and a Board Member of the Young Arab Leaders, UAE Chapter 45

Economics - International Investor

No Free Lunch

MENA Business Information Resources on the Web: Some paid, some free, all improving fast.

In the knowledge economy age, information is one of the most important inputs for business competitiveness and the health of the economy at large. In the Middle East, quality information about markets and business is rare and expensive. This governance and transparency culture deficit ends up not only constricting the growth of the industry specialized in divulging such information, but is also a drag for the economy as a whole.

James Hammond III

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earching the internet prior to 2000 would have yielded little by way of online information services in the Middle East, much less specialist business information. Fast forward to 2009, and it is apparent that steady growth in online connectivity in general and the importance of Middle Eastern markets on the global stage in particular have seemingly created ripe conditions for an active business information market.

Early progress came with growing pains.

At the dawn of the century, incubators (remember them?) put money into all sorts of start-ups. Special investment incentives resulted in ‘media cities’ sprouting in the desert (as in Dubai) attracting young tech savvy nationals and expats to a variety of electronic businesses.

Not all were successful. As in the West, there were scattered flameouts, as the promise of a connected world or retail investors failed to materialize in sufficient numbers to support a plethora of mass advertising supported portals.

In retrospect, this is hardly surprising given the disparity between internet access statistics of the region at that time. While high penetration was characteristic of some of the countries in the Gulf, such as the UAE where 36% of the population had internet access, the higher population centres had tiny penetration (Egypt at the time sported a .85% penetration rate.)

However, some notable outfits have shown staying power, and continue to provide a place for professional research on companies and industries in the MENA region. A common attribute for successful services is the presence of a subscription-based business model. A handful have earned a viable advertising revenue stream.

ISI Emerging Markets, with regional headquarters in Egypt, aggregates material from hundreds of information sources, including state and national newswires, newspapers, specialist trade 11 December, 2009

consultants and research houses, as well as some proprietary editorial material.

Their regional efforts specifically target the Islamic Finance industry and the market for statistical industry and economic information through specialist products, respectively, the Islamic Finance Information Service (IFIS), and CEIC Data.

Dubai-based Zawya is one of the wellknown outfits with a track record dating back to the early part of the 21st century.

Similar to ISI Emerging Markets, they too aggregate material from a wide variety of sources. Additionally, a Lebanon based editorial operation run jointly with Dow Jones makes them one of the regions most prolific generators of proprietary news outside the global newswires in the Gulf region in particular.

Noozz, based in Egypt, is a third regional information service with a subscription model. Like ISI and Zawya, Nooz aggregates material from third parties as well as produce material of their own.

While the free information model may have fewer participants than it did 10 years ago, a healthy number of financial portal sites remain extant. Gulfbase. com and MENAFn.com do a credible job with market data and information on public companies, mutual funds, etc. But among the free sites, www. mubasher.info probably gets the prize in terms of comprehensiveness.

AlBawaba, in addition to being a conduit of content to information aggregators like ISI, also publishes information for free on the web. Furthermore, the recent acquisition of Maktoob.com by Yahoo attests to the potential of the advertiser supported information market.

Nor have global industry giants been sleeping. Companies with a global outlook have shown an increased interest in the region.

Thomson Reuters has ramped up its coverage of Islamic finance, and hired a senior executive from Dow Jones to run the

operation. Bloomberg terminals are well established in trading floors and dealing rooms all across the region.

The question of who is making money in all this is more difficult to determine as none of the aforementioned companies publish financial results for the region specifically. And while they have all likely been affected by the global economic downturn, the major challenge is no longer identifying the proper business model. We all face a more insidious obstacle A major impediment to any business information company is that the relative paucity of publicly accessible sources of company information in the region.

Moreover, where that data does exist, it is of often of poor quality, or out of date. In some places, macro economic statistics are practically considered state secrets. This lack of transparency and the relatively poor regulatory standards in the region as a whole can deter companies and financial institutions from investing in the Middle East.

