issue 1548 EN

The Line of Pragmatism

In Search of the Casting Vote

Europa Europa

Michael Thumann

Glyn Davies, US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency

Daniel Capparelli

Who will have

the last dance?

Issue 1548, 8 March 2010

While the EU Buys Time, Turkey Does Business in the Middle East

By Nicholas Birch

Editorial

Cover

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz

Established by Hisham and Mohamad Ali Hafez

Editor-in-Chief

ADEL Al TORAIFI

Managing Director TARIK ALGAIN

Published by

Dear Readers, to The Majalla Digital, this week our issue W elcome brings to you an assessment of Turkey’s growing

closeness to the Middle East. Nicholas Birch, a former Turkish resident who currently writes for The Wall Street Journal and the Times of London, looks into this trend asking if this is a sign that Turkey, tired of being Europe’s perpetual suitor, finds the position of regional leader in the Middle East more congenial.

As a complement to Birch’s feature, Iason Athanasiadis brings to you an interview with Glynn Davies, the American ambassador to the IAEA. In the interview Davies discusses Iranian nuclear enrichment, and focuses on Turkey’s leverage in the negotiation process with Iran.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

The Majalla Magazine HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337 Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310

Sincerely, Adel Al Toraifi Editor-in-Chief 04

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Issue 1547

05

Contents 08 Geopolitics The Line of Pragmatism

11 In Brief Around The World Quotes Of The Week Magazine Round Up Letters

18 Features Who will have the last dance?

25 Debate Why Should Turkey Join the EU?

30 Ideas Al Qaeda’s Condolences

THE MAJALLA EDITORIAL TEAM London Bureau Chief Manuel Almeida Cairo Bureau Chief Ahmed Ayoub Editors Paula Mejia Wessam Sherif Daniel Capparelli Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Webmaster Mohamed Saleh 8 March, 2010

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25

35 People Profile Two Sides of the Same Coin

Interview

In Search of the Casting Vote

Issue 1548, 8 March 2010

Submissions

43 Economics International Economics Europa Europa International Investor Much Ado About Little

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55 Reviews Books

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62 The Political Essay What Will do the Trick?

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07

Geopolitics

The Line of Pragmatism Turkey’s Justice and Development Party

To describe Turkey’s current political scenario as a dichotomy of Islamists versus Secularists is misleading.

The AKP is not an Islamist party, but rather a melting pot of devout conservatives, Turkish nationalists, liberal reformists and pious businessmen. AKP’s political line is primarily a pragmatic one.

I

s Turkey turning Islamist? This allegation is a well selling story offered to the world by secular elite Turks with Western education and good English.

They refer to the ongoing standoff between the government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and the classical establishment of Turkey in the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the army. The confrontation reached a new peak in February with the arrest of high ranking generals in the course of a critical investigation against an assumed state sponsored terrorist network. However, the dichotomy Islamists versus Secularists is misleading. Instead, the government of Tayyip Erdogan is running into trouble because it has adopted some of the rather classically republican habits of governing Turkey. How did it get there after eight years in power?

Against the backdrop of Islamist movements since the foundation of the Muslim brotherhood in 1928, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not an Islamist party. Judged by its policies and its electorate, the AKP is a melting pot of devout conservatives, Turkish nationalists, liberal reformists and pious businessmen. In order to keep these factions together, its political line is primarily one of pragmatism; in negative terms, this could be seen as a zigzag course and as an explanation why reforms are sometimes sluggish. The regional elections in March 2009 demonstrated that the AKP is mainly the party of the rising Anatolian middle classes which form a new business oriented powerful elite. The AKP celebrated its greatest successes in Central Anatolia, but was defeated in the Mediterranean cities and the Kurdish East. There is also a growing Islamist party in Turkey on the rise, the Felicity Party (SP), which received some 5% of the vote primarily among the underprivileged impoverished Turks.

Erdogan’s time in office can be divided into two distinct periods. First, during the years of reform from 2003 to 2005, Erdogan reformed Turkey: an updated penal code, amended civil rights and the gradual reduction of the military’s role in politics. Erdogan’s second period though has been one of a constant struggle for power.

Since 2006, Turkey has seen a bitter dispute about the office of President, a thinly veiled coup threat of the general staff in April 2007, and the undemocratic closure proceedings against the AKP in 2008. However, a profound irony of Erdogan’s struggle with the classical elites is that he has assumed some traditional 8 March, 2010

Michael Thumann

positions of the Turkish centralized state— for example, in dealing with the PKK, or in media relations, recently in his policies on the Greek minority, and on Armenia. His often emotional and apodictic rhetoric provides the notion of a traditional Turkish ruler who detests criticism. Erdogan meets regularly with the chief of the general staff. His proposals to alleviate the Kurdish problem were approved by the army’s representatives on the National Security Council. At times, Erdogan defended the general staff against fierce attacks from the kemalist nationalist CHP. Tayyip Erdogan, the man from the periphery, has arrived at the center of the Turkish state.

Once a politician has taken the heights of the prime minister’s office or of the President’s palace in Ankara, mountainous Turkey looks completely flat. It is an extremely centralized state in which the teacher in a remote village is appointed by government agencies in the same way as hazelnut prices are fixed by bureaucrats in Ankara. Erdogan and his political associates had resented this centralist system for a long time. Now, at the top they have learned to like it. President Abdullah Gul has appointed the president of YÖK, a powerful agency overlooking universities which is crucial to shape the minds and skills of future economic cadre and state officials. Likewise, the general director of the state television network TRT was appointed by the President in 2007. In an even more crucial institution, Gul will appoint three new judges to the constitutional court before the end of this year. In the investigation against coup plotting generals and civilians, pro-government prosecutors have occasionally acted in similar ways as Turkish kemalist judges when they violated judicial rights of individuals. After eight years with the same government, and a President from the same party, Turkey changes gradually from the top to the bottom as any country with such a strongly centralized state would change.

The Turkish constitution was written under the tutelage of the army in the early 1980s.

Tayyip Erdogan talked on numerous occasions about the need of constitutional change but has achieved little so far. Therefore the germs of authoritarianism are still entrenched in many regulations and the composition of the top leading institutions. A striking example is the Turkish party closure law which threatened the existence of the AKP in 2008 and was used to shut down the pro-Kurdish DTP in 2009. These interventions fit the way how most of Turkey is governed. It is remarkable that in a country as diverse as this there are so few powers devolved to the regions. The dilemma is that towns and districts do not have the sources of revenue which would enable them to cope with their responsibilities. Local authority is further weakened by a division of power between a democratically elected mayor and a bureaucratically appointed governor.

The poorer Kurdish regions in the East as well as the rich and potentially powerful secular regions in the West do not enjoy the privilege of having a self-sufficient local government or strong representatives in the capital to push for their interests. There is no separation of powers neither at the top of the state nor in the provinces. The fact that regions and cities are deprived of participation, that they have no money and no clout is the biggest obstacle for future democratization in Turkey.

The rise of the new elites from Anatolia to power is a development the Turkish political system is no longer able to cope with. The AKP government’s strength and attitude emanates from institutions that the kemalist elites had once built to safeguard their supremacy. The resulting battles reveal that the republic cannot properly balance the interest groups competing for power. Turkey has seen four coup d’état in forty years to restore a rough political equilibrium.

But popular support for a coup has sharply diminished. Instead permanent obstruction of reforms and a destabilization through unending confrontation look more likely. Today, the country needs a profound constitutional reform which would aim at decentralizing and further democratizing Turkey at the same time. A new division of power both at the center and in the provinces is long overdue. The AKP, the Turkish parliament and the European Union in membership negotiations with Turkey should vigorously push for these reforms.

Die Ziet’s Middle East Bureau Chief

08

Issue 1547

09

In Brief Around The World

Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Letters

Al-Qaeda supports secessionists in Yemen Yemen's government has taken moves, at various levels, to put an end to instability and armed confrontations in south of the country.

Al-Qaeda, however, is the most serious threat to Yemen's stability and security, given the organization's support for the separatists in south of the country.

Al-Qaeda is considered a threat despite the government's raids against those suspected to be AlQaeda members—particularly after the failed attempt by a Nigerian Issue 1547

young man to blow up a Detroitbound US flight on Christmas Eve. This week, the Yemeni security authorities have killed one man and arrested eleven more, in an operation against a cell affiliated to Al-Qaeda in Sanaa.

In spite of such efforts on part of the government and security forces, Yemen has become a security concern to the West after the announcement by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda's arm in Yemen, of an intention to control

the Strait of Bab-el-Mandab.

In addition, the organization is seeking to recruit and train militants to launch attacks in the region and beyond.

Observers say that Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of anarchy in the north, with government engaged in a six year war with the Houthis in the Sa'ada province.

Al-Qaeda is also causing numerous problems in Yemen's south and supports armed protests and confrontations by secessionists.

11

In Brief - Around The World

Around The World 8 10

7

3 Somalia 1 Saudi Arabia India and Saudi Arabia signed a joint declaration stressing the need to strengthen their strategic partnership in areas like ship covering security, economic, defense and political areas. India's prime minister Manmohan Singh, who was on an official visit to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia met King Abdullah and during discussions the two leaders decided to increase the flow of investments between the two countries and enhancing bilateral trade.

2 Iraq The number of Iraqis killed in violence last February was nearly double the toll for January, authorities said. National Security Adviser Safa Hussein said that Iraqi security forces had found and prevented at least 10 vehicle bombs in the past month as Al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups sought to target the elections.

8 March, 2010

Somalia's main militant group has banned the United Nations food agency and ordered its aid workers to leave the impoverished country.

Al-Shabaab released a statement accusing the World Food Programme of distributing expired food and undermining local farmers. Peter Smerdon, a WFP spokesman declined to comment on the accusations, but said the agency is committed to the failed nation in the Horn of Africa.

4 Libya

5 Zimbabwe

Hundreds of Libyan students have protested outside the Swiss embassy in Tripoli against a recent referendum on the minaret ban in Switzerland. The protesters held pictures of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, chanted anti-Swiss slogans and called for a boycott of Swiss goods. The protest comes just days after Gaddafi called for a holy war against the Swiss minaret vote.

Switzerland's government declined to comment on Gaddafi's remarks.

Eight thousand lobsters and 4,000 portions of caviar were eaten at a birthday party for Robert Mugabe which was broadcast live to a nation facing famine as crop failure and drought raised the prospect of widespread hunger in the povertystricken country. Mugabe's political opponents, the Movement for Democratic Change, said the food served at Zimbabwe president's 86th birthday was enough to feed 50 villages.

12

In Brief - Around The World

8 UK

6 9

4

1

2

Jim Fitzpatrick Labor minister said that his party has been infiltrated by a fundamentalist Muslim group that wants to create an “Islamic social and political order” in Britain. The Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) — which believes in jihad and sharia law, and wants to turn Britain and Europe into an Islamic state — had become, in effect, a secret party within Labour and other political parties.

3

9 Israel 5

Although Israel has neither confirmed nor denied its involvement in alMabhouh’s death, a soaring number of visitors to the Mossad website expressed their interests in applying to become agents. Ilan Mizrahi, a former deputy director of the agency said “Mossad has been restored to its glory days,”

6 Japan The Hatoyama government affirmed that it is keen to end the US military presence in the country and chart a new foreign policy course with focus on Asia. Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) promised to reorient the country’s domestic and foreign policy and focused particularly on the continued presence of the US military on Japanese territory and the continuance of unequal treaties dating to the Second World War. Issue 1547

7 Chile Chile quake has left the copper market in crisis, the fears of copper production problems in Chile, the world's largest supplier of the metal, have driven copper prices upward and may push the commodity into the lap of profiteering speculators amid uncertainty about future Chilean shipments. Less than a month ago, market analysts were saying that suspected stockpiling by speculators and a perceived world surplus could cause copper prices to crash to less than $1 pound.

10 Spain Spain's foreign minister says Venezuela has pledged to cooperate with a Spanish court that accuses the country of collaborating with Basque separatist militants and Colombian rebels. Miguel Angel Moratinos says he spoke with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro who both deny the allegations and promise to investigate.

13

In Brief - Quotes Of The Week

Magazine Round Up

Quotes Of The Week

"Al-Aqsa mosque, the Cave of Patriarchs, and Rachel's Tomb will never be Jewish sites, but rather Islamic ones"

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan

Magazine Round Up 1

“If we created the euro, we cannot let a country fall that is in the eurozone�

French President, Nicolas Sarkozy referring to the Greek economic crisis

"Today is a historic day and the winner is the Iraqi people -- Kurds, Arabs and all other minorities.

I hope the election will pass off peacefully and that everyone respects its results" Nuri al-Mailiki, Iraqi Prime Minister and Shi'ite Politician

"Today I'm here to listen to you and to hear your problems" Afghan President Hamid Karzai during a visit to the southern town of Marja, a former Taliban stronghold

8 March, 2010

1 Time The Incredible Shrinking Europe

Not long after the new born dreams of another European renaissance created by the choice of president and foreign minister for the EU, did these dreams quickly dissipate. The Copenhagen summit has come to show that the U.S coupled

by China still reign over the international arena leaving European countries to stand quietly in the shadows as spectators rather than actors.

This week's cover story questions the EU's ability to reverse their diminishing international influence, both economically and politically.

14

2 Newsweek Rebirth of a Nation

Tainted by terrorism, religious disparity and continuous political unrest, Iraq sees a chance for democracy in the next parliamentary elections. The elections will see the participation of people from all the factions of the country which will in turn see Iraq go through the difficult task of choosing a future political orientation. According to Christopher Hill, U.S Ambassador to Baghdad, the real test is not so much the behavior of the winners but the behavior of the losers.

2 3 New Yorker Come Together

The health care agenda proposed by President Obama still takes a big portion of congressional debates. As the democrats declare their intention to cover the uninsured, the Republicans step up to announce that such an initiative is not affordable. The article demonstrates a resemblance between the Democrats' bill and Nixon's refused bill. Accordingly, the writer warns of regrettable consequences if the "ambitious piece of legislation" is not adopted, nevertheless, hope still remains for a conclusive agreement.

