issue 1543 EN

Khamenei’s Uncertain Future Karim Sadjadpour

The Kiss of Judas Anwar Al-Awlaki American Born, Radical Cleric and Terrorist Recruiter

The Neverending Story John Cooke

How

Al-Qaeda Turned Algerian By Jean Pierre Filiu

Issues 1543, 29 January 2010

Editorial

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Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz

Established by Hisham and Mohamad Ali Hafez

Editor-in-Chief

ADEL Al TORAIFI

Managing Director TARIK ALGAIN

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Dear Readers, elcome to The Majalla Digital, this week our issue W brings to you an analysis of al Qaeda’s role in

Algeria. Professor Jean Pierre Filiu’s feature draws from Algerian history to explain how al Qaeda’s infiltration in the country grew and stymied between the 1990s until today.

To complement this article, we have also invited Karim Sadjapour, associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to examine the uncertain fate of Khamenei in Iran. After suffering damage to his reputation, his vast network remains intact for the moment, although his future rests largely in the hands of the revolutionary guards.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

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Sincerely,

Adel Al Toraifi Editor-in-Chief

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Issues 1543

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Contents 08 Geopolitics Khamenei’s Uncertain Future

11 In Brief Around The World Quotes Of The Week Magazine Round Up Letters

18 Features How Al-Qaeda Turned Algerian

25 Debate Al Qaeda in Algeria

28 Ideas A Sorry State of Affairs

THE MAJALLA EDITORIAL TEAM London Bureau Chief Manuel Almeida Cairo Bureau Chief Ahmed Ayoub Editors Paula Mejia Stephen Glain Wessam Sherif Daniel Capparelli Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Webmaster Mohamed Saleh 29 January, 2010

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33

33 People Profile

The Kiss of Judas - Anwar Al-Awlaki Issue 1543, 29 January 2010

37 Economics Arab Economics Thanks, But No Thanks!

International Investor The Neverending Story Markets

Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words

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07

Geopolitics

Khamenei’s Uncertain Future A lonelier road for Iran’s Supreme Leader

While before the presidential elections it appeared that Khamenei would remain Supreme Leader for life, his fate is far less certain today, and he is openly defied by reformist leaders, faces dissent from top ayatollahs, and is contested in public demonstrations. Despite the damage to his reputation, Khamenei’s vast and potent network remains for the moment intact, and his future rests largely in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards.

A

mong the numerous casualties of Iran’s tainted 2009 presidential elections was the legitimacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While for two decades Khamenei had attempted to cultivate an image of an impartial and magnanimous guide staying above the political fray, his defiant public support for hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad— amidst massive popular uprisings and unprecedented fissures amongst the country’s political elites—exposed him as a petty, partisan autocrat.

At a popular level, previously sacred taboos were shattered, as hundreds of thousands of Iranians defied Khamenei’s unveiled threats against protestors by taking to the streets chanting “death to the dictator” and even “death to Khamenei.” Widely seen images of government-sanctioned brutality against civilians—such as the horrific murder of 27-year-old Neda agha Soltan—as well as persistent allegations of torture, rape, and forced confessions in prison have undermined Khamenei’s image as a “just” spiritual leader among Iran’s pious classes. Widespread allegations of the growing role of his son Mojtaba, considered a key Ahmadinejad ally, in Iran’s repressive security apparatus have further tarnished Khamenei’s public image.

At a political level, once respectful subordinates—including reformist leaders Mohammed Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mir Hossein Mousavi— now openly defy Khamenei, refusing to renounce claims of electoral fraud and brutality. Previously restrained critics have turned vociferous. The 29 January, 2010

with billions of dollars in assets— in addition to the millions more his office receives in charitable donations offered to Iran’s holy shrines.

Karim Sadjadpour late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, Iran’s most senior cleric and once the heir apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini, denounced Khamenei as an “unqualified and illegitimate” leader. Abdul Karim Soroush, Iran’s most prominent religious intellectual (currently in exile), lambasted Khamenei as a “cheating, treacherous murderer…cursed with doom.” Unprecedented dissent even came from within the Assembly of Experts, the 86-cleric body that has the constitutional authority to anoint and remove the Supreme Leader and is headed by Khamenei’s rival Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Despite the damage to his reputation, Khamenei’s vast and potent network remains for the moment intact. The country’s most powerful institutions—the Revolutionary Guards, presidency, Parliament, Guardian Council, and judiciary—continue to be led by individuals either directly appointed

by Khamenei or deeply loyal to him.

Khamenei also retains enormous influence over the Iranian economy.

He has more say than anyone how the country’s vast oil revenue (nearly $300 billion during Ahmadinejad’s first term) is spent and has jurisdiction over the country’s bonyads—statecontrolled religious foundations

Given his deep mistrust of both foreign powers and his own population, Khamenei, despite his clerical garb, has grown to rely on the support of the intelligence, security, and military apparatus far more than the clergy. As commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards, he handpicks the organization’s senior command and shuffles them regularly, overseeing their rapid rise to become Iran’s most powerful political and economic institution.

With the seemingly firm support of the country’s security apparatus, Khamenei has refused to cede any political ground since the election, long believing that compromise projects weakness and invites further pressure. His defiance is not cost free, however. For the last two decades, his modus operandi had been to wield power without accountability. Despite enjoying the lion’s share of Iran’s constitutional authority, because of the high profile of the Iranian president both at home and abroad, Khamenei has never borne proper responsibility for Iran’s economic malaise, political repression, and social restrictions. After the June elections, however, Khamenei no longer enjoys this immunity.

In addition to his domestic travails, Khamenei is facing unprecedented international scrutiny. While during the Bush administration much of the international community criticized Washington for not engaging Tehran, Barack Obama has arguably made 08

Geopolitics more of an effort to change the tone and context of the U.S.-Iran relationship more than any American president since 1979.

In addition to numerous rhetorical overtures to the “Islamic Republic of Iran”—the first U.S. president to acknowledge Iran’s post revolutionary name—Obama sent two private letters to Khamenei reiterating Washington’s desire to overcome past mistrust and build confidence with Tehran. Obama also trod carefully during Iran’s postelection uprising, resisting calls to support the opposition.

Yet Khamenei’s responses to U.S. overtures have been at best noncommittal, if not downright cynical.

In his public messages he has mocked Obama’s mantra of change as merely a tactical shift, saying Washington must first change its actions—by lifting sanctions, unfreezing Iranian assets, diluting support for Israel, and ceasing criticism of Iran—to show its seriousness. In his private communications U.S. officials claim that Khamenei’s delayed response to President Obama’s letter, received one month later, offered “nothing concrete to act upon”.

Behind closed doors, senior Iranian officials concede that Obama’s overtures have been unsettling for Khamenei, putting pressure on him to justify Tehran’s continued animosity toward the United States. “If we can’t make nice with Barack Hussein Obama,” said one Iranian official, “who is preaching mutual respect on a weekly basis and sending us noerooz greetings, it’s going to be pretty obvious that the problem lies in Tehran, not Washington.”

While before the presidential elections it appeared that Khamenei would remain Supreme Leader for life, his fate is far less certain today.

Aside from nagging questions about his allegedly poor health, Khamenei has never commanded the same loyalty and respect of his peers Issues 1543

afforded to his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini. His chief rival Rafsanjani, publicly humiliated as a corrupt traitor by Ahmadinejad, waits in the wings for an opportunity to pounce.

In a nation whose largest political affiliation is jokingly referred to as the hezb-e baad, i.e. the wind party, Khamenei’s current supporters could quickly abandon ranks if they felt stronger political winds blowing elsewhere.

Still, no matter the depth of popular discontent and outrage, it’s difficult to imagine a scenario whereby Khamenei would one day peacefully abdicate power or go into exile, as the Shah did three decades ago. Indeed, one important lesson that Khamenei learned while

revolting against the Shah is never to compromise under pressure. For when the Shah attempted to mollify demonstrators when he went on state television in late 1978 and admitted to past transgressions—famously declaring that he’d “heard the voice” of the revolution—he unwittingly emboldened them.

What’s more, whereas much of the Shah’s political, military, and intelligence elite—including the Shah himself—were educated in the United States and Europe and had other options when the Pahlavi monarchy began to crumble, the Islamic Republic’s elite—including Khamenei himself—spent their formative years in the seminaries of Qom and on the battlefield against Iraq. Lacking options abroad, it’s always been assumed they won’t relinquish power without a bloody fight.

Khamenei’s Iran is no longer an Islamic Republic, but a tightknit cartel of hardline clergymen and nouvea ruiche Revolutionary Guardsmen. Indeed, despite his pretensions as a religious leader, today Khamenei’s future rests largely in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. While growing fissures and dissent among top ayatollahs in Qom is certainly worrisome for Khamenei, dissent and fissures among top Revolutionary Guard commanders would be fatal for him. Though at the moment they seemingly remain loyal to him, as the economic situation continues to deteriorate and popular outrage persists, Khamenei himself must know that his position as Supreme Leader looks less supreme than ever before.

Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Regular contributor to BBC World TV and Radio and CNN. Has written for the Economist, Washington Post, New York Times, and International Herald Tribune 09

In Brief Around The World

Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Letters

Š getty images

Rational Fears Tensions on the Lebanese – Israeli scene have escalated following the recent Israeli army military exercises on the northern border, giving rise to speculations concerning a military strike on Lebanon in the near future, despite French assurances to the Lebanese government to the contrary.

Driving these concerns is information received by Lebanon that Tel Aviv is preparing for military action against Lebanese territory, including an increase in training conducted by the Israeli army on the northern border adjacent to Lebanon. Hezbollah have responded to the exercises Issues 1543

mobilizing their ranks to a state of "full alert" in case of any sudden Israeli operation aimed at the party headquarters and other positions.