Low transparency and weak disclosure regulation and enforcement are brakes not only for information companies, they are brakes on development. Without being able to research counterparties, people are reluctant to do business with people or firms they do not know.

Opaque ownership disclosure opens the door to cronyism and conflicts of interest. When economic statistics are considered state secrets, they can be manipulated opportunistically. The free flow of information is grease in the wheels of commerce and investment.

And the MENA region ranks low in this regard. And no amount of private sector activity by outfits like my own can compensate for the damage that ensues from a closed information culture.

Executive Vice President of ISI Emerging Markets, responsible for Marketing and Product Development.

46

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Economics - Markets

The Neverending Story

Iraq’s second bidding round on oil fields

Iraq is to auction off contracts for 10 untapped oilfields, the latest move in a plan to catapult it into the big league of oil producers. The first auction in June was largely unsuccessful after most foreign oil companies rejected the price Baghdad set for each barrel produced

The World Trade Organization’s seventh Ministerial conference gathered in Geneva from 30 November through 2 December. Trade delegates reported that the conference met the expectations of the trade community by not achieving more than a political commitment to foment a final push to conclude the WTO’s Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

KURDISH ADMINISTRATION

Iraq-Turkey pipeline

Kirkuk

IraqSyria pipeline

Bayji Baghdad

IRAQ

Iraq strategic pipeline

160km

After hitting its lowest price in three weeks, gold reached US 1, 130 an ounce on Thursday, December 10, 2009. The price of gold had reached its three weeks bottommost on Wednesday, when rumors reached the market of a possible recuperation of the dollar and the easing of inflation

100 miles

Reserves (bn barrels)

West Qurna-2 12.9 Majoon 12.6 East Baghdad 8.1 Halfaya 4.1 Gharaf 0.9 Najmah 0.9 Qaiyarah 0.8 Middle Furat (Kifl, 0.6 West Kifl, Merjan) Eastern Fields 0.3 (Nau Doman, Gilabat, Qumar) Badra 0.1 TOTAL: 41.3

GAS FIELDS FOR TENDER (Trillion cubic feet) Siba 0.1 Khashem Al-Ahmar 0.1 TOTAL: 26* *Includes associated Basra natural gas from oil fields in bidding

Oil fields Gas fields Oil pipeline

The Price of Gold

OIL FIELDS FOR TENDER

IraqSaudi Arabia pipeline

DEALS REACHED TO DATE

Oil Field Reserves Rumaila 17bn barrels West Qurna-1 8.7bn barrels Zubair 4bn barrels

Source: EIA

Consortium Current Output Price per barrel Planned Status names BP, UK 1m bpd $2 CNPC, China 2.85m bpd Deal signed Exxon Mobil, U.S. 280,000 bpd $1.9 Royal Dutch Shell, NED 2.3m bpd To be approved Eni SpA, Italy; Occidental 200,000 bpd $2 Petroleum Corp. U.S.; 1.1m bpd To be approved KOGAS, South Korea © GRAPHIC NEWS

Worldwide, Somali pirates were responsible for more than half of all pirate attacks in 2009. Their latest victim, the Greek-owned supertanker Maran Centaurus, was seized about 1,300km off the coast of Somalia – one of the furthest attacks ever from shore Pirate attacks reported Number of attacks*

Gulf of Aden / Arabian Sea / Red Sea

Latin America / Caribbean

129

33

Caspian Sea 1

27

West Africa Somalia / East Africa Source: International Maritime Bureau

34 Indonesia 10

India / Bay of Bengal

39

Issue 1536

South China Sea

76

14 Malacca / Singapore Straits

*Year to November 30

© GRAPHIC NEWS

49

Reviews Books

Issue 1536

Readings

Reports

51

Reviews - Books

Unsolved Mysteries The Kingdom Saudi Arabia and the Challenge of the 21st Century Joshua Craze and Mark Huband Hurst & Company, London 2009 The Kingdom attempts to recast the subject of the politics and culture of Saudi Arabia under a new, less mystified light. The compilation manages to include articles that range from the transitional phases of Saudi society, to the regional position of the country. Yet, despite its aims and efforts, the book results in an unsatisfactory read for those looking for balanced, up-to-date, and coherent literature on Saudi Arabia.

