Majalla 1571 - English

Yemen after Saleh

Have the hopes for change in Yemen been realized?

The Price of Union Exploring the deeper economic integration among GCC states

Issue 1572 • April 2012

Established in London 1980

Assad

Apologists How some in the Western media got it wrong with Syria’s dictator Download this magazine to your mobile.

Use your smartphone to scan this code.

TM1572_01_Cover v2.indd 1

04

9 770261 087126 The Majalla

Issue 1572

30/04/2012 14:13

TM1572_02-03_Ad.indd 2

28/04/2012 15:47

TM1572_02-03_Ad.indd 3

28/04/2012 15:47

Credits

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established in 1980 by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al-Toraifi Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Managing Editor Azeddine Senegri Editors Michael Whiting Amy Assad Designer Matt Dettmar Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: enquiries@majalla.com Subscriptions To subscribe to the mobile edition please download from the iTunes App Store Also available at www.issuu.com/majalla Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2012 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

Advertising sana.nafia@alkhaleejiah.com Tel: +44 (0)20 7404 6950 Fax: +44 (0)20 7404 6963 Mobile: +44 (0)7825 888788 Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn London WC1V 7AP

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 82-184 High Holborn London WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337 Tel: +44 (0)20 7821 818 Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310

4

TM1572_04_Credits.indd 4

28/04/2012 15:48

TM1572_05_Ad.indd 5

01/05/2012 10:14

Editorial

Editorial

A

s spring blooms in 2012 the world changing events of 2011 are still defining the political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite all efforts, the crisis in Syria continues with no sign of imminent abatement. With this in mind, The Majalla leads this month with a critique of how Syria is being covered across media outlets, especially in the West. Washington based Hussain Abdul-Hussain provides an analysis of the treatment given to Bashar Al-Assad’s government and reaches some damning conclusions concerning a widespread bias.

No less incendiary than other uprisings in the region, in many ways the forgotten story of the Arab Spring was Yemen. The termination of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s three decades in power brought great hopes to the country, but Bernard Haykel suggests that these hopes will not be realized without real changes to power structures.

Amid the vagaries of unprecedented regional geopolitical shifts, relationships between states are experiencing new stresses and unpredictable stresses. The unlikely rapport between two wannabe power-houses, Iran and Qatar, has therefore come under pressure. Alex Vatanka examines how ties between the two countries may change in light of fluctuating allegiances.

It is not merely international diplomacy that shapes the region however, religion in the Middle East is a powerful guiding influence. With this in mind, Mehdi Khalaji asks how the influential Shi’ite leadership will evolve in the 21st century, and how related tensions will affect the political world.

To complete the circuit of dominant forces affecting the region, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen examines the economic stability of the GCC, in a time of widespread upheaval in the Arab World. The challenges facing the Gulf States may well bring enhanced economic integration and see them develop their status as a global economic hub.

All these analyses and more are available on our website at www.majalla.com/eng, and we welcome you to follow us via Facebook and Twitter.

6

TM1572_06-07_Editorial v2.indd 6

30/04/2012 14:15

Contributors Alex Vatanka Alex Vatanka is a senior analyst at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. Born in Iran, he was from 2001 to 2010 the senior Middle East analyst at Jane’s Information Group. He is also a senior fellow in Middle East Studies at the US Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS).

Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shi’ite groups in the Middle East. He trained as a Shi’ite theologian in Qom from 1986-2000; he has also served on the editorial boards of two prominent Iranian periodicals and produced for the BBC and the US government’s Persian news service. Mr. Khalaji began his journalism career in Qom, first serving on the editorial board of a theological journal Naqd va Nazar, and then the daily Entekhab. He moved to Paris in 2000, where he studied Shi’ite theology and exegesis in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. He currently writes a bilingual English and Persian blog, MehdiKhalaji.com.

Bernard Haykel Bernard Haykel is professor of Near Eastern Studies and director of The Institute for the Trans-regional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, at Princeton University.

He was formerly associate professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern history in New York University's department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Haykel's primary research interests centre on Islamic political movements and legal thought. He has published extensively on the Salafi movement in both its pre-modern and modern manifestations.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States at the London School of Economics (LSE). His areas of research focus on political, economic, military and security trends in the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

His most recent publications include Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and The Transition to the Post-oil Era (Columbia University Press, 2011) and The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge, 2011).

Hussain Abdul-Hussain Hussain Abdul-Hussain has worked for the United States Congressfunded Arabic TV, Alhurra, as a news producer. Prior to joining Alhurra, he worked as a reporter and later as editor for Beirut's The Daily Star. In April/May 2003 he was in Baghdad where he reported on the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Abdul-Hussain has contributed articles to the New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The International Herald Tribune, the USA Today and the Baltimore Sun and has appeared on CNN, MSNBC and the BBC.

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_06-07_Editorial v2.indd 7

7

30/04/2012 14:15

Contents

30

Cover Story Assad Apologists

Politics The Future of the Marjayia: 12 How will the leadership of the Shi’ite

community evolve in the 21st Century?

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– The Odd Couple: Iran and Qatar: Two regional misfits ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Yemen after Saleh: What next for Yemen?

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Remembering Arafat: What happened to the cause?

Condition Growing Numbers at Reyhanli: 38 Human Syrian refugees: Eating rubbish and drinking poisoned water

Candid Conversations Republican Monarchies: Ten Years On 40 Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim,

one of Mubarak’s most outspoken critics

Profile The Compromise Candidate: 44 Amr Moussa

Choice The Mullah and Iran’s 50 Editor’s American Dilemma

Arts Confronting Paradise: 54 The Palestinian artist Laila Shawa

in conversation with The Majalla ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– If These Walls Could Talk: Inside the vaults of Turkey’s past

Critics The Unfinished Revolution: 60 The Voices from the Frontline in the

Global Fight for Women’s Rights ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign

Final Word Is the Egyptian State facing Bankruptcy?

62 The

8

TM1572_08-09_Contents v2.indd 8

30/04/2012 14:17

The Price of Union The Gulf and the global economy

48

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_08-09_Contents.indd 9

Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen explores the economic highs and lows of deeper integration among GCC states in response to the uncertain situation in the Arab World

9

29/04/2012 15:37

TM1572_10-11_Ad.indd 10

29/04/2012 15:38

TM1572_10-11_Ad.indd 11

29/04/2012 15:39

Politics

The Future of the Marjayia How will the leadership of the Shi’ite community evolve in the 21st Century?

In the face of inevitable challenges, Mehdi Khalaji examines shifting influences upon the global Shi’ite community and suggests that the politics of the Middle East could very well be reshaped, in due course, by unfolding tensions.

Mehdi Khalaji

T

he current form of religious leadership over the Shi’ite community, marjayia, was founded in the 1830s when Mohammad Hassan Najafi became the first transnational Shi’ite religious authority (marja) in Najaf, Iraq. Najafi created a universal patronage network through which he received religious taxes and endowment incomes, and appointed religious representatives from Shi’ite cities in Iraq to India.

In the 16th Century, Shi’ite jurists (mujtahids) had established a new conceptual theory describing the relationship between community leaders and Shi’ite worshipers. According to the theory, each worshiper should either reach the highest educational level in Shi’ite jurisprudence (ijtihad) or follow a living person who has attained such a level. The theory of ‘following’ (taqlid) was intertwined with another significant theory, which permitted Shi’ite jurists to receive religious taxes on behalf of the infallible and hidden twelfth Shi’ite Imam. It is believed that this Imam will return at the end of time to establish a just global government. Thereafter, a new form of Shi’ite leadership emerged that both provided the monarchy with legitimacy and was protected by it, but was also financially independent from it.

Ever since then, the marjas have been the highest religious authorities in Shi’ism and are followed by a large number of Shi’ite worshipers on mainly juridical issues. While there is no theological justification in classical Islam for a clerical class, today’s clerical establishment is the principal religious institution in the Muslim world, and especially in the

Shi’ite world. As Mohammed Arkoun (a late modern scholar of Islam) said, “Islam is theologically Protestant and politically Catholic.” In contrast to the papacy and the Catholic clerical institution, the Shi’ite marjayia is quite a recent establishment that was only started about 200 years ago. Another way in which the marjayia differs from the papacy is that the marjayia does not need to be in the hands of a single person. The most important difference, though, is that unlike in the papacy, the marjayia’s authority is personal and not institutional.

Before the 1830s, the Shi’ite leadership was utterly local. Each region had jurists whom the lay people followed, to whom they paid their taxes, and from whom they received religious and juridical advice.

The modern world—especially modern telecommunication and transportation— transformed local Shi’ite leadership into a transnational institution.

The 21st century will witness a new form of religious authority in the Shi’ite community, which is neither local nor transnational. The emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the confluence of religious and political authorities in Iran was a fundamental turning

point. However, the absence of Ayatollah Ali Sistani (B. August 4, 1930) and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (b. July 16, 1939) from the scene would be a benchmark for the new era.

Politics of Marjayia in the Modern Time In theory, Shi’ite jurisprudence tasks a marja with issuing a fatwa, or a religious ruling, but leaves their followers to decide on the applicability of God’s order to specific cases and subjects. For instance, if a marja states that drinking wine is forbidden, it is his follower’s duty to make sure that the liquid inside the glass is not wine but water. Followers should ask their marja only general questions and are responsible for applying his verdict to specific cases on their own. In practice, though, followers ask their marja advice on specific issues and circumstances. Thus, the marja’s religious authority has expanded from jurisprudence to politics and society.

A significant turning point was Mirza Mohammad Hassan Shirazi’s 1891 fatwa that forbade the use of tobacco. This fatwa was a response to Nasser Eddin Shah Qajar of Iran granting the British Imperial Tobacco Company the exclusive rights to produce, sell, and export

It will be interesting to observe how these authorities—the Iranian government (amongst others), clerical figures who lack high religious credentials, lay Islamists, and reformist religious intellectuals—will play a wider and deeper role in politics of Shi’ite community

12

TM1572_12-16_Politics 1.indd 12

28/04/2012 17:51

all of Iran’s tobacco in return for annual royalties. Later, the Shi’ite marjas in Iraq—who were predominantly Iranians—intervened in Iranian affairs by supporting either the pro- or anti-constitutional movement. The founding of Qom Seminary in 1921 was a regarded as a necessary step in creating a powerful clerical establishment inside Iran and decreasing the influence of Iraqbased marjas’ over Iranian society and politics. The Shi’ite marjayia, however, continued to remain a transnational entity. Religiously, a marja’s fatwa is valid for his followers, regardless of where his followers reside.

Since the marja’s authority was transnational and he was not limited in terms of the subject matter he could issue fatwas on, he was free to meddle in politics—especially the politics of countries other than the one in which they resided.

This was deeply problematic. Although the founding of Qom Seminary in the early 20th century partially solved this problem for the Iranian government, it did not fix it indefinitely. The emergence of the Islamic Republic and the repressive policies of Saddam Hussein against

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_12-16_Politics 1.indd 13

The emergence of the Islamic Republic and the repressive policies of Saddam Hussein against the Shi’ite community and its clerical establishments in Iraq diminished the political influence of Iraqi marjas in Iran the Shi’ite community and its clerical establishments in Iraq diminished the political influence of Iraqi marjas in Iran.

Although the Islamic Republic was not able to completely resolve the tension between the clergy and the modern state, the regime’s control over the clerical establishment in the region stole

much of the Shi’ite clergy’s freedom in political affairs. The Islamic Republic has made its clergy the richest in Shi’ite history and enabled them to have access to government and non-government resources that was denied to them in the past. By legitimizing its banking system, the Islamic Republic paved the way for marjas to use banks instead of accumulating cash in their houses. The Iranian regime has also provided exceptional opportunities for clergy to get involved in business. The Internet has also opened the door to a new world for marjas. These modern forces are shaping a new era in Shi’ite leadership.

Characteristics of the New Leadership The first feature of the new era in Shi’ite leadership is that religious authority is separate from political authority. By this, I do not mean secularization or a separation between government and religious institutions. Separation, in this case, means that those clerics who do play a political role and assume political positions are not necessarily marjas or mujtahids. Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon and Muqtada Sadr in Iraq are examples of ambitious clerics who did not study Shi’ite jurisprudence in seminaries enough to be considered a mujtahid.

Consequently—and this is another feature of the new era—marjas’ views on politics have become less important than before. This separation mainly started in the 20th century, when spokesmen and groups promoting Islamic ideology tried to differentiate themselves from the traditional clerical institutions. An example of this trend is Mojtaba Mir Lohi, known as Navvab Safavi, who founded Fadaian-e Islam, the first fundamentalist Islamist group in pre-revolutionary Iran. There were many other militant clerics in Pakistan and the Shi’ite Arab strongholds who were more comfortable working with lay people than the clergy. Their desire to mobilize people differed from that of the marja: while the marja represent the most conservative side of the religious spectrum, the militant clerics’ organization and ideology were motivated by radical political action. Khomeini was a historical exception.

13

28/04/2012 17:51

Politics

From this separation, another characteristic emerges: the eclectic approach of followers to the marjas they followed.

In the past, a follower followed his marja on all issues on which that marja had an opinion. Many political and non-political reasons have led today’s followers to selectively obey the opinions of their marjas. For instance, many practicing female worshipers follow a marja on numerous religious issues but do not follow him on those fatwa which suggest discrimination against women, such as polygamy or the wearing of the hijab.

Many worshipers also distinguish between private religious issues and pub-

Influential non-marja clerics, government agencies, radical lay Islamists, and other type of people will be able to run religious institutions without relying on arrangements with marjas, allowing for dozens of forms of authority parallel to the authority of the marja to emerge

Najaf and Qom: A Celebrated rivalry Despite the fact that the bulk of the world’s Shi’ites are Iranian, only two-thirds of the most senior are based in Iran, and the most celebrated contemporary religious guide is not based there. Instead, the most pre-eminent of the Shia Grand Ayatollahs is based in Iraq, the famous Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. Though born in Iran (he reportedly still speaks with a strong Iranian accent), he has made Iraq his home since he arrived at the seminary in the city of Najaf as a young man in the early 1950s.

It was there he became a protégé of the famed Grand Ayatollah Abul Qassim Khoei, who influenced him profoundly and groomed him as his successor, asking Sistani to take over as prayer leader when he became increasingly physically frail.

Upon the death of his mentor, Sistani inherited his mentor’s religious network and became head of the Najaf seminary.

This demonstrates another facet of the decentralized nature of modern Shia Islamic jurisprudence: the rivalry between the centers of learning in Najaf (in Iraq) and Qom (in Iran). The influence of each has waxed and waned, and each has enjoyed periods of pre-eminence at different times. After years of repression under Saddam Hussein’s regime, Najaf seems to be regaining some of its old influence.

The issue is complicated by disagreements between those who accept the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e-faqih and those who do not, despite the fact it has been the official basis of the Iranian constitution since shortly after the revolution of 1979. Ayatollah Sistani rejects the view that the state should be directly ruled by clerics, as do most Shi’ites worldwide and other Ayatollahs based in Najaf.

He has remained closer to his mentor Khoei’s views, and is relatively more quiescent in regards to politics, though he became an enormously influential political actor after the 2003 invasion.

Some recent reports suggest that the Iranian government, assisted by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, have attempted to maneuver their preferred candidate to succeed Sistani into position in Najaf. That candidate is Ayatollah Shahroudi, former head of the Iranian judiciary. It is difficult to tell if they will succeed, and what the results would be if the ploy works. Who can say that Sistani’s successor will be equally respected by the Shi’ites of Iraq and elsewhere?

Whatever happens in regards to the ideological struggle, both cities will remain amongst the pre-eminent centers of learning in the Shi’a world. Sistani’s popular website is run from Qom, and there will continue to be a flow of students and teachers back and forth between that city and Najaf. But the potential for rivalry will remain as long as the clergy themselves are divided.

lic issues that a marja is not necessarily an expert on. For example, in Lebanon many Shi’ites follow Ayatollah Sistani on issues related to prayer, fasting, hajj, marriage, and divorce, but not on politics. On politics and social issues, they might listen to Hassan Nasrallah, Khamenei, or other political leaders.

Therefore, the relationship between marja and follower has greatly changed, and the follower is not a passive practicing worshiper. Today’s followers, especially women, have much more agency in reshaping the relationship between their community and its leadership.

