The Majalla - Ten Steps to Downing Street

Issue 1552 • May 2010

Ten Steps to Downing Street Nicholas Blincoe guides us through the ins and outs of general elections in Britain…

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9 771319 087105 The Majalla

The Art of War

After the elections that gave Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqiya bloc a narrow victory in Iraq, Michael Hastings asks 'Did America win'?

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On Politics

Michael Thumann discusses the points of convergence in Turkish and Russian foreign policies, and how this could lead to an alliance

Issue 1552

The Wealth of Nations

The GCC should look more soberly at the EU integration process, learning from its successes, but above all, its shortcomings, says Valentin Zahrnt

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Established by Hisham and Mohamad Ali Hafez Editor-in-Chief Adel Al Toraifi Managing Director Tarik Algain Senior Editor Manuel Almeida Editors Paula Mejia Wessam Sherif Jacqueline Shoen Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield New Media Development Officer Markus Milligan Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2009 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: editorial@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover image © Getty Images

Editorial As the UK elections come closer, and the competition fiercer, it becomes ever more important to understand the ins and outs of British elections. With that in mind, this month’s edition features Nicholas Blincoe’s insight in “Ten Steps to Downing Street: All you need to know about the general elections in the UK.” Blincoe, who writes regularly for The Guardian and The Telegraph discusses the issues that will drive voters’ decisions this time around.

As the Iraqi elections came to a close only a few weeks ago, American officials started declaring victory in Iraq.

Journalist Michael Hastings, author of I Lost My Love in Baghdad: A Modern War Story and former Newsweek correspondent in Baghdad, evaluates the validity of this claim in “The Next Iraq Debate: Did America Win?” In addition to these articles, this issue brings to you an interview with Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid. Author of the best selling book Descent into Chaos, Rashid discussed with The Majalla a number of topics ranging from the prospects of the political effort to bring an end to the conflict in Afghanistan to the integrity of the Pakistani state.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

Adel Al Toraifi, Editor-in-Chief

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Contributors Nicholas Blincoe Nicholas Blincoe is an English author, critic and screenwriter living between London and the West Bank city of Bethlehem. He has authored six crime novels, one of which won him the Crime Writer’s Association Silver Dagger. Mr. Blincoe has also written for British radio and television, including episodes of the BBC television series Waking the Dead and Channel 4’s Goldplated. His more recent work is distinctly political in nature reflecting his experiences living and working in the occupied Palestinian territories. He writes regularly for the Guardian and Telegraph. He is also an advisor to Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg.

Michael Hastings Michael Hastings is a regular contributor for GQ magazine. He recently returned from covering the 2010 elections in Iraq. From 2005-2007 Hastings was the Baghdad correspondent for Newsweek, and arrived in Iraq in the most problematic period after the US occupation, when most of the foreign press was leaving. Hastings also covered the latest presidential race in the US for Newsweek. He is the author of I Lost My Love in Baghdad: A Modern War Story.

Guy de Jonquières Guy de Jonquières is a Senior Fellow at the European Centre for Internatonal Political Economy (ECIPE), a Brussels based think-tank. Until mid-2007, he worked for The Financial Times, most recently as the newspaper's chief Asia columnist and commentator, based in Hong Kong. His 39-year career with the newspaper also included assignments as a staff correspondent in Paris, Washington, Saigon, New York and Brussels, as world trade editor, international business editor and a variety of other editorial roles.

Michael Thumann Michael Thumann has been the Middle East Bureau Chief of Die Zeit in Istanbul since October 2007. Until 2001, he reported on Russia and Central Asia as the Moscow Bureau Chief of Die Zeit, and during the Yugoslav succession war, he worked as Die Zeit’s correspondent for South Eastern Europe. This year he has been a Bosch Public Policy Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, DC. His upcoming book is titled A Very Secular Affair. The Power Struggle of Turkish Elites, to be published

by Transatlantic Academy Paper Series.

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• CONTENTS

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Contents Quotes of the Month

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The Art of War

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• The Next Iraq Debate: Did America Win? • The Clash of Cultures: The Insurmountable Obstacle for the Americans in Afghanistan • Obama’s Nuclear Offensive

On Politics

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Ten Steps to Downing Street

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The Wealth of Nations

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The Human Condition

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A Thousand Words

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Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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The Critics

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The Final Word

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• The Endgame in Iran: The Prospects of Sanctions • Talking with the Taliban – Kai Eide: The departing UN envoy to Afghanistan

Nicholas Blincoe guides us through the ins and outs of general elections in Britain, plus everything you needed to know about the main party leaders...

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• A Shining City upon the Hill? What the GCC can learn from the EU – and its failures?

• Gambling in Greenbacks?

• The Dollar and the Global Economic Recovery • Great Expectations: The Chinese Renminbi • The British economy in the election • News Behind the Graph • The Markets

• Yemen’s Little Giant: Nujood Ali • The Great Equalizer: Eyjafjallajokul

• Ascending From Chaos?

The Majalla interview with Ahmed Rashid • The Power and Perils of Choice: An Interview with Professor Charles Tripp

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

“I think it’s part of the debate we should have in Britain. I think it’s energised the campaign” Gordon Brown on the first prime ministerial TV election debate

“Innocent people should leave the protests because the authorities have to take decisive measures against terrorists” Speaking on national television the Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban threatened heavy handed action by the authorities against protesters

“Hello dear compatriots” were the few words Kyrgyzstan”s deposed leader, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, managed to utter before supporters of the opposition attempted to attack him. The president was addressing a large crowd in the city of Osh, where he was hoping to rally support after being ousted in a bloody uprising in the capital in early April

“The urgency of the threat and the catastrophic consequences of even a single act of nuclear terrorism demand an effort that is at once bold and pragmatic” President Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington

“The top priority is to save people.

“The security We will never give up even if there is arrangements for only a slim hope” Ms Bhutto by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said after visiting the Rawalpindi the region hit by the Qinghai earthquake where hundreds have died, with many more missing district police were ineffective and insufficient” “Prime Minister Netanyahu Heraldo Munoz, the head of the UN has embraced investigation into Benazir the vision of Bhutto”s assassination the two-state solution” “The crew was aware of the Hillary Clinton, urging the inevitability of the coming Israeli government to support catastrophe” the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The US Polish chief prosecutor Andrzej Seremet said of the pilots of the plane that crashed killing the Polish president, Lech Kaczynski and 95 others

Secretary of State pressed Israel to halt Jewish settlement construction at a dinner attended by the ambassadors of Israel and several Arab states

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• THE ART OF WAR

A narrative of “Victory at last” in Iraq is rising, particularly after the elections that gave Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqiya bloc a narrow win over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Party.

This view is in stark contrast with those of many analysts in the Middle East, Europe or Asia, who find it hard to accept that anything resembling a victory has occurred in Baghdad.

Michael Hastings

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mericans think they won the war in Iraq. Scratch that: A significant number of American officials, media pundits and politicians have taken it upon themselves to convince Americans that a great victory has been won in Baghdad. This might come as a shock to those who live outside of the United States – perhaps the notion might even be perplexing to those Americans who don’t live inside the Washington, DC and New York bubble, the insular home of policymakers and leading editorialists. Certainly, as an American myself, who has spent a considerable time in Iraq lately, the potency of the propaganda campaign caught me somewhat by surprise.

For the US, the war is winding down, as opposed to Iraq, which will be stuck in an ongoing conflict for years to come The preemptive victory parade started last month on the cover of Newsweek. American readers were treated to a picture of George W. Bush, walking across an aircraft carrier (the same aircraft carrier from his infamous “Mission Accomplished” photo).

Blasted across the cover were the words: VICTORY AT LAST. Thomas Friedman, a New York Times columnist and one of the most enthusiastic and influential war supporters, followed up Newsweek’s cheers with his own essay titled: “It’s up to you Iraqis.

Good Luck.” Friedman wrote that the war had vindicated the “gut instinct” of the former president, confirming that Iraqis “craved democracy.” As for whether the war was worth it, he said, was a question for “historians to sort out.” By the end of the month, Senator John McCain had weighed in on the pages of the Wall Street Journal, saying Iraq would serve as “an example to other countries in the Middle East.”

The cause for the latest declaration of victory was last month’s election, when former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqiya bloc narrowly beat out current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Party. The elections were a success, Americans were told, because there were only 38 Iraqis killed on election day, and only a few dozen attacks. The reemergence of Allawi, once on the CIA’s payroll, also stoked hopes in Washington of an end to sectarianism. The country has now entered into what will be a messy and occasionally violent government formation process, likely to last until the end of the summer.

What the government will look like in the end is uncertain – there are huge hurdles to overcome if either Maliki or Allawi wants to take the prime minister’s job. But what’s clear is this:

Sectarian politics aren’t over. In fact, the vote split along very familiar sectarian lines, with Sunnis backing Allawi in the north and west (though a Shiite, the former Baathist is seen as representative of the Sunni Arab minority); Shiites backing Maliki, Moqtada al-Sadrists or the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq in Baghdad and in the south; and Kurds backing only Kurdish candidates. Also troubling is that rather than an endorsement of democracy, Maliki and Allawi’s appeal is that of the strongman, a Saddam–lite. Former US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker told the Washington Post that both men represented “two sides of the same coin” in a country seemingly trending towards “authoritarianism,” not democracy.

None of this detail really matters, though, to those in the US claiming a win. Most of the US foreign policy establish-

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The Next Iraq Debate

Image © iStockphoto

Did America Win?

ment supported the war, and they’ve always been desperate for any evidence to justify their bad judgment. But what’s happening does mark an important shift in the American debate on Iraq. The fierce policy arguments that raged for years are essentially over – the remaining question, really, is just how many American troops will be there after 2011? For the US, the war is winding down, as opposed to Iraq, which will be stuck in an ongoing conflict for years to come, averaging about 300 deaths a month now.

The new debate is over how Americans will remember the war. It’s a debate over the narrative of the war itself, of how we believe the war has ended. It doesn’t matter that it’s mainly themselves Americans are trying to convince – it is hard to find any policy thinkers in the Middle East or Europe or Asia who Issue 1552 • May 2010

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think anything resembling a victory has occurred in Baghdad.

But rather than admitting it was a mistake and swearing never to make such a catastrophic foreign policy blunder again, we’re already seeing a huge push from the US foreign policy and media circles to slap a happy ending on what has been and always will be, a thoroughly tragic story. We don’t need to wait for historians to sort that one out.

Michael Hastings – Author of ‘I Lost My Love in Baghdad: A Modern War Story’ and regular contributor to GQ magazine. From 2005-2007 he was the Baghdad correspondent for Newsweek. He recently returned from covering the 2010 elections in Iraq.

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The Clash of Cultures

The Insurmountable Obstacle for the Americans in Afghanistan The US has entered its endgame in Afghanistan with the latest offensive in the south of the country. The biggest setback, it turns out, was not Taliban military resistance. Instead, and despite spending a decade in Afghanistan, the culture war has been the obstacle that the Americans have not been able to surpass.

Iason Athanasiadis

Image © Getty Images

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andahar: A joint American-Afghan force had just uncovered a weapons cache in a small mud village known for supporting the Taliban. Returning to base, the soldiers dumped two ageing boxes on the ground in an explosion of dust. Several Iranian-funded promujahideen magazines spilled from the first case. In the second was equipment for launching mortars and several rusting weapons of Russian vintage.

Suddenly, the spirit of collegiality shattered as the Afghan and American commanders began fighting over ownership of the spoils. The Afghans sought to keep some of the weapons for themselves; the Americans wanted to pass them on to the Afghan judiciary so it could begin building a case against the netted detainees. A translator working for the Americans with an Afghan army general for a father and a running grudge match with the local army commander was the unlikely mediator between the two sides. A toe-to-toe shouting match only ended when the American commander waded in and screamed for quiet.

Power games aside, cultural misunderstandings are legion between the Americans and Afghans. Ordinary soldiers are not so much separated by the language barrier as saved by it. Nevertheless, the Americans’ trash-talking slang brogue penetrates through to their more modest Afghan colleagues, especially when they start parroting the Dari words for “Fuck you” and “passive homosexual.” The occasional fistfight is not unknown.

Operationally, even more is lost in translation. “We found a ledger kept by the Taliban containing the names of people they had killed,” a former NYPD policeman currently working as a contractor for the US military claimed as he oversaw the unloading of the weapons. But no such document existed in the sheaves of magazines brought out.

When the Americans sally forth to the neighboring village, things are hardly better. Well-intentioned as the company commander may be, he commits unthinking faux pas such as not taking his boots off when entering enclosed spaces, repeatedly spitting in the dust when speaking to locals, peppering his speech with swearwords or yawning in full view of village elders. The deployment of the 82nd Airborne Brigade to the Arghandab Valley, a fertile agricultural basin that is the spiritual home of the Taliban and historically provided shelter to Taliban operations, is the next stage in the war to win over Afghan hearts and minds. The question now is whether the American military is up to this task?

Top American commander General Stanley McChrystal feels that the US will never win the tactical war against an enemy willing to settle back and bide time. Instead, the only way to leave Afghanistan honorably is to build up the trust of

The only way to leave Afghanistan honorably is to build up the trust of the locals in the central government represented by President Hamid Karzai the locals in the central government represented by President Hamid Karzai. Easier said than done in regions where central government has been absent for decades if not centuries and its current manifestation is dominated by a rival ethnic majority to the Pashtuns of the Arghandab Valley.

While the Taliban managed to offer security, the government of Hamid Karzai is notoriously corrupt. Karzai’s brother, the governor of Kandahar, is widely reported to be a CIA asset involved in the heroin trade, running a private militia and a mediator between the US and the Taliban. Given all this, it is hardly surprising that ordinary Afghans regard the Karzai regime as a NATO puppet government.

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• THE ART OF WAR

It is this kind of hopelessness over the future that pushed one local in the Kandahar Valley to confidentially tell a reporter that “we don’t have nuclear weapons or metal helmets but we can defend ourselves with our bones. We’ve lost everything aside from our ability to blow ourselves up.”

Confronted with this kind of deeply-felt emotion, the young American soldiers who clamp on iPods and lose themselves in Hollywood blockbuster DVDs as soon as their patrols end don’t stand a chance. Aside from learning to press their hand to their hearts (a move so often and clumsily deployed that it appears comical), they do precious little else to immerse themselves in Afghani society.

Confronted with this kind of deeply-felt emotion, the young American soldiers who clamp on iPods and lose themselves in Hollywood blockbuster DVDs as soon as their patrols end don’t stand a chance Now, the American military is opting for a strategy of saturation. Tens of thousands of troops are being poured into this unruly valley from where the Taliban initially emerged. Helicopters and drones blanket the sky. For the first time, American soldiers are living inside the villages they are trying to sway towards their vision of the future. In the Arghandab Valley, I saw Special Forces men in T-shirts and no body armor, working out of an unfortified house on a village main street. One of their activities is to build a controversial local militia that critics say openly encourages fresh warlordism and is an implicit vote of no confidence in the corrupt central government.

But McChrystal’s new, more culturally sensitive COIN regulations are restricting even the Green Berets. They can no longer go on night raids with the kind of abandon that resulted in over 300 civilians being killed in 2009. “The only time their presence registers on the public chart is when a family emerges, complaining that their men were taken away overnight by Americans,” said an Afghan political analyst who requested that his name be withheld. “Americans stumbling into a village at night poses more risk than gain,” said George Wilson, a former Washington Post military correspondent. “My larger concern is (McChrystal) going back to a pacification strategy I saw fail in Vietnam for lack of troops and trust of the people for their own government.”

Commanders are exhibiting new sensitivity and an emphasis on showing locals proof of guilt as a way of convincing them of their actions. Officers present shuras of village elders with photographic evidence implicating the men they detain as a means of building consensus. In the event of a false imprisonment, detainees are flown back from the detention facility in Bagram and presented to village elders in a bid to underscore that these detentions are not random but part of an underlying process.

Back at the military bases where the Americans cohabit with the Afghan security forces in a final effort to pull them up by

their bootstraps ahead of the Americans’ scheduled departure in July 2011, the command rooms are a study in chaos. Busy American desk officers cluster around computers and plasma screens relaying live battlefield feeds from drones hovering five miles up. In a corner, a small desk with a hand-scrawled sign announces the Afghan National Police post. Though usually abandoned, sometimes a couple of lackadaisical Afghans take it – though they only exhibit a twinge of energy when it comes to yielding the tea thermos. “It’s training, it’s forcing them to take responsibility,” the American colonel in charge of the base told me. “But if we don’t do that, then what do we leave behind? We have to build capacity.”

Ultimately, what the Americans lack in large numbers is exactly what British colonialism was relatively successful in achieving: midlevel field officials with strong local knowledge who built up their regional expertise over successive tours of duty and intensive language training. US officials are so lost in the disorienting haze of their own popular culture that they have no time to engage with the country they occupy. Aside from discussing events “outside the wire,” the second most popular topic of conversation is discussing what they will do for R&R (Rest and Recreation) once their tour of duty ends.

Jo Soldier is expected to implement a confusing web of directives without the added frustration of First World regulations being imposed on an emerging system that is Third World at best. Though Afghanistan may have been spared the kind of outlandish Bush administration appointees who sought to impose smoking bans and traffic meters on a Baghdad lacking in electricity or water, some of the instructions filtering down now are equally incongruous. “This isn’t America where the DEA wants to do a drug bust, they call the local precinct and get two officers in 15 minutes,” one frustrated soldier told me. “When we call for the Afghan police, they’re usually hashed out of their brains so we have to go pick them up and escort them to the scene... It’s like nannying children.”

Iason Athanasiadis – journalist based in Istanbul. He covers Turkey, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since 1999, he has lived in Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Sana’a and Tehran.

