Iraq under the Ba’ath

Gulf Ambition

Arab states in the Gulf have become more adventurous in their foreign policy

Scenarios for Syria

Where will the continuing crisis lead Syria?

Determining the trajectory of the country Issue 1574 • July/August 2012

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Credits

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established in 1980 by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al-Toraifi Business Development Officer Jan Singfield Managing Editor Azeddine Senegri Editors Michael Whiting Amy Assad Designer Matt Dettmar Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: enquiries@majalla.com Subscriptions To subscribe to the mobile edition please download from the iTunes App Store Also available at www.issuu.com/majalla Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

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Editorial

Editorial

T

he political dynamics of the Middle East have changed more in the course of the last eighteen months than in the past ten years.

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003—forced by a US-led military intervention—was the first significant ouster of a Middle Eastern despot in recent history.

Since the end of 2010, the popular uprisings that have swept the Middle East and North Africa have removed from office Zine ElAbedine Ben Ali, Muammar Qadhafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Accordingly, this month in The Majalla, we take a look at the role of the dictator in Middle Eastern politics and try to reveal exactly what goes on in the minds of these men.

Bashar Al-Assad, a president who claims no responsibility for the actions of his security forces, is the latest Middle East ‘strongman’ to come under intense pressure and if Assad were to fall, his Ba’athist government would go the way of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Alex Edwards tells the story of Ba’ath rule in Iraq and how Saddam maintained his grip on power.

Elsewhere the reaction to gigantic geopolitical developments in the Middle East will be as crucial as the developments themselves. With this in mind, Dr. Christian Koch scrutinizes the responses of the Gulf States, especially Qatar, to a newly formed political landscape post-Arab Spring.

James Denslow projects some scenarios for how the Syrian crisis might unfold, and offers options for key actors. Dr. Larbi Sadiki discusses the travails of a Libya without Qadhafi, and questions whether a nascent democratic project may struggle to gain a foothold in an unstable environment.

As ever, all these articles—and more—are available at www.majalla.com/eng. We invite you to visit us online and connect with us on Facebook and Twitter.

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Contributors Alex Edwards Alex Edwards is a PHD candidate at the London School of Economics (LSE) who specialises in American foreign policy in the Middle East

Bryan Gibson Bryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the LSE and specializes in US-Iraqi relations during the Cold War. His PhD thesis is on the US policy toward Iraq and the Kurdish Revolt, 1958-75. He received his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in history and a Bachelor of Social Sciences in criminology from the University of Ottawa, Canada. He is the author of, Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, based on his MA thesis.

Dr. Christian Koch Dr. Christian Koch is the Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center located in Dubai, UAE. Prior to joining the GRC, he worked as Head of the Strategic Studies Section at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi.

James Denselow James Denselow is a writer on Middle East geopolitical and security issues based at Kings College London. He currently writes on Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi politics. He was a contributing author to the book 'An Iraq of its Regions'.

Juliet Highet Juliet Highet is a writer, photographer, editor and curator, Juliet Highet specializes in Middle Eastern heritage and contemporary culture.

Ms. Highet is currently working on her second book, Design Oman, having published her first book, Frankincense: Oman’s Gift to the World, in 2006.

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Contents

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Cover Story Iraq Under the Ba'ath

Politics Hormuz: Iran’s threat to 12 Bypassing close the Strait of Hormuz is nothing

new, and its neighbors have been preparing for this eventuality for decades ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Gulf Ambition: The foreign policy activism of the GCC states ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Beware the American Muslim Vote: US 2012 elections and the American Muslim community

Candid Conversations The Middle East in a G-Zero World: 40 Ian Bremmer: “We will no longer see US global leadership”

Profile The Judo Master of the Kremlin: 44 Does Putin have the moves to resist

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pressure on Russia’s links with Syria?

Wealth of Nations Hedging Bets: The Importance of Economic Diversification for Saudi Arabia

Choice Brotherhood Liberals 50 Editor’s ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Heikal: The Strategic Sheikh

Arts The Arabian Horse: 54 The Equestrianism through the ages

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Still Adoring the Idea: Turkish delight with “muddled pool of hypocrisy”

Critics Living in the G-Zero: 60 The Every Nation for Itself: Winners and

Losers in a G-Zero World ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– The Tunisian Project: Tunisia: Confronting Social and Economic Challenges

Final Word Is Tunisia really an exception?

62 The

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Scenarios for Syria

Where will the continuing crisis leave Syria?

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James Denselow discusses three possible outcomes for Syria’s future

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Politics

Scenarios for Syria

Where will the continuing crisis lead Syria?

There is a commonly-used phrase that says that academics and analysts are better at highlighting problems rather than coming up with solutions. This feature attempts to move beyond a purely descriptive analysis of events in Syria and instead paint a picture of the trajectory of the country, potential scenarios it may experience, and options for key actors.

James Denselow Rebels of the Free Syrian Army

Photo © Getty Images

A

fter over 450 days of protests and an estimated 15,000 reported deaths, there is no sign of Assad’s regime reasserting its control over Syria. Both the US and the EU have signalled their belief that the regime is in a death spiral and that it is only a matter of time before the endgame is reached, with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon accusing it of having “lost its fundamental humanity.” However, the notion of military intervention is off the table. Not only are the Russians and Chinese preventing any movement from within the UN, but with less than 20 percent of their respective publics supporting military intervention, both Washington and London currently have no stomach for military action.

There is no sign of an imminent collapse of the regime, with defections from the military and ubiquitous secret police failing to reach a critical mass for a host of reasons, including the regime’s threat of retribution against defectors’ families.

Syria’s armed forces remain strong, and are thought to number 325,000 regulars with more than 100,000 paramilitary personnel, not to mention the numbers of pro-regime Shabiha. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that while at “the outset of the crisis, many among the security forces were dissatisfied and eager for change; most are underpaid, overworked and repelled by high-level corruption. They have closed ranks behind the regime, though it has been less out of loyalty than a result of the sectarian prism through which they view the protest movement and of an ensuing communal defence mechanism.”

This leaves us with the prospect of continued conflict over the short to medium

term. However, it is important to note that this scenario is not static, and that a ‘wildcard’ event could lead to either the current regime defeating the rebels, or to the regime being successfully overthrown. An internal, high-level coup or assassination, for example, could suddenly bring about an end to regime. In May, opposition elements reported that they had successfully poisoned several senior regime figures including General Hasan Turkmani, an assistant vice president, and Lieutenant General Mohamed Al-Shaar, the minister of the interior. Although the official Syrian Arab News Agency has called the assertions that they are dead “baseless,” the story is a reminder of how unexpected events can come into play. Indeed, reports of the regime preparing to use chemical weapons against the protesters could end opposition and be another catalyst for a change. In February, the opposition reported that Syria’s military had begun

stockpiling chemical weapons and equipping its soldiers with gas masks near the city of Homs. A ‘Syrian Hallabja’ could force a new momentum on building a still non-existent appetite for intervention.

Despite a Chatham House paper speculating that a ‘Syrian Srebrenica’ massacre could act as a ‘tipping point’ for intervention, the reaction to the Houla and Qubair killings proved otherwise. Indeed, Kofi Annan has warned that “mass killings could become part of everyday reality in Syria.”

There is also the prospect of unforeseen regional events, such as a third intifada in the occupied Palestinian territory or an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could lead to a host of ramifications.

The Syrian Opposition The protest movement that began in March 2011 with the arrest of children drawing graffiti in Deraa can be characterised as a battle between courage and fear:

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the courage of people to come out onto the streets and denounce a regime that has ruled with the ‘hegemony of emperors’ for over 40 years, and the resentment against the violence that the regime has deployed as a means of ending protests.

One of the central arguments deployed by the Syrian regime is the false analogy that Assad is the state, and that without him the state would collapse or fragment along the Iraqi-Lebanese lines, complete with chaos and the arrival of Al-Qaeda. This argument is in evidence in all of Assad’s speeches and the ubiquitous posters of the president, often with the words ‘Syria, Assad’ underneath. The words imply that there is no alternative to Assad’s rule.

Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition is both geographically and politically fragmented. This is no surprise, given the lack of political oxygen allowed under the Assad dynasty’s control of the country. The nascent Syrian National Council (SNC), the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Muslim Brotherhood, various franchises inspired by Al-Qaeda, and more independent and organic opposition representing Kurds, students, villages, districts, suburbs, and more, can all be said to be part of the opposition to the Assad regime.

While the choice of a secular Kurd, Abdulbaset Sieda, as head of the Syrian National Council is an attempt to better unite the opposition efforts, significant challenges remain. There is a huge amount of international support for a more effective, representative and united opposition, with the ‘Friends of Syria’ contact group a testament to that. Ultimately, the greatest source of legitimacy for the opposition comes from their actions within the country. The Iraq model of an exiled opposition remains a lesson in how not to support an alternative to a regime. Of course, the difficulties of organising and operating whilst under constant attack from the regime means that it is a huge challenge for the opposition to present a united front. A recent meeting in Bulgaria in May attempted to set up a roadmap to create a common vision and a plan for coordination between a diverse collection of opposition groups, with the aim of developing a mechanism to work together under the umbrella of the SNC while maintaining their autonomy.

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Offer an Inclusive vision Despite the escalating violence in the country, there remains hope that the end of the Assad regime can deliver a new Syria that can better serve all of its citizens. At a recent debate in the British House of Lords, members of a panel were asked how they would ‘save Syria.’ However, instead of focusing on options going forward, debate focused on the role of the Syrian Kurds within the opposition, with one activist claiming that the “regime and the opposition are as bad as each other.”

In order to avoid a post-regime situation characterised by massive internal division, similar to the situation in Libya with its 200 militias, the opposition must present a broad and inclusive vision of a new Syria.

“The Syrian opposition is both geographically and politically fragmented” Sending out a message of progressive inclusivity by adopting a new Syrian flag, rather than the old flag that was used for several decades in the last century, and opening a discussion on changing the name of the country from the ‘Syrian Arab Republic’ to the ‘Syrian Democratic Republic’ could offer a populist statement of intent that would particularly appeal to the Kurds, who comprise 10-15 percent of the population.

A report by the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) warned that “so long as Syria remains a playground for these broader interests, the prospect of a united front geared towards ending the bloodshed remains remote at best.”

The opposition must maintain a ‘Syria First’ strategy that avoids compromising the country’s interests in favour of those of outside powers, but publically explains how it will accept outside support.

Offer an Economic vision An ICG report released in July 2011 stated that “over the past decade, conditions significantly worsened virtually across the board. Salaries largely stagnated even as the cost of living sharply increased.

Cheap imported goods wreaked havoc on small manufacturers, notably in the capital’s working-class outskirts. In rural areas, hardship caused by economic liberalisation was compounded by the drought. Neglect and pauperisation of the countryside prompted an exodus of underprivileged Syrians to rare hubs of economic activity.”

Last month, the Syria Business Forum pledged $300 million towards the Syrian opposition. Wael Merza, secretary general of the opposition Syrian National Council, explained that the “fund has been established to support all components of the revolution in Syria, and to establish a strong relationship with businessmen inside and outside Syria and to protect civilians.”

The opposition should use such support as part of a package of economic pledges for the post-Assad era. Economic incentives could prove particularly attractive as international sanctions begin to bite. The Syria Report published an article highlighting how “the Ministry of Economy has reduced the average weight of a cooking gas cylinder to 10 kg but kept its price unchanged, in effect increasing its cost by some 16 percent, as it battles with continuous shortages.” Meanwhile, Syrian government figures put annual consumer price inflation at 31 percent in April, with residents saying that basic goods such as sugar, vegetable oil and eggs have doubled in price.

Offering an economic vision for the future for the country should focus on the neglected countryside and job creation.

Pre-prepared trade deals with Turkey and the EU, the biggest infrastructure investment scheme in Syria’s history (supported by the Gulf), and joint energy ventures with the Russians and Chinese should allay their strategic fears. Economic plans should also offer a promise to end state corruption and cronyism, with the United Nations, perhaps through the UNDP, providing guarantors and independent government auditing.

Outline post-Assad de-Ba’athification The opposition must learn from Iraq in planning a process of transition and reconciliation that follows the demise of the regime. Naming and shaming senior figures with blood on their hands whilst maintaining as broad an amnesty scheme as possible, and one that is well13

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publicised, is crucial. This could be an important mechanism in encouraging defections and a vital dynamic within the balance of power. Indeed, on 11 June the opposition reported the highest rates of defections within the ranks of the Syrian Army. Hundreds defected in the province of Idlib and the city of Homs, including a strategic air defence battalion armed with anti-air and anti-tank missiles.

state and sectarian nationalism that overlaps into different sects, allowing for a peaceful balance. In contrast, when state nationalism promotes one sect over another it often leads to sectarian tensions and violent clashes.

The opposition should outline an immediate plan for a post-Assad reconciliation process separated from any transition to democratic government.

Improve communications abroad The opposition must understand the nature of conflict fatigue felt by the Western media and public and work creatively to ensure that events are kept on international agenda and high in public imagination.

Reporting from inside the country in June, Sky’s Tim Marshall described the opposition’s “increasingly sophisticated propaganda machine including the use of Skype and YouTube, while government officials rarely appear and rarely give … access to its military.” The FSA is running a rudimentary embedding process, although reports from Channel Four’s Alex Thompson about being deliberately led into a free fire zone show they still have much to learn.

A more immediate action should be to appoint a spokesperson who can respond to the 24-7 global satellite media demands, preferably based in a location inside the country or along the Turkish border.

Meanwhile, expatriates and exiled Syrians continue to produce creative accounts of the situation with two highlights including the Top Goon: Diaries of a Little Dictator puppet show and the play, 66 Minutes in Damascus, which gave Londoners a vision of being under Syrian detention based on a series of first-hand accounts.

“Civil wars are rarely declared, but rather are entered into as a consequence of the failure of politics”

Avoid Sectarian Politics A Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC) report earlier this year warned that “Syria is poised for sectarian conflagration—Allawites and Shia versus the Sunni majority with Druze, Christians, and other groups caught in the crossfire, or making tactical alliances.” The opposition must do its upmost to avoid a sectarian conflict, which would likely have a momentum of its own and fracture any post-Assad society. In his book, Sectarianism in Iraq, Haddad outlined how a perfect equilibrium is needed between

Counter the Al-Qaeda threat On 11 June, British Foreign Secretary William Hague told Parliament that “we … have reason to believe that terrorist groups affiliated to Al-Qaida have committed attacks designed to exacerbate the violence, with serious implications for international security.” The opposition will have to resist temptation to support, facilitate, or—even through inaction—help extremist groups.

While they may offer a tactical incentive in attacks against the regime, they are accelerants of sectarian tensions and their presence allows the regime to defend the idea that the devil you know is preferable to the devil you don’t.

The Syrian Regime The Syrian regime itself is running out of ideas. Authoritarian regimes traditionally use a balance of carrot-and-stick politics to maintain their rule, and the situation today is one in which the regime feels it has deployed more or less all of its carrots and is focusing entirely on different and more brutal uses of the stick.

ECFR Policy Fellow Julien BarnesDacey recently returned from a visit to Syria deeply pessimistic about the situation on the ground, with hopes for a political solution appearing all but dead: “The window of opportunity for a political solution now appears about a millimetre wide, with everything dependent on whether Annan can secure im-

mediate, meaningful concessions from Assad—pretty much the only step that would bring the country back from the abyss. However, this is now a highly unlikely outcome—and not because the regime feels strong, but by contrast because it appears to feel weak.”

Assad’s ‘carrots’ have included more rights and citizenship for the Kurds, the end of the Emergency Law, the sacking of Parliament and new Parliamentary elections, constitutional change with new parties and reformed media laws, concessions to the Islamic community, and more.

However, the problem is that Assad has lost so much legitimacy across the country that these offers have not significantly reduced or ended the protests, although they may have encouraged others not to stand up against the regime—a metric which is impossible monitor.

Meanwhile, the Annan Plan has proved to be the only game in town, with no sign of any of the participants actually playing. Although lethal violence is estimated by human rights groups to have dropped by 36 percent since the plan was supposed to come into effect, the Houla and Qubair massacres signalled the effective demise of the increasingly-strained likelihood of a ceasefire.

An ECFR report into possibilities for Syria’s future suggested that “Annan should encourage the opposition to enter a political process without the precondition of Assad’s departure.” Arguably, the one ‘carrot’ the regime has left is to open itself up to a Presidential election with independent monitors who can prove an unimpeded process and where opposition figures can stand; this, however, is unlikely.

Scenarios for civil conflict With an absence of any political initiatives, the violence the state is deploying against the opposition is the only scenario left open to examination.

The language on civil conflict in Syria has become increasingly pessimistic over the past four weeks. Syria is on the brink of a “catastrophic” civil war that will spread beyond its borders with explosive consequences for the Middle East, senior United Nations figures have warned. UN envoy Kofi Annan said in June that “Syria is not Libya. It will not

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implode; it will explode, and explode beyond its borders.” Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon commented that “Syria can quickly go from a tipping point to a breaking point. The danger of full-scale civil war is imminent and real, with catastrophic consequences for Syria and the region.” British Foreign Secretary William Hague explained that “we don’t know how things are going to develop. Syria is on the edge of a collapse or of a sectarian civil war, and so I don’t think we can rule anything out.” Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN special representative for children in armed conflict, said after visiting the country that “rarely, have I seen such brutality against children as in Syria, where girls and boys are detained, tortured, executed, and used as human shields.”

There has been a proliferation of discussion over the semantics of civil war. The regime describes events as a battle against extremists, while the opposition explain their actions as part of a revolutionary uprising. Civil wars are rarely declared, but rather are entered into as a consequence of the failure of politics. As in Iraq and the Askari mosque bombing in 2006, triggers for civil war are often acknowledged in retrospect. The Syrian population are very aware of the consequences of ethnosectarian civil conflict, having witnessed and borne some of the fallout of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991) and the Iraqi Civil War (2006-2008).

