Majalla 1555 - Shattered Expectations

Issue 1555 • August 2010

Shattered Expectations A global survey shows a steep decline in US approval ratings in Muslim countries

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9 771319 087105 The Majalla

The Art of War

China and Russia's support of the fourth sanctions resolution against Iran show the extent to which Tehran has alienated its former partners

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On Politics

If El Baradei is serious about reforming Egypt's political culture, he must avoid the cynical use of religious sentiment to win legitimacy

Issue 1555

Candid Coversations

Ismail Kara, professor of Turkish intellectual history, speaks about Islam’s relationship with modernity and the state

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established by Hisham and Ali Hafez Editor-in-Chief Adel Al Toraifi Editors Paula Mejia Jacqueline Shoen Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield New Media Development Officer Markus Milligan Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2010 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: editorial@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover images © Getty Images

Editorial This issue of The Majalla brings to you an analysis about US President Barak Obama’s declining popularity in Arab and Muslim countries. Fawaz Gerges, Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics, London University, assesses the findings of the Pew Research Center affiliated with Harvard University. This study shows that President Barack Obama continues to be popular and to improve America’s standing in much of the world, the notable exception being Muslim countries.

We also offer an insightful look into the state of the right in American politics. Noam Schimmel takes a look at the Tea Party and its contradictions in this month’s feature Tea Time. Claiming to be against large government and in favor of free markets, Schimmel explains, Tea Partiers have defined themselves as members of a “social welfare organization.”

Yet there is an evident dissonance between the objectives they want to achieve and the policies they are pushing.

Despite their internal contradictions, they will be a force to be reckoned with in the upcoming primaries.

This month we also bring to you an interview with Algerian artist Rachid Koraichi who assesses the role of Arab artists in the contemporary art scene, and his own accomplishments within that movement.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

Adel Al Toraifi, Editor-in-Chief

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Contributors Fawaz Gerges Fawaz Gerges is a professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Harcourt Press, 2007), The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and is currently writing a book tentatively titled The Making of the Arab World: From Nasser to Nasrallah. Gerges has written articles and editorials in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy.

Nicholas Birch Nicholas Birch lived in Istanbul, Turkey, from 2002 to 2009, working as a freelancer. His work from Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus appeared in a whole range of publications, including The Washington Post, Time Magazine, The Guardian and The Times Literary Supplement. Based in London since the beginning of this year, and continuing to work as a freelancer, Birch is in the early stages of writing his first book, a travel book investigating Turkey's troubled relationship with its past..

Hugh Pope Hugh Pope is currently based in Istanbul with the International Crisis Group. Previously he was a staff correspondent for The Wall Street Journal covering the broader Middle East for a decade. He has lectured widely on the Turkic world, including at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington DC. Pope is the author of Sons of the Conquerors, one of The Economist’s Best Books of the Year, Turkey Unveiled, a New York Times Notable Book and, most recently, Dining With Al-Qaeda: Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East.

Kil Dosanjh Kil Dosanjh currently leads The Economist Intelligence Unit's political and economic analysis on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In his capacity as the Country Risk Manager in the Asia team, he has developed his regional expertise of risks associated with politics, banking, currency and sovereign payments capacity, with a particular focus on North-east and South Asia. He has previously worked in South-east Asia, specializing in infrastructure development in the region.

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• CONTENTS

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Contents Quotes of the Month The Art of War

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On Politics

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Shattered Expectations

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The Wealth of Nations

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The Human Condition

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A Thousand Words

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Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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The Critics

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The Final Word

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• The Yes Votes: Beijing & Moscow join sanctions bandwagon • The End of “The War on Terror”?