3

Cover Of The Week

Cover of the Week Reason

Climate Crack up

According to Ronald Bailey, the Copenhagen summit came to a humiliating conclusion as a result of the resilient dispute between China and the U.S, which both stand as the biggest Carbon Dioxide emitters in the world.

The article provides both a technical and a chronological background to the environmental debate, showing that if the without proper Chinese cooperation, the environmental fiasco shall proceed.

Issue 1547

15

In Brief - Letters

Letters LAST ISSUE

Shape up or Shake out Attention should be focused specifically on the Shiites in Iraq, since they are a majority and their voices can resolve the next elections, which is crucial to determining the fate of the country through the determination of the upcoming prime minister.

However if a coalition is to be formed in the government, the sectarian conflict can be evaded.

Friend or Foe? The willpower of the Iraqi people in leading the pursuit of democracy in the country will be tested in the coming elections, especially with the near completion of U.S withdrawal from the country. I think that the Iraqi elections will have a heavy impact on political movements in Iraq, and the future of this country Mullah Naseer

Said Allawi

8 March, 2010

16

In Brief - Magazine Round Up

Issue 1547

15

Features

Š getty images

8 March, 2010

18 18

Who will have

the last dance?

By Nicholas Birch

Issue 1547

19

Features

Who will have the last dance?

While the EU Buys Time, Turkey Does Business in the Middle East Nicholas Birch

Despite having spent the latter parts of the ‘90s courting Europe, since 2009 Turkish attention, both politically and economically, has started to look East rather than West. Is this a sign that Turkey, grown tired of its role as the perpetual suitor of Europe, finds the position of regional leader more congenial? Turkey wants to be a major player in the Middle East, and what is crucial to understand is that the AKP’s diplomatic opening has been successful in large part because Turkey is a much more powerful country trade-wise than it was a decade ago.

Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (C) sits with Turkey's Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis (L) and an unidentified delegation member prior to a meeting concerning Turkey's accession to the European Union

trying to understand A nybody where Turkey is going could

do worse than to visit the home province of its mould-breaking new foreign minister. Back in 1959, when Ahmet Davutoglu was born into the house of a merchant just down the road in the sub-district of Taskent, the district capital Konya was a town of about 50,000 people. Perched on the southern tip of Turkey's vast Central Anatolian Plain, it served farmers coming in from miles around. Horse-drawn carts far outnumbered cars, and the easiest way to make an intercity telephone call was to go to the Yayla Hotel, opposite the ruins of 8 March, 2010

© getty images

the Seljuk palace on the prehistoric mound that marked the town centre.

closed, we were politically closed and our minds were closed."

"It seems like a foreign country, looking back now", says Konyaborn engineer Ali Akkaya, 18 years Davutoglu's senior. He remembers how his friends laughed in the early 1960s when he threw in a job with a state department responsible for building irrigation canals to open a small workshop. It was the sight of him hard at work welding water tanks that they found funny.

"Engineers were supposed to spend their days behind a desk, signing things, not getting their hands dirty", he says. "We were economically

It is a fair description of the country as a whole. By the 1970s, Akkaya had served as an apprentice in Austria and traveled to Ceaucescu's Romania to visit the spare parts factories there.

For most of his fellow countrymen, though, Turkey's frontiers appeared pretty much the way the billboards at the border crossings described them: walls erected "to defend the honour of the motherland." Until 1983, laws protecting the Turkish currency made it theoretically an offense even for waiters to accept a dollar in tips from a foreign 20

Features

customer. Starved of hard currency, businessmen traveling abroad had to hide black market deutschmarks in their socks when they took the plane.

Guardian of NATO's southeastern flank, ideologically at loggerheads with the USSR, Syria and Bulgaria, historically at loggerheads with Greece, Turkey was like the last stop on a global tube line. Annual exports averaged barely $1.5 billion throughout the 1970s.

Four decades on, Konya alone exports as much. Set up with considerable difficulty in the early 1970s by Ali Akkaya and 60 other first generation industrialists, the local Chamber of Industry now boasts 1300 members. Four organised industrial zones extend 20 miles north along the new motorway connecting what is now a city of over a million inhabitants to Turkey's capital, Ankara, two hours away.

Like the increasingly urgent reforms of the Ottoman Empire from the 18th century onwards, it is a transformation that has been powered by the proximity of vastly superior European technology.

Set up in the 1950s, Konya's first workshops were repair shops for western-made agricultural equipment. Akkaya has first hand experience of Turkey's dependence on foreign goods: work in his state office had been held up for days because his boss lacked the hard currency to buy spare parts for three American-made excavators that had broken down. "Three cogs about the size of my fist, that's all it was", he says, describing how he paid for a small shipment of Austrian steel with his first wage, fashioned new cogs out of it, and handed in his resignation.

Accelerating after Turkey signed a Customs Union with Europe in 1995, the trade relationship between Turkey and Europe reached a high point after 2001, when a corrupt Issue 1547

banking system triggered the worst economic crisis in Turkey's history.

"The domestic market dried up", remembers Esref Cifci, head of a Konya-based factory that supplies parts to car makers like Renault.

"We all made our catalogues, set up our websites, picked up our briefcases and set out to find new buyers." Back then, new buyers meant Europe: Turkish industry didn't have the reputation to permit people like Cifci to sell directly to buyers in the developing world.

Instead, they sold to middlemen in Europe who repackaged and sold on.

"We were economically closed, we were politically closed and our minds were closed" A decade on, Turkish-European trade links appear to be on the ebb. Between 2007 and 2009, Europe's share of Turkish exports dropped from 57% to 49.5% while the Middle East's share more than doubled from 10% to 22%. In 2009, meanwhile, Konya, for the first time ever, exported more goods East than West in 2009. Symbolic statistics that have a perfectly rational justification, Konya businessmen say. For one, the industrial pecking order is less pronounced than ten years ago, cutting out the need for the middlemen Cifci refers too.

More importantly, the on-going global crisis has affected developed western economies far more than Turkey and its less economically

developed eastern neighbours.

Long before European Union members began debating how to deal with indebted Greece, most analysts were predicting at most 1% growth in the Eurozone this year. South of a 300-mile long border it shares with Turkey, 90% of its construction sector in the hands of Turkish companies, Iraqi Kurdistan, meanwhile, is expected to grow by 20%. After years spent worrying about growing Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, Ankara has now decided to open a consulate in Erbil, capital of Iraq's federal Kurdish region. Another country which appears to have escaped pretty much unscathed from the global squeeze is Sudan, the world's second fastest growing economy over the past three years. Like China, Turkey is increasingly active there. One Turkish company, close to the government, provides uniforms to the Sudanese army. Another is building the country's tallest skyscraper, the 29-storey National Telecommunication Corporation tower. Turkish companies are lobbying hard to win an estimated $1.5 billion contract to build a new international airport in Khartoum.

"Sudan must become a strategic partner for Turkey", the Turkish Minister of Agriculture Mehdi Eker said last October, during his second visit to Sudan in 2009. So close are relations between Khartoum and Ankara that the latter came within a whisker of hosting Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for the third time in two years, and the first time since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest on war crimes charges.

The benefits of robust Middle Eastern growth are nowhere more evident than in the industrial city of Gaziantep, just an hour north of the border with Syria that Ahmet Davutoglu and his Syrian counterpart symbolically opened to visa-free traffic last autumn. In the 21

Features first quarter of 2009, Gaziantep's exports to Iraq and Syria rose by 93% and 106% respectively, while exports to Italy and Russia dropped by 31% and 51% respectively.

"The figures are like an x-ray of the effects of the global crisis", says Figen Celikturk, deputy director of Gaziantep's Chamber of Commerce.

"If the West collapses, we have the good fortune to be strategically placed to export eastwards too, it is as simple as that."

Is it really as simple as that, though?

Is the increased multilateralism that has characterised Turkish diplomacy since Ahmet Davutoglu began pulling strings behind the scenes in 2002 simply a reflection of the country's growing industrial clout and concomitant search for new markets? Is the speed with which Turkey has been opening embassies and consulates in countries to its south and east (15 in Africa over the past two years) merely a political response to the changing balances of world trade? Or is it a sign that Turkey, grown tired of its role as the perpetual suitor of Europe, finds the position of regional leader more congenial?

Widely acclaimed as the chief architect of a foreign policy transformation which actually began before his Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Ahmet Davutoglu has always insisted there is no contradiction between Turkey's growing regional prominence and its candidacy to the European Union. "The more you pull the bow-string eastwards, the further you can shoot the arrow westwards", he says, using a curiously belligerent image at odds with his reputation as the most peaceable of men.

Among the Konya business community, outspoken opposition to the European Union is rare. But 8 March, 2010

then so is criticism of the way in which the Turkish government seems to have put a complete stall on its reformist agenda since the European accession process started in 2005. That is not surprising. This is a city which in 1969 voted in the first explicitly Islamist (and antiwestern) parliamentary candidate, and which has voted overwhelmingly for Islamic-tinged parties (including the AKP) ever since. What you hear almost everywhere is a conservative rhetoric which mixes huge pride at Turkey's new-found economic strength with varying degrees of ambivalence about the West.

Unlike almost any other nationalist or Islamicminded group, the Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gulen is pro-Western and (particularly) proAmerican Sometimes, the ambivalence is explicit: nationalism tinged with schadenfreude at the way the economic boot appears to be increasingly on Turkey's foot.

"Turkey's future is open, I'll have you know", says Mehmet Ali Atiker, one of Konya's best-known industrialists, tapping the table with his finger, suspiciously eying the card I give him, half-convinced I am an industrial spy. "Europe may not pay much attention to us now, but they will.... The era of kingdoms is finished. The kings—Europe and America—are condemned to disappear." Like Turkey's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who told a group of students on their way to post-graduate programmes

in European universities early in 2008 that their predecessors had "imported only immorality from the West", others express concern at the harmful effects of western culture.

The CEO of a company that manufactures ovens and cutting machines for the baking industry, Vedat Yondem, remembers well how uneasy he felt when he went to Istanbul to start studying engineering at Turkey's most prestigious public university, the American-founded Bosphorus University. "The values there were not values we approved of, to be honest—dancing, going for tea with your girlfriend, that sort of thing", he says. "It was foreign to me. My blood group is A and I can't change that. You can't give me O." A sympathiser of Fethullah Gulen, the charismatic preacher whose followers in Turkey—estimated at between two and six million— have been opening schools across the world since the early 1990s, Yondem, shares Gulen's fascination and admiration for Turkey's Ottoman past. At times, he makes the Ottoman armies which swept through the Balkans and into Hungary in the 14th century sound like a late-medieval version of the teachers in Gulen's schools—secular in the classroom, models of upright Muslim sobriety outside.

"Do you know what made the Ottoman Empire great", he asks.

"Its honesty, its sense of justice.

And that culture is still there. In our Anatolia, I get the feeling today that the embers are still there, under the ashes. If somebody comes, if somebody comes and gives the ashes a good blow, those flames will rise again."

Unlike almost any other nationalist or Islamic-minded group, the Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gulen is pro-Western and (particularly) pro-American. For all his distaste 22

Features for certain Western habits, Vedat Yondem is too. His daughters are at American universities. He travels regularly to Europe. His Ottoman nostalgia is not, as it was with earlier Turkish Islamists, an expression of hostility to the West. It is an expression of confidence, of growing impatience with the introverted and sometimes xenophobic world view of those generations who lived through the trauma of the founding of the Republic, born out of the rubble of an empire assailed on all sides by invaders.

Ali Akkaya sums up the change in mentality. "Back when I was starting up... the Arabs were dirty tribesmen and the Europeans were a bunch of infidels, as far as we were concerned", he says. "These days, we don't even hate the Russians.

Today's Turkey is more tolerant of the West, more tolerant of the outside world in general. We have lost our fear. We have realised that the borders are here to stay." This is the spirit that informs the 'neoOttoman' slant of Turkish diplomacy under Ahmet Davutoglu: selfconsciously Muslim and bursting with confidence.

A foreign policy analyst sympathetic to the AKP (his wife is an AKP deputy), Ihsan Dagi occasionally worries the government overdoes its Muslimness. He acknowledges that ministers clearly feel much more at ease in Middle Eastern capitals than in Brussels and thinks one of the government's chief weaknesses since Abdullah Gul moved to the President's palace has been its lack of a counterbalance to Davutoglu, a Davutoglu who could look West.

But he wonders whether the greater danger is not simply over-reach triggered by over-confidence.

"Turkey is a new-comer to this great power game", he says. "It never had this option during the Cold War. It wants to be a major player Issue 1547

in the Middle East. Does it have enough experts on the Middle East in the ministry?" In a recent paper, Katynka Barysch, deputy director for the London-based Centre for European Reform, makes a similar point. Germany has 7000 trained diplomats, she points out. Turkey, a country of roughly the same size, has just 1,000.

The Turkish novelist Alev Alatli once compared her country to Schrodinger's cat, capable of being two mutually incompatible things at the same time Since Turkey began opening up to the world, both economically and politically, in the early 1980s, its lack of experience has showed.

One of the country's most visionary leaders, and a neo-Ottomanist long before Davutoglu came onto the scene, Turgut Ozal dreamed of Turkish hegemony in the Turkicspeaking lands of Central Asia.

Apart from scores of Gulen schools and the beginnings of a fortune for Erdogan's favourite businessman, Ahmet Calik, nothing much came of it. Islamist Prime Minister and Konya deputy Necmettin Erbakan's plans to turn Turkey's face away from Europe in the 1990s blew up in his face, when the Libyan leader Muammer Gadhafi, sitting in a bedouin tent outside Tripoli, upbraided him during an official visit for mistreating the Kurds. The whole sorry scene was broadcast on Turkish TV later that evening.