With these points in mind, there are two main options within the paradigm of continued violence: Outside powers arm opposition fighters At a practical level, what the opposition forces need is artillery and air support in rural areas, effective surveillance capabilities, and new weapons including better RPGs, anti-tank, portable mortars, and sniper rifles suited for urban fighting. There can be little doubt about the practical effect that this would have on the momentum of violence, potentially drastically increasing the numbers of casualties.

This would lead to scarred cities, along the lines of Beirut and Fallujah, across the country. As the ECFR explained, “Expanding and supporting armed resistance would invite even wider violence.”

“Rarely, have I seen such brutality against children as in Syria” Outside powers fail to arm opposition fighters In The Guardian, veteran Syria commentator Patrick Seale argued that “the only way to prevent a full-scale civil war in Syria…..is to demilitarise the conflict and bring maximum pressure on both sides to negotiate.” In June, The Guardian reported that there is no evidence of state-backed weapons runs in northern Syria, where Free Syrian Army units are mainly using small arms supplied by defectors or bought from still-serving loyalist troops. If the opposition fighters are starved of outside support they will be forced to rely on acquiring munitions from government forces and would likely adopt guerrilla tactics along the model of the Iraqi insurgency, typified by hit-and-run attacks on government forces and installations.

Conclusions The tragedy of the situation in Syria today is the general consensus that the situation will continue to deteriorate for the short to medium term. The international mechanisms of diplomacy are gridlocked, while the actors on the ground continue to lock horns in an increasingly bloody war of attrition with innocent civilians suffering the most casualties. Despite the grim backdrop, the Syrian opposition retains the momentum to offer a new vision and new options for the country. To do this requires real statesmanship to unite and present a coherent and persuasive narrative that the people can get behind. Meanwhile, the regime, bereft of creative and peaceful means to placate the protests, is trapped in a zero-sum game of raising the levels of violence directed against their own cities and citizens.  James Denselow is a writer on Middle East geopolitical and security issues based at Kings College London. He currently writes on Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi politics. He was a contributing author to the book 'An Iraq of its Regions'.

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Politics

Bypassing Hormuz

Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is nothing new, and its neighbors have been preparing for this eventuality for decades Ever since the 1980s, widespread fear that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz has led the Gulf states to seek ways around this strategic waterway, through which nearly 30 percent of the world’s oil flows. Today, with renewed Iranian threats to close the strait, it appears that these efforts have begun to pay dividends.

Bryan Gibson

D

uring the Iran-Iraq War, Iran implemented an attrition strategy and a policy of economic strangulation to force Iraq into submission. This led to an Iranian deal with Syria to cut off Iraq’s transSyrian pipeline in 1982. Together with the closure of Iraq’s Gulf ports at the start of the war, the closure of the Syrian pipeline meant that if Iraq were to stay financially solvent it had to find a way around the Strait of Hormuz, hurt Iran’s ability to export oil, or both. This led to the so-called ‘Tanker War,’ where each side targeted the other’s shipping in the Gulf, a dramatic rise in shipping insurance rates, and to efforts by Iraq’s allies—including the US—to seek out ways to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Looking at the situation in Gulf today, with Iran threatening once again to close the strait, it has becoming apparent that the Gulf states heeded the lessons of the past and have applied them to the current crisis. Simply put, the IranIraq War taught them that they needed to reduce their reliance on what former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance called “the jugular vein of the West”: the Strait of Hormuz.

Recognizing the threat that the strait’s closure posed, in the early 1980s Saudi Arabia constructed two major pipelines, both over 1,000 km long, from the Eastern province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. By 1992, after the Gulf War, the Saudis had expanded the pipeline to a capacity of 4.5 million barrels per day (bpd). The purpose was undoubtedly to mitigate against potential threats to the Strait of Hormuz, on which Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were almost completely reliant. But Saudi Arabia was not alone. As I point out in my book, Covert Relationship (Praeger, 2010), during his famous trip to Baghdad in December 1983, Donald Rumsfeld urged the Iraqi regime to agree to build a tie-in line from Iraq’s southern oil facilities outside Basra to Saudi Arabia’s existing Petroline, which consisted of two parallel pipelines running eastward to the Red Sea. Completed in September 1985, this became known as the Iraq Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA) and was operational until 1990, when Saudi Arabia cut Iraq off in response to its invasion of Kuwait. It was expropriated completely in 2001 as payment for outstanding Iraqi debts. Nevertheless, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War

“The situation continued to escalate into January and February, when the European Union agreed to an embargo of Iranian oil and the US froze the assets of Iranian financial institutions and banned international banks from making oil transactions with Iran with the threat of being blacklisted”

in August 1988, the threat to the Strait of Hormuz subsided—at least until recently.

In late December 2011, amid Israeli threats to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Iranian government threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event that Iran was attacked. The situation continued to escalate into January and February, when the European Union agreed to an embargo of Iranian oil and the US froze the assets of Iranian financial institutions and banned international banks from making oil transactions with Iran with the threat of being blacklisted. After a brief period of hope in April and May, when Iran agreed to talks on its nuclear enrichment program, things fell apart and the EU and US sanctions came into effect at the start of this month.

The implementation of the sanctions has raised the stakes for Iran, which is already in dire financial straits. It has also increased the likelihood that the government will close the Strait of Hormuz, though this would harm Iran just as much as any of the Gulf states by cutting off its own oil exports from its main terminal at Kharg Island. But Iran would not suffer alone: if the Strait of Hormuz was actually closed, it would have a devastating impact on the already-struggling global economy. Indeed, as Charles Emerson and Paul Stevens from Chatham House point out, “a sharp oil price spike could tip the global economy into a further slowdown.” The problem is that approximately 17 million bpd pass through the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 32 percent of daily global oil exports. It appears that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US have long been preparing for this contingency.

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Photo © Getty Images

The Strait of Hormu

At the time of Iran’s renewed threat to close the strait in early 2012, Chatham House estimated that the capacity of the pipelines that bypass the strait was somewhere around 8 million bpd. In the past two weeks, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced separately that a further 3.15 million bpd could still make it onto the market if Iran were to act. On 28 June, Saudi Arabia announced that it had been secretly testing the IPSA for the past four months, to ensure that it could be converted back to transporting oil instead of the natural gas it transports at present. This means that an additional 1.65 million bpd could stay on the market. In addition, Issue 1574 • July/August 2012

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“Simply put, the Iran-Iraq War taught them that they needed to reduce their reliance on what former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance called “the jugular vein of the West”: the Strait of Hormuz”

in late June the UAE announced that its Harshen-Fujairah pipeline, which began construction in 2008, had come online and would be fully operational by August, allowing an addition 1.5 million bpd to bypass the strait. These two pipelines, combined with the 8 million bpd already bypassing the strait, mean that at least 11.15 million bpd would still be able to bypass this choke point and make it onto the market. The smaller Gulf states, like Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, as well as Iraq, would be in trouble, but they would not be alone.

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million bpd that it is currently exporting, while the remaining 1 million bpd it is pumping sits in storage on- and offshore.

However, the US has made it clear that it will respond aggressively to any Iranian provocation, with the New York Times quoting one US official as saying, “Don’t even think about closing the strait. We’ll clear the mines. Don’t even think about sending your fast boats out to harass our vessels or commercial shipping. We’ll put them on the bottom of the Gulf.” The US has also quietly expanded its military deployment in the Gulf to include a floating military base, which could be used as a stationing point for mine sweeping, and—in a worst-case scenario—military attacks against Iran.

Interestingly, this is a throwback to US operations in the Gulf during 1987-88, which led to direct clashes with the Iranian navy, the sinking of several of its vessels, the destruction of a number of oil platforms, and the mistaken downing of an Iranian passenger plane that killed all 290 passengers on board. The Iranians have not forgotten this, and over the past few days have been rattling sabers in the Gulf. In the end, how the crisis turns out will ultimately boil down to how Tehran decides to act. If it chooses to act aggressively, it will be met with aggression.

However, if it chooses a more peaceful route, the West must take a lesson from how it treated the Russians after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s and be accommodating toward the regime, while creating opportunities to save face. For the sake of the region, the global economy, and the Iranian people, let us hope the regime chooses a more peaceful path: the consequences of aggression are unpredictable at best. Bryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the LSE and specializes in US-Iraqi relations during the Cold War. His PhD thesis is on the US policy toward Iraq and the Kurdish Revolt, 1958-75. He received his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in history and a Bachelor of Social Sciences in criminology from the University of Ottawa, Canada. He is the author of, Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the IranIraq War, 1980-1988, based on his MA thesis.

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“Interestingly, this is a throwback to US operations in the Gulf during 198788, which led to direct clashes with the Iranian navy, the sinking of several of its vessels, the destruction of a number of oil platforms, and the mistaken downing of an Iranian passenger plane that killed all 290 passengers on board” 21

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Politics

Gulf Ambition

The foreign policy activism of the GCC states Contradicting a commonly held notion, Arab states in the Gulf have become more adventurous in their foreign policy since popular uprisings swept the Middle East from 2011. Qatar in particular has taken some risks, but the UAE has adopted a cautious approach that might reap rewards.

Kristian Koch

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (L) speaks with Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabor Al-Thani of Qatar

Photo Š Getty Images

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he political turmoil that has defined the Arab world since the beginning of 2011 and that has so far resulted in the fall of four regimes (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen) has also opened the door for a period of foreign policy activism by the Arab Gulf states. Qatar has been at the forefront of this activism by displaying a readiness to engage and mobilize clear positions with regard to the developments in the region, something that stands very much in contrast to the more common ostrich mentality of the past, where the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States largely shied away from any sort of publicity, never mind encouraging active intervention in the internal affairs of other states. While Qatar has embraced the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to put itself on the international diplomatic map, other GCC states such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia have also been more outspoken and have engaged with regional affairs, thus underlining their pragmatic ability to adjust to the changing circumstances with which the Middle East as a whole finds itself confronted.

Given the numerous implications that political change in the Arab world holds for the Arab Gulf states, the manner in which these countries have structured their responses has differed depending on their own assessments about the potential consequences and impact. This can be seen in the example of how Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have pursued their foreign policy when it comes to such issues as Syria and Libya. It is also reflected in how these two countries perceive the role being played by the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force that is influencing many of the developments in the Arab world at present.

The general characterization of the Arab Gulf States within the context of the po-

litical turmoil in the region has been one of being counter-revolutionary, and as actively trying to stem themselves against calls for change and reform. The notion is one where the GCC states are determined to prevent the chaos from spreading to their own countries, to shore up the monarchical system of power, and to prop up existing regimes against their present opposition.

Yet in Libya, it was the GCC state of Qatar that stood at the forefront of organizing the opposition from the Arab side against the Qadhafi regime, with a supporting role played by the UAE. The movement spearheaded by Qatar provided Arab legitimacy to the NATO-led operation in Libya, which ultimately sought and resulted in regime change. As conditions have deteriorated in Syria, it was again Qatar (as well as Saudi Arabia) that started financially to support the Syrian opposition, even suggesting that the UN Security Council apply Chapter VII to permit military intervention. While such actions can be seen as responding to public sympathy for the plight of the Syrian people and a genuine belief that the violence must

end, it has also served to position Qatar as a responsible and progressive member of the international community.

A closer look, however, also reveals some subtle difference. The Qatari government has sent a clear signal that it is ready to take on more responsibility on the foreign policy front and engage itself more deeply in the affairs of other states. Equally, it has shown that it is ready to take greater risks. In the Libyan case, Qatar did not limit itself to a variety of public statements, but it put its resources on the ground. Qatar also did not limit its involvement in Libya through the NATO framework only, but was far more active in terms of supplying arms to the Qadhafi opposition, selling oil on the open market, and providing financial aid that proved quite critical in determining the outcome. What Qatar did was take the lead and set the terms of debate. As a result, it has made the assessment that its involvement in Libya was not wrong.

Qatar’s readiness to engage is certainly related to the fact that it can draw on a level of experience gained in recent years. The case

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of Libya was not Qatar’s entrance on the regional stage; rather, the country had engaged in series of mediating attempts prior to Libya, for example in the Darfur conflict in Sudan, the Polisario in the Western Sahara, and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. Qatar has also not been shy about publicizing its involvement in these various issues, and it displays a heightened sense of self-confidence to the point that it is even fully aware of the fact that such activism also generates various degrees of criticism. In this context, the most important tool at the disposal of Qatar is the AlJazeera satellite network, which has proven a critical instrument through which the country can operate.

In contrast, a country like the UAE continues to prefer to operate within the framework of an alliance, for example, the GCC or NATO, or with the support of the United States rather than going it alone. As far as Libya and Syria are concerned, the UAE has displayed a higher degree of sensitivity when it comes to its foreign involvement and it is not ready to the degree that Qatar has shown to go out on a limb or risk outside criticism. In Syria, the UAE has not taken on a visible role, in turn limiting its involvement to sponsoring the economic recovery and development working group of the Friends of Syria circle alongside Germany. Both countries fund the secretariat, which is to be located in Berlin.

The UAE position is due in part to an evaluation by the UAE leadership that their experience in Libya was not solely positive, and that therefore a more cautious position is warranted. Furthermore, the UAE is a country that does not have the same experience when it comes to mediating conflict as Qatar. The UAE is thus a newcomer, which explains this more behind-the scenes approach.

Qatar and the UAE have contrasting policies as far as the Muslim Brotherhood is concerned. While Qatar maintains close ties to the various Islamist forces that are now emerging across the Middle East, even providing a platform for broadcasting Muslim Brotherhood ideas through Shaikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the UAE has come to define Muslim Brotherhood policy as a direct threat to regime rule in the Arab Gulf and has taken direct steps to undermine the Islamist message throughout the region, including at home. While Qatar again seeks to define the discourse and shape the course of events as best as it Issue 1574 • July/August 2012

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Timeline 1991 The first Persian Gulf War draws Qatar and other GCC members closer to Egypt and Syria, the two strongest Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition. After the Iraqi defeat Egypt and Syria receive large sums from the Gulf States in appreciation for their roles and Qatar and Syria sign an agreement on trade and economic and technical cooperation.

2005 Qatar labours for the rehabilitation of Syria into the international community after its alleged involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

2008 Relations between Qatar and Syria assist negotiations that culminate in the Doha Agreement. Qatar calculates that being on good terms with Syria will engender cordial relations with Iran.

April 2010 Syrian Qatari Holding sign a principles of agreement with the Qatar Electricity & Water Company outlining the joint development, financing, construction and operation of two or more power plants in Syria.

May 2010 Syria and Qatar jointly back Turkey in a diplomatic solution to the row over Iran's nuclear programme.

17 January 2011 Leaders from Turkey, Syria and Qatar meet in Damascus to seek a solution to the political crisis in Lebanon.

26 January 2011 The uprisings begin in Syria. Qatar supports Al-Assad well until after the protest movement begins in March. Things change after the Emir reportedly feels duped

by Al-Assad.

March 2011 Qatar's foreign minister announces that The Arab League has given Syria until Sunday to sign an initiative to end its military crackdown on pro-democracy protests.

April 2011 Reconciliation between Hamas –supported financially by Qatar – and Fatah, as well as the reopening of the Rafah border crossing. “That development, combined with the reconciliation of rival Palestinian factions, makes it so that Qatar can now do without the Syrian go-between when dealing with Palestinians.” Says Karim Sader a political scientist specialising in the Gulf nations.

19 April 2011 Tensions between the two countries over rumoured threats of a campaign of incitement against the Syrian regime by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV channels culminate in Bashar Al-Assad’s refusal to meet with the Qatari Foreign Minister.

July 2011 The relative silence of Al Jazeera in the first stage of the Syrian uprising is broken by Qatari Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who in his weekly show condemns the Syrian regime and backs the revolt.

Al-Assad supporters storm the Qatari embassy in Damascus to protest against AlJazeera’s “exaggerated and dishonest” coverage of the events in Syria.

Qatar closes its embassy in Damascus. Karim Sader notes “Qatar’s move looks more like a shrewdly calculated divorce from the Syrian regime than a fleeting spat.”

21 July 2011 Arab media circles rife with rumours of financial support from Qatar and the UAE for Syrian opposition groups— paying for conferences, communications and more.

Feb 2012 British Qatari troops suspected of waging a secret war in Syria. On 27 Feb 2012 Qatar publicly backs arming Syrian rebels, repeating despite Kofi Annan’s UN Peace plan.

March 2012 Al-Assad blames Saudi Arabia and Qatar for a number of suicide attacks in Damascus. Al Jazeera reporter Ali Hashem resigns over its "biased" Syria coverage and is followed by a string of reporters and journalists.

May 2012 Hamas announces it is leaving Syrian capital Damascus for Doha in Qatar.

June 2012 The Independent reports that Syrian rebels are being armed by Gulf States.

can, the UAE takes a more reactive position that warns of possible dangers ahead.

Taken together, both Qatar and the UAE do want to send a message to the United States as well as the broader international community that they are trustful allies who are ready to assume responsibility when it comes to the alliance or international obligations. In this sense, NATO as an organization is seen as a critical tool, and as a result both countries have fostered strong relations with NATO through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative framework. The same goes

for working through such organizations as the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council. The difference is that Qatar has been more proactive in filling the void that currently exists as far as Middle East diplomacy is concerned. For the moment, the risks have paid off, but down the road the more cautious approach of the UAE might pay greater dividends. Dr. Christian Koch is Director of the Gulf Research Center Foundation, Geneva.

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Politics

Beware the American Muslim Vote

US 2012 elections and the American Muslim community The American Muslim community may play a pivotal role in the 2012 US presidential elections.

Particularly in key swing-states, the Muslim community has become well organized and politically aware.