T

here is perhaps no combination less familiar to the West’s own current cultural experience than the combination of royalty, religion, and conservatism that shape the external image of Saudi Arabia. Joshua Craze and Mark Huband’s recent book entitled The Kingdom attempts to recast the subject of the politics and culture of Saudi Arabia under a new, less mystified light. Setting aims quite high, the two editors argue that the “discussion of Saudi Arabia is hampered by as many preconceptions and misconceptions”. To make matters worse the degree of privacy that dictates the country’s relationship to the rest of the world greatly affects the ability of Saudi leaders to explain their way of life.

In order to overcome these obstacles of limited intercultural communication, the two editors compiled a list of articles from the website called SaudiDebate. com. This website, launched in early 2006, had the aim of presenting different analyses on Saudi Arabia’s political and economic condition, as well as its place in the region – subjects that, because of the aforementioned conditions, are not usually heard of in the mainstream.

According to the book’s comprehensive introduction, “the often narrow minded discussion of Saudi Arabia in much of the Western media has tended to foreclose the possibility of having many debates about the kingdom”, thus this book aims to provide a smorgasbord of perspectives on the country.

Divided into four main sections, the editors attempted to create the illusion of consistency between a multiplicity of entries in the website that inspired the book. The compilation manages to include articles that range from the transitional phases of Saudi society, to the regional position of the country. It is true that the editors managed to put together numerous articles addressing diverse topics concerning Saudi society.

Where, however, the editors did not 11 December, 2009

succeed, was in presenting any type of cohesive argument about what the main stakes were in each polemic issue discussed. One can quickly gather that the reason for this failure is that in an attempt to cover every issue, the editors were unable to present to the audience with a clear understanding of which were the most important issues – that is, even the most recognizable debates were lost in a number of articles that addressed other questions.

Although this fault is somewhat excusable considering the aims of the editors, there is another fundamental problem with the book. There is a clear selection bias in terms of which articles were chosen and by what author. As a result, the aim of truly presenting the full spectrum of opinions with regards to Saudi society and politics is not truly met.

However, the book does provide certain advantages. For one, it addresses controversial issues in Saudi Arabia, such as the role of women and how the government should react to Islamist elements in the country and the region.

Interestingly for example, one article addressing the progress women have made in pursuing certain rights is contextualized within greater trends of change in Saudi Arabia. The ability of the author to attribute the growth of reform minded individuals to greater socio-political events, such as the Gulf War and 911/, is illustrative of the type of article that truly sheds light on the nature of the Saudi State. Analytical and objective, the article is cable of providing a coherent argument to a reader that is probably less aware of the norms that drive Saudi society.

However, this type of article was not the norm, and others provided more of a personal opinion on what should be done in Saudi Arabia. In other words, instead of writing objectively, there were articles that presented an agenda or lacked the necessary evidence to

support their argument. Consequently, the overall calibre of research behind the book as a whole was limited.

One such example was that of an article that claimed a modern Koran was a necessary step for Arabs to forge the future. The main argument in this article was that Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, needed “a more dynamic and educated grasp of language in order to bring meaningful change and free them from received religions interpretations...

Only when the Koran is rewritten in a modern Arabic that is fully understood by the masses, will society and faith flourish once more”. While the argument presented by Fawaz Turki does raise important questions about the power and influence of religion, and the dangers of fundamentalist interpretations, the solution he provides is unrealistic.

Not just for the Koran, but for any holy book to be rewritten or translated is a controversial and difficult task.