• Trained to Kill: Between Peacekeeping and War Making in Afghanistan

• From the Mosque to the Presidency: The forthcoming Egyptian presidential elections • Where the Sun Rises: The AKP’s gradual shift to the East • Turkey’s Achilles Heel: The “zero-problem” policy must include solving Cyprus

One year after Obama’s speech in Cairo, a global survey shows a steep decline in US approval ratings in Muslim countries

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• Running Out of Gas: GCC running out of cheap energy • Not So Quiet on the Eastern Front: An historic cross-Strait agreement is signed • Clash of the Deficit Hogs • Agreeing to Remain Poorer: The GCC-EU Economic Cooperation

• Challenging Dictators: The promise of Kampala’s ICC conference • Lights Out: Pakistan's Chronic Power Shortages

• Professor Ismail Kara • Nawshirwan Mustafa

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

"As part of our religious and national duty we want you to ensure that fatwas are only issued by members of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars and other permitted people" said King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in the decree that was sent Thursday to Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh

"It's not about regulating the activities of private security companies, it's about their presence, it's about the way they function in Afghanistan... all the problems they have created" said Waheed Omer, President Karzai’s spokesperson, on the banning of private security forces in Afghanistan

“The president didn’t send me over here to seek a graceful exit…

My marching orders are to do all that is humanly possible to help us achieve our objectives” General Petraeus said at his office at NATO headquarters in Afghanistan

"Singling out a state assumes that there are a number of states in the same position and only one state was singled out" said the Arab League with regards to an inspection it is seeking of Israel’s nuclear weapons program

“This has been a heartwrenching day for me” Ban Ki Moon said after flying over the areas devastated by floods in Pakistan with President Asif Ali Zardari

"The camps are Sudanese territory under Sudanese authority and there is no authority in this world which can stop the government from ... prosecuting criminals who break the law" said President Bashir after threatening to expel UN forces if they did not respect government authorities

"We are concerned the additional documents they have may cause even greater risks than the ones they released previously" said Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell about the Afghanistan War logs released by Wikileaks

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• THE ART OF WAR

The Yes Votes Beijing & Moscow join sanctions bandwagon

The decisions by China and Russia to support the fourth sanctions resolution against Iran in the UN Security Council demonstrate the extent to which Tehran has alienated its former partners.

These two countries have also decided to curtail other ties with Iran, largely in response to refusal of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regime to address international concerns about its nuclear ambitions.

Richard Weitz

Image © Getty Images

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n 9 June 2010, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted with 12 votes in favor, two against and one abstention to adopt a fourth round of sanctions against Iran in response to Tehran’s continued pursuit of sensitive nuclear activities. Surprisingly, the two negative votes came from Brazil and Turkey rather than China and Russia.

The decision of these two veto-wielding UNSC members to vote in favor of the latest sanctions resolution was by no means certain. For months, both Beijing and Moscow had expressed unease about imposing yet more sanctions on Iran given that the previous ones had failed to modify its policies. Despite years of unilateral and multinational sanctions, as well as protracted negotiations and exhortations by many world leaders, the Iranian government has adamantly sought to develop the capacity to enrich uranium in Iran, without direct foreign assistance. Before imposing sanctions, the UNSC had adopted several resolutions calling on Iran to cease uranium enrichment and provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional information about its earlier nuclear activities, which could be interpreted as seeking the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon.

Although neither Beijing nor Moscow want Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, both China and Russia have important economic interests at stake in Iran related to energy and arms.

Before last year’s slowdown, trade between China and Iran has been growing by 30 percent annually, amounting to $27 billion in 2008. China regularly obtains 10-15 percent of all its imported oil from Iran, while Chinese firms have become significant investors in Iran’s energy industry. Chinese exports to Iran include motor vehicles, textiles and consumer goods, as well as machinery and equipment. Iran also purchases some Chinese weapons, especially missiles, and is interested in buying many more. Russia is one of Iran’s main weapons suppliers, and Russian firms have assumed a prominent role in helping to develop Iran’s civilian energy industry, including in the nuclear power sector. Russian consumers buy many Iranian products, while Russian diplomats appreciate the lack of Iranian support for the Islamist terrorist groups active in Russia’s North Caucasus.