14

TM1572_12-16_Politics 1.indd 14

28/04/2012 17:51

TM1572_15_Ad.indd 15

28/04/2012 17:49

Politics

Another aspect of the new era is that a marja’s financial resources are no longer confined to religious taxes. In the past, marjas collected religious taxes and endowment incomes, and stocked them in their own houses or those of their representatives. This money was then distributed among the clergy or spent on building and running madrasas, mosques, charities, and so on. Today, marjas can benefit from government aid. They have the economic advantage to run businesses, make investments, and import and export goods. In the past, a marja’s popularity and following was based on his financial capability. Today, this is no longer the case. Khamenei, for example, is the richest marja in the Shi’ite world—not because of his ability to attract followers, but because of his access to government resources. If Sayyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, former chief of the Iranian judiciary, claims to be a marja and opens an office in Najaf , it is not because of his ability to create a vast network of patronage for himself, but rather because tremendous business opportunities were provided to him by the Iranian government. This fundamental change makes marjas more independent of their followers but also more dependent on the economic frameworks set up by governments.

However, marjas have lost their monopoly over religious institutions. Not only does the Iranian government fully control Iran’s clerical establishment (and partially Iraq’s) and other religious institutions, but in the future there will be many religious institutions that marjas will not be able to have any control or supervision over. Influential non-marja clerics, government agencies, radical lay Islamists, and other type of people will be able to run religious institutions without relying on arrangements with marjas, allowing for dozens of forms of authority parallel to the authority of the marja to emerge.

The marjas will remain the representatives of conservative Islam. Due to the ever-changing nature of the Shi’ite community’s social policies, forms of religiosity are constantly evolving. When the religious discourse of the marjas becomes less attractive to the upper-middle and

upper classes, educated women, and the youth, these groups will invent their own religiosity. Reformist discourse created by religious intellectuals, which reemphasizes spirituality and morality over jurisprudence and theology, would consequently be more appealing. However, the marjas will still be a model to follow for millions of Shi’ites who adhere to an unreformed version of Shi’ite jurisprudence. As in Judaism and Christianity, where the orthodox and the catholic respectively continue to live as they have done for centuries alongside several other forms of Christianity and Judaism, conservative Islam—crystalized in traditional clergy—will also survive alongside other forms of Shi’ite authority.

assets would not be transferred to a new marja; therefore, every marja must build up his marjayia from the beginning. This enables more people to take the path of marjayia without the need for being the protégé of a previous marja.

Over the next few decades, the tension between Shi’ites and Sunnis will become a major element in reshaping the politics of the Middle East. Shi’ites in eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Turkey will play a bolder role in the political dynamism of their own country. This change of status coincides with the decentralization of the Shi’ite leadership and a significant reduction in the role of marjas, who represent mostly conservative Shi’ites and influence

Not only does the Iranian government fully control Iran’s clerical establishment (and partially Iraq’s) and other religious institutions, but in the future there will be many religious institutions that marjas will not be able to have any control or supervision over In the new era, marjas will need to act more within the framework of the nation-state. If Sistani does not react to Iranian politics or Bahraini politics, it will be because the marja’s ability to influence other governments or peoples has been significantly reduced. The marjas would prefer to be quietist; otherwise they will be influential only in local politics. Despite the fact that globalization and the Internet would enable marjas to proselytize for their marjayia throughout the world and attract followers and religious taxpayers no matter where they live, the marja institution will ironically become more local. Globalized communication tools allow more jurists to claim marjayia, and the pluralism of marjayia and its competitive nature would be quite unprecedented. The age of the universal marja who could monopolize religious authority is over. Marjayia does not survive by inheritance. When a marja dies, his office will continue to run his charities and other organizations for a while. His

their religious practices more than their social and political behavior. In the future, non-marja authorities will play a greater role. It will be interesting to observe how these authorities—the Iranian government (amongst others), clerical figures who lack high religious credentials, lay Islamists, and reformist religious intellectuals—will play a wider and deeper role in politics of Shi’ite community. Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shi’ite groups in the Middle East. A Shi’ite theologian by training, Mr. Khalaji has also served on the editorial boards of two prominent Iranian periodicals, and produced for the BBC as well as the US government's Persian news service.

From 1986 to 2000, Mr. Khalaji trained in the seminaries of Qom. There he studied theology and jurisprudence, earning a doctorate and researching widely on modern intellectual and philosophicalpolitical developments in Iran and the wider Islamic and Western worlds.

16

TM1572_12-16_Politics 1.indd 16

28/04/2012 17:51

TM1572_17_Ad.indd 17

01/05/2012 10:18

Politics

The Odd Couple

Iran and Qatar: Two regional misfits Iran and Qatar have sustained an unlikely relationship of mutual tolerance for best part of 30 years. But in today’s international climate Qatar have opted to side more and more with their GCC neighbors, while Iran attempts to cope with increased pressures.

Alex Vatanka

Once decent friends Iranian commentators routinely describe Qatar as Iran’s second best friend among the Arab States of the Gulf. Only Oman is said to have been a more dependable friend to the Islamic Republic in the last three decades. Since Iran’s 1979 revolution, Tehran-Doha relations have noticeably avoided the periodic wild swings that have characterized Iran’s bilateral ties with the other Gulf Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. A key Qatari decision made in the early days of the life of the Islamic Republic, which endeared it to Tehran, was its choice not to openly side with Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)—at a time when the likes of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia helped fund Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. Qatar’s stance was at best one of neutrality but it was good enough for Iran and it is still fondly remembered.

Photo © Getty Images

I

ran-Qatar relations face unprecedented uncertainty. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cancelled a planned trip to Doha in November 2011, and anti-Qatari Iranian rhetoric is at an all-time high. From Tehran’s perspective, Qatar has dangerously raised the stakes by spearheading Arab efforts to remove the Iranian-backed regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Damascus. Still, while Iran strongly resents Qatar’s so-called adventurism in Syria, Tehran’s hands are somewhat tied as it ponders a possible alternative approach towards Doha.

The simple fact is that Iran badly wants to maintain whatever entente it still has among Arab countries in an era of ArabIranian tension—and the undeniable rise in tensions between Iran and Qatar have to be viewed in this context.

Tiny Qatar, with the smallest indigenous population among the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, has more recently taken a number of steps to endear itself to the giant neighbor to its north. Perhaps most notably, Qatar stood out as the sole dissenting voice when the UN Security Council passed resolution 1696 in July 2006, which demanded Iran halt its nuclear enrichment activities and imposed sanctions on the country. That was the first UN Security Council vote on Iran’s nuclear program, and there have since been three more censoring Iran.

At the time the Qatari delegate to the Security Council meeting, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, urged “affording diplomacy enough time to guarantee the achievement of a peaceful solution” to the Iranian nuclear controversy. The 2006 Qatari decision is still cited by Iranian foreign policy analysts as a memorable act of Qatari solidarity with Iran. But what is arguably far more telling is Qatar’s position on Iran’s nuclear program since that vote in 2006.

As the Western-led international momentum against Iran built up, Doha very swiftly changed its diplomatic course and put itself in the majority rank and, in December 2006 and March 2007, voted in support of UN resolutions 1737 and 1747 that tightened sanctions on Iran. It was unfortunate that during Qatar’s two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Gulf country had to cast its vote on a critical issue involving a neighbor it earnestly wants to appease on three separate occasions.

When put on the spot Doha showed that its July 2006 vote in support of Iran was a one-off and that Qatar will not veer away from international consensus on big-ticket policy issues.

The same kind of experimental, if not wavering, stance has been evident in Qatar’s position toward Iran on a regional level. For example, while holding the rotating presidency of the GCC in 2007, Qatar famously invited President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend the block’s annual

18

TM1572_18-21_Politics 2.indd 18

28/04/2012 17:51

summit. The significance of the invitation went well beyond symbolism, as it took place at the height of Arab-Iranian tensions amid a lively regional rivalry intensified by the rise of a new Iranian-backed Shia political elite in Iraq. Plenty of reporting and speculation in the Arab media at the time suggested that Doha had acted unilaterally in inviting Ahmadinejad and had done so at the expense of fostering a united GCC front against Tehran.

But as with its earlier 2006 UN vote in support for Iran, Qatar proved to be in no mood to experiment and accommodate Iran when the gravest internal GCC crisis surfaced and Doha once again had to make a fundamental choice. In March of 2011, Saudi and other GCC security forces arrived in Bahrain on the invitation of the Bahraini government as part of efforts to tackle anti-government protests in that country. Qatar did not hesitate to support the GCC military intervention in Bahrain, despite the loud Iranian condemnations and its charges that the predominantly Shia Bahraini protesters faced discrimination at the hands of GCC governments.

Doha had once again clearly demonstrated the limits to its policy of accommodation toward Tehran and that Qatar was, despite its rivalries with other GCC members, firmly anchored in the Gulf regional bloc.

The Rival For the regime in Tehran, the GCC military intervention in Bahrain was a bitter moment. The upheaval in the Arab World was anxiously viewed in Tehran as an opportunity for geopolitical gains. Nowhere would a regime change have pleased the Islamic Republic more than in Bahrain, where many Shia protesters are—by Tehran’s account—said to be ready to accept Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their savior. In the early days of the Bahraini protests Iranian press reported that some Bahraini dissidents had made a direct appeal to Khamenei in a public letter. Hassan Mushaima, leader of Bahrain’s Haq Movement, went as far as touting the idea of an Iranian military intervention in support of the country’s Shia population.

Thus far Bahrain has not fallen to an Iranian fifth-column, but Tehran’s massive media campaign against the Al-Khalifa rulIssue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_18-21_Politics 2.indd 19

ing family in Manama continues unabated.

Among the other GCC states, Saudi Arabia faces the vast brunt of Iran’s fury. Scanning the Iranian regime’s propaganda for the last year shows that for the most part, Qatar was ignored as Tehran assailed the GCC’s intervention in Bahrain.

But Tehran’s concession to Qatar is not infinite. Tehran watched as Qatar joined forces with NATO in toppling the Muammar Qadhafi regime in Libya. Iran was plainly unsettled by this new Western-Arab model for political-military intervention— in which Qatar played a prominent and enthusiastic role—but its criticism of Doha remained largely subtle. The simple reason for Iran holding back at that moment was Libya’s relative irrelevance to Tehran. Qadhafi’s rapprochement with the West since 2003 had created great distance between Tehran and Tripoli, and Iran had little to lose with Qadhafi’s departure.

Libya, however, stood in contrast to another Arab country that found itself in turmoil in 2011: namely Syria. Syria has for over three decades been the bedrock of Iranian power projection into the Arab World. Iran has a clear-cut interest in seeing the regime of Bashar Al-Assad stay in power, and when Qatar opted to emulate the Libyan regime-change scenario in Syria, Iran became unquestionably unnerved.

The response was swift and unmistakable.

The Qatari Al-Thani ruling family found themselves depicted in Iranian information campaigns in the exact same crude terms as the Al-Sauds and the Al-Khalifa’s. Qatar’s rulers were said to be out of touch, illegitimate and peddlers for Western interests in the region. All of a sudden, Iranian state-controlled media became fixated with lambasting social freedoms in Qatar—such as the availability of alcohol in expat and tourist establishments—and the Al-Thani’s were said to be “abandoning Islamic norms and values.” Once decent friends, Tehran was now aiming at the Qatari jugular.

The most damning Iranian charge against Doha is that Qatar is in cahoots with the West to politically transform the Middle East by installing pro-Western regimes in Arab countries that have faced turmoil. This accusation is being repeated publicly and from the highest levels of power. In a greatly publicized interview with Fars News, General Yahya Safavi— the former chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and presently the top military advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei—spoke of the United States having tasked Qatar (together with Saudi Arabia and Turkey) to facilitate anti-Iran forces to come to power in places such as Syria. Esmail Kosari, the Vice-Chairman of the Iranian parliament’s commission on National Security and Foreign Policy, warned that Qatar’s “interference in the internal affairs of other countries will not remain unanswered.” This was in response to Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani’s suggestion that Syrian protesters should be given arms to fight the Al-Assad regime.

In fact, as the Syrian crisis continues, the Iranian state has had to go back in time in order to give credence to its theories about Qatari motivations. In one instance, the website Iranian Diplomacy reported in late 2011 that as early as February 2006 the US and Qatar were planning the political remodeling of the Middle East. The outlet quoted Ali Jannati, Iran’s former ambassador to Kuwait, who suggested that at the time he had attended the “Futures Forum” conference held in Doha it was clear that the US and Qatar were scheming to bring about disruptions in the Arab World.

This attempt to shape regional public perceptions about Qatar has an inevitable byproduct, as it produces a catch-22 moment for Iran’s rulers. Throughout the recent unrest in the Arab World, Iranian leaders have argued that Iran’s 1979 revolution is the model that the Arab masses

Iran has a clear-cut interest in seeing the regime of Bashar Al-Assad stay in power, and when Qatar opted to emulate the Libyan regime-change scenario in Syria, Iran became unquestionably unnerved 19

28/04/2012 17:51

TM1572_20_Ad.indd 20

29/04/2012 15:49

have sought to emulate by rebelling against their leaders. This argument for Iranian-inspired popular uprising comically contradicts the notion that Qatar is one of the principal regional instigators who receive its cues from Washington, but this inept contradiction continues to be part of the narrative told by Tehran.

Some of the most recent Iranian charges against Doha have included accusations that Qatar—together with the other GCC members—has given Israel permission to use the airspace of their countries in an eventual attack against Iran. This represents another drastic turn in relations since as recently as February 2010, when Iran and Qatar signed a defense agreement, or even December 2010, when an IRGC naval fleet docked at Doha’s port as part of a friendly tour.

These days Qatar is instead said to be engaged in an overt effort to recruit Iranian energy experts, using offers of high salaries to give Qatar an edge as the two countries race to exploit the reserves of the world’s largest gas field that they jointly own. Despite the fact that Iran has always lagged behind Qatar in the exploitation of the South Pars/North Field gas field—as it does not have access to Western technology and finances—it is only very recently that Tehran has begun to emphasize the issue.

Iran’s Oil Minister Rostam Qassemi has ordered contractors working on the Iranian side of the field to “work around the clock” to catch up with the Qataris. At times, in statements that evoke memories of the Iraqi justification of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iranian officials speak of Qatari pilfering in the Gulf. Iranian parliamentarian Ahmad Mahdavi told his colleagues that Qatar is taking three times as much gas out of the shared field than Iran. No one in Tehran is calling for the shared gas field to become a pretext for a military conflict with Qatar, but the issue is undoubtedly a lever that Iran knows it can resort to as it looks to shape Qatari calculations about its regional goals.

The Mediator?

Iranian-Qatari relations have largely been about safeguarding the lowest common denominators that brought the two countries together in the first place. A key factor has been Qatari-Saudi rivalry over the years, Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_18-21_Politics 2.indd 21

IRAN

QATAR

Size

18th biggest country in the world. Size of: Alaska

166th biggest country in the world. Size of: Connecticut

Population

78.9 million (2012 estimate.

World ranking: 18th)

1.9 million (approx. 250,000 are Qatari citizens. 2012 estimate.

World ranking: 148th)

GDP per capita

$12,200 (World rankings: 99th) $102,700 (World rankings: 2nd)

GDP real growth rate

2.5% (World rankings: 137th)

18.7% (World rankings: 1st)

Oil reserves

137 billion barrels (World rankings: 4th)

25.38 billion barrels (World rankings: 12th)

Natural gas reserves

29.61 trillion cubic meters (World rankings: 2)

25.37 trillion cubic meters (World rankings: 3)

and Iran’s deliberate strategy to fuel this intra-GCC division in order to weaken the collective strength of the bloc. Iran did not create this Qatari-Saudi split, but has sought to exploit it to the maximum extent. At the moment, it appears this line of thinking is still prevailing in Tehran despite the recent ups and downs in Doha-Tehran relations.

This strategic objective—to keep ties cordial with Qatar and keep Doha in an intense rivalry with Riyadh—is seemingly such an overriding policy for Tehran that it has led to it downplay another hard fact about Qatar: that the country also happens to be a close ally of the US and home to one of the largest American overseas military deployments, the Al-Udeid Air Base.

Meanwhile, some official Iranian voices have gone as far as mentioning Qatar adopt a quite a different role, that of a mediator between the Islamic Republic and Iran’s adversaries such as the US and Saudi Arabia. Amir Mousavi, a former top defense official in Iran told Iranian Diplomacy that as “Qatar has very good relations with the US and Israel” it can “play a very important role in maintaining security and tranquility in the region” by acting as a “mediator to carry West’s messages for Iran and the vice versa.”

Mousavi’s call is not unique. Qatar’s mediation efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia are also noted as useful by many other commentators in Tehran, particularly at tense moments such as the immediate aftermath of the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. At the moment, however, the idea of Qatar as Iran’s trusted go-between

is on very shaky ground and one has to wonder if the ongoing Arab revolutions that began in 2011 can allow former IranQatar relations to continue.

