issue 1540 EN

One Year On

Dr. Gamal Abdul Gawad

The Young and The Jobless

The Commander of the Basij

Daniel Capparelli

Mohammad Reza Naqdi

Generation

X

By Paula Mejia And Wessam Sherif

Issues 1540, 09 January 2010

Editorial Cover

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz

Dear Readers,

Established by Hisham and Mohamad Ali Hafez

Editor-in-Chief

ADEL Al TORAIFI

Managing Director TARIK ALGAIN

Published by

The Majalla Magazine HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337 Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310

to The Majalla Digital, this W elcome week our issue brings to you an analy-

sis of the position of the youth in the Gulf.

The article, Generation X, argues that the advent of a powerful middle class promises an empowerment of this important sector of society, including the youth that composes it.

Despite these promises however, challenges remain in the way of the youth’s ability to achieve its potential. To complement this article, we have invited intellectuals to debate the promises and prospects of the youth in the region.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

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Issues 1538/1539

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Contents 08 Geopolitics One Year On

11 In Brief Around The World Quotes Of The Week Magazine Round Up Letters

18 Features Generation X

24 Ideas The American Blanket THE MAJALLA EDITORIAL TEAM London Bureau Chief Manuel Almeida Cairo Bureau Chief Ahmed Ayoub Editors Paula Mejia Stephen Glain Wessam Sherif Daniel Capparelli Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Webmaster Mohamed Saleh 25 December, 2009

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29 People Profile

The Commander of the Basij Interview

Labor and Education Reform Amid the Crisis

35 Economics

Issue 1540, 09 January 2010

Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words

Gulf Economics

The Young and The Jobless International Investor

Challenges of 2010

Advertising

For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact

Markets

43 Reviews Readings Reports

29

Promises are Meant to be Broken

48 The Political Essay A History of Violence

Mr. Wael Al Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia

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Geopolitics

One Year On Reflections on the Gaza War

A year has now passed since the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip against Hamas and one should reflect on its results and re-assess its aims. It is important to do so since the Gaza war has reshaped the geostrategic map in the region and changed the rules of the game between Hamas and Israel.

O

ne year has passed since Israel waged war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It is a period long enough to test and evaluate the war, its effects and strategies of both sides. The war began after a period of escalation where rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel after the expiry of the truce/ceasefire between the two parties, which lasted for six months. Hamas had also refused to extend the ceasefire which had been agreed with Israel through Egyptian mediation.

For Hamas, the terms of the ceasefire were not acceptable and the movement believed that escalation would help it strike a new agreement on better terms. In addition, Hamas thought that threatening to renew the conflict could force all parties to engage with the movement as a representative of the Palestinians and a de-facto authority that enjoys legitimacy in Gaza. Hamas also considered the possibility this would help to negotiate a new agreement for the crossings which facilitates the movement of goods and people across the borders of the besieged Gaza Strip.

This agreement had on the crossings had collapsed with the departure of the Palestinian National Authority from the Gaza Strip.

Israel launched the war under the emblem of halting rocket attacks from Gaza, although some Israeli officials spoke of more ambitious goals, including eliminating the authority of Hamas in Gaza. The war has ended without the downfall of Hamas, though it stopped the launching of rockets from Gaza into Israel. The two parties have not reached a new deal for a truce/ceasefire, and the previous agreement was not renewed.

The relationship between Israel and Gaza Strip went back as it was during the truce agreement, but this time without any deal or legal framework that protects and regulates the situation.

Israel went on to expand its movement and held an agreement with the United States to impose a ban on admitting weapons into the Gaza Strip through intelligence and naval operations. These operations include a wide area stretching from the Mediterranean to the Gulf.

Moreover, several countries participated in implementing this ban.

25 December, 2009

Dr. Gamal Abdul Gawad The only change in Israeli behaviour towards the Gaza Strip was reducing the frequency of Israeli attacks against Hamas militants in Gaza, which eased the tension. After the Gaza war, the political/military game between Hamas and Israel became governed by news rules. Under these rules, Israel would refrain from attacking Hamas militants inside the Gaza Strip as long as they do not pose a direct threat to Israel, meaning when they are not on their way to carry out attacks against Israel.

Moreover, the new rules would give Hamas training and tactical activities within the strip a higher degree of immunity against Israeli attacks.

However, Israel has continued sporadic attacks on the tunnels that cross the Gaza border into Egypt. The Israeli attacks on the tunnels were intermittent and did not target all the tunnels, but only those which were used to transfer arms and military equipment to the strip.

The new terms of relationship between Israel and Hamas would provide protection from Israeli attacks for the activities of transporting goods and civilians commodities through the tunnels into the Gaza Strip, which compensated for the continued closure of border crossings connecting Israel and Gaza.

The severe shortage of goods, medicines and other civilian supplies in the Gaza Strip has eased.

This shortage has characterized the period of truce preceding the war.

However, the constraints became more stringent with respect to goods that Israel considered to be of dual-use. Israel was expanding its definition of dual-use goods to include building materials, which did not permit re-building of what the war has damaged in the strip.

The only type of goods, which Israel committed itself to provide the strip through the crossings is the fuel needed to run power plants in Gaza. In addition, part of the needs of the Gaza Strip from vehicle fuel came from Israel, while the rest was being smuggled through the complex network of tunnels equipped with pumps through its border with Egypt.

The current rules governing the relationship between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have been reached through Egyptian mediation during the war and in the weeks that followed. The Egyptian mediation has not resulted in reaching a written agreement due to the stringent conditions and unrealistic demands by both parties.

The Gaza war changed the rules of the political game between Hamas and Israel, but not to the extent that allows one of the two parties to claim victory in this war. Israel has achieved a greater degree of security for the southern towns near the Gaza border, but does not guarantee the halt of Palestinian attacks from the Gaza Strip. Hamas's power did not collapse under the pressure of the Israeli attack and the latter does not have any remaining soldiers inside the strip.

Hamas is likely to have restored the weapons it lost during the war, and to have added new weapons to its arsenal.

However, the blockade at the border and in the sea has slowed considerably the rate of development of Hamas military force. Israel is cautiously watching the evolution of Hamas military force, but wishes not to find itself compelled to breach an understanding of its relationship with Hamas through a pre-emptive strike against the growing military strength of Hamas.

The state of no-war that prevails between Israel and Hamas over the last year is too fragile and threatens to explode at any time. If Hamas reaches a level of armament that is difficult for Israel to tolerate, or if Hamas comes under pressure due to its ambiguous style of dealing with the current situation, it might open the door to renewed fighting.

Director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

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In Brief Around The World

Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Letters

Iranian Minister of Interior

The execution of freedom Iran declared publicly that the death penalty, from now on, will be the punishment for any one protesting the results of the presidential elections. Such protests will be considered an attempt at undermining national security in Iran. Protesters were described by Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, the Minster of Interior, as nonbelievers in the way of God and his Prophet. Najjar, a leader of the Revolutionary Guard, and former Minister of Defense, said that the protesters demonstrating in the street after the day of Ashura, are nonbelievers who fight the way of God and his Prophet, and that they are trying to unIssues 1538/1539

dermine national security in Iran. Thus, they must be executed.

Najjar gave a last warning to the protesters, after the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence reported the arrest of several foreigners involved in a "psychological war" against the Islamic Republic on December 27. These latest clashes were the most violent that the country has witnessed since the announcement of the election results on 12 June.

"Starting from the day of Ashura, anyone involved in the riots will be considered an enemy of God and a threat

to national security" said Najjar.

Saladq Larijani, the Chief Justice, advocated dealing firmly with the protesters. The police and Basij forces of the Revolutionary Guard gave similar warnings, saying that they will not tolerate further demonstrations by protesters. The government organized demonstrations that were led by militant Muslim clerics who called publicly for the execution of the reformist leaders.

They raised distorted posters of former President Mohammad Khatami, showing him wearing "Western" clothes.

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In Brief - Around The World

Around The World 1 Afghanistan US media sources claim the suicide bomber who killed seven CIA agents in Afghanistan was an al-Qaeda double agent. He is said to have been a doctor from Jordan, arrested there a year ago.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Major General Michael Flynn said that US intelligence in Afghanistan was still "unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they are trying to protect and persuade".

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3 Iran Nearly 90 professors signed a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, criticizing the government's violent handling of student protesters. The professors have asked Khamenei to order revolutionary guards, governmentsanctioned militiamen and others to refrain from their acts against students and to vacate university campuses. The letter also called for official apologies for beatings of university members and the unconditional release of detained students and faculty.

4 Somalia 2 Yemen The U.S. Embassy in Yemen, which was closed over the weekend due to security concerns, was reopened.

This was traced back to successful counter-terrorism operations conducted

by Yemeni security forces that have addressed specific concerns. Earlier, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the situation in Yemen a possible threat to regional and global security.

25 December, 2009

The World Food Programme declared that recent threats and attacks from militant groups have made it almost impossible to provide food to hungry people in southern Somalia. The WFP expressed concerned about rising hunger and suffering among the most vulnerable due to these unprecedented attacks on what they call purely humanitarian operations.

5 Iraq The US military reported that December was the first month since the beginning of the Iraq war in which there were no US combat deaths. The top US commander in Iraq, Ray Odierno said it was a very significant milestone which indicated that the level of violence in Iraq had decreased over time.

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In Brief - Around The World

8 Sudan

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9

8

3

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Ghazi Salaheddin from the National Congress Party (NCP) criticized the law governing the 2011 referendum passed in December after months of wrangling, saying it lacked any deadline to address outstanding problems. Accordingly, South Sudan's vote on independence next year is expected to lead to a new war unless key questions concerning the north-south border, nationality and external debts are resolved.