In the UNSC, Chinese and Russian diplomats have repeatedly sought to soften measures punishing Iran for its illicit

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nuclear activities, especially those that might constrain their energy collaboration with Iran on projects unrelated to nuclear power. In addition, they have consistently defended Tehran’s right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes, such as civilian energy production. Thanks to hard bargaining, they have managed to exempt their main economic interests regarding Iran from each round of economic sanctions. During the George W. Bush administration, they would accept only the minimum sanctions necessary to avert a possible US military attack on Iran, which could have precipitated adverse changes in the regional security environment.

Since Barack Obama was elected American president, the Chinese and Russian governments have supported punishments partly in response to US diplomatic pressure, supplemented by lobbying by other NATO countries. For its part, the Obama administration has accepted weaker measures than the “crippling” sanctions originally sought in order to provide sufficient cover for EU governments to adopt their own stricter sanctions.

But Chinese and Russian officials have also shown increasing irritation at the stubborn refusal of the Iranian government to suspend its nuclear enrichment program as a prerequisite to a diplomatic settlement, which has therefore remained elusive. Whereas previously they might blame Bush administration threats for impeding diplomatic progress and encouraging Iranians to consider nuclear options to guarantee their security, they have now come to hold the Ahmadinejad regime—its obstinacy and the continuing revelations about Iran’s suspicious nuclear activities—responsible for the continuing crisis.

The change in the Chinese and Russian positions became evident in June when they decided that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which they co-lead, cannot admit Iran as a full member as long as it is under UN sanctions. Beijing acted despite the obvious temptation to use Iranian ties as a means to retaliate for the US decision to keep selling sophisticated arms to Taiwan. Even more remarkable, the Russian government has announced that the latest round of sanctions prohibit it from providing Iran with its long-sought S-300 air defense missiles. These decisions were subjective interpretations of their UN obligations rather than obligatory requirements. The most recent Security Council resolution, like its predecessors, relies heavily on voluntary enforcement measures. In effect, China and Russia are punishing Iran more than is minimally necessary to comply with UN resolutions, which they in any case could have vetoed.

Ten years ago, Washington was leading the charge against Iran’s nuclear activities largely alone. Subsequent years of frustrating negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program led European governments to adopt a sterner stance toward Iran.

Now China and Russia, while defending their energy interests in Iran, have declined to protect Tehran. Its main friends are now Brazil and Turkey. These countries are important emerging powers but, as shown by the failure of their recent mediation efforts, they are clearly lacking the diplomatic weight, including the right to veto UNSC resolutions, to compensate for Iran’s growing list of alienated partners.

Richard Weitz - Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC This article was first published in the Majalla 5 July 2010 11

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Image © iStockphoto

• THE ART OF WAR

The End of “The War on Terror”?

Among the several previews to the recently released US National Security Strategy, Brennan once more highlighted that the new document marks the end of the “war on terror.” Dropping the expression that proved so damaging to the US image and interests is certainly a welcome development, but more needs to be done to permanently bury a view of the world that only breeds more extremism.

Manuel Almeida

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ast May, at the renowned US military academy of West Point, President Barack Obama introduced the new US national security doctrine, formally expressed in the National Security Strategy 2010 released by the White House later that month.

As is already tradition among foreign policy analysts, journalists and think tankers, a whole range of analysis was published about the new strategy. A particular point of general interest is usually to identify what are the elements of change, and also the elements of continuity, in relation to the previous national security strategy.

Whether or not the recently released document represents such a break from the Bush administration’s 2002 and espe-

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cially the 2006 National Security Strategies remains an issue of debate. In his speech, Obama tried to point out how different this strategy is when compared with his predecessor’s.

Clearly, there are some aspects to it that do mark a shift, especially regarding the emphasis on multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism, diplomacy over the use of military force, and in the explicit recognition of the limits of American might.