That aside, it is highly unlikely that a translation into Modern Arabic would limit extreme interpretations. Even the writer himself notes that “A progressive Muslim would interpret his faith progressively, and a reactionary would interpret it in an intemperate narrow minded way”. As such, the argument is not only inconsistent, and unrealistic, but in terms of the light that it casts on Saudi Arabia itself is quite limited. Although this is not to say that the problems Saudi Arabia faces are not regional in scope, the place of this article in a book that aims to provide further insight into the intricacies of Saudi Arabia is questionable. The Kingdom thus, despite its aims and efforts, results in an unsatisfactory read for those looking for balanced, up-to-date, and coherent literature on Saudi Arabia.

52

Reviews - Books

Readings Books The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989

Cover

Jeffrey A. Engel Oxford University Press, USA October 22, 2009

The fall of the Berlin wall is one of the most important events in modern history. It marked the fall of communism and gave birth to new democracies in Eastern Europe. This book examines this world-changing event from various perspectives, providing important insight on the value of this momentous event on the political power balance of the world at the time, and the legacy it created.

Cover

It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower Michela Wrong Harper June 16, 2009

This book tells the story of John Githongo, a journalist and activist who joined newly elected Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki's administration in 2003 as the anti-corruption czar. Its our Turn to Eat explores Githongo's journey, readers watch his reformist hopes fade away as he becomes growingly convinced of the corruption in Kenya.

Reports Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists Jayshree Bajoria Council on Foreign Relations October 26, 2009

Terrorism has been redefined in Pakistan, giving birth to new terrorist groups and allowing older groups to re-establish themselves in the region.

Pakistan has been witnessing an increasing number of suicide attacks – a clear sign of the deteriorating security situation in a nuclear armed country.

This report explores the changing face of terrorism in Pakistan and the threat it poses to the US’s goals of creating stability in the region.

Podcast Women in Afghanistan Human Rights Watch December 4, 2009

The conditions of Afghan women are among the worst in the world and continue to worsen. Afghan women's rights activist Mary Akrami and Human rights watch researcher Rachel Reid comment on the situation and ask the United States to be held responsible to its commitments in Afghanistan.

Issue 1536

53

Reviews - Reports

Stormy Weather The Middle East: Intractable Conflict?

Strategic Update LSE IDEAS November 2009

LSE provides an in depth analysis of Middle Eastern politics, shedding light on the conflicting ideologies in Iraq, and the stumbling peace process in Palestine.

T

he Middle East has long been diseased with an ever-changing political framework.

The London School of Economics has issued a strategic update composed of 5 reports, each addressing a different viewpoint about Middle Eastern Politics, and more specifically on the prospects of conflicts in the region.

The first report lays down an introductory framework for the reader shedding light on the different issues that make the region a troublesome one. However, informative as the introduction might be, it is not without shortcomings. The introductory segment provides an elaborate analysis of the state-building efforts in Afghanistan by NATO and the international community.

The introduction also mentions the Turkish pursuit of EU membership as 11 December, 2009

parts of the Middle Eastern "Regional Turbulence". These two discussions bring up questions concerning the proper geographic definitions of the Middle East. The introduction should have clarified the difference between the "The Broader Middle East" in which Afghanistan and Turkey are included and the conventional definition of the region. Furthermore, no mention of Afghanistan and Turkey is made " Tacitly, suicide operations – a relatively new mode of action in the region – became the key to carrying out this reorietated Jihad.

This tactic of martyrdom through suicide was transported into the Arab world by the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah ..."

throughout the rest of the report, which makes bringing them up in the introduction questionable.

The following 4 reports address Middle Eastern conflicts through different persepectives. The first report discusses Political Islam in the region, taking Iraq as a case study. Gilles Kepel, provides a chronological development for the evolution of the concept of Jihad. Kepel argues in an almost cynical way that the reason behind Jihad's movement against what he calls the "faraway enemy" is its failure to mobilize the masses internally, thus resulting in attacks like those of 911/. This could be considered a parochial analysis of Jihad's motives, since according to Kepel himself, Jihad has evolved, which in turn implies that Jihad's religious ideologies have changed their target, not out of failure 54

Reviews - Reports but as a result of a change in priorities.