Simona Sikimic

American Muslims and members of all faiths demonstrate March 6, 2011 in Times Square, New York

to rally xenophobic sentiment—a lesson that has so far failed to resonate with the American political establishment. With Muslims growing in numbers and organizational strength on both sides of the Atlantic, Nicholas Sarkozy’s ousting should be a cautionary tale to US presidential candidates, and the hundreds of congressman up for election this November—all must beware the Muslim vote.

Sarkozy’s late conversion to unashamed Muslim bashing was not the life raft it promised to be, instead helping to rally an esti-

mated 2 million Muslims to vote against him and giving Francois Hollande a majority of 18 million votes, to Sarkozy’s 16.8 million.

In America, heading for a closely contested election, Muslim Americans could prove even more crucial in the upcoming vote.

The outcome of the US presidential election in 2012 hinges on a few key swing states, most crucially, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan. No president since 1960 has won without taking at least one of the first three, with current polls citing microscopic gaps in support between the two candidates.

Photo © Getty Images

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he American Muslim community may play a pivotal role in the 2012 US presidential elections. Particularly in key swingstates, the Muslim community has become well organized and politically aware.

The Franco-American argument— about which country deserves to lecture the other on everything from liberty to multilateralism—has raged for centuries, but France just won the latest round. In France the May elections exposed the self-defeating folly of attacking Muslims

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Unbeknown to most, Muslims have the potential to be the decisive voice in determining the results in all four. While the Muslim population at best accounts for a fraction of a percent nationally, in these key battlegrounds they make up some one percent of voters. Moreover, unlike other minority communities who are beset by low turnouts, Muslims have historically voted in block and in the last decade have started to vote in extremely high numbers.

If the race to the White House stays tight, this historically little-understood, sidelined and isolated demographic of Muslim Americans, could finally make an impressive debut onto the national stage.

This is not fear mongering nor wishful thinking —depending on one’s political preferences—Muslims have swung US elections before. The Muslim vote was instrumental in helping former President George W. Bush secure the controversial contest in 2000.

Back then Muslims, who accounted for more than 100,000 registered voters in Florida, were the only minority to back the Texan en masse, giving him some 70 percent of their votes in a state decided by a mere 537 ballots.

By winning the Sunshine State, Bush won the presidency while losing the popular vote to former Vice President Al Gore.

As strange as it may sound, Muslim Americans and the Republican Party were not always the alien bedfellows they now appear. Excluding the 20 to 25 percent of the Muslim population estimated to be African American (and known to be loyally Democratic), the sparse data that exists on US Muslims voting preferences indicates that most are favorable to Republican messages on free markets, low taxation and religious values. George W. Bush’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Karl Rove, for one, was a firm advocate of incorporating Muslim Americans into the Republican fold—to counteract to the Jewish vote that, for all the right’s saber rattling over Palestine and Iran, has remained stubbornly Democrat.

But Rove’s union was not to be. The disastrous Bush-era wars in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, not to mention the explosion in anti-Muslim fervor institutionalized by legislation such as the Patriot Act, aroused a political shift as marked as anything seen in US politics. This post 9/11 fallout pushed Muslim Americans to organize, and become much more politically aware.

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Slowly shifting their allegiance to the Democratic Party in the mid-2000s, their conversion to the Democratic camp was cemented by President Barack Hussein Obama, who wooed Muslims with his diverse heritage and initially reconciliatory language toward the Muslim world.

The alliance looks set to endure for the duration of Obama’s presidency, but beyond 2012 or 2016, Muslim voter loyalty will be far less certain. While many identify closely with Obama, they are far less sure of the Democratic Party, explains Farid Senzai a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and the author of a recent a report intended as one of the first comprehensive works on America Muslim voting behavior.

Muslim Americans and the Republican Party were not always the alien bedfellows they now appear Complicating this political differentiation further is the staggering diversity of the American Muslim demographic, which consists of old and new immigrant groups, coming from places as diverse as Morocco, Iran and Southeast Asia—not to mention the home-grown domestic population.

The community also suffers from huge wealth disparities. While Muslims largely appear to be more financially affluent than the average American—meaning that they have as yet largely untapped resources to bestow upon political allies— pockets of extreme poverty also exist.

Although most American Muslims prioritize the economy as an electoral issue, it is hard to isolate a particular economic message. For all the differences, however, one unifying issue prevails: Islamophobia.

In Florida, which has been plagued by instances of organized Koran burning, witnessed a bomb attack on a Mosque and where Christian communities have come together to try and ban the building of Islamic houses of worship, the rallying cry has been particularly loud. As such, the Florida Muslim community has grown into one of the most cohesive and vocal in the country.

The process has not been purely spontaneous, receiving a necessary boost from Muslim electoral advocacy groups such as Emerge USA that have sprung up in recent years and work to bolster political participation. With their assistance, however, the community’s political engagement is slowly becoming self-sustaining.

Since 2007 when Emerge first started conducting polls and doing outreach, the organization has managed to boost registration and turnout in targeted districts from almost zero to anywhere from 50 to 100 percent. According to Emerge USA vice chairman Khurrum Wahid, in Florida almost 80 percent of Muslims eligible to vote did so in 2008. This compares to 58 percent of voters overall. In non-presidential elections, the difference has been just as stark and in 2010 some 60 percent of registered Muslims voted in Florida, in contrast to 41 percent nationally. While it will be difficult to replicate the excitement of 2008, Emerge still expects Muslims to turn out in well above average numbers this November.

There remains huge room for organizational and institutional growth. The exact number of US Muslims is still small and, owing to the US Census’ omission of religious affiliation, notoriously hard to put a figure on. Estimates vary from the 2.75 million projected by the independent Pew Research Center in 2011, to almost 10 million suggested by some pro-Muslim groups. But, for all the uncertainty, one thing is undeniable; the Muslim American demographic is growing and growing fast.

At an average population rate of increase of five to six percent, it laps the American average of less than one percent.

Ignoring these new voters, or worse, using them as tools to boost support among the right, threatens to prove politically disastrous. Gone are the days when Muslim bashing earned Democrats and Republicans alike a sure-fire ticket to Washington.

Politicians in both camps better wake up to the reality soon, or face the consequences. Simona Sikimic is a British journalist and a graduate of the Columbia Journalism School in New York.

She has previously worked as a staff writer at The Daily Star in Lebanon and at English-language publications in Syria, where she specialised in developmental and human rights issues.

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Cover Story

Iraq under the Ba’ath How Saddam Hussein used the Ba’ath Party to remain in power Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party dominated Iraq for over three decades.In this article, The Majalla examines how the party functioned as both the iron fist and the velvet glove of the regime.

Alex Edwards

A

rab politics has been dominated by personalities that are, in some ways, larger-than-life. Examples can be found outside the Gulf in leaders like Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hafez Al-Assad, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi. Outside of Egypt and Libya, Iraq and pre-uprising Syria, however, were members of a peculiar subspecies of dictatorship: the one-party state.

Although Iraq under the Ba’ath was dominated in so many ways by Saddam Hussein, it was also the exemplar of the one-party state in the Middle East. With the assistance of recent scholarship made possible by the toppling of Saddam Hus-

sein’s regime, we can now glimpse behind the scenes and see how the Ba’ath Party functioned and how Saddam Hussein used it to keep himself in power. Among the innumerable—and perhaps unforeseen— consequences of the American-led invasion of Iraq was the seizure of thousands of pages of documentation and hundreds of hours of tape recordings from the archives of the Iraqi state. This has allowed scholars, such as Georgetown University’s

Joseph Sassoon (author of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime), to piece together an intriguing, and at times surprising, look at the inner workings of an Arab one-party state.

It is something of a cliché to compare any dictatorial regime to the nightmarish totalitarianism envisaged in George Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, but in a one-party state like Iraq the picture that emerges is in many ways almost as sinister, distinguished from its fictional counterpart only by its inevitable real-world inefficiencies. There was a single party at the centre of power in the country, with its tentacles extending into every aspect of

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society and politics and into the lives of its members, backed up by incessant spying, and never hesitating to kill, imprison or torture anyone suspected of disloyalty.

While Saddam Hussein was ‘Big Brother’, it was through his mastery of the Party apparatus that he kept himself in this position: he recruited his henchmen from it, it shaped his rule, and it was shaped by him.

Perhaps this authoritarianism stems in part from the origins of these parties as revolutionary movements that seized control of the state in coups, after contending for power with dangerous rivals and a repressive state, ruthless, focused, and once in power determined to keep it. As O’Brian, the ruling party’s representative in Orwell’s novel, explains, “One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.” Whatever the reasons, any dictatorial one-party state is based on domination: the leader dominates the party, the party dominates its members, its members dominate society.

But how does the party rule? In the cases of Syria and Iraq, the Ba’ath were remarkably successful, taking and keeping power for decades. By the standards of dictatorship, this is quite an achievement. Ba’ath rule in Iraq survived two devastating wars, crippling economic sanctions and internecine struggles for power. For Sassoon, it comes down to a few factors which Saddam Hussein and the leadership of the Ba’ath mastered: it crushed its enemies and rivals with the large, powerful security services it also used to spy on Iraqis at all levels of society, and it bought off and divided everyone else it needed to keep itself in power. In other words, it ruled through paranoia, cruelty and bribery.

The Party Animal The structure and the internal rules of the ruling party in a one-party state have huge implications for society as a whole, determining how decisions are made, at what pace, and by whom. The party has no incentive to loosen its grip if it wishes to remain in power, and that results in the centralization of authority. In Iraq, the Ba’ath Party secretariat was the center, with policies handed down through a strictly defined hierarchy and information (not always accurate) flowing upwards.

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This resulted in an extensive bureaucracy that moved at what was frequently a glacial pace, as decisions moved through and up all tiers and offices in the system, with only those at the very top—Saddam Hussein and his immediate underlings—having the final say over virtually every aspect of life in Iraq. This made for a cumbersome system of government, but effectively blocked the development of rival centers of power and influence and allowed Saddam Hussein to keep as much control as possible in his own hands. Ironically, although the Ba’ath Party became perhaps the single most powerful institution in Iraq, it could be a harsh mistress to its members, who were also often individually subject to extensive Party control.

“On joining even the lowest ranks, members were obliged to sign a declaration that stated they would be hanged if they were found to be secret members of any other party” In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, membership of the Ba’ath was a prerequisite, formal or informal, for many jobs, especially in the public sector. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), for instance, once boasted that it had dismissed 12,000 Iraqi schoolteachers as part of the ‘de-Ba’athification’ process after the American invasion of 2003. By the time of the invasion, it numbered almost 17 percent of Iraq’s population amongst its members, although admittedly many were at the lowest tiers of membership, of which there were several.

One of the major goals of the Party was constant recruitment. New blood coming in, after all, allowed the Party to simultaneously renew itself, and bringing new members into itself also meant bringing those people under its control. Members were expected to be totally loyal to the Party, and in ensuring this the Party collected a

great deal of information on its members.

The questionnaire for new members was quite extensive, and required the applicant to describe his or her personal interests and background, the nature of their introduction to the Ba’ath Party and its ideology, how they felt about it, who their superiors in their branch or cell were, and where they had originally taken the oath of membership, amongst other questions.

All members of the Party seeking to climb up its ranks were subject to particular rules and discipline, and this, in Sassoon’s words, ranged “from the sublime to the ridiculous,” but all of which served to keep members on a tight reign. On joining even the lowest ranks, members were obliged to sign a declaration that stated they would be hanged if they were found to be secret members of any other party. Leaving the Ba’ath and joining a different political party was punished with seven years in prison. Other regulations were less stark, but at the same time more personal. Members required permission from the Party hierarchy to get married, and one of the stages of this process was submitting a great deal of information about the member’s prospective spouse, including details of background and family, even if they too were members in good standing. Members were also chided for being late to meetings, not bringing their notebooks, and were expected to remain physically fit, with those failing medical exams facing demotion. Senior officials were ordered to notify the president’s office of any stays in hospital. Members were also discouraged from playing cards or sitting with their legs crossed. Other things, however, were permitted. Sassoon recounts how attempts to prevent members from celebrating by firing guns into the air as being ‘uncivilised’ were vetoed by Saddam Hussein, who believed that it provided a valuable outlet for self-expression.

Unsurprisingly, the Party also put a lot of effort into indoctrinating its members. Many were required to attend training courses that could last months, and were designed to instil loyalty to the Party and the leader, and further reinforce the ‘Ba’athification’ of Iraqi society. Senior members were sent on courses geared to make them more effective party leaders, while candidates for full membership were there to absorb the Party’s ethos and procedures as well as receive ideological indoctrination. Members 29

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Cover Story

were also instructed in the Party’s ‘official line’ on national history, which unsurprisingly emphasised the role of the Party and its leader, and included an extensive study of Saddam Hussein’s speeches and writings and Ba’ath Party congresses. The Party also acted as a channel of indoctrination of the populace at large, and as a means to disseminate Saddam Hussein’s personality cult. For instance, copies of his books were issued to members via branches and cells of the Party on release, and they were the frequently the subject at monthly discussions of cultural topics.

Eyes and Ears In a one-party state, the party also functions as a system of public surveillance. Its membership and social role make it ideally suited to monitor the population, and this is boosted by its wide grasp: as we saw above, the ruling party often seeks to sweep as many people into its embrace as possible, both for its own health and as a means of control. In Iraq, it was amongst the duties of members of the Ba’ath to keep track of disloyalty amongst the population. Branches were required to create security committees to spy on the regime’s opponents and keep track of potential subversion amongst the population, and within state institutions like the healthcare and education systems.

Each school maintained lists of their teachers, who were required to be committed to Ba’ath ideology, and professional associations of medical staff were monitored, as were trade union organizations (until they were shut down and integrated into the Party). The members of the branch security committees, who were issued weapons, were also charged with using their local knowledge to track down and arrest deserters from the military. In addition, party headquarters tasked its branches with tracking down rumours and those who instigated or spread them. The civil service was also placed under the supervision of the Ba’ath Party. Committees of retired or senior Ba’athists were placed in each ministry as ‘watchdogs’ to oversee its work and ensure that it was loyal, even going so far as to appoint separate committees for each regional branch of every ministry.

One of the keys to the survival of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party was their mastery of the use of internal se-

curity services. According to Sassoon, the evidence points to a “symbiosis” between the Ba’ath and the various intelligence agencies. In his book, Sassoon paints a picture of ever-present official paranoia and describes no less than four secret police agencies used for spying on the population, aside from other specialised units that watched the military and other institutions for signs of disloyalty.

He recounts how this network of organizations was structured in such a way that they overlapped, and none had too much power as a ‘coup-proofing’ measure. The Ba’ath Party itself had its own intelligence unit that was tasked with keeping an eye on all the members—which must have been more than a full-time job, given their number.

“One of the keys to the survival of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party was their mastery of the use of internal security services” The single most powerful of these agencies was the Special Security Organization (Jihaz al-amn al-khass), or SSO, which reported directly to the office of Saddam Hussein. After 1991, it was headed by his son, Qusay. It recruited heavily amongst clans close to Saddam Hussein, especially his own, the Tikritis. It also formed the second tier of his bodyguard, and was responsible for protecting (and, no doubt, watching) senior members of the Ba’ath.

In this capacity it put a great deal of effort into spying on the domestic staff of Saddam Hussein and his family. This led them, for example, to discover that the wife of the president’s personal chef was addicted to gambling, and allowed them to infiltrate an agent into her card games at the suggestion of Saddam Hussein himself. It almost goes without saying that the employees of the SSO itself were spied on, and were required to disclose all kinds of personal information about themselves to the organization, even down to which brand of cigarette they smoked. As com-

pensation, and to help ensure their loyalty, they were given access to subsidised housing, education and other fringe benefits.

The power of the organization (even government ministers required its permission to travel abroad) had the same effect on its employees as absolute power seems to have had on Saddam Hussein, and to some extent all dictators: they came to enjoy the impunity and the trappings of power. In one case, officers of the organization helped themselves to pornographic films seized in a raid, and in another, their celebratory gunfire at a football match killed several people. Others were found to have solicited or accepted bribes.

The military was also carefully monitored, and the Ba’ath did its best to inculcate the Iraqi armed forces with its own vision and ideals, and to fill its ranks with its members and supporters. Aside from this, it also created parallel paramilitary forces, including Party militias, to offset the power of the regular army. The most obvious example was the Republican Guard, which functioned as the regime’s praetorians and was practically an army within an army.

The most bizarre was the fida’iyyu Saddam, which was set up in the 1990s and seemed to function as a giant death squad under the leadership of Uday Hussein. Its uniform featured a helmet that was reportedly modelled on Darth Vader’s from the Star Wars film franchise, and was inscribed with a picture of Saddam Hussein’s profile.

A separate branch of the Ba’ath Party was established just for members of the armed forces, reporting directly to Party headquarters. In addition, the Ba’ath Party also controlled the admission to the military academies, vetting all candidates for loyalty. As with all other aspects of life in Iraq, loyalty to the Party and Saddam Hussein was rewarded, often with pay rises and other benefits like free medical care for officers and their families, while any perceived disloyalty was severely punished. Eventually, loyalty became the single most important factor in an officer’s career prospects. Some senior officers at the highest levels of the Iraqi military were appointed because they were close to Saddam Hussein, without even having served in the military beforehand.

Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath’s terror of a military coup was well-founded, given

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Iraq’s history. It meant that the army was spied on as closely as every other institution in Iraq by the internal security agencies.

The movements of its units were checked and double checked by the SSO, and, like members of the Ba’ath Party, officers required permission to marry—something which, as Sassoon recounts, was a lengthy and torturous process, with decisions often made at a senior level by high-ranking officers. Reasons for refusing permission seem petty to outsiders, but show just how paranoid and obsessed with security Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath were: Sassoon describes one case in which an officer was refused permission to marry because his fiancée had a relative living abroad.