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9 Egypt

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6 UAE The world's tallest building has been opened with a dramatic fireworks ceremony in the Gulf emirate of Dubai. The Burj Khalifa was revealed to be 828m (2,716ft) high, far taller than the previous record holder, Taipei 101. The tower was inaugurated

by Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahayan.

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The gunmen responsible for a drive-by shooting that killed six Christians and a Muslim guard after have turned themselves in. The three gunmen gave themselves up after a 24-hour chase that ended in farm fields in southern Egypt. Consequently, the government heightened security after the attack, which happened Wednesday, the day Egyptian Coptic Christians celebrate Christmas Eve.

7 Iceland Iceland's president has refused to sign a controversial bill to repay $5bn (ÂŁ3.1bn) to the UK and the Netherlands to compensate for the failure of Icesave Bank. President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson said he would instead hold a referendum on the bill, following public protests.

10 Kuwait The Kuwaiti parliament postponed a scheduled vote on a controversial multi-billiondollar scheme to buy citizens' private debt after heated exchanges on Tuesday. Speaker Jassem al-Khorafi adjourned the session, as he failed to bring order to the floor when supporters and opponents of the plan traded accusations.

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In Brief - Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Quotes Of The Week

"I'd talk with Israel if it recognized 1967 borders" Mahmoud Abbas the Palestinian President announcing his preconditions to negotiations with Israel

"That is not going to happen" Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanhayu commenting on calls for negotiations pertaining to his country's withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

"It is time to lower weapons and renounce violence and terrorism.

You must save your lives and become good citizens again" Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh addressing Al Qaeda personnel.

"The United States commends Yemen for the recent actions it has taken to disrupt (Al Qaeda) networks and we are reiterating our commitment to assist in those efforts" American Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, declaring support to the Yemeni government against Al Qaeda.

25 December, 2009

1

Magazine Round Up 1 Newsweek A Thousand Points of Hate

This week's issue discusses what Obama labeled as a systematic failure in its counter-terrorism screening methods. Christopher Dickey argues that the American counter-terrorism policies have resulted in mounting pressure on extremist groups, which in turn has led to a new wave of amateurish individual terrorist acts.

Dickey exemplifies his argument with the case of the Nigerian 23 year old man whose failed attempt to blow up an airplane has stirred a public upheaval.

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3 Time Frau Europa

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"Merkel has never given a speech that stayed in the memory", Time's cover story argues that despite Angela Merkel's exceptional rise to power many perceive her as inefficient.

Merkel has consistently been underestimated, yet she remains ambitious. Based oh Merkel's background and history, Catherine Mayer tries to draw an outline of her future decisions.

2 Foreign Policy The Carter Syndrome This article discusses the "split personality" that has characterized American foreign policy. Walter Russel claims that Obama's current strategies are not in any way different than the general American policy trend, which may in turn tear his presidency apart and transform him into another Jimmy Carter.

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4 4 Reason Commandante Climate "Consumer societies are incompatible with saving the natural and energy resources that development and the preservation of our species require". Reason magazine takes this statement made by Fidel Castro to demonstrate in a cynical way how highly developed nations exceed the acceptable margin of CO2 emissions as opposed to poverty stricken countries, like Cuba. The article raises the question of whether countries will be able to keep per capita carbon dioxide emissions below two tons a year.

Cover Of The Week

Cover of the Week The Economist We did it!

Within the next few months women will become the majority of the American workforce surpassing the 50% margin. The article discusses women's success in overcoming numerous societal challenges. Moving from repetitive and stereotypical jobs only a decade ago to running organizations, women are now reaping the fruits of their revolution. Nevertheless, there still are many fields in which women remain underrepresented.

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In Brief - Letters

Letters

LAST ISSUE

A Grim Future I fully agree with the author that Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with high unemployment and illiteracy, significant population growth, and roughly 45 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Yemen’s large youth population faces pervasive unemployment and the Yemeni people are in need of viable economic opportunities.

Yemen is dependent on external aid but is perhaps in greater need of stable, economic and development partners. Longterm investment is hard to attract, however, given that experts have been saying for years that Yemen is on the verge of collapse.

Suhail Azab 25 December, 2009

The Heat is On It is true that some regions are likely to experience water shortages. Projected reduction in the areas suitable for growing crops are likely to produce an increased risk of famines. Rising temperatures will decrease the supply of fish from large lakes, with impacts on food supplies. We all look forward to a fair, ambitious, & binding deal that reverses climate change and helps us tackle the world's biggest issues.

Sameh Al-Attar 16

In Brief - Magazine Round Up

Read The Majalla weekly in English and Arabic Regular Contributors

Cover Story

Dr Jon Alterman

Everyone’s Crisis

Director and Senior Fellow of the Middle East Programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

Syria’s State of Play

Aaron David Miller, scholar, author and policy adviser

Christopher Boucek

Geopolitics

Everyone’s crisis: Yemen’s quagmire and the need for regional involvement

Putting the House in Order Elsy Melkonian

Christopher Boucek

Debate

Can Assad be the second Sadat?

Dr. Joshua Muravchik Saeed Al-Lawendi Samir Al-Taqi

Ph.D Richard Weitz

Senior Fellow and Director at the Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute, Washington DC

Dr Steven Heydemann

Ideas

Tough Love The Paradox of Syrian-Iraqi Interdependence

Assad

National investment Funds Company and Board Member Of Young Arab Leaders UAE Chapter

Phase II

Chris Phillips

People

By Stephen Glain

Aaron David Miller Syria’s State of Play

Mohammed Suleiman

Economics

Issue 1537, 21 December 2009

Board Member of Young Arab Leaders, UAE chapter of World Economic Forum.

Putting the House in Order Elsy Melkonian

www.majalla.com Features

Geopolitics

Everyone’s Crisis:

In Brief

Yemen’s quagmire and the need for regional involvement Yemen’s stability and security situation is rapidly deteriorating, and its potential implosion will have a dramatic impact on the region. Ultimately, there is no Yemeni or American solution for Yemen’s problems. They cannot be solved without the help of Yemen’s neighbors and international partners.

A

s the Gulf Cooperation Council met for its 30th summit in Kuwait this week, the organization discussed a number of issues of mutual concern. Iranian nuclear ambitions, a unified currency, and the ongoing global financial situation were all expected to be on the agenda. Regardless of all these legitimate concerns, the most critical issue facing the GCC is the future of Yemen.

Yemen’s stability and security situation is rapidly deteriorating, and its potential implosion will have a dramatic impact on neighboring states. The country faces an astonishing confluence of unprecedented challenges – violent extremism, economic collapse, a looming water shortage, and a growing secessionist movement. If any one of these challenges comes to a head, it could overwhelm the Yemeni government. Unless appropriate steps are taken, Yemen risks becoming a failed state and a training ground for Islamist extremism, in which case its problems will quickly envelop the entire region.

Owing to the central government’s historically weak control, Yemen has often stood on the brink of chaos. The country has survived several individual crises in the past, but today, multiple interconnected challenges are poised to converge at the same time. At the heart of the country’s problems is a looming economic crisis. Yemen’s petroleum reserves are fast running out, and it has few viable options for creating a sustainable post-oil economy. Moreover, the country is consuming its limited water resources much faster than it can now replenish them. A rapidly expanding and increasingly poor population places unbearable pressure on the government’s ability to provide basic services. Islamist terrorism, magnified by a resurgent alQaeda organization, an armed insurrection in the North, and an increasingly active secessionist movement in the South, all endanger domestic security.

Historically, the central government has faced stuff resistance in expanding its authority, as the Yemeni people associate it with corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and thwarted economic and social opportunities. Yemeni officials are considering a policy of decentralization, granting more autonomy to local 21 December, 2009

Christopher Boucek authorities, thereby institutionalizing the informal patronage systems that operate in lieu of an effective national government.

Corruption remains a major challenge for the government, amid allegations that almost 30 percent of government revenue is never deposited in government accounts. To address the serious and continuing problem of government graft, the country will need to institute sweeping judicial reforms, establishing fair and transparent prosecutions.

The situation is further complicated by a pending political transition. President Ali Abdullah Saleh has ruled the Republic of Yemen since its unification in 1990, and the next presidential election is scheduled for 2013. It is unclear whether Saleh will be constitutionally eligible to stand for reelection for what would be a third term, and he has no obvious successor in place.

Meanwhile, since 2004, the Yemeni government has been fighting a sporadic civil war against Zaidi Shi’a revivalists in the northern province of Sa'ada known as the Houthis. This conflict again erupted into open fighting in August when the government launched Operation “Scorched Earth”. Over the course of the conflict, fighting has been both fierce and indiscriminate, punctuated by periods of relative calm. The toll has been severe in Saada itself, resulting in extensive damage to infrastructure and an estimated 175,000 internally displaced people.

The conflict stems from a complex combination of competing sectarian identities, regional underdevelopment, perceived socioeconomic injustices, and historical grievances. Over time, the antagonism has increased, and the rebels want little to do with the regime.

Around The World

Magazine Round Up

Letters

In November 2009, the conflict has expanded, drawing in Saudi Arabia.

After an incursion by Zaidi rebels into Saudi territory, Riyadh reportedly allowed Yemeni forces to transit through its territory in order to attack Houthi positions. Saudi aircraft later were reported to have hit Houthi positions inside Yemen. This marks a major deterioration in the situation, and provides yet another example of how instability in Yemen threatens the entire region.

Though the region has much to lose in Yemen’s ongoing meltdown, it has much to gain by coordinating an international approach to improve stability there.