The AKP's diplomatic opening has so far been much more successful, in large part because Turkey is

a much more powerful country trade-wise than it was a decade ago. But there are signs that cracks may be beginning to form. Rather than concentrating on using its good will to try to bring Fatah and Hamas together, Erdogan (perhaps because his claims to represent the oppressed inside Turkey are looking increasingly dubious) seems set on playing the part of scourge of Zionist oppression overseas. In the mean time, his government's bravest foreign policy move, the rapprochement with Armenia, risks falling apart at the seams.

"The AKP has thrown a lot of balls up into the air", says foreign policy analyst Soli Ozel. "But the skill of a juggler lies in his ability to catch the balls and throw them back up again.

The balls are beginning to fall now, but we haven't quite reached the crucial moment."

The Turkish novelist Alev Alatli once compared her country to Schrodinger's cat, capable of being two mutually incompatible things at the same time. The box hasn't opened on Turkey's foreign-policy make-over yet and we don't know whether the cat will be alive or dead.

Like earlier governments, the AKP may eventually feel the need to turn the bulk of its attention westwards again.

Alternatively, the flurry of reform packages that Turkish politicians passed after 2001 to ensure a start to European Union accession proceedings may in time be seen as the high summer of a rapprochement in terminal decline, a desperate flurry of activity aimed at shoring up a national economy that was on the verge of collapse.

Nicholas Birch - Worked as a freelance reporter in Turkey for seven years. He currently writes for the Wall Street Journal and the Times of London.

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Debate Why Should Turkey Join the EU? As a crucial country unifying two important regions of the world, Turkey stands to bring much to the table for the EU. Yet membership has proved difficult to obtain. While some have argued that the possibility of accession was just hinted at so as to avoid being chategorized as an all-christian-club, others claim that the EU’s intentions in allowing Turkey to join are genuine. Although the intentions of the EU may be beyond analysis, three Turkish intellectuals have been invited to discuss the costs and benefits of a potential accession to the EU. Great for their depth and scope, the authors include in their discussion not only the benefits of a possible accession but also the causes for its delay, including the impact of the AK party’s foreign policy on its relations with Europe.

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Switching Sides?

The AK Party’s Foreign Policy Erdal Guven Has Turkey’s AK Party changed the foreign policy direction of the country with regards to the EU? Guven argues, contrary to popular opinion, that the AKP’s strategy is not a sign of change in the country’s foreign policy. Rather, it is a symbol of its continuity and their commitment to demonstrating that the EU has much to gain diplomatically by acceding a country with close ties to the Middle East.

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urkey has been striving to become a full member of the European Union since the signing of the Ankara Treaty in 1963. From a Turkish point of view the reasons for this endeavour are quite clear.

Becoming an integral and indispensable part of the West, has been Turkey’s biggest project of modernization from the day it was founded in 1923. NATO membership was a very important milestone in this process, but the final objective is EU membership. Turkey firmly believes that only via full integration with Europe will it be able transform and anchor itself in the West.

This is especially true as long as democratization, the most important pillar of the modernization project, is concerned. Additionally the prospect of EU membership with its economic benefits has become a very strong incentive in this process.

From the European point of view, it is clear that the EU needs Turkey, if it is ever to become a global player rather than an inward-looking continental power. The EU should also take into account Turkey’s growing economy and dynamic demography.

A modernized Turkey in line with EU policies could come to play a decisive role in a wide range of issues; from illegal human trafficking to terrorism. Last but not least, including a predominantly Muslim country into a union of Christian countries will be the strongest message that the West is not at war with Islam.

Yet, there is much-debated question of whether the current Turkish government has shifted its axis.

Turkey, under the ruling Justice and 8 March, 2010

Development Party (AK Party) government, has recently been in the spotlight due to its opening towards the East, rather than its integration process into the West. Accordingly, it has been widely claimed, both at home and abroad, that ‘The Zero Problem’ policy with the neighbouring countries, the brainchild of the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, has chade the focus of Turkish diplomacy away from the accession process. The deepening of ties with countries like Syria, and growing efforts to reach out to the Gulf countries appear to support this claim.

The EU accession process is set to remain the top priority for Turkish foreign policy in the coming years Although not totally baseless, the argument that Ankara has shifted its axis, misses an important aspect of the AK Party’s foreign policy. The AK Party wants to demonstrate Turkey’s unique position and strategic value for the West, by using its softpower and diplomatic skills to become a stabilizing power-centre in a turbulent Eurasia.

In presenting itself in this light, Turkey has already made some headway.

Turkey played and role in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Turkey seems to be ready to facilitate the nuclear rift between Iran and

the West and the peace process between Israel and Palestine. Turkey could thus help heal the wounds afflicted by the division between Islam and the West Therefore, it the foreign policy AK Party has been pursuing is not so much different from the traditional Turkish foreign policy which aims to placate the country as a solid bridge between the East and the West. The difference lies in AK Party government’s determination to fulfil this aim. Unlike the previous governments, rather than paying mere lip service to objectives, the current government has shown a clear commitment to that aim. Another point that distinguishes the AK Party government from its predecessors is that it has used its Islamic roots to improve the relations with the Muslim world.

The EU accession process is set to remain the top priority for Turkish foreign policy in the coming years. That being said, two obstacles are yet to be overcome by Turkey in order to achieve this goal. The first is the democratic deficit of the country. While Turkey has come a long way, in order to become a fullfledged democracy, there is still much to be done in terms of human rights, minority issues and rule of law. The second obstacle is the foreign policy discords with the EU. These discords range from the Cyprus problem to the treatment of the Sudanese leader Omar al Bashir. Only by overcoming these obstacles could Turkey ask the EU to consider its membership.

Managing editor and columnist of Turkish daily Radikal; author of two books on Cyprus 26

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Much to Gain

The Benefits of Turkish Membership in the EU Yigal Schleifer

In assessing the costs and benefits of Turkey joining the EU, Schleifer highlights how far Turkey has come since it first began to court the possibility of a membership. Although Turkey still has a long way to go in convincing the EU that they are club-membership worthy, the efforts it has thus far undertaken are significant. If this much benefit can come from only the possibility of joining, actual membership holds a significant promise of progress for both Turkey and the EU.

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he recent large-scale arrests top Turkish military officers—including the former heads of the Air Force and Navy—as part of an investigation into an alleged plot to topple the country’s government, were a stark reminder of the deep political divisions gripping Turkey.

They are also a sign of the continuing struggle to democratize and increase civilian control over the armed forces.

The arrests were also a reminder of the importance of Ankara keeping its eyes on the prize of an eventual European Union membership, as critical in helping Turkey defuse its internal tensions and consolidate its democracy. Joining the EU would help the country achieve some of its ambitious foreign policy goals.

Turkey’s road towards EU membership has already been a long and frustrating one, dating back to 1959 when Ankara applied to become an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate in 1999 and started negotiations with Brussels in 2005. After an initial burst of reforms, though, Ankara appears to have lost its zeal for the EU project.

Some of this can be attributed to frustration with European foot-dragging and opposition to Turkey’s joining the bloc. Another reason is Ankara’s growing sense of its own potential as an economic and political power in its surrounding region. (To a large extent, Ankara’s “zero problems with neighbours” foreign policy, and its scrapping of visa requirements with several countries in the region seem modelled on some of Brussels’ own efforts for stabilizing the European neighborhood).

But many of Ankara’s long-term forIssue 1547

eign policy objectives would get an important boost from a meaningful partnership with the EU. Turkey’s plan to turn itself into a major transit hub for oil and gas would be handicapped if the country were not fully integrated into Europe’s common energy policy and pipeline network. Meanwhile, Ankara’s plans to turn itself into a regional soft power broker, particularly in the Middle East, are tied up in being able to present Turkey as a “bridge” to Europe. Making that bridge easier to cross, something EU membership would do, would further enhance Turkey’s claim to being a country that spans East and West.

Turkey’s plan to turn itself into a major transit hub for oil and gas would be handicapped if the country were not fully integrated into Europe’s common energy policy More significantly, EU membership will help Turkey overcome its domestic differences, which stand as the largest hurdle towards Ankara realizing the ambitious goals it has set out for itself. Ultimately, joining the EU—or at least meaningfully engaging in a process that would lead towards membership—offers Turkey the best chance at developing a political system that can successfully manage those dangerous

divisions and blunt their impact.

Indeed, it’s important not to underestimate what a difference simply being engaged in the EU process over the last decade has made for Turkey in terms of developing civil society, strengthening institutions and the rule of law, and forming a polity that is learning to recognize and accept differences. The opening of EU-funded small business support centers in some of Turkey’s most impoverished areas and the training of lawyers and judges by European counterparts are not the kinds of trends that make headlines.

Yet, they are the kind of low-profile projects that have helped make an impact on how the country operates.

Meanwhile, considering Turkey’s limited experience with true democracy—with its history of military coups, powerful nationalism and intense division based along ethnic lines—the promise of joining the EU has created am impetus for enacting reforms that the country might not have otherwise been implemented.

Joining the EU, as one analyst recently put it, is an essential part of Turkey becoming a member in good standing of the “rules and regulations community.” It sounds boring and it is boring. But after four coups and decades of bitter infighting, perhaps what Turkey needs is a bit less political turmoil and excitement, and a bit more of the boring stuff.

Freelance writer based in Istanbul, where he works as a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and writes Istanbul Calling (istanbulcalling.blogspot.com), a blog on Turkish politics and foreign policy.

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The Best of Both Worlds The Benefits of Turkish Accession to the EU Hüseyin Bağcı

Both Turkey and the EU stand to benefit much from a potential membership. In reviewing the historical obstacles that have come in the way of Turkish accession to the EU, Bağcı hilights how Turksih foreign policy has developed in line with European policy. Turkey’s political and economic potential would not only benefit the EU’s international relations, they would also encourage the country to continue on this path of progress and refrom. ince beginning EU membership cussed at the time. Even the Lisbon be the second most populous counnegotiations on 3 October 2005, Treaty rejected this, in spite of some try after Russia, with its 105 million Turkey’s “long journey” to- EU countries’ insistince that the EU population in Europe. The question wards accession has not achieved the consititution should have a reference that Turkey is to big in geography expected results. Yet, in this process to its Christian values in the pream- and population does not reflect the there was “no train crash” as some ble. For the EU, Turkey is the country reality on the global space. Accordpredicted at the end of 2007. There where the Islamic world would look ing to Prof. Kühnhard, “The Europeare important parallels between the in search of greater sympathy. an Union comprises 0.86 percent of modernization of Europe, and Turthe globe (4.323.783 square kilomekey’s westernization. This is why the The EU wanted to show the US that ters) and rougly seven percent of the EU membership remains a state poli- it was growing and was no longer un- global population (491 million). Even cy for Turkey, as the Turkish foreign der its influence. Some thinkers even with Turkey as an EU member, these minister Davudoğlu recently stated argued that Turkey was the “Trojan figures would increase only insignifiduring the second ambassadors meet- horse” of the US within the EU—a cantly to 1.01 percent of global space ing in Ankara. theory that was refuted when fol- and nine percent of global populalowing the US intervention in Iraq tion.” In other words, Turkey would For a year now Turkey has had a new in 2003, Turkey denied US troops contribute for the EU in general in “chief negotiator” as state minister access to its territory for operations. space and demography. for EU Affairs. This shows that Tur- Since then, everyone has spoken of key pays great attention to the EU a “Europenazation” of Turkish for- Last but not least, as the former Enmembership, and the reform process eign policy. Indeed, Turkey’s de- largement Commissioner Günther within Turkey to become a more fence concepts and practical policy Verheugen once stated, if the EU is democratic society. This renders Tur- look more European than expected. going to become a global player and key a unique candidate for EU memthink in grand strategic terms, it is bership. The EU is now in its stage Another factor affecting Turkish suc- better for Europe to be with Turkey of “second founding”, in the words cession was Russia. Turkey’s good than without. There is no question of Professor Ludger Kühnhardt, and economic and political relations with that Turkey would also bring a furnow the cardinal question is whether Russia were important. Under Presi- ther “intellectual refreshment” in to Turkey, which missed by various rea- dent Putin, Russia sent signals to the the European thinking, and not play sons “first founding”, could join the EU that negotiating Turkey’s acces- the role of the “other” but rather beEU in future. Turkey should join the sion would benefit Russian-EU re- ing one “with the others”. Turkey EU not only for Turkey’s sake, but lations. It was argued that with this wants to be an open, democratic, hualso the EU’s, in order to create a membership process, Turkey would man rights respecting, woman equalmuch more stable, strong and globaly be more relaible, accountable, mana- ity searching society with the values acting Europe. gable and peaceful. Brussels also re- of the modern society protecting the ceived these signals from Israel and country. In other words, in order to In December 1999, Turkey got the the Islamic world, and today Turkey be on the right side of the history, status of candidacy which had been is the most valuable membership can- Turkey should join the EU. denied to Turkey in 1989. In Decem- didate for the EU with its great pober 2004, Turkey received a clear litical, economic and cultural impact Professor of International Reladate for the beginnnig of the nego- from the Balkans to Central Asia. tions at Middle East Technical tiations—October 2005. Five years University in Ankara and former have past, and no progress has been Turkey is also a great economic and Senior Fellow at the Center for made. By putting forward the date of demographic asset for the EU in the European Integration Studies in October 2005, the EU wanted to give coming decades. With an estimated Bonn, currently teaches at the the world the idea that the EU is not 90 million population, and a very Humboldt University in Berlin as a Christian Club, as many people dis- young one, by the year 2025, it will a guest professor

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THE MAJALLA

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Ideas

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Al Qaeda’s

Condolences

By Francisco Corboz

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Ideas

Al Qaeda’s Condolences Legitimizing the Killing of Muslim Civilians Francisco Corboz In legitimating their war against the West, al-Qaeda has had to adapt its stance on the death of Muslim civilians.