In addition to Obama, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, US National Security Advisor James Jones, and John Brennan, Obama’s top counter-terrorism adviser, also previewed the new strategy. Brennan in particular highlighted that the US is involved in a conflict with Al-Qaeda, and not Issue 1555 • August 2010

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The wrong response to extremism only breeds more extremism. In order to end “The War on Terror,” the Obama administration has to do more than remove a word from a document 13

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• THE ART OF WAR

in a “war on terror.” In the 2006 National Security Strategy, expressions like “the war against terror,” “the war against terrorists,” “the terrorist enemy,” and so forth could be found all across the document.

This expression “war on terror,” which reflects a particular view of the world and how to deal with it, proved very damaging for the US image and interests across the wider Middle East.

Brennan advocated the abandonment of this expression as early as 2009 in his first speech after joining the Obama administration. At the time, Brennan argued that the new approach would focus on the “root causes of terrorism,” namely economic and social causes that breed extremism.

This view is in sharp contrast with the Bush administration’s idea that terrorism was caused by tyrannical regimes in the Middle East.

One of the flags of the Obama presidential campaign was the closure of Guantanamo, the darkest symbol of a “whatever it takes” approach of Bush’s “war on terror.” This proved to be a much harder task than initially thought, and the deadline to close it in January this year was not met It remains to be seen if the dropping of the expression “war on terror” corresponds to actions by the Obama administration that really establish a change of course in this regard. There is an effort in the new document to stress clearly that the new administration is not at war with Islam—“…this is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, Al-Qaeda, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners.”

Although the expression “war on terror” has been dropped, there is still some doubt about if the idea behind the expression is still present in the new strategy—“For nearly a decade, our nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.” Indeed, the question remains if the Obama administration is aware that the wrong response to extremism only breeds more extremism.

In order to end “The War on Terror,” the Obama administration has to do more than remove a word from a document.

One of the flags of the Obama presidential campaign was the closure of Guantanamo, the darkest symbol of a “whatever it takes” approach of Bush’s “war on terror.” This proved to be a much harder task than initially thought, and the deadline to close it in January this year was not met. The question of what do to with the inmates that remain there is only one of the puzzles the Obama administration needs to solve. Sending the many Yemeni nationals still in Guantanamo back to Ye-

men is certainly not an option. Although it was an invention of the Bush administration to transform this prison into a torture camp where “terror” was fought with “terror,” the inability to keep the pledge of closing the prison has backfired on the Obama administration.

There is another development which is at least as damaging for the US’s long term interests as their inability to close Guantanamo, and that is the huge increase of drone strikes in Pakistan since the Obama administration took office. As a past article in The Majalla has argued, while “counter-terrorism experts find this program a real asset, some counterinsurgency specialists have been firm in pointing out that it sends the wrong message to the Pakistani people.” Various warnings have been made about the potential boomerang effect of this strategy, including by David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, of the Center for a New American Strategy, and by Professor Fawaz Gerges from the London School of Economics, in a recent article in Newsweek.

This strategy, responsible for the killing of too many civilians, is contradictory to numerous ideas put forward in the new National Security Strategy, namely “the strengthening of international norms on behalf of human rights,” or the “efforts to live our own values, and uphold the principles of democracy in our own society, underpin our support for the aspirations of the oppressed abroad, who know they can turn to America for leadership based on justice and hope.” It is particularly hard to see how the bombing of villages in tribal areas of Pakistan by unpiloted US drones can contribute to the goal contained in the new strategy of “build[ing] positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world.”

Until at least these two issues—the closure of Guantanamo and the restrain in drone strikes—are addressed, the “war on terror” isn’t really over, it just changed its face.

This article was first published in the Majalla 12 July 2010

America at War “The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.”

In this short speech given by US President George W Bush, immediately following a meeting with his national security team on 12 September 2001, the day after the terrible events of 9/11, the Bush administration paved the way for its highly controversial “war on terror.”