Further reading Napoleon in Egypt: A Clash of Cultures

by Paul Strathern Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 2007 In an historical account of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, British author Paul Strathern describes the first Western attack on Middle Eastern soil and the military failure that resulted. Expecting to be welcomed as heroes for liberating the Egyptians from their Mameluke oppressors, the young military leader found his men locked in a fierce battle against an ad hoc army of Muslims. This “clash of cultures” also led to the recovery of artifacts that paved the way for the translation of hieroglyphics and modern Egyptology, providing citizens of the West much insight into a culture largely unknown until then.

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Obama’s Nuclear Offensive All four elements of Obama’s nuclear campaign are meant to decrease the risks of nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. There are, however, limits to what Obama can achieve in this regard, especially when so many forces are beyond his control.

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resident Barack Obama has launched his long-expected campaign to reduce the threat of global nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. Last year, Obama received a Nobel Peace Prize based on expectations that he would make great achievements in this area. Although the Prize decision may have been premature then, the President has definitely earned his award during the past month.

President Obama’s nuclear campaign consists of four core components. The first element was Obama’s speech in Prague last year recommitting the United States to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The second was the signing earlier this month in Prague of the New START Treaty. The third component was the administration’s Nuclear Security Summit aimed at enhancing the safety and security of nuclear materials. The fourth core element will occur next month, with the convening of the NPT Review Conference in New York.

The new Nuclear Posture Review, released at the beginning of April, provides an overarching conceptual framework for integrating these elements. In principle, all four elements will work together to decrease the risks of nuclear war, nuclear terIssue 1552 • May 2010

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Image © Getty Images

Richard Weitz

rorism, and nuclear nonproliferation. Unfortunately, one man, no matter how great, cannot achieve nuclear nirvana when so many forces are beyond his control.

The Prague speech served to rally popular support for the new administration’s arms control agenda in many countries, but several of the world’s nuclear powers do not seem to have received the message. The first signs of trouble became evident in the fall and winter, when the United States and Russia failed to negotiate a new strategic nuclear arms control agreement before the original START Treaty expired in December 2009.

Administration officials now acknowledge that they underestimated the complexities of negotiating even the modest reductions achieved in the recently signed New START Treaty.

The initial plan, developed even before Obama assumed office in January 2009, was to proceed quickly to negotiate a new treaty with much deeper reductions that would also address some of the issues left out in New START, which was originally seen as a simple bridging agreement pending its replacement by something more comprehensive. Now that the New START Treaty looks to be a more enduring accord, supporting a stable 15

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• THE ART OF WAR

and predictable U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship in some areas but not others, the Obama team is rethinking the entire bilateral arms control process inherited from the Cold War. The new thinking could endorse a more multilateral process that would involve additional nuclear weapons states or closer linkages between offensive and defensive weapons.

The April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit was seen as a personal triumph for President Obama even if it accomplished little in practice. Most of the announced agreements simply confirmed or at best accelerated projects that already were accepted. The most important decision was to hold a follow-on conference in Seoul in 2012, which will likely ensure continued attention and progress regarding the nuclear security issue. Nuclear terrorism is a low probability but high risk danger that has the potential to devastate the international economy and paralyze world trade even more effectively than Iceland’s volcanoes.

The administration’s ability to secure the attendance of so many world leaders, representing 47 countries with advanced nuclear technologies, for the first Nuclear Security Summit to discuss an issue that until now has been largely left to technical experts demonstrated the potential power of President Obama to shape the international political agenda. The White House is now debating what issue to focus global attention on next – climate change, international financial reform, or Middle East peace.

Tensions within the greater Middle East threaten to undermine the administration’s plans for next month’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The original hope was that demonstrating progress in reducing Russian and U.S. nuclear forces as well as in improving the security of loose nuclear materials would enhance Washington’s leverage to restrict further the number of countries that develop sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, which can be misused to make nuclear weapons.

A key priority is to mobilize support among NPT parties for limiting nuclear cooperation with Iran.

But many Arab countries want Washington to exert greater pressure to compel Israeli nuclear concessions before they will consent to other NPT-related changes. Having now fought and failed twice to force a change in Israel’s settlement policies, the Obama administration is not eager for yet another confrontation with Israel, at least until after this November’s congressional elections.

Nuclear terrorism is a low probability but high risk danger that has the potential to devastate the international economy and paralyze world trade even more effectively than Iceland’s volcanoes In addition, the Obama administration, like everyone else, has yet to find a solution to Iran’s pursuit of unauthorized nuclear activities. Neither diplomacy nor sanctions nor military force provides good options in this case. Next month’s NPT Review Conference will likely not solve this problem either. Regime change is increasingly seen as the best hope for Tehran, though people continue to debate what if any role the United States can and should play in promoting it.

Richard Weitz - Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute-Washington DC.

Countries with nuclear weapons or programmes, past and present

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• ON POLITICS

A Turkish-Russian Alliance Presently, the more visible side of Turkish-Russian relations is business, contracts and trade. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, get along particularly well, and there are points of convergence in Turkish and Russian foreign policies. The manner in which membership negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU have been handled since 2005 might give the final push for a Turkish-Russian alliance.

Michael Thumann

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urkey has astonished many observers with dazzling new directions in its foreign policy. Today, Ankara is considering visa-free travel with Syria and Libya and holds frequent cabinet meetings with Damascus and Bagdad. However, the most significant change in Turkey’s foreign relations has taken place just beyond the Black Sea. It is the multi-layered relationship of Russia and Turkey that represents the most significant power shift between Cairo and the Caucasus. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in Moscow in January for extended meetings with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev will visit Turkey next month. In the West, these meetings are often accompanied by speculations of a fresh alliance. Such new bonds would be a matter of concern for countries in the West and in the Middle East. Are these conjectures justified?

What seems to be most visible between Russia and Turkey above all else is: business, contracts and trade. If any country trades with Russia, it ends up buying oil and gas. Hydrocarbons are also the main basis of Turkish-Russian commerce. Turkey’s exports of cars, vegetables, textiles and construction projects are dwarfed by its import of Russian gas. In 2008, Russia was Turkey’s most important trading partner and its main supplier of natural gas. It accounts for roughly two thirds of Turkey’s gas consumption, 50 percent of coal imports and 30 percent of its oil consumption. Turkey is also seen by Russia as a possible hub for its energy exports. In August 2009, Russia and Turkey together with Italy agreed to begin preparations for the construction of the South Stream, a pipeline from Russia crossing the Black Sea to Europe.

What makes this business smoother than others is a second ingredient. A Russian foreign policy advisor explained to me recently: “Being able to trust somebody is vitally important for Erdogan.” Putin, he said, is reliable, can deliver and has helped Turkey out in difficult situations. He referred to the winter of early 2008 when Iran did not supply Turkey with natural gas and Russia jumped in the void. Putin, he continued, treats Erdogan as an equal (implying that the Europeans do not). But there is more. Erdogan and Putin met 10 times in five years for extended personal meetings. They like each 18

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Moscow very much appreciated the motion in the Turkish parliament in 2003, which prevented US forces from entering Iraq via Turkish soil Today, these rather pragmatic relations do not yet look like an alliance directed against third countries. But there are reasons to be attentive to the cozy relations between Turkey and Russia. They could very possibly grow into something more than pragmatic neighborly relations.

Primarily, they could evolve into a natural gas axis of supplier and recipient. Although Turkey sits in the middle of some of the most major oil and gas fields in the world it has entrusted two thirds of its gas consumption to the Russian company Gazprom.

With future projects Turkey’s gas imports from Russia will continue to grow. If Russia manages to expand also its share of the Turkish oil market to over 50 percent and builds the first nuclear power station, all of Turkey’s power will come from Russia.

The second possibility is an alliance of the offended. A foreign policy advisor to Erdogan said recently that relations with Russia are also a function of how Turkey is being treated by the West. Both countries have a rich history and culture and at least expect to be treated as equals with other nations in the international arena. Both are also “hurt” countries. How can Turkey be offended? The first answer relates to Iran. As Tehran has rejected many UN proposals to manage its nuclear program in more transparent ways a far more serious conflict with Iran seems to be just around the corner. Turkish elites remember very well that their warnings were disregarded by the former US administration in the run-up to the Iraq war in Issue 1552 • May 2010

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2003. As a result of this and the Turkish refusal to allow US troops pass into Iraq, relations have turned sour. Today, Turkey is hypersensitive to strong Western pressure on Iran and often finds itself in the same camp as Russia in the same camp. Turkey even hides behind Russia, a veto power in the UN Security Council. A serious confrontation with Iran could push Ankara and Moscow into a coalition against Western policy on Iran.

The third scenario could be the formation of a bloc of the excluded. Turkey is regularly antagonized by the way EU countries have conducted membership negotiations since 2005.

These talks are hamstrung by a number of interventions from all sides. France’s president has called Turkey an Asian country and has blocked a handful of chapters based on the fear that they could lead to membership. Germany’s chancellor openly calls for a Privileged Partnership – an obscure way of saying no. This does not escape Russia’s attention; on joint RussianTurkish conferences advisors close to Prime Minister Putin encourage the Turks to give up on Europe like the Russians did back in the 1990s.

If the Western world is concerned about a Turkish-Russian alliance, three measures are likely to prevent the relationship from developing further. The EU should conduct fair negotiations on Turkey’s future membership. The US must consult Turkey and its Arab neighbors more closely when planning its strategy on Iran. And Arab countries could try to persuade Turkey that the benefits of being an independent player in the region far outweigh the consequences of being too closely allied with any camp, be it Russia or Iran.

Michael Thumann – DIE ZEIT’s Middle East Bureau Chief. While a Bosch Public Policy Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, DC, Thumann worked on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and Turkish-Russian relations.

This article was first published in The Majalla 18 April 2010

Past relations Russia and Turkey, as well as their leaders, are friends today. This relationship, however, was marred by conflict in the past. From the second half of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire supported the Turkic and Islamic vassal states against the Czar’s Empire, support which eventually led to war between both countries. Further conflict came in the 19th century when the Soviet monarchy assisted the Christian and Slavic minorities in Turkey to revolt against Ottoman rule. This was reinforced by Russia’s desire for free passage through the Turkish-controlled Straits. The First World War marked the last time the two empires fought each other and the end of the two monarchies, both overthrown.

Images © Graphic News

other; both tend to have a beefy style in politics and share similar backgrounds. Erdogan comes from a lower class family in the dockland area of Istanbul. He was a football player, always a fighter, imprisoned by the Kemalist judiciary and made it to the top. Likewise, Putin came from the shabby courtyards of St. Petersburg, was often humiliated, became a boxer and later joined the KGB to begin his ascent in the Soviet hierarchy.

Shared backgrounds often have an impact on how often leaders meet, how long they meet, how much they trust each other.

To be sure, there are also points of convergence in Turkish and Russian foreign policies. Moscow very much appreciated the motion in the Turkish parliament in 2003, which prevented US forces from entering Iraq via Turkish soil. In the Black Sea, Russia does not want to see a NATO or US presence. Turkey often agrees with Russia, and both countries have worked together to limit the presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea. Further east, Turkey and Russia have moved closer together in the Caucasus. Georgia is clearly Moscow’s adversary in the region, but Turkey also has bones of contention with Tbilisi.

In Turkey there is a strong Abkhaz community, which has close ties with the separatist republic of Abkhazia. On Iran, both Russia and Turkey reject a coercive approach to Iran’s nuclear program. They are neighbors as Putin and Erdogan insist. They regularly meet with President Ahmadinejad and help him find his way out of international isolation.

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The Endgame in Iran The Prospects of Sanctions

As time runs out on the US effort to talk Iran out of acquiring nuclear weapons, attention has shifted to the UN Security Council’s attempts to impose sanctions on Iran. Will sanctions be approved?

If so, will they be effective? Russia and China’s reluctance to impose sanctions implies the necessity of substantial bargaining. Moreover, historically speaking, sanctions are likely to prove ineffective, especially in Iran’s case where time is on their side.

Kevork Oskanian

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he Middle East is nearing a strategic crossroads: Within the next 18 months or so the decisions taken by different actors will affect issues far beyond the area itself; and time is running out. Last year’s discovery of a covert enrichment plant near Qom is probably only the tip of the iceberg; for the first time in its dealings with Iran the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently openly accused Tehran of developing nuclear weapons. Many experts now estimate that the country is at most one to two years away from acquiring a functioning nuclear device. And, judging from the regime’s increasingly defiant tone, it has no intention whatsoever to diverge from its stated policy of becoming a “nuclear nation” – one that has mastered a sufficient share of civilian nuclear technology to put nuclear weapons well within its grasp.

As time runs out and the Obama administration definitively gives up on its short-lived attempt at dialogue with Tehran, attention will again shift to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), starting with renewed Western attempts to impose sanctions on the Iranian regime in the coming weeks

and months. Proposals on the table include various restrictions on institutions and persons connected with the regime, and in particular, its core support base in the Revolutionary Guard.

Notably, however, recent statements have been shifting towards a whole-scale embargo on Iran’s oil industry – blocking Iranian imports of refined fuels, which it cannot produce itself, and technical supplies, and perhaps also blocking oil exports from Iran with other producers making up for the shortfall.

A two-fold question arises. First, whether such sanctions would be approved by all veto-wielding UNSC members,

For the first time in its dealings with Iran the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently openly accused Tehran of developing nuclear weapons

Iran Sanctions—Key Dates 2002

September Russian technicians begin constructing Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr.

2003

February - May Iran reveals nuclear enrichment program at Natanz.

October - November Tehran agrees to temporarily stop its program and allow more thorough inspections of its nuclear facilities.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports no evidence that Iran is building atomic bomb.

2004

March UN resolution condemns Iran for keeping some of its nuclear facilities secret.

Iran bans inspectors from its sites for several weeks.

September Iran has until November to suspend its program—IAEA. Iran begins to convert raw uranium into gas. US nuclear monitor releases satellite images of Iranian weapons facility possibly involved in work on nuclear arms.

November Iran signs temporary agreement with Britain, Germany and France to stop its uranium enrichment program. IAEA refers case to UN Security Council (UNSC).

2005

2006

March US President George W. Bush announces that the US will support negotiations with Iran and offer economic incentives in return for a halt to Iran’s nuclear program.

June UNSC adopts Resolution 1696 in support of diplomatic and economic incentives, giving Iran until 31 August to suspend all uranium enrichment programs.

August - September Tehran resumes uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant. IAEA finds Iran in violation of nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).

December UNSC Resolution 1737 imposes sanctions on Iran’s trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology for failing to meet the August deadline.

February Russia signs deal to supply fuel to Iran’s Bushehr reactor.

April Iran announces that it has successfully enriched uranium.

2007

January Iran refuses entry to 38 IAEA inspectors.

March UNSC passes Resolution 1747, whereby Iran is banned from exporting arms, and the financial assets of 28 individuals and businesses are frozen.

April IAEA confirms that Iran is producing nuclear fuel.

August Iran and IAEA determine timetable for Tehran to report on its nuclear program.

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September President Ahmadinejad announces that 3,000 centrifuges are actively enriching uranium.

October US intensifies its sanctions on Iran for allegedly “supporting terrorists” and pursuing nuclear activities.

IAEA Director General Mohamed AlBaradei announces that there is no evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons.

December US intelligence report finds that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Iran and IAEA resume talks.

2008

February IAEA presents report to Security Council stating that Iran refuses to stop producing uranium fuel.

March UNSC passes Resolution 1803, which restricts the import of “dual use” technology; adds 13 names to existing travel ban and asset freeze on businesses and individuals thought to be engaged in Iran’s nuclear program.

2009

February IAEA report shows major increase in Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium— enough to make one bomb, according to physicists.

June IAEA report says Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium has increased by 25 percent since March.

August Diplomats report no increase in number of centrifuges enriching uranium since May. According to IAEA, Iran has slightly reduced scale of its uranium enrichment, but has also increased number of installed centrifuge machines.

September Iran reveals a second uranium enrichment plant under construction.

November Iran announces its plans to build 10 new nuclear plants.

2010

January Iranian and Russian officials announce that Iran’s first nuclear power plant is expected to be operational by middle of 2010.

March Foreign ministers from eight leading industrial nations call for “appropriate and strong steps” against Iran over its nuclear activities, while US and France call for new and tougher sanctions.

Sourced from BBC News online, the Global Policy Forum in New York, CBS News online and Al-Jazeera English online.

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especially Russia and China; and second, whether such sanctions would be effective. The historical evidence is stacked against both of these possibilities. Russia and China have a long track record of being reluctant in imposing sanctions on regimes deemed “rogue” by the United States and the West.

Both also have serious misgivings about the effectiveness of sanctions in general, and in Iran’s particular case, both governments described them as counterproductive on numerous occasions. While no country, including Moscow and Beijing, would be interested in the serious damage a nuclear Iran could cause to regional stability and the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), both have interests in Iran that would be affected directly by a UNSC decision to that effect. Russia is a major trading partner; China has invested heavily in Iran’s oil industry in recent years.

Any imposition of sanctions would therefore involve considerable horse-trading as well as probable linkages with other issues that affect great power relations today – with Moscow and Beijing trying to extract Western concessions in matters not necessarily connected to Iran in return for cutting themselves in the flesh. This does not exclude the possibility of sanctions being ultimately pushed through at the right price. Russia’s position in particular has begun to shift in recent weeks with the foreign ministry expressing alarm at the prospect of a nuclear Iran, and Russian defense contractors delaying the delivery of the state-of-the-art S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to the Islamic Republic, ostensibly for “technical reasons.” Still, Moscow could very easily return to its original position – and China is maintaining its traditional line emphasizing the importance of a negotiated settlement.