Syria is reported to have called up their reserve troops and declared a state of preparedness in its army.

With Hezbollah's commitment not to launch any missiles or military operations against Israel since the end of the July 2006 war, Israel has no reason to justify launching a strike against Lebanon. But political analysts do not rule out the possibility that Israel might wage a war on Hezbollah considering that it is currently under the rule of an Israeli extreme right-wing

government headed by Netanyahu and Lieberman. According to a report on Israel Radio, a senior official in the Israeli army has denied any intention of a military targeting of Lebanon.

Saad Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister, met several days ago with Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, and received assurances that Paris will work on preventing Israel from striking the infrastructure in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries have been trying to convince the U.S. administration to pressure Israel not to take any military action against Lebanon.

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In Brief - Around The World

Around The World

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3 Sri Lanka

1 Russia Talks between U.S. and Russian diplomats over a new arms control treaty were resumed in Switzerland. U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev indicated last week that the new treaty was nearly agreed upon and could be finalized within a few weeks.

2 United Kingdom The UK economy finally returned to growth in the fourth quarter of last year, after the deepest recession since records began more than half a century ago, but at a far weaker rate than expected. The economy grew by 0.1 percent in the final three months of the year, as both the service sector and manufacturing saw output rise.

29 January, 2010

Sri Lanka elected President Mahinda Rajapaksa to a second term in the country's first peacetime presidential election in more than two decades according to state television.

Rajapaksa's opponent, Gen. Sarath Fonseka, did not immediately concede defeat and accused the incumbent of intimidation.Official results however indicat that Rajapaksa has garnered more than 50 percent of the vote needed to avoid a runoff.

4 Venezuela Protests over media freedom continued in Venezuela a day after two student protesters were killed in separate clashes.

Student leaders opposed to cable operators' decision to drop five television channels, including an opposition station, for failure to follow broadcast laws pleaded for an end to the violence at a demonstration in front of the state-run broadcaster. The Interior Ministry designated four investigators to look into the shooting deaths of the two students in the western state of Merida.

5 Nigeria US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has blamed failings by Nigerian leaders for increasing "radicalization" among young Nigerians. She pointed to poor living standards and "unbelievable" corruption. Mrs. Clinton made this announcement after a young Nigerian man from a wealthy family was accused of trying to blow up a plane over the US on Christmas Day 12

In Brief - Around The World

8 France 1

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9 Jordan

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6 Israel Israeli prime minister has taken part in tree-planting ceremonies in the West Bank while declaring Israel will never leave those areas. Benjamin Netanyahu said the Jewish settlements blocs would always remain part of the state of Israel. His remarks came hours after a visit by US envoy George Mitchell who is trying to reopen peace talks between Israel and Palestinians.

Issues 1543

French lawmakers recommended a partial ban on any veils that cover the face, including the burqa, the full-body covering worn by some Muslim women. According to a French parliamentary commission, the ban would apply in public places like hospitals and schools, and on public transport.

Jordan's King Abdullah II urged US President Barack Obama to intensify efforts for achieving tangible progress towards the two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The monarch made the remark during a telephone conversation which was initiated by Obama, according to a royal court statement.

7 North Korea

10 Afghanistan

North Korea has fired artillery shots near the disputed sea border with South Korea and the South has returned fire. The North fired shells into the sea near Baengnyeong Island off the the South's western coast, South Korean news agency Yonhap said. North Korea said the firing was part of an annual military drill, adding that it would continue.

The United Nations has removed five former Afghan Taliban officials from its sanctions list which was imposed because of alleged links to al-Qaeda. The UN said the five would no longer be subject to international travel bans and a freeze on their assets.

Separately, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said a fixed date to pull troops from Afghanistan would be a mistake.

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In Brief - Quotes Of The Week

Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Magazine Round Up

"There is no blueprint that can get the political processes moving forward" Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, referring to the progress of the Middle East peace process.

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"In order to continue dialogue, no one should be isolated" Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavarov reiterating on the importance involving all parties in the Middle East peace process negotiations.

"What we want above all is a commitment on the development and the building of our capacities against radicalization" Yemen's foreign minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, stating his country's intentions prior to the meeting in London to discuss the rising threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen.

"As with all aspects of the fight against terrorism, this new threat can be met only through enhanced cooperation" Gordon Brown highlighting the danger posed by terrorism in Yemen, which might pave the road to the rise of al-Qaeda 29 January, 2010

1 Newsweek The Fight Over "Allah"

This article tackles Malaysia's steady rising racial and religious consciousness among Muslim Malays.

The interethnic chaos in Malaysia is getting closer to becoming a reality fortifying the fears of Malays, since this month 10 churches were attacked around the country following a civil-court ruling on New Year's Eve declaring that a law prohibiting non-Muslims from using the word "Allah" to describe their God was unconstitutional. This brings up a controversy, since Christian Malays have long used the same word to describe god. Hence, the sudden spark of religious animosity in the country that has been known for religious tolerance is under Question.

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2

2 Time When Economic Indicators aren't worth that much Justin Fox argues that the recent economic depression might have caused people to ignore that the world is changing, and that economic indicators might not be as accurate as perceived.

Economic indicators to Fox are but a way to explain and increase one's understanding of the economy, yet they may not be of much help when it comes to forecasting Economic future. Consequently, Fox refutes the advice that believes in "focusing on the trends and ignoring the noise", since when trends reverse, the context of the economy takes precedence.

3 Foreign Affairs Not so Dire Straits This essay in the current issue of Foreign Affairs argues whether or not the American government should continue supporting Taiwan in its faceoff with China given the new political situation.

China and Taiwan have been walking down intersecting economic and political paths, increasing the bond between the two nations. This novel relationship presents a challenge to the American ambitions of balancing the Chinese influence in the region.

3

4 The New Republic Turf Warrior The recent terrorism attempt against an American flight has caused public opinion upheaval against American security measures generally and intelligence in particular. This article studies the possibilities of saving the American faltering intelligence, that has been in worsening condition under Dennis Blair's administration.

The article further discusses the context in which admiral Blair became the director of the American national intelligence and the variables that have lead to the widening of the rifts in the government.

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Cover Of The Week

Cover of the Week The New Yorker

A Little While Edwige Danticat in this issue of the New Yorker magnificently delivers the story of her deceased cousin who used to live in Haiti. Danticat decorates the story with the consequence of events prior to and after the quakes in Haitit, demonstrating not only a the dire humanitarian situation, but also a Issues 1543

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In Brief - Letters

LAST ISSUE

Letters

Rigging The Game

Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks Lebanon is now at a period of stability, especially under wise management, headed by Saad Hariri, and is expected to continue this period for a long time ..

It is great thing that the national companies tries to benefit to great extent from its resources but I think they would face a lot of obstacles from the international companies which would ask their countries to interfere by any means

Mohamed Alkalany

Signals from the Royal Court

samer khayat

King abd allah is very moderate and talented king , where he knew that the only way to make his country go forward takes place by getting rid of extreme thoughts and he is trying to get rid of this thoughts by teaching his people the right thoughts .

New Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is still trying to find a safe and correct path for the country among various political and religious currents which only care for their political gains.

It is good news that Saudi Arabia's s current ruler will soften religious restrictions in the kingdom and will introduce new legislations to give women their rights among other examples.

Salim Al-Mutairi

29 January, 2010

Magid mohamadie

Radwa Zidan 16

In Brief - Magazine Round Up

Issues 1543

15

Features

Š getty images

29 January, 2010

18 18

How

Al-Qaeda Turned Algerian

By Jean Pierre Filiu

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19

Features

How Al-Qaeda Turned Algerian

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Jean Pierre Filiu

Drawing from Algeria’s history, Filiu explains how Al-Qaeda’s infiltration in the country grew and stymied between the 90’s until today.

© getty images

the morning of April 11, O n2007, the center of Algiers was

shaken by a devastating blast, when a suicide-car exploded in front of the Government palace. At the same moment, two other terror attacks occurred in the eastern suburbs of the capital city, hitting two security stations. The casualty toll quickly reached 30, with hundreds more injured. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility for the slaughter and pledged to “liberate the land of Islam” from the “crusaders” and their “apostate” allies. A jihadi website broadcast the pictures of the three kamikazes, the only one to show his face was identified as Marwan Boudina, a 29 January, 2010

petty delinquent radicalized by a charismatic imam, a teenager from the populous outskirts of Algiers, who died under the war moniker of Moaz Bin Jabal.

The shock for the Algerian society was terrible. Even at the climax of the political violence, during the “black decade” of the nineties, suicide-attacks had been unknown (the only exception was probably the result of a mistake, with the terrorist exploding unexpectedly with the bomb he was carrying). The horrors of the civil war with the Islamist guerrillas were supposed to be buried in the past and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, had conceived a “law

of civil reconciliation” that was massively approved by referendum.

Six years later, President Bouteflika had expanded his initiative through a “Charter for peace and national reconciliation”, also endorsed by referendum. Now jihadi terror was, under the banner of Al-Qaeda, striking Algiers again.

To understand this whole process, one has to move back in Algeria’s recent history, to October 1988 when social riots flared in the capital city. It was then that the young and disenfranchised protesters were emulating the Palestinian “stones revolution” against the Israeli occupation: they provoked 20

Features the security forces with bricks and slingshots, they challenged the one-party system of the National Liberation Front (FLN), they denounced the widespread corruption and the economic fiasco, despite all the oil wealth. But this social intifada was crushed without mercy and hundreds of rioters were killed. The FLN monopoly was however obsolete and other parties had to be legalized, including the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS), a coalition of the different shades of political Islam. The FIS considered Algeria to be still “colonized”, at least culturally, and pledged to restore the “Islamic identity” of the country by fighting the “party of France” (hizb Fransa), namely the secular, progressive and Frenchspeaking elite.

the jihadi cells launched violent attacks on civil servants and secular intellectuals.