Finding it increasingly difficult to protect the lives of Muslims, the organization has relied on rhetoric of crisis to justify the death of Muslims. However, the organization’s inability to live up to their standards of what constitutes morality is increasingly problematic.

Adam Gadahn, an American member of Al-Qaeda © getty images

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n December 12th, al-Qaeda released a video featuring Adam Gadahn, its English-language spokesman, on several jihadist websites. In the video “The Mujahedeen Don’t Target Muslims”, Gadahn suggests that the Central Intelligence Agency, Blackwater, the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence agency, or the Indian Research and Analysis Wing perpetrated recent suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and blamed al-Qaeda for their actions. These attacks—which killed Muslim civilians in crowded marketplaces, mosques, shops, and schools—were orchestrated, Gadahn argues, to discredit alQaeda.

The video claims that al-Qaeda has always condemned attacks which target innocent Muslims, noting that Shari’a Law is not permissive in that regard. Hence, Gadahn expresses the condolences of al-Qaeda to 8 March, 2010

the families of the Muslim men, women and children killed in these criminal acts. “We ask Allah to have mercy on those killed and accept them as shohadaa [martyrs] …We also express the same in regard to the unintended Muslim victims of the mujahedeen's operations against the crusaders and their allies and puppets", he says. Gadahn, then, asks supporters in the region not to quit on ‘moral, physical and financial’ help.

interpretations of Islamic legitimating concepts on the conduct of war. Sometimes, al-Qaeda used arguments with no precedents in Islamic Law. Second, that these interpretive moves and related combat practices generated criticism among Islam scholarship, setting al-Qaeda further away from traditional and even some factions of radical Islam.

Gadahn’s statement seems to be both a disclaimer and a rare condolence message devoted to the innocent victims of war, who are exclusively Muslim. Interestingly, however, a review of al-Qaeda’s treatment of who constitutes legitimate targets in war demonstrates two important phenomena.

First, that the organization once supported a much broader concept of ‘innocence’ in war and that it progressively expanded

Journalist Peter Bergen, for one, recounts Bin Laden’s refusal to proceed with an initial plan to assassinate the Afghan King Zahir Shah in 1991. Bin Laden’s rescindment was due to the possibility of endangering the King’s grandson. When confronted

by Paulo Almeida Santos, a Portuguese convert to Islam who was going to carry out the assassination, with the argument that the child could be considered as collateral

Defining Collateral Damage

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Ideas damage, bin Laden replied “in no way! …We are Muslims, we do not eliminate children!”

Almeida Santos later said that Bin Laden “would rather have had the King return and have a civil war than to kill a child.”

In a similar case, when asked about killing American civilians, bin Laden answered back “No. The American government is one thing, the majority of Americans don’t even vote, they are totally apathetic.” In these episodes, it is clear how strict Bin Laden was regarding noncombatant immunity.

Al-Qaeda’s stance regarding the immunity status forcefully changed in the 1998 Declaration of the World Islamic Front.

This document is not merely permissive, it is a call for the duty of individual Muslims to kill Americans and their allies—civilian and military alike. The Declaration’s stress on defensive Jihad was influenced by Ibn Taymiyya’s writings, which had provided precedents for other resistance movements.

It relied on a rhetoric of crisis by refering to the “wicked nature of the enemy”. This allowed al-Qaeda to transfer the theological authority of the ulama to its own militants.

From now on, they would decide what the correct interpretations of Shari’a.

The September 11 attacks and al-Qaeda’s intent to obtain weapons of mass destruction demonstrated their commitment to a new definition of who constituted a legitimate military target. Al-Qaeda justified their definition by referring to the shared guilt of all citizens of a democracy and by adhering to the law of reciprocity. They argued that “1,200,000 Muslims had been killed in the past decade” by Americans and this would legitimize the killing of “4,000,000 Americans”, “2,000,000 of them, children.”

This retaliatory reasoning does not consider accidental killing of innocent Muslims by Americans.

Al-Qaeda’s new stance on indiscriminate tactics generated stark criticism by Islamic scholars, among them, prominent Sheikh Al-Azhar and Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologue Al-Qaradhawi. In 2002, Shaykh Muhammad, resistance movements’ supporter in Chechnya and elsewhere, elaborated on the idea that currently there was no competent authority in Islam to wage Jihad and on Shari’a imperative of honourable combat, even in a defensive emergency.

Regarding the killing of innocent Muslims, al-Qaeda has until recently used a restrictive moral discourse. As scholar Quintan Wiktorowicz explains, al-Qaeda did not accuse large portions of Muslim population of apostasy, thereby making them liable to be Issue 1547

targeted, because they were supposedly being led astray from Truth by their governments.

Thus, apostate government officials and infidels constituted the only legitimate targets for al-Qaeda. The sole justification for killing a Muslim was unintentional error—which should be compensated with ‘blood money’ to the victims’ families.

Yet, the 2003 bombings in Riyhad and Casablanca and the increasing number of innocent Muslim victims of al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to contradict this moral discourse.

In 2008, Bin Laden’s lieutenant al-Zawahiri, added the Medieval notion of “necessity as in cases of al-tatarrus” as an exceptional justification for Muslim casualties. AlTatarrus exempts Muslim armies from the prohibition of killing and wounding Muslims, if the latter are taken as human shields by non-Muslim armies. Zawahiri relied on the writings of al-Qaeda’s theological hardliner, al-Libi, who recently reinterpreted altatarrus, arguing for “new perceptions of modern shielding which were probably not provided for by the scholars of Islam who knew only of the weapons used in their era.”

Al-Qaeda’s stance regarding al-tatarrus recieved fierce reactions by Islamic scholarship. Morrocan Sheikh Zemzmi, claimed that al-tatarrus was an inadequate argument considering the kinds of operations the organization undertakes. Also, Dr. Fadl, a dissident from al-Qaeda’s top council, claimed that the al-tatarrus argument constituted an instrumental mechanism that would escalate the killing of Muslims, due to sectarian and national differences. On the other hand, researchers Jeff Brachman and Abdullah Warius show how al-Libi’s revolutionary treatment skipped passages of original texts, stating the obligation of “blood money”—that is the monetary compensation for property damage.

This sort of evolution in the concept of ‘innocence’ is designed to encompass larger portions of legitimate targets and its major normative changes were possible by employing a language of emergency and necessity. Reactions from traditional and extremist Islam have not, however, tolerated such ethics of war.

Living up to Expectations A few days before Gadahn’s video was issued, al-Qaeda’s Iraq branch apparently claimed responsibility for three major attacks, massively harming Muslims— such as December 8th Baghdad bombtruck blasts on a governmental building, a

neighbourhood and a commercial district killing 127 and wounding 448. Recurrent similar examples undermine al-Qaeda’s claim to honourable combat by reference to its own moral justifications—being neither error, nor al-tatarrus but, at best, brutal negligence or failure to coordinate interests and actions among al-Qaeda’s branches and, at worst, simply waging terror against ‘apostate’ regimes and populations.

Gadhan’s video was probably a response to a Combating Terrorism Center at West Point report, published just a few days before, concluding that, from 2004 to 2008, 85% of al-Qaeda offensives’ casualties were nonWestern and that only in the period between 2006 and 2008, 98% of the casualties were non-Western inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. Also, the video appears less than a month after the Lybian Islamic Fighting Group, former ally to bin Laden and with personal ties to the senior al-Qaeda leadership, publicly denounced al-Qaeda’s ideology and stance regarding the noncombatant status. CNN read this as possibly ‘one of the biggest breakthroughs against Islamist terrorism since 9/11’.

Gadahn’s video, using English-speaking, is a desperate attempt to dissuade Muslim communities in the Western world that their fellow Muslims are being massively killed and thus ensure their moral and financial support. It could even be a subliminal statement that al-Qaeda is now striving for a greater respect for innocent Muslims’ immunity.

Al-Qaeda’s stance regarding the immunity of innocents, especially Muslim ones, and its practice of accusing several regimes and movements of apostasy have been major factors for the progressive isolation of the organization. Both practices stem from the same problem, namely al-Qaeda’s selflegitimized theological authority, which was proclaimed in the 1998 Declaration.

Facing a legitimacy crisis, along with its current weak financial situation, alQaeda faces a real emergency, which may prompt its return to ‘innocence’.

For such revision, al-Qaeda would still have to ensure the harmonization of interests and operations of its branches. Yet, al-Qaeda can hardly consider adopting a stance previous to the Declaration. Al-Qaeda is guilty of its own solitude.

Researcher specializing in the ethics of international relations 33

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In Search of the Casting Vote Š getty images

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People - Interview

In Search of the Casting Vote Glyn Davies, US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency In this interview with The Majalla, Glyn Davies, the US ambassador to the IAEA, talks about his visit to Turkey in order to convince the Turkish Government out of repeating its November abstention from a vote to condemn Iran. The next Board of Governors meeting in the IAEA will start 1 March, and there is talk of a possible fissure between Ankara and Washington on how to deal with Iran.

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STANBUL: With the confrontation between Iran and the US heating up, Glyn Davies enjoys frontrow involvement in often frantic behind-the-scenes diplomacy at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Washington’s man in Vienna was dispatched to Turkey this week to ask its government—a close trade and military partner to Tehran—not to repeat its November abstention from a vote to condemn Iran.

Born to US diplomat parents in Afghanistan, Davies is a career diplomat who served as a deputy assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was posted in London and Paris, and worked at the National Security Council and on 8 March, 2010

NATO and nuclear disarmament.

Since coming to the IAEA, he has been heavily involved in the Obama administration’s October offer to Iran that would swap 70% of its lowenriched uranium stockpile for nuclear medical fuel rods. Though once a State Department spokesman, Davies does not shy away from tough language and has described the Iranian government’s actions as “callous, chilling” and “alarming”.

Turkish newspapers reported that a fissure is emerging between Ankara and Washington over how to deal with Iran.

The Turks are adopting the Chinese position that more time should be given over to diplomacy, while the Americans

are ready to impose “crippling” sanctions. As Turkey’s Foreign Minister continues bargaining with Tehran, there are those who believe that refreshed ties with Iran and Syria, very public criticisms of Israel, and an ongoing crackdown on secularist Army generals are all signs that Ankara has slipped its pro-Western moorings in favour of Muslim solidarity.

Iran officially rejected America’s offer on the same day as this interview. In a letter to the IAEA, it explained that it would rather buy the fuel it needs or accept a simultaneous exchange on its own territory. Washington called Iran’s response a “red herring”.

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People - Interview since last August but say sometimes it feels like “a lifetime”. Is working on the Iranian nuclear program exhausting?

We’ve been engaged in efforts to reach an accommodation between the IAEA and Iran that would refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (a five megawatt lightwater reactor supplied by the Americans to their staunch ally, the Shah of Iran, in the Sixties under the Atoms for Peace project) using a portion of the uranium that the Iranians have already infused.

The most frustrating element of this of course is that we thought we had an agreement that worked very well for them as well as us. But Iran proved incapable of agreeing to this deal that we thought was manifestly in their interests.

Q: When the Obama administration offered Iran this deal, it effectively departed from the Bush administration position of not allowing Iranian enrichment on its soil? What was the logic behind this?

What was, we thought, very important from the Iranian standpoint is that it was a narrow deal. It only really ever dealt with refuelling the Tehran Research Reactor so it never got into issues related to their ongoing enrichment plans, or the work in Esfahan or Qom, or anywhere else.

It only talked about taking Iranian fuel, enriching it in Russia, making fuel rods in France, and shipping them back into Iran. For us, the most important part of the deal was getting this large portion of LEU out of Iran at the front end of the deal as a confidence-building measure so that they could demonstrate that in fact their nuclear program is civilian in nature and peaceful, and that seems to be the part that they balked at.

They’ve since come up with many other variations on a deal but nothing like the original deal that Mohammad al-Baradei negotiated back in October.

The Turks played a very important role in the early days when they offered to host or secure this material once it had been shipped out of Iran. It would be on Turkish soil under IAEA seal, they would hold it in a sort of escrow arrangement.

And we said that this works fine with us. That was passively rejected by the Iranians because they never responded positively to that. The only thing they

said was that they would only allow a swap within Iran of the material which doesn’t do it for us and it doesn’t get the material out of the country and give us the diplomatic breathing space to try to find a solution to this problem.

We’ve been engaged in efforts to reach an accommodation between the IAEA and Iran that would refuel the Tehran Research Reactor Q: To what extent has the Arab position on Iran shifted since, say, the later Bush years when Cheney would visit and try to rally Saudi Arabia and the Gulf state without much apparent success? Is there a greater urgency now over a nuclear Iran?

During the Board of Governors meeting of the IAEA in November, we achieved the overwhelming passing of a resolution (criticising Iran for its noncooperation). There were only three countries that voted against it—Cuba, Venezuela and Malaysia. Eight countries abstained and then, of the 45 members of the board, everybody else voted for it. Egypt was on the cusp of agreeing to vote for it but they wanted language that we didn’t have time to come up with on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. That was the first time the Board approved a resolution that was cosponsored by the P5+1, so that was a dramatic new development and there was an awful lot of confident reaction by Arab states to that resolution, even though many of them ended up abstaining. But they didn’t vote against it.

Q: Realistically, where can the Turks offer help on the Iran file? And to what extent, should sanctions be agreed upon, will they want to see their own neighbour and lucrative

trade partner financially crippled?

My purpose in coming here was we have a very important board of governors meeting coming up March 1. It’ll be very important because it’ll be the first meeting after this latest, very sharp board report that has been done under the new administration of the IAEA. Turkey is a very important country because of its role in the region. It’s on the board, it’s on the UN Security Council so of all the countries I could have visited to discuss this issue I chose to come here on the eve of the board meeting to listen to the Turks, and understand where they’re coming from.