The Party, the Carrot, and the Stick In many ways, rewards were as important as punishment (or the threat of it) to maintaining Ba’ath rule. Rewards were doled out to members of the Party for a variety of reasons, such as uninterrupted membership over twenty-five years, service in the military or one of the militias, or other demonstrations of loyalty, usually in the form of a medal or badge from the Party. These rewards varied, but by using them the Ba’ath was able to “coopt a large number of individuals by making it advantageous, both to those who became part of the organization and even to those who were outside of it, to continue supporting the regime,” to use Sassoon’s words. An intricate system of patronage was established that went all the way from generals and cabinet ministers down to neighbourhood informers and leaders of local Party branches, and distributed cash, goods, housing and plots of land. The effect of these rewards and enticements in creating and reinforcing loyalty can only have been enhanced by the fact that they could be revoked at merest suspicion of disloyalty. The system became so widespread and so complicated that the Party itself had trouble keeping track of it, and finding ways to meet the commitments it had made. These measures were all made more effective by the UN sanctions of the 1990s, as the shortages of food and other goods gave Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath extra leverage. Party members, for instance, were entitled to a higher food ration.

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Ba’athism Ba’athism is an Arab nationalist ideology that essentially promotes the development and creation of a unified Arab nation. As part of this, it seeks a renaissance of Arab —as opposed to national—culture, values, and society. Supporting single-party states and rejecting political pluralism, Ba’athism is a self-preserving ideology that seeks to remain in power for as long as is required to develop its goals. Basing itself on the principles of pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism, and social progress, it seeks a revival of the Arab states through the slogan of ‘unity, liberty and socialism.’

Important to note is that it is a secular ideology; it seeks to avoid being conflated with politicised Islamic causes. There are currently two prominent Baath parties in existence: one in Syria and one in Iraq.

Ba’athism is said to have originated and developed with the ideas of Zaki Al-Arsuzi and Michel Aflaq. Forming the Arab Ba’ath Party in 1940, Al-Arsuzi’s views influenced many like Aflaq, who formed what became known as the Arab Ba’ath Movement with Salah Al-Din Al-Bitar in 1940. Al-Arsuzi was initially inspired by the French Revolution, the German and Italian unification movements, and the Japanese economic miracle— so much so that he became a strong advocate of Arab nationalism. Aflaq, too, sought a unity of the Arab nation through language, in keeping with the idea that a common language leads to a unity of thought, norms, and ideals.

A turning point in the two groups’ developments occurred when the movements differed over the issue of the 1941 coup d’état by Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani and the consequent Anglo-Iraqi War. Al-Arsuzi and Aflaq found themselves on opposite sides of the conflict, with the former opposing Al-Gaylani’s government and the latter supporting it and its war against the British. By this stage Al-Arsuzi’s support was diminishing, a decline that was further consummated by his expulsion from Syria by the French authorities in 1941.

The Arab Ba’ath Movement was united for only a few decades in the middle of the last century. In 1947 it merged with the Arab Socialist Party to establish the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, but by 1966 the Ba’ath Party split once more, forming the Syrian-led Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi-led Ba’ath party.

in,” which entitled him or her to personal meetings with the president and other officials, gifts and property the same as that awarded to the president’s own employees, and a priority for themselves, their spouse and their children in entrance to universities and military academies, and, strangely, the gift of four suits a year directly from the president’s office. Closer to the other end of the scale was a Ba’ath Party badge, which entitled the holder to an apartment, which was particularly valued in Baghdad and Iraq’s other large cities, with their exorbitant real estate prices. Ba’athist military officers were awarded cars, or grants towards the cost of buying one.

Jobs were also within the Party’s gift.

In academia, professors who were known Ba’athists favoured over those suspected of sympathising with other political credos. Senior members of the Republican Guard, the SSO, the president’s office, and the Ba’ath secretariat also enjoyed free access to university places, whatever their academic credentials (or lack thereof), all

the way up to PhD level. Opportunities to study abroad were also often allocated on the basis of loyalty.

Outside of officialdom and the Party itself, the Ba’ath also made extensive use of informers amongst the general population, in common with all one-party dictatorships. While many people were motivated by money or threats, others seemed to have informed for personal reasons, such as to settle scores, or out of genuine conviction.

Nonetheless, many received gifts of cars, cash, or housing, particularly those living in restive areas, such as the Kurdish north, and their relatives received pensions and other benefits if their activities on behalf of the regime led to them being killed.

In the end, Saddam Hussein skilfully deployed the power and resources available to him as the master of the state of Iraq.

The Ba’ath Party was one of the most important instruments for dispensing the terror, violence and spoils that ensured the loyalty of his followers and the acceptance of the Iraqi people. 31

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Understanding Dictators The psychology of an authoritarian

It may be that the era of dictatorship in the Middle East is drawing to a close. The Majalla reflects on the nature of the institution that had dominated politics in the region for so long, following the downfall of several over the past year.

Alex Edwards

Illustrations © Graphic News

W

ith unprecedented turmoil gripping the Arab world over the past year and a half, it seems that the age of the Middle Eastern dictator may be drawing to a close. The last decade has seen the end of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Qadhafi, Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and perhaps soon Bashar Al-Assad: once the masters of all they surveyed, autocrats who ruled with an iron fist. But now that this creature might be heading for extinction, are we any closer to understanding it? With the benefit of hindsight we can gain an insight into how they kept themselves in power and ask, most of all, why they behaved as they did.

What were the reasons for their remorseless cruelty towards their opponents, their indifference to the suffering of most of their people, and the systemic kleptomania of their regimes?

A Charmed Circle In seeking to explain a dictator’s behavior, the first thing to understand is that a dictatorship, as a form of government, is a pyramid: it gets narrower the further up the regime you go. Every dictator relies as little as possible on other people, relying instead on a small group of cronies. Political scientists Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith explain how this is a smart survival tactic for a dictator in their work, The Dictator’s Handbook. To borrow these authors’ terms, every dictator relies on a small coalition of “essentials”—people whose support he needs to maintain his rule. Outside this circle is a wider group of

“influentials”—people who may have some say over how the state is run, or a role in carrying out policy. Everybody else—the bulk of the population—are “interchangeables” who have no say at all.

A successful dictator, Mesquita and Smith maintain, is one who carefully maintains his grip on the loyalty of his coalition of “essentials,” at the expense of the welfare of everybody else if need be. Without the backing of his key supporters, a dictator has few options when faced with a serious challenge to his rule: he will likely become an exile, a prisoner, or a corpse, as recent history has shown.

This dependence explains much of the behavior we saw from Mubarak, Qadhafi,

Ben Ali and their contemporaries: the personalization of their rule, with all power concentrated at the center, no matter how inefficient or ramshackle this makes the machinery of the state. Interviews with former senior members of the Iraqi armed forces and Saddam’s regime, and analysis of documents captured in the 2003 invasion, reveal Saddam’s reliance on a small group and his preference to take the most important decisions himself with little input or advice from anyone else. This is Mesquita and Smith’s first lesson: keep the number of “essentials” small, to keep the levers of power from slipping out of the dictator’s hands.

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The Military: A family affair What better way to ensure the loyalty of the small, key group of supporters you need to stay in power than by filling it with members of your family? The military plays a key role in a dictatorship: many dictators have a military background, and nearly all of them rely on it to keep themselves in power once they have achieved it. To prevent themselves becoming victims of their own armed forces they cram its upper ranks with their children, siblings, cousins, and in-laws.

In Libya, Qadhafi relied heavily on his children and relatives to command the security services that kept him in power. His son, Khamis, was the commander of the Khamis Brigade, a military formation with a key role in internal security. Another son, Saadi, was the head of the Libyan military’s Special Forces units. Members of Qadhafi’s clan and tribe commanded other key units in a bid to foster loyalty. In Yemen, Saleh was unusual in that he has been forced to step down more-or-less peacefully. His family is a veritable military dynasty—perhaps appropriate for a former general who seized power in a coup. His son Ahmed commanded the elite Republican Guard, while nephews Yahya, Tareq and Amar, headed the paramilitary Central Security Force, the Presidential Guard, and the National Security Organization (the intelligence service) respectively.

Saleh’s half-brother, Mohammed Saleh AlAhmar, commanded the Air Force.

A similar situation can be seen in the Assad dynasty in Syria. The original heir-apparent of Hafez Al-Assad was his oldest son, Basil, a military officer who was in charge of presidential security until his death in a car accident in 1994. Hafez’s brother, Rifaat, was in charge of a large portion of the military. (He commanded the forces that crushed the uprising in Hama in 1982.) That lasted until Rifaat contested his brother’s rule when Hafez fell ill in the early 1980s, leading to his exile. This role is now filled by Maher Al-Assad, son of Hafez and brother of the current president, Bashar.

He commands the Syrian army’s Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored Division, giving him effective control of the bulk of Syria’s military forces. As added insurance, the Syrian intelligence service was headed by the president’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawqat, now the deputy minister of defense Saddam Hussein adopted a similar system of rule in Iraq before he was toppled. He came to power after pushing out the previous president, Ahmed Al-Bakr, who was actually his cousin. Once in power, he surrounded himself with his relatives. His half-brothers became senior members of the internal security forces and he gave his son, Qusay, a substantial role in the security apparatus. In addition, one of his most feared henchmen, Ali Hassen Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, or ‘Chemical Ali,’ was his first cousin.

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia Ruled for: 24 years (1987-2011) Background: Former military officer, security service chief, ambassador, interior minister, prime minister to previous president.

Came to power through: Bloodless coup against former president Habib Bourguiba.

Fate: In exile in Saudi Arabia after being ousted by protestors in December 2010-January 2011, marking the start of the ‘Arab Spring.’ Tried in absentia with wife, for drug smuggling and corruption. Sentenced to 35 years in prison.

Most notorious for: Massive corruption, building a police state.

Quote: “[A] shameful masquerade of the justice of the victorious.”

Ben Ali on the subject of his trial.

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The second lesson is to maintain a large “selectorate,” a pool of people from whom a dictator’s “essentials” can be recruited. This gives the dictator power over his henchmen, as they can be replaced relatively easily, yet at the same time bolsters his control over society at large: the age-old strategy of divide and rule. In cases where there are large ethnic or sectarian divisions, a particular constituency is often favored as part of this strategy as much as from ethnic or sectarian solidarity. In Iraq, the ruling elite were drawn from Sunni Arabs, who formed the bulk of the officer corps of the Saddam-era military and the government, despite being a minority in the state as a whole. Within that group was a smaller coalition of supporters drawn from the same clan and tribe as Saddam Hussein. It goes without saying that Saddam was himself a Sunni.

The situation is even starker in Syria, where Syria’s Alawis—from whom the Assad family originates—form a substantial part of the armed forces, especially its leadership. Most of the professional soldiers (as opposed to conscripts) are Alawis, and core units like the Fourth Armored division is virtually all Alawi, as are the key security services.

Corruption and Cronies We can also find answers to the question of why dictators tolerate corruption (aside from simple greed) when it creates so much anger amongst their people and further tarnishes their reputations abroad. The reasons can be found in Mesquita and Smith’s third, fourth and fifth rules: control the flow of money, pay your key supporters enough to keep them loyal (and not a penny more), and never use money that could go to your supporters to improve the lives of the population at large. These steps, they argue, are necessary to maintain a power base amongst the “essentials.” As well as keeping existing cronies loyal, it also ensures that a tyrant will always find someone new to do his dirty work if it becomes necessary to ‘reshuffle’ his supporters.

One of the most efficient means of distributing goodies is via official corruption. If henchmen (and the occasional henchwoman) are given a license to steal, then they can enrich themselves without a dictator having to buy their support outright. As Mesquita and Smith point 33

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out, “Resources spent saving the lives of the people cannot be spent on cronies.” The dictator can also reward disloyalty by prosecuting his ungrateful underlings for corruption and replacing them with someone else.

It is also an excellent source of unaccountable, hard-to-trace revenue, maximizing a ruler’s freedom of action.

Mesquita and Smith therefore argue that corruption often functions as a political survival strategy for tyrants. While the leader of a democracy must provide public goods in order to appeal to as many people as possible (or at least a few more than their opponents in the next election), a dictator can lavishly reward a few essential followers—whose own interests are tightly bound up with those of their benefactor—by allowing them to squeeze the population at no cost to himself.

This was readily apparent in many of the countries that experienced revolution during the Arab Spring, where many ordinary people were living in poverty or seeing their living standards fall, while a wealthy, wellconnected elite profited enormously from their proximity to power.

Tunisia was particularly unfortunate in this regard. American diplomatic cables, accessible via Wikileaks, exposed the notorious corruption of President Ben Ali’s family, particularly his wife and her relatives.

American ambassador Robert Godec wrote in 2008: “Whether it’s cash, services, land, property, or yes, even your yacht, President Ben Ali’s family is rumored to covet it, and reportedly gets what it wants . . . Seemingly half of the Tunisian business community can claim a Ben Ali connection through marriage, and many of these relations are said to have made the most of their lineage.”

Corruption did not end there, however: reportedly, it was pervasive at many levels of Tunisian officialdom. Mohamed Bouazizi was reportedly regularly harassed by the police and officials seeking bribes until the day he snapped and set himself alight, inadvertently sparking off the waves of revolution that rocked the Arab World in 2011.

There was also great public anger at the perceived level of official corruption in Egypt. There was outrage over the violent death of Khalid Said at the hands of the police, reportedly because he possessed evidence of their involvement in trafficking narcotics. The coterie of rich businessmen

Saddam Hussein, Iraq Background: Former revolutionary agitator with theBa’ath Party, eventually vice president of Iraq.

Came to power through: Coup with the Ba’ath Party, another coup against the former president.

Fate: Deposed by US-led invasion, 2003.

Captured in December 2003, tried and condemned to death by special tribunal 2004-2006. Hanged in December 2006.

Most notorious for: Systemic brutality and oppression in Iraq, invading Iran and Kuwait, use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians and Iranian troops, attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Idolized Stalin.

Quote: “The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun…The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins!”

Saddam Hussein, in radio broadcast at the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War.

around Gamal Mubarak was also a target for popular resentment in an era when unemployment was endemic and prices rising.

In Libya, living standards for the bulk of the population were declining despite the state’s oil wealth and the recent lifting of international sanctions. Qadhafi’s family and members of the elite also acquired huge fortunes in the wake of Libya’s rehabilitation, while ordinary Libyans struggled to get by.

Aside from widespread official corruption, there were complaints of disparities in government investment in the different regions of Libya, with the east allegedly disadvantaged in favor of areas populated by loyalists with closer links to Qadhafi.

In Saddam’s Iraq, crippling UN sanctions provided unparalleled opportunities for corruption, with smuggling enriching the regime and its small coterie of flunkeys while the people starved, grew sick, and died without access to medicines.

In Syria, a similar picture of cronyism emerges. The cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad, Rami Makhlouf, controlled businesses with effective monopolies in a variety of industries. One example is Syriatel, Syria’s biggest mobile phone service. In June 2011 Makhlouf announced that he was stepping down from the company to

focus on charity work after he became a target of the protestors’ ire. There is little doubt that he and his family remain fully paid-up members of the power elite.

Dictators have a strong incentive to let their people go hungry while their supporters and cronies grow rich: people struggling to survive are usually too preoccupied with the hardships of their day-to-day existence to try to rise up, while their co-opted supporters will be ever-eager to assist in keeping the ordinary people down so they can claim their share of the spoils.

The Psychology of Dictatorship So much for the machinery and the mechanisms of taking power and keeping it—what about the strange behavior of so many tyrants? We can understand why dictators try to ‘keep it in the family’ and allow their people to live in poverty and despair while their henchmen live in luxury.

It’s good to be on top, and if you are, you want to stay there. But what accounted for Saddam Hussein’s adventures in literature, or Qadhafi’s many eccentricities?

As Abraham Lincoln once said, “Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power.” His remark is especially insightful

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when we consider the nature of power in a dictatorship. What does absolute power do to a personality? The effects of it can only be guessed at. Could it be that existing traits are magnified, the ordinary restraints placed on a person by social and family bonds diminished by the hordes of sycophants and the endless opportunities for the abuse of power? Do the personality traits that help somebody become a dictator in the first place determine how they will act when they achieve power? Or is it a combination of the above? Or do dictators just act as anyone would in that situation?

Why is it, in particular, that some dictators develop bizarre habits like those lampooned

by Sacha Cohen Baron’s comic creation, Admiral General Aladeen, in his latest film The Dictator? For instance, it’s not hard to find pictures of jubilant rebels or American troops brandishing gold-plated guns ‘liberated’ from the homes of Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein and their families, a trend parodied in The Dictator, where Admiral General Aladeen brandishes a golden Beretta pistol at every opportunity. Aladeen’s outfits are also clearly modeled on Qadhafi’s comicopera uniforms that would embarrass even the generalissimo of the most fascistic South American junta.

It was virtually impossible to peer into the thoughts of despots like Qadhafi or

Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen Ruled: Yemen, 22 years (1990-2012); North Yemen, 12 years (1978-1990).

Background: Former military officer.

Came to power through: Dead men’s shoes. Selected by colleagues on military council after previous president was assassinated.

Fate: Stepped down in October 2011 as part of a succession plan agreed with the GCC, following popular protests and an assassination attempt Most notorious for: Clinging onto power through thick and thin, promoting his family to positions of power.

Quote: “No one may surrender himself to death or liquidation”.

Saleh, explaining why his relatives should not step down from the military.

Approximately 2000 people were killed protesting his rule.

Saddam Hussein while they were alive, but occasionally the mask slipped and something of the man behind shined through.

The results were not pretty. Ironically, now that both men are dead and their regimes have been dismantled we can scratch out

Muammar Qadhafi, Libya Ruled for: 42 years (1969-2011) Background: Former military officer (originally a Lieutenant, self-promoted to Colonel).