They eventually coalesced in October 1992 into the Islamic Armed Group (GIA), while the FIS established its own military wing, the Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS). Osama Bin Laden had then been expelled from Saudi Arabia and, from his new base in Sudan, he was beefing up Al-Qaeda all over the Muslim world. But his openings to the GIA were not reciprocated, because even the die-hard jihadis refused any non-Algerian interference into their fight against the Algerian regime.

The GIA became also engulfed in a bloody spiral of massacres, first against pro-government localities, then against rival FIS strongholds, ultimately against dissident jihadi groups.

The FIS was betting on the dynamics of democratization to achieve its Islamist goals and this gamble on “political jihad” gained momentum after the landslide FIS victory at the municipal elections of April 1990. But a vocal minority was calling for “military jihad” against the “infidels” and they paraded some of their militants in “Afghan” attire (kohl-lined eyes, henna-tainted beard, sharwal and kamis), presenting them as veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. On the side of the regime, President Chadli Bendjedid was genuine in his commitment to political liberalization, but the military nomenklatura, widely described as the “decision-makers” (décideurs) by the Algerian public, became increasingly wary of the Islamist rising tide. FIS won the first round of the legislative elections in December 1991 but, before the second round could take place, the Army leadership deposed President Bendjedid, put him under house arrest and “suspended” the electoral process.

Security forces rounded up thousands of FIS militants and followers, while the “Afghan” networks went underground and

Confusion also prevailed on the side of the regime, where one of the FLN founding members, Mohammed Boudiaf, was brought back from his exile in Morocco to be the new head of state. But he was killed by his own bodyguard in June 1992, in murky circumstances.

So Algeria came to be ruled by a collective leadership, out of which General Liamine Zeroual emerged as the strongest man.

Issues 1543

victory over the jihadi insurgency before the end of his four-year term and he decided to step down from the presidency. The tremendous toll of the civil war was estimated between one hundred and two hundred thousand persons killed, but the human cost of the conflict was aggravated by the massive exile of part of the French-speaking urban class, who fled the jihadi terror overseas, as far as Canada.

Zeroual’s successor in April 1999 was Abdelaziz Bouteflika, minister of Foreign affairs during the seventies, the “golden age” of the FLN rule. But Bouteflika ran as an “independent” candidate and reaped three-quarters of the vote (his challengers had withdrawn in protest against a “set-up” election).

He pledged to devote most of the oil revenues to healing the open wounds of the civil war. His “law of civil reconciliation” was widely endorsed because a majority of the Algerian population wanted, more than anything else, to close the chapter of the “black decade”.

In November 1995, the first multi-party presidential elections gave 61% of the votes to Zeroual, while a non-FIS Islamist challenger reached 25%. Zeroual had then the legitimacy and the clout to push for negotiations with the FIS and to stop the now full-fledged civil war. In September 1997, the FIS proclaimed a cease-fire, while the GIA, increasingly isolated, became even more violent, with a horrifying string of mass slaughters. One of the GIA commanders, Hassan Hattab, condemned the blood-shed and led an offshoot faction, called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), in September 1998.

This open-hand policy towards repentant jihadis who laid down their weapons came along with increased military pressure on the defiant groups. The decline of the GIA appeared irreversible and its Saharan branch switched to the GSPC, becoming the last jihadi organization to challenge the Algerian state. Hattab was obsessed by the preservation of his outfit and he kept a low-profile on the international arena, while focusing his attacks on the security forces.

But he found troubles trying to rein the GSPC commandos in Southern Algeria, they kept roaming in the Saharan desert, from Mauritania to Mali, and even Tunisia or Libya.

Their smuggling of drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants was quite profitable, but their abduction of Western tourists proved even more lucrative.

General Zeroual could claim

Hattab’s prestige as GSPC leader 21

Features was tarnished by the defiant stand of his Saharan subordinates, but also by the criticism of younger militants, Nabil Sahrawi and Abdelmalik Drukdal, who were fascinated by Al-Qaeda. In August 2003, Hattab was forced to step down in favor of Sahrawi, who was killed later in a security ambush, leaving Drukdal as the undisputed leader of the GSPC. Bin Laden, after years of being rebuffed by xenophobic jihadis in Algeria, had finally found potential partners. But Drukdal’s role model was less Al-Qaeda’s founder than was Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of its Iraqi branch. Drukdal even chose a war moniker echoing Zarqawi’s, Abu Musab Abdel Wadud (both nicknames refer to Musab Bin Umayr, who died as a martyr during the battle of Uhud in 625). Between the Eastern and the Western Abu Musab, cooperation increased, even though they never met face to face.

The GSPC became the regional hub for Al-Qaeda in Iraq, channeling volunteers from all over North Africa to join the “blessed jihad” against the US occupation. Zarqawi reciprocated by abducting and executing two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad, in July 2005. The US command considered that onequarter of the kamikazes in Iraq in 2005 came from North Africa, mainly through the GSPC. Drukdal then decided to apply for a formal merger with Al-Qaeda.

He was looking for enhanced international visibility through the Al-Qaeda inspired websites, but he was also hoping to deflect the impact of the “national reconciliation” among his own followers. Even Hattab, the GSPC’s founder, had answered positively to President Bouteflika’s call to end the violence.

So Drukdal went global to escape this political trap where all jihadi groups were falling one after the other.

He pledged public allegiance to 29 January, 2010

Algerian rescue workers search through the rubble of destroyed buildings near the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) offices © getty images

Algerian President Liamine Zeroual © getty images

Bin Laden in September 2006 and GSPC officially turned into “AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) in January 2007. The triple suicide bombing in Algiers in April stunned both society and regime.

But the worst was yet to come: on December 11, 2007, there were two simultaneous attacks struck the Constitutional Court and the UN regional headquarters.

President Bouteflika had been reelected in April 2004 with 85% of the votes and he had earmarked a significant part of the oil bonanza, in

order to launch a colossal program of public infrastructures across Algeria. He felt his capital and his international status were being challenged. So the security apparatus went back on the offensive and mopped up isolated jihadi cells in 2008, thus containing AQIM into the ominous “death triangle” (the three provinces of Boumerdes, Bouira and Tizi Ouzou, where Drukdal and his associates are based, east of Algiers).

The dynamics of recruitment induced by the anti-US jihad in the Middle East collapsed with the 22

Features mixed, with Mauritanian, Malian, Libyan or even Chadian members.

Despite the superficial religious rhetoric, the main activity of these highly-mobile commandos is illegal smuggling, with occasional hitand-run operations against the local security forces. The abduction of Western nationals became highly profitable, not only for the Saharan branch, but for AQIM as a whole.

There was only one case when a British tourist was executed in May 2009, under direct pressure from AlQaeda’s top leadership, who wanted to “retaliate” against the “Crusaders’ crimes”.

Algerian High State Council President Mohamed Boudiaf © getty images

Ali Hussain Kafi © getty images

crisis of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, where the nationalist insurgency turned against Bin Laden’s followers. Drukdal could no longer plug his network into this pool of potential militants, and he was also frustrated in his efforts to integrate jihadi groups from Morocco and Tunisia. So AQIM failed to live up to its commitment to expand the GSPC into the “Islamic Maghreb” and it was also frustrated in its repeated attempts to export its terror North of the Mediterranean: European security services were on the alert and actively cooperating against AQIM that tried in vain to Issues 1543

attract and recruit new members.

Drukdal was then forced to rely much more on its Saharan branch, run from Southern Algeria by one of his most loyal commanders, Yahya Djouadi. But the two major military units (katiba), even though they have safe havens on Algerian soil, are focused on neighboring countries, Mauritania for Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s katiba, and Mali for Abu Zeid’s.

All these leaders are Algerian, but their rank and file is increasingly

In Algiers, President Bouteflika felt confident enough to have the Constitution amended by a parliamentary vote, in December 2008, thus allowing him to run for a third term. He was re-elected in April 2009 with 90% of the votes and, despite the low turnout and the heated controversy, he claimed his popular support was unprecedented.

The jihadi threat, so spectacular in 2007, appears now marginal in the public debate but, even on the sides, AQIM shadow remains nefarious.

Algeria has been a reliable player in the US-inspired “global war on terror” and has joined the USsponsored Trans-Saharan CounterTerrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

Nevertheless, Algiers obviously prefers regional cooperation with its Southern neighbors without Western interference. And Algerian diplomacy pushes for an international commitment to ban any payment of ransoms to terrorist groups. To promote such a collective discipline, it argues that AQIM depends heavily on the abduction of Western nationals to finance its overall networks. After the “black decade” of the nineties, and the somehow “gray” start of this millennium, when Al-Qaeda managed to incorporate the Algerian GSPC, the next years will tell us if Algeria can finally turn the page of this political violence.

23

Debate Al Qaeda in Algeria

Does al Qaeda still have a strong presence in Algeria?

For some time, Algeria, and the Islamic Maghreb more generally, saw a surge in the occurrence of terror attacks. The presence of al Qaeda in Algeria, and its attempts at making the country another stronghold in the region, prompted the Algerian government to undertake counterterrorist measures to confront this threat. While the presidency of Boutaflika has been praised for its success in reacting to the emerging presence of al Qaeda in the country, the question of whether the terrorist group continues to have a presence in Algeria remains a subject of debate.

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25

Debate

Algeria's Al-Qaeda From the idea of jihad to banditry

The evolution of the tactics of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, can be explained as reactions to various tactics the government has put in place to discredit the organization and encourage the disarmament of combatants.