But secondly, I wanted to let them know in no uncertain terms and very directly how we see matters and why we’re so disappointed in the direction that Iran is taking and has taken in recent months on [the recently revealed covert enrichment facility in] Qom, on the failure to cooperate with the IAEA, on the decision to enrich uranium up to close to 20%. All these moves are very much in the wrong direction.

At a time when we’re trying to build confidence, try to reach out and engaging with them they seem to be giving us the back of the hand and moving in the wrong direction. I wanted to explain to Turkey that this is how we see it and to explain the diminishing possibility that appear to be out there of reaching a deal.

The IAEA deal is still on the table if they would respond possibly but it would have to be that deal.

Q: Why does the US insist upon offering the deal when it no longer appears to believe that Iran is negotiating in good faith?

It is important to try to find a way to keep this research reactor going because it produces medical isotopes for 850.000 cancer patients in Iran. The deal could provide a chance for Iran to demonstrate that its nuclear program is civilian, is peaceful, and could be the beginning of other processes, it could lead to other directions. The reason we thought the deal was so good in the beginning was because it gave so much to the Iranians in terms of not talking about Natanz or Qom, but really just about how the other nuclear countries would work with Iran to help refuel this reactor.

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People - Interview

Yukiya Amano chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency arrives for a board of governors meeting

That's why the deal is still on the table.

People have a misconception about the dual-track policy, thinking that since America’s now talking about sanctions and pressure this must now mean that the outreach part of the dual track is somehow off the table. But it’s not and it won’t be.

We’ll always try to reach ways to find solutions to these problems but they have to be on terms that are acceptable to both sides, they have to be a winwin. Since the conclusion of this deal by Baradei, and what initially appeared to be acceptance on the part of the Iranians including their President, the dialogue has kind of gone south in Iran and it looks as if they now don’t seem capable of meeting those conditions that were worked out by the IAEA. I wanted to explain that to the Turks.

The Turks are trying very hard to pursue a diplomatic opening, I’ve said and I believe that their motivations are pure in all this, they’ve been terrific in sharing with us all the details but…

Q: Ultimately Iran is a close trade partner and important neighbour?

Turkey has to make up its own mind but we are coming to this point where there will be a Board of Governors meeting in the IAEA starting March 1st. Turkey is 8 March, 2010

on the board of governors, there will be discussion and action we believe in the Security Council. So I wanted to come here and lay out for the Turks how we see the situation and why it’s important at this point to put some pressure on Iran to change their calculus, change their thinking and get them to understand it’s in their interest to go in this more positive direction instead of continuing in this provocative stance.

Q: Why has feeling very the prospect as a location

the US not been comfortable about of Turkey serving for the fuel swap?

There was a time some months ago when I don’t think the US had a problem with the notion of Turkey as a location for a fuel swap but the problem is that it has to be a minimum amount of 1,200kg in one shipment and at the beginning of the deal.

Much of what we understand of the Iranian position—and it depends on the day when you’re talking or listening to them—they’ve never stepped up to those originally agreed-upon provisional positions that Mohammad el Baradei agreed upon. So they’ve sought to avoid one condition or the other, or for the most part all three. So a swap of a partial amount once the fuel assemblies are produced at some point in the middle future doesn’t do it for us because it lacks

© getty images

the confidence-building component, the signal that Iran is serious about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

And it allows it to continue to churn out low-enriched uranium. They’ve produced over 600kg of the stuff just since October so what was then a universe of 1600-1700kg of which 1200kg would have been a substantial portion, that ratio has changed rather dramatically.

Q: How would the imposition of sanctions affect the situation?

It’s important to bring some pressure to bear on Iran to clarify their thinking so that they understand that their continued march towards the acquisition of these technologies outside the bounds of their agreements with the IAEA, the NonProliferation Treaty, these need to be met not with additional concessions but with steps that signal that there is a consequence when you flout the rules of the international system and agreements that you yourself signed.

Q: Would sanctions on gasoline imports figure in this package?

Whoa, that gets me into a level of… I haven’t actually worked on sanctions, I’m not in New York. As a general rule, what we’re looking at is to direct pressure towards individuals who are directly related to the IRGC. 38

People - Interview Q: Why does the Obama administration seem to no longer believe the 2008 National Intelligence Estimate that stated that Iran had abandoned the military side of its nuclear program back in 2003?

In the US Government there’s been no official change made to that original finding by the intelligence community.

Sticking to the confines of the IAEA’s own reports [http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2009/ gov2009-74.pdf] and what they have to say about the public signs of possible military dimensions to the uranium program, that in and on itself is a concern to us and is one of the key factors that heightened concern in Washington for the need to find a way out.

Q: According to current trends, what is the time window within which the US expects Iran to be capable of building a nuclear bomb?

It’s interesting that the IAEA, in addition to detailing all the troubling aspects of this program—the heavy water; the possible military dimensions; the failure to be open about the Qom facility—they also detail some of the technological challenges that Iran seems to be facing in its enrichment program. So that’s part of the picture as well.

The amount of 19.75% enriched LEU that they’re producing is at the moment relatively small. But as we’ve learned when dealing with Iran, it’s not about the daily rate but about what they produce over time. Right now they’ve only devoted one of the IAEA cascades to this purpose, so they could devote more soon.

Q: The recent IAEA report was remarkably harsh towards Iran.

Could such a report have been issued on Mohammad el-Baradei’s watch?

There’s no question that Mohammed al-Baradei and Yukiya Amano are two different men from two different parts of the world with different style.

Director-General Amano is taking a very methodical approach to this, he is stripping away a lot of the adjectives, getting right down to cases, he’s telling it like it is.

Q: No more Muslim solidarity?

Issue 1547

Nobody’s questioning Iran’s right to have peaceful nuclear technology, the question is whether or not they do it within the bounds of the international system I don’t really go for that stuff, I admire Mohammed too much. I think he was genuinely ahead of his time, he’d been at this for a dozen years so the reports I was working with him towards the end of his tenure, he had a particular purpose for doing the reports in the way that he did. The bigger story is if you look at some of the reports that Baradei did during his tenure, they were quite hardhitting. Remember what he said at the end of his tenure, that Iran was on the wrong side of the law?

Q: But he also said that you can’t bomb nuclear knowledge.

He was a man who gave good quotes (laughs), there’s no question about that.

There’s now a new Director General, he’s got a different approach that is perhaps having a bit of an effect on the tenor of these reports. But the substance?

Not so greatly different.

Q: You said last year that Iran has a possible “breakout” capacity. Does this mean that it is too late to stop Iran's nuclear progress?

I don’t think it’s ever too late for a country, even Iran, to change its strategic calculations and make a principled decision to move in the direction of adherence to the NPT, try to find accommodation with its neighbours and the world community.

I’ve got a president who set out his stall in the direction of moving towards a world without nuclear weapons. People can be cynical about that; the man is sincere though. It can be a long process: we’re trying to negotiate a reduction in

strategic arms, move to corral fissionable material in the next four years and you have a very few actors who’re moving in the opposite direction. So it comes down to what sort of world you want, a world in which there’s proliferation of new technologies and people are acting outside the system, constantly testing the NPT and trying to get away with infractions? Or do you want to work towards a world where you strengthen the IAEA and NPT which is all we’ve got? To ensure that this technology will be used for peaceful purposes, medical and agricultural, instead of increasingly proliferating and using it for dangerous purposes? That’s the stark strategic choice that we face and that’s why we’re so concerned with what Iran is up to at the moment.

Q: How does the Green Movement and Iran’s domestic problem play into US calculations?

There’s a great deal of turmoil inside Iran, there’s been an uptick in repression in recent months, and yet I also know that this issue of the right to the peaceful pursuit of nuclear power is probably quite an emotional touchstone in Iran.

Nobody’s questioning Iran’s right to have peaceful nuclear technology, the question is whether or not they do it within the bounds of the international system to demonstrate that indeed it is a civilian nuclear program, or whether they continue to defy the IAEA and their obligations under the NPT and the Additional Protocol, and continue to raise questions over whether this is a peaceful program or one that is pointed in the direction of establishing a capability to develop nuclear weapons.

That’s what so scary, especially for the region where we’re sitting right now.

My personal view is that all the signs point to an attempt by Iran to develop that capacity for a breakout, give themselves that option, and perhaps ultimately pursue that sort of a weapon. That would be tremendously destabilising in this region, threaten Iran’s neighbours, and set back the progress we’re all seeking to achieve.

Interview conducted by Iason Athanasiadis journalist based in Istanbul, covers Turkey, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since 1999, he has lived in Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Sana’a and Tehran

39

People - Profile

Two Sides of the Same Coin Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Ethiopia’s Prime Minister has been greeted by the world as the answer to stabilizing the horn of Africa. In addition to his efforts at undermining insecurity in the region, the 3 term leader has also done much to curtail poverty in his country. However, after 15 years in power, allegations questioning his commitment to democracy have surfaced. With elections due in May, Zenawi will have the opportunity to prove which side of democracy he is on.

© getty images

A

world away from the barista pouring your Starbucks Ethiopia blend coffee is the country where this bean was first cultivated as a drink fit only for the lips of emperors. Today’s leader of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, unlike his predecessors, promises to lead the way for democracy in Africa. On the 23rd of May Ethiopians will queue at polling stations to register their votes in the fourth national election in their country’s history.

Now in his third five-year term as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi has been hailed as a model for democratic rule on the continent. Yet could this beacon of hope for democracy be a false flame fed by government lip-service 8 March, 2010

and Western optimism? While Meles’ government promotes fair elections and free press, rights groups and foreign observers condemn his party for crushing opposition and committing grievous human rights abuses.

most important African ally in the War on Terrorism’. With neighbouring Somalia causing America some serious headaches as a haven for terrorists, Ethiopia has gained importance in the US’s attempts at stabilizing the region.

As the largest country in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia pulls many of the strings within the region. Its strategic location, separated from the Gulf of Aden by Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea makes it a valuable pawn in deciding the fate of the region. Western powers are hoping to keep Zenawi on side, especially concerning their counterterrorism agenda. In an interview with the Prime Minister Newsweek named Meles ‘Washington's

The links between the US, and its African ally are many. For example, in 2006, with US backing, Ethiopia invaded Somalia to rid it of extreme Islamist leadership and set up the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ethiopia has also been involved in the recruiting and training ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia to fight the Somalian militia group Al-Shabaab in coordination with Djibouti and Kenya. This assault is forecast 40

People - Profile to take place in the coming year.

For seventeen years the military regime of the Derg headed by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam ruled over Ethiopia with terror, orchestrating the famines of the eighties with Marxist farming policies, keeping the weak population firmly under its grasp. In 1991 the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) swept down from Ethiopia’s Northern highlands taking the capital, Addis Ababa and toppling Mengistu’s communist dictatorship. The chairman of the TPLF at the time, a little known public figure, was Meles Zenawi.

Born in 1955 in Ethiopia’s northern most region of Tigray, Meles Zenawi went on to complete his schooling in the capital, Addis Ababa. He then joined the medical faculty of Addis Ababa University before interrupting his studies to join the TPLF in their armed struggle against the ruling regime.

After the fall of the military junta Zenawi led the Transitional Government until his election as Prime Minister and leader of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1995. Initially a Marxist follower, Meles Zenawi moved to more mainstream politics, promoting free market policies and a becoming a spokesman for democracy.

Zenawi was showered with praise from the international community for his efforts to alleviate poverty and promote democratization.

He introduced a system of ethnic federalism instead of the centralised government under Mengistu. Meles was the poster child of the Live Aid charity appeal, the face of hope and self-sufficiency in Africa.

At the time, in 2005, Meles was chosen to sit on the UK sponsored ‘Commission for Africa’ dealing with aid, debt-relief and trade on the Continent. He was praised by Tony Blair for his pragmatic and Issue 1547

fair leadership. He has also had considerable success in delivering aid, water and electricity to Ethiopia’s some 70 million people.

With an ongoing battle against drought, rebel attacks and aid reliance Meles has still managed to improve the country’s living standards during his past fifteen years in power. Infant mortality is down by half and life expectancy has increased from 45 to 55 years.

Zenawi was showered with praise from the international community for his efforts to alleviate poverty and promote democratization Yet the rose-tinted spectacles that many have viewed his tenure through quickly came off in the wake of the 2005 elections following a controversial win by Zenawi’s party marked by accusations of voter fraud. The opposition took to the streets. Violent clashes erupted between demonstrators and government forces leading to the deaths of 183 people. Yet Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry defended government action by saying that “Most contemporary press reports made no mention of the fact that 7 policemen were killed and over 340 injured in the violence.

Throwing grenades, setting fire to buses with people on them and destroying government and private buildings do not constitute

a

‘peaceful

demonstration’.”

Human Rights Watch has accused Zenawi’s government of harassment, torture and imprisonment of members of the opposition. In late 2007 Ethiopia was threatened with US congressional sanctions for its oppression of critics unless democratic reforms were made.

Zenawi’s government has refused to admit to any human rights abuses. Claims have also been made about food aid being politicised, especially of withholding food to the Ogaden region where a separatist movement is underway.

Although this was dismissed as false reporting by the World Food Programme and Zenawi himself said if this were true he would dismiss the persons responsible.

With elections approaching in May, international observers will be looking closely for any false moves made by Zenawi’s ruling party.

The Ethiopian government appears equally eager to avoid a repeat of 2005. The National Electoral board is closely regulating media coverage and funds between campaigning parties. The government has also introduced a Code of Conduct for Political Parties agreed on by some 65 parties that has now been passed into law. This code outlines the rules of the game in an attempt to divert dispute and fraud. Forum, the main opposition grouping, is the only party to refuse negotiations with the EDRDF claiming that they would cajole them into agreeing to terms that benefit their own agenda.

This will be Zenawi’s opportunity to prove his critics wrong. The West seems, on the whole, happy to ignore Zenawi’s breeches of human rights and become cosy bed fellows in order to avoid a downward spiral into conflict in the Horn. The European Union and the United States are hoping for a Zenawi victory in the upcoming elections to keep their pawn in play in this volatile region.