On the issue of the Syrian uprising, the most pressing and consequential question facing governments in the region, Tehran and Doha are the respective cheerleaders of pro and anti-Assad forces. And there are other matters of disagreement, such as Qatari attempts to move Hamas out of the Iranian orbit and Doha’s Afghan mediation efforts, which might lead the Taliban (Iran’s foe) to join the political process at the expense of the Tehran-backed factions.

In their own ways, both Iran and Qatar are regional misfits. They stand out as regional actors due to Iran’s ideological rigidness and Qatar’s knack of latching on to opportunities such as those emerging from the Libyan mayhem. It is also clearly a relationship of two unequals. There are urban districts in the city of Tehran (population 9 million) with a greater number of people than the entire indigenous Qatari population of some 200,000. While they have maintained a mutually beneficial relationship involving a host of regional issues, it is patently clear that the ongoing Arab revolutions have brought a hitherto stable Iran-Qatari understanding to the brink. Alex Vatanka is a senior analyst at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. Born in Iran, he was from 2001 to 2010 the senior Middle East analyst at Jane’s Information Group. He is also a senior fellow in Middle East Studies at the US Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS).

21

28/04/2012 17:51

Politics

Yemen after Saleh What next for Yemen?

After the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh as president of Yemen, hopes for change in the country were high. Given that the power structure hasn’t drastically altered, however, it is still not clear whether these hopes will be realized.

Bernard Haykel even the division of the country. The rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh since 1978 has effectively stripped the country of all institutions: he governed in a highly personalized manner, keeping the government deliberately chaotic and tying all actors directly to the president. Institutions did not matter; rather, what did was whether one was in the president’s favor and a beneficiary of his patronage.

For example, after unification in 1990, Saleh re-tribalized the regions of former South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen). This was intended to dismantle the institutions of this state and create personalized links with new tribal leaders, many of whom engaged in predatory practices by expropriating land and other economic resources in the south. This is one reason why so many southerners feel that Saleh’s rule represented an occupation of their portion of the country, and the reason why some sought to secede.

This dream of separation will remain alive in the south so long as Saleh (or members of his family) remain in power.

And it is this southern sentiment of being dispossessed and misgoverned that has allowed Al-Qaeda, and like-minded groups like Ansar Al-Sharia, to find refuge and support in these regions.

Saleh’s resignation came in the form of a deal to transfer power brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. This deal allowed Saleh to resign in return for immunity from prosecution; however, it did not address many critical issues, such as Saleh’s continuing political role or that of his entrenched and heavily armed rivals.

The army remains divided, and large swathes of the country are under the control of forces not beholden to the central government, such as the northern

regions under the Zaydi Huthis and portions of the south under Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In short, the GCC deal has brought about some political changes in the form of a new government and a new president, but it does not provide an outline or program for the needed structural reforms that will set Yemen on a course towards stability and order.

Furthermore, providing Yemen with much needed economic aid—while per-

Photo © Getty Images

P

resident Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to relinquish his office in November 2011. He formally stepped down in February 2012 in favor of his vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansur Al-Hadi, who is now president.

Saleh remains, however, a major force in Yemeni politics: he is head of the General People’s Congress party, and members of his immediate family retain key positions in the military and intelligence services. Examples include his son, Ahmad, who heads the Republican Guard, and his nephew, Yahya, who leads the Central Security Services.

So far, all signs point to Saleh’s unwillingness to give up his influence, especially as long as his political rivals remain active and in a position to dominate Yemen.

One group of rivals is the Ahmar brothers, of the Shaykhly family of the tribe of Hashid, who are hopelessly divided against one another and unable to rally around one leader.

Another rival is one of Saleh’s relatives and erstwhile ally, General Ali Muhsin, who commands the first division of the Yemeni army. This trio of rivals, each of whom regards it as his right to rule Yemen, will not give up the competition for power unless all are made to simultaneously exit politics. Their continued presence represents a threat to the emergence of a stable political order in the country.

There is one principal question that policy makers in the Gulf region (as well as in the West) must ask themselves: can Yemen pursue stability and development in spite of the presence and influence of these rival forces, or is their departure is necessary for Yemen’s long-term stability?

At present, Yemen is a tinderbox that could easily become an inferno of violence, leading to civil war and perhaps

22

TM1572_22-23_Politics 3.indd 22

29/04/2012 15:48

haps necessary—will not solve the country’s profound developmental problems.

The country struggles with generalized malnutrition and overpopulation, the collapse of all social services, a calamitous decline in water resources, and staggering corruption and government incompetence.

Making matters worse is the fact that the policy of the United States toward Yemen is exclusively focused on Al-Qaeda and the security threat it poses. In practical terms, this means that the US views Yemen through a military prism that involves a combination of training certain units of the Yemeni army and the use of drones and airpower in the fight against Al-Qaeda.

Thus far, this policy has empowered those units under Saleh’s family command, turning many Yemenis against the United States for effectively supporting Saleh’s dynasty, as well as ignoring the real problems of misrule and underdevelopment.

Given the array of problems listed above, where does the solution lie?

There is no simple answer to Yemen’s problems. The political field is highly segmented and the country has few if any functioning institutions.

The solution, if one is to be found, must come from the Yemenis themselves and must involve the creation of a system of rule that unites the different actors around a set of shared goals rather than the zero-sum power struggle in which they are presently engaged.

The regional actors, led by Saudi Arabia, also have a key role to play in helping Yemenis begin the long journey toward stability. The Kingdom is the only country with the intimate historical knowledge, longstanding contacts, and financial and political resources to help initiate the necessary reforms.

These must include finding a way for Saleh, the Ahmar Shaykhs and Ali Muh-

sin to devolve power to other actors who have a cleaner record and reputation.

President Hadi’s ascent to the presidency is a good start, and now is the time to help him build a base of support that is independent of Saleh.

Should the reform of the Yemeni political system fail to materialize, the country would become a failed state and civil war and secession would be a strong possibility. Furthermore, Iran has been offering its support—financial and political—to any dissident Yemeni forces willing to accept it.

This does not bode well for the future, since it might mean another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the battleground in another Arab country. This is the time to prevent this from happening, by supporting a new and reformed political order that represents a clean break from the rule of Saleh and his rivals.

The country struggles with generalized malnutrition and overpopulation, the collapse of all social services, a calamitous decline in water resources, and staggering corruption and government incompetence Bernard Haykel is professor of Near Eastern Studies and director of The Institute for the Trans-regional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, at Princeton University. He was formerly associate professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern history in New York University's department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Haykel's primary research interests centre on Islamic political movements and legal thought. He has published extensively on the Salafi movement in both its pre-modern and modern manifestations.

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_22-23_Politics 3.indd 23

23

29/04/2012 15:48

Politics

Remembering Arafat What happened to the cause?

Yasser Arafat was elected by the Central Council of the Palestine National Council, the governing body of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), to be the president of the proclaimed State of Palestine on 2 April 1989. 23 years later, The Majalla looks at the legacy of Arafat.

Omar Rahman

Photo © Getty Images

W

hen Yasser Arafat assumed leadership of the PLO in 1969, the Palestinians were a people cast into ruin.

Over two-thirds of the entire population of Palestine had been forcibly removed from their homeland during the War of 1948 and dispersed into refugee camps in neighboring countries. The physical remains of their villages and towns were steadily being removed, while the memory of them faded. The backbone of Palestinian society had been shattered and seventy-eight percent of the land was now in the hands of the newly formed state of Israel.

Most importantly, the Palestinians have had no voice. From the time of the British Mandate of Palestine—which in practice began in 1917, although not officially until 1923—the Palestinians have almost never been spoken with directly. Their fate lay in the hands of others, be they the leaders of the various Arab nations, the Hashemite family of the Hijaz, or the Zionists themselves. Even the PLO, which was established by the Arab League in 1964, was largely a conduit for Egyptian control of the various Palestinian liberation factions that had formed in the aftermath of the war.

Arafat was a man obsessed by a single goal: the national independence of his people.

The legacy of Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement, which took control of the PLO shortly after the decisive defeat of the Arabs in Israel in 1967, was the return of Palestinian agency over their own affairs.

This culminated in 1974, when the PLO was recognized by the United Nations as “the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” under his leadership, It was a singular achievement.

“Yasser Arafat revived the Palestinian cause and changed it from an issue of refugees to a cause of people struggling

to be free,” explains Dr. Ahmad Tibi, a Palestinian member of the Israeli Knesset who was an advisor to Arafat from 1993 to 1999. “This is the most important thing that Arafat succeeded in. He brought the Palestinian narrative and the Palestinian suffering to every place in the world.”

Yasser Arafat represents the greatest of contradictions for Palestinians. On the one hand he is the supreme icon of the resistance

and the national movement for liberation, embodying Palestinian political consciousness. He is also the father figure that brought all his Palestinian sons and daughters under one roof—and kept them there.

On the other hand is the legacy of corruption, repression, and unaccountability that Arafat left behind, particularly after initiating the Oslo peace process. His mercurial personality and the desire to be at the

24

TM1572_24-27_Politics 4.indd 24

28/04/2012 17:56

center of all things stunted the formation of the state institutions that he helped to create.

Edward Saïd, the leading Palestinian scholar of his time and a trenchant critic of Arafat, wrote in 1995 that “Yasser Arafat and his Authority use censorship not just to silence and threaten opponents of his policy, but also to hide his past mistakes from discussion and accountability. He accepted an agreement with Israel that said nothing about Palestinian self-determination on the one hand, and tacitly accepted occupation and the settlements on the other.”

Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, a leading Palestinian intellectual and member of the PLO Executive Committee, sees Arafat’s legacy in not so simple terms. “Abu Ammar’s [Arafat’s nom de guerre] legacy is very complex. First of all, politically he is the one who changed course in the sense that he transformed the whole Palestinian national movement from revolution to peace making and reconciliation. Without him public opinion would not have moved in that direction. Second, he represented a symbol to the Palestinian people, always. The national symbol, the father of the nation, a larger-than-life figure, and so on. And he also represents an era in which the one-man-show was important and significant, in which the charismatic leader was the reference for everybody.”

The Leader and the Legend As leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat’s responsibilities were beyond measure and he was constantly maneuvering between rival organizations, the meddling of Arab governments in Palestinian affairs, a populace fractured along hostile geographic lines, and running a clandestine organization that was always in the precarious situation of operating in host countries. Moreover, the PLO was considered for a long time as a terrorist organization by much of the West. The lives of its leadership were constantly being targeted by Israel’s military and intelligence organization, the Mossad.

Indeed, Arafat survived several attempts on his life, including a bombing attack on his headquarters in Tunis that left 73 dead and a plane crash in the Libyan desert of which he was the only survivor. Arafat’s intuition for survival became the source of legend.

“He was really the master of manipulation and control in the sense that he had Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_24-27_Politics 4.indd 25

to balance so many things simultaneously,” says Ashrawi, who knew him from her time as a student in 1969 until his death in 2004.

“I don’t underestimate the tremendous challenges. So, even though he was not perfect, and he made mistakes, he remained a very significant force for change.”

For those closest to him, Arafat was a man obsessed by a single goal: the national independence of his people. He worked endlessly in this pursuit and had no personal life to speak of. He did not even get married until 1990, at the age of sixty-one.

“He was a man of one problem, of one issue, of one case,” says Ahmad AbdelRahman, a long-time Fatah member and companion of Arafat, who described their relationship as “magnetic… He had an obsession with his role. You cannot imagine a man like him. Sometimes we called him mad.”

Arafat was unlike other leaders of his time in many ways. He was known equally for his accessibility as well as his charisma.

His door was always open to his people and it was well known that one could visit him with him ease, day and night.

“He didn’t have any of the trappings of power that the Arab leaders and others wanted: the entourage and the ostentatious display of wealth and privilege and palaces,” explains Ashrawi. “He was living modestly and every time we went to have a meal with him or something he would have 20 or 30 people there, anyone who was around had to come eat. It was a very sort of personal relationship in that sense.”

The PLO in Decline In 1982, an Israeli invasion of Lebanon drove Yasser Arafat and the PLO from their Beirut stronghold to far-off Tunis. For the first time, the PLO was no longer on the border of their homeland, and their fortunes suffered immensely. Arafat tried to return to the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli in 1983, but was driven out once again by a Syrian-sponsored split within Fatah.

“The Syrians were aiming all the time to undermine the PLO position and encourage other Palestinian groups… to declare that they were not part of the PLO,” says Dr. Saad Nimr, professor of Political Science at Birzeit University in the West Bank.

“They were trying to convince them to form a new PLO.”

A story of Arafat from this period displays his savvy as a tactician and political survivor. After leaving Tripoli on a French ship bound to Yemen—a “political freezer” in the words of Arafat—he jumped ship in Egypt while passing through the Suez Canal. At the time, Egypt was being boycotted diplomatically by the entire Arab World for their decision to break with the rejectionist line and make peace with Israel in 1979. Without consulting anyone, Arafat met with Egyptian officials, causing uproar throughout the region.

Explaining his decision to a close PLO member, Arafat said he had to rearrange the table and chairs by flipping them all over. At that time, Egypt did not have a seat at the table, so by breaking the diplomatic isolation he brought Egypt back to the table and gained himself a useful ally in the process.

Nonetheless, It was a period of rapid isolation that reached its peak in 1987, when for the first time the Palestinian question, which had always been at the top of the pan-Arab agenda, was not even brought up for discussion at the Arab Summit held in Amman. Isolated and running out of cash, the PLO leadership began to seriously consider a course that some of its members had raised beginning in the mid-1970s: an agreement with Israel over partitioning the land into two states. At the time, Israel was unwilling to even acknowledge the PLO. The Intifada The opportunity, however, would soon present itself in unexpected fashion. In December 1987, the occupied Palestinian territories erupted into a full-scale revolt that came to be known as the first Palestinian intifada. Although Arafat was wary of Palestinian resistance manifesting outside his direct control, the intifada placed the Palestine question back on the map, and the leader of the PLO returned to prominence.

Arafat used the pressure building on the international community to resolve the conflict as an opportunity to change the fortunes of the PLO by altering the direction of the entire Palestinian national movement. At the Arab League Summit in Algiers in 1988, Arafat declared the establishment of the State of Palestine, and in effect recognized Israel and the two-state solution. He was criticized heavily at the 25

28/04/2012 17:56

Politics

time, including by those who felt he was co-opting the momentum from the first intifada for his own aims.

Over the next few years, Arafat would do what was necessary to get himself to the negotiation table with Israel, from renouncing terrorism to political engineering within the PLO in order to achieve the national mandate to carry out a two-state compromise. It was something that no one other than Arafat was capable of doing.

By the time Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, the PLO was in a position of severe debilitation. Its funds, mainly acquired from the Arab states, had dried up, and strategic decisions— like Arafat’s decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War—had hurt his political relationship with the United States and Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This weakness would further hurt the Palestinians at the negotiating table, as the severe power imbalance between the parties manifested.

The PLO returns When the PLO ‘returned’ to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the Oslo Accords, it was for many of them the first time they had stepped foot on the soil they were fighting for since 1948 or 1967. It was not surprising—albeit a bit ironic—that none of them had ever seen an Israeli settlement in person, or the way these settlements strategically hindered the emergence of what the PLO thought would be their new state.

The ignorance to these facts on the ground, as well as the lack of research, organization and planning, had direct consequences on the negotiations between high-ranking members of the PLO and their Israeli counterparts. The outcome of their dismal performance at the negotiation table were a series of agreements that left the Palestinian community chopped up and compartmentalized, while ensuring that the type of intifada that had forced international recognition of Palestinian self-determination would never happen again.

Azmi Bishara, a well-known former Palestinian member of the Israeli Knesset, speaking in a documentary interview in 1998, said, “I don’t know why people analyze it as if Oslo was supposed to pro-

vide the answer to the crisis of the [Palestinian] national movement. It was supposed to provide the answer to the crisis of the PLO. What is being built here—in the realities that we face—is not a twostate solution, it is a demographic separation without sovereignty. Now demographic separation without sovereignty has one name in history, it is called apartheid. It has no other name. You are separating two groups, one with sovereignty and the other not. This is apartheid, this is not two states.”

Compounding this was the autocratic governing style of Yasser Arafat, which left a terrible legacy of corruption, repression, and unaccountability.

“He didn’t undergo a transformation smoothly from a revolutionary leader into a statesman. It was very difficult for him, particularly to deal with institutions and laws and accountability,” says Ashrawi.

“In many ways he undermined the institutions or didn’t always work within the institutions and the system.”