Mahmoud Al-Naggar

A

l Qaeda’s base in the Islamic Magreb begun its armed activities in the area under the name the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. It was founded by the organization's Emir, Hassan Hattab, in the mid 1990s after he defected from the Armed Islamic Group, or the GIA. Under Hattab, the organization undertook terrorist operations, planting bombs and explosive devices in public places. It was also under his leadership that they were able to concentrate their activities in the major cities of the country, including the capital of Algiers. The also attacked the National Gendarmerie and the municipal guard. Having very little control over the situation, the activities of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat have become a great embarrassment to the Algerian state.

This trend continued until President Abdel Aziz Boutaflika assumed power in 1999. Upon his inauguration, he issued the civil accord in an attempt to contain the situation and open the way for armed groups to be reintegrated into society. This law brought great results, as more than 6,000 members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat laid down their arms and renounced extremist beliefs.

As the remainder of the organization continued their terrorist operations against civilians and the military, they grew increas29 January, 2010

ingly unpopular in the eyes of the public. This caused the organisation's leaders to resort to other methods in their confrontation with the state.

The organization continued their terrorist operations against civilians and the military, they grew increasingly unpopular in the eyes of the public In this second phase the organization made increased efforts to avoid killing civilians. This situation continued until the presidential elections fought by President Boutaflika for a second time in the spring of 2004.

Once Boutaflika began his second term, he presented what was called the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was put to public referendum and the people endorsed it overwhelmingly on September 29, 2005. The charter opened the door to amnesty for the armed militants who renounce armed action, provided they were not involved in genocides or planting explosives in public places or committed crimes of rape.

These laws have caused many terrorist to abandon armed activity. Those repentant members have reached more than 3,000 until now. This was a severe blow for all armed organizations, but most of all for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

The isolation of the organization increased after the army intensified its strikes. Moreover, Algeria, the Mediterranean coast and African Sahara countries have increased their security coordination, prompting the organization to alter its style to fight the government.

The organization of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat began to use suicide bombers immediately after they joined the international al Qaeda organization early in 2007. It was then that they began to call themselves "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" under the command of Abdul Malik Drukdal, or Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

Since then, the organization has carried out a series of very large operations, including the bombing of the government palace on 11 April 2007, and the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in the district of Hydra in the centre of the capital on 11 December 2007.

Journalist specialized in Maghreb affairs and former head of the Middle East News Agency Office in Algeria 26

Debate

The End of Armed Violence Al Qaeda in Algeria: A mirage or a reality?

The era of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria seems to be over and The bombings that the country witnesses from time to time are no more than individual activities rather than organized operations. The same bombings happen in many other countries because of high rates of unemployment, poverty and absence of the state's role.

Khaled Ben Quqa

T

he case of Algeria disproved the popular perception that terrorism was impossible to combat. On the contrary, Algeria succeeded in ending the violence, thanks to the rigidity of both society and the government. Strangely, however, there are still many accusations that al-Qaeda has strong presence in the country.

The presence of al-Qaeda in the early 2000s was strongly associated to the fact many Algerians sympathized with its policies. It was felt then by the Algerians that their attack on 9/11 for example was a retaliation against unjust American policies—especially in Palestine. However, the popularity of al-Qaeda soon declined in the eyes of Algerians, when the organization’s tactics started to take civilians in Algeria as victims.

The reconciliation initiative put into place by President Bouteflika, however, completed the process of eradicating the group from the country. The kind of resistance it encouraged nationally was necessary for protecting and securing Algeria, as well as the Maghreb region in addition to Europe and the US. Issues 1543

Although analysts believe that al-Qaeda may return to Algeria as it managed to in Yemen, there is no concrete evidence to support this assumption. On the other hand, one should take into account that there are important differences between Algeria and Yemen with regards to their vulnerability to organized terrorist groups. Most notably, al-Qaeda’s power in Algeria was never as great as it was in Yemen.

The presence of al-Qaeda in the early 2000s was strongly associated to the fact many Algerians sympathized with its policies The era of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is over. The bombings that the country witnesses from time to time are no more than individual activities. The same bombings happen in many other countries because of high rates of unemployment, poverty and a lack of state presence. These

incidences have nothing to do with al-Qaeda. Rather they are a means individuals rely on to demonstrate their dislike of certain policies. Yet, the Western media has played a role in inflating the subject and involving al-Qaeda so as to create a state of panic amongst the Algerian people.

Some people may think that accusing the Salafist Group of the bombings that continue to occur in Algeria is evidence that these acts are related to al-Qaeda's presence in the country. However, when we track the development of events in Algeria well, it is evident that the Salafist Group now plays a very limited role in the violence that erupts from time to time. Perhaps this group is trying to challenge the government's policy in one way or another, but the fact is that Algeria will not change its tried-and-true approach towards terrorism. A culture of peace and security has been adopted by the Algerian people and there is no room in the country for violent intruders, be it al-Qaeda or other militant groups Algerian Journalist 27

Ideas

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29 January, 2010

28

A Sorry

State of Affairs

By Paula Mejia

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29

Ideas

A Sorry State of Affairs The Democratic Path for Stability in Sudan Paula Mejia

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the civil war in the Sudan is at a crossroads. The elections that the agreement guaranteed are an opportunity to create necessary stability, especially since a referendum on the future of the southern autonomous region is due to take place soon after.

However, the present conditions suggest that the elections scheduled for April are unlikely to begin the type of institution building necessary for a reconciliation.

Sudanese men hold up a poster picturing Sudan People's Liberation Movement presidential candidate Yasir Arman with the slogan 'The new Sudan' Š getty images

decades of civil war, Sudan A fter was given the opportunity to

implement transformative measures that would address the underlying grievances behind the conflict. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South, and the government’s National Congress Party (NCP), was meant to provide the Sudanese with a promise that has been left unfulfilled since the colonial era: the promise of self-determination.

29 January, 2010

Not only was the CPA to ensure the election of government officials at all levels, these elections were to be a small step towards the referendum that would allow the South to choose between remaining a part of Sudan, or seceding and creating their own independent state.

While the CPA has been commended on its ability to bring an end to the civil war, it has come up short on many, if not most of its promises.

Most notably amongst its short-comings have been the repeated delays of the

elections, and the unfortunate decision that the elections will now focus on the presidency instead of the entire administrative body. Originally meant to be held before the end of July 2009, they are now scheduled for April, after being postponed three times.

The clear inability of the government, and the international community, to meet the deadlines that were set by the CPA have rendered the constitution of the country threadbare to say the least, and seriously undermined the possibility 30

Ideas of ensuring the stability of Sudan. The challenges that Sudan is now confronting speak to an important lesson about peacebuilding processes. Looking back at the grievances that motivated the civil war in the first place, we see the political disenfranchisement of communities as one of the preconditions for the conflict.

Years later, the level of distrust that pervades Sudanese politics, especially between the SPLM and the NCP, has only made legitimate elections more important for the CPA’s measures to stand a chance at promoting peace.

However, observers have repeatedly noted that the prospects for a free, fair and peaceful election are bleak. The United States has expressed concern about a recent surge in flow of arms into semiautonomous southern Sudan, including heavy weapons. Recent reports by Oxfam and Human Rights Watch have also confirmed that the Sudan is raft with insecurity. Human Rights Watch, for one, has warned that repression of political opponents in both Sudan's North and semi-autonomous South has been blatant, with both sides targeting the opposition.

In a moment of unfortunate irony, Edward Thomas of Chatham House observes that processes intended to help Sudanese people ‘now run the risk of perpetuating violence…’ The elections present an important crossroads in Sudan’s history as any perception of their illegitimacy may set a negative tone for the referendum on secession. Moreover, as Tomas notes in his recent report Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan, while the SPLM originally favoured rejecting the secession, ‘the widespread Southern perception that the central government has failed to take the opportunity to transform itself has strengthened the hand of SPLM leadership favouring secession.’

Surely this negative perception of the government by the South would not benefit from a messy electoral process, and the chances of repeating the same mistakes at the time of the referendum could turn into a casus bellicus.

Pointing fingers is an inconclusive game in this situation, as both parties have neglected important processes to promote the credibility of the electoral process.

Both parties have reportedly neglected engagement with their constituents. In a country with a high rate of illiteracy, Issues 1543

programs in civic education are necessary for ensuring that civilians have an accurate idea of their options. Furthermore, the case of many administrative posts having important links to militarized groups is one important example of the ways in which the local parties have come short on their commitment to promoting stability.

If these conditions were not enough, the SPLM has shocked many in renouncing its idea of promoting what The Economist called ‘a genuinely national electoral strategy.’ With the expectation that Omar Bashir of the NCP will be re-elected, many doubt that the SPLM will even submit a candidate. This is considered a lost opportunity for the many ethnic groups that have been politically marginalized by the NCP, and saw the SPLM as a means to reverse the state of affairs. Instead, it appears the SPLM is relying on the referendum and hoping that a secession will guarantee them the power that this election is unlikely to provide.

But what about Omar Bashir? The blame game would be incomplete without a serious discussion of how Sudan, and the international community, could allow a man indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity to be re-elected. If the main purpose of the CPA is to allow democratic institutions to instil a process of reconciliation between the various groups that have been at war in Sudan, then allowing Omar Bashir, accused of trying to eradicate non-Arab tribes from Darfur, to lead the country is contrary to the principles behind the CPA. However, the ICC’s involvement in Sudan’s peace-building efforts has been framed by the North as just another neo-colonial ploy. Realistically, the strong hold of power held by Bashir’s NCP is likely to shelter him, for the time being, from accountability over the genocide in Darfur.

Although some would call the prospects of the CPA hopeless, there are still avenues which can be pursued that might reinforce the agreement. For the international community, theirs is an opportunity to demonstrate the endurance of their commitment. The CPA was implemented largely because of the international pressure that Sudan faced at

the time. This pressure, and the resources that accompany it, is needed to reinforce the measures the CPA recommended.