The international community should encourage the Gulf states to offer Yemen membership in (or at least a ‘special relationship’ with) the Gulf Cooperation Council in exchange for tough steps, including progress on security concerns, curbing government subsidies, and addressing corruption.

Assad

Ultimately, there is no Yemeni or American solution for Yemen’s problems.

They cannot be solved without the help of Yemen’s neighbors and international partners. The consequences of inaction could be too severe to contemplate, especially as the country’s demographic and economic woes exacerbate its worsening security situation.

GCC Summit agrees joint military force to deal with security threats

Phase II

Associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

By Stephen Glain

08

21 December, 2009

18 18

Issue 1537

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The 30th GCC Supreme Council Summit in Kuwait concluded its activities with renewing solidarity with Saudi Arabia against threats, mainly that of the Houthi rebels and supporting Saudi actions against Houthi infiltrators. The GCC leaders stressed that any violation of security and stability of the Kingdom will be seen as a violation of the GCC countries' security and stability. The six nations' leaders agreed to form a deployment force to deal with any security threats that would face any of the member countries like the threat of Houthis.

Issue 1537

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Quotes Of The Week

The conflict has strained the Yemeni army, leading to questions about its ability to simultaneously engage in other missions, including counterterrorism operations. Moreover, the government’s failure to put down the rebellion has prompted concerns that other domestic challengers may perceive the regime as vulnerable, and possibly move against the central government. Islamist militants or other disaffected groups could mount attacks on other fronts while the government is distracted by the war in Saada. Ultimately – and perhaps most ominously – the war is worsening the economic crisis in Yemen. A large budget deficit is forecast for next year and the government is spending its foreign currency reserves at an alarming rate.

The leaders approved a defense strategy of the GCC countries and stressed the importance of developing capabilities of the Joint Jazirah Shield and shared military projects. They stressed the cooperation between their countries in confronting arm smuggling to the GCC countries. The Gulf leaders renewed their unified stance on confronting terrorism and fighting its financing sources and the extremist intellect leading to it. They also called for collective and international efforts to confront terrorism, exchange information and not use or let the land of their countries be used for preparing,

planning or fostering terrorist activities.

The Summit came at a time in which Iran tested an optimized version of the solid-fuel Sejjil-2 deterrent missile.

The international community considers this missile a very bad sign that Iran is making significant advances in its missile programme. The missile that Iran tested is capable of reaching the Gulf states. This may escalate the already severe tensions between the Iranian leadership and the Gulf countries.

Many experts stress that Iran's ballistic programme is just a military arm of its nuclear programme.

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Features

25 December, 2009

18 18

Generation

X

By Paula Mejia And Wessam Sherif

Issues 1538/1539

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Features

Generation X

The Empowerment of the Youth in the Gulf

Wessam Sherif and Paula Mejia

The advent of a powerful middle class promises an empowerment of this important sector of society, including the youth that composes it. Despite these promises however, challenges remain in the way of the youth’s ability to achieve its potential.

Students at the Graduation ceremony

O

nly a few weeks ago, the Head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Mecca, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi, expressed his support of the mixing of men and women at the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.

To the surprise of many, and the outrage of some, Sheikh AlGhamedi noted that ‘the term ikhtilat, or the separation of sexes, was a recent adoption that was unknown to the early people of knowledge… Mixing was part 25 December, 2009

of normal life for the Ummah and its societies.’ ‘The word in its contemporary meaning has entered customary jurisprudential terminology from outside’, AlGhamedi said.

As a the head of the Hai’a, as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice is known, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s statement is not just significant because it was he who said it.

A sign of the evolution of social mores in the Gulf states, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s interpretation of ikhtilat also speaks of the weight

that the opinion of the youth in the Gulf has on social and political developments of the region.

These progressive opinions might have been felt by some before, but they are only now being heard that they have the majority of support from the youth in the country – a constituency, so to speak, that has continued to show support for the Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s controversial assessment when rumors of his potential dismissal abound.

The story of the youth in the Gulf, and their growing influence 20

Features over the developments of the region however, is not one that should be taken for granted.

The youth in the Gulf have historically trodden a fine line between fortune and calamity – as they are bound by numerous religious, cultural and economic constraints.

The Reformation In the past, the youth in the Gulf have been viewed by elders as individuals of lesser wisdom, maturity and experience. This has impeded their development and internalized a feeling of inferiority associated to the hierarchical structure that governs societies in the Gulf.

According to Mounira Jamjoom, at Oxford University, younger generations have been considered fledglings in the eyes of their elders, leaving their potential for innovation and leadership locked; and as the story of Sheikh AlGhamedi shows, religious beliefs play a significant role in shaping the conservative upbringing of the youth in Gulf societies.

Consequently, religious conservatism combined with disenfranchisement has led to trends in religious extremism amongst Gulf communities – trends that have appealed to younger generations in the region.

The New York September 11th attacks speak to this trend, but they also created the perception that Gulf upbringing is based on radical religious ideas that prepare the youth for Jihad. This external outlook has severely taken its toll on young populations in Gulf societies, as surely the majority of the youth does not share its beliefs with those extremists.

In fact, contrary to popular belief, the rise of a new phenomenon known as the "objectification of religion" has started building Issues 1538/1539

up in Gulf societies. This phenomenon is characterized by the “popularization” of religious discourse, that is, the understanding that the interpretation of religious discourse is no longer limited to scholars, but also includes average individuals. This has created a ripple of revolutionary thought, stretching the boundaries of the youth's identity beyond the religious framework.

The Middle Class Effect How can these changes be explained? Despite the challenges the youth in the Gulf faces, there appears to be a wave of reform altering the position of the youth on the political arena. According to Vali Nasr’s most recent book, Forces of Fortune, the growth of the middle class as a result of a strong performance in the private sector, can encourage political change, even in the context of religious and social constraints.

In essence, Vali Nassr describes the region’s balance of power as being reshaped by the upwardly mobile middle class, and echoes Barrington Moore’s famous explanation of the democratic revolutions of the West, “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”. In a similar way, Nasr has pointed out that the entrepreneurs, investors, professionals and consumers of the region, are tipping the scales of politics away from extremism, and tipping the scales altogether.

For the youth in the Gulf who have found themselves prominent members of this growing middle class, this trend has not only moved them away from extremist politics. The growth of the middle class has, perhaps more significantly, altered their position on the political scene making them important players whose opinions are intrinsically valuable because of the economic power they growingly represent.

As Nasr notes ‘The great hope of the new middle class rising all around the region – pulling itself up out of the poverty that has provided such a ripe terrain for the fundamentalist call – is that these business-minded shopkeepers, traders, craftsmen, and civil servants, have little or no interest in extremism. The Islam they respect is more moderate and they have generally not thrown their support behind fundamentalist parties in elections – at least not until those parties have abandoned the fundamentalist component of their stated goals.’

Opportunities Not To Be Missed

However, Nasr’s assessment poses an important challenge. It is necessary to remember that he is describing a trend in progress.

The fulfillment of his prediction on the middle class’s potential to embody change in the politics of the region might not be met if their economic resilience is hindered.

Unfortunately for the Gulf’s youth, the states of the Gulf are not consistent in their ability to promote the economic interests of the middle class, and there remains a risk of squandering the potential of the youth as a part of this “reforming” middle class, and of squandering the potential of the middle class as a whole.

Shortcomings in the political, economic and societal structures pin down the promising youth sector. As a result, despite the wealth of Gulf economies, their communities should be further scrutinized for the economic potential that they have.

Oil revenues make for a very large part of Gulf economy, yet opportunities to take advantage of peaking oil prices by reforming the economy have been wasted.

The recent financial crisis was considered a double edged 21

Features sword, since high oil revenues have been extremely beneficial to Gulf economies, yet they have shown the need to diversify sources of revenue. The oil based economies have faced an unemployment problem, directly affecting graduating youth.

The problem of unemployment for the youth of the Gulf can be traced to two main factors.

The first is that due to a lack of diversity the economy has resulted in limited employment options for the fresh labor force.

Secondly, the Gulf is plagued by low wage standards and working conditions in the oil sector, and consequently attracts more immigrant labor while pushing away the domestic labor force.

Accordingly, the public sector's appeal has exceeded that of the private sector, due to the security it provides to its employees.

Statistics show that the majority of the labor force in the Gulf is employed in the public sector: almost 90 percent of all Qataris in full time employment in 2007 worked in the public sector, compared with 50 percent of Saudis, 86 percent of Emiratis and 84 percent of Kuwaitis.

However, the public sector has reached the upper limits of its ability to absorb new entrants into the labor force. Recalling again the lessons proposed by Nasr, it is the resilience of the private sector that provides the opportunity for political change.

If the youth then should find itself mainly in the public sector, its ability to contradict dated policies of the establishment would be compromised. In other words, part of the youth’s independence and strength is dependent on its capacity to exploit its successes in the private sector.

Interestingly, the employment 25 December, 2009

Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghamedi

The conservative religious trend in addition to deprivation have led to extremist trends among the youth of the Gulf communities

problems that have been sparked by the economic crisis have encouraged Gulf states to encourage private sector employment. This has resulted in a significant rise in private sector employment although unemployment among Gulf nationals is still on the rise.

Yet, the private sector initiatives in place are not perfect – and different trends can be observed amongst the different Gulf states.

For one, there has been a surge in the creation of family owned enterprises. These enterprises have created high salary expectations for the graduating

youth of some Gulf states. For example, the youth in countries like the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait refuse to take relatively lowpaying jobs, while the youth in countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain display a greater margin of flexibility.