In other words, a bigger threat has surfaced.

The report's most significant drawback is its failure to differentiate between radicalism, Jihad, and terrorism, which results in a stereotypical generalization that radicalism, is Jihad and that Jihad, is a form of terrorism. The report also discusses the other side of the coin, the U.S.’s War on Terror which, according to Kepel, is a manifestation of both terrorism and the Bush's political agenda. Kepel accordingly concludes that both the Jihadist and CounterTerrorism approaches have proved futile in Iraq, which in turn has led to Obama's new plans of a scheduled pullout from Iraq.

The second report tackles the shift in Hamas' policies pertaining to the ArabIsraeli conflict, giving hope that there might in fact be a light at the end of the tunnel. Fawaz Gerges brilliantly demonstrates how Hamas has managed to use its religious ideology to serve new purposes, hence coping with the international pressure and the new variables in its relationship with Israel.

Hamas' acceptance of a truce shows how its ideologies have changed to achieve political goals that would be impossible otherwise. Gerges differentiates between Hamas and AlQaeda, showing the difference between religion-based paramilitary resistance and terrorism. Gerges however fails to elaborate on Fatah's role in diverting Hamas' policies, being the domestic opposing force, in addition to regional mediation's role in toning down Hamas' ideologies, which still refuses to acknowledge Israel as a state.

The strategic update then discusses the Jordanian role in the Middle East peace process, and specifically the Arab Israeli conflict under the notion that "Jordan is Palestine". According to Nigel Ashton, Jordan has much at stake when it comes to the Palestinian impasse with Israel, both economically and politically.

However, Ashton argues throughout his report that Jordan's involvement in the dilemma will not exceed a certain level, hence remaining largely un-influential.

Thus, despite Jordan's strong diplomatic ties with many all the involved parties, namely the United States, Israel and Fatah, it still has minimal ability to influence the peace process. This goes back to Jordanian fear of another backlash resulting from the conflict, like what occurred during the Gaza war in December 2008. The report generally provides a good analysis of Jordanian involvement and political interest in the conflict, although it ignores regionally influential parties like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This could be considered Issue 1536

"After 911/, George Bush ...produced a grand narrative, that of the war on terror, which used the opportunity of 911/ to push its own agenda: to remake the Middle East". a major fault in the report’s analytical framework.

The final report handles the question of whether a new twist in the Arab Israeli conflict is to be expected. The report discusses the different variables and factors affecting the conflict. Amnon Aran argues that Ehud Barack and Benjamin Netanyahu are the major decision makers in the Israeli system and hence the conflict with Palestine.

Barack and Netanyahu are however, on different ends of the spectrum, with Barack refusing negotiation while Netanyahu endorses them. The shift in policies towards the right in Israel is also discussed, in addition to the Palestinian division that is considered a result of Hamas' political rigidness. This

could be considered a contradiction to Fawaz Gerges' hypothesis pertaining to Hamas' policy shift. The report also digresses into demonstrating the American influence on the conflict.

However, like Nigel Ashton's report, Aran ignores regional influence and negotiation efforts.

Despite the inconsistency between its reports, and overlooking several vital factors in Middle Eastern politics, LSE's strategic update provides great in-depth analysis of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict and the war-torn Iraqi state.

For the full report please refer to: www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/ reports/SU003.aspx" 55

The Political Essay

Hit First

But let us definitely talk later The increase in troop numbers is not recognition by the Obama Administration that there should be no negotiations with the Taliban. It is however an implicit acknowledgment that, in order to talk with the Taliban, there is the need to break them first. An ultimate defeat of the Taliban is unrealistic, and only when the Taliban suffer several strategic setbacks will they consider sitting at the negotiating table.