Unfortunately, many have noted how the crisis in Darfur, which coincided with the signing of the agreement, drained many of the diplomatic resources in place.

Although this is an understandably difficult obstacle to overcome, it is insufficient to legitimately excuse the commitment of the international community. If only for selfish interests, various countries should be committed to instilling stability in Sudan. The US has admirably recognized this problem, and as of October 2009 announced a new policy that balances the need to end violence with the need to support the CPA. As usual, American engagement is insufficient, and the US government should be cautious in how its relationship with Sudan affects its internal politics.

Since much of Sudan’s future will continue to be decided by high level politicians, Edward Thomas argues that the politics of exclusion that undermine its stability could be worsened if the country looks to engage more with international powers than with its own population. In this case, regional actors including the AU can support Sudan as it meets the upcoming deadlines of the CPA. Most importantly, these bodies can promote the type of local and national dialogue that will undermine the current tension in Sudan.

Finally, there is hope that the two parties can come to an agreement which will promote a peaceful transition, no matter the outcome of the elections. For example, an oil deal that equally supports both the North and South has been described as an important mechanism to create incentives for reconciliation. It is possible that in the moths to come, shared interests such as these can undermine the mistrust that has characterized the relationship of the two parties.

The future of the CPA hangs in the balance as the April elections approach.

However, all is not lost, and both national and international actors should play their part in ensuring that the building of democratic institutions creates the foundations for reconciliation in this wartorn country.

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36

People

The Kiss of Judas Anwar Al-Awlaki American Born, Radical Cleric and Terrorist Recruiter

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People - Profile

The Kiss of Judas Anwar Al-Awlaki American Born, Radical Cleric and Terrorist Recruiter Al-Awlaki has gained increasing attention from the media and authorities for his links to various terrorist attacks in the UK, US and Canada. This American born cleric is now the English voice for Jihadi propaganda.

I

n various terrorism cases in the US, Britain and Canada, suspects have claimed a devotion to Anwar Al-Awlaki— an eloquent Muslim cleric based in Yemen. Mr. Awlaki has gained much attention, for his involvement with terrorists including Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian responsible for the bombing attempt of an airplane headed to Detroit and three 9/11 hijackers.

However, Mr. Awlaki has also gained much attention for the way in which he indoctrinated these individuals— relying primarily on the web as a tool for radicalization.

Adding another, although not uncommon, twist to the story, Anwar Al-Awlaki is an American citizen.

Al-Awlaki represents a growing trend in terrorist actions affecting the US, where the majority of threats are originating internally.

Al-Awlaki was born in Las Cruces, 29 January, 2010

New Mexico in 1971 while his father, Nasser Al-Awlaki, was completing his master’s degree in Agricultural Economics at New Mexico State University. His family returned to Yemen in 1978, where Nasser AlAwlaki would serve as Agricultural Minister and President of Sanaa University. Anwar would remain in Yemen for 11 years.

In 1991, however, Al-Awlaki returned to the US for his graduate studies, receiving an MA in Education Leadership from San Diego State University and a PhD in Human Resource Development at George Washington University. During his studies, Anwar continued to remain involved in the Islamic community, working as an Imam at Rabat Mosque in San Diego, and at Dar Al Higrah Islamic Center in Verginia.

Looked at superficially, Anwar AlAwlaki’s biography appears to be that

of just another American of foreign descent, who kept strong ties to his country of origin but also excelled within American institutions. After all, hyphenated American identities are rather common in the “melting pot nation” and most Americans are able to reconcile their multiple cultures.

However, that appears to have just been a façade, for it was during his return to the US, whilst pursuing graduate studies, that Mr. Awlaki first come into contact with three of the 9/11 hijackers. It was also during his time in San Diego that Al-Awlaki served as Vice President of the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) which was later confirmed to be a front organization to funnel money to terrorists by FBI agent Brian Murphey during a 2004 terrorism trial.

Anwar Al-Awlaki’s links to terrorist organizations have since grown alongside his popularity amongst 34

People - Profile English-speaking Muslims. How and why this Yemeni-American came to support fundamentalist movements is unclear. It appears as though, despite what were described as neutral sermons whilst an Imam in the US, he already had ties to terrorist organizations.

It was in 2002, however, in the aftermath of 9/11, that Al-Awlaki left the US for the UK, citing a climate of fear and intimidation. After spending several months in Britain he returned to Yemen with his wife and five children, where he taught at Imam University. His involvement with Imam University was also controversial, if not only for only it being headed by Al-Zindin, branded a terrorist by the US and the UN, but also because it is believed that most of the school’s courses are based on radical Islamic beliefs.

What is clear in the evolution of Al-Awlaki’s path to radicalization is that since his move to Yemen, he has become more overt in his criticisms of the West and his support for violence.

This has been partly associated to the 18 months he spent in a Yemeni Prison.

On August 31, Al-Awlaki was arrested by Yemeni authorities on charges of kidnapping a teenager for ransom and being involved in an AlQaeda plot to kidnap a US military attaché. Al-Awlaki, on the other hand, has blamed the US for pressuring Yemeni authorities to arrest him. After 18 months in prison, having been interrogated by the FBI for his links to terrorist groups, and especially his knowledge of 9/11, Al-Awlaki was finally released.

But as his influence over terrorists like Major Nidal Malik Hassan, and most recently Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, it has become clear that he understands his responsibility of Jihad as that of a recruiter and supporter.

In line with this beleif, last year Mr. Awlaki exchanged public letters on the web with Al Shabaab, a Somali an Islamist terrorist organization which has attracted recruits among young Somali-Americans. He told his audience ‘their success depends on your support. It is the responsibility of

the ummah to help them with men and money.’

Al-Shabaab, however, is not his only link with an organized terrorist group.

Al-Qaeda’s increasing influence in Yemen, has also brought these two together. It has been reported that Mr. Awlaki has provided al-Qaeda members in Yemen with the protection of his powerful tribe, the Awlakis, against the government.

Yet, despite his significant involvement with terrorist organizations, the major concern that he seems to be instilling is with regards to his powers of persuasion. According to the New York Times, experts believe that his persuasive endorsement of violence as a religious duty, ‘in colloquial, American-accented English has helped push a series of Western Muslims into terrorism.’

By simplifying the teachings of the Koran into a simple “if you are not with us you are against us,” Mr. Awlaki tapped into an important weak spot in American policy.

‘Al-Awlaki condenses the AlQaeda philosophy into digestible, well-written treatises,’ said Evan Kohlamnn, a counterterrorism researcher. His fluency in English, his unabashed advocacy of jihad and mujahideen organizations, and his Web-savvy approach are a powerful combination.

Although his website has been taken down, there is still growing concern over the influence of his Facebook page, and other publications including a text entitled “44 Ways to support Jihad.”

But beyond his ability to persuade individuals to join the jihadi cause,

Mr. Awlaki sheds light on an important issue. His case and that of his disciples, so to speak, provide interesting insight into the processes that might lead individuals to become radicalized.

A perfect example of this case is the course of events that linked Mr. Awlaki with the shootings in Fort Hood last year. In July, Mr. Awlaki posted an attack on his web site denouncing Muslim soldiers who would fight against other Muslims.

‘A Muslim soldier who follows orders to kill Muslims is a heartless beast, bent of evil, who sells his religion for a few dollars.’ After the shootings he called Major Hasan a hero. It does not take much effort to see that his condemnations implied that Muslims who were not pro-actively fighting against American efforts in the War on Terror, were bad Muslims.

By simplifying the teachings of the Koran into a simple “if you are not with us you are against us,” Mr. Awlaki tapped into an important weak spot in American policy. The story of Mr. Awlaki and Major Hassan indicate that the US is facing a similar problem at home as it is abroad. A major flaw in their efforts up until recently has been the failure to win “the hearts and minds” of those being affected by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The same can be said of the lesser integrated Muslim Americans. Keenly aware of this issue, Al-Awlaki has been successful in recruiting an often ignored demographic.

This group might feel a conflict with regards to their duties as a Muslim, and their status as Americans. If not well integrated into American society, it is easy to see why Al-Awlaki has been able to win over impressionable and confused American Muslims with the accusations that they are not fulfilling their religious duties. How to avoid the radicalization of these “miss-integrated” foreigners is an important question that the American government should address as a means to combating Mr. Awlaki’s influence.

As for Awlaki himself, the Yemeni government has been attempting to trace him since his disappearance in March 2009. He was believed to be hiding in Yemen’s Shabwa or Mareb regions, but sources believed him dead as a result of an air strike by Yemeni Air force against an Al-Qaeda meeting on December 24, 2009. These claims, however, have been largely refuted and the search for him continues.

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Economics Arab Economics

International Investor

Markets

Thanks But No Thanks! Š getty images

Issues 1543

By AndrĂŠs Cala 37

Economics - Arab Economics

Thanks, But No Thanks!

U.S. oil firms shun Iraqi spoils of war Andrés Cala The end result of the Iraqi oil auctions was unforeseeable a few years ago. While European, Asian and even African companies rushed to guarantee a share of the cake, American companies did not bother to bid for the bounty.

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L

ong before U.S. forces launched their invasion of Iraq to overthrow dictator Saddam Hussein, few second-doubted the underlying motive was oil.

The conspiracy theory was debated publically even in diplomatic circles as high up as the United Nations. Uncle Sam, led by oil hawks in the White House, starting with then President George W Bush, had mobilized the world’s most powerful military under false pretenses to secure the awesome reserves of crude and gas in Iraq, the argument went.

Years later, even the most benign 29 January, 2010

observers still expected that the spoils of war would be handed out during the first two oil field auctions since the 2003 invasion, if nothing else to compensate for the billions in U.S. taxpayer money that have gone to nurturing the war-torn country.