Although not necessarily corrupt himself, Arafat allowed others around him to be corrupt. When Ashrawi says she posed the question to Arafat as to why he didn’t hold them accountable, he stated plainly that it was out of loyalty to those who had stood behind him when he needed them.

Maybe the most devastating of all, however, was the marginalization of the Pal-

26

TM1572_24-27_Politics 4.indd 26

28/04/2012 17:56

estinian Liberation Organization after the Oslo Process began and the strengthening of the Palestinian National Authority at its expense. Theories abound as to why Arafat might have allowed this to happen.

“Politically it was not wise to marginalize the PLO . . . because the PLO has to be kept as a body just to explore the possibilities of success, to test the intentions of the Israelis, and there is a lot to be tested,” says Dr. Mamdouh Al-Aker, the former head of the Palestine Commission on Human Rights, set up by Arafat in the early days after Oslo.

“Besides that, by marginalizing the PLO—whether intentionally or unintentionally—all Palestinians in the diaspora were marginalized and kept outside the decision-making process,” he adds.

End of the Peace Process By 1999, the year that the interim Oslo Process was supposed to have ended with final-status negotiations, the reality on the ground had deteriorated tremendously.

Average Palestinians felt more isolated and disenfranchised than ever before.

In 2000, US President Bill Clinton and his people were pushing Arafat to attend a hastily-scheduled conference for negotiations at Camp David, but secret prenegotiations between the three sides had yielded little and illustrated to Arafat that the gaps between them were very wide on the final-status issues. Arafat was reluctant to attend.

In the end, a promise from Clinton that Arafat would not be blamed for a potential failure of the talks to yield results persuaded the Palestinian leader to go to Camp David. According to sources close to Arafat and the negotiations, Arafat was tense and afraid to engage out of a fear that Clinton and Israeli President Ehud Barak would gang up on him and force him into an unfair agreement. Indeed, Arafat was not prepared to sign an agreement at Camp David that did not meet full Palestinian expectations and without the support of the Arab World.

After two grueling weeks in July, the Camp David negotiations concluded without an agreement. Clinton reneged on his promise, and Arafat was summarily blamed by both the Americans and the Israelis. As Clinton’s term in office was Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_24-27_Politics 4.indd 27

coming to an end, Arafat began to believe that the next president might be more favorable to his cause.

By 28 September of that year, popular frustration with the failure of the peace process once again erupted into mass protest after Ariel Sharon, the notorious former military general and leader of the right-wing Likud party, sparked a confrontation at the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem. The first few days of unarmed Palestinian demonstrations were met with brutal repression by Israeli police forces that resulted in several deaths and quickly spiraled out of control.

This second intifada was markedly different from the first in terms of the use of violence by Palestinians—it was propelled by armed factions instead of a popular movement. Arafat’s role in this shift has never been clear despite being contested vigorously. According to a source close to Arafat, the Palestinian leader did not initiate the violence, but once it started he did not try to stop it. Indeed, Arafat felt he could use the violence as leverage at the negotiation table under the misguided assumption that the Israelis would bend in the face of a high death toll. Proving this assumption wrong, Ariel Sharon and other Israeli hawks used the violence as a pretext to destroy the Palestinian Authority and its leader after Sharon was elected prime minister in 2001.

By 2002, Arafat’s compound in Ramallah, Al-Muqa’ta, was under siege by the Israeli military and surrounded by tanks, after a massive ground offensive led to the reoccupation of Palestinian cities. For two years he remained a prisoner, until a sudden illness caused him to be evacuated to a hospital in Paris for treatment. On 11 November Yasser Arafat passed away at the age of seventy-five.

The legacy of Arafat Nearly eight years after his death, the Oslo Process that Arafat bequeathed to his people has stagnated and left the Palestinians more trapped and divided than ever before. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are not only geographically disconnected but suffer from an internecine political division between Fatah and Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement that Arafat had, at different times, both coddled and crushed.

Jewish settlements in the West Bank have grown exponentially, and the possibility for a two-state compromise is widely perceived as all but impossible. Palestinian society is now on the precipice of a tremendous challenge: to once again find a means forward for national liberation and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights.

The vehicle for achieving national consensus, the PLO, is barely functioning and its aging leadership is becoming increasingly disconnected from its people. Moreover, as the center of political life shifted to the occupied territories after Oslo, Palestinians worldwide have been cut off completely from participation in the decision-making process. Today, the PLO is in need of serious reinvigoration and reform. Although many of these developments are beginning to manifest, divisions and power struggles within the Palestinian body-politic present a significant obstacle to achieving unity and progress.

Such divisions have plagued the Palestinian people from the beginning of their conflict with the Israelis, yet for decades they had a leader in Arafat that was capable of bringing disparate factions together, however tenuously. No other leader today shares the esteem of Arafat, nor his authority. This includes his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, who continues to be much more of a politician than a populist capable of uniting his people under a common agenda.

Moreover, Palestinians have not fully transitioned out of the shadow of oneman rule and the many complications and failures involved in having the fate of a people tied to the personality of a single leader. Today’s reality is in many ways the reflection of the decision-making of Arafat. Although he secured the right for his people to make their own decisions, he did not always make the right ones himself.

The legacy of Yasser Arafat will continue to reflect this fateful dynamic and the deep complexities of the Palestinian struggle that he embodied. Omar Rahman is a freelance journalist and commentator covering the socio-political issues of the Middle East. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, the Guardian, and Aljazeera among several other international publications.

His website is www.orahman.com

27

28/04/2012 17:56

TM1572_28-29_Ad.indd 28

01/05/2012 10:17

TM1572_28-29_Ad.indd 29

28/04/2012 17:54

Cover Story

Assad Apologists How some in the Western media got it wrong with Syria’s dictator When Bashar Al-Assad became president of Syria upon the death of his father in 2000, Western media hailed him as a young, modernizing reformist who would begin a ‘Damascus Spring.’ The events of the Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria have shown that no lessons have been learned. Though the media always claim to be objective, there some elements whose biases will continue to assist the powerful and unscrupulous in their attempts to pull the wool over the eyes of the public.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain

W

hen Bashar Al-Assad became president of Syria upon the death of his father in 2000, Western media hailed him as a young, modernizing reformist who would begin a ‘Damascus Spring’ that would bring democracy and openness to Syria. The events of the Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria have shown that no lessons have been learned, with the same biases and double standards at work today as they were a decade ago.

This can be traced partly to a challenge that journalists face which is unique to their profession: the need to maintain ‘access’ to sources. Many reporters find themselves facing a stark choice about how far they should court newsmakers to get information. If their relations with their sources become too cozy, they might be forced to compromise on criticizing them. If they remain too distant, they might be cut off from news sources.

In his book Journalism Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2010), Christopher Meyers, a former ambassador and head of the British press watchdog, noted this schism.

He wrote about a journalist’s relationship with a source that would win him access that benefits the public in a way that would not

have otherwise been possible. “Does that friendship therefore not constitute a conflict of interest?” Meyers asked. “I say it does,” he responded, adding that evidence of a public benefit would only be a partial defense. “In a larger sense,” he argued, “the relationship would remain a detriment: the reporting itself is likely to suffer from favoritism.”

According to Meyers, if “the relationship were kept secret it would be a frontal assault on the obligation to reveal circumstances pertinent to important coverage,” and “if disclosed it would set precedents about the relationship between personal ties and coverage,” thus undermining “the confidence of potential sources in the impartiality of the journalist.”

Not everyone in Washington who advocates engagement with Syria has or seeks connections to senior figures in their governments

Patrick Seale, the biographer of late Syrian President Hafez Assad, is a case in point. For him to win unprecedented access to Assad and his court, it would have been inconceivable that Seale would author a book that might have depicted Assad in an unfavorable manner. Those who have read his classic book, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (University of California Press, 1992) might have noticed that while Hafez comes across as the “good guy,” his brother and former righthand man, Rifaat, is shown as an aggressive bully from childhood.

Seale’s book was printed in 1990, a few years after Hafez and Rifaat had fallen out and their forces neared a brutal confrontation. Eventually Hafez prevailed and Rifaat went into exile, hence Seale’s book favors Hafez over his brother. Had the book been written during the heyday of their friendship, say in 1982, there is no doubt that Rifaat would have been painted as good-natured as his elder brother.

Seale, who is still actively commenting on Syrian affairs today, still suffers from what Meyers saw as problematic proximity between the journalist and the person in power, and his commentary suffers from favoritism as a result.

30

TM1572_30-34_Cover Story.indd 30

28/04/2012 17:55

The same conflict of interest highlighted by Meyers impacts not only journalism, but also think tanks whose papers (as some might argue) are supposed to be impartial and written for the benefit of both citizens and decision-makers. Like media outlets, think tanks reflect the interests of their donors and funders, which casts some doubt over their impartiality. Likewise, think tanks (as some would also argue) teeter between acting as impartial study houses and partisan lobby groups, which undermines their policy papers on a wide array of issues, especially on complex topics like those pertaining to the Middle East.

In Washington, despite its low-key presence, the Syrian regime has succeeded in finding supportive voices. The outbreak of unrest in Syria in March 2011 and the subsequent tightening of US sanctions on the Assad regime have not contributed to any significant muting of Assad’s proponents. To understand the reasons behind Assad’s persistence, looking back at how think tanks can also double as advocacy groups might help.

In July 2008, Washington’s Brookings Institution held a panel discussion entitled “Engaging Syria,” five months before the Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_30-34_Cover Story.indd 31

end of Bush presidency. In the aftermath of the murder of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Bush had recalled his ambassador in Damascus, Margret Scobey, and had led the international isolation of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, hoping that pressure would eventually lead to “change in Assad’s behavior.”

Change was coming, but not from Damascus. The slogan of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, “Change We Can Believe In,” was sweeping the United States. Obama had vowed to engage both Syria and Iran, and his promise carried more weight as his Republican opponent John McCain looked increasingly unable to clinch the presidency.

The Brookings panel, headed by the institute’s director, Martin Indyk, consisted of the political analyst, historian, author of several books on modern Syria, Sami Moubayed, Samir Al-Taki, advisor to Syria's prime minister, and Samir Seifan, a consultant. The three were members of the US-Syria Working Group, sponsored by ‘Search for Common Ground’ under Tom Dine.

31

28/04/2012 17:55

Cover Story

While the line-up might have passed for a random selection of experts with diverse views, a closer look—and information that emerged in later years—would show that the panelists were carefully selected. The panelists were not just discussing whether Washington should engage Syria, they were advocating it.

Later revelations would show that Indyk promoted ties between the US and Assad’s lieutenants. The batch of hacked Assad emails, released in 2011, unveiled this connection. “Some close friends of mine will be visiting Damascus from May 25-29, (2010) for tourism,” Indyk wrote to Assad’s advisor, Bothaina Shaaban.

The Americans visiting Damascus, according to Indyk, were “influential people in Washington and I think that you and Walid [presumably Walid Mouallem, Syrian foreign minister] would benefit from meeting them and they would certainly benefit from meeting both of you.”

region, for example towards secular dictatorships such as Assad’s, rather than conservative states such as Saudi Arabia.

Others do it to get scoops, including interviews with the rulers of these two countries. The host of CNN show GPS, Fareed Zakaria—who once inadvertently offended many Saudis by referring to their state as an “800-pound gorilla”— flew to Tehran in October of last year and interviewed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. It seems unlikely the Iranians would have handed such a media scoop to a foreign journalist whose opinion of Iran they deemed unfavourable, a trait they share with governments worldwide.

In the United States today, Zakaria stands out for arguing against a strike on Iran’s nuclear installations, even though he does not go as far as calling for an end to the economic sanctions, which Zakaria believes are biting.

AbuKhalil’s enthusiasm receded when the revolutionary flames found their way to Syria. AbuKhalil goes ballistic when commenting on US press reports on Syria, arguing that they are misguided and undermined by their reliance on Syrian opposition activists.

AbuKhalil spends more time bashing the Syrian National Council (SNC) and calling them names than attacking Assad, whom he often announces as victorious in defeating the rebels. AbuKhalil attacks the SNC’s president, Burhan Ghalioun, and accuses him of being a puppet in the hands of the West and Gulf countries.

Perhaps it never occurred to the professorblogger that his attack is ad hominem, a logical fallacy. If there are defects in the person or the beliefs of Ghalioun or any other member of the Syrian opposition, it does not mean that the entire Syrian uprising demanding an end to the rule of Assad is rotten.

Washington and Western capitals are full of intellectuals, journalists, academics, think tankers, bloggers and activists who—for different reasons—end up propagating the views of anti-Western rulers like Syria’s Assad and Iran’s Ahmedinejad Another leaked email showed Shaaban briefing Assad on a meeting with Turkish Ambassador in Damascus, Omer Onhon.

In July 2011, while Assad’s forces were brutally subduing Syrians demanding an end to his rule, and while Turkish officials were expressing outrage against Assad in public, Onhon privately told the Assad regime that “Sami [Moubayed should] write in the Turkish press to explain the Syrian stance and the need to maintain strategic Syrian-Turkish relations.”

Not everyone in Washington who advocates engagement with Syria has or seeks connections to senior figures in their governments. Amongst them, there are those who are skeptical of the uprising in Syria, not because they believe that Assad’s government is democratic, but because they do not perceive the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states positively. Some liberal intellectuals show biases towards regimes in the

Zakaria has also expressed skepticism about the uprising in Syria. When interviewed by Don Lemon on CNN, Zakaria said that arming the Syrian rebels “would be a very risky move.” He added that Syria “is geographically a difficult place. It’s landlocked. You don’t have the kind of access you had in Libya, [where] there was an eastern part with Benghazi that could be easily supplied from the sea.”

Amongst the many other commentators on Middle East affairs in the United States who do not enjoy Zakaria’s celebrity status, there are some who are more vehement.

Assad AbuKhalil is an example. The Lebanese-born professor at California State University is a columnist with Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese daily newspaper close to Hezbollah. He maintains a blog called ‘The Angry Arab News Service.’ The Egyptian revolution found a staunch supporter in AbuKhalil, yet

Photo © Getty Images

32

TM1572_30-34_Cover Story.indd 32

28/04/2012 17:55

Despite his best efforts and his endless attacks on the Syrian opposition, AbuKhalil is not doing Assad as big a favor as Nir Rosen, even though both use a depressingly outdated “anti-imperial” rhetoric. Rosen does not even notice the contradictions he commits in a single interview.

In February, after having spent four months in Syria legally, on a Syrian visa, Al-Jazeera English interviewed Rosen, who said: “The foreign media has focused on exiled Syrian opposition activists and politicians, but in fact there is a mature and sophisticated leadership on the ground and they are the ones in charge of the uprising... they are not known outside their communities.” To another question, he answered: “On the issue of intervention, as on most issues, it is impossible to generalize about ordinary people in Syria.”

Rosen freely swept all “foreign media” into one, but refused to “generalize about” the Syrian people that he

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_30-34_Cover Story.indd 33

described as diverse and divided. Had Rosen been familiar with Arab debates on the West-East dichotomy, he might have been familiar with not only Edward Saïd’s theory of Orientalism, but also its rebuttal from Syrian philosopher Sadeq Al-Azm. While Said argued that Western views of the Middle East are sweeping generalizations, Al-Azm countered that Saïd himself had committed the mistake he had warned against as he lumped the whole West and its views of the East into one.

Rosen was also wrong when he described those inside Syria as unknown to the West. In Washington alone, there have been dozens of Skype conferences, at think tanks and with Syrian activists such as the brave Razan Zaytouneh, amongst others.

Rosen’s statement on the West’s ignorance of Syria’s events is also untrue.

In Syria, it has been the availability of

accurate and detailed reports from inside Syria, whether on Youtube, Twitter, Facebook or through Skype, that has made it hard for Assad to suppress the uprising or the news of it.

Still, Rosen’s superficial understanding of Syria is not the most troubling aspect of his brand of journalism. The emails published by Al-Arabiya showing Assad’s advisor Hadeel Al-Ali that introduce Rosen as the journalist who had been “mentioning the armed groups” and “trying to represent the Alawites in a good way” are even more worrying.

During his four months in Syria, Rosen had apparently “got his cover” from “Khaled and his people.” Khaled Al-Ahmad, presumably one of Assad's security advisors, emailed Assad describing Rosen as a “trusted source” who “was able to get into Baba Amr” and who had “told me that many Western media delegations [had] entered the area by crossing the Lebanese borders illegally, one of them was a French and a German media delegation.” Khaled’s email also depicted Rosen as leaking news that the rebels in Homs were waiting for an arms shipment, presumably coming from Libya through the Lebanese port of Tripoli.