Came to power through: Bloodless coup against monarchy.

Fate: Deposed by popular uprising backed by NATO and some Arab League air forces, FebruaryOctober 2011. Captured by rebels and summarily executed in October 2011.

Most notorious for: Bizarre behavior at home and abroad.

Quote: “I am an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims, and my international status does not allow me to descend to a lower level.”

Qadhafi, March 2009.

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a few more hard-won insights into their psychological make-up. It seems that as the dictator becomes the sole center of power, more and more of the state becomes focused in turn on serving his own vision, and inevitably, his pretensions and neuroses, and fewer and fewer underlings will be willing to challenge them.

Qadhafi’s state of mind was the favored topic of a legion of armchair psychologists over the years, allegedly including some employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In a psychological profile drawn up by the CIA in the 1970s, following Qadhafi’s seizure of power, he was described as “an exceptionally troubled personality, suffering from a serious inferiority complex.”

The psychologist Jerrold Post, formerly of the CIA, offered another assessment last year.

He claimed that Qadhafi had a “borderline personality,” which meant that he was emotionally unstable, swinging from euphoria to depression and back again, and prone to delusional thinking when placed under stress.

This may account for some of his more bizarre behavior during the uprising against his rule in 2011, such as his claims that his opponents were rebelling because they had drunk coffee laced with hallucinogenic drugs and were members of Al-Qaeda.

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Harder to imagine are the reasons for his other bizarre statements made in calmer times, like his petition to the UN to abolish Switzerland (perhaps the fact that his son Hannibal and daughter-in-law were arrested there for beating their servants), or blaming Israel for the assassination of President Kennedy in a speech to the UN General Assembly? He also had a marked obsession with former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that led him to commission a video montage of her public appearances complete with a specially-commissioned soundtrack (“Black Flower in the White House”) and keep glossy albums full of photos of her in his residence.

This was, of course, not the only sign of Qadhafi’s eccentricity. One subject that fascinated many journalists was his troupe of female bodyguards. Rumors and innuendo swirled around this quirk in a predictable fashion, thought the truth seems to be, equally predictably, a lot less glamorous and as grim as many other aspects of life in Libya under Qadhafi. Some have since come forward with claims of sexual assault at the hands of some senior members of Qadhafi’s regime. With hindsight, surrounding himself with a group of women who were under his control and dedicated to protecting him takes his attitude to women beyond the patronizing and paternalistic into truly unsettling territory. Echoes of it can be found, perhaps, in another strange incident during one of Qadhafi’s visits to Italy, when he was in the habit of assembling large groups of young women so he could then lecture them on his thoughts on religion and women’s rights. In one case in 2009, he paid for two hundred young women to be bussed to his compound, where he delivered a twohour lecture on the role of women in society and the benefits of converting to Islam, and distributed copies of the Qur’an and his own work on political philosophy, the Green Book. He seemed unaware of the irony of hiring several hundred women from an agency to come and listen to him decry that fact that, as he put it, “[Women] are often used like bits of furniture, changed whenever the man wants. And that is an injustice."

These incidents cut to the heart of Qadhafi’s attitude to other people. They were only props to burnish his self-image as a visionary and a powerful leader. If these things were all that one knew of Qadhafi,

Hosni Mubarak, Egypt Ruled for: 30 years (1981-2011) Background: Former Air Force officer and vice president.

Came to power through: Dead man’s shoes. Was deputy to President Sadat at the time of his assassination.

Fate: Resigned amidst popular protests against his rule, February 2011.

Arrested and tried, August 2011-January 2012. Found guilty of murder of protestors; sentenced to life in prison June 2012.

Currently appealing.

Most notorious for: Crushing all opposition, manipulating elections.

Quote: “I really consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family.”

Hillary Clinton, 2009.

he would seem a harmless buffoon. But his delusions of grandeur also cost his both his own people and others dearly. His intervention in the Chadian civil war in the late 1970s and 1980s, for instance, costs thousands of lives in both countries, as did his sponsorship of rebel groups worldwide, all in a futile attempt to establish himself at the center of Arab politics, and when that didn’t work, African affairs. (At one point he started referring to himself as ‘the King of Kings of Africa’.)

Saddam Hussein was also part showman, part thug. American intelligence believed he was a “malignant narcissist” who was driven by fantasies of power and glory, was incapable of remorse, and who was paranoid and cruel. While only speculation—it is hard to imagine a paranoid dictator opening up to a therapist—some of his actions make sense if we keep this in mind. Aside from invading first Iran, and then Kuwait, he ordered the construction of a series of bizarre, tasteless monuments to his various ‘triumphs.’ One of the most famous of these is the gigantic arch in Baghdad in the form of arms wielding crossed scimitars that commemorated Iraq’s ‘victory’ in the First Gulf War of 1980-88. Named the Swords of Qadisiyyah, it was modeled on casts of Saddam’s own arms. In an act worthy of the fictional Admiral General Aladeen, Saddam reportedly rode under the arch on a white horse on the day of his inauguration ceremony.

While his people starved and grew sick, he oversaw the building of luxurious palaces for

himself and his family, and at one point approved the construction of what would have been the world’s largest mosque. The plans were announced in the mid-1990s while the Iraqi economy collapsed under the impact of UN sanctions. It was to be constructed in the Mansour district of Baghdad, would be built in the middle of an artificial lake, and would feature eight minarets and a dome 150 meters high. According to press reports from the time, it would have housed 100,000 worshippers and was projected to cost a quarter of a billion dollars. He decided, of course, that it was to be named after himself: the Saddam Mosque. Artificial islands and walkways in the shape of Arab countries would be constructed in the lake, with one in the shape of Saddam’s thumbprint. The subtext is clear: Saddam was at the center of the Arab world, and it was within his power to shape it. Construction began in 1998 and was still unfinished when the US invaded in 2003. Today, it is at best half-finished, and its shell looms over Baghdad.

Saddam’s bizarre sense of grandiosity extended to the relics of Iraq’s ancient past.

He went so far as the order the reconstruction of the ancient city of Babylon, but with bricks inscribed with his own name in imitation of the ancient king Nebuchadnezzar.

Aside from his forays into architecture, Saddam also sought to conquer a literary genre: the blockbuster novel, though it is alleged that he was assisted by some ghostwriters. The first of these works, and the most famous, was Zabibah and the King, a

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torrid romance in which a peasant woman, Zabibah (who represents Iraq), is mistreated by her brutal, domineering husband (America), but avenged by a benevolent monarch (guess who?) with whom she has fallen in love.

Three more novels followed—The Fortified Castle, Men and the City, and Begone, Demons—all of which enjoyed enormous sales in Iraq and very little critical acclaim everywhere else. A journalist with a British magazine once sent anonymous extracts of Zabibah to established authors and editors to get their objective opinions on its literary merit. The reviews were not encouraging.

One writer said that the number of rhetorical questions alone indicated that the author was not interested in his readers. The book was an ego trip, in other words. Qadhafi, too, dabbled in literature, but restricted himself to an anthology of short stories. A reviewer from the Guardian called it “surreal rants and bizarre streams of consciousness obviously unmolested by the hand of any editor.”

On the surface, these are the acts of somebody deranged—somebody unable to engage with reality—yet Saddam tenaciously clung to power, as did Qadhafi. This is something that should be borne in mind: no matter how bizarre and unreal a dictator’s antics may seem, they remain dangerous. Their obsession with building monuments to their own glory and power served a purpose beyond flattering their own egos, and reminded their own people who was in charge. Qadhafi proved to be wily, cunning, and ruthless; even Saddam’s famed paranoia served to terrify his underlings.

Hafez Al-Assad, Syria Ruled for: 29 years (1971-2000) Background: Former Air Force officer, minister of defense.

Came to power through: Bloodless internal Ba’ath party coup.

Fate: Died in office of natural causes in June 2000.

Most notorious for: Destroying city of Hama in 1982 uprising, machinations in Lebanon.

Quote: “What are you talking about, 7,000? No, no. We killed at least 38,000.”

Rifaat Al-Assad, brother of Hafez, on the Hama massacre (quoted in Thomas Friedman’s From Beirut to Jerusalem).

In contrast, Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad seems to be more modest and self-effacing; a chip off the old block like his father, Hafez, who on many accounts seemed to have little interest in the trappings of power. Perhaps if Syria had enjoyed the oil wealth of Libya and Iraq, the story would have been different. What is not different is his determination to hang onto power, seemingly at any price. There are some examples of the dictator’s outlandish behavior to be found: his government has insisted on maintaining the illusion of power and control, denouncing its

Bashar Al-Assad, Syria Ruled for: 12 years at time of writing (2000-present) Background: Former eye surgeon, son of previous president.

Came to power through: Dead man’s shoes.

Father and older brother died of natural causes and a road accident, respectively.

Fate: Currently fighting for survival against an uprising.

Most notorious for: Attempting to crush opponents.

Quote: “I am president, I don't own the country so they are not my forces.”

Bashar Al-Assad denies responsibility for violence in Syria, December 2011.

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enemies as “armed gangs” and “terrorists,” and blaming them exclusively for the troubles Syria finds itself in. Bashar’s father Hafez encouraged a personality cult, with omnipresent pictures of himself plastered everywhere in Syria. Aside from the brief interlude of the ‘Damascus Spring,’ Bashar has followed in his father’s footsteps in this, too.

Downfall A few lessons can be drawn from all of this.

As Mesquita and Smith say in their book, never expect a dictator to do anything to benefit their own people if it endangers their grip on power. Second, never expect a dictator to stop corruption unless they see it in their own interest to do so, and never, ever, expect them to share power with anyone unless forced.

Absolute power, as Lincoln observes, also tests the character of the person who holds it. It is a test most dictators fail, and fail spectacularly in the cases of Saddam Hussein and Qadhafi.

Nonetheless, dictators can fall. As was have seen over the past year, the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen have been more or less toppled, while Assad is clinging on in Syria in the midst of a bloody, life-or-death struggle.

Perhaps this means that another old adage is true, and pride does go before a fall.

Then again, given how long those men were able to keep themselves in power, perhaps not.

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Candid Conversations

The Middle East in a G-Zero World

Ian Bremmer: “We will no longer see US global leadership” In an exclusive interview with Ian Bremmer, The Majalla explores the unfamiliar terrain of his “G-Zero” concept, and the leaderless world it envisions. We ask how the Middle East will fare in a world where no one state is in a position to exercise global leadership. Who will be the winners and losers? How will states survive in this new world? What comes next?

Andrew Bowen

I

an Bremmer is the founder and President of the Eurasia Group, a leading geopolitical risk advisory firm. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University and was the youngest national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is an author of several books including, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?, and The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall, which was selected by The Economist as one of the best books of 2006. Bremmer is a contributor for the Financial Times A-List and Reuters.com, and writes “The Call” blog on ForeignPolicy.com. His newest work is Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World.

Your new work revolves around the idea of the absence of global leadership and its implications. Terming it “the G-Zero” you argue that “the world rests on the absence of one country or group of countries exercising global leadership.” What is the main implication of a G-Zero world?

We have been living in a world for more than half a century where there has been global leadership. It’s not always been effective and certainly not always the preference of everyone out there, but it existed. It was the world order, it was USled globalization. It’s now gone. We will no longer see US-led global institutions or architecture. We will no longer see US global leadership. We will either see US leadership that is not global, or we will see some global institutions that are not USled that will eventually emerge, or we will

see neither. But right now this G-Zero period is very much not the next new world order; it’s not sustainable. Nature abhors a vacuum and geopolitics does too, but it is where we are right now. We don’t have global leadership right now. That is the way we should think about global solutions and how the world functions.

How long have we been living in a G-Zero world?

The G-Zero was born in 2008. It was conceived before that if you want to torture the analogy. We have lived in a USled world in terms of all our major institutions and architecture and the world economy since World War II. But, you can say that really started to shift with first the rise of OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries]

and then, much more structurally with the rise of the emerging markets from the 1970s, notably China and the other BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa]. You have a group of emerging countries that do not share fundamental values—and in many cases political and economic systems and priorities—with that of the United States, or its allies among the advanced industrial democracies. So for a period of 30 years, you have had this underlying shift from the countries that were leading the world and its institutions and defining the world standards and the actual balance of power globally. That is the context in which the G-Zero came into fruition. But, in order for the G-Zero to be born, you needed a shock that would break down and shake to its roots the old institutions and sys-

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tems. While the world experiences shocks all the time: the collapse of the Soviet Union, 9/11, the Asian currency crises, the peso and Rouble crises, it was really only the 2008 financial crisis that was large enough and hit when the balance of power had shifted sufficiently that we saw the G-Zero created.

How does the Middle East fare in a G-Zero world? Who are the winners and losers?

It’s interesting because in the Middle East you have both the Arab Spring, that has buffeted so many of these countries internally, but you also have the G-Zero which matters immensely externally. It’s very clear we should not just focus on what these global populations want, but also the fact that international players who have been historically so dominant in determining outcomes across different Middle Eastern conflicts will have much less of a role. The US is of course out of Iraq and not about to put troops back in if the situation deteriorates. Qadhafi was removed from power in Libya but there is no interest in having troops on the ground to rebuild that country. It’s largely a limited UN endeavor. You can talk about [a similar situation in]Yemen, Syria, and Egypt. The US, Russia, China, these are all takers in terms of foreign policy but are not makers of foreign policy in the Middle East. They will not lead outcomes.

The most important players are increasingly local players. Unlike Europe where Germany is the dominant player, in the Middle East there are several dominant players, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.

Egypt would be one too but they are very distracted by their domestic instability and transition. The challenge is that these states all support different outcomes.

The Saudis support more integration in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council], largely Sunni Arab monarchies, and stability and the status quo. The Iranians are the opposite of the Saudis on every issue across the Middle East. Qadhafi is almost unique in that both the Saudis and the Iranians disliked him. The Iranians support largely disenfranchised Sunni populations, which puts them [Saudi Arabia and Iran] on opposite sides in these conflicts. The Turks are probably closer to the Issue 1572 • April 2012

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Saudis but nonetheless have a very different perspective in terms of their secularized democracy, urban middle classes, and more economic and political reforms.

Well, if those are the countries that will play the most significant role, we will clearly see much more sectarianism, fragmentation, and much more conflict in the Middle East. The G-Zero is not kind to the Middle East.

Of course, the biggest loser in the Middle East in the G-Zero is Israel. Because with the absence of a very strong role for the United States, who is going to be supporting the Israelis? They have lost their relatively decent relations with the Turks, the Egyptians, and are in the process of having a much more fractious relationship with the Jordanians. Israel is searching really hard for friends and feeling much more isolated in this environment.

“Unlike Europe where Germany is the dominant player, in the Middle East there are several dominant players, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey” Do you see Egypt playing a role in the G-Zero?

Clearly, Egypt is constrained right now and they are constrained in part because they have no money. Egypt always had problems with its budget in the best of times. Tourism has fallen off the cliff. It’s 30 percent of their GDP. Who’s going to Egypt right now? Most of the country is pretty stable in terms of the economy and the ability of people to get work. But, they had an enormous economic hit. Yes, the Saudis are prepared to provide economic support—and other countries are as well—but it’s a very difficult transition.

There is obviously still a very significant level of tension between the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. A lot of young people feel that the revolution has not benefited them. I see challenges on all these fronts.

In the absence of global leadership, is there any way to manage the crisis with Iran?

I certainly think that there is a lot of international desire to stop the Iranians from developing nuclear capacity. There is willingness to have a negotiated settlement but that requires a level of transparency and commitment from the Iranian regime and a level of consistency from the leadership that is very difficult to envision. Also, the Iranians have some leverage nowadays with the global economic recovery rebound being anemic; the concept of high oil prices is one that is very problematic for most of the Western leaders that are trying to press the Iranians. There are plenty countries of willing to breach the sanctions [imposed on Iran]. They are willing to support continued economic relations with Iran, since it has significant internal wealth and significant ability to be useful to these countries.

Obviously, I am talking about countries like China, Russia, and even, India. When I put that all together, it makes it hard to believe there is going to be a breakthrough. I don’t happen to believe that the Americans will bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities. Even though the Israelis are much more concerned about [Iran’s nuclear threat], I think it is highly unlikely that they would either, it’s not impossible but it’s unlikely. I suspect that there will be fits and starts on diplomacy but the Iranians will continue to develop breakout nuclear capacity and ultimately we will learn to live with it just as we have with the North Koreans and the Pakistanis.

Can Russia play a more crucial role in the resolution of the nuclear issue?

It’s not clear how much of a role the Russians are prepared to play. The Russians usually want to be paid for it if they have leverage. I have seen now a series of [US] secretaries of state that have said “well the Russians have the same interests on Iran as the Americans do” but that is not true. It’s not how the Russians perceive their self-interest.

They see it more narrowly. It’s not that the Russians don’t want the Iranians to develop nukes but the Russians find utility in having influence with Middle Eastern countries that will support them or will be a thorn in the West’s side on a whole bunch of international issues. The Iranians of course support the Syrians and Syria is important for the Rus41

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Candid Conversations

sians in terms of military bases in the region and buying arms. Historically, the Iranians have engaged in economic cooperation with the Russians on ballistic missile technology, on civilian nuclear energy, and maybe, not so civilian energy. So, it’s very hard to say the Russians are aligned [with the US]. On most issues, the Russians have different priorities and in many cases different values from the advanced industrial countries that comprise the G8. I think that is an important point to always keep in mind.

What will likely come next after the G-Zero? Will it be the return of US global leadership or a new Cold War between China and the US? Or, will it be a world order more regional than global?

We have been in the G-Zero now for four years since the financial crisis. If you look at what has been emerging in a nascent fashion in those four years, the US-China relationship has been deteriorating and will likely to continue to do so. Other countries are playing a larger role on the world stage, such as Brazil, India, Turkey—in part because they are coming into their own—but also the US and China are continuing to be reluctant to play a dominant role, and in China’s case incapable of doing so.