T

he reactions and issues that were raised, within the United States and beyond, regarding Obama’s decision of sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan revealed the complexity of the assessment the US Administration faced. Several variables played into the decision, first and foremost the financial issues for such a costly war and whether or not NATO allies would also contribute with more troops. Several concerns in the ground also had to be evaluated, such as the prospects of Karzai’s government “new face” being really new, and whether or not it can be expected that Pakistan is more serious than ever in doing its part of the job. Among all these variables, and implicit in the strategy that comes along with adding more troops to the surge, is the central issue of diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. This possibility has been the main topic for debate in the US about Afghanistan, and rightly so. The main question is whether it is achievable, and how.

The increase in troop numbers is not recognition by the Obama Administration that there should be no negotiations with the Taliban. It is however an implicit acknowledgment that, in order to talk with the Taliban, there is a need to break them first. Or at least, to use the phrase that is now being coined, to “break their momentum.”

Indeed, as Mullah Omar has repeatedly affirmed, the Taliban will never negotiate. At least they won’t while they think they can win. Thus, there is the need to put real pressure on the Taliban and make them suffer several strategic setbacks for the Taliban to even consider the possibility of sitting at the table.

Several concerns were expressed regarding the 2011 deadline set out

by Obama. Critics argued that it will embolden the Taliban and convince them that they just need patience because the US will soon be gone. These 11 December, 2009

tentative date “to change the nature of the relationship” with the Afghan forces, but he was also clear that the US “will not abandon Afghanistan as we did in 1989”, once the soviets withdrew.

Manuel Almeida critiques are misplaced. The deadline sends the message that the United States will not stay in Afghanistan forever in the present conditions as the main military and security force fighting the Taliban. The Afghan military and policy forces are being trained to gradually take over from the US and NATO allies, but the deadline makes the point that this transition cannot take a decade. It also sends a very explicit warning to the Afghan government and places pressure on Karzai who, after a rigged election, has been trying to pass the image that from now on things will be different, in particular regarding the levels of corruption and the issue accountability (or lack thereof).

It soon became clear after Obama’s announcement that the deadline was more symbolic than anything else.

If there are any doubts that this date is a political move rather than a defined military strategy, these were dissipated by the declarations by Gates and Clinton following Obama’s announcement. In CBS’s Face the Nation, both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were clear that 2011 is the date set to begin the transfer of responsibilities to the Afghans. This is dependent on the “conditions on the ground”, and the decision of whether or not to start sending troops home will ultimately depend on the assessment by the US military commanders in the field. Gates added that 2011 is a

Thus, with the 30,000 US reinforcements plus at least 5,000 from NATO allies, the whole allied force will comprise more than 140,000 troops.

In addition, there are roughly 95,000 Afghan army troops, an equal number of Afghan police members, and there are plans to expand both the Afghan army and police forces. These numbers, at least according to the calculations of the commanders in the field, should be enough to decisively change the course of the war. Moreover, an Iraqistyle strategy prepared according to the specific circumstances of Afghanistan, as the Petraeus counter insurgency field manual advises, is being designed.

It consists in placing armed groups trained by NATO under government supervision. Their main goal would be the protection of their communities from the Taliban.

It is already consensual that an ultimate defeat of the Taliban is unrealistic. It’s too big a country with too adverse a geography to make such an achievement likely. Though a good case can be made that there is a difference between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban, especially when considering leadership and goals, in these circumstances it might not be a useful distinction. The Afghan Taliban easily move into Pakistan through the countries’ porous borders. The fact that Mullah Omar operates from Quetta in Pakistan explains it all. And all this justifies the need to negotiate. This number of forces, plus an increase in the quality and reliability of Afghan police and military, should be enough to pressure the Taliban and convince them that they have no other option but to sit at the negotiating table.

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11 December, 2009