Rosen later confirmed the correspondence, but insisted that it was his style of journalism. “I lose access as much as I gain it,” he wrote. “Doing your job right often means burning those bridges and later losing access, but that’s part of the process of finding out truths people don’t want to be revealed.”

So Rosen believes he gets one shot when reporting. First he tricks Assad’s associates, then after learning the truth, he “subverts” Assad and “burns his bridges.”

While Rosen’s trickery might be benign, it allowed people like Assad’s Khaled to make use of him, but only after Rosen had published a few pieces proving his status as one of the best Assad apologists in the “foreign media” that he so despises.

Washington and Western capitals are full of intellectuals, journalists, academics, think tankers, bloggers and activists who— for different reasons—end up propagating the views of anti-Western rulers like Syria’s Assad and Iran’s Ahmedinejad.

33

29/04/2012 15:54

Photo © Getty Images

Cover Story

Whether through direct coordination with Assad and his advisors, or through mere superficial knowledge and logical fallacies, these intellectuals end up as Assad apologists, and before they know it, the politically-savvy Assad and his advisors figure out ways on how to use them and give them controlled access to what the journalists believe are scoops.

And whether these intellectuals later burn their bridges with Assad or not, or change their position on supporting the Syrian uprising or foreign intervention or not, becomes irrelevant. What will stick is their unprofessional association with shady people in power, or the exploitation of their ignorance. In both cases, a big question mark looms over their writings, panels and judgment.

In the West, the media tries to live up to certain standards, which does not always mean plain objectivity. There is no doubt that many outlets are boldly partisan and propagate some views at the expense of others. In the US, for instance, compare left-leaning MSNBC to right-leaning Fox News. Neither TV channel tries to hide its sympathies, while the media establishment

The events of the Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria have shown that no lessons have been learned, with the same biases and double standards at work today as they were a decade ago looks approvingly on their pronounced affiliations. What the media establishment— and the audience—seem to detest, however, are ethical violations and distortions.

In cases of ethical violations, internal or external investigations are often conducted.

But this does not mean that investigations automatically lead to the adoption of higher standards. Between now and then, there will emerge journalists, think tankers and academics with different agendas, and many of

them, as shown above, might not only get away with their sub-standard practices, but might find some popularity with this or that segment of readers, viewers or listeners.

The conflict of interest between public service and those who fund it, the dilemma between ethics and access to people in power, and the Arab Spring which saw some self-styled free-thinking intellectuals cherry pick in their support of uprisings, all cast doubt upon the objectivity and standards that some intellectuals claim to possess. Hussain Abdul-Hussain has worked for the United States Congress-funded Arabic TV, Alhurra, as a news producer. Prior to joining Alhurra, he worked as a reporter and later as editor for Beirut's The Daily Star. In April/ May 2003 he was in Baghdad where he reported on the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime.

Abdul-Hussain has contributed articles to the New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The International Herald Tribune, the USA Today and the Baltimore Sun and has appeared on CNN, MSNBC and the BBC.

34

TM1572_30-34_Cover Story.indd 34

29/04/2012 15:55

TM1572_35_Ad.indd 35

01/05/2012 10:20

TM1572_36-37_Ad.indd 36

28/04/2012 17:57

TM1572_36-37_Ad.indd 37

28/04/2012 17:57

Human Condition

Growing Numbers at Reyhanli Syrian refugees: Eating rubbish and drinking poisoned water

The number of Syrian refugees at Reyhanli camp in Antakia, Turkey, is increasing by the day, partly due to the living conditions in their Syrian villages which appear to be worsening. As Andrea Gliotti discovered, some citizens are now eating rubbish to survive.

Andrea Gliotti

W

hile the Syrian regime was carrying out its military offensive on the northern region of Idlib, refugee camps in Turkey were visibly expanding day by day. Official UN figures state there are approximately 17,000 refugees, though the Turkish Red Crescent expects half a million will flee in the coming weeks.

The village of Reyhanli is home to the biggest of the seven camps on Turkish soil. Three weeks ago there were between 2,500 and 3,000 refugees, an average of four or five for each tent, but the number is continuously growing: two days later, according to the accounts of the residents, a completely new sector had been created to host 500 newcomers. Ankara started to transfer those who had lived in the camp for a long time to a new housing complex in the Islahiye district (Hatay) and in the province of Kilis. Alternatively, official Turkish sources claim that the authorities are considering the creation of a buffer zone inside Syria, to avoid absorbing the next migration wave.

The majority of the refugees seem satisfied with the manner in which they have been welcomed by Turkey, despite the frequent blackouts and the complaints of those who have remained with the same clothes for three months, since they cannot afford to buy new ones outside the camp.

Some refugees did not have the time to carry anything with them: “The regime troops are like demons descending over your village,” says Saleh, who arrived one month ago from Al-Atma (Idlib). “We were not even able to pick up IDs and clothes.” The road to reach the border is not an easy one; people flee hoping to avoid landmines planted by the Syrian army and the paths are too muddy to be accessible to cars.

“We walk or ride on young donkeys until we reach the border, where the Turks, God bless them, are there waiting for us,” recalls Abu Wahid, 41, who has been just recovered in Antakiya’s National Hospital, together with his 8-year-old son. According to the father they were both shot during a demonstration, however, since journalists are still banned from autonomously verifying facts inside the country, it is equally probable that Abu Wahid took part in an armed operation.

The camp is a microcosm of different social classes. The wealthiest ones attempt to move outside the tents as they feel they are not impervious or “waterproof ” enough when it comes to the infiltrations of Syrian secret services. Tareq Abdul-Haqq, a 26-year-old activist from Jisr as-Shughur who arrived in Reyhanli nine months ago, told me about a failed plot to kidnap him near the camp: “A car with tinted windows, with the unmistakable plate of the Syrian secret services, approached me and a friend of mine, pretending to ask for information… I ran away a few moments before they got out of the car, but my friend has been caught and I don’t have any news of him so far”.

A few days ago, I was informed of the disappearance of one defector from Dara’a, who had just arrived in the camp from the village of Al-Dana (Idlib), where he was serving in the army. No one has really forgiven Turkish authorities for what they did last September, by handing over to Damascus Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush, the first high-ranking official who defected to the opposition. In February, official Turkish sources finally confirmed the involvement of local intelligence in the kidnapping.

Turkey is neither safe nor economically viable for refugees coming from Idlib, one of the neediest of the Syrian prov-

inces. However, the cost in life in Syria is also increasingly unsustainable: “One kilo of rice used to cost 60 Syrian liras before the revolution, more or less the equivalent of one dollar,” affirms Saleh.

“Now we pay two dollars.”

The defectors and those civilians who chose to embrace guns to join the Free Syrian Army, even face severe inflation on the black market for weapons: “You could get a Kalashnikov bullet with a

Photo © Getty Images

38

TM1572_38-39_Human Condition.indd 38

28/04/2012 17:57

quarter of a dollar before the revolution, now the cost is four dollars,” confirms Abu Bakr, who is leading a handful of soldiers in the ‘Phalanx of the Martyrs of Jabal Al-Zawiyyah (Idlib).’

Humanitarian conditions in Syria are in a state of free fall, even if provinces like Idlib have yet to reach the scale of tragedy of the Homs siege. “In my area electricity is cut every three hours, there is no running water and we need to get it from a spring,” says 25-year-old Farid from AlYounsiyyeh (Idlib), who has been recovering in Antakiya after losing one foot to a landmine while helping his family cross the border. In his village they still receive bread, one loaf per family nearly every day, but it’s not part of government supplies. They rely on a young, local baker working in a remote oven. “There are no hospitals and we avoid them due to the risk of being arrested… No medicines as well… If we don’t find them in

Jisr as-Shughur, we have to go all the way down to Latakia [on the coast],” continues Farid.

There are even worse situations: “Some of us started eating rubbish. Mazout [fuel oil used for heating] is impossible to find and we were warming up ourselves by burning olive trees,” recalls Salahuddin, another young defector from Idlib who arrived a few days ago in Reyhanli. “As a consequence people are cold in their houses, they keep on demonstrating in the streets and they keep on being killed.” In some areas, water reserves are not merely scarce: according to several accounts they need to be defended against poisoning attempts. “Someone started to be affected by hepatitis… It’s the regime poisoning water, so that our village’s popular committees decided to watch over the water tanks,” claims Abu Wahid.

According to some Syrian humanitarian networks, the anguish of refugees is not

over even in the hospitals of Hatay. They are allegedly mistreated by the Turkish Alawi medical staff. “Alawis treat [Sunni] patients really harshly here, some refugees have been wearing the same clothes since their arrival fifteen days ago,” complains Omar, a 25-year-old member of the High Commission for Syrian Relief (HCSR). In Antakiya’s State Hospital, a 20-year-old Syrian patient lamented the bad treatment he endured at the hands of the medical staff by pointing at a hematoma on his right foot. An even more worrisome aspect than the alleged mistreatment they receive is the indicated presence of sectarian divide, which appears to have become enough rooted to stretch beyond Syrian borders. * Where the family name is not indicated, pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of refugees, taking in consideration the habit of the Syrian regime to target the relatives of the expatriates.

There were between 2,500 and 3,000 refugees, an average of four or five for each tent, but the number is continuously growing: two days later, according to the accounts of the residents, a completely new sector had been created to host 500 newcomers Andrea Gliotti is a freelancer who was based in Syria for the first five months of the uprisings in 2011. He received his MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at SOAS, London, and has worked as a coordinator for LIMES, an Italian geopolitical magazine, gathering articles from Syrian activist authors. Andrea has also written for several Italian newspapers, the Lebanese Daily Star, OpenDemocracy and the New Internationalist.

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_38-39_Human Condition.indd 39

39

28/04/2012 17:57

Candid Conversations

Republican Monarchies: A Decade On Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, one of Mubarak’s most outspoken critics

Twelve years ago, the Egyptian-American academic Saad Eddin Ibrahim was arrested and imprisoned by the Mubarak regime after The Majalla published his article “Al-Jumlikiya: The Arab Contribution to Politics in the 21st Century.” Recently, The Majalla caught up with the eminent sociologist and activist.

Safa Azaab

T

welve years ago, the EgyptianAmerican academic Saad Eddin Ibrahim was arrested and imprisoned by the Mubarak regime after The Majalla published his article “Al-Jumlikiya: The Arab Contribution to Politics in the 21st Century,” which discussed the Middle East’s ‘republican monarchies’: dictators who handed power on to their sons.

Recently, The Majalla caught up with the eminent sociologist and activist, and founder of Cairo’s Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies and the Arab Organization for Human Rights, to discuss his relationship with the ousted Mubarak, the Arab Spring, Egypt, and the future of politics in the Middle East.

Mubarak’s Family You were released from prison in poor health. How did you feel on your release, emotionally?

Victorious. I understand the importance of the sacrifices I made for the sake of the cause I am fighting for. In my lectures and discussions, I stress that revolutions and political struggle are no picnic. There is a price that needs to be paid. I paid the price for supporting my principles and not giving up. In my case, giving up would have been easy, as Suzanne Mubarak and both of her sons were my students, the former president used to know me, which would have helped in achieving some kind of conciliation.

How did your relations with the Mubaraks turn sour?

Do you remember the first time you met former president Mubarak?

It was at a party Suzanne threw after her graduation. I was invited with a number of other professors and it was then that I met Mubarak for the first time and we talked about my debates with Suzanne before I knew her true identity. “She used to tell me about your debates with her, which amuses me,” Mubarak said to me.

This was the beginning of my relationship with the Mubaraks. After that, whenever Mubarak needed my help with anything, Suzanne would contact me saying, “The vice president needs your help.”

They were good until my article “The Royal Republic” was published, discussing the thorny issue of succession. The article provoked Mubarak, who forced Suzanne to choose between standing by her husband and supporting her former professor, and it was easy for her to make up her mind. I think if it weren’t for my previous acquaintance with the Mubaraks, I would have suffered more in jail.

Why did you choose to get that close to the Mubaraks in the first place?

Suzanne requested me as her supervisor for her master’s degree. In those days, Mubarak was a vice-president, and she used to introduce herself as Suzanne Salah Thabit, avoiding any mention of her connection to Mubarak. I discovered the truth by chance, and I admit that I respected the fact that she didn’t make use of her status.

Was it true that Mubarak had a ‘feeble’ personality?

Well, no. Mubarak was limited in terms of creativity and thinking capacity, and he didn’t care about changing that. He saw everything like a bureaucrat, as he ran Egypt just to barely keep it going, nothing more. He used to nag me, saying he will give me a ministerial post, and I used to refuse politely, which made him comment: “I know that a salary for a minister is nothing in comparison with your salary paid by the university.”

Assassination Attempt Did you regret writing your controversial article?

Never, as I strongly believe that getting involved in public affairs means you have to cope with the problems that follow, including being attacked, your reputation being tarnished, and even being subject to assassination.

40

TM1572_40-42_Candid Conversations.indd 40

29/04/2012 13:25

Is it true that you were targeted for liquidation?

True. It was the last week of December 1999, when I read a lengthy report in the daily Al-Akhbar, titled “A Man for All Times,” which was full of accusations and attacks against me, saying that I altered my stances from Nasserism to follow Sadat, and that I visited Israel, in addition to having close relations with monarchies. At the end of that day, on my way to home, I had a car accident, and in hospital I learned from my driver that we were hit by a truck that fled the scene after the accident.

How did you know that it was a plot to take your life?

In the wake of the accident I was visited by my dear late friend, the Moroccan writer Mohamed Abed Al-Gabry, accompanied with Adel Hussain from the Labor Party, who was the uncle of the potential presidential candidate Magdy Hussain. Hussain assured me that it was a plot to take my life, stating that he was the subject of a similar plot and so was Moustafa Al-Shardy, the then Editor-inChief of the opposition Al-Wafd newspaper. Hussain revealed to me that the presidency had what he called “Death Squads” to track critics of Mubarak and his family.

Later, I received flowers from the head of State Security, who called me saying: “I am happy that you are safe and sound, Doctor. I assure you that we had nothing to do with that accident.” I then asked about the party involved, and he got nervous and quickly ended the call. When I narrated what happened to Hussain and Gabry, we all agreed it was a plot, and that the Death Squads were real and their mission was to humiliate and insult anyone who crossed the line.

Foreign Funding What do you think of foreign funding for civil society institutions?

To start with, the Ibn Khaldun Center was repeatedly attacked and accused of treason. The Egyptian judiciary cleared our name beyond any doubt. As for the foreign funding debate, I would like to argue that the Egyptian government and military is the major recipient of foreign financial support.

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_40-42_Candid Conversations.indd 41

You mean American aid?

Yes. Is it or isn’t it a foreign aid? It is definitely not divine assistance.

Isn’t the problem one of secret foreign aid?

This issue of secrecy has to be explained, and if it were secret funding, how the state learned about it. Secondly, civil society institutions which get local or foreign funding are subject to supervision by four major entities: the Central Auditing Organization (CAO), the tax authorities, the institution’s board of directors, and finally the entity funding the institution in question. So the question is really what they are doing with this funding, and are they actually supervised and monitored by any of the previously mentioned entities? In comparison, who monitors the military in Egypt when it comes to the American aid? This is one of the major problems hindering the drafting process of the constitution: they didn’t get used to being held accountable.

So why do you think this case was brought into the spotlight now?

It is simply because these institutions are the loudest critics of the military, its performance, and shortcomings. So they were being punished, or why else hadn’t the military discovered such a case before in its 11 months of ruling the country?

The Military Council Obviously, you are not happy with the military council and its performance.

They have their positives, but they are overshadowed by their negatives. The millions who demonstrated asking for the military council to step down was a clear testimony of their failure, after enjoying prestige and a high status in Egyptian society. I published an article asking, “Why is the military not keen to preserve what is left of its status?”

What was the worst mistake made by the military, in your opinion?

Mainly, its failure to impose rule of law and restore security, claiming after each sad chaotic episode that a third party is meeting and plotting in the dark, which is a joke. They never conducted a serious investigation into any of the violence or

rioting. On the other hand, they adopted a tough stance on the so-called foreign funded civil society. This is known in psychology as ‘searching for a scapegoat.’

How do you rate the new parliament?

So far, it can’t get more than five and a half out of 10. It is the most legitimate parliament in the history of Egypt. Also, the performance of the political factions represented in it has been rational so far.

What are the parliament’s points of weakness as you see them?

Mainly showing off during public sessions.

The opening session especially made a very poor impression, instead of assuring the respect for parliament. Doing its job is not everything. The parliament has to win the people’s respect.

Hijacking the Revolution Do you accept a government formed by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), as they enjoy the parliamentary majority?