But even if tough sanctions came into force their effect would be highly ambiguous: The historical track record of sanctions – be they of the smart or, if you will, “dumb” variety – is highly dubious. Even in cases where they have had the time to affect elites, economies and societies, they have usually not achieved their desired result in terms of changing regime behavior. The luxury of time is certainly absent in the case of Iran, and the kind of sanctions that are currently being advocated might end up accelerating rather than stopping its nuclear program. Past and current embargoes on dual-use technology may hamper Iran’s nuclear quest from the supply side, but ultimately, its drivers on the demand side remain unaddressed: Nuclear weapons, once acquired, are a watertight guarantee of regime security from external threat. This is, and will remain, the primary driver of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the foreseeable future, sanctions or no sanctions.

Some have clung on to the idea that an oil embargo would bring about the current regime’s downfall. Certainly, a wholescale boycott of Iranian petroleum products would hurt Iran’s oil-dependent economy in an unprecedented way, thereby undermining Iran’s ability to provide for its population. This line of thinking, however, makes three highly uncertain assumptions. First, regime change would be dependent upon the regime’s loss of control; instead, an embargo may very well give its hardliners carte blanche for even bloodier repression than has been seen up to now in the name of “national security.” Second, the assumption is also that Iran would not resist any such development. The odds are, however, that Iran would respond by using one or all of its many options –

Hamas and Hezbollah come to mind, but Iraq, Afghanistan and Hormuz are also definite possibilities should the regime be backed into a corner.

The third assumption is that the regime would fall before it actually managed to obtain “the bomb.” But if anything, an oil embargo might increase the demand-side factor in Tehran’s nuclear quest—North Korea has clearly shown how the dynamics of inter-state interaction change before and after a state goes nuclear. Before, regime destabilization remains an option; after, it becomes a folly. Among the “international community’s” greatest contemporary nightmares are those of a destabilized North Korea and Pakistan. Iran probably knows that a destabilized nuclear Iran would potentially generate equal fear into the hearts of Western policymakers, even more so, than a stable nuclear Iran, which is all the more reason to obtain the bomb quickly; for once you cross the nuclear threshold, the kinds of sanctions that actually engender regime change become irrational, providing ample opportunity for brinkmanship.

But even if tough sanctions came into force their effect would be highly ambiguous: The historical track record of sanctions – be they of the smart or, if you will, “dumb” variety – is highly dubious If one assumes sanctions to be either unattainable or ineffective, the choice becomes one between the two evils of nuclear deterrence and military action – and it is not a straightforward one to make. The views of nuclear deterrence as a regional stabilizer are controversial at best; they also come at the price of either abandoning the NPT, thereby allowing nukes to proliferate freely in the region, or the extension of America’s nuclear umbrella, not to mention the incomparable consequences of potential deterrence failure.

The military option, on the other hand, would carry with it the certainty of regional destabilization, probably with global repercussions, and great uncertainty in terms of its chances for success. In the absence of reliable intelligence – a rare commodity indeed – military strikes would at best delay Iran’s nuclear capability.

But this is exactly what might make the military option a more rational, or less irrational, choice in combination with sanctions. If embargoes are perceived to take a long time to work, a hit on Iran’s nuclear facilities might be seen as extending the possibility for sanctions to work, even if it only ends up delaying its nuclear status. Considering the fact that Israel, as a “free agent,” might actually be both able and willing to carry out such strikes, it becomes clear to what extent this is a situation fraught with danger. And, in view of all the certainties and potentialities involved, it seems the next few years will be undesirably interesting for all.

Kevork Oskanian - London based researcher in security and West Asian politics This article was first published in The Majalla 18 April 2010

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Talking with the Taliban Kai Eide: The departing UN envoy to Afghanistan

The departing UN envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, has supported a political solution to the conflict.

However, his tenure, marred by controversy, may have done enough to discredit his opinion and hinder the cooperation necessary to bring a political solution to Afghanistan.

A

So serious is the impact of this loss in legitimacy that it drove Eide’s former deputy, the American diplomat Peter Galbraith, to accuse Kai Eide of turning a blind eye to the fraudulent practices that allowed for President Hamid Karzai’s re-election. These accusations, which later led to the dismissal of Peter Galbraith, have not done much in favor of promoting Mr. Eide’s credibility in the eyes of Afghans nor in the eyes of the international community.

Despite the controversy, Kai Eide’s experience in the country and his contacts with the Afghan government and the Taliban make him well-placed to provide an expert opinion on realistic options for the country. Far from arguing that a political solution is the only solution, Mr. Eide has profited from the attention accompanying his departure from Afghanistan to send the message that military efforts should be balanced by political efforts.

Otherwise, Mr. Eide told The New York Times, “if negative

Image © Getty Images

s the US prepares to send another troop surge to Afghanistan, hinting that a military solution stands to offer Afghanistan stability, Kai Eide has voiced a dissenting opinion. The departing UN Envoy to Afghanistan has spent the last months of his tenure underscoring the necessity of negotiating with the Taliban. More than that, the foremost proponent of a political solution to the conflict has until recently been part of an informal negotiation with members of the Taliban.

However, the credibility of the Norwegian UN envoy has been tainted by various controversies. The two-year position he undertook stood out, not for a rise in stability, but for increased bloodshed. More importantly, however, was the extent to which fraud plagued Afghanistan’s recent presidential elections and greatly undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government – a turn of events that effectively undermines a political solution.

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trends are not reversed, there is little that could restore peace in the country.” But perhaps the lesson that he most highlighted was that “military operations against insurgents needed to be weighed in a manner that did not impede efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution with them.”

As a recent interview between Mr. Eide and the BBC demonstrated, his message to the international community fell on deaf ears. Having been in contact with members of the Taliban since January of 2009, Mr. Eide was critical of the rupture in communication that occurred with the Taliban following the recent arrests of some of their top members by joint US-Pakistani forces. Not only did he denounce the impact of the arrests, he also strongly denounced the supposed intentions of the arrests.

Arguing that Pakistan was probably aware that negotiations had been taking place with the Taliban, Mr. Eide accused Pakistan of attempting to derail a political solution that the Pakistani government was not leading. Although these allegations have been refuted by the Pakistani government, the blame game that has been taking place highlights the importance of political cooperation in the conflict – although perhaps not exactly the kind Mr. Eide has proposed.

The conflict in Afghanistan, as Mr. Eide’s tenure has shown, endures not only because the Taliban refuses to sever ties with Al-Qaeda. The geopolitical aspects of the conflict require political cooperation but not just between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Rather, serious cooperation is necessary between the UN, the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan if they are to avoid scenarios like this one – scenar-

ios where they are all left questioning each other’s intentions and which greatly undermine the trust-building mechanisms necessary for cooperation in the first place.

As the UN envoy to Afghanistan, however, much of the responsibility for coordinating should have fallen on Mr. Eide’s lap. While he cannot be held wholly responsible for electoral fraud, the position of the UN as a mediating party was not satisfactorily fulfilled, and Mr. Eide’s successors should be better prepared for negotiating differing interests between the parties at hand.

Despite the controversy, Kai Eide’s experience in the country and his contacts with the Afghan government and the Taliban make him well-placed to provide an expert opinion on realistic options for the country If the incumbent envoy to Afghanistan does continue in Mr. Eide’s path by calling for negotiations, he or she must be able to coordinate these plans with the other policies that have been put into place to weaken the Taliban. Apart from the military aspect of these policies, there have also been efforts to demobilize Taliban members by offering the fighters security and employment. These are efforts that should be integrated in a more robust plan for dealing with the Taliban politically. More importantly will be the necessity of securing a formal level of negotiations so as to avoid any accusations that the people discussing on the behalf of the Quetta Shura are not entitled to do so.

Eide has described the year 2010 as the most challenging for the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion. However, it would be an understatement to argue that previous years were not difficult. On the contrary, the years of Mr. Eide’s tenure were undoubtedly challenging, despite his lengthy experience in conflict-ridden countries.

Kai Eide, 60, previously served as the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General in Kosovo in 2005 and as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1997 to 1998. Prior to that he was the Norwegian ambassador to NATO from 2002 to 2006, and the OSCE from 1998 to 2002. Despite his experience, many have been critical of his methods in Afghanistan, suggesting that he valued building his relationships with the warring parties more than he valued the rule of law. So great was the impact on Afghanistan that the International Crisis Group called for his resignation.

Mr. Eide however has confirmed that he is not resigning his post as Envoy. Instead, he is keeping his promise to his family that he would only stay in Kabul for two years. Yet why Mr. Eide is leaving is less important than who will replace him and how he or she will respond to the impact of Eide’s tenure on Afghanistan.

This article was first published in The Majalla 8 April 2010

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As the first ever three-way race and 44 million registered voters, the May 6 general elections in the UK are sure to be thrilling. With an outdated parliamentary system, the expenses scandal and a shattered economy, Labour’s 13-year reign may be threatened by Britain’s desire for real change.

Writer Nicholas Blincoe takes you through the ins and outs of general elections in Britain, including the importance of establishing a geographical base, the difficulties associated with being an outsider party and why there is still hope for Gordon Brown. Whether you are a seasoned voter or a curious onlooker, this piece will ensure that you have a full handle on the excitement to come.

Nicholas Blincoe

Image © iStockphoto

T

he single greatest surprise of the British general election is that it happens so fast. Britain is home to 61 million people, more than 44 million of them registered to vote. How could anyone dream of replacing the government of a country this size in little more than a day? Yet this is what happens. The election takes place on a Thursday and, if the government is defeated, by lunchtime Friday a removal truck is standing outside 10 Downing Street, while a brand new prime minster hovers with his suitcases. In comparison to the United States, where the transition takes three months, the agility of the British system is remarkable.

But when one considers the age and decrepitude of so much of Britain’s political life, this turn of speed looks miraculous: like discovering that your Grandmother is challenging for a place in the Olympics sprinting team.

The British take a special pride in parliamentary government because they believe they invented it: The Victorian politician John Bright famously claimed that, “England is the mother of all parliaments.” But if modern democracy first developed in England, it has not continued to develop there since. The system is old; reputedly older, even, than the English plumbing system. Yet, as anyone who has visited the UK could point out, the time comes when it makes sense to replace the pipework.

British politicians finally agreed modernization might be necessary in 2009, following a parliamentary expenses scandal. For years, Members of Parliament (MP) had chosen to inflate their expenses rather than increase their salaries. As parliament is self-regulating, the system was hugely and flagrantly abused.

MPs expected to be recompensed for the most outlandish claims – there was a claim for a tiny doll’s house in which one MP planned to keep his pet ducks. The public were outraged when they learnt that many MPs were speculating on the London property market, buying houses for rental or quick resale, and leaving voters to pick up the mortgage payments.

The Labour government has been in power for 13 years. It is natural to want change and the expenses scandal has sharpened the public demand. Early in the election campaign, the great symbol of change became the leaders’ debate. Before 2010, the British had never seen a home-grown, live televised debate and, out of curiosity, almost 10 million viewers tuned in to watch Prime Minister Gordon Brown face the Conservative leader, David Cameron. However, in their enthusiasm to recognize the desire for change, the two parties had allowed the often-forgotten Liberal Democrats to join the debate. After the assured performance by Nick Clegg, the Lib Dem leader, the other parties were left looking at their election strategy like parents looking at their house after leaving a teenager alone for the weekend. Everything was in ruins, and no one is sure if it is a short-term surge of hormones or a sign of worse to come.

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The first week of campaigning established that May 6, 2010 would be the most open election that anyone could remember, and the first ever three-way race. This is so remarkable because the British system is designed to squash any deviation from the two-party system. A British general election is, in essence, 650 separate mini-presidential races. In each race, the winner is the one who receives the most votes. Technically, this is known as Single Member District Plurality (SMDP) voting, but everyone calls it “first-past-the-post”: as long as your nose is first across the line, it does not matter if you beat the next guy by an inch or 60 yards. Long ago, when the mother of parliaments was a freshfaced child, these individual representatives began to organize themselves into parties. As the party system developed, it exploited flaws in the SMDP system, flaws which favor regional bases, secret pacts and gerrymandering. It is perfectly possible for the party with the most seats to have the least number of votes: just imagine that one party won by a nose in 326 races, yet did not

Before 2010, the British had never seen a home-grown, live televised debate and, out of curiosity, almost 10 million viewers tuned in to watch Prime Minister Gordon Brown face the Conservative leader, David Cameron even show up in the other 324 races! It happens, sort of. In 1929, the Conservatives edged ahead of Labour by a single percentage point, but lost the election by 27 seats. Again, in February 1974, the Conservatives picked up a slim 0.5 percent majority of votes and lost by four seats. If this situation has never caused outrage, it is because these anomalies only occur in close elections. More usually, a win by a few percentage points translates into a big majority of seats, and provide the UK with stable governments that lead as though they had won huge popular mandates. Indecisive elections can always be re-run (as the above examples were, in 1931 and October 1974, respectively). The British electorate are quick to get the message: Do not mess around, vote for the party you hate the least and forgot the third choice.

Over time, successful parties deepen their geographical base and the weaker parties are squeezed out of the picture. Today, the Conservatives have zero support in Wales or Scotland, despite representing a clear strand of Scottish political thought (the strand that likes running banks and does not absolutely loathe the English). Labour has no support in Cornwall de27

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spite local factors such as unemployment and poverty that are big Labour issues elsewhere in the country. The overwhelming problem for Liberal Democrats is that they have broad geographical support and come second in hundreds of seats. They are perpetual challengers, and their hopes of ever winning are perpetually deferred.

In the current election, however, the result might be so unfair that the electorate finally takes notice. Mathematical models based on recent opinion polls suggest that Labour could come third in the popular vote and still win the most seats (while the Liberal Democrats could win all the votes and still come last). If the most likely result, weighing other probabilities, is a slight win for the Conservatives, this may still produce a parliament with no over-all control: a “hung parliament” as it is brutally called (though the Liberal Democrats are trying to popularize the more jaunty term “balanced parliament”). If this happens, the Conservatives would try and form a “minority” government, hoping that the other parties would fail to snuggle-up close enough to vote against them.

David Cameron could then choose his moment to re-run the election and get a proper majority. History suggests this works 50 percent of the time; the other half of times, the voters go for other guy. The Conservatives would, no doubt, calculate that if they could beat Gordon Brown once, they could do it again. But if the Labour Party replaced Gordon Brown, then the result might be just as close, again.

If the most likely result, weighing other probabilities, is a slight win for the Conservatives, this may still produce a parliament with no overall control: a “hung parliament” By tradition, elections run along a fear-change axis. The government argues the opposition cannot be trusted, while the challenger asks the voters to gamble on change. This election is different because all parties are standing for change, even the government. Of course, Gordon Brown must run on his record as Tony Blair’s finance minister. He is playing a poor hand well by arguing that only he can be trusted in the present poor economy. And, outside of economics, even he is offering change.

In the lead-up to the election, Brown revealed an unsuspected enthusiasm for reform. For instance: the House of Lords. In every other country with a second chamber, like the US Senate, the representatives are elected. Only in the UK is this chamber a mix of appointees and aristocrats. Now Brown is offering a fully elected house. On electoral reform, he is promising a referendum on a new voting system. Why now, after 13 years?

The assumption is that they are looking for schemes that will be attractive to Liberal Democrats, their likely partners in a hung parliament. Unless the Conservatives can win two elections in a run, Britain may see changes bigger than at any other time in the 303 years of its mother parliament.

Nicholas Blincoe is an author and screenwriter living between London and the West Bank city of Bethlehem. He writes regularly for the Guardian and Telegraph. He is also an advisor to Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg.

Ten things you should know about the election 1. The Leaders’ Debate

It works so well in America, what could possibly go wrong? Oops. Britain’s first live TV debate changes the shape of the entire election... and possibly the result.

2. The Swingometer

The swingometer is to elections what the Big Dipper is to Blackpool Pleasure Beach. Once a giant pendulum housed in a BBC TV studio, the swingometer is now hi-tech and virtual... and a lot less fun.

3. Thurrock

The Conservatives need to win 127 seats on a 6.9 percent swing. The magic seat is Thurrock. Between elections, Thurrock is a large shopping mall on the M25.

4. The Queen

If no one wins, the Queen gets to choose. By convention, she asks the leader with the most seats, or the current Prime Minister. Okay, no one knows. The Queen may have a headache on the 7th of May.

5. 3-Way Marginals

There are 58 seats which could be won by either of the big parties. None is more three-way than Ealing Central and Acton. At the last election, the parties scored: Labour 33.4 percent, Conservative 31.2 percent, Liberal Democrat 30.6 percent.

6. Poshness

The big question: who is the poshest party leader?

Cameron went to Eton College. Clegg’s grandmother was a Russian Countess. But Brown is the “son of the manse”: the child of a Presbyterian Minister. In Scotland, this is like Royalty meets Pop Idol.

7. Independents

Despite the grip of the big parties, independents do win seats. A TV personality? A leftwing firebrand? A local doctor protesting about a hospital? All stand a chance in a system that can never, quite, ignore local issues.

8. Single Member District Plurality

The technical term for the UK election system: basically 650 mini-presidential races. This may be the last UK election ever run under SMDP.

9. Na h-Eileanan an Iar

The western isles off Scotland form the smallest constituency with 21,908 voters. The Isle of Wight is the largest with 110,228 voters. Most others have 62,000 voters.

10. Coalition

How Europeans like to be governed, and so regarded as a continental perversion like sadomasochism.

However, both World War II and the Great Depression saw coalition government in the UK. A mixed record, once one thinks about it.

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Leaders Profiles Gordon Brown If Labour win an unprecedented fourth consecutive election, the prime minister once again will be cast in a new light, this time as the Lazarus of modern-day politics. Having inherited the mantle of leadership from Tony Blair in 2007, he has survived coups attempts and the dubious distinction of being compared memorably to both Joseph Stalin and the hapless Mr. Bean. If Gordon Brown manages to retain the keys to Number 10 Downing Street it will be an undisputable personal triumph.