The world likely to replace the G-Zero is a world of regions which does not have global leadership but instead has very different types of integration in different parts of the world. Europe is much more focused on political and economic integration and shared values; in the Middle East, you see different countries with different models and much more sectarianism; Eurasia is dominated by Russia through security and energy ties to the Russians. Asia will be trickier: economic ties drive [countries in the region] towards China but the security drives [them] towards the United States.  Andrew Bowen is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and regularly writes, teaches, and consults on Middle Eastern politics and American foreign policy. His work primarily focuses on the regional and international politics of the Levant, but he frequently comments on the international relations of the Gulf and American national security policy.

Potential New Players Bremmer’s Premise: The “G-Zero” can be best understood with reference to a group of emerging countries that have shifted from the architecture and fundamental values implemented by the Anglo-American new world order following the end of the Second World War. This shift began in the 1960s with the creation of OPEC and was catalysed by the financial crisis of 2008. Bremer purports that the latter event broke down and fundamentally unsettled the old institutions and system—and with it the balance of power, thus creating the G-Zero.

Brazil Brazil’s economy is the largest in South America and the country boasts welldeveloped agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors. Since 2003, Brazil has improved its macroeconomic stability, built foreign reserves, reduced debt, kept inflation rates under control and committed to fiscal responsibilities Russia Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of area, at more than 6.6 million square miles. It is one of the most industrialized of the former Soviet republics.

Besides its resource-based industries, it has developed large manufacturing capacities, notably in metals, food products, and transport equipment. Russia is now the world’s third-largest exporter of steel and primary aluminum. Russia inherited most of the defense-industrial base of the Soviet Union, so armaments remain an important export category for Russia.

India India is labor-intensive economy, and has benefited immensely from outsourcing from developed countries. It has a strong manufacturing and export-oriented industrial framework.

China Market liberalization in the Chinese economy has brought its economy forward by leaps and bounds. Forecasts for 2015 predict China’s GDP to reach nearly US$10 billion, growing 10-12 percent per year between 2010 and 2015. In the last 30 years, the rate of Chinese economic growth has been almost miraculous, averaging 8 percent growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per annum. The economy has grown more than 10 times during that period, with Chinese GDP reaching 3.42 trillion US dollars in 2007. China already has the biggest economy after the United States and most analysts predict China will become the largest economy in the world this century.

South Africa South Africa is one of the most stable economies in the African continent. It is a middle-income country, with fully developed basic infrastructure. The country exhibits several indicators of a developing economy, such as well grown primary, secondary and tertiary sectors and non-dependency on agriculture. The manufacturing, mining and service sectors are the largest contributors to the country’s GDP. Source: www.economywatch.com

“Other countries are playing a larger role on the world stage, such as Brazil, India, Turkey—in part because they are coming into their own—but also the US and China are continuing to be reluctant to play a dominant role, and in China’s case incapable of doing so”

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Profile

Vladimir Putin: The Judo Master of the Kremlin

Does Putin have the moves to resist pressure on Russia’s links with Syria?

Vladimir Putin has used the skills he developed as a member of the KGB to dominate Russian politics for the best part of 15 years.

Photo © Getty Images

T

he accusations from the US that Russia is continuing to ship offensive weapons to the Syrian government while it battles against rebels is bound to focus more attention on Russia and its controversial president, Vladimir Putin.

To his opponents, he is an authoritarian who brooks no dissent, willing to use force and manipulation of the media to crush his political opponents, and who undermines democracy and tolerates corruption in high places if it keeps him in power.

To his supporters, he is a strong leader who has restored some stability and national pride to Russia after economic and political crises, the military disaster of the first Chechnyan War, demographic collapse, and the looting of state assets by the oligarchs of the 1990s, and who is restoring the power and prestige of the Russian state. He has also presided over an economic boom based on exports of Russia’s rich bounty of natural resources, improving the economy after years of stagnation and collapse.

Born in St. Petersburg (named Leningrad under Communist rule) in 1952, his parent’s two elder sons had perished during the Second World War. As a youth he grew up aspiring to a career in the security services. He went on to study international law at Leningrad State University. It was at university that he met the law professor Anatoly Sobchak, who would play an important role in his future.

Upon graduation in 1975, he enlisted in the KGB, and after training and a variety of domestic assignments he was posted to East Germany in the 1980s, possibly because of his fluency in the language. He married Lyudmila Skrebneva in 1983, a student and former flight attendant, and the couple had two daughters. After the collapse of East Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Putin was recalled to St. Petersburg, where he was assigned to watch the student body of his alma mater for subversives and potential recruits.

He resigned from the KGB with the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1991, but by then had obtained his first job in politics as an advisor on international affairs to his former professor, Anatoly Sobchak, who had become the first elected mayor of St. Petersburg. Putin went on to hold a string of posts in the city government, un-

Putin was still largely unknown to the Russian public and the world at large when he became one of three Deputy Prime Ministers, and eventually Prime Minister in August 1999, after President Yeltsin fired his predecessor

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til he was appointed deputy chief of staff to President Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin in 1997, a year after Sobchak’s defeat in the 1996 election.

Other Kremlin jobs followed, most notably as head of one of the successors of the KGB, the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) in 1998. Putin was still largely unknown to the Russian public and the world at large when he became one of three Deputy Prime Ministers, and eventually Prime Minister in August 1999, after President Yeltsin fired his predecessor.

It was also a surprise when Yeltsin announced that he wanted Putin to succeed him as president. Yeltsin, by this stage ailing and plagued by health and alcohol problems, facilitated this by resigning at the end of 1999, making Putin the acting president. He subsequently won the presidential election three months later, his image bolstered by his oversight of the return of Russian troops to Chechnya in 1999 following a terrorist bombing campaign, which helped ease the sting of the 1996 withdrawal from the breakaway region after a disastrous military campaign.

Since then, Putin has dominated Russian politics, serving two consecutive terms as president between 2000 and 2008 as head of the ‘United Russia’ party. He was then appointed prime minister under his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, and won another presidential term in 2012 amidst allegations of electoral irregularities from international observers. Throughout, he has enjoyed consistently high approval ratings amongst most Russians.

Over the last decade, Putin has carefully cultivated an image as a macho ‘action man,’ with a mission to restore Russian power and prestige. He is frequently photographed indulging in outdoor pursuits like hunting, horse riding, and fishing, racing Formula 1 cars, and at the control of combat jets (he flew into Chechnya to visit Russian forces in a fighter jet after announcing his candidacy for president in 2000), and is well-known for his expertise in Judo and its Russian counterpart, Sambo. In contrast, he has been careful to keep his private and family life out of the public eye. Despite some media speculation, he has not responded to claims that he is separated from his wife, or to rumors linking him to several different women.

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He has also used the full power of the state to crush the political power of the oligarchs, the coterie of wealthy businessmen who gained incredible fortunes in the free-market reforms of the 1990s, and especially those who engaged in political activity. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia’s richest man and head of the oil giant Yukos, was jailed for fraud and tax evasion and his assets seized by the state after funding opposition parties and criticizing President Putin’s style of government .

Amidst recent, growing protest in Russia against his personal, authoritarian style

of rule, and endemic low-level official corruption, it is likely that Putin will worry about being perceived as weak, giving him an added incentive to continue to resist international pressure to cut or downgrade ties with Assad’s government in Syria.

His focus on increasing Russian power and influence abroad also make it unlikely that he will be willing to give up support for Syria, a major purchaser of Russian armaments, and the site of Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean and wider Middle East. 45

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Wealth of Nations

Hedging Bets

The Importance of Economic Diversification for Saudi Arabia In the context of a difficult global market, with oil prices dropping, Saudi Arabia has become increasingly exposed due to the limited structure of its economy. Economic diversification will be necessary to ensure the future stability of the Saudi economy. Fortunately, the country demonstrates high potential in a number of sectors, which could be developed to protect the country from future shocks in the oil market.

Paula Mejia

S

“That the country’s refined products have been the fastest growing category of exports bodes well for Saudi Arabia’s future growth”

visit to Saudi Arabia, such practices allowed for higher imports and increased worker remittances, which together with financial assistance created positive spillover effects in other economies in the region and beyond.

Saudi Arabia’s economic performance has been strong and its outlook remains positive. Nevertheless, the country’s growth is expected to slow from 7.1 percent in 2011 to 6 percent in 2012. And

Photo © Getty Images

audi Arabia’s role as a leading producer of oil has put it in a position of great responsibility.

Through the prudent management of its resources, Saudi Arabia has managed to provide important support to the global economy during a period of high instability, including through its actions in stabilizing the global oil market.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s most recent findings following a

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while the oil sector will remain a fundamental aspect of the country’s economy and its important geopolitical position, Saudi Arabia’s high reliance on the oil sector also puts the country at risk from future shocks in the oil market.

Already the European debt crisis has had an impact on Saudi Arabia’s economy. Oil prices have slumped as a result, with Brent crude falling around 20 percent due to a weakened global stock market, the reduction of a political risk premium resulting from improved relations with Iran, and increases in the global stock of oil. These events have been followed by the abrupt fall of TASI, the Saudi stock market, significant decreases in consumer spending, and rising inflation.

Yet, in spite of the weakening state of the global economy and the inevitable impact that it has had on Saudi Arabia’s economy, the country shows promise in a number of sectors, which if exploited further could provide an alternative lifeline to the country.

In a clear break from past trends, Saudi Arabia’s private sector is growing. This trend can be in part explained by the increase in bank lending to private sector. In year-onyear terms, lending growth was at its highest since March 2009. More specifically, bank lending to private sector rose by 1.1 percent in April to reach 13.5 percent in year-onyear terms, according to a recent report by Jadwa Investment. Increased lending opportunities are crucial for the growth of the private sector, as they provide entrepreneurs and SMEs with the possibility to pursue new ventures. In advancing the opportunities available in the private sector, increased lending also creates important positive spillover effects in the rest of the economy, such as the creation of more jobs.

Further demonstrating the potential areas of growth in Saudi Arabia’s economy, non-oil exports and imports grew significantly in March of this year.

Petrochemicals and refined products led non-oil exports. That the country’s refined products have been the fastest growing category of exports bodes well for Saudi Arabia’s future growth. Countries that focus on exporting a wide variety of products, especially products of higher levels of sophistication that have Issue 1574 • July/August 2012

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Timeline 1932 Oil is discovered in Bahrain. Standard Oil of California (Socal - later Chevron) begins a year-long series of negotiations with the Saudi government.

1933 Saudi Arabia grants oil concession to Socal. Oil prospecting begins on Kingdom's east coast.

1938 Kingdom's first commercial oil field discovered at Dhahran. Crude is exported by barge to Bahrain.

1939 First tanker load of petroleum is exported.

1944 Casoc changes its name to Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco).

1950 1,700 km Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (Tapline) is completed, linking Eastern Province oil fields to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.

1956 Aramco confirms scale of Ghawar and Safaniya, the largest onshore and the largest offshore field in the world, respectively.

1961 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)—propane and butane—is first processed at Ras Tanura and shipped to customers.

1973 Saudi Arabia acquires 25 percent interest in Aramco.

1980 Saudi Government acquires 100 percent participation interest in Aramco, purchasing almost all of the company's assets.

1981 East-West Pipelines, built for Aramco natural gas liquids and crude oil, link Eastern Province fields with Yanbu on the Red Sea. 1987 East-West Crude Oil Pipeline expansion project is completed, boosting capacity to 3.2 million barrels (510,000 m3) per day.

1988 Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or Saudi Aramco, is established.

1989 High-quality oil and gas are discovered south of Riyadh — the first find outside original operating area.

1992 East-West Crude Oil Pipeline capacity is boosted to 5 million barrels (790,000 m3) per day.

1994 Maximum sustained crude-oil production capacity is returned to 10 million barrels (1,600,000 m3) per day.

2005 Saudi Aramco and Sumitomo Chemical Co., Ltd. sign a joint venture agreement for the development of a large, integrated refining and petrochemical complex in the Red Sea town of Rabigh, on Saudi Arabia's west coast.

2008 Saudi Aramco celebrates the 75th anniversary of the 1933 oil concession with Socal.

2009 Saudi Aramco reaches 12 Mbbl/d (1,900,000 m3/d) capacity after completing an expansion program.

2011 Saudi Aramco starts production from Karan Gas Field, with an output of more than 400 standard cubic feet per day.

2011 Saudi Aramco is officially named the world's largest and most valuable privately owned company.

a higher added value, boast higher levels of growth. If Saudi Arabia continues on this trend, it could see a similar positive trajectory to other countries that have pursued this approach to growth, such as South Korea.

According to the IMF’s study, many of the positive trends currently being observed in Saudi Arabia result from the government’s positive and prudent management of the economy. The Saudi government is well placed to continue to build on these advances and it is most likely to achieve success if it further reforms the economy, rendering its business environment more favorable. In addition

to sustaining its reform agenda, the IMF has called on Saudi Arabia to support the growth of its financial sector, primarily by implementing Basel III, strengthening risk management, and promoting capital market development. Paula Mejia is a freelance journalist based in Tunisia and consultant for the African Development Bank. Her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L'Institut D'Etudes Politiques de Paris and the University of Chicago.

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Editor's Choice

Brotherhood Liberals Abdullah Al-Otaibi

W

ith any major event, an intellectual must review their information and perceptions, yet they do not necessarily have to change their outlook unless there are objective reasons to do so. In the Arab world, considerable and long overdue debates have arisen across the entire scene, whether in terms of depicting, interpreting, analyzing or envisioning the future.

In this context, it is natural, or even healthy, to witness an ongoing debate about the rise of political Islamist groups to power in a number of Arab states via the ballot box. Here it is beneficial to incorporate multiple perspectives and approaches to analyze a phenomenon of such size and complexity. Comparisons must be drawn and attention must be paid to history, the current reality and the future, along with various political, economic and cultural challenges.

However, some Arab intellectuals, the majority of whom are commenting from outside the “Arab Spring” states, have opted to adhere to their own particular point of view whilst dismissing all others. For example, they believe that the rules of politics necessitate that they must be satisfied without any form of criticism, questioning or analysis – by the Muslim Brotherhood acquiring the most votes in recent elections. By doing so, they are hiding behind the slogan of democracy, yet ignoring its very essence and its profound arguments both past and present. They are also ignoring the fact that the results achieved in the ballot boxes do not necessarily represent a transformation in mindset or outlook.

For the past year and a half, many symbols, elites and civil parties in Egypt have expressed varying degrees of concern regarding the Brotherhood’s rise to power. When the election results were announced, none of the aforementioned rejected President Morsi's victory, but rather they continued to be wary of the Brotherhood and its political project and persisted with their criticism politically, by choosing to be in the opposition. However, this is something which some other Arab intellectuals failed to do, under the pretext that Morsi's votes should nullify all historical, cultural and political criticisms of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Last week, a revealing incident took place when President Morsi announced a decree to overrule the earlier decision to dissolve Egypt’s parliament issued by the constitutional court, the same court where the president acquired his constitutional legitimacy by taking his oath of office. Subsequently, Egypt was engulfed in a crisis that lasted for days when civil currents, liberals, nationalists, leftists and others championed the civil state option by adopting explicit and strong stances against the president's decree.

Several well-known names adopted such a stance including Sa'duddin Ibrahim, Hamdin Sabahi, Mohammed ElBaradei, Refaat el-Saeed, El-Sayyid el-Badawi and many others. Yet some Arab intellectuals failed to do so, and maintained their same old conviction that the ballot boxes must be obeyed.

A few days later, Morsi retracted his decision; having thrown a huge stone into the

“A revealing incident took place when President Morsi announced a decree to overrule the earlier decision to dissolve Egypt’s parliament issued by the constitutional court, the same court where the president acquired his constitutional legitimacy by taking his oath of office”

Egyptian political pool and watched the waves reverberate around him. Perhaps, this was simply a ploy to create a crisis and subsequently deal with it in order to reshape the Egyptian scene, and this could be a common strategy in the forthcoming period.

The principle of realism is not a naive submission to the accomplished facts, rather it is an attempt to understand the reality, analyze it and then identify the priorities and interests at stake. Domestically, realism prompted the Brotherhood's opponents in both Egypt and Tunisia to confront the movement following its victory. Whilst regionally, the Gulf States – for example – confronted two Islamist models; the Shiite model in Iran, and the Brotherhood model in Sudan. The Gulf States did not cut off their diplomatic ties with either country, despite the fact that they lived a state of open confrontation with Iran, and a state of repulsion and attraction with Sudan. This puts paid to the idea that the only political option in such situations is comprehensive acceptance or diplomatic severance.

No two democratic experiences are the same, whether in the times of ancient Greece, or in the contemporary history of Europe and the West. Furthermore the experiences of the West are far different to those of the East. Hence, when some Arab intellectuals attempt to identify elements of similarity between the Arab voters level of electoral awareness compared to that of the West, this neglects the historical and cultural contexts of the respective nations.

The Western citizen has overcome many of his old group loyalties that are, at least politically, deemed to be backwards – i.e. sectarian, ethnic, ideological and tribal loyalties – whilst the Arab citizen still seems completely immersed in these.

Although such loyalties continue to exist among some categories in the West today, Western awareness cannot be classified as backwards. Comparably, the voting results in our Arab world clearly demonstrate that such backward loyalties are deeplyrooted in our Arab consciousness.

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then required to adhere to. Yet these numbers are worthless if they serve to abolish historical information, the freedom of thought and political institutions.