Gender Equality and Tolerance The potential of the private sector to support the empowerment of the youth in the Gulf however is limited, and other challenges stand in the way of the youth’s development. One prominent example is the issue of gender 22

Features

The phenomenon of both sexes' unemployment escalates due to lack of economic diversification and low wages in the oil sector

Shopkeepers with practical mentality, traders, craftsmen, and government officials don't care much, if they care at all, about extremism. The Islam which they believe in and respect is a more moderate kind of Islam

equity in the Gulf states.

Due to cultural and religious requisites, the female sector of the community is regularly deprived of several rights. The challenges that face young women in Gulf countries are very different from those facing the male sector.

Young females have become more concerned with issues that address their independence such as their ability to participate in the economic, political and cultural realms of their communities.

It should be noted, however, that there has been a slow albeit Issues 1538/1539

significant improvement among the majority of Gulf countries with regards to the empowerment of women specifically, and gender equity more generally.

The reforms that have been carried out have enabled women to participate in economic and political fields, in addition to enhancing their social status.

Nevertheless, women still remain subordinates when it comes to family-related issues, such as marriage, divorce and custody.

The presence of these inequalities poses important challenges to the youth in the Gulf as a whole, not just to women. In the 2009 Arab

Human Development report, produced by the United Nations Development Program, the report notes how the insecurity – defined in physical, emotional, economic and social terms – that women face, hinders the development of Arab states.

Most obviously, by limiting opportunities for women, states are limiting the professional and social development of half of their labor force which consequently diminishes the state’s overall capacity for development. Yet, the views of Sheikh Al-Ghamedi speak to the understanding that the loosening of conservative social norms might encourage the empowerment of women, and further promote the potential for development of the youth in the region.

The youth in the Gulf has demonstrated significant signs of empowerment, evidence that their position in the political and social realm of the region is changing, and that they are the force behind much reform. Nasr has indicated however, that their empowerment has been a result of the growth of the middle class. This phenomenon holds a great deal of potential for the development of the youth in the Gulf, but many challenges lie ahead before this potential can be realized. From limited economic opportunities, to questions of equality, the youth in the Gulf has a long road to travel if it is to continue on the trend of empowerment that it has recently begun.

What is certain is that the Gulf states stand to gain much from the promise that the youth has shown.

23

Ideas

25 December, 2009

24

The American

Blanket

By Bernardo Pires de Lima Issues 1538/1539

25

Ideas

The American Blanket

and the long road to success in Iraq

Bernardo Pires de Lima

Iraq has disappeared from the Administration agenda and presidential speeches. One may say that deterioration of “AfPak” is reason enough to explain that. However, finishing the job in Iraq with coherence, strength and ambition should be the goal of the Obama administration. The American withdrawal must guarantee a political commitment to Iraq and the problems it might face in the future.

Such warning signs can still be found in many places in Iraq

I

n the last four months almost 400 people were killed in Baghdad as a result of terrorist bombings. The three major attacks were not only methodologically similar, but they all focused on political targets, mainly governmental institutions under Iraqi leadership.

These attacks remind us that the Iraqi state is still a work in progress for the international commu-

25 December, 2009

nity and for the Iraqi authorities. It also highlights the necessity of allotting more attention to the country by the Obama Administration.

As John Alterman wrote previously in The Majalla, the war in Iraq has disappeared from American newspapers and televisions in the last year. Iraq has also disappeared from the Administration agenda and

presidential speeches. One may say that deterioration of “AfPak” is reason enough to explain that. However, finishing the job in Iraq with coherence, strength and ambition should be the goal of the Obama administration. In other words, the American withdrawal must guarantee a political commitment to Iraq and the problems it might face in the future – as the current chal-

26

Ideas lenges are unlikely to disappear in the moment of military retreat and will probably increase while Iraqi authorities keep the political and economic process in their hands.

Instead, the Obama administration should be prepared to help Iraq in three main areas: in the security, economic and strategic fields.

answer will also be affected by the consequent departure timetable of the US military forces, which may be postponed after the elections. In other words, the Obama administration must be focused on the preparation of trustful Iraqi security and armed forces while working on the troop withdrawal.

Three major events have shaped the relationship between Americans and Iraqis. The first was the Strategic Framework Agreement, aimed to regulate international cooperation, and help to improve education, the economy, and the judicial system. The second was the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which established the US military’s withdrawal timetable from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and the commitment to leave Iraq by 31 December 2011.

Both agreements were approved by the Iraqi Parliament in November 2008, but SOFA calendar may change after the Iraqi referendum which will be held together with the parliamentary elections in March 2010.

Additionally, while the US administration is refocusing most efforts on the “AfPak” front, Obama should not consider the maintenance of the Iraqi economic environment as of secondary importance. The current Iraqi government has developed a reputation for being business-friendly, outlining a strategy for expanding the country’s private sector and attracting international investors. Foreign investment has increased more than 200% over the last year. These investments are mainly concentrated on oil and gas deals, real estate and mixed investments projects which have also improved the confidence among international companies who view Iraq as a viable investment location.

The Pentagon and the State Department under the Obama administration have demonstrated a commitment to respect these important steps. Obama reinforced this view during his major speech on Iraq, Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, at North Carolina in February 2009. This speech constitutes the third major development affecting the Iraqi-American relationship.

In his speech, Obama was clear in one point: “Iraq is not yet secure … violence will continue to be part of life in Iraq”. He was right.

But the question is how to reduce this prediction to a minimum level without jeopardizing the goals already achieved? The answer will be delivered by the electoral results, which will determine the political stability of the country. The Issues 1538/1539

As Iraq’s deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, said at the Invest Iraq 2009 Conference, held in London in April, “jobs and services are the best counter-insurgency strategy for economic reconstruction”. Nowadays, Iraq’s public sector provides 43% of the country’s jobs and nearly 60% of a full-time employment, figures that should motivate the government to go in expanding the country’s private sector, certainly with the help of foreign direct investments.

Iraq must also be encouraged to reduce its dependence on oil revenues, which makes up more than 60% of its GDP and 19% of its budget revenues. One of the important lessons from the current global financial crisis is the need to boost oil production and to diversify the economy.

According to the IMF, the Iraqi economy will continue to increase for the next five years more than 7% per year. In other words, with improved security, fair distribution of natural resources, and a businessfriendly administration, Iraq may see much-needed investment. But even this will depend on the Obama administration’s will to maintain a commitment to these goals. A successful election process in March 2010 and the conclusion of the U.S. troop withdrawal may help to transform the international perception of Iraq into one of an emerging market.

What the United States could not do unilaterally, it must try to do with others, including neighboring countries, European allies, and the United Nations. Although President Obama did not choose this war, nor did European countries approve the intervention, the case remains that the collapse of Iraq would be catastrophic to the region – and to Europe. A plan to draw down U.S. forces would therefore contribute to the success of a larger diplomatic strategy, prompting Middle East states, European governments, and the UN to be more constructive and proactive in working to salvage stability in the Persian Gulf.

The priority of the U.S. administration and its allies should be to design a comprehensive political strategy which outlines the distribution of resources within Iraq, improves the recruitment of Sunnis to the army and security forces, and stabilizes the country both politically and economically. This course is risky but it is still better than a short-term approach divorced from any larger political vision for Iraq and the Middle East.

Researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations 27

25 December, 2009

36

People

The Commander

of the Basij

Issues 1538/1539

29

People - Profile

The Commander of the Basij Mohammad Reza Naqdi: The Tyrant of the Campus

Reformists viewed the appointment of Naqdi as the commander of the Basij as another evidence that Khamenei was neither going to review his stance nor withdraw his unlimited support to Mahmoud Ahmadinijad. Instead, it is a striking indication that the regime would continue its strategy aimed to eradicate the reformist movement

D

espite all the doubts provoked about him and although it was said that he was sent by the Intelligence Service of the Iraqi Army to spy on the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Reza Naqdi was appointed by the Guardian Jurist Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the commander of the Basij (the Iranian Mobilization Resistance Force).

Naqdi succeeded Hojjatoleslam Hussain Taeb, the former commander of the Basij as a recognition of Naqdi's vital role in the crackdown against protesters after the recent presidential elections. Naqdi is described by reformists as the "Tyrant of the Campus".

Mohammad Reza Naqdi who is Iraqi national with Iranian origins, managed to occupy very critical positions in the system of the Guardian jurist. He carried out many duties, the most recent of which was observing the activities of the candidate reformists during the recent presidential elections, Mer Hussain Musevi and Mahdi Karroubi before Naqdi was appointed as the commander of the Basij midst the embarrassment of the reformists who had been optimistic and expected positive 25 December, 2009

changes in the leadership of the Basij forces when news spread about the deposition of the Basij former commander, Hussain Taeb.

Reformists were shocked when the Guardian Jurist did not do more than exchanging positions and replaced Taeb with Naqdi and thus Taeb again commanded the Intelligence service of the Revolutionary Guards which gained more authorities and influence.

Reformists viewed the appointment of Naqdi as the commander of the Basij as another evidence that Khamenei was neither going to review his stance nor withdraw his unlimited support to Mahmoud Ahmadinijad.

Instead, it is a striking indication that the regime would continue its strategy aimed to eradicate the reformist movement. The regime entrusted this responsibility to Naqdi who is half Iraqi and half Iranian. Naqdi was granted complete power and authority about doing whatever he considers suitable for the protection of the Guardian Jurist's regime.

Reformists accuse Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of committing heinous crimes against students and other

prominent reformers, when he was the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence. In recent protests, he played a key role in extracting confessions from the supporters of the two leaders Mir-Hossein Moussavi, and Mehdi Karroubi.