But if Bush’s objective was to pave the way in for U.S. oil companies, it certainly didn’t pan out that way. From a list of 15 foreign companies, only two American ones were involved in the winning bids for the 10 fields that were awarded.

The reason: they were simply not interested. Only one U.S. company

bothered to bid in the second round, the results of which were announced in December. And in the first round, only four.

Iraq’s Oil Ministry is still in the process of signing 20-year contracts with mostly European, Asian, Russian, and even African firms that made a strong showing. Iraq’s state oil company will take 25 percent stake in all fields. And there is no planned third round to look forward to.

What is at stake is nothing short of the biggest oil bounty within grasp in decades. Iraq expects its output to more than quadruple to a plateau production of 11.14 million barrels per day within 38

Economics - Arab Economics years to rival the world’s biggest producer Saudi Arabia. And that is a shy estimate, considering the untapped resources.

The poor American showing was a strategic decision. Some account this merely to the higher risk appetite of Asian or state-owned companies. But a closer look reveals that the big winners were European and publically traded companies from throughout the world that are bound by the same market logic that American IOCs adhere to.

Take a look at the big four super giant fields that were awarded: Majnoon with 12.6 billion barrels in proven reserves went to Royal Dutch Shell, Europe’s biggest publically traded company, with a 45 percent stake and Malaysia’s stateowned Petronas with 30 percent; West Qurna Phase 2 with 12.9 billion barrels went to Russian publically traded giant Lukoil with a 64 percent of stake and Norway’s state-owned StatoilHydro with 11 percent; West Qurna Phase 1 with 8.7 billion barrels went to U.S.based Exxon Mobil with a 60 percent stake and Shell with the remaining 15 percent, and Rumaila with 17 billion barrels in reserves went to BP with a 38 percent share and state-owned CNPC of China with 37 percent.

a shaky regulatory framework, corruption, and the unattractive terms offered by Baghdad in the form of service contract, rather than the preferred production sharing deals. But those factors applied to all, including all those publically-traded companies that came out winners.

punished by their managements' decision to stay away, signaling shareholders support for being hard bargainers. Fiscally speaking, U.S. companies would have also faces bigger liabilities, thus requiring better returns than its European and Asian peers.

Yes, American companies have higher risk aversion. But it is also true that they simply use classic exploration and production economic models. In Iraq’s case, low remuneration and instability together made the deals unattractive. BP, for example, will barely get a 20 percent return on investment from its deal, while American companies usually target at least a 25 percent return.

It could be US companies prefer a backdoor entry, letting bid winners deal with all the initial headaches and upfront risks to later buy themselves into a minority stake. After all, service contracts allow companies to optout easily, as opposed to production sharing ones that require longer-term commitments.

All the billions of dollars Uncle Sam spent and the thousands of American lives lost to secure Iraq will not translate into what many expected would be vast spoils of war

Of the other fields, Occidental, the only other American company aside from Exxon involved in a winning bid, took a minority stake in a consortium led by Italy’s Eni to develop the Zubair field, with 4.1 billion barrels.

CNPC also took a 37.5 percent stake in Halfaya with 4.1 billion barrels in reserves, leading a consortium that also includes Petronas and French Total, each with 18.75 percent.

US companies are also wary of setting a precedent. That is, winning big in Iraq doesn’t justify risking a wave of contract renegotiations elsewhere in the world. Many U.S. IOCs already proved as much when Venezuela changed the rules, while Europeans accepted the new terms.

Other winners in smaller fields are Japex, Russia’s Gazprom, and Turkey’s TPAO. Petronas came out with four stakes in as many fields, including two big ones. Another surprise was Angola’s Sonangol, the winning loanbidder in two fields.

To be sure, European and Asian companies have already accepted the move, but Americans aren’t ready yet, if nothing else because service contracts don’t even count toward booking reserves, the most attractive incentive to shareholders.

Many have blamed American indifference to insecurity, instability,

And this is not necessarily bad.

Share prices of U.S. IOCs were not

Issues 1543

American IOCs prefer waiting for the next presidential election and an oil law, not to mention for a resolution of the ever-dangerous Kurdish impasse with the central government. Doing so could pay out considering there are still seven fields of the ones offered in the first two rounds that didn’t even receive bids.

Furthermore, Iraq remains vastly unexplored and there will surely be more opportunities in the future.

That doesn’t mean the economic terms will be better, but at least the risk will be lower.

Still, most U.S. IOC’s are foregoing the early entry advantage. If things go the way Iraqis plan, competition will only stiffen, along with the terms. However, if Iraqis are unable to consolidate their path toward stability, first-comers will come knocking on American doors seeking more money to meet their contracts.

In either case though, all the billions of dollars Uncle Sam spent and the thousands of American lives lost to secure Iraq will not translate into what many expected would be vast spoils of war. And that is best for all.

Madrid-based freelance journalist and political scientist specialising in Middle Eastern and European policy, as well as global energy issues 39

Economics - International Investor

The Neverending Story The European Union-GCC Free Trade Agreement

The European Union-GCC Free Trade Agreement is being negotiated for twenty years. While a change of attitude from both sides could give new impetus to the negotiation process, the hurdles inherent in these negotiations will most likely not be solved by mere good will.

A

nniversaries are a time for reflection, and twentieth anniversaries all the more so. In Europe, 2009 saw much reflection on the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. This year, round the world, there are other anniversaries.

Among them is the twentieth anniversary of the start of the start of the negotiations between the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) and the European Community for a Free Trade Agreement. Why is it that these negotiations have yet to be concluded?

And are there structural reasons, in terms of global political economy, why have they taken so long?

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of all the features of a negotiation with such a long and complex history.

All the same, a significant anniversary is a thought-provoking opportunity for a retrospective look. This is all the truer where the object in view is a free trade agreement. For, with the rarest of exceptions, few free trade agreements are really about free trade alone, narrowly defined: they nearly always involve at least some wider mutual approach to trade and economic relations. And in many cases, particularly when relationships between non-contiguous regions are involved, there is some political motivation aiming at a result going wider than trade.

It is often said that globalisation and regionalisation are complementary processes –two sides of the same coin. In some ways, globalisation may not really be global: instead, the process displays marked geographical unevenness, shown in the concentration of economic activity in the “triad” regions of North America, Western Europe and East Asia. This “triad” accounts for the huge bulk of global GDP and global foreign direct investment. So globalisation has a strong regional component.

Nor is this new. The roots of globalisation and regionalism lie far back in world history – at least as far back as 29 January, 2010

John Cooke

the discovery of the New World in the fifteenth century, and the formation of the United Netherlands in the sixteenth, the United States in the eighteenth, the short-lived European Zollverein customs union in the nineteenth, and – rather differently - the USSR in the twentieth.

But regionalism was given new impetus – and a new shape - in the post-war world, as states pooled aspects of their sovereignty to gain wider goals. The formation in the 1950s of what became the European Union was a key European example. But the later twentieth century has seen plenty of other examples round the world – among them the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) from 1967, the South African Development Community (SADC) from 1980, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) from 1981, and Mercosur from 1991. All these showed different degrees and dynamics of regional integration, taking place for different reasons. But all reflected the attraction of geographical groupings of countries and markets as a way of building mutual cooperation.

Given this background, it is of course natural for regional groupings to seek the added advantage of building links between each other. And the uneven progress of globalisation strengthens the case for their doing so. However – and here we come to the EU-GCC negotiations – broad linkages between complex groups are not necessarily easy to enshrine in agreements. A narrow agreement between two states, or even an agreement between a regional group

and a third state, may be much more straightforward, particularly when the agreement covers a specific and welldefined field. But a broader accord, such as one providing for free trade between two groups of countries, is inherently more challenging. At any particular point in time, there are variations in the “fit” between the two groupings – their degree of integration or their comparative state of development, for example. And, at a dynamic level, there are questions concerning the future pace of change that each envisages for itself, and social and political questions about the risks and rewards of change. Finally, at any given time, one or other grouping may be faced by new or difficult challenges: at the time being, for instance, both the EU and the GCC are having to consider the extent to which they can integrate systems of financial supervision in the wake of the global financial crisis.

All this means that agreements between regions, whatever their attractions, are not easy to bring about. There may be junctures at which they seem feasible, only for internal stresses, political change, economic preoccupations or some new challenges to draw the parties apart. But none of this, it seems to me, should be a cause for discouragement.

Indeed, the twenty year lifetime of the EU-GCC negotiations has been a period of growing interregionalism, and the present juncture may well be particularly favourable to it. To take only two factors, the need for economic reconstruction precipitated by the financial crisis, and the common post-Copenhagen objective of tackling climate change in non-adversarial ways, are key drivers that favour agreements between regions towards achieving shared economic aims.

I hope that the EU-GCC negotiations will derive energy from them and allow a Free Trade Agreement to be concluded.

Chairman, Liberalization of Trade in Services Committee, International Financial Services London (IFSL) 40

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Economics - Behind the Graph

The Emergence of the BRIICS The BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) are a variation of Goldman and Sachs’s BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) put forward by Dr. Razeen Sally, Senior Lecturer of International Political Economy at the London School of Economics. Dr. Sally argues that the BRIICS grouping is more representative of the shifts emerging economies are undergoing in the 21st century.

In the early 1980s, the world economy was much different from what it is today. China was still living in near autarky; the Cold War kept the Soviet Union, isolated from the western world; Brazil was suffering from severe macroeconomic imbalances and negative growth rates; and the Indian Economy operated under the strong capital controls and the Licence Raj. As the graphs bellow illustrate, these

economies have progressed enormously in the past 30 years.

Furthermore, while developed economies experienced severe recessionary pressures during the global financial crisis, these emerging economies weathered the financial and economic shock relatively well. If this trend continues (and all indicates that it will), one should ask how different the world will look 5 or 10 years from now.