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood never believed in democracy, although he used it as a tool to dominate power. He rejected political parties, and favored violence against those in his group who adopted a different viewpoint. He regularly used the stick to punish them, and this evolved into the establishment of a secret organization for assassinations and political killings. Then he exported his ideology and his group led a coup in Yemen. Today the “old guard” and members of the Brotherhood’s secret organization dominate the decision-making process within the group, having managed to expel most affiliates who adopted a different point of view. With this history and reality it is clear that this group, in its internal dealings, never believed in de-

mocracy. Yet, some intellectuals now seem convinced that it will abide by democracy in its leadership of the state.

The Muslim Brotherhood has consciously confined the concept of democracy to the ballot box, curbing the wider concept by placing restrictions on culture, intellect, art and creativity. Some Arab intellectuals have failed to realize that the Brotherhood's interpretation of democracy is only designed to serve its political project, and that this has nothing to do with the true essence of democracy.

Any observer can recall numerous dubious acts committed by the Brotherhood's newly-elected symbols, as well as their unelected guides, in both Tunisia and Egypt, yet some "Brotherhood liberals" prefer to completely turn a blind eye to this, believing that the only thing that matters is the ballot box and its results. This article was printed in Asharq Alawsat

Photo © Getty Images

We must by no means confuse the way in which supporters of a political party in the West cast their votes with the way in which Muslim Brotherhood affiliates act the two situations are vastly different. The former case is deemed a political choice, whereas the latter is mere ideological dogmatism. The Brotherhood affiliates are under an oath of allegiance to the General Guide, to whom they are subordinate, and as a result, they go to the ballot boxes without free will. This is clear from the Muslim Brotherhood's literature on the subject, so should intellectuals continue to champion such dogmatism, as long as it is carried out in democratic circumstances?

An intellectual would be doing a great disservice to history and to his peers if he viewed the Muslim Brotherhood purely from the perspective of the ballot box with no consideration for its history, awareness, culture or politics. The ballot box only gives us numbers, which everyone is

Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi, arrives for a press conference flanked by security guards

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Editor's Choice

Heikal: The Strategic Sheikh Mshari al-Zaydi

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hose who were shocked by the recent statements issued by the "Sheikh" of the Egyptian Nasserite press, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, regarding the Syrian tragedy, should perhaps pay more attention to Heikal's rhetoric in the future!

We have long been accustomed to hearing Sheikh Heikal's "strategic" talk regarding the game of nations, the regional vacuum, power struggles, the Cold War, warring axes, and all his hidden secrets and untold tales that he keeps in his dangerous archive. Over the past two decades, Heikal has appeared as someone who no longer lives in the present day, but rather is captured by his own Cold War thought process between the communist Russian bear and the capitalist American eagle. Yet his recent statements about the Syrian crisis, as published in al-Ahram daily newspaper and circulated by several news websites, suggest that perhaps Heikal this time is living in the present day.

In his article and assessment of the current Egyptian stance towards the Syrian crisis, Heikal says that he does not imagine "the Egyptian stance towards Syria to be driven by others. The relationship between Egypt and Syria has held a special nature throughout history. I do not imagine that Egypt can break off its contact or its political, trade or cultural relationships with Syria for whatever reason, because Syria is Syria, regardless of the nature of the ruling regime in Damascus." He then goes on to describe what

the Syrian opposition and the entire international media, not only the Arab media, say about the nature of the horrors taking place on Syrian soil as "a feverish campaign of exaggeration, with an element of truth of course, yet the amount of exaggerations and overstatements far outweigh facts." Heikal reveals that he fears "a perfect strategic vacuum in the east, extending from eastern Iraq to the shores of the Mediterranean."

Sheikh Heikal concludes his shocking view by saying "I can also see the influence of al-Qaeda, but I do not know the logic of those who facilitated its access to Syria, in order to blow up and kill people.

I also know that Blackwater – a company known for its secret and bloody history of weapons services – is active around and inside Syria, albeit under a new name, and that there are nearly 6,000 affiliates of this company who are operating both inside and outside the country." Heikal then alleges that Turkey has its own considerations when it comes to the Syrian crisis, and has begun to reconsider its earlier push, whereas some Arab states are persisting to topple the al-Assad regime with determined zeal, which he believes to be either naive or a display of complete ignorance regarding the facts of strategic balance.

In summary, Heikal’s words do nothing more than promote the propaganda of Bashar al-Assad’s media, the Iranian media and the rhetoric of Sergey Lavrov the Russian Minister of Propaganda serving his country’s Tsar, Vladimir Putin.

“A revealing incident took place when President Morsi announced a decree to overrule the earlier decision to dissolve Egypt’s parliament issued by the constitutional court, the same court where the president acquired his constitutional legitimacy by taking his oath of office”

There is nothing new in this rhetoric, just Heikal’s usual blend of spice and excitement, and the latest example is his "Blackwater" story, something we can neither confirm nor disprove. Mr. Heikal previously alleged that a Serbian nationalist group was behind the September 11 attacks on the US. Indeed, it seems he does not want to acknowledge the existence of a popular uprising, or that a regime is ravaging its own people, and that people are being displaced and killed purely because of their sectarian identity, as evidenced by the daily footage of such crimes.

Heikal seems to have failed to see what is happening in Baba Amr, al-Khalidya, al-Hawla, Daraa, Deir Al-Zour, Zamalka, Douma or rural Aleppo, nor does he see the most blatant savage massacres committed in the present century in front of the entire world and in a daily live broadcast.

This is his own business, yet what matters here is the bitter malice he bears towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, a sentiment which he has long harbored and which is seemingly a remnant of the Nasser-Faisal struggle.

I imagine that if Saudi Arabia had not sided with the Syrian people, perhaps Heikal would have changed his stance, or at least adopted a more relaxed one.

The man still seems to be captured by the 1950s and 1960s period of interArab struggle. He believes Saudi Arabia acts with a sense of superiority, and as such stands against any role it may perform in the region, something that it never seeks to do in the first place. Heikal believes there is a vacuum between Iran and Egypt - perhaps with the exception of the Damascus oasis. In his view, the region consists of Egypt and Iran only, and perhaps Turkey, and this view is not radically different to that of the most hardened orientalists and Zionists. Indeed, it is odd that he promotes this in the name of Arabism, Islamic history and civilization.

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Sheikh Heikal recently attempted to evoke Nasserite memories by quoting the late President Gamal Abdul-Nasser as saying "It is important that Syria should remain."

There can be no doubt that it is important that Syria should remain. Who would dare to argue with such a sentiment? Yet the devil lies in the detail, so which Syria does Heikal mean in this context? Which Syria does he want to maintain?

He wants the Syria that he came to know with Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, one that can perform its required role externally, regardless of the fact that it kills its own people in a systematic manner.

He wants the Syria that Putin and Lavrov can maintain in some way, and that Khamenei and Hassan Nasrallah can also maintain in their own manner. He wants the Syria that can continue to perform its regional function, and perhaps this is what the West wants as well.

The West and Russia need the alAssad regime because it maintains peace with Israel, of course with some added sound effects of war that guarantee that any effective Arab Sunni role is curbed and confined to specific boundaries. The Russians and the West are negotiating for the ouster of the "employee" Bashar alAssad, but not his job.

In March, Lavrov himself issued a statement about Russian and Western views towards the Syrian crisis, in which he highlighted the crux of the matter, not the superficial impression given in negotiations and conferences. In an interview he gave to Kommersant FM radio, and also published by Russia Today, Lavrov said: "You said that our position on Syria differed from what they think, say, in the West. On the contrary, what they think does not at all differ from what we declare in our position. They think in just the same way. There is a great difference between what they discuss in the calm and quiet of their offices and military headquarters and what they are saying publicly in the capitals."

Lavrov suggested that Russia and the West unanimously agree of the crux of the Syrian crisis, saying: "They [the West] perfectly know that as far back as last April there were first reports about armed men among demonstrators provoking the Issue 1574 • July/August 2012

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Egyptian editor and journalist Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, one of the most important writers of the Nasser era

authorities into a disproportionate reaction." With such an inclination, Lavrov is promoting the same version of events as peddled by the Syrian regime about the existence of al-Qaeda, weapons, armed gangs and so on.

It is worth noting that with regards to the Syrian crisis, demonstrators only began to carry weapons after five months had passed since the start of peaceful protests and continual bloody repression.

Yet Lavrov and Sheikh Heikal fail to take this period into account.

Why have the US and the European Union slackened their overt political and

legal support for the Syrian opposition, failing to provide weapons and cover, or at least buffer zones to facilitate the regime's collapse and maintain the Syrian state after al-Assad has been overthrown? This is another matter that goes beyond the same old rhetoric of conferences and negotiations, but now is not the place for this.

Heikal's recent rhetoric convinces us that the al-Assad regime will certainly be overthrown, given that he also offered his wisdom and advice to Abdul-Nasser and Saddam Hussein in the past! This article was printed in Asharq Alawsat 53

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The Arts

The Arabian Horse Equestrianism through the ages

In the year of Queen Elizabeth’s Diamond Jubilee comes The Horse: From Arabia to Royal Ascot, the title of a major exhibition at the British Museum.

Juliet Highet

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ow many courtly poems have been written to the Arabian horse? How many evocative Bedouin songs have risen into the night sky above a desert encampment in praise of this noble animal? These petite-but-tough galloping champions of the sands have been treasured in the West, too. This horse, the most iconic symbol of Arabian romance and pride, has been as much admired for its sensitive beauty as it has for its speed and powers of endurance in the inhospitable territories in which it has been bred since at least 3,500 B.C.E. Entire peoples and cultures have been characterised by the horse and its central role in society—in peace and war, in mythology and literature. As travel is one of the defining features of human development, so the history of the horse is in essence the history of civilisation, a force for change in ancient cultures. Both pure Arabian bloodstock and its descendant thoroughbreds continue to win world-famous races today.

The Horse: From Arabia to Royal Ascot is the title of a major exhibition at the British Museum and its accompanying book. This is the year of Queen Elizabeth’s Diamond Jubilee, and the exhibition is organised this year, no doubt because the Queen so loves horses. She rides them, breeds them and cheers her own on to win so many classic equestrian events.

The exhibition shows the influence of horses in Middle Eastern culture from their domestication around 3,500 B.C.E. to the present day, with Olympic trophies on the horizon. Famous pieces from the British Museum and Saudi Arabian collections demonstrate this ancient history, such as the cylinder seal of the Achaemenid Persian King Darius, dating from 522-483 B.C.E., showing him hunting lions in a chariot. The ‘breaking’, or training, of wild horses for domestic

use probably took place on the steppes of southern Russia, with horses introduced into the Middle East around 2,500 B.C.E. Another thesis is that the Arabian horse originated in the Sabean kingdom of what is now Yemen. With the frankincense trade routes linking so much of the Middle East, King Solomon (r. 970–931 B.C.E.) obtained horses from the Queen of Sheba and gave one to some visiting Omanis.

In just a few decades this stallion had 157 descendants, which were famous all over southern Arabia. In subsequent centuries countless numbers were exported to India.

The second part of the exhibition is entitled Before the Horse, showing the use of asses and donkeys for transport— particularly as harness animals—pulling cumbersome but technically advanced vehicles. This was famously depicted on the Standard of Ur, and a silver rein ring decorated with a donkey discovered at the Royal Cemetery of Ur. But gradually horses became the means of fast transport in these early societies, used to pull chariots, wearing elaborate bronze harness ornaments. The love affair between human and horse had begun, and progressed with respect and affection as the horses were increasingly used for riding, too.

One of the earliest depictions of a horse and rider is a terracotta mould found in Mesopotamia (Iraq) dating from around 2,000-1,800 B.C.E. Another early representation is found in a tomb painting from Egypt’s New Kingdom, c. 1,400 B.C.E. Horses were a vital component in warfare and hunting, reflected especially in the art of ancient Assyria (900-600 B.C.E.), whose ornate horse trappings illustrate the prestige and status of the horse, rider and charioteer. Famously, the Achaemenid Persians used ‘post horses’ charging along the royal road to deliver messages. In the Parthian period (200 B.C.E.-300 C.E.), their horsemen were even acknowledged by their enemies, the Romans, for the ‘Parthian shot.’

This shot was devastatingly delivered by an apparently-retreating horseman, who turned to shoot arrows backwards. Their renowned horsemanship was celebrated by terracotta plaques and bronze belt buckles on view in this show.

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From the 7th century C.E., the growing importance of the horse to the Islamic world became apparent in exquisite Persian, Turkish, Arab and Mughul miniature paintings, ceramics and manuscripts. The lightweight, fast-moving Arabian horse was instrumental in spreading the Islamic faith as far as China to the east, and Spain to the west.

Indeed, the Prophet Mohamed praised horses on several occasions, and instructed his followers to take good care of them. A beautifully illustrated manuscript on show in the exhibition, the Furusiyya (14th century C.E.), is a manual of horsemanship. It includes information on the proper care of horses, advanced riding techniques, correct weapon handling while riding and elaborate manoeuvres for parades.

Beloved steeds, famous for their speed and spirit, bore princes and nomadic Bedouins. Horses were a significant part of traditional Bedouin life, along with falconry and hunting with dogs. Certain Arabian horses have been celebrated for centuries for their elegance, character, courage and stamina. There is a story of a champion horse, Al-Kahila, who was stolen. His Bedouin owner sent his son after the thief, secretly praying that his son would not catch up with his beloved AlKahila, preferring to lose him rather than admit that the horse could be overtaken.

The first shipment of Arabian horses to Britain took place in the 17th century.

Three Arabian stallions were mated with native mares to produce bloodstock that became famous as the English thoroughbred. DNA testing of a horse called the Darley Arabian indicates that 95 per cent of modern thoroughbreds derive from this one horse. A painting of this horse

by John Wooton from 1704–30 is on display. When the emperor Napoleon with-

drew his army from Egypt, he took 221 Arabian stallions and 31 mares to France.

The Arabian horse was developed through selective breeding, creating the distinctive head profile, the ‘dished’ nose, and dashingly high tail carriage. Based in Saudi Arabia, Lady Anne Blunt (1837-1917) helped to protect the purity of the Arabian breed and began to import them into Britain. Her memorabilia in the show includes watercolours, photographs and diaries.

Most Arab countries now devote great attention to breeding and racing their horses, honouring an aspect of their heritage and culture. Breeding stables have been set up, often palatial in design, their air-conditioned stalls housing an exploding equine population. Over 1,000 racehorses registered in the United Arab Emirates are tended by specialists and trained by experts. The ruling family of Dubai, the Maktoums, are leading owners; the Aga Khan prefers to have his racehorses bred and trained in Ireland and northern France.

The exhibition concludes in the present day with paintings, prints and trophies from memorable equestrian events like Ascot, always attended by the British royal family, celebrating the remarkable bond between horses and humans for thousands of years. The Horse: from Arabia to Royal Ascot runs at The British Museum from 24th May-30th September 2012. The accompanying book of the same name by John Curtis and Nigel Tallis is also a Royal Jubilee Tribute.

Juliet Highet is a writer, photographer, editor and curator, Juliet Highet specializes in Middle Eastern heritage and contemporary culture. Ms. Highet is currently working on her second book, Design Oman, having published her first book, Frankincense: Oman’s Gift to the World, in 2006.

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The Arts

Still Adoring the Idea

Turkish delight with “muddled pool of hypocrisy” Turkey’s current love affair with all things Ottoman was captured by the massively popular February release of the historical blockbuster Fetih 1453, which depicts the conquest of Istanbul—despite criticisms of its depictions of violence and inaccuracies in its historical representation.

Vedica Kant

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he 29th of May marked the 559th anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul. Thousands of people gathered in the soft, drizzling evening rain on the Golden Horn to watch the celebrations. Some climbed trees to get a better view of the stage that had been set up on the water; others contributed to the atmosphere by wearing Ottoman costumes. Almost everyone was waving the national flag. Before the spectacle began, the organisers played a neo-Ottomanist militaristic tune on a loop. “This is infectious,” said my friend, swaying to the music along with the vigorously flag-waving crowd, continuing,“It reminds me of what Woody Allen said about not being able to listen to too much Wagner for fear of wanting to conquer Poland.” As the proceedings commenced, a voiceover reminded the crowds of Sultan Mehmet’s statement before the conquest: “Either I will take Istanbul or Istanbul, me.” Heavy cheering ensued. They may not have been the Sultan’s actual words, but almost everyone in the crowd would have been familiar with them, given that they had been emblazoned across the city on the posters of the summer mega blockbuster Fetih 1453.

When Fetih 1453 (Conquest 1453), a historical epic about the conquest of Istanbul, was released in February—the premiere showed as a matinee at 14.53—it was the most expensive film to have been made in the history of Turkish cinema.

The film boasts 16,000 extras, CGI effects, numerous sword fights and battle scenes, free use of violence, and a cameo voiceover by an actor portraying the Prophet himself. The film’s ambition meant an ever-expanding budget during filming and trouble with financing. By the time shooting had wrapped up, the film had taken the best part of three years and an estimated

“In school when we had to draw the conquest, I remember drawing Ulubatli Hasan planting the Ottoman flag, with tons of arrows in him” $17 million to be made. Still, the producers need not have worried about the budget even though it was massive by Turkish standards. On the opening weekend alone, a staggering 1,405,000 viewers flocked to the movie theatres to watch the film. It was the best opening weekend any Turkish film had ever seen. Since then, Fetih 1453 has become the highest grossing Turkish film of all time, earning back about three times its cost of production.

The success of the film is, perhaps, not all that surprising, given that its release has coincided with a period of particularly strong love for all things Ottoman in Turkey. Much has been made of the current government’s so-called ‘neoOttoman’ foreign policy, but interest in Turkey’s Ottoman past has very much become a feature of cultural life in the country, with ‘Ottomania’ affecting realms from food to fashion. Soon after the film’s release, school children were taken on school outings to see the film. A restaurant in the heart of Istanbul’s touristic Sultanahmet district that specialises in Ottoman food brought out a special ‘Conquest Menu.’ More recently, when the football club Galatasaray won the Süper Lig trophy, the Turkish daily Radikal used the Fetih poster to report and celebrate the club’s victory. The club’s manager, Fatih Terim, whose name literally means ‘conqueror,’ was depicted as the conqueror of Istanbul.