41

8 March, 2010

Economics International Economics

International Investor

Markets

Europa

Europa

By Daniel Capparelli

Issue 1547

43

Economics - International Economics

Europa Europa Turkey’s accession to the EU Daniel Capparelli

© getty images

Although Turkey’s attempts at accession to the European Union have been replete with hurdles, Turkey has in effect benefited greatly from complying with these requirements. In Turkey’s attempts to gain accession to the EU, it has vastly improved its political and economic institutions. Further requirements for accession, particularly the aquis communautaire, stand to offer Turkey’s institutions the same if not more benefits than other reforms.

Greens and socialist euro deputies hold papers saying 'YES' during the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France, backing Turkey's bid to open accession negotiations with the European Union

I

n Greek Mythology, Tantalus became famous for killing his son and offering him as a meal to the gods. Since cannibalism, infanticide and human sacrifice constituted an absolute taboo for the Greeks of classical times, the gods severely punished Tantalus for his actions. His sentence: stand for all eternity in a pool of fresh water under a tree bearing succulent fruits.

Whenever Tantalus reached up for a fruit, the tree branches would retract, not allowing him to reach his meal; whenever he reached down to quench his thirst, the waters would recede before he could 8 March, 2010

attain his objective.

At first glance, one could be tempted to liken Turkey’s accession to the European Union to the fate of Tantalus.

Whenever Turkey comes close to reaching the accession requirements, the requirements become more stringent and intricate. Requirements that were first overwhelmingly based on the objective improvement of Turkey’s political and economic institutions have since morphed into an inherently convoluted accession process. France, for instance, went as far as changing

its constitution to require a national referendum on the issue.

Notwithstanding the frustrating effects of these political hurdles, upon looking closer one realizes that unlike Tantalus, Turkey benefits greatly from this situation; perhaps even more than if it had been granted accession on less demanding conditions.

These benefits stem from two main sources: first, the accession process reduces the existing barriers to trade, capital flows, and movement of people between the EU and Turkey; second, it serves as leverage for pushing 44

Economics - International Economics forward badly needed reforms.

Turkey’s Accession Timeline

At the top of the list of Turkey’s objectives is its accession to the EU’s internal market. One of the stipulations of the Ankara Agreement (1963) and Protocol (1971) was that a Custom Union should be implemented prior to accession to the internal market.

The resulting Custom Union formed by the EU and Turkey in 1996 not only eliminated tariffs and quantitative barriers to trade in industrial goods and processed agricultural products, but also harmonized many economic standards and regulations.

31 July 1959

Turkey requests Associate Membership to the European Economic Community (EEC)

12 Sept 1963

Membership requirements recognised within the Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement).

1 Dec 1964

Association Agreement implemented.

23 Nov 1970

Procedure outlining a schedule for the abolition of duties and quotas on goods is signed (Ankara Protocol)

1980

Following Turkey’s 1980 military coup, relations with EEC are severed.

1983

Improved relations with EEC after Turkish elections.

14 April 1987

Turkey requests formal membership of the European Community.

As a consequence, both economies are today relatively well integrated. In 2008, the EU topped the list of Turkey’s major trade partners accounting for 41.7% of trade flows, far ahead Russia’s 11.4%, China’s 5.2% and the US’s 4.9%. Between 2006 and 2007, European Foreign Direct Investment flows to Turkey amounted to more than €24 billion and European FDI stocks stood at more than €48 billion by early 2008.

6 March 1996

Formation of EU -Turkey Customs Union.

12 Dec 2002

European Council stipulates that Turkey must fulfil ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in proceeding to negotiate with the EU.

2004

‘Annan Plan for Cyprus’ supported by Turkey and Turkish Republic for Northern Cyprus.

17 Dec 2004

Negotiations between Turkey and EU begin.

11 Dec 2006

EU halts proceeding with Acquis Communautaire (AC) due to unresolved dispute between Turkey and Cyprus.

29 March 2007

AC reopened. Chapter on Enterprise & Industrial Policy.

There are still many technical and administrative barriers to trade, particularly in the services sector, that need to be removed prior to an eventual accession. This will benefit the Turkish economy greatly: only the harmonization of these barriers and regulations would increase GDP by 0.8% and bilateral trade by 12-18% yearly according to some conservative estimates.

25 June 2007

Opening of Economic & Monetary Policy chapter blocked by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The major gain from the EU accession process, however, lies in the improvement of Turkey’s economic and political Issue 1547

19 Dec 2008

8 Dec 2009

Economic & Monetary Policy and Information Society & Media chapters opened.

Environment chapter opened

institutions. In the last 50 years, the EU accession process has served as a lever to pushing forward with politically sensitive institutional reforms and economic policies that benefit Turkey even in the event of a definite collapse in the accession talks.

As an illustration, prior to 1980

the Turkish financial sector was heavily regulated. This led to a system controlled by very few large banks benefiting from considerable profit margins. In the 1980s the government decided to reform the financial sector by liberalizing market access to foreign banks, and eliminating 45

interest rate controls and directed credit programs. The increased competition created by the entry of foreign banks and their more efficient business models served as powerful incentive to domestic banks to modernize and expand the variety of services offered.

Competition also reduced the margins charged by domestic banks, making their services cheaper to consumers. Over all, capital became better allocated in the economy and the quality of services has greatly improved One of the most demanding accession requirements still pending is the implementation of the “acquis communautaire”, i.e. the existing body of the Union’s legislation by Turkey. This would be a powerful catalyst to further institutional reform by, inter alia, pressing the modification of Turkey’s ineffective public procurement codes and services sector regulation. It would also considerably increase the transparency of government institutions, reduce corruption and, consequently, enhance Turkey’s international economic competitiveness. According to some studies, more transparency and less corruption could increase trade between Turkey and current EU member states by 17 to 27%.

Cashing In Accession in itself, nonetheless, could prove deeply beneficial at a sectoral level for the Turkish economy. Since tariffs and non-tariff barriers ultimately represent taxes, their elimination would result in a change in the relative prices of goods produced in Turkey and the EU. From a Turkish perspective, this would allow producers to specialize in Turkey’s 8 March, 2010

comparative advantage—namely, textiles, Apparel, Business and Transportation services, and above all, agricultural goods, which represent over 50% of Turkey’s exports.

Paradoxically, except perhaps for the free movement of people issue, this represents one of the main politico-economic obstacles to accession from a European perspective. Turkey’s full accession to the internal market is likely to further increase the competition faced

by European (French) farmers and to divert trade from Central and Eastern European member states. Given that these countries specialize in the same economic sectors as Turkey, the latter’s accession to the internal market will most likely lead to a loss in production in the former. Up until now, Central and Eastern European countries have benefited from preferential access to other European markets. Turkey’s accession will toughen the competition and inevitably lead to some loss of market power.

The major obstacle, in political economic terms, remains migration, however. The most conservatives studies put migration flows from Turkey into the EU at around 2.9 million migrants when and free movement of people is established. This is 3% of the population of Central and Eastern Europe and 0.7% of the population of Western Europe.

Studies speculate that of these 2.9 million potential migrants, 76% would establish themselves in Germany, 8% in France, 4% in the Netherlands.

Although, in purely economic

terms, this would be greatly beneficial to the EU and Turkey, from a political perspective the situation is less appealing since it would increase the pressure in already saturated European labour markets. Not surprisingly, it is the countries likely to absorb the brunt of the migratory flows that oppose Turkey’s accession most vociferously. The mood in these countries is well illustrated by the German Prime Minister, Angela Merkel when she said that “[i]if Turkey joined the EU, it could overload the EU politically, economically and socially, thereby endangering the process of European integration”.

Make the Most of It Unlike Tantalus, the fresh water and the shade from the trees are making Turkey stronger everyday. Its leaders have been able to turn a frustrating situation into an advantage for Turkey by using the accession process as leverage for the implementation of more economically efficient legislation and institutions. The establishment of the Custom Union between the EU and Turkey in 1996 implies that the principal objective is to use accession to reform the rest of Turkey’s inefficient institutions. As the prospects of accession improve, and Turkey’s ambition turn to joining the common currency, the government is likely to focus on Turkey’s unstable macroeconomic policies. The road, however, is still long. Accession to the EU would be needed if Turkey is to “lock-in” these economics and political reforms, since once inside, populist governments would be unable to roll them back no matter what political capital they may have.

46

Issue 1547

49

Economics - International Investor

Much Ado About Little The low commercial value of multilateral trade negotiations in agriculture Agriculture is severely undermining the prospects of concluding the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Even in the very unlikely case where there would be significant cuts in agricultural tariffs and subsides, they would have very little effect in the price of commodities.

W

e may be living in a high-tech world but agriculture remains the dominating sector in the Doha negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

For almost a decade, trade diplomats and ministers have been striving for a comprehensive deal that would cut tariffs for all goods, discipline regulatory barriers to trade in services and liberalize agriculture. Over and again, the entire talks were delayed and even suspended due to inextricable conflicts on agriculture. Most strikingly, a key ministerial meeting in 2008 collapsed over technical details of an escape clause that would allow developing countries to renege on their agricultural tariff reductions in the case of import surges.

The influential Peterson Institute estimates the potential GDP gains from a Doha agreement to range between $300 billion and $700 billion annually – for the 22 leading trading nations alone. Such figures cannot capture the real boost that new market opportunities would give to the animal spirits of the ailing world economy.

Nor do they account for the environmental benefits that would arise from the abolition of harmful subsidies, the exchange of environmentally preferable products and enhanced availability of cutting-edge services, for instance for waste-water treatment. If governments are prepared to risk these manifold gains over agriculture, the economic implications of the tabled liberalization in agriculture must be tremendous. Or so one might think.

The tariff cutting formula seems indeed ambitious at first sight: the higher the tariffs, the stronger the reductions – with tariffs in developed countries above 75% to be scaled back by 70%. This compares favorably with the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 and so far the only multilateral discipline on agricultural tariffs. Back then, the average reduction expected from developed countries was a more modest 36%. But countries have the right to designate a share of their tariff lines 8 March, 2010

also stipulates reductions in other tradedistorting subsidies, such as payments for production or farm modernization. Again, these disciplines are too weak to trigger major policy reform in the US and the EU that are handing out the bulk of such payments.

Valentin Zahrnt as sensitive, allowing them to soften the impact of the tariff cutting formula on those products where trade volumes and tariffs are highest.

Developing countries managed to secure even gentler treatment. Their tariff cutting formula is less demanding and they can designate more tariff lines as sensitive. In addition, they can categorize products as special and exempt them from any tariff cut.

For most developing countries, however, these exceptions are not even needed to shield existing policies: their tariff rates as bound in the WTO, which are the subject of the cutting formula, significantly exceed the rates they actually apply. Brazil’s average bound tariff amounts to about 40%, whereas its applied average is a mere 4%, and India’s bound tariffs tower applied levels by at least 70 percentage points. Only very steep multilateral cuts would create new market access in countries like these.

The subsidy disciplines outlined in the draft agreement are equally feeble. The would-be phase-out of export subsidies is celebrated as a major achievement. But the economic relevance of this instrument has long been declining. The EU paid less than € 1 billion of export subsidies in 2008. Domestic pressures are strong to do away with them altogether, regardless of any Doha deal, as they are criticized for wasting tax payers’ money and harming poor farmers abroad. The negotiating draft

The real driver of subsidy reform will not be any negotiations in far-away Geneva but fiscal and environmental imperatives at home. With public debts soaring in the wake of the financial and economic crisis, governments will find it ever harder to justify lavish farm subsidies. At the same time, rising concerns about water quality and availability, biodiversity and climate change will force governments to harness their shrinking agricultural budgets to promote sustainable farming. This puts a double squeeze on the traditional schemes that stimulated production and supported farm incomes.

The Doha negotiations are not the decisive determinant of future prices for agricultural products on the world market.

Global food demand will be boosted by population and income growth. The supply side will benefit from renewed attention to agricultural research and innovation.

Numerous initiatives attempt to spur production in developing countries through enhanced farm advisory services and better-functioning markets, especially for land. Climate change endangers farming in many regions – but it raises productivity in others. India might decide to follow the lead of other developing countries and open its vast market to imports, and Russia will develop into a major food exporter.

Developments like these will drive future food and land prices and shape the profits of the agricultural supply chain, from fertilizer and seed producers to processors and traders.

A Research Associate at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and Editor of www. reformthecap.eu.

48

Now you can follow the majalla anywhere anytime on your

Issue 1547

Economics - Behind the Graph

America’s Interest for Trade According to Craig VanGrasstek, Executive Director of the Program for Trade and Negotiations at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, the United States has witnessed a significant decline in the public and Congress’s interest in international trade during the last 20 or so years. Given the importance of the US as key player and partner in the international trade system, this trend raises questions about the viability of present and future multilateral trade negotiations. Accord-

ing to Dr. VanGrasstek, American trade policy has become increasingly extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic, i.e. policymakers and the public are more worried about the policies in place in foreign countries rather than in the policies in place in the US.

Much of this can be attributed to the success of trade liberalization in the past 30 years.

Multilateral and bilateral negotiations have successfully abolished most quantitative barriers to trade (quotas) and considerably

lowered tariffs. What has not been achieved so far is the removal of some tariff peaks in sensitive products and the removal and harmonization of non-tariff barriers and standards. The fact that trade liberalization has been locked-in by the World Trade Organization’s tariff schedule, means that protectionist forces have to pass via what trade specialist call “trade remedies” such as antidumping laws and safeguards. Both of these facts may contribute to explaining the decline in interest in trade policy in the US.

Shrinking Demand for Protection via Antidumping Actions After many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, tariffs have been brought down drastically in developing countries to an average of 3-4%.