Naqdi, the chandler Naqdi is the son of Ali Akbar Thamahniy Shams. He is also known as the 'Chandler' because he used to sell candles in his youth before becoming an Iranian religious man.

He has been looked at with much suspicion, to the extent of questioning his loyalty. He has been accused of cooperating with the Iraqi military intelligence during his time as one of the leading officers in the intelligence unit of the Badr Corps, which belongs to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

Mohammad Reza has been expelled from Iraq a year after the eruption of the Islamic revolution in Iran. He joined the convoys of displaced Iraqis of Iranian origin. The Office of Immigrant Affairs at the Ministry

30

People - Profile of Interior placed him and his family in the Kurdish city of Nakda, which is located northwest of Iran. Mohammad Reza and volunteered to join the ranks of the Badr Corps of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He was accepted despite intelligence from Orumieh - capital of West Azerbaijan province – warning the Supreme Council of entrusting Naqdi with carrying out security and intelligence missions. A Peshmerga man belonging to a Kurdish Iranian opposition party made a confession in which he revealed the names of some displaced Iraqis who were cooperating with the Iraqi Military Intelligence.

Naqdi managed to become the leader of the Supreme Council Intelligence. He became the commander of the Supreme Council Intelligence at the northern front. However, he was arrested about a year later, by the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence, after being subjected to continuous surveillance for several weeks. The reason behind the arrest was Naghdi's daily trips to a place outside the city of Orumieh to practice selftorture. At times he burned his fingers, and at other times he burned his feet. Naqdi admitted, after being questioned, that he practiced such sport of self-torture so that he might be able to bear any kind of torture he might receive in the prisons of Saddam Hussein, in case he was captured. He was released three months later, following orders issued by the Revolutionary Guards Command. He returned to the Badr Corps, but this time as a logistics officer, and not as an intelligence one.

After the Iran-Iraq war had ended, Naqdi was transferred to the 'Jerusalem Corps', as the officer responsible for covert operations outside the country. When war broke out in Bosnia, he went there with one of the commandos units of the Jerusalem Corps, where he trained young Muslims on the arts of intelligence and interrogation of detainees.

He also visited Lebanon as a member of the pressure group known in Iran as "The Iran supporters of Hezbollah", which was led by Brigadier General Hussein Allah Karam.

It should be noted that the commander of the Revolutionary Guards units, which were based in Lebanon at the time, Brigadier General Ali Reza Asghari (Who later became assistant of the Secretary of Defense, and disappeared in Turkey in 2007. It was said that he had unveiled the locations of Iranian nuclear and military installations and Syrian nuclear laboratories, which the Israeli aircraft launched an attack against. This was made after he resorted to the United States during a visit to Damascus and then to Istanbul), had sent a report to the command of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran expressing his doubts about the conduct of Naqdi. He pointed out that Naqdi Issues 1538/1539

was accused of being too much interested in identifying the secret bases of Hezbollah and the warehouses where Hezbollah stacked its weapons.

Naqdi returned to Tehran. He was given a task to test his loyalty. He was ordered to assassinate his cousin, Mohammed Hussein Naqdi, the Iranian revolution acting officer in Rome, because he joined the opposition.

Naqdi carried out the task successfully.

Mohammed Hussein Naqdi was assassinated with several bullets in the head fired by an aide of his cousin.

After the success of the mission, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard recommended that he be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. He was responsible for the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence. He showed competence and loyalty in his new position, during the questioning of Gholam Hossein Cirbeschi, the mayor of the capital and the known reformist, in the era of President Mohammad Khatami, along with 163 managers and assistant directors in the municipality of Tehran.

Mohammad Reza Naqdi who is Iraqi national with Iranian origins,

managed to occupy very critical positions in the

system of the Guardian jurist

Mohammad Reza Naqdi as the former Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the Iranian military for logistics and industrial research.

The council said that Naqdi through his responsibility for the management of the Counter-Smuggling Department was responsible for Iran's efforts to circumvent the previous two packages of sanctions.

Naghdi had declared after the imposition of the second package of sanctions in March 2007 that his country had taken measures to face the sanctions. He said that his country has the potentials to continue the program without the need to import materials from abroad.

In 1993, Naqdi became the deputy director of intelligence of the 'Jerusalem Corps' of the Revolutionary Guards, which is responsible for foreign operations. However, his most important role was the step which he took in the wake of the accusations made against the deputy of the Minister of Intelligence for security affairs, "Saeed Emami", for the killing of two secular intellectuals. Naqdi with the aid of his crew set up a "parallel intelligence force" in order to avoid such scrutiny. This allowed Naqdi to work outside the control of the President of Iran at the time, Mohammad Khatami, who vowed to clean up the ministry. But despite the attempts at reform, which Khatami sought to achieve, they continued to commit their practices of atrocities.

Naqdi also played an important role in the torture of a group of prominent members of the opposition party of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In addition he played a key role in organizing and funding "The Iran supporters of Hezbollah" which masterminded the attack against the student's district at Tehran University in 1999.

Recent elections

At the 'Wissal' detention camp Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi practiced the worst and most cruel kinds of torture against Cirbeschi and his aides. The statements made by some of the detainees during their trials about the torture practices of Naqdi, raised a lot of debate throughout the country. This led some reformists in the parliament to make a decision to summon Naqdi to the parliament for questioning. But Khamenei saved him by transferring him to the Directorate responsible of fighting the smuggling of money and drugs, and from there to the armed forces.

Naqdi's name was included among the list of officials responsible for Iran's nuclear program, in the context of the sanctions imposed on Iran by resolution 1803 of the UN Security Council, which was issued in March of 2008. The resolution described

Following the launch of the green movement protests, Naqdi was assigned to lead the interrogation of important detainees in coordination with Javad Azadeh, the assistant of the former Minister of Intelligence, who is known for his cruelty in torturing detainees, and forcing any one, unfortunate enough to spent two days in one of his cells, to confess to treason and working for the US. There is no doubt that the success of Naqdi and Azadeh in forcing reformist leaders such as Dr. Saeed Hajjarian, the adviser of Khatami, and the known reformist Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Ali Abtahi, the former assistant to the President, to read prepared confessions in front of the cameras of Iranian television, was one of the most important reasons for his appointment as commander of the Basij forces.

31

People - Interview

Labor and Education Reform Amid the Crisis Tariq Yousef – Dean of the Dubai School of Government, Co-Director of the Middle East Youth Initiative at Brookings Institute, Washington DC Tarik Yousef spoke with The Majalla about the impact of the global financial crisis on labor market and education policies of the countries of the region. Yousef, the Dean of the Dubai School of Government, also provided policy recommendations and stressed the need to address the needs of the young generations in particular.

Success in dealing with the crisis depends on the achievement of reform

T

arik Yousef is one of the leading young economic minds in the Middle East. Dean of the Dubai School of Government, he is also affiliated with Georgetown University, Kennedy School of Government, and Brookings Institute. He specializes in developmental economics and economic history of the Middle East and has written extensively about the regional impact of the economic recession. He is also a former economist in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and advisor to the United Nations Millennium Project. Energetic and well-humored, he spoke to The Majalla on the sidelines of a conference about the 25 December, 2009

impact of the global slowdown on labor and education policies in the Middle East.

The Majalla: What will the Middle East look like after the crisis?

I worry it will look very much the same.

The Middle East is unlikely to go through any kind of traumatic change.

Q: Why do you say that?

Because all the forces that are underlying the crisis can only on the surface reinforce the status quo in the Middle East, which is largely pro-government, suspicious of

the market and of liberal economic and political ideology. One of outcomes of the crisis is an emboldened role for the state, but this is how the Middle East is to begin with. In fact, if the crisis deepens, if the recession gets worse, there will be more calls for the state to come in and do things. And many happen to be authoritarian states, so this is a way to build their legitimacies.

Q: That doesn’t sound very optimistic.

It ultimately depends on what the goal is. The liberal political and economic model has not gotten any traction in 32

People - Interview much of the Middle East and now it is under tremendous stress. It could be undermined fatally if the crisis deepens.

And I would say this is a realistic reading, although that doesn’t mean there are not thing that should change, or will change.

Q: And in this context, what do you expect will happen with labor market deficiencies in the Middle East?

It depends. Large structural unemployment problems require equal commitments, political and economic. The anti-market and anti-globalization model has not been able to deliver.

Oil prices helped manage it, but you can no longer avoid globalization.

You may not end up with high unemployment, but with people having mediocre jobs, low quality jobs, more informal activity, and some poverty.

Q: Do you expect labor-driven political instability as a result?

It won’t necessarily threaten governments. It’s just less than optimal economic management.

Q: How are countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council making out in this regard?

The problem is different there. These governments are doing a better job of trying to solve structural underpinning problems. With few exceptions in the GCC, governments have made education and employing every national a priority.

The problem of the GCC is the lack of manpower to achieve the grand projects they have. I worry more about countries with high level of unemployment, too much government intervention, lack of a long-term vision, and populations very vulnerable to falling below poverty line, like Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco.

Q: But education and unemployment are not detached. Iran, for example, has vastly improved its education system, but it still has one of the highest unemployment rates in the region.

That’s right. Iran is a state-driven economy. It is not conducive to attract capital that would allow it to complement its high human capital. It’s not easy for Iranians to be mobile either.

And governments in the Gulf are not at ease with growing Iranian influence.

Q: What about the GCC? It’s not exactly a free market either.

I agree with you. The GCC and the rest

of the Arab world share big government.