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) only joined the revolution five days after its outbreak, while the Salafis never took part in it, yet the revolution was totally hijacked

by Islamists. This is not unprecedented in history: it happened before with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Egyptian revolutionaries made a mistake by not forming parties directly following the fall of Mubarak. They refused to take power; they were pure enough to leave the platform early before revolutionary goals were fully fulfilled.

Are you willing to give the MB a chance?

Yes, I am for giving a chance to everyone, as I assume goodness in everyone, until he proves otherwise. I wish the language of suspicion would disappear. Islamists have the right to be given a chance, but they have to learn how to commit to the rules of the game.

Are you optimistic about Egypt’s future under MB rule?

Yes, I think they will follow footsteps of the Turkish Justice and Development Party, which has a long list of achievements and has put Turkey shoulder to shoulder with the biggest economies.

41

29/04/2012 13:25

Candid Conversations

Egypt’s next president What are the best criteria for a president of Egypt?

We are neither looking for an angel, nor a superman. We need a stable, mature person who can act as a role model for this generation and the coming one.

You make no stipulations about having experience or specific political views?

Experience isn’t a requirement. Everyone can learn.

Can Egypt bear a president with minimal experience who will learn by trial and error?

Why not? The youth deserve a chance.

The 1952 revolution was led by young officers. Revolutions all over the world are usually sparked by youth, and they usually take power.

Whom do you support among candidates for president?

I was thinking of running myself to help cure the Egyptian fear complex in this concern, but according to the law I can’t, as I am married to a foreigner. I supported Al-Baradei, who left the race. Then I endorsed Hisham Al-Bastousy, who also left.

I was for Ayman Nour, but it seems his legal status will prevent him from running.

Now I see Abdel Monaiem Aboual Fatouh as the closest candidate to my heart.

He belongs to a different ideological background, so why would you endorse him?

He was an activist during his university years and was jailed for supporting his principles; this makes him dear to me and proves he deserves the presidency. Also he has a great history of union activism, which means an accumulation of knowledge. I had the chance to know him, while I was head of the socialists’ union through Essam Al-Aryan.

Revolutions all over the world are usually sparked by youth, and they usually take power

Secret Meeting Do you believe there is an understanding between the US and the Islamists?

Yes, their meeting with Islamists is a clear sign. When I was visited by foreign diplomats in jail they used to ask me if I could arrange a dialogue with the imprisoned Islamists, which was hindered by the jail administration in accordance with instructions given by the Ministry of Interior.

After getting out of jail, I managed to get both of the two sides to the same table in the Swiss Club located in Embaba, a local neighborhood. These meetings were held three times and attended by Abual Fatouh, Essam Al-Arayan and Gamal Al-Bana, the younger brother of the late Hassan Al-Bana.

What happened during these meetings?

The usual issues were raised about the MB’s stance on the Copts, women, and art. The MB gave assurances on all these issues. Also, now, the MB are doing their best to ease the West’s worries and state that Egypt will not undergo earth-shattering changes.

Troubles of the Arab Spring How do you evaluate the Arab revolutions? They led to military dominance in some cases, the rise of Islamists in others, and chaotic situation in a third group of countries.

This is what Western writers call the ‘Arab Spring.’ Spring is usually known here for its extreme changes and sometimes-troubling weather. What is going on is nothing but the troubles accompanying the spring.

Things are progressing easily in Tunisia, half as easily in both Egypt and Libya, two-thirds as easy in Yemen, a quarter easy in Syria. Generally the Arab Spring is a transformative stage for the Arab world, especially as it came 12 years late.

Why? Because by the late 80s, early 90s, huge transformations were taking place in eastern and central Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Asia. Only the Arab world was left out then, which invited a new term, which has been used for 12 years, namely “Arab Exceptionalism”, as if Arabs are restricted mentally and emotionally.

For years I fought against this Orientalist

classification, explaining in my writings the late emergence of democracies in the Arab world, until the still waters started to move.

Do you see a connection between what is happening in the Arab world now and the term coined by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “creative anarchy”?

No. America is definitely not involved in developments taking place in the Arab world, and which was generated due to longstanding repression. The ousted regimes used to suppress their people by either tarnishing the reputation of activists and revolutionaries, or creating imaginary alien enemies like Israel. Moreover, the security institutions were extremely violent in dealing with people, which created a strong sense of fear and delayed change.

Opposition at that time was very fragile, and more like an individual who throws pebbles that can do little harm. What happened is that the fear barrier was destroyed once and for all, affecting the way we think about the idea of revolution.

After the ‘Republican Monarchies’ As for the demise of the ‘republican monarchies’, what do you think about the future?

I think the number of republics are increasing, while ‘republican monarchies’ still operate in North Korea, a Caribbean country, and of course Syria.

Will the ‘republican monarchy’ in Syria collapse soon?

I think it will collapse from inside with no need for foreign military intervention.

The Syrian opposition refuses foreign interventions, asking for no more than a nofly zone, and the freezing of arms deals and the funds of the Syrian state.

How do you see the Arab future in wake of revolutions?

The fourth wave of revolutions in the world will carry on and disprove the ‘Arab exception.’ Actually, other countries will follow the Arab revolutions as a source of inspiration. Safa Azaab is a television producer and freelance journalist based in Cairo

42

TM1572_40-42_Candid Conversations.indd 42

29/04/2012 13:25

TM1572_43_Ad.indd 43

01/05/2012 10:19

Profile

Photo © Getty Images

The Compromise Candidate Amr Moussa

With the announcement that 10 candidates have been barred the presidential elections in Egypt, more attention is bound to focus on those remaining in the race. One of these is Amr Moussa, a former head of the Arab League and Egyptian Foreign Minister, who launched his campaign for the presidency in April.

T

he competition to be president of Egypt now looks like a three-horse race between Amr Moussa, the ex-Muslim Brotherhood moderate Abdelmonim Abolfotouh, and the Brotherhood’s new candidate Mohamed Morsi, with Moussa seen by many observers as the frontrunner.

Arguably, Moussa has the highest public profile, which could well play in his favor.

The 76-year old married father of two is a veteran politician who has been a fixture at the top of Egyptian politics since the 1990s, when he became Mubarak’s foreign minister after a long career in the Egyptian foreign ministry.

Born in the Cairo in 1936, Moussa entered Cairo University and graduated with a law degree in 1957. The following year he began his career as a diplomat and steadily rose through the ranks, serving in different Egyptian embassies and posts abroad, including a stint at the United Nations, before returning to Egypt to serve as an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He returned to the New York in the early 1980s and spent the next decade there, broken only by a two-year tour of duty as Ambassador to India. He served first as the deputy, then the permanent Egyptian representative to the UN, a job he held until the start of the 1990s. It was in this decade, which saw him elevated to become Egypt’s foreign minister, that he became a relative celebrity in Egypt’s political scene.

Although reportedly personally charismatic, it was his forthright manner of speech and blunt condemnation of Israeli policies that made him wildly popular

amongst the Egyptian people. In fact, that he was immortalized in song, after Egyptian balladeer Shaaban Abdel Rahim released a song with the lyrics ‘I hate Israel, but I love Amr Moussa’ in 2001.

Acquiring such a high public profile may have had an unintended effect on the foreign minister’s career. It was widely rumored in Egypt that President Mubarak, fearing Moussa’s newfound popularity, arranged for him to be neutralized politically by engineering his accession to the top job at the Arab League. Moussa was appointed Secretary-General of the organization in 2001, where he spent another decade.

As Secretary-General, he helped the organization navigate its way through various regional crises and disputes. At the same time, he never denied his own ambitions.

In 2009, he admitted that he was considering running for president, and expressed guarded opposition to the accession of Mubarak’s son, Gamal, to the presidency in a TV interview in 2010. Following the overthrow of Mubarak, Moussa decided that his time had come. He resigned from the Arab League and announced his intention to stand for the presidency as an independent candidate in February 2011.

To date, he has focused mostly on economic development issues in his election campaign, adopting the slogan ‘poverty is our number one enemy.’ He officially launched his campaign in one of Cairo’s poorest neighborhoods, and has organized rallies in several poor rural areas. Among his pledges, he claims that he will reduce poverty levels in Egypt by 20 percent in the next four years, make sharp cuts in the

level of illiteracy, and introduce an unemployment-assistance stipend equal to half the minimum wage.

He has also promised to serve for only one term, and to appoint a vice-president closer to the youthful revolutionaries who did so much to oust Mubarak.

Recent polls suggest he has a good chance, and this has only been enhanced by the recent decision of the national electoral commission to exclude several candidates from the upcoming contest.

One poll, conducted by Al-Ahram newspaper earlier this month, placed Moussa at the top of the list, with a plurality of

44

TM1572_44-45_Profile.indd 44

29/04/2012 13:33

support at 30 percent. He is expected to pick up some of the votes that would have gone to the former vice-president, Omar Suleiman, and perhaps a smaller number from the radical Salafi preacher Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, who trailed him closely in the same poll.

He enjoys some advantages over his rivals. His time at the top of the Egyptian government has gifted him with name recognition and a public image of respectability and experience that might appeal to those who desire stability in the days ahead, a compromise candidate for those who are glad to see the Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_44-45_Profile.indd 45

back of Mubarak but worry about the possibility of radical forces seizing control of the state.

At the same time, this could also hold him back by limiting his support amongst the new, youthful revolutionaries. Foreign Policy magazine called him a “quintessential establishment man.” His ties to the old regime are, after all, strong. Moussa did not reach the top of the Egyptian government by snubbing Mubarak. Ageism may also hinder his chances. In his mid-70s, Moussa may be seen by some as too old to tackle the enormous challenges that he will be faced with.

The first round of presidential elections are due to take place in May. Depending on those results, there may be a run-off the following month. Whoever is elected, they—like Egypt itself—are heading into unknown territory: the new constitution has yet to be written, meaning that the final powers of the presidency are not yet defined. The role of the military in the Egyptian state is also an issue that will have to be resolved, and the economy is in dire shape.

Assuming Amr Moussa gets the job he wants, it is developments in these areas that will determine if he can keep the promises he has made on the campaign trail. 45

29/04/2012 13:33

TM1572_46-47_Ad.indd 46

29/04/2012 13:33

TM1572_46-47_Ad.indd 47

29/04/2012 13:33

Wealth of Nations

The Price of Union The Gulf and the global economy

Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen explores the economic highs and lows of deeper integration among GCC states in response to the uncertain situation in the Arab World.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Photo © Getty Images

T

he six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have emerged as influential regional and international actors over the past decade. Led by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, they have invested heavily in struggling Western economies, built up enormous capital accumulations during the post-2003 oil-price boom, and possess some of the world’s largest conventional supplies of oil and natural gas.

Their relative stability and pro-Western orientation have also enhanced their geostrategic attractiveness as relatively secure places to do business in a volatile region.

Set against this optimistic backdrop, however, is the political upheaval and age of uncertainty affecting the Arab World. Although the uprisings have yet to seriously impact the GCC states (with the significant exception of Bahrain) they have generated a reassessment of the mechanisms of regional cooperation. Last May’s announcement that the GCC would invite membership bids from Jordan and Morocco surprised many observers, while in December Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah suggested a shift toward a ‘single entity.’ This proposal for deeper integration looks set to become reality in an as-yet undefined Arab Gulf Union Council, to be fleshed out at a meeting in May 2012.

At first glance, the GCC states would appear to be well-positioned to move towards closer union. Unlike the 27 member-states of the European Union, they share common linguistic and socio-cultural characteristics and underlying structural similarities in their economies. In addition, they declared a customs union in 2003 and launched a common market in 2008, while in 2009 they formed a Monetary Council as a first step toward an eventual shared currency. That was supposed to launch in 2010, but has been delayed as first Oman, and then the UAE, withdrew from the project.

The hydrocarbons share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose rapidly during the 2000s, from 3 percent in 2002 to 51 percent in 2006 The difficulties experienced by the project for monetary union illustrate some of the challenges of aligning policy and moving toward confederation.

Oman withdrew in 2007 citing issues relating to economic and fiscal convergence. More problematic was the UAE withdrawal in May 2009, the day after the location of the central bank was awarded to Riyadh rather than Abu Dhabi. Their sudden and unexpected departure highlighted the vulnerability of regional institutions to personalised decision-making and policy responses.

Several challenges complicate the move toward greater regional integration, and may even impede the emergence of individual GCC states as world trading hubs. The structural similarities in Gulf economies mean there is at present very little intra-regional trade.

Hence, with the partial exception of the transfer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar to Oman and the UAE via the Dolphin pipeline, the links binding the GCC states to the global economy are far greater than those binding them to each other. Similarly, cross-border GCC labour flows remain small, in spite of the common market declared in 2008. This is because their segmented labour markets mean that most GCC citizens are concentrated in (national) public sectors, while the private sector employs mostly expatriate labourers who are unable to move at will.

By contrast, the importance of the GCC states to the world economy has expanded in the past decade of boom and bust. The cornerstone of GCC trading flows with global partners is oil

48

TM1572_48-49_Wealth of Nations 1.indd 48

29/04/2012 15:26

With the partial exception of the transfer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar to Oman and the UAE via the Dolphin pipeline, the links binding the GCC states to the global economy are far greater than those binding them to each other These new flows, along with other trends such as the steady growth of Gulfbased sovereign wealth funds and their role in recapitalising struggling western economies in 2007-8, became a microcosm of the rebalancing of global geoeconomic power. This revolved around the remorseless eastward shift of the world economic centre of gravity (WECG). Recent research by Professor Danny Quah of the London School of Economics has indicated that the WECG shifted 4800 kilometres to the east between 1980 and 2010, and will move a further 4500 kilometres eastward by 2050. Both geographically and by virtue of their possession of the fuel of world trade, the GCC states are centrally positioned as a pivot around which the shifts in the global economy are taking place.

With the above in mind, the GCC states have succeeded in managing their integration into the global economy on their own terms. Qatar and the UAE, and for different reasons Saudi Arabia, have become regional powers with an international reach.

They have been able to capitalise on their

comparative advantage in oil and gas. More careful policy choices than those made in the 1970s oil price shock have allowed them to project their leverage through sovereign wealth investments across the world.

This story of success is now threatened by the upheavals across the Arab world, and doubtless explains the move toward closer integration. However, such move would be for inward-looking purposes, and hence unlikely to bring a net gain to the outwardfocused GCC economies. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States at the London School of Economics (LSE). His areas of research focus on political, economic, military and security trends in the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. His most recent publications include Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and The Transition to the Post-oil Era (Columbia University Press, 2011) and The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge, 2011).

Photo © Getty Images

and gas. These constitute by far the largest sectors in each GCC economy, as the hydrocarbons share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose rapidly during the 2000s, from 3 percent in 2002 to 51 percent in 2006, on the back of sustained high prices. Moreover, the large-scale economic diversification programmes that developed in this decade also created new links of great value to the global economy. This occurred as the Gulf became a world-leading centre of production for a variety of industries ranging from petrochemicals and aluminium to cement and construction products. By 2008, the GCC accounted for 12 percent of global petrochemical production, as more complex industrial ties developed with emerging and industrialised economies alike.

Linkages also expanded beyond oil and gas, and with major new partners. Significant new agreements with India, China, and East Asian economies represented a diversification of the Gulf States’ interdependencies with energy-importing states.

Importantly, these linkages covered more than just oil and gas, as concerns for food security bound the GCC more closely with food-exporting Asian partners. This growing energy-food security nexus was encapsulated by the General Secretary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Suring Pitsuan, in 2009.

Speaking at the inaugural GCC-ASEAN joint meeting in Bahrain, he stated, “You have what we don’t have, and we have in plenty what you don’t have, so we need each other.”

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_48-49_Wealth of Nations 1.indd 49

49

29/04/2012 15:26

Editor's Choice

The Mullah and Iran’s American Dilemma Amir Taheri

I

n a village near Tehran, a young man is voting as TV cameras record the event for the evening news. Suddenly, the reporter shouts: Cut! The reason? The voter, presented by the TV reporter as a feda’i of the “Imam”, is wearing a T-shirt emblasoned with the US flag and the message: God Bless America.

The footage did not make it to the evening news. But someone with a sense of humour posted it on the Internet for all to see.

Foreign visitors to Iran are struck by the presence of signs and symbols related to the “Great Satan.” Caps bearing logos of US basketball clubs, key rings inscribed with names of American cities, mugs painted in American colours, and posters of American pop stars are everywhere.

For years, opinion polls, some conducted by the Pew Group, have shown that the US is the most popular foreign nation in Iran. There are fewer anti-Americans in Iran than in France.