Inward FDI flows for BRIICS in bn US$ (1980 - 2006)

In the 1990s, the Chinese economy began what has been dubbed as the biggest and fastest unilateral economic liberalization in contemporary history. The opening of the Chinese economy to foreign markets meant the appearance of 1 billion consumers in the global market.

Capital account liberalization and the strong commitments undertaken

by China in its accession to the World Trade Organization created the conditions for a rapid inflow of foreign direct investment. Although to a much lesser extend, other BRIICS economies also underwent ground-breaking economic reforms that rendered these countries increasingly attractive to international investors. Driving this increase in FDI inflows since 2003 are the main economic sectors of these economies, namely agriculture and manufacturing (Brazil), services (India), and oil and gas (Russia).

Outward FDI flows to BRIICS in bn US$ (2000 - 2006) Since 2000, the BRIICS economies have consolidated themselves as major players in the international economic and political scene. Brazil was able to prove itself for the first time in its history as immune to contagion from the crises experienced by its neighbours, such as Argentina. As the BRIICS economies grew and underwent an unprecedented period of economic stability and sustainable development, these economies turned into nonnegligible international investors. Benefiting in particular from a low dollar since 2005, multinationals from the BRIICS entered the international market with force, competing on an equal footing with Western multinationals.

BRIICS Share in Global Trade in Goods and Services (2008) One of the main drivers behind the rapid emergence of the BRIICS economies as key players in the international scene was international trade. Throughout the 1990s, these countries underwent significant economic reforms, liberalizing trade flows and capital accounts. As a consequence, companies operating in BRIICS countries had not only to compete to exist in the international market, but also in their domestic markets. The pressures to innovate and to specialize in the country’s comparative advantage led to more efficient allocation of capital and to faster economic growth and development. In 2008, these economies represented 15% of all trade in good and services in the world.

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Economics - Index Page

Bankers Warn Against Unilateralism Leading industry leaders and bankers gathered at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, cautioned Western governments against populist measures directed at the financial industry. They stressed that the unilateral initiatives by the United States and Great

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Britain to further regulate banks could undermine an already fragile recovery from the worst recession since the 1930s.

Barclays Capital’s boss, Bob Diamond argued that Britain’s attempt to tax Banker’s bonuses could weaken the multilateral initiatives coordinated by

the G20. Joseph Ackerman, Deutsche Bank’s CEO, underlined that efforts to make markets more resilient could be undermined as some activities migrated to unregulated sectors in the absence of supranational coordination.

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Reviews Books

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Readings

Reports

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Reviews - Books

A Sense of History

The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle Harold James Harvard University Press 2009 The Financial Crisis has become the mused of authors wishing to explain and profit from the bewilderment that accompanied the economic losses of the last couple of years. Harold James’ book, however, stands out for his mastery of economic principles, financial history, and especially his ability to articulate complex issues to those unfamiliar with the subject.

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otwithstanding their collective failure to foresee the oncoming storm, the Great Recession of 2008 has been a boon to mediasavvy economists wishing to give their views on the current economic crisis. Yet, beyond the countless columns explaining the difference between mortgage backed securities and credit default swaps, or the pundits predicting a future inflationary crisis, there has been a noticeable lack of sober historical analysis of our contemporary economic woes.

It should come as no surprise that this cacophony of voices has led many members of the lay public to agree with Hegel’s assessment that what history teaches us is that economists have not learned anything from history at all.

Harold James’ latest book should therefore be welcomed by those readers avidly searching for an accessible introduction to the history of modern economic crashes. A Princeton University professor, and a specialist of twentieth century German Financial history, Professor James has been warning against 29 January, 2010

the Panglossian naïveté of professional economists and public intellectuals for many years. Unlike those who saw the Financial euphoria and globalization boom of the early 2000s as evidence of ‘the end of history,’ James stresses that what history actually teaches us is that there is nothing irreversible or inexorable about the most recent wave of globalization.

On the contrary, there is much to be worried about. Past financial crises have often exceeded stock market crashes and the bursting of Ponzi schemes, metastasizing into beggar-thy-neighbor trade wars and xenophobic immigration policies.

The first thing one appreciates upon opening this book is James’ rare mastery of economic principles, financial history, and his ability to articulate complex issues in a way easily accessible to the uninitiated reader. The book begins by questioning the conventional wisdom that the Great Depression began with the stock market crash of 1929, colloquially referred to as ‘Black Tuesday.’ Indeed, the facile reference to 1929 often made misconstrues the Great

Depression as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1929, when it actually began with banking crisis of 1931 that took place in Austria and Germany.

Far from being a sterile academic debate, James’ interpretation has important implications for public policy.

While policymakers understand quite well how to use monetary and regulatory policies to fight against financial crashes, much less is known about how to prevent a banking crisis from degenerating into a full-blown economic meltdown.

This perhaps explains why central banks reacted quickly and effectively to the drying-up of liquidity markets in 2007, while governments acted in such a hesitant and haphazard manner when it came to bailing out large financial institutions in the fall of 2008.

Many commentators have limited themselves to discussing how the recent financial troubles are affecting the real economy, be it the significant decline in growth rates or the massive increase in unemployment that has plagued many countries 46

Reviews - Books over the past few months.

James, however, stresses that the economic fallout from past crises was often exacerbated by subsequent sociopolitical shocks. Depressingly, the ‘Buy American’ provisions originally included in the US federal stimulus package, together with the recent tide of antiimmigration policies proposed

by European governments, suggests that policymakers have learned frighteningly little from past mistakes. Contrary to what the cynics may say, James argues that while we can do little to tame the irrational mood-swings of Wall Street traders, there is nothing unavoidable about the short-sighted and counterproductive policies put forth by populist legislators.

Ironically perhaps, the last chapter of the book is in many ways the weakest. In it, James argues that the fundamental danger facing our international economic order is a collapse of the values supporting global integration and international political cooperation. However, when one considers the recent diplomatic spat concerning China’s exchange rate policy, and the secular shift of economic power away from the industrialized West in favor of the emerging BRIC countries, one is left thinking that geopolitical considerations will outweigh any trend towards moral decrepitness for the foreseeable future.

Ultimately, despite emphasizing many worrying similarities between the current financial crisis and past episodes of economic collapse, the book does not adopt an apocalyptic tone.

Instead, much like Voltaire’s Candide, James’ invites us to take history seriously, rather than relying blindly on a misplaced optimism. As the author himself writes, ‘analyzing what went wrong is the key to learning from a cathartic crisis, as well as to preventing a Carthaginian one.

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Harold James

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Reviews - Readings

Readings Books Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East Rashid Khalidi January 2010 Khalidi’s latest book provides a comprehensive history of modern conflict in the Middle East. Sowing Crisis argues that current conflicts are by-products of the cold war and the policies, strategies and priorities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Khalidi illustrates how the cold war rivals saw the Middle East-with its vital location and vast oil and gas reserves-as a tool to further their parallel agendas: the Soviets and Americans both subordinated the goal of Arab-Israeli peace and supplied weapons at a profit to both Iraq and Iran during their eight-year war, while the U.S. sought to further its dominance of the region by backing a coup to overthrow democracy in Iran. Khalidi concludes by charting how George W. Bush's "Global War on Terror" has allowed for a massive military expansion in the Middle East and resulted in futile and feckless policies that may have increased the actual risk to American citizens and wreaked havoc on the region. Khalidi has written an important book, essential for anyone concerned about the stability of the Middle East.

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Guardians of the Revolution: Itan and the World in the age of the Ayatollahs Ray Takeyh June 2009 The unending war of words suggests an intractable divide between Iran and the West, one that may very well lead to a shooting war in the near future. But as Ray Takeyh shows in this accessible and authoritative history of Iran's relations with the world since the revolution, behind the famous personalities and extremist slogans is a nation that is far more pragmatic—and complex—than many in the West have been led to believe. Takeyh explodes many of our simplistic myths of Iran as an intransigently Islamist foe of the West. Tracing the course of Iranian policy since the 1979 revolution, Takeyh identifies four distinct periods: the revolutionary era of the 1980s, the tempered gradualism following the death of Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989, the "reformist" period from 1997-2005 under President Khatami, and the shift toward confrontation and radicalism since the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005.

Engaging the Muslim World

Juan Cole March 2009 Juan Cole’s book, Engaging the Muslim World, disentangles the key foreign policy issues that America is grappling with today and in doing so provides the West with recommendations on how to proceed. Cole’s unique ability to take the true Muslim perspective into account when looking at East-West relations make his insights well-rounded and prescient as he suggests a course of action on fundamental issues like religion, oil, war and peace. With substantive recommendations for the next administration on how to move forward in key countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, Engaging the Muslim World reveals how we can repair the damage of the disastrous foreign policy of the last eight years and forge ahead on a path of peace and prosperity 29 January, 2010

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Reviews - Readings

Reports Yemen Fear of Failure Chatham House Report

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Ginny Hill January 2010 Yemen presents a 'perfect storm' of problems for Western governments confronting the prospect of state failure in this strategically important Red Sea country, according to a new Chatham House paper. Based on original research conducted over 16 months in Yemen, this paper by journalist and film-maker Ginny Hill says future instability in this weak and incomplete state has the potential to expand a lawless zone stretching from northern Kenya, through Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, to Saudi Arabia. Piracy, smuggling and violent jihad would flourish, with implications for the security of shipping routes, the transit of oil through the Suez Canal and the internal security of Yemen's neighbours.

Cover Sudan: Abuse Undermines Impending Elections End Rights Violations, Ensure Fair and Free Elections

Human Rights Watch January 2010

In a recent press-release by Human Rights Watch, the organization calls the international community to take note of the violations of civil and political rights by Sudanese security forces throughout the country. The report further argues that these trends are seriously undermining prospects for free, fair, and credible elections in April 2010.