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Swords and Sandals; Violence and Hedonism I went to see the film expecting a historical piece that follows the journey of Sultan Mehmet II and his successful siege of Constantinople. What I ended up seeing was a story about the conquest that gets mostly co-opted by a love triangle between the heroic Ulubatli Hasan (a character of dubious historical reality, but one who is nevertheless celebrated in Turkish folklore as planting the conquering Ottoman flag on the Byzantine palace and getting shot down by arrows in the process), the Genoese commander of the Byzantine forces, and a cross–dressing female member of the Ottoman army who makes the victory possible. As a way of assurance that the film was not completely counterfactual, my Turkish friend guaranteed that all school children did learn the Ulubatli Hasan version of the conquest—though there was no love triangle mentioned: “In school when we had to draw the conquest, I remember drawing Ulubatli Hasan planting the Ottoman flag, with tons of arrows in him.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly and despite all the money spent on the film, it has come in for criticism for its recreation of the past, and especially its depiction of the Byzantines, who are painted with broad brushstrokes as evil hedonists. A Byzantine historian friend fumed that the film was so off the mark that “it seemed the makers had not even bothered to read a basic history of the period.”

The critic Emine Yildirim was even harsher on the film, writing, “Obviously, the filmmakers did a lot of research and expended a lot of effort to depict the Ottoman state as genuinely as possible, but why has this not also been the case for the Byzantines? In the film, Emperor Constantine XI and his statesmen seem to have been transplanted from a comic book universe where there are no grey lines between good and evil.” The simple oppositional set up of the film not only ignores the fact that there were a large number of Greeks who were fighting on the Ottoman side, but also some of the continuity the Ottomans themselves saw between Byzantine and Ottoman rule. On his conquest of the city, Mehmet claimed the title ‘Caesar of Rome’.

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Apart from problematic historical representation—a fault found in many a historical blockbuster—there is also the violence. Journalist Andrew Finkel says he saw the film as an unconscious celebration of war. Once Constantinople has been conquered Sultan Mehmet enters the Hagia Sofia, where a group of terrified Byzantines have been hiding, kisses a baby and declares that the citizens of the city have nothing to be afraid of and can practice their religion as they like. Though the scene is based on historical fact, it seems too superficial a gesture coming on the back of endless minutes of violent battle scenes.

The film also makes a big play of Mehmet allowing the defeated army to bury King Constantine’s body according to their rituals, though in actual fact the fate of the last Byzantine emperor’s body or its burial place is highly disputed. It is this kind of token nod to tolerance that caused Yildirim to declare the film a “muddled pool of hypocrisy” that not only engenders antagonism against the West, but also reinforces an aspiration for superiority. The columnist Burak Bekdil added to the sentiment, writing, “Sadly, millions of Turks will go to the theatres to feel proud of their ancestors and to visually show their children ‘our greatness.’

We are great not only because ‘we had the power of the sword’ but, even more sadly, because we still adore the idea.”

The Conquest in Public Consciousness These criticisms, however, were just a few in a sea of praise for the film. Its admirers include Prime Minister Erdogan, who said it was “well done”. Finkel believes Fetih 1453 has a continued resonance because in many ways the story of the conquest has significance not just for the political classes who want to re-enact that ultimate triumph again and again, but also for the many people who have come or want to come to Istanbul. Despite being banished to the side-lines by the new republic in its first decades, Istanbul has been the throbbing heart of the country and a magnet for migration since the 1950s. Today, the

city is home to nearly 15 million people.

According to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul has seen a migration of nearly 11 million people over the last fifty years. “You can say that Istanbul has been conquered multiple times even in my lifetime,” says Finkel. “The Istanbul of today is not the city it was in the 1960s, 1970s or even the 1990s. The notion of conquering the city and making it one’s own has a strong resonance.”

In spite of the early Republic’s rejection of all things Ottoman, the conquest of Istanbul is one of the two main central dates in Turkish historiography.

After the 1980 coup, the military government embarked on a wide-ranging cultural project of TurkishIslamic synthesis. In the run up to the coup, the country had been racked by violent divisions between the left and right-wing political groups and it was hoped that Islam and Turkish nationalism in combination would prove to be an allinclusive ideology. It was a final consolidation of the re-embrace of religion that had first become visible in Turkish politics and public culture in the 1950s. After the Welfare Party (the predecessor of the currently-ruling AK Party) won the 1994 Istanbul municipality elections, there was a determined effort to reinstate 1453 as the defining event in the life of the nation.

In the Istanbul neighbourhood of Uskudar, two red sculptures of the dates 1453 and 1923 overlook the Bosphorous.

One is the year the city was conquered, the other the year the Republic was established. It might be too simplistic to say that 1453 is now more important, but the release of Fetih has certainly contributed to a certain swagger and nationalistic pride over the conquest and made it even more central to popular culture and politics in Turkey today. Vedica Kant is a graduate from the Singapore Management University in Economics and Political Science, she received her MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oxford. She currently lives and works in Istanbul.

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The Critics

Living in the G-Zero Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World

By Ian Bremmer Portfolio Penguin, 2012 Ian Bremmers’s latest work brings a fresh and informed perspective to the current debates on international politics in the 21st century.

The future of the international order is certainly not a new topic; it has arguably become the staple of gatherings such as Davos, think-tank reports, and geopoltical analysts. Ian Bremmer’s latest book adds a depth and dimension to these debates, especially in light of the 2008 financial crisis.

Discussion of a world without US global leadership is certainly not new. Noted historian Paul Kennedy’s 1987 classic, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers began this discussion, but unfortunately it came two years before the revolutions that swept Europe bringing the end of the Cold War. Following this, debates on American power and the new international order were held at bay as the US celebrated its brief unipolar moment for

a little over a decade. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History captured this optimism and the perceived triumph of American liberal values and democracy over the destructive forces of nationalism, totalitarianism, and communism which had plagued the 20th century and made it one of the most violent centuries in human history.

American policymakers were so confident of the rise of a new American century that noted Republican policymakers Robert Kagan and William Kristol spoke of American power as an eternal resource that could be employed to reshape international politics into purely an Americanled enterprise, fulfilling America’s manifest destiny. This optimism began to be shaken when a non-state actor, Al-Qaeda, attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. It remains the single largest attack on US soil since Pearl Harbour. This catalytic and cathartic moment hit the United States when it felt both vulnerable and immeasurably powerful at the same time.

The Tunisian Project Confronting Social and Economic Challenges International Crisis Group (ICG) 6 June 2012 The ICG's recent report on Tunisia attempts to offer solutions to some of the problems facing the country in its transition from the Ben Ali era.

In a recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia is said to be facing formidable social and economic challenges that threaten to halt progress despite continued success and a seemingly progressive transition. The report suggests that there are three challenges that stand out most prominently: rising unemployment (in particular amongst university graduates), regional inequalities, and corruption.

The report notes that despite being aware of these social and economic ills, the unity government—led by the Islamist Ennahda party—has so far been unable to address these issues quickly enough. It is therefore failing to subdue the impatience of workers and the unemployed, who naturally have expected to benefit from the recent tumultuous events.

Bremmer convincingly argues that the greatest shock to America was not the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11, but rather the global financial crisis of 2008. It highlighted the deep constraints of America’s present position in the international system in light of the rise of the rest—especially Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)—to create a new global order where no single power has the ability to exercise global leadership. Mocking the ineffectiveness of the G-20, Bremmer calls this new order the “GZero” where every nation must act for itself.

These ideas are hardly new—they were discussed by authors such as Fareed Zakaria even before the financial crisis. Bremmer brings very little of his own original research to the issues raised in his sweeping macrolevel study of global politics. From China to the Middle East to climate change, he largely leaves the focussed analysis to other writers. Coming from the president of a leading geopolitical risk firm, it was surprising to not see more original empirical analysis to compliment his wider points.

As a result, the ICG suggests that in order to avoid destabilising social conflicts, the government needs to respond more effectively and efficiently to the “escalating violence caused by worsening economic conditions; get a handle on the large informal economic sector, including smuggling; overcome administrative bottlenecks that hamper socio-economic improvements; and foster democratisation at the regional and local level.”

In comparison to other Arab nations, Tunisia enjoys some semblance of normalcy. To some extent, the state and society have managed—at least on the surface—to continue to function. There is, however, the problem of deeper economic grievances bubbling beneath the surface. The report comments that these grievances could boil over, because “the economic and social causes that sparked the uprising a year and a half ago are far from resolved or even adequately addressed or discussed.” Furthermore, the behaviour of individuals is often obeys the maxim ‘every man for himself,’ due to the variety of people involved in the uprisings.

In addition, the ICG notes that Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali’s government has inherited a troublesome economic situation that will only lead to worsening social and economic unrest.

They note that it “took over a state whose presence and reach in the country’s hinterlands is feeble and which has proved incapable of curbing corruption, the violent renegotiation of power at the local level, the burgeoning informal economic sector, or the proliferation of smuggling networks which fuel inflation.”

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Instead, Bremmer’s strength and contribution though comes from his wider conceptual grasp of geopolitics and synthesis of other writers’ works. In that sense, his work contributes more than others to conceptualizing the wider geopolitical order of our times. Importantly, he breaks from the purely American debates on the future of US power, which tend to circle around similar points and obscure the wider changes in the international system. At the same time, Bremmer distances himself from works that focus solely on the rise of non-Western countries and the growing irrelevancy and decline of the United States.

He also brings a measure of caution to the debates on China, which often define China’s rise as either peaceful or threatening without providing any real nuance.

Bremmer has developed his own vocabulary for this new order: pivot states, rogues with powerful friends, adapters, protectors, cheaters, referees, exposed states, shadow states, dinosaurs, and other words that are quite catching and may influence public discourse. He also blends issues of geopolitics with economics, and underscores how the G-Zero is a world

where economics and politics shape one another, and how leadership in this leaderless era must harness both to have any success in a G-Zero world.

Bremmer strives to chart the future of international politics as well. His training as a political scientist comes across clearly as he makes the systemic argument that a G-Zero, this vacuum in hegemony, will not last, and a new order is bound to replace it.

He sees a new order emerging, with three main likely scenarios: a form of accommodation or conflict between China and the US, a world where regions predominate, or a sub-G-Zero world where the state is no longer relevant.

Reflecting his own pessimism about the return of global leadership, Bremmer sees a world of regions as the most likely order to replace the G-Zero. Such a world order will allow a certain degree of international cooperation on particular issues. The lack of global leadership and global public goods raises the question whether such a new world order will be any different from the G-Zero except for more wisdom and experience of dealing with and adapting to a multi-polar world. It’s hard to see how

Evidently, the upcoming tasks are of grave importance. Thus the government will need to “maintain an increasingly fragile peace, keep a complicated political transition on track and regain the confidence of local communities, whose inhabitants measure progress primarily by material improvements.”

The ICG believes that in the absence of short-term progress, the feelings of unrest could manifest in various ways. For instance, clanbased violence has claimed more than a dozen lives, whilst the state has failed to restore its authority in several regions: “Corruption persists and provokes discontent and indignation.” This socio-economic insecurity and political instability are inextricably linked with

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global challenges such as climate change could be solved in this world. Bremmer provides few answers to how to overcome these collective action problems.

His work ends on a largely optimistic note about the future of America’s role in the world. Bremmer asserts that if the US addresses its fiscal crisis, the US would be in a better position than others to play a leading role in a post-G-Zero world, even if it means its once predominant global leadership is over. Interestingly, he notes that America’s leadership in global trade will offer it the best path to securing an important and relevant role in the future. In his final chapter, however, the author notes that this future success will depend on the decisions the US makes in the G-Zero. At the present moment, with such deep and caustic political divisions in the US, it is hard to see how the America can address the challenges facing it.

Overall, Bremmer’s work is a sophisticated and timely assessment of international politics in the 21st century. It should read be read by anyone seeking to understand this post-unipolar world, and the challenges states, companies, and citizens will face in the G-Zero. 

the post-revolutionary context, which means these issues have the potential to cause a legitimacy crisis for the newly-elected government. The reports suggests that the government should “prioritise job creation for young graduates, regional development and active support for those who are part of the informal economy”.

In its concluding remarks, the report offers a list of ten recommendations to assist in alleviating these potentially threatening problems. It makes seven of these recommendations to the Tunisian government and the National Constituent Assembly; one to the International Trade Union Confederation and the International Labour Organisation; and two recommendations to the international community. Overall, the findings suggest a range of solutions to the problems noted above: fixing unemployment, regional inequalities, and corruption.

The findings and recommendations are specific enough to help fix these problems, but not too narrow so as to inhibit their implementation. There is also a degree of flexibility in the recommendations that make them useful irrespective of party or leadership. It is this aspect of the report that helps to produce quality findings and analysis for the Tunisian government and their situation, whilst not giving in to any partisan agendas. Tunisia, though a huge success in many respects, will need to consider these findings and their implications as soon as possible. It is, after all, economic dissatisfaction that led to the uprisings in the first place—not simply a desire for democracy, but rather the want of liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. 

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Final Word

Is Tunisia really an exception?

Adel Al-Toraifi

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n Sidi Bou Said, where the Tunisian uprising erupted, clashes recently broke out between adherents of the Salafist current and wine merchants, and some religious elements—armed with sticks, swords and firearms—attacked bars and shut them down. Tunisian unionists and intellectuals expressed their discontent with the Ennahda-led coalition government, which remained silent about the Salafists’ transgressions and failed to punish them according to the law. This has encouraged the Salafists to commit more violence and intimidation inside Tunisian universities, where they have sought to impose the niqab on female students, and even raise Al-Qaeda's flag in place of the Tunisian national flag.

Such a tense situation prompted Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki last month to extend the emergency law, although he had long criticized the previous regime for resorting to such means which curb conventional laws and curtail freedoms. The state of overwhelming unease has been made apparent by statements issued by state officials, as a result of the left-wing and workers' continual demonstrations and the threats launched by religious extremist groups, to the extent that the Tunisian Ministry of Interior threatened to use live ammunition in the event that sovereign institutions such as police headquarters are attacked, or if public security is jeopardized.

In an interview on Tunisian television, Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali— who spent years in the former regime's jails—threatened to confront anyone who thinks that the current government is in a position of weakness, or anyone seeking to monopolize public opinion and impose a social trend by force, in reference to the Salafists. He also expressed his objection to the ongoing demonstrations that are crippling development in Tunisia, in reference to the workers unions and the revolutionary left-wing protests taking place in the country. Utilizing a strong tone, Jebali said "the Tunisian people have run out of patience. You are wronging yourselves as well

as Islam, and the government will not hesitate to intervene to stop this going too far."

Such signs and indications are very worrying because they reflect the slow pace of an inexperienced coalition government and a constituent assembly whose members are still in the process of learning the ABCs of parliamentary work. This has been compounded by the European economic slowdown that has impacted greatly upon Tunisia's exports, whilst European tourism has failed to return to the pre-revolution levels. On the other hand, the Tunisian people so far seem divided over what direction the country should move in. There are some voices that are demanding a change in foreign policy, as is the case with Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi, who has received symbols of political Islam such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Ismail Haniya and others. There are also those who demand greater openness with Iran, and the endorsement of a law that prohibits the normalization of relations with Israel. Whilst others have demanded that the Turkish language should be taught as part of the official school syllabus, and the Ministry of Education has since sought to turn this into a project.

Yet I do not know how a government that is yet to restore basic services can be preoccupied with teaching a foreign language, in a society where the number of unemployed citizens—as a proportion of the population—exceeds that of other Arab states. I do not know how the constituent assembly can be preoccupied with secondary issues whilst it is yet to finish drafting the country's constitution.

In an article by William Lawrence, Director of the North Africa Project for the International Crisis Group, published recently in Asharq Al-Awsat entitled "The Tunisian Exception", he argued that Tunisia's experience in the "Arab Spring" seems to be an exception if compared to that of Egypt or Libya. He attributed this to the consensus on certain democratic rules of the game. However, Lawrence also warns of the difficulty when it comes to getting rid of the past, as

the lack of coordination between major cities and rural suburbs, between Islamic and secular powers, and between the heirs of the former regime and the supporters of the new regime could all thwart the Tunisian experience, or at least stifle it in the short-term.

In my opinion, focusing on the assumption that the Tunisian experience is an exception could have an adverse effect. This is because the tendency to create illusions and promote a utopian discourse with regards to the revolution might cause the Tunisian people to magnify their revolutionary climate, making it seem even more important than the actual causes of the revolution in the first place, which were limited political participation and the deplorable economic conditions. Anyone who reviews the statements issued by some symbols of the new era in Tunisia would be surprised by the size of discrepancies and the lack of realism in the pledges they have made, whilst the country is still unable to overcome its security vacuum or restore economic or tourist activity.

The Tunisian experiment has a greater chance than its other Arab counterparts, yet this depends primarily on achieving stability, economic openness and avoiding revenge against those who served in the previous regime. The sense of social forgiveness that leads to renouncing public vendettas is essential in order for the new regime not to embark on killing innocent people together with guilty ones, as happened in Iraq, Egypt and Libya. The calls for revenge under the cloak of disenfranchisement will ultimately lead to only one ideological trend within the state's institutions. In an interview she gave to the Attounissia website, writer Olfa Youssef said "I do not believe that what happened in Tunisia was a revolution. Rather it was an uprising staged by marginalized and unemployed people, subsequently hijacked by intellectuals and youths who were eager to gain freedom, whilst the uprising was then backed by foreign powers and fulfilled by the flight of the former president."  This is an extract from Asharq Al-Awsat

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