The critical and essential difference in the rest of Arab World is that they are actively intervening in the game. You have a lot intervention, a lot of laws and procedure. In the Gulf by contrast you have big states that are led by people who tend to be business-friendly. Another way of saying it is that states in the Gulf are business friendly and outside the Gulf they are predatory.

Businesses fear them. In the Gulf, states are looking out for the interests of private industry, even while maintaining big public responsibilities. And I love that!

Q: So how does that translate into employment?

These private sectors, if output from the educational system is of the quality necessary, are job creating machines and rely on expected labor force. The issues that need to be dealt with in the GCC are not as complicated as those in Algeria or Egypt, where the state is not here or there.

Large structural unemployment problems require equal commitments, political and economic. The anti-market and antiglobalization model has not been able to deliver Q: Is the system sustainable though, considering population growth?

Look, we cannot find enough nationals to fill the jobs in the Gulf. Everyone is competing for the nationals. Not all are qualified, but they are competing for them. If these economies continue to grow, they will create enough jobs for all nationals. And economic development is also lowering population growth in the Gulf. Education is changing things.

People now want to have jobs. They no longer want to just stay home. More and more women in the Gulf are more career minded and not family focused.

Q: We’ve heard about the opportunities that arise in times of crisis. Would you say any government took advantage of this severe recession to ready the future, especially in terms of job creation?

I don’t think any country took advantage. Everyone was just coping. Half measures here, stimulus package there.

Nobody has put together that plan. Maybe the only exception would be Abu Dhabi, in part because it was the least exposed and it was just building its ambitions.

Q: In that case, what would you advice Middle Eastern governments to do?

We can identify some broad policy reforms that all countries in the region should consider in order to ease the pressure of youth unemployment. On the broad level, needed reforms include the modernizing of education systems so that students gain relevant and adaptable skills; expanding the private sector as an engine of job creation by easy the barriers to doing business; reforming labor laws to increase employer flexibility in hiring and firing; and reducing the appeal of public sector employment.

It is not easy or often politically feasible to adopt some of the aspects of these broader reforms. Moreover, doing so will take considerable time which, given the scale of the unemployment problem among youth and the impact of the global economic downturn, we cannot afford.

Q: Can you give some specific policy recommendations?

Reform public sector hiring practices, provide social protection for all workers, reform university admission policies, invest in scaled-up volunteerism and learning programs, raise the value of informal work, and carefully expand vocational training schemes.

The scale of this challenge can only be addressed by countries forging greater cooperation on youth policies and programs. This means greater youth targeted investments shaped by evidence-based knowledge and improving the institutional environment for young people at time when the Middle East is in the midst of an unpredictable global economic environment.vZ

Interview conducted by Andres Cala - Madrid-based freelance journalist and political scientist specialising in Middle Eastern and European policy, as well as global energy issues.

33

25 December, 2009

Economics Gulf Economics

International Investor

Markets

The Young

and The Jobless By Daniel Cappareli

Issues 1538/1539

35

Economics - Gulf Economics

The Young and The Jobless Solving the problem of youth unemployment Daniel Capparelli Despite all the advantages its oil reserves and economic wealth brings, Saudi Arabia suffers from a serious, albeit common, disease: youth unemployment. Much effort has been put in tackling this issue producing encouraging results. Much still needs to be done to solve this problem affecting not only the young fractions of the labour force, but also the development of the economy as a whole.

It has become easier and faster for a Saudi businessman to start a project, compared to what things were like five years ago

many angles, the Saudi F rom economy is seen as a giant.

It’s economy is by far the largest in the region; its gross domestic product (GDP) constitutes 40% of aggregate Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries’ GDP, it owns the largest oil reserves in the world, and has built a significant 25 December, 2009

trade balance surplus that reached US$ 212 billion in 2008 (mainly due to oil exports). Yet, when one looks closer, one sees an economy teeming with equally sizeable structural challenges, the most politically sensitive and economically troublesome being youth unemployment. In this

sense, one could venture saying that the giant has clay feet.

The Saudi economy’s wealth can easily obfuscate the crude reality of an unemployment rate that already stood at 11% at the outset of the global financial crisis. Even more conspicuous is 36

Economics - Gulf Economics the fact that of this 11%, 44% was men and women aged between 20 and 24. The resulting risk of social instability, notably by generating a pool of recruits for terrorist activities, for instance, is undoubtedly a prime motivation behind Government efforts to mend this quandary.

From a theoretical perspective, the obvious answer to high youth unemployment is the creation of a diversified and vibrant private sector capable of absorbing the excess labour generated by the recent demographic revolution.

The reform push initiated in 2005

by King Faad has, according to the 2010 World Bank Doing Business Index (which compares economic regulation across 183 countries), set the country on the right track towards achieving this objective. By pushing ahead with these reforms, King Abdullah’s current government has undoubtedly contributed to the Kingdom’s rise to rank 13th in the world for the most business friendly economies in 2010.

Many key economic fundamentals have indeed been improved. For instance, today it is significantly easier and faster for a young Saudi entrepreneur to start a business than five years ago. Furthermore, when compared to its peers in other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and OECD countries, the Saudi entrepreneur enjoys numerous advantages including fewer procedures required to start a business, less waiting time, and no minimum capital requirements.

Easiness of Starting a Business Substantial problems continue to hamper the development of the private sector, however.

Despite recent and encouraging progress, current regulation still creates unnecessary roadblocks for entrepreneurs seeking credit to develop a commercial venture, for instance. Indeed, by not enacting efficient legislation Issues 1538/1539

protecting the rights of lenders, the Government has sustained a credit environment with intrinsic disincentives to lend, thus reducing the availability of capital for business development. Furthermore, a relatively inefficient judiciary constitutes a sizeable barrier to the enforcement of contracts between private parties, which hinders the long-term risk assessment of commercial ventures. Although the quality of contract enforcement may not seem an important issue at first, studies have shown the important role this can play in speeding economic growth and in the development of the private sector.

Enforcing Contracts A further hurdle for the Saudi entrepreneur is the state of the labour market. Although the Kingdom’s labour regulations are more flexible in terms of employee hiring and redundancy than in other MENA or OECD countries, the high costs of redundancy make it significantly harder for a Saudi entrepreneur to react to economic downturns by reducing costs. This factor is undoubtedly partially responsible for the lower international competitiveness of Saudi companies.

Labour Market Although the quality of labour regulations constitute an impediment to the strengthening and diversification of the private sector, this factor seems to be dwarfed by the difficulties created by the low level of qualification of the labour force. This fact is buttressed by a 2008 report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), which underlines the need for an efficient education system to create the human capital necessary to assist in the development of the private sector and overall economic diversification.

Experts agree that refurbishing the education system is a must.

In our increasingly globalized

world, the costs created by the low qualification of the Saudi labour force are a liability for local entrepreneurs. High labour costs make it difficult for Saudi entrepreneurs to compete with Chinese and Vietnamese producers of labour-intensive goods, and the low skill of its labour force precludes it from competing with Western producers of capital- intensive and high tech goods.

A more efficient education system would raise the quality of the labour force and encourage the development of a knowledge-based economy. The deregulation of the educational system is an important element in creating a competitive atmosphere between educational institutions. This encourages, among other things, enhanced quality of teaching and an overall increase in the performance of the educational system. As a case in point, the creation of King Abdullah’s University of Science and Technology (KAUST) encourages a sense of optimism about the future, but for this initiative to reach its full potential, however, more high quality educational institutions must enter the market.

The liberalization of higher education services can help. The Kingdom is the only important economy in the region not hosting a foreign university. The latter would be crucial in introducing new pedagogic knowhow, and in creating the basis for a dynamic and competitive educational system.

As things stand now, Saudi Arabia’s young people are stuck in a quagmire. On the whole they do not possess the qualifications required to support the development of a dynamic and vibrant private sector.

Nonetheless, there have been encouraging signs in the last five years. The truth of the matter is that the giant must realise that it needs strong feet in order not to collapse - and it must act quickly.

37

Economics - International Investor

Challenges of 2010

Will the UAE banking sector manage to survive the crisis?

The challenge which the UAE banking sector currently faces has its roots in mid-2008. Foreign liquidity ranging between 150180- billion UAE dirhams left the country. The total amount of this capital flight was not officially revealed.

Regardless of the motives behind this behaviour, it has created a wide liquidity gap.

T

This rescheduling and payments may constitute a considerable pressure, especially if these obligations (bonds) are concentrated in large banks such as the Emirates National Bank of Dubai (ENBD) and the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB). These two banks were part of the creditors' committee in charge of negotiations on the terms of postponement and rescheduling.

he UAE’s banking sector is composed of 24 national banks with 657 subsidiaries, and 28 foreign banks with 82 subsidiaries.

According to the reports of UAE Central Bank, by the end of October 2009, the total assets of national banks reached 1.536 Trillion UAE dirhams (418.3 billion US dollars) with a growth rate of 8% when compared with the same period of 2008.

The following figure illustrates this growth over the period October 2008 – October 2009, compared with Two Periods Moving Average (the average of a sequence of smaller periods within the main period analysed, depicted in red in the graph). The growth of assets was higher than Two Periods Moving Average since August 2009.

The challenge the UAE banking sector currently faces begun in mid-2008, when 150180- billion UAE dirhams in foreign capital suddenly left the country.

The Central Bank did not reveal at the time the factors that contributed to this capital flight. What is certain, however, is that this liquidity left the country over a relatively short period of time and that it had previously entered the country supposedly to benefit from the upward trend of the stock market, and the possibility of De-pegging of the dirham from the US dollar.