Although it is difficult to establish exactly when the expression was first used, it is likely to have been on 20 September 2001 in a Bush address to a Joint Session of the US Congress which included the following statement: “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”

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• THE ART OF WAR

Trained to Kill

Between Peacekeeping and War Making in Afghanistan Although soldiers are trained to fight conventional wars, the American counterinsurgency in Afghanistan resembles a peacekeeping effort more than anything else. The values that counterinsurgency efforts depend on are not those that soldiers are trained to appreciate. Given this contradiction and the US’s questionable successes in Afghanistan, it is time to review what our expectations are of a military that is doing a job it was trained explicitly not to do.

Paula Mejia

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Given the enormous doubt that weighs on the shoulders of the US’s counterinsurgency efforts, its worth understanding why even McChrystal’s former soldiers question their beloved boss. The answer is pretty straightforward. The US’s counterinsurgency strategy oddly resembles a peacekeeping mission, except it’s a peacekeeping mission that the US calls a war.

American soldiers were not trained to keep peace, they were trained to fight in conventional wars (despite the US’s lengthy experience with insurgencies). They were trained to kill.

The entire process that brought these individuals from small towns in the US to the valleys of Afghanistan is premised on incorporating these men and women in to an institution that understands its value based on its capacity to implement violence.

Yet, in Afghanistan they are ordered to avoid “lethal force.”

To understand the doubt these soldiers feel about the war in Afghanistan, one must understand the details of the counterinsurgency strategy and the extent to which their training

Image © Getty Images

n the recent article that abruptly ended Stanley McChrystal’s career, various controversies came to light. Apart from issues of military insubordination, the article also did much to remind the public that the counterinsurgency policy in place might very well be ineffective. Repeated accounts demonstrated that the men on the ground, despite their respect for the general, do not believe in a strategy that puts military personnel in danger. They feel like they are losing militarily to the Taliban, and that the concessions they have made to save Afghan lives have done little to boost their image amongst locals.

Since December, Obama has been talking about putting an end to the momentum the Taliban has in the country. This continues to be the objective according to which the US measures its success. Although, as the war becomes costlier—in terms of lives, time and resources—doubts regarding the ability of the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) to do anything about the Taliban’s momentum has done nothing but grow.

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contradicts the expectations of these tactics. One of the most important components of the counterinsurgency, as a member of the War College noted, is that it must be thought of not as a military activity but as a “strategic communication campaign supported by a military component.”

In other words, the war for the hearts and minds of Afghans implies the support of civilians on the ground, but its not really a war in the conventional sense of the term. War in this context means creating a narrative that makes the Taliban out to be the bad guys and the US out to be the good guys.

It does not mean killing, even though that is what soldiers are trained to do, and it especially means avoiding killing innocent people. This is because when innocents die, the entire concept behind the communication campaign is lost, and insurgents can instead frame these deaths as yet another example of a foreign power trying to impose its proscribed authority on Afghanistan. For a country whose history is replete with invasions and foreign rulers, the communications campaign the US is trying to sell by putting 140,000 soldiers (between US and NATO) on the ground with very big guns, is one not easily bought, even if they don’t kill innocents. Yet, as the US’s “Counterinsurgency Field Manual” states best in its questionable wisdom, more force is less effective and ultimate success “is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force.”

This philosophy, however, does not sit well with military culture. The modern military as an institution changed greatly in the 17th century. Napoleon’s professionalization of the military meant that its purpose as a violent enforcer of power was combined with its ability to incorporate the individual as a cog into its war machine. The ability of the military as an institution to subjugate individuality has been dependent on its reliance on incessant drills, the concept of respect for authority, and ultimately the controlled use of aggression. As Major RWJ Wenek wrote in 1984: “The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units.”