More than ever, this election has been all about “the economy, stupid,” and Labour has sought to cast themselves as the party best able to secure the recovery of Britain’s economy. Brown has positioned himself as “a serious man for serious times” whose government “led the world in saving the banking system.” An

ideological battleground was drawn as the parties argued over the scale and consequences of post-election spending cuts and tax rises. By far the most important issue for voters is the question of what can be done about the government’s enormous budget deficit. The three main parties agree that spending cuts are the key to reducing this deficit. Their differences lie in how and when to make those cuts. Labour has said that the economy is too fragile to risk dramatic cuts this year. For voters, it is difficult to determine how a reduction in the deficit will materialise under Labour.

Labour has acknowledged the grave challenges faced by the new government and Brown has called for a programme of “further national renewal” as Britain seeks to rebuild its economy and society. Labour has tried to present itself as the defender of public services yet their proposed policies have been constructed under the pressure of severely restricted fiscal resources and no fresh commitment to spending increases in public services was made in the party’s manifesto.

With the economic crisis so high on the agenda, other issues seem to have fallen by the wayside. It seems likely that the spoils of victory will go to the leader who convinces the public that he is capable of tackling Britain’s budget deficit whilst stimulating economic growth. Gordon Brown is relying heavily on his experience in handling the economic crisis so far, which in his view makes him the most competent candidate to lead the country through to recovery.

Images © Graphic News

David Cameron David Cameron once described himself as “heir to Blair” and there are certainly marked similarities in the way he has forced changes on a reluctant party. At the helm of the Conservative party for almost five years, Mr. Cameron has sought to rid the Conservatives of their “nasty party” image.

The once unelectable party is now firmly camped on the centre ground with significant poll leads and a popularity contrasting to Gordon Brown’s image as captain of a sinking ship. Cameron has used the expenses scandal, which rocked parliament in 2008, to portray himself as a radical reformer intent on cleaning up politics, an image aided by the replacement of many older, more traditional Conservatives with fresh young minds.

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The financial crisis saw Cameron adopt a more sober approach, agreeing with the government in power that voters faced tough times and spending cuts ahead. The Conservatives have argued that it is vital to begin reducing the budget deficit this year. One element of their plan would be the creation of an Office for Budget Responsibility to monitor public finances and assess government plans. The Conservative manifesto may be considerably lengthier than Labour’s, but it is similarly short on solutions to the main issues vexing the electorate, namely, how to fill the gaping hole in public finances.

Beyond this core campaign issue many other issues – crime, immigration, defence and the environment – divide the parties and may motivate voters even if such issues have not featured heavily in the parties’ national campaigns. The thread that holds modern Conservative values together is what Cameron has called the “big society,” a call to strengthen civil society and give more power to the people.

The Conservatives are hoping that public dissatisfaction with the Labour government will finally bring an end to the party’s longest period in opposition. If Brown offers experience, Cameron unequivocally offers change and a fresh face.

It remains to be seen, however, if the electorate share his vision for “radical political reform.” If the Conservatives triumph Cameron will make history as the youngest prime minister since 1812.

past year. A fluent television performer, his appearances have seen him reach out to voters disaffected with the policies of the two main parties. This approach has been especially successful during the televised debates. Various polls have shown Clegg in the lead, with an average of 30% of those polled claiming they will back Clegg in the election.

The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto outlines their plan to “hardwire fairness into British society.” In setting out his agenda, Mr. Clegg accuses Labour and the Conservatives of making unrealistic promises that cannot be fulfilled in the current economic climate. Instead, the Liberal Democrats have proposed a series of costed pledges to regain the money needed to lower the deficit. Clegg goes on to accuse his main opponents of “airbrushing” the economy from their documents. Mr. Cameron, according to Clegg, is guilty of “economic illiteracy” for demanding cuts during the recession, while Mr. Brown is “in denial” about the need for them afterwards.

Nick Clegg Amidst speculation that the election may result in a hung parliament there has been increased focus on the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third political party. In the recent past, the Liberal Democrats have struggled with a lack of public awareness as to what their party offers the country. As a result, party leader Nick Clegg has spent much of the campaign attempting to project the Liberal Democrats as an alternative to Labour and the Conservatives. Clegg has suffered from comparisons to David Cameron, whose projected image as a young, modernising leader is similar in the eyes of many voters.

During the election campaign, the reputation of Mr. Clegg has grown in stature as he sought to place emphasis on his honesty as a leader, claiming he could reach out to voters angered by the corruption scandals of the Issue 1552 • May 2010

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Is Britain ready to pass the torch?

Lib Dem leader comes out on top in first televised debate

Image © iStockphoto

Britain made history Thursday when the leaders of the three largest political parties debated live on television for the first time ever. Poll results favored Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg’s performance in what was the first of three televised debates covering national issues like health, immigration and public spending.

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n the first ever televised prime ministerial debate in Britain, Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg stood out as the candidate of choice among the British public. A number of polls conducted Thursday evening awarded Clegg the proverbial gold medal for his performance. Conservative party leader David Cameron came in second, leaving third to Labour’s Gordon Brown with only 20 percent of the final vote, according to ITV. Responding to questions directly from the audience, each leader was given a certain amount of time to clarify his party’s stance and contest the other’s argument on issues of domestic importance such as healthcare, immigration, law and order, education and public spending, among others.

In a setting that seemed more like a defunct game show trying to make a come-back, the spectacle was much too civilized for the cut-throat free for all political matches the British

Second leaders’ debate, a close race to first Clegg places first in three of the five reaction polls referred to here, however the differences are marginal. Incumbent Prime Minister Gordon Brown fails to score first in any of the polls, all of which were conducted immediately following the second debate.

ComRes

Angus Reid

ICM

Populus

YouGov

Clegg

33%

35%

33%

36%

32%

Cameron

29%

32%

30%

37%

36%

Brown

29%

23%

30%

27%

29%

All poll information is sourced from the UK Polling Report (www.ukpollingreport.co.uk) and YouGov (www.yougov.co.uk).

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While Clegg spent his time trying to convince the public that the Lib Dems were the fresh and honest alternative to the two old hands next to him, Brown and Cameron largely saved their angst for each other “It’s still about blues versus reds” Jim Pickard of the Financial Times wrote on his elections blog. “After all, the Lib Dems have no chance in the majority of seats in the general election.”

Though some of us may cringe from the overcharged atmosphere surrounding Mr. Clegg – one voter called him an amateur and generally disappointing the Lib Dems may have a thing or two going for them with this initial vote of confidence. The next debate, scheduled for 22 April, may give a better indication as to whether Thursday’s showing will give Clegg the momentum he needs to carry the so-called outsider party through to a ballot victory on 6 May. Outspoken critics of the debate such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru of Wales did not participate. Plaid leader Ieuan Wyn Jones noted the exclusion of Wales from the discussion entirely. “Not once did we hear the word Wales mentioned by any of the leaders. Indeed much of what they said was irrelevant to our communities.”

BBC will hold separate leaders debates in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

This article was first published in The Majalla 16 April 2010

Ten Numbers David Cameron is a direct descendant of King William IV, who reigned over the United Kingdom and Hanover from 1830-1837.

The cost of a bus journey across London has only increased by 20p since the last general election in 2005.

Crime rates have fallen under the Labour government; they are estimated to be approximately 45% lower than they were in 1995.

The average cost of a litre of unleaded petrol was 58p in 1997 up to £1.18 today.

Inward migration from 2001-2008 accounted for 62% of population growth in Britain.

In the 2005 election campaign ‘The Official Monster Raving Loony Party’ proposed to introduce a 99p coin to ‘save on change’.

397 seats won in 1983: the best Conservative result in terms of seats, won under Margaret Thatcher.

The average UK house price has soared under the Labour government from £68,525 in 1997 to £164,455 at present.

Under a Liberal Democrat government 3.6 million people would pay no tax at all; according to their proposal to increase the threshold of tax-free allowance to £10,000, a huge increase from the current threshold of £6,475.

9.4 million: the estimated number of viewers of the historical first prime ministerial TV debate.

Image © Getty Images

public is used to seeing on the floor of parliament. Finding truth in the cardinal rule of repetition in the face of debate danger, each party rep. rarely diverged from their well-rehearsed script, except for the offhand remark by Mr. Brown.

As Philip Stephens commented on the Financial Times blog, each candidate was exactly what we expected him to be – himself. Surprisingly, “there were no knock-out blows and no dreadful slip-ups,” Stephens wrote.

While Clegg spent his time trying to convince the public that the Lib Dems were the fresh and honest alternative to the two old hands next to him, Brown and Cameron largely saved their angst for each other. “I believe that the way things are is not the way things have to be. I am here to persuade you that there is an alternative,” Clegg said in his opening statement.

Cameron used his public speaking skills to drive home the point that a future with Conservative leadership is a secure future. “If you work hard, I'll be behind you. If you want to raise a family, I will support you. If you are old and you become ill, we will always be there for you.”

Brown, on the other hand, was applauded for his courage as incumbent, a role he predictably used to his advantage.

“These are no ordinary times and this is no ordinary election,” he said. “This is the defining year to get these decisions right now. Get the decisions wrong now and we could have a double-dip recession.

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A Shining City upon the Hill?

What the GCC can learn from the EU – and its failures?

The EU likes to glorify itself as a model for the world – as a living example of how supranational cooperation can bring peace, democracy and prosperity to a region, and how the pooling of resources can enhance political influence on the world stage. But how is European integration itself faring? The GCC should look more soberly at the EU integration process, learning from its successes, but above all, its shortcomings.

Valentin Zahrnt

Image © iStockphoto

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he EU does not quite match the American sense of mission. Even when the European heads of state give their history-laden speeches, they do not cast Brussels as the shining city upon the hill. Nonetheless, the EU likes to glorify itself as a model for the world: It is a living example of how supranational cooperation can bring peace, democracy and prosperity to a region, and how the pooling of resources can enhance political influence on the world stage. EU dignitaries also cite the organization’s institutional innovations of multi-level governance with civil society participation and the discursive quest for win-win solutions as major achievements.

The EU’s predilection for its sui generis status – transcending the traditional division into nation states and international organizations – does not keep it from promoting regional integration beyond its borders. It accomplishes this with development aid and technical assistance. And it attempts to negotiate trade-and-cooperation agreements with groups of partner countries, such as the GCC – assuming that collective representation vis-à-vis the EU will help these countries to establish a common identity.

But how is European integration itself faring? How appealing is the example that Europeans want to sell to the world?

Against the backdrop of its war-torn past and the shambles of 1945, its success is undeniable. A closer look at its performance in the new millennium is, however, more sobering.

The EU has been losing public support. Voter turnout has decreased in every election for the European Parliament, reaching a meager 43 percent in 2009. Otherwise, citizens are rarely asked to vote on EU affairs, but for good reason, since they have the dangerous inclination to say no. The much-touted EU constitution was rejected by the French and Dutch in referenda in 2005. EU leaders scrapped the constitutional trappings, such as the Ode to Joy anthem, and repackaged what was left into the Lisbon Treaty. This time, only the Irish government went for a referendum, securing support in a re-run after promises and threats had tamed the popular resistance that had carried the day in the first round.

Does this disenchantment reflect tough policy choices, painful today yet promoting competition and structural change for long-term economic growth? By no means. The grand strategy, decided upon in 2000, of transforming the EU, within a decade, into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, failed spectacularly. The explanation behind

For the US, the war is winding down, as opposed to Iraq, which will be stuck in an ongoing conflict for years to come such a disappointing outcome is that the removal of barriers to the single market has slowed down. A serious attempt at liberalization was undertaken in services. Member states would have been allowed to maintain only non-discriminatory, objectively justified and proportionate regulation of service industries; and service providers could have adhered to the regulation of their home country while temporarily working anywhere in the EU. This was too much economic freedom for the European Parliament, which watered the legislation down beyond recognition.

Moreover, the EU budget remains a relic shaped by successive rounds of political bartering. Remarkably, the EU pays out about €55 billion (40 percent of its budget) in farm subsidies every year, dwarfing the €11 billion dedicated to “competitive-

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ness for growth and employment,” a budget line covering research and innovation, education and training, and energy and transport networks.

These setbacks might have been severe enough for member states to conclude that the time for strong leadership had come.

Instead, they picked an obedient crew to steer EU institutions.

Herman Van Rompuy, who had proven his capacity as an able conciliator in Belgium but was little known by the European public, became the first permanent president of the European Council. The even lesser-known Catherine Ashton, who has never been elected to a public office, was given responsibility for the EU’s foreign policy. The ever-smiling and compromising Manuel Barroso, meanwhile, was allowed to stay at the helm of the European Commission for another term.

Conditions in the European and Arab world differ in fundamental ways, and so do EU and GCC institutions. Nevertheless, some general lessons may be drawn from the EU experience, which may help the GCC to avoid certain dangers of regional integration. First, avoid the short-term boost of pathetic prose and grandiose goals. Praising an ever-closer union as a panacea for all ills breeds disappointment. A business mentality – sticking to clear objectives with a timeline – pays off in the long run.

Second, don’t get distracted over a social agenda. Strengthening cultural exchange and human rights are worthy ambitions of regional integration – directly tackling poverty and unemployment less so. The contribution of regional integration lies not in social policy but in economic liberalization, through the removal of internal and external barriers to trade and a forceful aggressive competition policy.

Third, proceed carefully on shared spending. At any time and place, subsidies have shown enormous staying power. If several governments have to agree on their removal, subsidies become virtually immutable. Finally, entrust the shared institutions with a mechanism to monitor the quality of members’ policies. Enhanced transparency of policy measures and outcomes, with hard data that is comparable across members, can be a major benefit of regional integration. This should be accompanied by independent evaluation, or, to put it more bluntly, naming and shaming. The EU is groping in this direction. Any new regional formation with a lighter institutional baggage, such as the GCC, might move more resolutely and serve as a role model on transparency and smart cooperation some years down the road.

Valentin Zahrnt - Research Associate at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and Editor of www.reformthecap.eu.

This article was first published in The Majalla 18 April 2010

Metaphorically speaking The metaphor of America as a city upon a hill was first expressed by the Englishman John Winthrop in his famous sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity,” 1630, on his voyage to Massachusetts where he was later to become governor. Winthrop is known for his role in shaping the puritan movement in American politics and society. The expression is in reference to Jesus from the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:14-16 Issue 1552 • May 2010

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Gambling in Greenbacks?

The Dollar and the Global Economic Recovery Without major changes, the United States appears to be on track for a sustainable long-term debt level. While looking at economic tea leaves can be a precarious business, they do provide the best basis we have from which to anticipate future developments in the economy and currency markets.

Dr. Mark Duckenfield

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ompeting projections for America’s future debts have emerged from the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) assessments of US President Barack Obama’s recent budget proposals. Much observer attention has focused on the disparity between the two projections – $1.2 trillion over the decade, but what is most troubling is what they have in common: a major increase in the level of government indebtedness as a share of GDP. While looking at economic tea leaves can be a precarious business, they do provide the best basis we have of anticipating future developments and better preparing ourselves for the consequences.

The Obama administration’s budget projections through 2020 keep the federal budget deficit above 3.5 percent for the entire decade. The CBO thinks that 4.5 percent will be the real floor. Without major changes, the United States appears to be on track for a sustainable long-term debt level of somewhere around 80 percent of GDP. This level, while not desirable, is also not catastrophic, especially as squaring the circle of this deficit financing might not be as problematic as many suggest.

American tax rates remain relatively low compared to European countries; indeed, they remain well below the American rates of the booming nineties. Raising taxes to the levels seen in the Clinton years would make substantial inroads into these deficits and debts regardless of whose figures are used. However, as the recently concluded debate over health care reform revealed, there are major institutional and partisan obstacles to such major changes in existing policies. Whether President Obama or any of his successors can overcome these roadblocks remains highly questionable.

American fiscal deficits are just one of the United States’ twin deficits – the other being its ongoing trade deficit. The United States’ last trade surplus was in 1975. For a generation the world has known only large, and frequently rising, American trade deficits. The economic crisis has put a dent in the trade deficit, which fell from its previous record in 2008 of $696 billion to a still substantial $381 billion in 2009. A return to normalcy will likely lead to further erosion in the US balance of payment.

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when the current economic crisis has passed. The recent attractiveness of the US dollar has much more to do with the absence of other safe harbors for money than any underlying strength of the United States’ trade and fiscal position.

Currency prices are relative and the few alternatives to the dollar also confront challenges. The euro has been going through troubled times of late. While its trade is roughly in balance, the financial position of some EU member states is seen as precarious. It remains to be seen whether the fiscal turmoil seen in tiny Greece will be replicated in larger Spain and Italy.

However, the Eurozone’s limits on the size of the fiscal deficits of its members provide a powerful constraint that is lacking on the United States’ federal government. Even without any changes, the US fiscal position more closely resembles Germany’s than it does Europe’s southern states. The American trade position, on the other hand, is the inverse of Germany, the world’s number two exporter after China.

And, of course, whatever the talk of a “strong dollar,” it is the official policy of the United States that China should let the undervalued renminbi float against the dollar. Experts are in broad agreement that the consequences of removing the peg between the dollar and the renminbi would be an appreciation of the Chinese currency of between 25-40 percent. This would likely cripple China’s export-oriented economic strategy, but American policy-makers are increasingly attempting to engineer further revaluation of the renminbi.

As the world economy emerges from the Great Recession, investors once again slowly start to look at investments that earn higher rates of return than safe government bonds. Gains from a recovery in the American economy are likely to be tempered by a slackening in demand for the dollar. Europe holds some prospects as the euro continues to establish itself as a regional alternative to the dollar, but the real growth prospects in the European Union are likely to be in the eastern members, most of whom have not yet adopted the euro. In this climate, economies in the developing world, especially success stories like China, India and Brazil with their combination of perseverance and sustained growth in the face of the financial crisis, will begin to look even more attractive.

Dr. Mark Duckenfield – Professor of International Political Economy at US Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the US Air War College or the Department of Defense.