Regardless of the motives behind this trend, it has undoubtedly created a wide liquidity gap, which only got worse after two big financial companies (AMLAK and TAMWEEL) suspended circulations of their stocks in Dubai Financial Market. This gap has affected the borrowing process and led to a decline in its volume.

In October 2008, the liquidity gap in the UAE banking sector reached the record of 82.7 billion UAE dirhams (22.5 billion US dollar). This raised the ratio of loans to deposits to 109.40%.

The graph shows clearly a neat decrease of this ratio in October 2009 to 103.8%, which means a reduction in the liquidity to 37.6 billion dirham (10.2 billion dollars). This decrease in percentage was better than the moving average of 25 December, 2009

Dr Wadah Al-Taha two previous periods (which is shown in the graph in red).

There is ample evidence to support the view that the most important government decision leading to the stabilization of the market was the state’s full guaranty of deposits in local and foreign banks operating in the country. In addition, the government injection of 120 billion dirham (32.7 billion dollars) through the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank also contributed to the stabilzation.

However successful the stabilization of the banking sector was, lending operations remained limited, with a growing number of defaults on debt.

Allocations for bad debts rose from $6.3 billion in October 2008 to 10.4 billion dollars in October 2009. This came about as some of these allocations were part of debts granted by United Arab Emirates banks to the two defaulting groups of Saad Gosaibi, and to the many defaults by the expats who lost their jobs and had to return home. Moreover, the truth is that banks were already over tolerant in granting credit before mid-2008. The average of UAE banks' capital adequacy (which expresses the durability of the UAE banking sector according to international standards) at the end of the third quarter of 2009 reached 18%.

Furthermore, Dubai World announced at the beginning of December the rescheduling of outstanding $ 4.1 billion in debts of one of its subsidiaries (Nakheel). The company has later proposed rescheduling this payment to May 2010 as well as discussing the rescheduling of the company's $ 26 billion due on different dates.

The request to reschedule the payment of the debt has been accompanied by a lot of fuss by the international and Western media. It has been given peculiar descriptions such as the "failure to repay" or the "Bankruptcy of Dubai".

In order to avoid the consequences entailed by such exaggerated headlines, Dubai surprised everyone by repaying the due amount in collaboration with the Government of Abu Dhabi. The support of Abu Dhabi came in the form of bonds worth US$ 10 billion. Other creditors are expected to be paid their dues. This measure will contribute to alleviating the pressure on bank liquidity.

Repaying the debt in due time was a strong message conveying the commitment of the Government of Dubai to maintaining a healthy investment climate in the emirate. The cooperation of the Government of Abu Dhabi conveyed a second message: in the context of the Federal State, the UAE economy is capable of facing crises, while keeping its developmental plans in the state budget. This fact was confirmed by the declarations made by officials from the International Monetary Fund.

One should expect that the power of the UAE banking sector will be tested again in the first quarter of 2010. Payments due during this period are expected to be postponed. At the same time, the banking sector will have to not only meet the needs of the finance and credit sector, but also try to reduce the ratio of loans to deposit below 100%. This will certainly require an increase of deposits.

All these factors need to be balanced by the banks under the watchful eyes of the Central Bank.

Senior Economist and Financial Analyst 38

Geopolitics In Brief

Features

Debate

Interview

Economics The Political Essay

Ideas Profile

Issues 1538/1539

Reviews

25 December, 2009

42

Economics - Markets

Gulf Bank

The U.S. Transportation Security Administration has announced that all passengers flying into the United States from or via a total of 14 countries will be subject to enhanced screening techniques, such as body scans, pat-downs and a thorough search of carry-on luggage Lebanon

United States

Syria

The recent financial troubles of Dubai developer of Islamic bonds, Nakheel, highlights the need for more effective bankruptcy rules in the gulf in order to better assist the development of this market.

Currently, given that many Islamic bonds are construed under English law, and that few Gulf countries have enforcement treaties with the West, investors often must go before a local court for the enforcement of contracts. Given the poor quality of bankruptcy codes in the region, this additional risk associated with sukuks remains a mighty obstacle to the full development of the market.

Afghanistan

Iraq

Libya

Algeria Cuba Listed by U.S. as state sponsors of terrorism “Other countries of interest”

Pakistan

Nigeria

Iran

Sudan

Saudi Arabia

Somalia

Yemen

Source: TSA

Increased Security in US Airports The failed terrorist attempt to a flight connecting Amsterdan to Detroit on Christmas day led American authorities to increase security in Airports.

The American government also increased the security measures for travelers native or passing by countries deemed “of concern” or “sponsoring terrorism”.

This measure dificult the free movement of people and will therefore increase the barriers to economic integration between the concerned countries.

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© GRAPHIC NEWS

Spire Visible from 95km away Corporate offices and suites

The $4 billion, 160-storey Burj Dubai towers 818 metres above Dubai city and became the world’s tallest building when it overtook the Taipei 101 in July 2007 124th floor Observation platform

54 Otis elevators travelling at up to 10 m/s 700 private apartments

Armani Hotel

Cooling system sufficient to create 12,750 tonnes of ice each day

STRUCTURE Shear walls Core

Tube skyscraper: Giant tube with 125,000 openings – supported by shear wall buttresses in Y-shaped clockwise spiral.

Structure locked together by hexagonal core, which stops building from twisting in wind

Cladding: 24,348 panels over total wall area of 132,190sq m, including 103,000sq m of reflective double-glazing and 15,500sq m of stainless steel WORLD’S TALLEST BUILDINGS (to architectural top) 442m 451.9m 509.2m

1973 Willis (Sears) Tower Chicago

1998 Petronas Towers Malaysia

2004 Taipei 101 Taiwan

Foundations: 192 piles to depths of 50 metres and 10,000-tonne foundation slab requiring over 45,000 cubic metres of concrete

Sources: Emaar Properties, Openshaw Properties, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill

© GRAPHIC NEWS

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25 December, 2009

Reviews Books

Issues 1538/1539

Readings

Reports

43

Reviews - Readings

Readings Books Justice Michael J. Sandel

Cover

September 2009

What are our obligations to others as people in a free society? Should government tax the rich to help the poor? Is the free market fair? Is it sometimes wrong to tell the truth? Is killing sometimes morally required? Is it possible, or desirable, to legislate morality? Do individual rights and the common good conflict?

These questions are at the core of our public life today—and at the heart of Justice, in which Michael J. Sandel shows how a surer grasp of philosophy can help us to make sense of politics, morality, and our own convictions as well.

Cover The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes you a Happy Birthday: Unexpected Encounters in the Changing Middle East Neil Macfarquhar March 2010 War zones are in some ways all alike, but countries that simmer in relative peace all simmer in their own ways. MacFarquhar's new book makes stops in war zones (Baghdad, Beirut), but it glances at these stock figures of Middle East reportage only obliquely.

Instead it concentrates on the simmering. In a geographically wide-ranging series of portraits, it depicts a region more complicated and more interesting than coverage of its signature conflicts suggests.

Cover Dining With Al-Qaeda Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East Hugh Pope March 2010 The 30 years Pope has spent living and travelling in the Middle East, from a 1980 visit as an Oxford student through a decade-long stint as a correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, color this reflection on the region's recent history. Moving back and forth through time in vignettes set in Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, this fascinating memoir of his career tackles subjects as varied as the sexual attitudes of Middle Eastern men, the murder of Daniel Pearl, the Iraq-Iran War, and the poetry of the mystic Persian poet Hafez.

Cover

Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the rise of hamas Paul McGeough March 2010-01-06

In Kill Khalid, Australian journalist Paul McGeough uses the botched assassination as the jumping-off point for a timely and thorough examination of Hamas, highlighting the ways in which Israel has intentionally and unintentionally aided its rise.

25 December, 2009

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Reviews - Readings

Cover The Cartoons that Shook the World Jytte Klaussen November 2009 On September 30, 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Five months later, thousands of Muslims inundated the newspaper with outpourings of anger and grief by phone, email, and fax; from Asia to Europe Muslims took to the streets in protest. This book is the first comprehensive investigation of the conflict that aroused impassioned debates around the world on freedom of expression, blasphemy, and the nature of modern Islam.

Report Jailing Refugees Human Rights Watch December 29, 2009 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement arbitrarily detains refugees and holds them indefinitely for failing to meet paperwork requirements. The 40-page report, "Jailing Refugees: Arbitrary Detention of Refugees in the US Who Fail to Adjust to Permanent Resident Status", examines the detention of refugees for failure to file for lawful permanent resident status, even though US immigration officials already put them through a thorough vetting process at the time they were recognized as refugees.

Interview Foreign Policy Challenges in 2010 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jessica Thuchman Mathews In a panel discussion on the Diane Rehm Show, Jessica Mathews examined the challenges of international terrorism. Explaining that the roots of terrorism cannot be boiled down to merely the issue of poverty, she argued that instead, more attention must be paid to the role of bad governance and corruption which fuels a sense of injustice and anger that finds its outlet in extremism.

Iraqi Politics: Uncertainty Ahead Council on Foreign Relations Jane Arraf, Baghdad Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor Veteran Middle East correspondent Jane Arraf says that despite recent terrorist explosions in Baghdad, most Iraqis do not blame Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for security problems. "After all the suicide bombings, you would think people would be incredibly angry," she says. "But when you ask people in the street, he doesn't get a lot of the blame."

Still, it's not clear that he will prevail in the March 7 parliamentary elections, she says.