A strong American presence has been a feature of the Khomeinist regime from the start. Khomeini’s first Cabinet, headed by the late Mehdi Bazargan, included five dual Iranian-American nationals.

In a recent debate in the Islamic Majlis in Tehran, a member claimed to have a list of 400 officials who had US citizenship or “Green Cards”. It was, perhaps, for that reason that a motion to ban dual nationals from public office was buried in the Majlis. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s PR strategist, a dual national, is a former university teacher from Washington.

Inside the US, the Islamic Republic runs lobby groups under different names.

Today, Iranian-Americans number around 1.8 million. There are also thousands of students who may or may not return to Iran. Some Khomeinist officials

send their children to study in the US. And exile dissidents of the regime prefer the US than any other country. More than 200 former Khomeinist officials, including Cabinet ministers, ambassadors, members of the Islamic Majlis, and officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard including at least one general, live in the US as asylum seekers.

And, yet, at least once a year, Iran witnesses a feast of anti-American gesticulations with the burning of US flags and effigies of the US president. Khomeini’s slogan “Death to America!” is exhibited in many government buildings. Official discourse is peppered with bellicose themes against the United States, the only country apart from Israel, to be labeled “enemy” (doshman) rather than adversary.

As a nation Iran has been profoundly Americanophile since the 1940s when US support helped push Stalin’s troops out of northwestern Iranian provinces.

Khomeini’s revolution, however, had to adopt an anti-American profile. The ayatollah had portrayed the Shah as “an American lackey”. He also wanted to deprive the Left of one of its principal themes: hatred for American in the name of anti-Imperialism. A hotchpotch of xenophobia, misogyny, and misunderstood religious concepts, Khomeinism lacked an ideological backbone. It found it in anti-Americanism which, for decades, had filled the intellectual vacuum in other revolutionary movements, from Kim Il-sungism in North Korea to Fidelism in Cuba and, more recently, Chavism in Venezuela

Having obtained Obama’s tacit acceptance of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, Khamenei could declare victory over the nuclear issue and further radicalise his regime by intensifying moves against the US on other fronts, notably Iraq and the Gulf In Iran, America is a national obsession.

Preparing for this article, I went through Tehran newspapers controlled by the office of the “Supreme Guide”. There contained a dozen articles and even more news items concerning US domestic and foreign policies. Of course, some of the items could be classified as anti-American.

However, even those were borrowed from US citizens who have made commerce of anti-Americanism. In other words, the Islamic Republic imports much of its antiAmerican propaganda from the US. So, why is there no thaw in Irano-American relations, frozen since 1979? The answer lies in Iran’s political schizophrenia.

Deprived of its ideological backbone, Khomeinism would fade into nothingness.

As a nation and country, Iran badly needs to re-establish normal ties with the US and end a futile dispute that has kept it out of the international mainstream for a generation. As a vehicle for Khomeinism, however, Iran must remain anti-American if it is to retain its self-worth.

Ali Khamenei, the mullah cast as the “Imam” in Tehran, faces a dilemma: continuing the anti-American course could ruin the country. Ending antiAmericanism could administer the coup de grace to his moribund revolution.

50

TM1572_50-51_Editor's Choice.indd 50

30/04/2012 14:22

ing to acknowledge the Islamic Republic as a regional power.

However, normalisation with US could change the socio-political landscape in the Iran. Queues of Iranians seeking visas at the US embassy in Tehran, a direct American “cultural invasion”, repeatedly denounced by Khamenei, and visits, both as tourists and investors, by millions of Iranians living abroad could create an atmosphere in which Khomeinsim would look out of place.

Khamenei might consider normalisation too risky for the regime. Having obtained Obama’s tacit acceptance of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, Khamenei could declare victory over the nuclear issue and further radicalise his regime by intensifying moves against the US on other fronts, notably Iraq and the Gulf.

That is the North Korean method of

cheat-and-retreat in which a step backwards is followed with two steps forward against “the enemy.”

Which course would Khamenei choose? Though the jury is out my feeling is that he lacks the courage to opt for normalisation. This article was printed in Asharq Alawsat Amir Taheri has written for the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have been translated into 20 languages. He has been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York.

Photo © Getty Images

Khamenei has a choice because, for the first time since the mullahs seized power, the “leader” is in a position to change course. All Khomeinist governments, from Bazargan to Ahmadinejad tried to normalise ties with the US and failed because rival factions sabotaged their efforts. Each faction feared that if its rival settled the “American problem” it would come on top in the power struggle.

With the defeat of the Ahmadinejad faction, Khamenei enjoys a rare moment of supremacy within the regime.

Nevertheless, his position remains unstable and his temporary supremacy may not last long.

He could opt for normalisation with the US, hoping to enlarge his support base.

In Barack Obama, he faces an American president who, like Jimmy Carter, is will-

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_50-51_Editor's Choice.indd 51

51

29/04/2012 15:25

TM1572_52-53_Ad.indd 52

29/04/2012 14:00

TM1572_52-53_Ad.indd 53

29/04/2012 14:00

The Arts

Confronting Paradise

Palestinian artist Laila Shawa in conversation with The Majalla At her recent exhibition at London’s October Gallery, The Other Side of Paradise, Palestinian artist Laila Shawa says “I try to give the two sides of the argument”. Here she speaks to The Majalla about her work, her convictions and her concerns for the region.

Amy Assad

M

e being a Palestinian, I guess, may have something to do with the interest people have in my work.” says internationally-renowned artist, Laila Shawa at her most recent exhibition at London’s October Gallery, The Other Side of Paradise; a visual amalgamation of kitsch and glamour, colorful pop art, Persian miniature paintings and mannequins festooned with plumes and jewels.

On first impression the collection exudes exuberance and opulence. Before long, however, it becomes apparent that this masks a darker subject matter. A jarring, explosive bang from an accompanying soundtrack shatters the illusion, and the disconcerting and bizarre inclusions appear: Israeli drones, screaming faces cleverly disguised, charred dolls and bejeweled headless, limbless, female torsos draped – Rambo-style – in bullet belts and grenades.

Suddenly the impression of this socalled ‘Paradise’ – a reference to historic accounts of Palestine’s idyllic gardens – is one of disturbing illogicality.

“If you live, you see, you become politicized the moment you come from this part of the world.” explains Shawa, who originates from a country where, more often than not, art is instinctively inspired by the Palestinian cause.

Shawa, however, was not always politically motivated in her work. Hailing from a political family – she concedes that they “defined her outlook” – Shawa was born in Gaza in 1940 eight years before the State of Israel was declared to exist in Palestine. Between the 1960s and early 1970s, still in the early days of her career, she felt the political situation around her had become an overused artistic tool, which created in her an aversion to “an exploitation of the Palestinian cause in art.”

Despite her awareness of the “politically charged” environment, she says: “I rejected that because it was more propaganda art, it was more driven by what the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) thought artists should do and I went totally the opposite way.”

Emphasising another conviction, Shawa says “I believe that an artist can only work from direct experience. You have to be directly in a situation to experience it for you to be authentic in your work”.

She adds “Up to that point I hadn’t actually come face-to-face with the Israelis, with the occupation, though in theory the Israelis occupied Gaza in 67, and things started to shift in my head.”

It is for this reason, in conjunction with her fiery intellect, that The Other Side of Paradise and Shawa’s work in general (a few pieces of which were displayed in an adjacent gallery room) concerns itself more with a personal awareness of a situ-

ation, commenting on the deeper, complex issues that exist as a consequence of the unnatural and chaotic state of occupation. “My development is my intellectual development, its my knowledge, its my awareness of the world I live in.” she says.

As a young artist and woman in the Middle East, Shawa “started noticing the dichotomies that existed in Arab societies and to a certain extent the status of women and how women can be manipulated.” Issues affecting women in the Middle East were Shawa’s initial focus – “At that point I remember that it was basically marriage that I was rejecting.” (She subsequently produced a large series of work on prostitution, which also placed the idea of arranged marriages in the region within this context.)- and, along with issues affecting children in Gaza “It’s not just the mental or physical it’s the whole decade of formative years of development that is just gone”, have long since informed her practice.

Shawa has experimented with a variety of media over the years. She was also motivated and informally tutored by a family friend, who worked as a war photographer with the UN photographing refugees. “The eye of a war photographer is very different”. she says “It was very good training.” In 1975, when Shawa was involved in the ambitious building of a cultural center in Gaza, she also became directly involved with daily life under occupation. “I came face to face with Israelis, I was exposed to a great deal of the realities that were happening”.

She did not react artistically, however, until the first intifada of 1987. The inspiration for this, she says, was “a very simple matter. People started writing on the walls of Gaza.” Under occupation, people in Gaza were banned from all forms of media. “So people had to re-

54

TM1572_54-55_The Arts 1.indd 54

29/04/2012 14:20

sort, in order to communicate with each other, to write their political messages on the walls (which were often covered up afterwards), and it made me think, ok, what to do with this.” Accompanied by two bodyguards, dodging arrest by patrolling Israelis, Shawa went around “in the back streets and in the alleyways with the camera, taking pictures at great speed.” She would subsequently produce her series of silk screens and prints, collectively entitled The Walls of Gaza to great acclaim.

Within The Other Side of Paradise, it is not hard to pin point the most disturbing of the pieces. It is the silent looping CCTV footage taken at an IDF checkpoint on the Gaza-Israel border that shows a woman isolated in a security cage, who, while ordered to de-robe, becomes increasingly confused and anguished as she fumbles with an explosive that she clearly has no idea how to detonate. “The subject of Trapped, the core series in The Other Side of Paradise started with a woman suicide bomber,” Shawa explains “And this woman’s story is a very long story”.

Moved by the footage which was aired in a 2007 Channel 4 documentary entitled The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, Shawa, who bought the rights to the film, felt urged to enter her “harrowing” investigation into the still-taboo and complex subject of female suicide bombers in Palestine. It is unsurprising that Shawa’s work has been described as “uncompromising” in its documentation of the region. “It made me want to find out why she failed,” explains Shawa “Her failure intrigued me because I thought if you’re going to be a suicide bomber you’re going to do it properly.”

Shawa discovered that many of the female suicide bombers had been induced into the practice for reasons of honor relating to their families, not only to avoid disgracing or being killed by their families but also achieve the honor associated with becoming a martyr. “I didn’t want to be judgmental in my work” Shawa says emphatically “I wanted to pose the question: are women suicide bombers heroes or are they victims-or are they both? I had to put her in the context of occupation, I had to put her in the context of Gaza being bombed and I had to put her in the context of children being killed.”

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_54-55_The Arts 1.indd 55

The Other Side of Paradise is that context. Among the pieces, Inside Paradise depicts burned dolls that represent children; Another, Gaza Sky on first look are comic book illustrations of airplanes, complete with the ‘Wham!’ visual sound effects. They are in fact, Israeli drones. “I am driven by some guy sitting in an office sitting in front of his computer game, of you like, and deciding to send a drone up to kill hundreds of people. He could be anywhere.” says Shawa.

There are also criticisms of the self-brutalizing responses to this. In a series entitled Trapped I, II and III, still images of the screaming girl from the CCTV footage are placed behind a mesh of calligraphy, or “‘greeking’, to represent the misreading

or miscomprehension, essentially, of religion.” says Shawa. “This interpretation or misunderstanding traps the person behind it, it controls their actions.” The writing is sparse in the first of the three paintings, but becomes denser and denser “until she is completely overwhelmed by her ignorance in her misunderstanding.”

Disposable Bodies, a series of provocatively-decorated mannequin torsos that would not look out of place in an Amsterdam window, is a “tongue-in-cheek criticism of the concept of the suicide bomber.” Paradise Now, a bright blue torso with peacock plumes and dynamite strapped to her thighs, is “ready to go up to heaven, she’s a bird of paradise already. If you look at her body it has all the sexual connotations,” Shawa says, hinting at warped ideals, and the nature of these women as being controlled, dispensable and muted commodities.

Decades after her first foray into the subject, Shawa remains deeply concerned for the female condition in the Middle East: “In the Arab world, rather than advance [women] are being kicked back and controlled, this resurgence of Islam in the wrong context is damaging women to a great extent.”

“Twenty to thirty years ago in Cairo you wouldn’t have seen a veiled woman anywhere. Today 90 percent of the women are wearing veils in Gaza, the same in Lebanon and in Syria – what happened? From being one thing and aspiring towards one thing to being totally invisible-it doesn’t make sense.”

Probing such controversial issues requires courage and strength character.

Indeed, Shawa’s bold and intelligent curiosity is reflected in her extensive and successful four-decade spanning repertoire of work. As she points out, however, her need to comment on the conditions around her is also an intrinsically human one: “The moment you open your mouth and you say I do not accept what is happening to my country you are called an activist. Why are you an activist? You are a normal person who does not accept-a normal person complaining bitterly and adamantly.” Amy Assad is a Syrian-English London based writer, specializing in the Arts and Culture of the Middle East. She received her BA in Arabic and Middle Eastern studies from Leeds University, and has lived and studied in Morocco.

55

29/04/2012 14:20

The Arts

If These Walls Could Talk Inside the vaults of Turkey’s past

Founded in 1856, the Ottoman Bank held a unique position at the centre of the empire. Now SALT, a contemporary art space within its walls, is using the bank’s archives to open Turkey’s history up to the world.

Vedica Kant

T

he contemporary art space SALT is one of—if not the most—spectacular of the recent entrants onto Istanbul’s burgeoning arts and culture scene. While SALT (meaning ‘pure’ in Turkish) has a number of ongoing events—exhibitions, installations, and talks—the space’s permanent collection focuses on the history of the Ottoman Bank, which operated as the central bank of the Ottoman Empire from 1863 until the end of the Empire’s rule in 1918.

This is an apt choice given that SALT’s second location, SALT Galata, is housed in the 120-year-old building that was the erstwhile headquarters of the Ottoman Bank.

It is located on Bankalar Caddesi (Banks Street), a name remnant of the turn of the last century, when the area around Galata was the commercial centre of Istanbul— and indeed the Ottoman Empire.

Founded on 24th May 1856, the Ottoman Bank has a unique history. Set up by a royal charter from Queen Victoria, it was one of the first movers in the nascent banking sector in the Ottoman realms.

Even though British and French shareholders owned the bank, within a period of just seven years it had outstripped any potential competition to become the bank of issue, and therefore the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

An exploration of the history of the Ottoman Empire’s central bank is an interesting project in itself—especially given its complex ownership and the various complications that such a set-up would cause in the years surrounding the First World War. The Museum, however, sets itself a broader aim. Rather than just looking at just institutional history, it uses the Ottoman Bank as a lens through which to view and understand late Ottoman and early republican society.

While Istanbul has been transformed by globalisation and may be seen as a transnational city, it is no longer cosmopolitan in the way that it once was The exhibition was conceived by Dr. Edhem Eldem, a professor in the Department of History at Bogazici University.

He told me that the Bank’s archival materials were first brought to his attention as long ago as 1989 by its then-CEO. He immediately noted the richness of the archives, and in particular the potential of these materials in making an imaginative recreation of the past.

The archival materials were catalogued and used for a series of exhibi-

tions. The idea of a museum to commemorate the Ottoman Bank and preserve its institutional memory came about when the Ottoman Bank merged with Garanti Bank in 2001, thus marking the passing of an historical institution. Though a museum was set up in 2002, the opening of SALT has led to the exhibition’s redesign; it now occupies a permanent space in the vaults of the bank’s buildings.

The Ottoman Bank Museum, says Eldem, is different from most other museums in Turkey in its focus on history and the story of an institution, rather than on a collection of objects. (Although it should be noted that there is one exception: the fabulous bank safes have been wonderfully incorporated into the exhibit. This creates a sense of excitement of entering the most secret and secure area of the bank for the visitor, while also making the safes seem like miniature archives through their use as display cabinets for bank documents.)

56

TM1572_56-57_The Arts 2.indd 56

29/04/2012 14:31

All Accounted For The story is primarily that of the bank’s interactions with society. Foremost among the treasures of the museum is a collection of 6,000 full-length photographs, which the bank maintained of all employees, including about 200 female employees. The Ottoman Bank’s network grew exponentially between the year it was founded and the beginning of the First World War. From just 13 branches in 1870, the bank grew to 89 branches that covered almost the entirety of the Empire in 1913. The photographs are a wonderful visual medium that brings to life the bank clerks, tellers, and managers who display a variety of styles and poses in their workplaces from Tunis to Istanbul to Basra.