This article was first published in The Majalla 12 April 2010

Great Expectations The Chinese Renminbi As the Chinese economy rapidly recovers from the economic downturn created by the global financial crisis, questions about the sustainability of its exchange rate arise again. Although a revaluation would be welcomed abroad, contrary to common assumptions, this action would be no panacea, nor would it happen overnight.

Guy de Jonquières

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s China about to revalue its national currency, the renminbi? As its economy heads into a second year of rapid recovery from the economic crisis, rumours are circulating again that a rise in the exchange rate, which has barely budged against the US dollar for two years, may be imminent. But if that happens, do not expect dramatic global consequences any time soon.

There are many reasons to think that a stronger RMB would be beneficial, for China and for the world. It could help combat growing inflationary pressures and deter the hot money inflows that bedevil the country’s domestic monetary policy. It would also boost Chinese consumers’ spending power by making imports cheaper and spur industries to upgrade to higher valueadded products – both stated government aims.

A revaluation would be widely welcomed abroad, particularly in the US, where China’s heavily managed exchange rate has long been bitterly criticised. It is blamed for artificially depressing the price of Chinese exports, generating big current account surpluses and contributing to the build-up of global financial imbalances that some economists believe fuelled the crisis. By letting its currency strengthen, China could reduce the risk of bruising conflicts with trade partners.

However, these are mostly hopes, not certainties, and many of them are likely to be disappointed. For one thing, any renminbi appreciation will almost certainly be modest and gradual. A big move would be bound to face powerful resistance from politicians in the country’s export-oriented coastal provinces, who fear it would add to the millions of job losses already caused by the crisis.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that even a sizable revaluation of, say, 30 per cent, would be enough to curb China’s persistent external surpluses. A recent study by researchers at Columbia University, based on analysis of long-run data from 170 economies, fails to find any consistent correlation between movements in exchange rates and current account performance.

Linkage is especially tenuous in China’s case because so many of its exports consist of items – such as consumer electronics products – that are assembled from imported components.

Revaluation would cut the cost of the latter in local currency

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terms, limiting upward pressure on the price of China’s exports and consequently the probable impact on the trade surplus.

In truth, explanations for the country’s external surpluses mostly lie elsewhere. These stem mainly, not from unfair trading practices, but from the fact that China saves far more than it invests or spends at home. Like oil-rich Middle Eastern nations - which increasingly owe their wealth to Chinese demand - its economy simply cannot absorb all the money it makes, despite its dizzyingly high levels of fixed asset investment. The surplus cash has therefore to be exported. Much of it flows to the west, because that is where the world’s biggest, deepest and most liquid capital markets are.

It is anomalous that so much wealth is regularly transferred to rich countries from poorer ones. It is odder still that Chinese public opinion celebrates as a sign of strength the vast foreign exchange reserves amassed as a result of its external surpluses.

In reality, the surpluses and bulging reserves reflect structural and policy flaws that have prevented the country’s citizens benefiting as much as they could from its economic success by holding down their living standards.

In order for them to share more of China’s prosperity, its economy needs to be re-balanced, to make consumption - not investment and exports – its main growth driver. Beijing has

talked for years about promoting that shift. But progress has been slow and may well have been reversed by heavy reliance on investment, which generated almost all of last year’s growth, to power recovery from the crisis.

Re-balancing requires action on four fronts. First, savings rates must be lowered – not just in households, but in companies and the central government, which are now reckoned by many economists to be China’s biggest savers. Second, modernisation of the country’s distorted and primitive financial system should be accelerated, in order to ensure that savings are invested more productively and capital allocated more efficiently.

Third, household incomes must rise faster in order to support higher consumption, after several years in which they have grown more slowly than corporate profits. And fourth, more jobs need to be created by reforming and opening up services markets, which are potentially by far the biggest job creators but which, in China, are often dominated by politically influential state-owned enterprises that lock out private competitors.

This amounts to a formidable agenda. Even if China’s cautious current leadership summons the will to tackle it, braving likely opposition from powerful lobbies and entrenched vested interests, it will take many years to achieve. A renminbi revaluation – and better still, a steady move towards a more flexible currency regime – could contribute to positive structural change. But China’s foreign critics should recognise that on its own, it is not the magic bullet that many of them claim.

Guy de Jonquières - Senior fellow at the European Centre for International Political Economy. He previously worked for The Financial Times This article was first published in The Majalla 27 February 2010

Image © iStockphoto

Den Xiaoping

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Leader of China from 1978 to the early 1990s Den Xiaoping is remembered by the international community as the architect of China’s dramatic economic development. Inheriting a country burdened by social and economic woes, Xiaoping became the figurehead of the “second generation” of the communist party.

Under his leadership, communist rule in China survived the demise of eastern European communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations with the West improved dramatically during his time in office; Xiaoping even became the first Chinese leader to visit the White House in 1979. China underwent significant modernization under his leadership and the goal of his reforms was to see China become a modern industrial nation. He placed economic development at the center of the country’s interests and opened up China’s markets to foreign investment and market allocation within a socialist framework. His reputation, however, has been tarnished abroad by his ruthlessness in masterminding the notorious massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Nevertheless, Xiaoping has twice been named TIME’s “man of the year,” and in death he is held in great affection by many fellow countrymen.

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The British Patient The British economy in the election

Despite recent encouraging reports on the British economy, the fact remains that the soaring fiscal deficit and public debt continue to be a significant burden to Great Britain. As the British prepare to go to the polls, the main contenders to 10 Downing Street unveil different plans to tackle the British economic predicaments. The truth is, however, that whoever takes office after the election will be faced with the difficult task of picking up the pieces of a collapsed economy.

Image © iStockphoto

E

conomically, at least, there is precious little to inspire on either side of the pond these days. Both the U.S. and British economies are saddled with record levels of debt and declining revenues. Investment is down and both dollar and sterling are unstable. Washington and London are struggling to rebuild their financial sectors from the rubble of the global credit crisis, and to make matters worse, they are both mature democracies, which means very little is likely to get done absent another crisis.

So it was counter-intuitive indeed when Morgan Stanley this month [EDS: April] issued a report that was cautiously optimistic about the outlook for British recovery following national elections scheduled for May 6. Despite record net public debt of 63 percent of gross domestic product, (compared with America’s 70 percent), a budget deficit for fiscal year 2010 of 12 percent, and projected economic growth of only 1.25 percent, Morgan Stanley pointed out, the UK has faced similar challenges in the past and prevailed.

Throughout much of the 1990s, for example, Britain endured budget deficits of some 8 percent as well as abysmally low revenues, only to greet the new millennium with a budget surplus.

“In other words,” according to the Morgan Stanley report, “on these simple metrics, the deficit reduction plan looks achievable and is not without precedent.” Morgan Stanley even thinks the British pound, which has taken a beating from speculators, is poised for a rebound after the election. Such a hopeful prognosis, however, presumes politicians currently stumping for national office will make good on their campaign rhetoric with meaningful tax hikes and spending cuts. “Political will is likely to be required to push through what will be painful spending adjustments on the public sector and on the public more generally,” notes the investment bank.

Until now, demanding real sacrifice of unruly electorates has been an unheard-of state of affairs in either republican American or constitutional-monarchical British democracy. This is what makes the British campaign, which the opposition Conservative party is likely to win, so intriguing. All three UK political parties have assembled reform packages that call for tax increases and significant cuts in spending. Conservatives would quickly impose austerity measures to reign in spending and cut the deficit. While this would cut corporate taxes, about 22 percent of the party’s fiscal consolidation plan would come from tax increases. The ruling Labour Party, meanwhile, would postpone consolidation efforts until the next fiscal year, though its budget forecast calls for dramatic deficit reduction, to 4.0 percent, by fiscal year 2014. The Liberal Democrats, whose fortunes have risen due to the strong performance in televised debates of party leader Nick Clegg, would also hold off on austerity measures until next year while limiting tax increases to a levy on bank profits.

Stephen Glain Though Morgan Stanley concludes that the government’s longterm budget projections are overly optimistic, it reports that a deficit reduction by as much as half the current total, or 6 percent of economic output, could be managed within the next five years.

And according to a recent Financial Times survey, roughly half of British economists agree with a statement by George Osborne, the Conservative Party’s shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, that “credible fiscal consolidation plans will have a positive impact through greater certainty and confidence in the future.”

Success is by no means guaranteed, however. For one thing, though the rate at which the British government borrows money to avoid default is expected to decline slightly next year, to £163 billion from £167 billion, that level represents the UK’s largest peacetime line of credit ever. Currently, London must borrow from investors £1 for every four it spends, rather than collect it from taxpayers.

That means the British economy, like its American counterpart, survives at the pleasure of investment houses, rich individuals and sovereign wealth funds. Fortunately for the government, the nation’s private sector is running a surplus big enough to cover its fiscal deficit. But as other economies, particularly emerging markets, continue to mount robust recoveries, the cost to the government of financing its debt burden could well increase. Commodities markets, which are responding to growing demand from high-growth countries like China, India and Brazil, are also increasingly stiff competitors with the British government for investment capital.

There is also uncertainty over the British pound, notwithstanding Morgan Stanley’s hopeful post-election outlook. A weak currency is good for the UK, which relies on exports for nearly 30 percent of its economic output and remains the world’s sixthlargest manufacturer. But what if no single party emerges as a conclusive winner, creating a “hung” parliament that might fail to assure investors that London is on track for fiscal consolidation? That could trigger a run on the pound, precipitating an inflationary spiral and a sharp increase in long-term interest rates that would almost certainly short-circuit the nation’s recovery.

The favored Conservative party may deliver themselves from the opposition benches only to find themselves in possession of a collapsed economy. From that vantage point, the political wilderness may not look so hostile after all.

Stephen Glain is a former correspondent for Newsweek and covered Asia and the Middle East for the Wall Street Journal for a decade. Now based in Washington as a freelance journalist and author he is currently working on his forthcoming book about the militarization of US foreign policy.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

News Behind the Graph The UK Economy The structural problems of the UK economy imply that whatever government comes to power in the upcoming elections will be severely constrained in its margin of action. Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus in that, as far as the economy is concerned, a hung parliament is the worse outcome. As David Frost, general director of the British Chamber of Commerce, puts it, “Businesses are right to be wary about the prospect of a hung parliament. Instinctively, companies prefer a clear mandate to lead and govern. With our economy still fragile and the public finances in a dire state, the overwhelming concern is whether a hung parliament will provide decisive action around the UK’s unsustainable deficit.”

A hung parliament would not be able to act decisively in pushing forward with the necessary reforms – such as the financial regulatory reform – and spending cuts. As the economic recovery has announced itself slower and more painful than many had hoped, the current public deficit burden will rapidly become unsustainable. A strong mandate is therefore necessary to overcome the high political costs sound economic policymaking would engender.

The state of the UK economy is delicate at best. Recovery has been slow and all signs indicate that this trend will not improve in the near future. Despite the severity of the past recession, however, the structural imbalances observed in the early 1980s and early 1990s were significantly more pronounced.

Unemployment has not been nearly as bad as in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, and inflation has remained relatively stable.

The reforms carried out in the Thatcher and Blair years significantly improved the ability of the UK economy to absorb shocks and therefore reduced the propensity of overreaction by economic agents.

Given the nature of the current crisis, real estate prices colapsed after more than 15 years of unstopped growth. The real estate price index shows that between 1993 and 2008, real estate prices increased by a factor of 4.5. During this period, the importance of real estate prices to household grew considerably as new financial innovations – such as the ones at the origin of the crisis – liquified what had historically been highly iliquid assets. As the graph makes clear, the price of real estate has resumed its steep upward trend since the end of 2008.

One of the main challenges for the next UK government is the pitiful state of public finances. The steep fall of economic activity, the financial institutions’ bailout and the stimulus package

A hung parliament would not be able to act decisively in pushing forward with the necessary reforms – such as the financial regulatory reform – and spending cuts

considerably increased the fiscal deficit and the share of general government debt as a share of GDP. One of the priorities of the next government will be to reign in spending, re-establish fiscal balance and reduce the public debt. The meagre economic recovery has also rendered these tasks all the more difficult. A strong mandate is necessary for a government to bear the political costs of these unpopular but necessary policies.

Structural Indicators

Source: IMF World Econmic Outlook April 2010 Real Estate Prices

Source: Nationwide Debt

Source: IMF World Econmic Outlook April 2010

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The Markets

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Yemen’s Little Giant Nujood Ali

Nujood Ali is a published author, a divorcee, and only ten years old. The story of her life, her marriage and her divorce, provide great insight into the development challenges that Yemen faces. More importantly, her story attests to the negative impact that the continued oppression of women’s rights have on the prospects for stability in Yemen.

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overage of Yemen tends to focus on the country’s ongoing conflicts – from the separatist movement in the South, to the civil war in the North. Good news is difficult to find in a country ravaged by war, yet one woman in Yemen, a little girl rather, has made international headlines for her bravery.

Nujood Ali recently became Yemen’s first child bride to legally divorce her husband. Nujood’s courageous actions have not only allowed her to save herself, they have set the precedent for other child brides to defend their rights in Yemen. At 10 years old, Nujood has also written an international best seller. I am Nujood age 10 and Divorced has been published in 18 languages, including her native Arabic, and its international success has allowed her to become her family’s main breadwinner. Nujood’s accomplishments, needless to say, are great. Hilary Clinton even described her as “one of the greatest women she had ever seen.”

Yet, Nujood’s story is about more than just one child bride and her accomplishments. Rather, her story provides great insight into the practices that shape Yemen and hinder its development. The problem of child brides and the repression of women more broadly is more than a cultural difference that Yemen has with say Western countries. It is a problem of its underdevelopment, and a problem that is largely responsible for the many types of insecurity that Yemeni’s have grown accustomed to.

Although, Nujood’s story has a happy ending, her childhood is a sad reminder of the harsh reality that many girls in Yemen live to this day. Nujood is remarkable for having given a rampant problem in the country a voice, but she is also remarkable for how commonplace her situation as a child bride is, and that is why her life story is worth recounting.

The nightmare for most girls in Yemen begins in very much the same way as it did for Nujood. When she turned nine, her family told her that she would marry a deliveryman in his 30’s. She

Image © Getty Images

Nujood’s story is about more than just one child bride and her accomplishments. Rather, her story provides great insight into the practices that shape Yemen and hinder its development had previously made her father promise her that he would not force her to marry and drop out of school for she was especially interested in Math and the Koran. Although Nujood was at first impressed by the gifts she received for the marriage – dresses, a perfume, two hijabs, a hair brush and a ring – she was very unhappy at the idea of marrying and leaving school. But the arranged marriage took place, despite her incessant pleading.

Nujood’s father had agreed with her husband that although the marriage would take place, he was not to touch her until she was “ready”, as the vague Yemeni legal system stipulates with regards to child brides. However, as in most other cases, Nujood’s former husband did not comply with these demands, raping her daily and beating her when she tried to escape him.

The extent of Nujood’s fear and unhappiness grew unbearable, and two months after her wedding Nujood ran away to Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. On her own, the little girl took a bus and a taxi to the main court of the city where she remained until a judge granted her a divorce. Although the judge did

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grant her the divorce, Nujood was ordered to pay her former husband $200 USD, an incredible amount in Yemen where the majority of the population lives under the poverty line.

In fact, poverty stands to explain much in Nujood’s story, although it excuses none of the injustice women like her suffer regularly. At first glance, it is easy to take Nujood’s story and categorize her male relatives, her husband and her father particularly, as first rate antagonists. But the problem of gender inequality in Yemen, and the exploitation of young girls like Nujood, is more complex and more expansive than the two men that defined this story might lead one to believe.

Nujood’s father, Ali Mohammed Ahdal, is a former street sweeper. He has 16 children, two wives and is unemployed. Ahdal found marrying his 9 year old solved two of his problems: insecurity and poverty. Ahdal had immigrated to Sanaa with his family to look for work but instead found himself poorer than before. Unable to provide for his family, the prospect of a dowry and of one less mouth to feed made marrying his daughter a partial solution to this problem in his eyes. Perhaps what convinced him was that one of Nujood’s sisters had already been kidnapped and another raped. Marrying Nujood, might save her from being dishonored, kidnapped and raped like the other girls.

In these conditions, some Yemenis might interpret child marriage as a solution to the types of insecurities they regularly face. But as Nujood showed the world, the insecurity that girls face as a result of early marriage only continue to grow. More strikingly, because her story has a happy ending, it does not show how negatively these practices affect this underdeveloped and conflicted country if children stay married.

As Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times explains, “it is no coincidence that Yemen abounds both in child brides and in terrorists. Societies that repress women tend to be prone to violence.” Although it might appear as an all-encompassing explanation for a complex problem, various human rights NGOs and international organizations support his view.

The reason countries with child brides can be unstable, they argue, is because these conditions result in unusually high birth rates, which cause a youth bulge in the population.

The high proportion of young men aged 15-24 increases the likelihood of violence. This tendency increases even further in countries like Yemen where there are very few economic opportunities. In fact, 70 percent of men in this age group in Yemen are unemployed.

To make matters worse, because polygamy and child marriage are practiced in Yemen, and these two factors correlate with a higher death rate in women, more men are likely to be single than married. This is another factor that has proved to increase the tendency of men to participate in conflict, as “frustrated bachelors” are more easily recruited by extremists. (In fact, Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorist strategy supports this view, as many of their demobilized combatants are encouraged to start families to prevent them from rejoining militant groups).

Rachel Cooke of the guardian wrote that Yemen is the worst place in the world to be a woman. Citing the Human Development Index, she shows that 71 percent of Women in Yemen are illiterate, as opposed to 31 percent of men, and 35 percent of women in most other Middle Eastern countries. Women in Yemen also have a 1 in 39 chance of dying in pregnancy or childbirth throughout their lifetime. Because the law in Yemen Issue 1552 • May 2010

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Child Marriage: The Facts (Source UNFPA Child Marriage) Most countries have declared 18 as the minimum legal age of marriage. Despite the sanctions on child marriage, however, more than 100 million girls are expected to marry in the next decade.