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Reviews - Reports

Promises are Meant to be Broken Behind Scuttled Nuke Pact, Iran’s Regime in Turmoil Ray Takeyh Council on Foreign Relations December 21, 2009

The report by the Council of Foreign Relations underscores the dynamic between Iran’s foreign policy and the internal conflict between the regime and its opposition. In essence, Takeyh’s report highlights how the controversial elections in Iran, and the general sense of illegitimacy attached to the current president, affected the prospects of the October deal on uranium enrichment.

R

eflecting on one of the most important issues that the world faced in 2009, the Council on Foreign Relations has released a report that discusses potential explanations for the setup and consequent breakdown of a nuclear deal between Iran and the West. After having been caught with their hands in the cookie jar, so to speak, Iran was faced with an uncomfortable 25 December, 2009

decision. In what was interpreted by many as a breakthrough for American-Iranian relations, Iran finally agreed to ship out the majority of their low-enriched uranium for reprocessing abroad.

This deal was interpreted as a sign that Obama’s invitation for rapprochement was working, and more importantly, as an opportunity to buy time to

dissuade Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

However, the deal did not last and it was not long before Iranian officials had gone back on their word – a decision that many have interpreted in light of the internal turmoil that has dominated Iranian politics since the scandalous elections of the summer.

The report by the Council 46

Reviews - Reports on Foreign Relations again underscores the dynamic between Iran’s foreign policy and the internal conflict between the regime and its opposition.

In essence, Takeyh’s report highlights how the controversial elections in Iran, and the general sense of illegitimacy attached to the current president, affected the prospects of a deal.

Takeyh explains that after the election Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and security services underwent a significant revision that involved the integration of the command structure and the expansion of the intelligence apparatus in order to dismantle the opposition’s strength’s.

“As part of these measures it appears that a new committee was created to verse national security affairs who paid more attention to the low enrichment uranium deal and promptly revolted against an arrangement that could retard Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations.” From these events, Takeyh concludes that it was opposition within the system, and not the objections of peripheral figures like Larijani and Rafsanjani that ruined the deal.

Takeyh’s introduction to the events that problematized the deal raises more issues than just the impact of internal Iranian politics on their foreign policy development.

In addition, it demonstrates the problems that arise in formulating foreign policy when dealing with divided and unstable regimes.

That is, the example of Iran is demonstrative of the challenges that internal division pose for the country’s ability to create a consistent relationship with the outside world. As Takeyh notes, in one of international relations’ greatest ironies, it was President Ahmadinejad who seemed to support the deal on uranium enrichment abroad.

However, given the pressure he faced at home, recanting suited his interests more than keeping his word. While this may make Issues 1538/1539

life easier at home for the regime in place, it certainly has done a great deal to complicate its relationships with the West.

Certainly, the most recent example of Iran’s inability to be consistent with the West poses problems for Obama’s attempts at engagement. The open hand that he has offered Iran is now a questionable strategy, as it is becoming clear that for Iran’s government promises are meant to be broken. In Takeyh’s assessment however this does not imply an end to the deal. Although a negotiation with Iran is always going to be difficult. “In Tehran, no deal ever dies. It is entirely possible that the LEU export proposition could be resurrected not with the specifications of the October 1 deal which called for the shipment of 1,200 kgm abroad, but there may be 400 today, 400 tomorrow, and 400 the day after. Something like that can still evolve.”

However, an underlying assumption in Takeyh’s assessment is that a rapprochement between the Iran and the US, is that a nuclear deal is indispensable for the two countries to improve their relations. Yet, as a recent interview for The Majalla with Ambassador Chas Freeman indicates, there are other issues standing in the way of a rapprochement between the two countries. Although perhaps beyond the original objectives of his article, an assessment of the possibility of building a relationship outside of the nuclear deal and then moving on to the nuclear deal once more trust is established would have complemented Takeyh’s assessments of the prospects of a rapprochement.

Additionally, Tayekh observed that the restructuring of the revolutionary guard and security services in Iran has encouraged a belief in Western conspiracy with internal civil society groups – brought together by

a determination to topple the Islamic Republic. Although this assessment of their concerns is valid, where Takeyh’s conclusions are questionable are with regards to how this conspiracy fear affects the regime’s interests in a nuclear weapon’s program. “A nuclear program, or weapons” he says “are designed out of fear for an external threat. If you don’t fear that then the utility of nuclear weapons diminishes.” While it may be true that in most cases the utility of a nuclear weapons program is derived from its function as a deterrent, to view it only in this light is quite limited.

Nuclear weapons are more than just weapons, they also bring with them association with an elite club of powerful states. To question the utility that a government with significant internal division would derive from the prestige associated to obtaining a nuclear weapon demonstrates a limited understanding of the way in which the regime attempts to balance its relationship with an internal opposition by tailoring its foreign policy accordingly. Furthermore, as the Islamic Republic founded on the concept of revolution, and anti-Americanism, it becomes further clear why the regime in place would be interested in being perceived internally as “rebelling” against Western expectation.

Moreover, the possession of a nuclear weapon might make the regime appear less divided, and thus discourage opposition.

While Takeyh’s article addresses important details pertaining to the possibility of an Iranian deal with the West, and further the impact that internal politics has on their foreign policy, his article also has serious set backs. Consequently, though informative, this Council on Foreign Relations report might be most useful if accompanied by a broader analysis on how the prospect of a nuclear weapon alters the internal dynamic between the regime and the opposition in Iran.

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The Political Essay

A History of Violence Eritrea’s Path to Become a Pariah

The history of violence that characterizes the Horn of Africa partly explains, though obviously does not justify, the behaviour of Eritrea. The support to non-state armed groups is a feature that characterizes the history of most of the African continent. The particular relevance of Eritrea’s activities is that the group they favour— the Shabaab—is not just a regular non-state armed group.

A

t the end of 2009, the United Nations announced that it would impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of militants in Somalia. The UN Security Council sanctions target the Eritrean government and military leaders with an arms embargo (to and from Eritrea), travel restrictions, and asset freezes. These UN sanctions are partly a result of the mounting pressure and requests from several governments of the region and from the African Union. The UN Security Council resolution ‘demands that all Member States, in particular Eritrea, cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region or incite violence and civil strife in Djibouti.’ The history of violence that characterizes the Horn of Africa partly explains, though obviously does not justify, the behaviour of Eritrea.

Eritrea is bordered by Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and has a small population of 5 million. It gained its independence in 1951 from the United Kingdom’s trusteeship under UN Mandate. Eritrea was then federated with Ethiopia according to UN Security Council resolution 390, adopted after the people of Eritrea were consulted by referendum. Finalizing a process of gradual takeover, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, and the former strongly imposed its culture on the latter. Like many African countries, Eritrea endured a long civil war, which started in the 1960s against successive Ethiopians governments.

This war ended in 1991, and the UN supervised a referendum where the people of Eritrea overwhelmingly voted in favour of independence from Ethiopian rule. Eritrea gained its independence but the scars of the long war and bloody occupation remain fresh.

Isaias Afewerki, once the leader of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front which professed Marxism, became Eritrea’s provisional president and has been the nation’s leader ever 25 December, 2009

Manuel Almeida since. Internally, his rule has been one of a single-party which does not allow opposition to organize, and it never held national elections. The government is accused by several non-governmental groups of religious persecution and severe human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests.

Externally, Eritrea has been engaged in conflict with virtually all its neighbours – including wars with Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti.

The animosity with Ethiopia is the main driver of Eritrea’s activities that the United States, the United Nations and the African Union strongly criticize and oppose. Since May 1998 and until 2000, due to an unmarked border between both countries, a war took the lives of about 20,000 Eritreans and 125,000 Ethiopians. Since then, the distrust between the Ethiopian and the Eritrean government only worsened. Certainly, Eritrea is not the only guilty party in this ongoing conflict. After the Algiers Agreement which put an end to the 3 year conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a Boundary Commission associated to the UN decided in 2002 to award Badme—the disputed territory— to Eritrea. However, Ethiopia refused to accept the decision, it did not withdraw its troops from the disputed areas (Badme included), and thus the quarrel went on.

In July 2006, with Somalia once more diving into chaos, Ethiopia was invited by the Somalia Transitional

Federal Government to intervene, with the support of the United States, against the Islamic Courts Union and affiliated militant groups. Ethiopia at the time justified the intervention with the need to ‘defend its territorial sovereignty.’ The ICU was defeated, but the Shabaab, a splinter group, waged an insurgency war against the Ethiopians troops who were forced to withdraw. After Ethiopia’s withdrawal, the African Union sent a peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) to assist the transitional government in Somalia, in particularly in training the Somalia security forces. Eritrea has been accused, ever since Ethiopia’s intervention in support of the Somali government, of providing arms and financial assistance first to the ICU and then to the Shabaab. Ethiopia was not alone in accusing the Eritrean government, with the United States and the UN also backing Ethiopia’s concerns.

Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have traditionally pursued a strategy of support to opposition groups in each country and non-state armed groups against the rival government. This is a feature that characterizes the history of certain parts of Africa, not only the Horn of Africa but also the Great Lakes region, if not most of the continent. The particular relevance of Eritrea’s activities is that the group they favour—the Shabaab— is not just a regular non-state armed group. Indeed, the sheer strength and high degree of radicalism of the Shabaab, together with its close ties with al-Qaeda and the ambitions of international jihad, make it one of the most dangerous militant groups worldwide. Furthermore, Eritrea keeps destabilizing Djibouti, and refuses to pull out its troops from the disputed area as UN Security Council resolution 1862 demanded. This assumes greater strategic importance because Djibouti is a crucial base for US and France operations against Somali militants and the problem of piracy. All this explains and justifies the UN sanctions.

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25 December, 2009