This has, in principle, exposed many economic sectors to foreign competition. While facilitating the implementation of a free trade multilateral regime, countries have allowed for some flexibility. For instance, if Chinese manufacturers would export goods prices bellow their production costs, American producers could demand their government to implement “antidumping” duties on these goods. Antidumping laws, however, have so many loopholes that they often serve as protectionist tools in the hand of those sectors suffering “too much competition”. This is made clear by the first table, which shows a clear correlation between economic downturns or crisis and the increase in demand for antidumping actions (see bellow the explanation for the lack of correlation between the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the demand for antidumping actions).

-----------

Decline in Safeguard Demands As the former section makes clear, there has been a net decline in the interest of the private sector in trade remedies. Table two highlights the demand for safeguard mechanisms per president. The WTO allows countries to implement a temporary duty on goods if the domestic sector in question is experiencing an unexpected surge in imports. The implementation of safeguards in the US is at the discretion of the president. Much like the decline in the demand for antidumping actions showed in the first graph, the demand of safeguards has fallen considerably in the last 30-40 years. Although the decline in the use of safeguards has much to do with the rise in the use of antidumping actions (a substitution effect), taken together, both these trends would confirm that there is a clear decline in trade activism by the private sector in the US.

-----------

US Trade Deficit of Interest?

Although there is no doubt about a decline of interest in trade policy in the US, this alone does not explain the absence of a correlation between the demand for anti-dumping actions and the 2007-2009 global economic crisis. Some have advanced the hypothesis that international coordination through the G20 has dissuaded the administration to go through with protectionist policies during the crisis. This, however, would only explain a decline in antidumping and safeguards implementation, not the decline in demand for such actions. What seems to be the best explanation is that the crisis led to a significant fall in imports. Since exports did not fall as fast (given the fast recouperation of Asian economies), the trade deficit fell considerably during the crisis. This would confirm that not even during the crisis—as had been the case in previous crises—trade became a factor of concern for business.

8 March, 2010

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-10.0 -14.2 -8.4 -3.2 -6.9 -7.4 na +3.3 0 +8.8 +7.8 +0.7 -6.9 -3.2 _7.2 -8.0 -3.8 -2.4 -1.1

Qatar Exchange

6,750.000 6,600.000 6,450.000 6,300.000 0

0

01 /2

/0 2

0

01 /2

/0 2

2 2

0

01 /2

/0 2

1 7

0

01 /2

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01 /2

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0

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01 0

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1/ 2

01 0

01 0

1/ 2

8/ 0 1

1

3/ 0

1/ 2

1/ 2

01 0

6,150.000

8/ 0

3/ 0

3.66 4.10 3.47 6.17 3.23 1.33 na na na na na na 1.76 6.16 7.40 7.71 3.79 2.63 2.44

6,900.000

0

0

0.14 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.32 2.2 6.82 7.21 7.12 5.66 0.77 9.98 8.65 8.75 3.80 1.88 0.13 0.50

7,050.000

01 0

10

20

2/

10

20

2/ 2

2/ 0

10

20

2/ 1

0.73 0.78 0.78 0.78 87.6 3.67 0.37 0.38 3.64 0.29 3.75 5.55 2.36 32.8 49.1 8.84 7.76 1.51

Dubai Financial Market 1,900.000

6,500.000

1,800.000

6,400.000 6,300.000

1,700.000

6,200.000

1,600.000

6,100.000

1,500.000

6,000.000 5,900.000

0

/2 01

0 2

2/

02

/2 01

0 1

7/

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/2 01

0 1

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02

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8 March, 2010

0

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0 1

2/ 01

/2 01

7/ 01

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1,400.000

0

2/ 01

-3.0 -1.9 -2.0 +4.2 -0.7 +2.7 +8.5 +44.6 +9.1 +27.9 +44.7 +28.5 -1.7 -1.0 +3.8 -0.7 +6.3 13.7 +12.7

7,200.000

Tadawul 6,600.000

0

-465.3 Q3 -28.2 Q3 -56.7 Nov +158.0 Nov -109.6 Oct +133.4 nov +22.3 Dec +70.6 Dec +5.4 Dec +28.6 Dec +70.5 Dec +134.0 2008 -4.9 Q3 -24.3 Dec +47.5 Q4 _31.5 Q3 +364.4 Q2 +26.2 Q3 +20.9 Q3

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7/ 0

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8/ 0

10

20

1/ 2

3/ 0

10

20

1/ 1

3/ 0

8/ 0

10

20 1

8/ 0

1/

10

20 1/ 3/ 0

-518.4 Nov -126.0 Nov -56.1 Nov +187.7 Nov +25.3 Nov +34.4 Nov +63.2 2008 +6.3 2008 +14.8 2008 37.0 2008 +62.5 2008 +212.0 2008 -25.4 Q3 +24.6 Dec +104.1 Nov -74.5 Nov +196.1 Dec -26.1 Nov +24.1 Dec

6,900.000 6,800.000 6,700.000 6,600.000 6,500.000 6,400.000 6,300.000 6,200.000 6,100.000

0

0

Trade Budget Interest Rate Balance Balance as a Current Account Balance Currency Units, per$ lastest 12 % of GDP 10 years Govt months Latest 12 months % of GDP 2009 latest Year ago 3 month latest Bonds latest 2008 $bn

United States United Kingdom France Germany Euro Area Japan UAE Barhain Oman Qatar Kuwait Saudi Arabia Egypt Brazil Russia India China Hong Kong Singapore

Kuwait Stock Exchange 7,500.000 7,400.000 7,300.000 7,200.000 7,100.000 7,000.000 6,900.000 6,800.000 6,700.000 6,600.000

-0.3 10.0 Dec 7.8 Nov 10.0 Nov 8.1 Dec 10.0 Nov 5.2 Nov na na na 0.3 Dec na na 9.3 Q3 7.4 Nov 8.1 Nov 10.7 2009 10.2 2009 4.9 Dec 3.4 Q3

+2.1 +0.1 +0.3 +0.3 -1.3 +2.5 +3.0 3.3 0 +4.7 +4.3 +11.8 +4.9 +11.7 +10.5 -0.8 +0.5 +0.3

01

10

/0

2/

20

10 20

2/

2 3

10 20

2/

/0 1 8

10 20

2/

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10 20

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10 20

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10 20

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10 20

1/

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10 1 9

/0

1/

20

10 1 4

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20 1/

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0 4

/0

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20

10

1,400.000

0.1 +3.1 +1.0 +1.1 +1.6 +1.0 +7.2 +5.1 +12.7 13.2 6.8 +9.5 +18.3 +5.9 +13.3 +10.6 +1.2 +2.1 +5.5

/2

1,450.000

+2.7 Dec +2.9 Dec +0.9 Dec +0.9 Dec +0.9 Dec -1.9 Nov +0.7 Nov +1.6 Dec +0.8 Nov -9.9 Dec na +4.0 Nov +13.3 Dec +4.3 Dec +8.8 Dec +13.3 Nov +1.9 Dec 1.3 Dec -0.2 Nov

/0 1

1,500.000

-2.0 Dec -6.0 Oct -3.8 Nov -8.0 Nov -7.9 Nov -4.2 Nov na na na na na na +6.7 Q3 +5.1 Nov +1.5 Nov +11.7 +18.5 Dec -8.6 Q3 -8.2 Nov

Unemployment rate latest

2009

2 8

Bahrain Stock Exchange 1,550.000

+2.8 +1.5 +1.6 +1.9 +1.4 +1.5 +2.4 +3.7 +3.8 +18.5 +4.4 +3.2 +5.4 +4.4 +3.0 +7.1 +9.3 +4.6 +4.8

Year Ago

01

% Change Since Feb 18 Since Dec 31 0.27 -1.79 -0.33 -1.54 -0.88 -2.49 -2.86 -7.51 -2.61 -7.14 -0.72 -5.12 -0.11 -6.73 0.78 4.10 -2.71 -12.29 -1.38 5.23 -1.02 -1.62 -0.24 5.33 0.85 5.62 -5.25 9.26 0.64 2.64 -0.79 -5.82

Index Feb 25 3502.96 2234.22 5278.23 3640.77 5532.33 2749.15 20399.57 1518.06 1581.94 6701.7 6846.36 7378.8 6465.69 1530.2 1207.99 8645.1

New York (Dow) New York (Nasdaq) London (FTSE 100) Paris (CAC40) Frankfurt (DAX) Singapore (STI) Hong Kong (Hang Seng) Barhain (BSE) Dubai (DFM) Oman (ASE) Qatar (DSM) Kuwait (KSE) Riyadh Cairo (Case 30) Japan (Nikkei) Mumbai (BSE)

-2.5 -4.7 -2.2 -4.7 -3.9 -5.3 -0.2 +3.0 +4.0 +11.5 +4.7 -1.0 +4.7 -0.3 -8.0 +6.5 +8.3 -3.2 -2.1

Latest

2 3

+2.2 -1.2 +1.0 +2.9 +1.5 +1.3 na na na na na na na +5.1 na na na +1.6 -6.8

2010

/0 1

-2.6 Q3 -5.1 Q3 -2.3 Q3 -4.8 Q3 -4.1 Q3 -5.1 Q3 +7.4 2008 +6.1 2008 +7.9 2008 +16.4 2008 +2.5 2008 +4.8 2008 +4.3 Q3 -1.2 Q3 -8.9 Q3 +7.9 Q3 +10.7 Q4 -2.4 Q3 +3.4 Q4

2009

/0 1

United States United Kingdom France Germany Euro Area Japan UAE Barhain Oman Qatar Kuwait Saudi Arabia Egypt Brazil Russia India China Hong Kong Singapore

qtr

0 8

Latest

Prices

52

Issue 1547

8 March, 2010

THE MAJALLA

31

Reviews Books

Issue 1547

Readings

Reports

55

Reviews - Books

Behind

Iraq’s Sectarianism Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia Insurgency in Iraq Patrick Cockburn Faber 2009

Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shia cleric, has defined much of Shia politics since the US invasion of Iraq.

How and why this young cleric managed to enthral and militarize a portion of the Shia population is addressed in Patrick Cockburn’s latest book.

Although designed as a biography of Muqtada, this book is much more, providing insight on the history of Iraq’s politics and insight on its place in the region.

A

fter Operation Iraqi Freedom managed to topple Saddam Hussein, one thing was clear, that the Coalition Armed Forces had not planned for the political vacuum that was to follow. Although post-invasion state building has proved more of an art than a precise science, part of the reason for the US’s under prepared policies was their misunderstanding of Iraqi politics. As a result, out of the ashes of the war arose Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shia cleric, who not only understood Iraqi politics but had the capacity of mobilizing the young urban poor into a militia known as the Mehdi Army.

the region, Patrick Cockburn, an Irish journalist based in Iraq since 1977, takes on the challenge of explaining this phenomenon to the world in his latest book. His fascinating account manages to turn the biography of one leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, into a study of Shiism and the importance of sectarian conflict in Iraqi politics.

Since his rise, al-Sadr has become an enigma, but a force to be reckoned with for allies and Iraqis alike. Recognizing that the story behind his rise and that of the Shia insurgency in Iraq are little understood outside

on the US, the US

8 March, 2010

Iraqi governments

since 2004 had been slow to grasp that, while they might

be militarily reliant was more politically dependent on them

than they imagined

Despite the overwhelming amount of literature and interest on sectarianism in the region, Cockburn’s style and choice of content sets his book apart.

The book addresses a range of issues, from the historical split between Shias and Sunnis, to current struggles within Iraq over sectarian issues. The breath of the book allows Cockburn to account for the most significant moments in Iraqi politics and demonstrate how this combination of events led to the rise of the Shia insurgency and of Muqtada al-Sadr himself.

Although the book does not begin to discuss Muqtada himself until the 9th chapter, the author’s choice in bringing the protagonist in at this point is not without merit. In fact, this strategic decision allows Cockburn to place Muqtada’s movement within the country’s historical context, thus explaining Muqtada’s popularity. More 56

Reviews - Books

specifically, Cockburn illustrates how Muqtada managed to place himself as the natural heir to the leadership of the Shia in Iraq by building upon a discourse of the martyrdom that so affected his family, including his father and his father in law.

Beyond depicting Muqtada al-Sadr’s life, this book also highlights the life and decision making of Iraq’s past rulers, particularly that of Saddam Hussein. Hussein’s rise and fall is depicted as a consequence of the leader’s skill, and his overwhelming misunderstanding of Iraq’s position in the region.

Cockburn particularly succeeds in providing an uncomplicated account of the coup-proof regime that Saddam Hussein built. At the foundation of his regime, Cockburn argues, were military police and tribal allegiances.

Most importantly, however, “was the jump in oil prices after 1973, which provided Baathists with funds sufficient to raise the living standards of all Iraqis and quell popular discontent.” This combination made Shiite clerics, and other politically active Shiites in the Dawa Party feel that there was a very little chance of success if they were to confront Hussein.

Beyond explaining the political trajectory of Iraq’s notorious dictator, Cockburn’s inclusion of the US’s support for Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war is also presented as an important historical lesson for Western allies with interests in the region.

The same can be said of the US’s support for sanctions against Iraq.

In recounting the impact of the Issue 1547

US’s policies, Cockburn explains how Western countries did their fair share in encouraging sectarian conflict. Cockburn notes that the Iraqi economy and society were collapsing under the weight of the UN sanctions imposed after the invasion of Kuwait. As a result of the sanctions, millions of Iraqis saw their lives ruined, and this partly explains why they were so receptive to Sadr’s message.

Much like the US’s support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during Soviet occupation, Cockburn’s implications here are clear. The US and other governments should be weary of who they support and how, lest their policies do more harm than good, and end up creating the type of resentment that surely contributed to the anti-American sentiment felt in the country.

The long and

bloody conflict had served to discredit Iraqi nationalism.

When Saddam

invaded Kuwait

in August 1990 he

found the patriotic well had run dry

Cockburn’s evaluation of Iraqi politics is also important for the insight it provides on the combination between Shiism

and nationalism that Muqtada al-Sadr would later rekindle as a foundation for his movement.