Child marriage is a health issue as well as a human rights violation. Because it takes place almost exclusively within the context of poverty and gender inequality, it also has social, cultural and economic dimensions.

Married adolescents are typified by: • Large spousal age gaps • Limited social support • Limited education • Intense pressure to become pregnant • Increased risk of maternal and infant mortality, and vulnerability to HIV and other STDs • Restricted social mobility/freedom of movement • Little access to modern media • Lack of skills needed to participate in the labour market It is no coincidence that the same countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East that have high rates of child marriage are those with: • High poverty rates, birth rates and death rates • Greater incidence of conflict and civil strife • Lower levels of overall development, including schooling, employment, health care The East Asian “Miracles” like Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand that have successfully eradicated the harmful traditional practice of child marriage are characterized by: • Economic growth and opportunity • Declines in birth and death rates • Increase in educational and employment options for girls does not have a minimum marrying age, there is also larger proportion of younger girls who are especially vulnerable to maternal mortality and health complications.

As Nujood’s lawyer, said “Yemeni women have few rights, and they don’t know those they do have.” Although calls to raise the legal age of consent in Yemen to 18 have failed, Nujood has inspired other young girls to seek divorce. Women like Nujood and her lawyer, Nasser, have undertaken a gargantuan task, and they are successfully opening doors for gender equality in Yemen as a result. Their case is raising awareness of the problems that child marriage and the oppression of women lead to, not only for women but for Yemen’s future as a whole.

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

After nearly a week of airport closures, more than the tourism industry has been affected by the halt in air transportation. Global supply chains have been disrupted, greatly impacting economies around the world, even those away from the ash cloud produced by Eyjafjallajökull.

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he third week of April was difficult for Londoners, when out of nowhere, whole foods markets were out of mini pineapples. And even the best sushi restaurants stopped serving sea urchin, monkfish liver and scallops. On the other side of the world, far away Hong Kong was rationing stocks of Belgian chocolate, Scotch and chèvre.

Those of us who were not included in the 7 million people caught in airports during the most extensive peacetime air travel disruption in history, still felt the impact of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajokull, and will continue to do so (beyond the occasional locutionary gymnastics that naming the source of the problem requires).

The economic impact of the volcano has been cause for concern in the tourism industry for days now, with estimates of losses reaching £7 billion for airlines alone, says the International Air Transport Association. The US lost approximately $650 million.

While long-term impact on the European economy is said to be minimal, should another air travel disruption occur, European economies could lose between one to two percent of their GDP. But the effect of Eyjafjallajokull reaches farther than just the tourism industry, as the tragedy of London’s limited access to exotic flowers and other perishable goods demonstrates. The reduction in flights has affected florists and caterers, impacting the entertainment market. Even weddings have been postponed because, to the brides’ dismay, flower arrangements and guests have not been able to make the trip.

Sarcasm aside, although these anecdotes might sound like “first world problems,” the impact of the ash cloud has shown that there is much more to the luxury of importing goods than pleasing the economic elite whose purchase of exotic products has become part of their every day lives.

While European countries find themselves without carnations, the exporters of these products, comprised largely of developing nations, are left with perishable goods in their warehouses.

According to TIME, 10,000 tons of goods are transported between Asia and Europe daily. Extrapolating these numbers to a global scale, it becomes clear that the closure of air space seriously impacted global supply chains.

Perishable goods coming from Colombia, Ecuador, Israel and Kenya went bad at the cost of local producers, since buyers have no responsibility to pay for goods that perished before shipping. The loss of revenue for these countries will surely impact the livelihood of business owners and their employees. Apart from having temporarily laid off workers during the transport halt, many producers of perishable goods might be unable to overcome the economic losses they incurred when economic conditions around the world are still in a stage of recovery after the global financial crisis.

The Eyjafjallajokull, or island mountain glacier, is home to one of Iceland's largest volcanoes. This particular volcano has been dormant for approximately 200 years before seismic activity began in late March of this year. It was, however, on April 14 that

The Great Equalizer Eyjafjallajokul Image © Getty Images

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an explosion sent ash into high altitudes, interfering with air travel.

As a precautionary safety measure, airplanes across northern and central Europe closed for nearly a week, testing the flexibility of the transport industry and the patience of stranded travelers.

And flexible they were. As it became increasingly clear that the closure would outlast the weekend, firms, from pharmaceutical companies to supermarkets, began to fly perishable goods from Africa to Spain and then transporting these by land to destinations affected by airport closures.

The Financial Times explained that, according to the Chief European economist at Goldman Sachs, Erik Nielsen, the temporary disruption to the airfreight business was “partly offset by increased use of road, rail and sea transport.” Nielsen estimated that “air transport accounted for just 0.2 percent of gross value added in the 16-nation eurozone and 0.4 percent in the UK." As this issue of The Majalla went to print, the worst seems to be over now that airports have opened. However, many scientists warn that what happened in recent days could have been worse if the Eyjafjallajökull volcanic glacier were followed by an eruption of the nearby Katla volcano. The Katla volcano is larger, more dangerous and, what’s worse, it has a habit of erupting when its neighboring volcanoes explode. It has done so on three occasions during the past 1,100 years in 920, 1612 and 1821.

Should another air travel disruption occur, European economies could lose between one to two percent of their GDP Although a figure of three times in over 1,000 years makes it sound like statistics might be on our side, many might find the numbers more discomforting after learning that President Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson of Iceland told the BBC that the country has been waiting for a Katla eruption for some time. Although Iceland has made preparations in the event this should occur, the rest of the world should likewise be prepared since a Katla eruption would be more powerful, producing denser ash clouds whose impact might damage agricultural crops and livestock, not to mention its impact on transportation.

If there is any silver lining to this natural disaster, it’s that it has reminded the world of how interconnected we are. Perhaps more importantly, it has shown us that nature, at its best and worst, is in control.

Living in a time when people have become accustomed to thinking that the only thing standing between New York and London—destinations separated by an ocean and 5,567.11 kilometers—is the measly cost of a ticket, Eyjafjallajökull has reminded us that this is a luxury we should not take for granted.

Power, is also useless when it comes to coercing nature as Angela Merkel and General Stanley McChrystal learned. The German Chancellor embarked on a journey that took her through North Dakota, Portugal and Italy before arriving by car in Germany. While McChrystal, the commander of the US and NATO forces, someone surely accustomed to traveling the skies at whim, took a 20 hour bus ride from Paris to Berlin.

In this sense, Eyjafjallajökull has been a great equalizer – showing the world that not only can money not buy you happiness, it can’t do much with nature either.

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• A THOUSAND WORDS

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Image Š Iason Athanasiadis

As the US prepares the offensive into Kandahar city, civilians prepare for another restless night...

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

Ascending From Chaos?

The Majalla interview with Ahmed Rashid

In this interview with The Majalla, Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid discusses a number of topics ranging from the prospects of the political effort to bring an end to the conflict in Afghanistan to the integrity of the Pakistani state in the face of several threats, including the growing insurgency in Balochistan and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Manuel Almeida

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ince 9/11, the eagerness of the US to tackle militancy in Pakistan has traditionally clashed with the position of the Pakistani army. Pakistani authorities always had considerations in mind other than Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, such as maintaining its influence in Afghan affairs and playing the great game against the old foe India.

Ahmed Rashid is perhaps the analyst who best bridges the gap between Pakistani and American views, adopting an almost unique position of neutrality and balanced criticism regarding what ought to be the strategies of both countries for stabilizing the region. Mr. Rashid has covered political developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia for three decades, and he is, in the words of Christopher Hitchens, “Pakistan’s best and bravest reporter.”

We should see that the Afghan government has actually failed to carry out any truth and reconciliation process since 2001 Mr. Rashid graduated in English from Cambridge University’s Fitzwilliam College. In the 1960s, he returned to Pakistan where he was involved in the political developments of Balochistan, the southwest province that has witnessed five insurgencies since 1947. In 1978, Mr. Rashid was in Kabul for the coup that put the Communists in power, and in Kandahar a year later when the Soviets rolled in. His book Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia was published just before 9/11 and was the first comprehensive introduction to Western readers of the group that provided Al-Qaeda a safehaven, selling more than 1.5 million copies in English.

Today, from his home in Lahore, Mr. Rashid continues to write prolifically about political developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also provides advice to regional and Western diplomats involved in the nation/state-building efforts in the region. It was from Lahore that Mr. Rashid spoke with The Majalla about the prospects of the political effort to bring an end to the conflict in Afghanistan. Among other issues, he discussed the possibility of convincing the Afghan Taliban to drop their close connections with Al-Qaeda. Mr. Rashid likewise examines the ideological differences between the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts, and evaluates the several threats to the integrity of the Pakistani state – including the insurgency in Balochistan and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

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Do you agree with the analysis of US officials that most of the Taliban in Afghanistan fight for local reasons or money rather than because of ideological commitment to the movement, and can as a result be won over?

I think the majority of the rank and file of the Taliban are fighting for other reasons—for revenge, for the lack of development in their region, for inter-tribal rivalries. It is for these kinds of reasons that they have been recruited by the Taliban.

We should also remember that there is false forced conscription in southern and eastern Afghanistan by the Taliban. I don’t know if this figure that the Americans put forward of 70 percent of the Taliban being ready to stop fighting is true, but clearly, there are large numbers of the Taliban who could be bought over if there was a proper dialogue with them and proper compensation packages.

What kind of assurances are there, in the case that a political agreement is reached, that the Taliban will not resume fighting against the government in Kabul as soon as US and NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan?

Certainly the Taliban have this option of sitting and waiting for the start of expected US troop withdrawal in July 2011 and expecting also that NATO would withdraw their troops. But at the same time I think the Taliban also recognize the need for a dialogue, and the reasons for that are several. Firstly, they are extremely tired; they have suffered enormous casualties.

Secondly, they are also perfectly aware that they cannot take the cities as long as Western firepower patrols the cities. And thirdly, they have certainly realized that for them to come to power again will only create another crisis because they would be totally isolated from the international community with no money or aid, and it is far better in these circumstances to have an agreement with the Kabul regime so that they can be more responsible towards the Afghan people.

What role can Saudi Arabia play in re-integrating the Taliban into Afghanistan’s political life?

I think Saudi Arabia has offered a venue for the Taliban and the Kabul government to talk, and that role played by Saudi has been very important. Taliban leaders have been meeting with the Kabul administration in Saudi Arabia and with Saudi intelligence, which is now seen by both sides as being a neutral venue and a helpful venue. Whether the Saudis are actually in a position to broker real negotiations between the two sides and work as a party that can help these negotiations I think we still have to see. But certainly I think Saudi does offer a venue that is acceptable for both sides.

Do you think the Afghan Taliban realize that it might be a strategic mistake to be closely associated with Al-Qaeda?

I think a lot of the Taliban now accept that fact, and they accept the fact that bringing foreigners into Afghanistan and depending on foreigners was and is a strategic mistake. Certainly, if there are very serious negotiations with the Kabul regime and with the Americans, I think this is something that most Taliban would be willing to acknowledge and thereby dump Al-Qaeda. It is certainly the key demand of the Americans.

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Do you believe the Afghan population, especially the non-Pashtun population, will be willing to live side by side with the perpetrators of horrible crimes and human rights abuses, much like what is happening, for example, in Rwanda today in relation to Tutsis and Hutus?

I think that is a very very important and sensitive question.

We should see that the Afghan government has actually failed to carry out any truth and reconciliation process since 2001.

With the warlords there was an enormous pressure on the government to implement some kind of reconciliation for all the abuses they carried out for so many years and the government has not done that, and I think that has been a very big failure.

Now how exactly the government and the Taliban are going to agree on some kind of peace and reconciliation process is very difficult to see. Clearly, if there is a negotiation there will have to be an amnesty for the Taliban, and will that amnesty cover protection against the Taliban being prosecuted for human rights abuses, the murders and assassinations of so many Afghans? This is a very sensitive issue which many civil society groups in Kabul and non-Pashtuns, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks are very much opposed to. They would want to see some kind of retribution against the Taliban.

Do you think the threats posed by the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban can be treated in isolation?

The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban I think are two completely different entities, very different, even though they are allies; they work together, they share logistics, supplies and fighters, but I think ideologically they are very different. I still see the Afghan Taliban as essentially a peasant army with deep grievances against Kabul, against the foreign troop presence in their country, and with a thin layer of very ideological leaders. On the other hand, the Pakistani Taliban are, generally speaking, much more ideological. Many of their young fighters have been to madrassas, many of them are semi-educated—which perhaps is even worse than being uneducated—many of them are more politicized and more ideological than their Afghan Taliban brothers, and that has given them a certain edge here in Pakistan and made them much more ruthless. They want to topple the establishment, the political government in Pakistan, defeat the Pakistan army, and set up a Khilafat (Caliphate).

The threat they pose is even greater than the threat posed by the Afghan Taliban. I think the Afghan Taliban, at the end of the day, will become Islamist nationalists uninterested in expanding their zone or territory beyond Afghanistan, trying to establish some kind of Islamic system in Afghanistan. I think the Pakistani Taliban are more ambitious – they have ambitions in Kashmir against India; they would like to see a greater Talibanization against the entire region.

You have always been a strong critic of Islamabad’s neglect of Balochistan and you point this out as the biggest threat, even bigger than the Taliban, to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. How serious is the current situation in Balochistan?

There is a very serious insurgency going on there. This is the fifth insurgency since 1947, and it’s a reflection of the complete deprivation and the lack of resources and development that the Balochs have suffered from at the hands of the centre.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

So there are very deep-rooted economic and social reasons for this insurgency. Unfortunately, because of the mishandling of the insurgency by first Musharraf and also after him, and the state trying to seek a military solution for this insurgency, it has been hugely mishandled, and we now have a worsening of the situation, because the Balochs who were first demanding autonomy are now demanding a separate state. In all the previous four insurgencies you did not have this degree of separatism that exists today and that makes the Balochs insurgency very dangerous.

In your book Descent into Chaos you point to the tensions in Kashmir between India and Pakistan as a fundamental obstacle for Pakistan’s contribution in stabilizing Afghanistan. Do you think the current US Administration understands this?

Yes, I think they do. They certainly understand the connection between the need to make peace between India and Pakistan and to also, and perhaps most immediately, try to reduce the tension between both countries and Afghanistan. They are both now rivals in Afghanistan; Pakistan considers India’s presence in Afghanistan a major threat and there needs to be a dialogue between both countries in making their presence in Afghanistan more transparent to the other, coming to some kind of agreement about their presence; unfortunately none of that is happening. Certainly of course there needs to be a wider dialogue on their longstanding disputes over Kashmir, water and other issues.

Clearly Pakistan is a critical element in any future negotiations and has to play a role in any future negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul, and even the US The group Lashkar-e-Taiba has been characterized as the Frankenstein of Islamabad’s own making, and some analysts now fear that this group will replace Al-Qaeda as the biggest international terrorist threat. Are the Pakistani authorities in a position to tackle this threat?

Lashkar is posing a major threat to the state and many of the militant groups in Punjab like Lashkar have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest frontier and are trying to destabilize Pakistan. But the problem in Punjab is that there is a state of denial about the existence of the so-called Punjabi Taliban. The government, the army, the opposition, the federal government, the provincial government, are all refusing to accept the fact that the Punjabi Taliban are a mortal threat to the state, are part of the extremist network that has been developing in Pakistan, and also are part of the international Jihadist network led by Al-Qaeda. Until we face up to the reality of accepting that this threat exists, it is very difficult to see how the government is going to tackle the problem. First you have to acknowledge the problem before you tackle it.

The Pakistan authorities recently captured two important Taliban leaders. What do you make of the timing they were captured?

There is a lot of controversy about this and it is not clear.

The army, which is running Afghan policy at the moment, has not even made clear exactly how many Afghan Taliban leaders they have captured. The numbers go from five to 15, but certainly they have acknowledged the capture of Mullah Abdul Gani Baradar; he is the Taliban’s number 2 and is considered one of those who have been talking to the Kabul regime and would like to see a dialogue. And it is clear that some of those arrested in Pakistan belong to his group if you like, within the Taliban Shura. I think Kabul is deeply suspicious of these arrests. It feels that these arrests have come at the wrong time, at a time just when Kabul is trying to have a dialogue with these groups; they come in a time when Pakistan is perhaps trying to muscle its way into this dialogue wanting a seat at the table. Clearly Pakistan is a critical element in any future negotiations and has to play a role in any future negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul, and even the US. But at the same time Pakistan must allow a natural process to take place, and the most important dialogue has to be between Afghans, rather than having a third country involved.

After The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?; The Taliban; Jihad; and Descent into Chaos, what is your next book?

I completed the book Descent into Chaos last year, which took four years to write, and it was a very exhausting process. At the moment I am not involved in any book project, but I am working on some long and more thoughtful pieces about how the war in Afghanistan can be brought to an end.

This article was first published in The Majalla 16 April 2010

Descent into Chaos Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia was published in 2008, a time when the efforts of the US and NATO allies in Afghanistan were going through one of the worst phases since the Taliban regime was toppled by the US and UK operation “Enduring Freedom.”

Descent into Chaos strongly criticizes the lack of vision of successive US administrations, particularly the lack of interest in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 when the country had been torn apart by warlords and later taken over by the Taliban.

The biggest post-intervention mistake pointed out by Ahmed Rashid is the absence of a comprehensive nation-building plan for Afghanistan, which is partly explained by the US focus on Iraq. Due to such neglect, all sorts of mistakes by the US and NATO arose, which seriously jeopardized the chances for success in this country torn apart by three decades of conflict.

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The Power and Perils of Choice An Interview with Professor Charles Tripp

Professor Charles Tripp spoke with The Majalla about the implications of the recent elections in Iraq.