Cover The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking Brookings Institution

Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney and Rabea Benhalim January 2010 President Obama’s decision not to seek additional legislative authority for detentions at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba—combined with Congress’s lack of interest in the task— means that, for good or for ill, judges must write the rules governing military detention of terrorist suspects. As the United States reaches the president’s self-imposed January 22, 2010 deadline for Guantanamo’s closure with the base still holding nearly 200 detainees, the common-law process of litigating their habeas corpus lawsuits has emerged as the chief legislative mechanism for doing so.

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Reviews - Reports

Judgement Day The Status Report: Obama’s Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan Vanda Felbab Brown Brookings Institution January 2010

Obama’s presidency held promises of change for those looking to see the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan improve. A year later, Brookings Institution Fellow Vanda Felbab Brown puts Obama’s strategy to the test concluding that although there were significant setbacks, the important groundwork has been laid for vast improvements.

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resident Obama’s election was greeted by the world as a harbinger of the positive changes that were to come. His campaign, run on the promise of change, was welcome by the international community, and most of all, by those looking for a successful end to the challenge in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Nonetheless, these promises created expectations that even Obama grew concerned 29 January, 2010

about meeting. While only a year has passed since his inauguration, it is certainly an important moment to assess his policies, particularly regarding those in Afghanistan and Pakistan where there is much to be done.

Brookings Institution Fellow, Vanda Felbab Brown, is in a particularly good position to measure the

progresses and shortcomings of the administration in this area.

While various publications have also discussed Obama’s first year in the White House, her report is unique as it is based on specific recommendations she provided the administration when Obama was inaugurated. The Status Report now takes a look at how Obama’s policy differed from their suggestions, and 50

Reviews - Reports how these alterations have improved or weakened the US’s goals in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Although rigorous in their assessment, the Brookings Institution provides a fair, and surprisingly positive review of the President’s decisions in the region thus far.

The Brookings report begins by acknowledging that the question of Afghanistan was part of an important debate within the United States. In other words, that there were significant internal political obstacles that could have stood in the way of decisive action on the part of the administration. Yet, despite this challenge, the Obama administration, according to Brown ‘announced in December 2009 the right strategy to accomplish the objectives laid out for Afghanistan-Pakistan. He also committed much needed resources to accomplish them.’

The overall verdict of Obama’s policy however was not entirely positive according to her assessment.

While he did implement the correct policy, Brown argues that 2009 turned out to be a year of lost opportunities in Afghanistan. The reason for this is that the momentum of improving strategies was compromised by the corruption in Afghanistan, and apathy on the part of the Afghan administration. As a result, she argues, the window of opportunity to defeat the insurgency partly closed, and as a committed party in the country, the US needs to be held accountable on the shortcomings of its ability to confront local issues.

‘The Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan thus earns a B.’ A “B” in the American grading system, is somewhere between satisfactory and excellent. The reason for Brown concluding that this was the overall performance of the US was two-fold. Great strides took place in March 2009 after a two month review was put into place.

This review consisted of a broad Issues 1543

counterinsurgency effort which sought to reverse the worsening security situation in Afghanistan.

As the Brookings Institution had expected, these measures created ‘the necessary environment for a large-scale economic development effort, including a strong agricultural program that would also reduce poppy cultivation.’

Unfortunately, the comprehensive nature of the approach was weakened by what Brown called a ‘narrow counterterrorism focus that emphasized the need to prevent Al-Qaeda havens in Afghanistan.’

Although limiting Al-Qaeda havens is surely an important goal for American interests, in terms of the overarching goals of counterterrorism, Brown considers such a strategy short sighted. More importantly, focusing mainly on the interests of the US in the area failed to appeal to Afghans. When trying to win the hearts and minds of locals, such oversights can be detrimental.

Furthermore, this review did not include a thorough investigation of the resources required to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, an issue that was later raised by the new US Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal.

While this prompted an additional review by President Obama which evaluated the challenges McChrystal was facing, Brown argues that the second review did little, if nothing, to improve the confidence of Americans and Afghans of the new direction of the US in the region. Expectations were equally hurt with the advent of Karzai’s fraudulent campaign.

On the other hand, Brown was positive in her review of the administration’s performance in Pakistan, arguing that despite inheriting a deteriorating security relationship, the US was able to help the Pakistani ‘military and civilian leadership to devote the will and capacity to confront the Pakistani

jihadists…’

Overall, the Brookings Institution’s assessment is positive and comprehensive. For one, an assessment of the US’s accomplishments in the region might have only been measured by assessing how American interests were advanced. Yet the report is also dedicated to measuring how the actions of the US affected local issues, which might have a lesser importance for American interests, but far greater implications for the region as a whole.

In addition to taking into account the interests of all parties, Brown’s report is also balanced as she considers the way in which American politics limit or support successful strategies in the country’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, her ability to question the speed at which important decisions were taken allows for the US, to be held accountable for its strategy in a region that is easily destabilized.

The report, is thus balanced in its assessment. While remaining critical of the administrations short comings and, at times, short sighted approach, it continues to acknowledge that progress was made. Most notably, Brown was quick to acknowledge the efforts of the administration which successfully improved the security situation in some regions of the country.

It is fair, then, to agree with Brown on the potential that lies ahead in America’s involvement in the region. Namely, that while the American military is not yet out of the woods with regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the necessary foundations have been put into place in order to complete a successful counterinsurgency strategy.

For the full report refer to: http://www.brookings.edu/ 51

The Political Essay

Mixed Signals The Taliban’s Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual Mullah Omar’s code of conduct for Taliban fighters raises the issue of whether actions are following words and, in spite of central concern with civilian casualties, there is the lack of definition of who is a civilian. The issuing of this strategy last summer might be behind Karzai’s government assumption that the Taliban are changing and thus the time to negotiate has arrived. This assumption can be a big mistake.

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fter General Petraeus Counterinsurgency Field Manual and General McChrystal’s Assessment, another strategic document has the potential to change the course of the war in Afghanistan, at least according to some analysts and news agencies.

Issued last summer, Mullah Omar’s code of conduct for Taliban fighters establishes clear rules of engagement and behaviour.

Among these rules, avoiding civilian casualties and civilian distress stand out as the central concerns and main reasons for the alleged change of behaviour. The document is back into public discussion in the context of recent developments in Afghanistan, making it an appropriate time to assess its implications.

The rules of The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Rules for Mujahideen, as the document is called, include the following: (a) “Governors, district chiefs and line commanders and every member of the mujahideen must do their best to avoid civilian deaths, civilian injuries and damage to civilian property. Great care must be taken”; (b) “if any mujahideen or commander is disturbing innocent people he should be warned by his leader. If he doesn’t change his behaviour he should be expelled from the movement”; and (c) “people with a bad reputation or who have killed civilians during the Jihad must not be permitted to join the Taliban movement”.

Clearly part of the militants’ propaganda war, the rules for the Mujahideen apparently prove the Taliban’s acknowledgement that whoever wins the fight for “the hearts and minds of the population”, will win the war.

Indeed, the motto “focus on the population” adopted in the international coalition’s strategy following General McChrystal’s report seems to have equally been adopted by the Taliban. In spite of this, there is no definition in Mullah Omar’s strategic document of who a civilian is, which makes it very prone to different interpretations by the various Taliban commanders.

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Manuel Almeida The fact that the Afghan Taliban is not a particularly centralized organization challenges the belief that The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Rules for Mujahideen will have/is already having a profound impact in actual Taliban behaviour. Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura do not have a very close control over all the fighters that belong or claim to belong to the Afghan Taliban ranks.

This characteristic—a high degree of autonomy—is precisely what makes them so dangerous and allows them to operate so swiftly over such huge distances and under such harsh geographical conditions. This is in deep contrast with the international coalition troops, who complain ironically of having to wait for written permission before firing a single shot.

Together with the lack of definition of who is a civilian, the main question is whether or not the Taliban have changed their behaviour since Mullah Omar’s directives were distributed. The signs are mixed. Suicide and other types of attack undertaken by the Taliban of which most victims are civilians have continued.

Yet, a less aggressive approach has been observed in the Taliban dealings with the Afghan population. As The New York Times has recently reported, the shift in Taliban behaviour towards civilians is confirmed by NATO officials and Afghan villagers alike.

It seems fair to assume that there is in fact a different approach by the Taliban.

The issue, however, regards what value to attribute to this change. The Afghan Taliban ties with al-Qaeda—whose main targets are civilians—lends a certain sense of contradiction to the idea of expecting a changed approach from the Taliban, after the issuing of Mullah Omar’s code of conduct. Mullah Omar has refused to break such ties, in spite of numerous attempts from several fronts to convince the Taliban to go in that direction. Among these attempts is Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah’s 2008 letter asking Mullah Omar to disavow al-Qaeda which was snubbed by the Taliban leader.

Judging by the related and long standing question of whether or not to negotiate with the Taliban, US officials and the Karzai government seem to have divergent opinions. US officials believe that the possibility of negotiating is only feasible after the Taliban break with alQaeda and suffer a few serious setbacks.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates was quite straightforward regarding this position in his recent visit to Pakistan.

The Afghan Government seems to think otherwise, and Mullah Omar’s document and the changes it enforced might have convinced Karzai and his aides that the Afghan Taliban has adopted a less radical more reconciliatory approach. This assumption can be a big mistake.

The way the Karzai government is referred to—“the slave government”— in The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Rules for Mujahideen leaves no room for doubting that while the Taliban might become softer with those they consider civilians, they have no intention of doing so with the government in Kabul. Last week’s Taliban attacks in the centre of the capital on government buildings is a reminder that, while the Taliban think they are winning, offering them carrots is a bad idea.

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