Cockburn explains that the Shia in Iraq “were nationalist though their definition of what this meant in terms of Iraqi national identity was different from that of the Sunni…Unlike the Kurds the Shia demand had never been for the destruction or weakening of the Iraqi state but rather a fairer share of power within it and an end to anti-Shia discrimination.”. The Sadrist movement that inspired Cockburn’s book would be comprised of a “potent blend” of Iraqi nationalist and Shia religious identity. Thus, the sectarian component of nationalism would come to explain the surprising popularity of Sadrism both under Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr between 1992 until 1999 and later under his son Muqtada.

Cockburn’s book is a success in terms of its aim of presenting Muqtada al-Sadr’s rise within Iraq’s historical context. Most importantly, he demonstrates that if his rise was a shock to anyone, it was only for their lack of understanding of the evolution of Shia politics in the country, and its role in creating a specific brand of Iraqi nationalism. More than a biography Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia Insurgency in Iraq, has the content worthy of a history book, and an analysis valuable for political scientists and lay people alike. Engrossing, and well researched, this book is not only readable; it is highly informative for anyone interested in understanding Iraqi politics today.

57

Reviews - Readings

Readings Books ‘Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan’ Greg Mortenson

From the author of the number one national bestseller Three Cups of Tea, comes the story of a determined humanitarian and the schools he established in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Few new books are as welltimed as "Stones Into Schools.” Greg Mortenson is the recipient of Pakistan's highest civil award (The Star of Pakistan) for his sixteen years work to

promote education and peace. His great conviction, according to this book, is that the right kind of educational effort can bridge enormous gaps. Although he reiterates this point without describing exactly what the children in his Central Asia Institute schools are taught, he is convinced that encouraging literacy is the most effective way to promote trust and understanding.

On the Brink Henry M. Paulson Jr.

This book stands out for the many that have emerged from the most cataclysmic financial crisis since the Great Depression. Hank Paulson, the former CEO of Goldman Sachs, became the U.S Secretary of the Treasury in 2006, less than a year before the financial collapse. ‘On the Brink’ is a first person account of the epicentre of the crisis from a man who made many of the key decisions at lighting speed. This is a fast paced and dramatic account of the people and politics

that came into play during the financial Armageddon of 2007. ‘I'm a straightforward person. I like to be direct with people," Paulson tells the reader early on. His account is just that—straightforward and direct and offers plenty of colour and detail. For those that are interested in what happened, what caused it, and what some of the most brilliant and hardworking financial minds in the world did to prevent a complete financial meltdown, this book is a must.

Task Force Black

by Mark Urban

In this ground-breaking investigation of the UK’s Special Air Service (SAS) in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, Mark Urban has managed to breach the draconian levels of confidently that surrounds the SAS. The Task Force Black is weighed down by the influence of the Ministry of Defence. Yet with obvious access, the author has put together one of the only really authentic accounts of the modern 8 March, 2010

SAS outside the world of fiction. Such an account is very necessary. Occasionally, the perspective of the book seems a rather too aligned with that of the SAS. However, in telling the story of one of the most dramatic and sustained operations in recent military history Urban provides the reader with a better understanding of the conflict from the perspective of those actually engaged in the fighting.

58

Reviews - Readings

Reports Decisions and Deadlines A Critical Year for Sudan

Chatham House January 2010

In less than a year, voters in Southern Sudan, one of the least developed and most war torn places on earth, will vote in an election with has far reaching consequences for the peace and security of the country and the region. The election in January 2011 will take the form of a referendum that gives Southern voters a choice between independent statehood and continued unity with the central government. This

referendum will mark the end of six years of negotiations charted by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

This reports shows that Sudan is entering a crucial period in its history, placing the country's powerful elites under pressure to reach agreement on a wide range of issues. The need for sustained international engagement to ensure that the provisions and principles of the CPA are adhered to is stressed in the report.

Impact of the Economic Crisis and Food and Fuel Price Volatility on Children and Women in the MENA region Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 310 November 2009 Commissioned by the UNICEF Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa, this paper assesses the evidence about the current and potential impacts of the so called ‘Triple F crisis’ on children in the Middle East and North Africa. The shortages of food, fuel, finances are discussed in an analytical framework developed

by ODI to specifically assess the impacts of economic crises on children’s experiences of poverty Issue 1547

and vulnerability. The report also looks at how government and donor policy responses could affect the severity of these impacts. Drawing on in-depth analysis from six countries, the report highlights the diverse ways the economic crisis was experienced in different countries.

Their differing capacities to respond to the social impacts of the financial crisis are shown to be based on preexisting macro-economic health and policy infrastructure.

59

Reviews - Reports

What Next?

The Tough New IAEA Line on Iran Council on Foreign Relations Michael Levi February 19, 2010

In Yukiya Amano’s first report as Director of the IAEA he presents his findings on Iran’s aggressive nuclear enrichment tactics. The Council of Foreign Relations evaluates the importance of this report, and argues that while the stance is strict, current conditions limit the impact of its findings. With the IAEA’s hands tied, it leaves the international community asking “what’s next” in its approach towards Iran.

I

n September of last year the world awoke to the daunting news that Iran had been secretly building a nuclear power plant near the holy city of Qom. Allegations regarding the military potential of the plant—its ability to bring Iran closer to developing nuclear weapons—have since dominated international concerns. Despite talks with the G5 + 1, efforts at curtailing Iran’s interest in developing its 8 March, 2010

uranium enrichment capacities have largely been ineffective. To make matters worse, on February 11, 2010, the 31st anniversary of the Iranian revolution, Ahmedinejad declared that Iran was a nuclear state, capable of producing uranium to a level of 20 percent enrichment.

This announcement rekindled the interest of the international community to discourage Iran from obtaining a nuclear military

arsenal. However, the international community has few tools at its disposal to truly influence the country that appears committed to obtaining nuclear weapons.

Beyond sanctions, the international community has largely relied on the International Atomic Energy Agency to put pressure on rogue states like Iran and North Korea to comply with international non60

Reviews - Reports proliferation agreements. A recent report by the IAEA on the Iranian nuclear program highlights the long held suspicious of Western countries which claim that Iran has largely improved its uranium enrichment capacity to levels that render the creation of nuclear weapons easier.

However, the significance of the report produced by the IAEA is not limited to the new information it has disclosed about Iran’s nuclear program. According to an analysis of the report by the Washingtonbased think tank The Council on Foreign Relations “it is an important indication that under the IAEA’s new Director General, Yukiya Amano, the IAEA will be blunt and forthright with its assessments.”

The report has received a significant amount of attention for its sharply articulated concerns about weaponization activities in Iran. The difference between now and its past allusions to concerns on nuclear armament, is that it “has never elaborated them with the compelling detail that its new report includes.”

For example, the report confirms Ahemdinejad’s claims that Iran completed uranium enrichment to 20 percent, and that the country continued nuclear weapons involvement beyond 2004.

This information is significant as it expands upon American intelligence assessments which argued that Iran had ended its weapons activity in 2003. In addition to this information, the report confirms that Iran is taking a more aggressive approach to its program “by transferring almost all of its low-enriched uranium to a facility where it expects to produce uranium enriched to 20 percent—possibly marking an intent to significantly upgrade its Issue 1547

ability to enrich material.” In other words, the first report by Amano insists that Iran’s behavior is asking for an international confrontation.

The report confirms Ahemdinejad’s claims that Iran completed uranium enrichment to 20 percent The Council on Foreign Relations regards the rhetoric employed by the IAEA as promising for the impetus it might provide the UN Security Council for agreeing on sanctions against Tehran. However, the findings of the report also speak to Iran’s commitment to an aggressive strategy. Consequently, the possibility of a successful sanction implementation program is unlikely. Although and only alluded to by The Council on Foreign Relations, the lack of progress the international community has had in undermining Iran’s nuclear program is a symptom of a greater ailment that plagues the current global order.

Although described as blunt— especially in comparison to the types of reports that were produced under the former director of the IAEA El Baradei—the report is still merely comprised of words.

The harshest statements made in the report are limited to saying that Iran is not implementing the requirements of the IAEA, essential to building confidence in the

“exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions.” While Iran should cooperate and ease concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear program, if we have learned anything from the past talks between Iran and the G5+1 is that Iran is willing to say anything to stall. Whether Iran wants a nuclear weapon or not is not in question.

However, what in question is whether Iran sees an interest in appearing confrontational towards the international community— perhaps to garner support at home where the government has seen signs of its weakness. If it does, even a strongly worded report, or director of the IAEA will be quite helpless in inducing Iran to comply.

True, the assessment of the report will be important for convincing reluctant members of the UN Security Council, namely Russia and China, to support sanctions against Iran. This is astutely recognized in The Council of Foreign Relations’ assessment of the IAEA report. However, the think-tank does believe that targeted sanctions may have a greater impact in the short term.

Yet, the effectiveness of sanctions is also questionable. Even targeted sanctions that undermine the economic capacity of the regime in place will have a limited impact if the government of Iran finds that the costs of a nuclear program outweigh its benefits. While both reports are informative, it would have been interesting to see The Council of Foreign Relations develop policy recommendations that might be more effective than sanctions.

For the full report please refer to:

www.cfr.org

61

The Political Essay

What Will do the Trick?

Sanctions and the Dual Face of the Iranian Oil Industry Many observers claim that sanctions are largely counterproductive. Yet, the era of heavy sanctions seems to be over, and now the talk is all about the so-called “smart sanctions”. The current sanctions that target the Iranian economy and the IRGC in particular have had their effect, albeit a limited one. The key to an Apartheid-like economic isolation of Iran is China, and the vulnerability of Iran lies in its oil industry, the pillar of its economy.

M

uch has been written about the effectiveness of international economic sanctions. After World War II, the official policy of racial segregation in South Africa led to the increasing international isolation of the Apartheid regime. By early 1960s, UN General Assembly economic sanctions—a boycott of South African goods and a refrain of exports to South Africa— together with a UN Security Council arms embargo, formalized international pressure on the South African government. More sanctions followed suit in the 1970s and 1980s, from the UN, the US, the then European Economic Community, the Commonwealth, post-colonial African countries, and international banks, together with a massive disinvestment campaign. This international pressure and South Africa’s increasing political and economic isolation led, first, to a reform of The National Party’s racial policies and negotiations with the black community and, eventually, to its breakdown.

South Africa is a unique case of wide unanimity regarding the justification for tough economic sanctions. It is also a distinct example of sanctions that fulfilled their mission—to pressure the South African government to change its behaviour. In general, economic sanctions are believed to have a contradictory effect as they are more likely to hurt the population than the regime they are meant to target.

It is now a unanimous opinion that Iran’s nuclear programme is not exclusively for civilian purposes. Ahmadinejad’s orders to Iranian nuclear scientists to enrich uranium up to 20%, and the opening of 10 other enrichment plants, together with a reinforced air-defence system leave no room for doubt. As the US leads the effort to impose a new regime of sanctions on Iran, the traditional argument that sanctions don’t work and that sanctions are counterproductive is back to the fore.

Sanctions against Iran are considered counterproductive because they provide the current Iranian regime with an excuse 8 March, 2010

regime, Iranian businessmen are aware that it’s their government’s fault. Sanctions will not overthrow the Iranian regime, but this is hardly the result Americans expect. Yet, smart sanctions not only hurt the intended targets, but also send a strong message of disagreement about Iran’s nuclear intentions, and are thus an important tool for a more muscled diplomacy.

Manuel Almeida to blame the US led sanctions for Iran’s difficult economic situation. They also give a justification for the aggressive posture of the Iranian government against the US, and its refusal to engage in dialogue.

The argument that sanctions against Iran don’t work raises two issues. First, it is important to be specific regarding what type of sanctions are in place, and against what/whom are they directed.

And second, what do these sanctions aim to achieve. The era of heavy sanctions seems to be over, and now the talk is all about the so-called “smart sanctions”.

These sanctions target specific individuals and their businesses—particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose members, by making use of their privileged position, now dominate the Iranian economy. The US Treasury Department has also been targeting specifically the IRGC due its companies close support to the proliferation programme.

As Afshin Molavi from The New America Foundation recently explained to me, in great part as a result of the current sanctions, it is now more difficult to do business in Iran. It is not only IRGC’s companies that are under pressure in Iran. Commercial enterprises in general now face enormous difficulties, especially in securing credit for small trade or large deals. Iran’s commercial growth has slowed down substantially, and sanctions are playing a role in this. And against the argument that the Iranian people will side with the

As Molavi told me, “the current sanctions regime is still limited in its results. Its about the oil, oil is the real vulnerability, and as long as there’s someone buying Iranian oil…China is key then”. And he added, “60% of Iran’s crude oil exports go to Asia.” The importance of China does not lie only in that it is the largest recipient of Iranian oil exports. Iran is in desperate need to reform its oil business infrastructure, otherwise it seriously risks losing its capacity to export oil, the lifeline of the Iranian economy. As far back as 2005, Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh wrote in Foreign Affairs, “The National Iranian Oil Company estimates that $70 billion is needed over the next ten years to modernize the country’s dilapidated infrastructure and is counting on foreign oil companies and international capital markets to provide approximately threequarters of those massive investments.”

Since then, Iran has barely made any progress in this crucial enterprise.

Do sanctions work? The smart sanctions on Iran have worked, at least to a degree.

After another round of failed negotiations and new defiant declarations by Ahmadinejad, Russia has been convinced that sanctions are the way to go. To achieve an Apartheid-like economic isolation, the key for the US is to convince China to participate in the sanctions regime and to look for oil elsewhere. The prospects of this happening do not look as grim as one could expect. According to a recent report of the International Crisis Group, “While China resists tougher UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, it is likely to ultimately come on board but will seek to delay and weaken the West’s desired measures.”

62

Issue 1547

53

8 March, 2010

THE MAJALLA

13