He analyzes a broad range of issues certain to impact the politics of the region in this context. From the challenge of coalition building, to the prospects of developing relations with neighboring countries, Charles Tripp builds on his expertise to highlight the areas that the new Iraqi government should focus on.

Hannah Mitchell

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rofessor Charles Tripp, of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, is a worldrenowned expert on the politics and history of Iraq.

As part of a small team of academics who personally advised Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the consequences of war prior to the invasion of Iraq, he is uniquely situated to comment upon the on-going Inquiry into the war.

His recently updated book, A History of Iraq, is widely regarded as the definitive work on the topic.

The 2005 elections were hailed as a milestone because of the way the Iraqis voted, but of course the aftermath was terrible. Partly that was because a whole section of Iraqis boycotted the election

Image © Getty Images

American President Barack Obama hailed this month’s elections in Iraq as a “milestone.” Do you agree with this stance?

It depends on the outcome of the election. The 2005 elections were hailed as a milestone because of the way the Iraqis voted, but of course the aftermath was terrible. Partly that was because a whole section of Iraqis boycotted the election. The feeling amongst Iraqis at the time was that whatever the result of the elections was, they would be less representative than they should have been. In the case of the last elections, although fewer Iraqis voted, the spread was better from all communities across Iraq. So in this sense it is more hopeful, yes.

How do you explain that despite improved security the general turnout was significantly lower than in the 2005 elections?

The reduction in turnout is related to the record of the previous parliament and the record of the local councils. People don’t vote if they feel that voting doesn’t mean much. I think people voted in 2005 to show defiance of the old regime and defiance of the terrorists. Now Iraqis are not voting probably for similar reasons that people don’t vote in many other countries; they feel that the people they have elected in the past haven’t done much.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

In contrast to general turnout figures, the participation of Sunnis was much higher than in 2005. How do you interpret this anomaly?

Well, I’m sure that’s to do with the fact that the Sunnis generally boycotted the 2005 elections. Now the feeling is that they’ve got to make their vote count. They could certainly have an effect on who holds power and I think the feeling of powerlessness was a real problem previously. So I think there’s now probably more incentive among the Sunnis to vote than anyone else.

In A History of Iraq you wrote that the post-war elections of 2005 were “little connected to the life and death struggles of more local politics.” Is it your opinion that central government continues to lack the ability to shape events in the provinces?

Well, I think that’s changed a bit but one of the interesting things is that Al-Maliki was a strong centralist and really showed his true colors in 2008 when he started to re-conquer the provinces and tried to bring many local powers to heel.

One of the noticeable features of the party lists is that the power balance is rather shaped within the provinces themselves. That’s why the case of Baghdad is quite interesting. Of course the field is much more open there in contrast to other places where you can see that the local politicians and local groups have taken their frustration out and exerted power on established parties.

I think under Saddam Hussein you could say that there was always a shadow state behind the public state Apart from Al-Maliki, who are the key players in Iraq today?

The obvious key players are the leaders of the main coalitions.

I think under Saddam Hussein you could say that there was always a shadow state behind the public state and you could argue now that that is still the case. Who are the real power brokers in the nationalist opposition? There are people who are quite happy to use violence if necessary and we simply don’t know who they are because they are quite a shadowy people.

There is this sense that you have the obvious leaders of Iraqi society who head the coalitions but you also have people who can make life very difficult. They need to be taken into account on a much more local level.

Do you think the use of violence to achieve political aims will ever cease in Iraq?

I think certain circumstances encourage some people to rely on violence more than others, and you could argue that under the present circumstances it has become less profitable to use violence. Many people have seen a better route to power than resorting to violence, but unfortunately under present conditions it is still a very potent force and instrument.

In addition to a lengthy period of coalition building what do you expect to be the key challenges for the new Iraqi Government upon its formation?

A twofold issue is of course Kurdistan. How does the new government integrate the Kurds and the Kurdish region into Iraq once again? Beyond other struggles it should ensure that there isn’t a war in Kurdistan. The other issue is simply the question of whether the new government will be able to deliver basic resources to the Iraqi people; public services like sewerage, water and electricity are still diabolical. The feeling amongst many Iraqis is that their leaders ignore them.

I think most of the people who maneuvered themselves into positions of power at the head of these parties are people who have very little connection with the generality of the Iraqi people. Clearly there is concern about what kind of record in terms of public welfare the new parliament and the new government will be able to deliver.

What will be the likely repercussions of the election results for Iraq’s relations with neighbors such as Syria and Saudi Arabia?

Any new government in Iraq will be careful to have quite good relations with their neighbors. However, one of the problems for Iraq is that it is seen by many as a playground for regional powers. If the Saudis believe that the Iraqi government is too close to Iran that could be problematic. If the Syrians believe that the new Iraqi government is too close to America then that could be problematic and so on. In a sense, I think this is one of the greatest challenges for a new Iraq government. How will the new government retain sovereignty and shape a national policy when regional powers are quite happy to intervene and encourage some of its opponents?

How do you picture Iraq’s relations with Iran evolving once the new government is formed?

Whatever kind of coalition comes out of this bargaining they can’t afford to be seen to be in the pocket of Iran. Whether it is Al-Maliki in his new posture or Allawi or al-Sadr, none are puppets of Iran. They are actually Iraqi nationalists in many respects. You could argue that all of them have an interest in distancing themselves from Iran, not in a hostile sense, but in a way that they are aware that their credibility and authority falls apart if they are seen as being too close to Iran.

What are your thoughts about the potential impact of the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in August?

The feeling is that for many of the Iraqi politicians it is key that the Iraqi forces can do the job, and in some ways this seems to be happening in their own particular way. The key is to demonstrate that the Iraqi troops are not completely dependent on the Americans. My own perspective is that you won’t necessarily get that feeling of “oh my goodness the Americans have gone; now it’s going to be an upsurge of violence,” although obviously there will be people who will try it on just as we saw with the violence of the autumn of last year. There is a concern about whether the withdrawal of the Americans will make the Kurds more edgy and that feeds into the other major problem, which is the future of Kurdistan in Iraq.

What are your thoughts with regards to the future of Kurdistan in Iraq?

I think it is very uncertain. There is a younger generation of Kurds who don’t speak Arabic and who don’t see Iraq as be-

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ing part of their lives. Yet at the same time there is this older stratum of politicians who know perfectly well that if you go for independence you are doomed. There is also the question of whether the Barzanis and Talabanis have the authority to manage the clear unrest that there may be in Kurdistan if the Iraqi government starts to make inroads on it. There are plenty of friction points: Kirkuk, Mosul itself, Mosul province, the oil contract, the question of population, and the issue of what kind of balance there is to be between a Kurdish area of Iraq and greater Iraq. Of course it is quite possible that they will come up with a compromise solution, but there are so many potential flashpoints.

Who do you think could be the most effective in curbing such flashpoints in Kurdistan?

Inevitably it will have to be the Kurdish leadership because they have to control their own constituencies. If they play a strong nationalist card it may be at a time when Jalal Talabani is feeling threatened by the Movement for Change in Kurdish politics. In this case there will be that danger that people will prefer to overplay their hand if they feel threatened and undermined.

However, you could also argue that there are Iraqi politicians such as Allawi and possibly Al-Maliki who have a much greater interest in playing the Iraqi national card and the danger comes if they believe that they have more interest in playing an Arab nationalist card – effectively splitting the Arab population. In pragmatic terms you could argue that the Kurdish leadership and the (more or less) secular Iraqi leadership has some interest in dampening down tensions. On the other hand, they are both ambitious and they are both insecure. There may also be circumstances in which they play up such flashpoints.

British Foreign Sectary David Miliband has claimed that the UK’s involvement in the Iraq earned it respect in the Middle East. Do you think this statement can be justified?

I think you’ll have to ask the Middle East that. Miliband is of course bound to say this because he supported the war. Yet the reaction in many parts of the Middle East is that the UK followed the US and that the British are no better than puppets of the US in that sense. I do think there is disappointment in parts of the Middle East because their so-called vaunted “British expertise” of the Middle East counted for nothing in their administration of Iraq.

What is your opinion of the British Iraq Inquiry so far?

What it has achieved so far is to give a public airing to things that people knew about already. I don’t think that it has uncovered anything dramatic and of course that wasn’t what it was intended to do. The Inquiry was supposed to explain, in a sense, how the British political establishment can learn lessons from the experience of the involvement in Iraq. The problem is that in much of the public mind it was regarded as something else altogether. So clearly much of the criticism has been focused on the lack of forensic investigatory punch, however many times the Inquiry says “no that’s not what we’re about.”

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problems for the outcome of it will be that people will think that it is a damp squib. So I think we have this real problem of the authority of the Chilcot Inquiry because many people expected it – maybe wrongly in terms of its formal commission – to be a much more hard-hitting, inquisitorial, blame-finding, judgmental committee, which it is not.

During the Inquiry, Tony Blair justified the invasion of Iraq with the removal of Saddam from power. Do you agree or disagree with the statement that the means were justified by the end result?

Well the end result was very quickly achieved in terms of the removal of the dictator. But the trouble is that people stayed and hundreds of thousands of people were killed.

The end result was terrible and so is it justified in terms of bringing death and destruction on hundreds of thousands of Iraqis? Possibly, because every time Tony Blair was questioned about that, he said Saddam Hussein killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, which he did, so you have a balance between two evils that attempts to judge it in these terms of a gruesome body count. Had Saddam stayed in power, how many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis would have been killed and as a result of the war how many thousands of Iraqis have been killed? It is a complete moral minefield and that’s when one has to look at international law in which it is illegitimate to invade another country because you don’t like a government and that is what happened. In that sense the war was certainly unjustified and I would say that in terms of the legality, in terms of the outcome, in terms of what was known at any particular time, by whom, for what purpose and what was concealed, there are still large questions that need to be answered.

The Inquiry was supposed to explain, in a sense, how the British political establishment can learn lessons from the experience of the involvement in Iraq Finally, considering that you advised Blair prior to the invasion of 2003, how do you think the decision to depose Saddam Hussein will be judged in 20 years time?

I think it depends on who’s writing the history. For Blair personally, the hope is that history will vindicate him. I think two things will come out of this. One is the terrible fact that in history, hundreds of thousands of poor people dying often disappears from the public memory. Yet it hasn’t disappeared from the Iraqi memory and in many years time it will still be there even if the terrible actual physical consequence of the war may well in 20 years time be consigned to the annals of history. The other side of it is, the very fact is that Britain and America and others were able to get away with invading another country because they didn’t like its government, and clearly as far as that precedent is acted upon, it may be regarded as a terrible trend setter in what happens in the future.

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Image © iStockphoto

The Republic of Sudan

Timeline 1956 Sudan's centuries of association with Egypt formally ends.

1962 Tensions in the south flare up into full-scale civil war, led by the Anya Nya movement.

1972 First civil war ends when the military-led government of President Jaafar Numeiri agrees to autonomy for the south under the Addis Ababa peace agreement.

1983 Second civil war breaks out in the south between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

1989 Omar Bashir seizes power in a coup against the government of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi.

2002 Peace talks in Kenya lead to a breakthrough agreement between the government and rebels, ending the civil war.

2003 A separate conflict breaks out in western region of Darfur. Rebels in western Darfur rise up against government, claiming the region is being neglected by the central government.

2005 The final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is signed, granting the southern rebels autonomy for six years and ending the civil war.

Omar Bashir forms a government of national unity in July 2005 as part of the deal 2009 The International Criminal Court in The Hague issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

2010 April – Sudan holds first contested presidential, parliamentary and regional elections since 1986.

Sudan’s North-South Divide • Sudan has two distinct major cultures – Arab and Black African.

As a result, the country’s population is composed of hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups. This has rendered effective collaboration between different groups difficult.

• The northern states cover most of the Sudan and include most of the urban centers. The majority of the 22 million Sudanese who live in this region are Arabic-speaking Muslims.

• The southern region has a population of approximately six million. The region’s economy is predominantly a rural, subsistence economy. Southern Sudan has been affected substantially by the civil war resulting in lack of infrastructure and development, not to mention the humanitarian impact of extensive displacement.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Future of Sudan After decades of civil war, Sudan was given the opportunity to implement transformative measures that would address the underlying grievances behind the conflict. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South, and the government’s National Congress Party (NCP), was meant to provide the Sudanese with a promise that has been left unfulfilled since the colonial era: the promise of self-determination.

Not only was the CPA to ensure the election of government officials at all levels, these elections were to be a small step towards the referendum that would allow the South to choose between remaining a part of Sudan, or seceding and creating their own independent state. While the CPA has been commended on its ability to bring an end to the civil war, it has come up short on many, if not most of its promises.

Most notable amongst its shortcomings have been the repeated delays of the elections, and the decision to hold elections for the presidency instead of the entire administrative body. Originally scheduled to take place before the end of July 2009, the elections only recently took place in April 2010 and, even so, were largely tarnished by allegations of fraud.

The inability of the government, and the international community, to meet the deadlines that were set by the CPA have rendered the constitution of the country threadbare to say the least, and has seriously undermined the possibility of ensuring the stability of Sudan. The challenges that Sudan is now confronting speak to an important lesson about peace-building processes. Looking back at the grievances that motivated the civil war in the first place, we see the political disenfranchisement of communities as one of the preconditions for the conflict. Years later, the level of distrust that pervades Sudanese politics, especially between the SPLM and the NCP, has only made legitimate elections more important for the CPA’s measures to stand a chance at promoting peace.

The Sudanese Elections As The Majalla went to press, Sudan’s poll results had not yet been announced. However, those that had been released showed President Omar Al-Bashir in the lead, to the surprise of very few.

However, even prior to the elections, allegations of fraud were extensive, leading two of President Bashir’s main opponents to withdraw. This has been considered a lost opportunity for the many ethnic groups that have been politically marginalized by the NCP,

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President Omar Al-Bashir and The International Criminal Court But what about Omar Bashir? The blame game would be incomplete without a serious discussion of how Sudan, and the international community, could allow a man indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity to be re-elected. If the main purpose of the CPA is to allow democratic institutions to initiate a process of reconciliation between the various groups that have been at war in Sudan, then allowing Omar Bashir, accused of trying to eradicate non-Arab tribes from Darfur, to lead the country is contrary to the principles behind the CPA. However, the ICC’s involvement in Sudan’s peace-building efforts has been framed by the North as just another neo-colonial ploy. Realistically, the strong hold of power held by Bashir’s NCP is likely to shelter him, for the time being, from accountability over the genocide in Darfur.

Although some would call the prospects of the CPA hopeless, there are still avenues that can be pursued that might reinforce the agreement. For the international community, theirs is an opportunity to demonstrate the endurance of their commitment. The CPA was implemented largely because of the international pressure that Sudan faced at the time. This pressure, and the resources that accompany it, is needed to reinforce the measures the CPA recommended.

Hope for Sudan?

Unfortunately, many have noted how the crisis in Darfur, which coincided with the signing of the agreement, drained many of the diplomatic resources in place. Although this is an understandably difficult obstacle to overcome, it is insufficient to legitimately excuse the commitment of the international community. If only for selfish interests, various countries should be committed to instilling stability in Sudan. The US has admirably recognized this problem and, as of October 2009, announced a new policy that balances the need to end violence with the need to support the CPA. As usual, American engagement is insufficient, and the US government should be cautious in how its relationship with Sudan affects its internal politics. Since much of Sudan’s future will continue to be decided by high level politicians, Edward

Key Facts

Image © iStockphoto

which saw the challengers as a means to reverse the state of affairs.

Instead, it appears that the challengers that withdrew are relying on the referendum in the hope that a secession will guarantee them the power that this election is unlikely to provide.

The elections present an important crossroads in Sudan’s history as any perception of their illegitimacy may set a negative tone for the referendum on secession. Moreover, as Tomas notes in his recent report Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan, while the SPLM originally favored rejecting the secession, “the widespread Southern perception that the central government has failed to take the opportunity to transform itself has strengthened the hand of SPLM leadership favoring secession.”

Surely this negative perception of the government by the South would not benefit from a messy electoral process, and the chances of repeating the same mistakes at the time of the referendum could turn into a casus bellicus.

Capital: Khartoum Independence: 1956, from Egyptian-British rule.

President: Omar Al-Bashir Geography Area: 2.5 million sq km Border Countries: Central African Republic 1,165 km, Chad 1,360 km, Democratic Republic of the Congo 628 km, Egypt 1,273 km, Eritrea 605 km, Ethiopia 1,606 km, Kenya 232 km, Libya 383 km, Uganda 435 km People Population: 42.2 million Ethnic Groups: black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1% Religions: Sunni Muslim 70% (state), Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum), Animism, indigenous beliefs 25% Languages: Arabic, English (official) Refugees: (by country of origin): 157,220 (Eritrea); 25,023 (Chad); 11,009 (Ethiopia); 7,895 (Uganda); 5,023 (Central African Republic) IDPs: 5.3 - 6.2 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region) (2007) Economy GDP (ppp): $92.81 billion GDP composition by sector: agriculture: 32.6%, industry: 29.2%, services: 38.2% Investment Gross Fixed: 20.6% of GDP Inflation rate: 12.3% Unemployment rate: 18.7% Population below Poverty Line: 40% Thomas argues that the politics of exclusion that undermine its stability could be worsened if the country looks to engage more with international powers than with its own population.

In this case, regional actors including the African Union (AU) can support Sudan as it meets the upcoming deadlines of the CPA. Most importantly, these bodies can promote the type of local and national dialogue that will help to overcome the current tension in Sudan.

Finally, there is hope that the two parties can come to an agreement that will promote a peaceful transition, no matter the outcome of the elections. For example, an oil deal that equally supports both the North and South has been described as an important mechanism to create incentives for reconciliation. It is possible that in the months to come, shared interests such as these can undermine the mistrust that has characterized the relationship of the two parties.