Within a short time of its creation, the Ottoman Bank also played an important role in changing the traditional financial habits of the society. The museum showcases client files of not just the Sultans, diplomats and elite, but also ordinary Ottoman citizens. People from diverse professions—grocers, butcher, cobblers, teachers and nannies, even the palace eunuchs—were making use of banking services. Some used the bank for their savings, others had portfolios of just one or two stocks—but this was already a radical modernisation of the financial system.

It is widely acknowledged that the Ottoman commerce and trade were largely conducted by the non-Muslim communities.

The Ottoman Bank documents support this conclusion. In 1920, only 20% of the bank’s employees were Muslim, and most of those were employed as guards and office boys.

Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Christians formed the bulk of the bank staff.

The bank was initially successful in negotiating the uncertainties it faced after World War I in the face of the Mustafa Kemal-led resistance in Anatolia,; however, this composition of its employees would prove a challenge in the early republican period. Once the Turkish Republic came into existence, the rules of employment changed.

Implementing the requirements of the state began with raising the Muslim Turk population among its staff together with their salaries, as well as the obligation to use Turkish as the official language (instead of French) in the bank’s accounting and administrative documents.

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_56-57_The Arts 2.indd 57

This change in official language was particularly negative for the minority communities, not only because it took away the competitive advantage of their knowledge of European languages over the Turks, but also because many of them did not speak Turkish and had to learn the language from scratch. The bank opened Turkish language classes for its nonTurkophone staff, and began systematically favouring Muslims over non-Muslims in its recruitment of Turkish citizens.

From 1927 to 1933, the proportion of Muslim employees rose from 30% to 60%, and their salaries from 23% to 40% of the total salaries paid by the bank. What happened at the bank was a reflection of the larger trends in society. In the bank’s neighbourhood, the commercial and trading district of Galata, these same laws (in addition to more punitive ones that reserved certain professions for Muslim Turks only) would result in the non-Muslim minorities rapidly loosing their monopoly in certain areas of the economy.

What happened at the bank was a reflection of the larger trends in society This systematic and state-led discrimination against minorities in the early republican period has largely remained under the radar, and the museum raises a number of problematic questions about the early republic. Foremost amongst them is the conception of ‘secularism.’ It might be fair to argue that the republican project was in-

credibly contradictory and in reality built on the notion of a Muslim-Turkish nation where the Christian (in particular) and Jewish minorities were greatly disenfranchised by the state, thus leading to their slow but steady emigration from Turkey.

When I asked Eldem about reactions to some of the less state-sanctioned narratives of the museum, he pointedly noted that because history in Turkey is still extremely political, people make conclusions that suit them and even completely dismiss things that have been presented to them that they might not wish to think about. The republic, he said, is now rediscovering the aesthetic benefits of being cosmopolitan.

While Istanbul has been transformed by globalisation and may be seen as a transnational city, it is no longer cosmopolitan in the way that it once was. What has been lost will never come back, Eldem concluded.

Through its documents and images, the Ottoman Bank Museum provides a glimpse— however narrow—into that lost past, allowing the viewer to try and imagine what Ottoman society used to be like and follow the story of how it was changed and eventually became the society that we see today. Vedica Kant is a graduate from the Singapore Management University in Economics and Political Science, she received her MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oxford. She currently lives and works in Istanbul.

57

29/04/2012 14:31

TM1572_58-59_Ad.indd 58

29/04/2012 14:21

TM1572_58-59_Ad.indd 59

29/04/2012 14:21

The Critics

A Revolution worth Completing The Unfinished Revolution: Voices from the Frontline in the Global Fight for Women’s Rights Edited by Minky Worden Seven Stories Press, New York, 2012 Launched on international Women's Day, from the Human Rights Watch (HRW) book series, The Unfinished Revolution presents us with the views of a collection of women who deal with women's issues across the globe.

The aftermath of an Arab Spring was initially a time of joy for the role many women played during those days of revolution. However, from West to East, there is still much to be accomplished. The Unfinished Revolution speaks of an enduring global fight for Women’s rights.

From the Human Rights Watch (HRW) book series, The Unfinished Revolution pres-

ents us with the views of a collection of women who deal with women’s issues across the globe.

They talk of their experiences through the opinions, ideas and stories of the struggle of women and young girls. Some of them are journalists – the foreword is

by Correspondent Christianne Amanpour from ABC News – but most of them are current or former Human Rights workers, longtime activists and advocates committed to women’s causes.

“Women’s rights are human rights” became a powerful and recognized slogan.

These are the words of Charlotte Bunch, an advocate and leader in United Nations (UN) conferences speaking up for women. This was a landmark in the fight for women’s rights, or a “revolution in thinking” as the book states.

The book takes the reader through the entire concept of Human Rights, focusing on the role of Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the first UN Commission on the status of women and who was a key element in estab-

A Lasting Shadow over Libya Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign RUSI, March 19 2012 ‘Short War, Long Shadow’ is a comprehensive RUSI report, released on the anniversary of Unified Protector- the Western military operation against Quadhafi’s regime – that details a final assessment of the seven-month campaign

This report specifically argues that the Libyan operation seems “destined to go down in history, at best, as a strategic footnote.” suggesting that for all the good that occurred, it happened in a “singularly unique moment where the international states, as it were, had aligned in a set of propitious circumstances”. The report further suggests that Libya will provide little in the way of a widely applicable model for future operations, which should be kept in mind as the unfolding crisis in Syria rolls on, and leaves some troubling implications for the future of Responsibility to Protect.

The operation raises serious questions, more specifically, on how the strategic decisions were handled and how the effects of Libya on “NATO, on Britain’s allies, and its diplomacy, will play out as policy makers confront far more serious challenges to British security”.

Michael Clarke, in his chapter, notes that the decision to intervene came from the top down, despite military warnings of risk and its lack of congruency with their new National Security Strategy.

lishing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Eleanor Roosevelt had a special role but she was part of a global movement that fought and still fights to make a better world for other women. The problems are still there, challenging the global society. From domestic violence in Europe to female genital mutilation (FGM) in Iraq, women continue to pursue equality and independence in the social, political and cultural arena.

“Will the women who supported and participated in the 2011 revolutions be pushed aside by military, Islamists, or other leaders, or will they be allowed to take part in governing, in the judiciary, and in making autonomous decisions about their own lives?”

The book raises many questions about whether a revolution by itself is a guarantee of freedom. In the introduction, Minky Worden speaks about revolutions and rights.

It should be an obvious part of the equation, but sometimes it is not that simple.

This has wider implications for how the government’s efficacy will be viewed, especially when seen in light of statements made when they took office- “that Blairite ‘liberal interventionism’ would be reinterpreted in a far more hard-nosed way” and military intervention would be done on a national security basis. Furthermore, this ‘selectivity’ in intervention operations, despite far more pressing issues worthy of intervention that currently exist (Yemen, Somalia), furthers the issue within the Responsibility to Protect debate on neo-imperialist concerns and creates a divide within the Permanent 5 as it harks back to issues of Western superiority.

The report specifically notes how at “home and abroad, a debate quickly flared up over the generous interpretation of ‘all necessary means’ to ‘protect Libyan civilians’ in UN Security Council Resolution 1973”; and that, “whatever the initial intention of the P5, there is little doubt that the operation mutated into a proxy war with regime change as the object”.

However, a criticism to this is that, as D. J. B. Trim purports, “in one sense, all interventions are to bring about a change in a regime: if there was no imperative to change a regime’s policy, there would be no need for intervention in the first place”.

The question concerning regime should then be one of: will the change be by the regime or a change of regime? This bodes more implications for the language used within justifications of interventions and the norms that the R2P is attempting to set. These issues span into a much wider and deeply contested debate over the notions of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and what has been framed as neo-imperialism.

60

TM1572_60-61_The Critics.indd 60

30/04/2012 14:19

The second part of the book, Revolutions and Transitions, focuses on how some revolutions did not mean equal rights for man and women – from the Iranian revolution, to recent years in Iraq and the recent revolution in Egypt, as well as the ongoing struggle of Saudi Women.

“These revolutions alone will not be enough to secure rights for women and might even lead to the weakening of key rights protections.”

Violence against women is one of the main topics covered in the book. Across cultures, countries and continents, violence affects women and girls through its many forms.

It may be rape used as a weapon of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo during armed conflict, or Female Genital mutilation (FGM) in Iraq and Egypt – a practice that provokes lasting physical and psychological wounds in girls as young as 6 yearsold. A road map for rolling back the practice of FGM is described, focusing on Human Rights Watch’s work with a religious fatwa to fight the practice in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Child marriage in Afghanistan affects ten million girls a year – as many as 100 million girls over the next decade if nothing is done to prevent it. The book shows us how a global coalition – the Elders a group of former heads of state and international rights advocates led by Graça Machel and Mary Robinson and founded

by Nelson Mandela – is trying to eradicate this practice. The causes for this enduring practice are social and cultural. Poverty forces families to marry young girls early on, to settle their debts and to protect their honor, forcing them among other things, to give up the right to an education, which in turn compromises their future.

Marrying young can lead to a number of health problems, another issue covered in the book. Furthermore, violence affects women throughout the world and in different ways. Such as, women who are being denied contraception and abortion in Latin America or the ban of burkas and other forms of religious dress in some European countries. According to

Consequently, though, this vision of regime change as imperialistic means future interventions justified by the R2P will come up against more opposition and effect adversely the implementation of R2P, as already seen in the case of Syria.

This then should ignite the people behind R2P to reconsider, or at least reiterate what intervention actually means, and consider whether painting it as a concern for humanitarian responsibility will only lead to further criticisms of western hypocrisy. It seems that what is needed is a wider advocating of arguments made by scholars such as Nicholas Wheeler, John Bew, and Thomas Weiss who suggest that humanitarian action is not “unmasked if it is shown to be the instrument of imperial power”.

Another point of contestation is over the role of the Arab League in conjunction with these forces of ‘intervention’. The report states that the support of the operation by the Arab League was imperative though it was not necessarily supported

Issue 1572 • April 2012

TM1572_60-61_The Critics.indd 61

the author, this represents a clear violation of women’s rights to freedom from discrimination, religious expression and personal autonomy. “Yet many support this ban because they mistakenly believe that such garments always represent a type of forced veiling, even when it is voluntary.”

From East to West, domestic violence is still a serious issue in many European countries. In the western world, the way rape victims are treated in the United States is the big story. Because rape kits go untested and unused within the justice system, the victims’ suffering endures and those guilty are never brought to account for their crime.

The book covers other complex issues such as the trafficking of Asian women and the exploitation of domestic migrant workers. The problems are there and they are as many as diverse, but so are the challenges. As the editor says: “No measure will be more important than whether the unfinished revolution for women’s rights in the region is permitted to take hold and flower.”

by the ‘Arab Street’. This complements current debates over the Arab League being used as a tool of neo-imperialism, or western domination. As previously mentioned, the on-going debate between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention has for centuries created troubles for foreign policy initiatives.

However, it is interesting to note that some statesmen and commentators do not see the two in direct opposition but in fact as part of good governance, with Realpolitik and humanitarian concerns seen as inseparable. That is, regional, or multilateral initiatives to ensure democracy and human rights help to create stability, as it is proven that chaos and danger only spread, thus furthering the instability of a state within its region if it is not dealt with. These notions step into dangerous territory and it is by no means possible to claim to have a solution to the fine balance that is needed between what is seen as neo-imperialism and what is classified by Classic Realists as human nature and inevitable.

Overall, the finding that Libya is its own specific case within a set of specific circumstances remains a strong theory to conclude on. It would be foolish and unwise if not detrimental to assume that what worked for Libya would work elsewhere – and this is a notion that needs to be accepted by high officials but also by the people within the Arab world urging their own revolutions/ rebellions. The ‘Benghazi Scenario’ evidences this.

Language is persuasive and misleading. It is through such reports and research that we can expand our knowledge so as to help “distinguish lies from facts, and propaganda from sound analysis” in order to discover the truth and raise awareness in our world so that policy is driven behind open and public diplomacy.

61

29/04/2012 14:47

Final Word

Is Egypt facing Bankruptcy?

Adel Al-Toraifi

D

uring the first weeks of the Egyptian revolution a lot was said and written about the historic transformation undertaken by the Egyptian youth who defied fear and committed to [political] change. It was said, for example, that the revolution was led by young people far removed from the ideologies or the politicization of traditional parties, and it was also claimed that political forces were no longer holding the reins of power and would now face internal upheaval.

Likewise, a lot was written about the “aspirations” of the revolution, about the need to purge institutions from the remnants of the former regime, and some even went so far as to say that what happened in Egypt would change the face of the region. As for questions about the military carrying out an internal coup, the danger of the Islamists – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood – coming to power, or even the difficulty of economic and security challenges following the collapse of the Mubarak regime – which was moderate when it came to foreign policy – these were all downplayed, and anyone who asked such questions was accused of “living in the past”, for these were the scarecrows of the former regime, and “revolutionary” Egypt would be different!

Those who know Egyptian politics well are now declaring that these concerns and challenges are real, rather than illusions or scare tactics. When we consider Egypt’s political, economic and security situation, we find that the country is facing a critical juncture which threatens its long term stability. The conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and their rivals over the monopoly of power has become clear; the Brotherhood won a majority in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council elections, and put forward two candidates for the presidency having previously pledged not to compete for this position.

The Brotherhood, along with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] is also conducting careful manoeuvres around the constituent assembly.

As for the personalities and individuals who filled Tahrir Square a year ago, heralding their revolution with the slogan “the flower blooms in Egypt”, they seem only to represent a minority in a society where the Islamists and former military figures are competing for the presidency.

If you think that the current political crisis is normal in such circumstances, and that Egypt must pass through a phase of instability in order to achieve the aims of its revolution, think again. The Egyptian economy is witnessing a resounding decline that may impact upon future growth for decades, in a country already suffering from poverty, illiteracy, poor production outputs, and the proliferation of bureaucratic corruption.

The Central Bank of Egypt announced that external reserves have declined to less than $15 billion, i.e. less than the minimum value of three months of imports, according to IMF conditions. Egypt has lost around $20 billion over the last 14 months, whereby the cash liquidity of Egyptian banks has declined from $30 billion before the revolution to $9 billion today, due to the mass transferal of deposits. The government has had to resort to borrowing at the upper limits that local banks are able to provide. Currently, the trade balance deficit for the past year exceeds $10 billion dollars, and in the tourism sector alone Egypt has lost $4 billion, so we can say that the Egyptian budget deficit (in addition to domestic and foreign loans) amounts to 76 percent of the country’s GDP. According to an article by the economist Mohsin Khan – of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington – the economic reforms introduced by the Mubarak regime in 2004 produced steady growth until 2010, and achieved reserves of over $36 billion. These achievements are now about to collapse whereby the decline in foreign investment in important sectors such as tourism, oil and telecommunications, alongside the increase in the trade balance deficit, could push Egypt towards bankruptcy if indicators continue as they are.

Khan argues that Egyptian politicians have perpetuated the status quo and have failed to confront the Egyptian citizens with the facts of the crisis, instead opting to buy time. Egypt is on the verge of an economic crisis that could ravage its currency and eliminate its access to foreign loans, especially with the inflammatory language used by the Muslim Brotherhood – such as Khairat al-Shatar’s recent statements – towards the IMF. As Khan points out, Egypt will first need political stability, then $15 billion in the form of loans, grants and foreign investments in order to correct its economic course.

Some might say that what is happening in Egypt will be resolved in time. When a new president is elected and a new constitution is drafted the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, will be able to put their pragmatic mark – as they claim – on Egypt’s economic and security situation. In my opinion, this is unlikely. The experiences of the last year show that the Muslim Brotherhood’s party is still living in the past, and reveal the bankruptcy of the Egyptian elite, culturally and intellectually, and the shallow nature of the Brotherhood’s vision as it moves to secure power.

As for those who are upset by the criticism of the Egyptian revolution – for emotional and ideological reasons – they should remind themselves that per capita income in post-revolution Iran remains – till this day – lower than it was 33 years ago. There may come a time when some people may excuse the corruption of the Mubarak era, and view the bequeathing of their country to radicals who do not have any vision to modernize their homeland, as a crime.

In reality, the danger in Egypt does not come from economic bankruptcy alone; the Egyptians have always managed to safely navigate through historic lean years, rather the danger comes from the bankruptcy of the ideology and culture of the “Tahrir Square revolution”. All the revolution has done so far is swap a bad regime for a group of radicals who are in reality worse and more dangerous than the former regime. 

62

TM1572_62_Final Word.indd 62

30/04/2012 14:19

TM1572_IBC_Ad.indd 63

01/05/2012 10:21

TM1572_OBC_Ad.indd 64

01/05/2012 10:22