The future of the CPA hangs in the balance as the results of the April elections are awaited. However, all is not lost, and both national and international actors should play their part in ensuring that the building of democratic institutions creates the foundations for reconciliation in this war-torn country..

Image © Getty Images

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• THE CRITICS

Educating For Peace A review of Three Cups of Tea

by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin Published by Wheeler 2008 Mortenson and Relin’s best seller Three Cups of Tea tells the story of how one man touched the lives of thousands of children by building schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This story, however is more than just an inspirational tale, it provides important lessons on the possibilities of development initiatives and the challenges of implementing them the right way.

Long before the Coalition of Allied Forces invaded Afghanistan a very unlikely candidate began his battle to combat extremism in the region. Greg Mortenson, a climber-turned-development activist, has built over one hundred schools and supported countless existing schools in an effort to promote the education of women in the remote regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The inspiring tale of his journey from the mountains of K2 to the building of his first schools is entertainingly recounted in Three Cups of Tea. Journalist David Oliver Relin’s command of story-telling does justice to the gargantuan tasks Greg Mortenson set out for himself when he promised village elder after village elder that he would return to Pakistan and build schools for girls.

Three Cups of Tea explains the personal sacrifices that Mortenson, his family and the supporters of his organization, the Central Asia Institute, undergo to promote education in the region. So impressive are the accounts of the risks he undertakes, which include his kidnapping by the Pakistani Taliban and the issuance of multiple fatwas against him, that it is refreshing for the sake of objectivity to know that the account is told by someone other than Mortenson. In this sense, Relin’s investigative skills as a journalist shine through. Relin interviews Mortenson’s colleagues both in the US and in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in this way, manages to paint a portrait of the type of person that is willing to do so much for people whose reality is so far from his own.

That “type of person,” one concludes after reading the book, is hard to come by. Mortenson is a polyglot, fluent in Urdu, Pashtun and other dialects of the region. But more than that, he is fluent in the cultural practices of the places where he works.

He respects their beliefs and traditions, and they acknowledge this. It is through his interpersonal skills and commitment to his promises that he manages to win the trust of both Pakistanis and the Americans that support his initiatives financially.

This book, however, is more than an inspirational story about the impact that one person can have on the world. More importantly perhaps, Three Cups of Tea is an insightful lesson into the role that development initiatives can play in undermining extremist initiatives in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

Although Mortenson did not set out to combat the causes of terrorism, he has been incredibly effective at improv-

ing the image of the US in the eyes of Pakistanis and Afghanis. Mortenson has used education to empower women and, at the same time, provide communities with the chance to acquire a balanced education. More than just alternatives to madrassas, the schools that Mortenson has set up also include vocational centers for adults, as well as other infrastructural initiatives such as water sanitation projects and bridges. In implementing these complete development initiatives Mortenson managed to provide services that the governments of these countries have been historically unable (or unwilling) to provide themselves.

Beyond recounting the professional achievements of one man, Three Cups of Tea also raises important issues that those working in the field of development should expect to face.

When Mortenson first arrives to Pakistan with the funds necessary to fulfill his first promise of building a school in Korphe, he is filled with an urgent need to get things done. He finds, however, that building schools in Pakistan requires patience – patience with the Pakistani work ethic that is so different from his own as an American, patience in bargaining for supplies, patience in gaining the trust of communities slowly so that he can have their permission to build schools.

As such, in a discreet manner, Three Cups of Tea proposes an important theory regarding the way development should be practiced: It should not be imposed on a community, but should rely on them for direction. When Mortenson arrives to build a school in Korphe, the village elders surprise him with the news that they would prefer a bridge. Begrudgingly he agrees to build the bridge, but later realizes that without the bridge students would have been unable to travel to the school he had wanted to build first. Locals know their communities better than American NGOs, and Mortenson is quick to learn that his work requires the humility to recognize that he is not in charge, but rather that he is there to facilitate the needs of those he had come to serve.

Beyond theories of development, Three Cups of Tea, and Mortenson’s projects in particular, focus a great amount of attention on women. This subject is worthy of note, since many would question whether it would not be more effective to combat extremism by focusing on young men who are more likely to become fighters. Three Cups of Tea, like other books on development, argues that the role of women in these communities is indispensable. For one, boys are more likely to be educated than girls in poorer communities and when they are educated boys tend to relocate to urban centers where they can earn higher wages. Girls on the other hand, tend to stay in their communities and focus on their development. Educating one girl, argues Mortenson, will have greater lasting effects on an entire community.

In Three Cups of Tea, Mortenson tells how at the end of his third cup of tea with the Balti, he was considered practically a member of their family. Mortenson is a true advocate for his adopted families in the region, giving privileged readers insight into his subject’s everyday lives. More importantly, Mortenson’s book provides alternatives to Western countries that are preoccupied with guaranteeing their security, giving them a better and more effective means of securing their borders: educating the children of at-risk regions.

This article was first published in The Majalla 18 April 2010

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Found in Translation A review of Dining With Al-Qaeda: Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East

by Hugh Pope Published by Thomas Dunne Books 2010 Hugh Pope’s latest book recounts his experience in the Middle East during the region’s most tumultuous periods. More than an account of what occurs on the ground, this book also provides important insight regarding the politics of journalism itself.

Reminiscent of Indiana Jones’ adventures, Hugh Pope’s account of his personal growth as a journalist in the Middle East is an epic book for anyone whose career interests have been driven by the mission of accurately representing the Middle East to Western observers. Honest and light-hearted, Dining with Al-Qaeda is more an autobiography than a historical or political account of Pope’s region of expertise.

Although this is not to imply that the book is without depth.

On the contrary, in framing the political and socio-economic characteristics of the region around his experiences Hugh Pope manages to create what most educators aspire to do in a class.

Teach and inspire, without having their students notice.

Taking you from his days as a student of Arabic and Persian at Oxford, to his days as a Middle East correspondent for some of the most well-known Newspapers in the West, Pope manages to traverse the region more times than one could imagine.

It is in this way that he provides his reader the type of exposure to the numerous countries that make up the Middle East in a way that most other books on the region cannot. The essays that comprise his book may at first seem divided by space and time, but in the end comprise a comprehensive patchwork of the region ranging from post-revolutionary Iran to post-invasion Iraq. Most impressively however was how Pope managed to be present at every one of the most pivotal moment’s of the region’s history.

In his accounts, Pope does not limit himself to the factual accounts you could read in the media or a guide book, but rather explains countries and their histories as he experienced them at the time.

Instead, the aims of his book go beyond explaining the cultural encounters that one well-educated Westerner might have in his meetings with terrorists, officials, and women of a region that tends to fascinate. Rather, Hugh Pope embraces his journalistic training to expose the shortcomings and advantages that journalism itself has had on the region.

Although slightly disenchanting to those wishing to follow in his footsteps, Pope makes important strides in highlighting two issues with enormous effects on the relationship between journalism and policy-making. Pope eloquently argues that despite the ethics of the most prestigious journals in the West, obstacles stand in the way of presenting the Middle East accurately.

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journalists on the ground intend to get through to their readers.

The most notable example Pope addresses is that of the ArabIsraeli conflict, which apparently was not news unless some prospect of peace could be incorporated into the journalist’s account. Pope thus demonstrates that despite the best intentions of journalists, at the end of the day, front page news is inhibited in a way that reduces its intended impact.

On a positive note, however, Pope takes advantage of this book to set the record straight. He tells not only of the obstacles but overcomes them giving its reader the better-late-than-never accounts. Combined with a first-person narrative, these insider’s views create a complicity between Pope and his reader that makes Dining With Al-Qaeda a pleasant and informative read.

Beyond the politics of Western journalism, there is also an important emotional dimension to Pope’s latest book. A student of the culture and languages of the Middle East, it is clearly difficult for Pope when instead of being acknowledged as an objective investigator, he is perceived of as a spy. Beyond the degree to which he is accepted in the region, Pope also brings to light the more serious risks journalism implies.

As a reader, one often tends to forget the dangers journalists in the Middle East expose themselves to in order to bring home accurate and interesting accounts. Pope’s ability to connect his reader to the day-to-day aspects of his profession is impressive. It is also a tribute to the colleagues and friends he lost in the field.

Dining With Al-Qaeda attests the ability of this journalist to speak to his audience. Despite the difficulty of explaining such a complex region during three of its most tumultuous decades, Pope succeeds in every one of the aims his book sets out to accomplish. Although not a historical or political reference work, Pope’s latest book is certainly a contribution to the study of the Middle East, if only for the moving and unique perspective his patchwork of essays provides.

This article was first published in The Majalla 1 April 2010

Discriminating in the Name of the Law Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria Human Rights Watch, November 2009 In a recent report, Human Rights Watch highlights the oppression Kurds in Syria face regularly. Despite limits to their investigation because of a lack of compliance on the part of the Syrian government, the report is an informative account on the current human rights situation for Kurds in the country.

HRW argues that despite their peaceful intentions, the Syrian government successfully makes claims to legal codes in order to undermine the political and cultural rights of Kurds in the country.

'Spas' means ‘Thank you’ in Kurdish. You would be greeted with exclamations of surprise and joy if you used this word in response to receiving a cup of tea from a Kurdish back alley joint in Damascus. Kurds make up an estimated ten percent of Syria’s total population of 20 million, but you would never know it. In 59

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• THE CRITICS

their 63-page report on Kurdish Syrians, Human Rights Watch (HRW) unearths the discrimination they experience under the Syrian government, focusing on their oppression in both political and cultural spheres of life. The fate of Syrian Kurds is largely overshadowed by headlines covering Turkey’s PKK fighters and Iraqi Kurdistan autonomy. However, HRW’s report has given a voice to Syria’s Kurds who may be less show-stopping in their fight for minority rights but whose suffering is just as profound.

The report provides a personal perspective on Kurdish marginalization by citing the testimonies of Kurdish activists, their family members and local human rights campaigners. Group Denial aims to provide evidence and raise awareness of the victimisation, imprisonment and in some cases torture or even death of Kurdish activists at the hands of the Syrian authorities.

The report skims the evolution of Kurdish experience in Syria since the mid-twentieth century and is primarily devoted to the events that unfolded post 2004. This was the year that clashes with Syrian security forces at a football match resulted in the death of Kurdish fans. What had been a long history of Kurdish grievances simmering under the surface suddenly erupted into the open. Kurds took to the streets in large scale demonstrations against their oppression under the Syrian regime. 36 people were killed, mostly Kurds, and over 2,000 arrested. Alarmed by the mass rallying of Kurds, Syria’s government responded by clamping down on any activities promoting Kurdish culture or political participation. The report documents the Syrian government’s efforts to ban all Kurdish celebrations and to crush all events and demonstrations promoting Kurdish rights.

The report entails a run down of the Syrian security apparatus involved in the detention and torture of activists. Locations and names of various security groups are given, shedding some light on the murky world of Syria’s intelligence agencies Syrian Kurds live mainly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country along the borders with Turkey and Iraq. Unlike their Turkish and Iraqi counterparts their parties don’t demand autonomy and separation from Syria. Syrian Kurdish activism uses a softer approach. Their demonstrations are largely peaceful, demanding only recognition of the Kurdish population and equal rights to cultural and political expression.

Yet these peaceful protests are met with overwhelming violence from the Syrian authorities. The Kurdish new year ‘Noruz’ celebrations have been disrupted for several years running. Since 2005 HRW found that 14 political and cultural events have been broken up by the Syrian authorities. Yet these celebrations pose no threat to the stability of Syria and are a mere expression of Kurdish heritage.

The key players in Kurdish activism are listed in affiliation with parties advocating Kurdish minority rights. The report reveals that prominent leaders of various Kurdish parties no longer have immunity from prosecution and detention. Since 2005 over a dozen leading figures belonging to parties fighting for Kurdish freedoms have been arrested.

‘Group Denial’ exposes the wider scale oppression by the Syrian government on its entire population. The Syrian political system does not allow any room for criticism against the ruling Ba’ath party. The Emergency Law, in place since 1963, suspends basic freedoms by banning any form of opposition to the government. There are penal provisions that treat ‘any gathering of more than seven people with the aim of protesting a decision or measure taken by the public authorities as a riot that is punishable by jail’ Just under half of the former detainees interviewed by HRW said they had been tortured by the Syrian security forces. The report entails a run down of the Syrian security apparatus involved in the detention and torture of activists. Locations and names of various security groups are given, shedding some light on the murky world of Syria’s intelligence agencies. First hand accounts by those imprisoned paint a bleak picture for human rights within Syria’s prison walls. All 30 former detainees were held incommunicado when first imprisoned. The abuses read as a litany of horrors, trampling over any human rights acts Syria may have agreed to. Aside from the physical torture are the psychological taunts, derogatory and racist. “All Kurds are traitors. You are a heavy guest in Syria” were the words from the mouth of a Syrian interrogator.

HRW makes a plea to the international community for condemnation of repression of Syria’s Kurds. Syria’s government has signed several international treaties that uphold human rights but it is clearly not playing by the rules. The report finds the UN and other international organisations responsible for keeping the Syrian government in check and holding it accountable for breeches of the guidelines.

The report excels in providing an in-depth, close contact account but is extremely narrow in approach. It would have been enlightening to hear more about the discrimination that every Kurd faces on a daily basis, in the workplace, at the market and not just at public displays of culture or dissension. The channels of study focus only on those Kurds actively fighting for their rights. However it is clear that the author has chosen his fight and did not intend to provide an exhaustive investigation into Kurdish rights in Syria.

This narrow approach is largely unavoidable, going hand in hand with the problem that comes with carrying out research in an ultimately authoritarian nation. The Syrian government denied HRW access to carry out research within the country. The pool of evidence collected in this study covers mainly personal accounts, the majority of which were collected via telephone interviews. There is little hard evidence provided through individual case studies. That said, evidence concerning human rights abuses will never be an exact science for as this report demonstrates human life is more than just a number.

This article was first published in the Majalla 15 March 2010

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• THE FINAL WORD

Peace Versus Justice in Afghanistan?

The potential involvement of the International Criminal Court in Afghanistan might do more harm than good.

Justice is a noble ideal, without which lasting peace is harder to achieve. Yet, prosecuting Taliban war criminals can undermine the current negotiations that are so crucial for a future peace process in Afghanistan.

Manuel Almeida

W

hen an ideal stands in the moral high-ground as if it were the only one worth fighting for, the notion of the bigger picture can be lost. This might just be the case with the pursuit of justice by the International Criminal Court—to which Afghanistan is a signatory—if Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor, opens a formal investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan.

Until now, prosecuting Taliban leaders was a remote possibility. Yet, Candace Rondeaux and Nick Grono from the International Crisis Group argued recently in the International Herald Tribune, in an article titled “Prosecuting Taliban War Criminals”, that a window of opportunity is open. Indeed, with Pakistan’s arrest of the Taliban’s No. 2 Mullah Baradar (along with other Taliban leaders), Rondeaux and Grono wrote that Ocampo “should now launch a formal investigation and, if he believes he has evidence to justify it, seek an arrest warrant for Baradar and ask Pakistan to hand him over to The Hague.”

Civil society groups, human rights activists and many Afghan citizens (especially non-Pashtuns) have expressed serious concerns regarding the impunity of the Afghan Taliban and the warlords. There are, however, essential problems in the hypothetical involvement of the ICC in Afghanistan’s affairs.

These problems start with how the very word “international” resonates in Afghanistan. It is not only the Taliban who resent the foreign presence in Afghanistan. The common Afghan does not like international interference in any form, with a rare exception made for financial assistance.

Lakdar Brahimi, former United Nations special representative for Afghanistan (and Iraq), told the following story in a recent public event about Afghanistan: A British military man asked the local people in a village in Helmand if they could have three wishes, what would those be, to which they answered, “We know very well what those wishes would be.

First, we would like the Taliban to go away. Second, that you go away. Third, that neither of you come back.”

Although many in Afghanistan don’t like the idea, the Taliban are still Afghan citizens, and will have to be included in any political solution to the conflict. The Taliban are now under severe pressure from the recent US offensive in the Taliban strongholds of Marja and soon in Kandahar. Negotiations have started and a valuable opportunity to reach a political deal is very likely to arrive.

In a recent interview with The Majalla, Ahmed Rashid, the famous Pakistani author, explained that the Afghan Taliban are

tired of the war and have suffered enormous casualties. They realize that returning to power would only isolate them again from the international community. Thus, they are convinced that it is better to reach an agreement with Kabul. Furthermore, Rashid believes the Afghan Taliban now accept that bringing foreigners to Afghanistan is a strategic mistake, and this applies to their views about Al-Qaeda.

As Rondeaux and Grono explained in their article, “Amnesty laws are not effective against ICC prosecutions.” If this is true, what is the incentive for Taliban leaders to negotiate if they fear being chased and prosecuted regardless of their agreement with the government in Kabul? The ICC could undermine the very basis of the reconciliation process that puts an end to the conflict.

Although many in Afghanistan don’t like the idea, the Taliban are still Afghan citizens, and will have to be included in any political solution to the conflict Needless to say this is a complex issue. Take the case of Uganda. In 2006, the Lord’s Resistance Army entered into negotiations with the Ugandan government after the ICC had issued warrants of arrest for five of the LRA.’s senior leaders. Instead of arresting and delivering them to the ICC, the Ugandan government offered total amnesty to all LRA members as part of the peace deal. This amnesty was conceded according to a local code whereby the people involved are required to admit to their crimes and request forgiveness. This deal didn’t work, and the war between Uganda’s government and the LRA is today one of Africa’s longest running conflicts.

Justice is a noble ideal. So are peace and order. In the case of Afghanistan, it can be a bad idea to choose international alien justice over a local solution, even if in the end the latter comes in the form of restorative justice through Afghan courts and an amnesty to war criminals. Can there be lasting peace without comprehensive justice? In Afghanistan, after three decades of conflict, the answer is probably affirmative. And it is definitely worth it to wait and see.

This article was first published in The Majalla 7 April 2010

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