Given these conditions, it is not surprising that McChrystal’s soldiers questioned his counterinsurgency strategy directly. To ask a solider to “patrol only in areas where [they] are reasonably certain they will not have themselves with lethal force,” after putting them through training that defines their worth by their willingness to put themselves in harms way and their ability to defend themselves in those situations, is counterintuitive, and they know it.

That the US military has even remotely been able to follow those orders of restraint is surprising when reviewing a similar situation the US’s more internationally-beloved neighbor underwent in the 90s. Unlike the US, Canada’s foreign policy is known less for invading and more for peacekeeping.

But even this foreign policy identity did little to subdue the military culture of its soldiers. Their peacekeeping mission in Somalia—comprised entirely of military personnel—was dramatically discredited after it was reveled that two innocent Somali civilians were shot and one tortured to death by members of the country’s elite airborne regiment. There were even Abu Ghraib-like trophy photos to document the atrocity of their actions.

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soldiers are trained to be aggressive. Putting them in a situation that is dangerous and forbidding them from using force is completely contrary to the training they have received, and no one should really be surprised by the fact that they don’t support the current COIN strategy. Like a good soldier, they weren’t trained to think that way.

Rather, soldiers are indoctrinated to see themselves as part of a larger unit. Ask any soldier to describe their platoon, and the language they use will immediately emote the type of bond you only find in families. They call each other brothers and sisters, and the reason they are willing to die in a war has often less to do with the political definition of victory and more to do with the military’s definition of a soldier—including their ability to protect their “brethren.”

Now that the counterinsurgency strategy is receiving so much attention, it is not only an opportune moment to evaluate what can constitute a victory in an unconventional war. It is also the moment to evaluate whether the current military culture is compatible with the missions these soldiers are being sent on.

If they are not, then how can we expect soldiers to execute this strategy with any kind of success?

This article was first published in the Majalla 19 July 2010

The Millennial Soldier Starting August 2010, basic training is changing, reported Jen Dimascio for Politico. The US military is finally making adjustments to fit the qualities of the “millennial generation,” whose qualities differ from those traditionally associated with the role of a soldier.

According to Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, who is in charge of the overhaul, the new generation of soldiers have not met the standards of the military at a time when their expertise was needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. With their softer qualities, technological skills and greater sense of purpose, the Army has been “using old methodologies to train on the battlefield” for too long.

The new initiative involves using smart phones, allowing for trainees to access training literature easily, while scrapping some of the courses that are no longer relevant in today’s warfare, such as bayonet assault courses. These changes make way for cultural training aimed at winning hearts and minds on today’s counterinsurgency fronts. This includes a course called Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, which helps soldiers improve their emotional intelligence, while emphasizing values such as integrity and loyalty.

Hertling believes in the sustainability of this new approach, asserting, “If trained right, these are the best soldiers imaginable.”

A more holistic notion of the role of a soldier is crucial as the line between peacekeeping and warfare is becoming increasingly blurred. “That doesn’t come across as soldierly,” said Hertling, but “I’d rather have a course in how to get along versus another three hours on a bayonet assault course.”

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• ON POLITICS

From the Mosque to the Presidency

The run up to the 2011 Egyptian presidential elections will be a crucial period for Egypt's political future. There is the potential for real change but the indications are that the key figures will once again cynically use religious sentiments to win legitimacy.

If El Baradei is serious about reforming Egypt's political culture, he must avoid this strategy.

Elizabeth Iskander & Minas Monir

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The forthcoming Egyptian presidential elections

Image © Getty Images

n late 1798, on the shores of Alexandria, Napoleon addressed a letter to the people of Egypt justifying his invasion. He spoke to them about his respect for Islam and his willingness to cooperate with Muslim clerics. It was the same step taken by Alexander the Great when he came to Egypt thousands of years earlier. Alexander visited the temple of Amun where he was praised as the Son of Amun and consequently he was accepted by Egyptians. Both of these great leaders entered Egypt through the gate of religion.

Even in the era of Arab socialism, ushered in after the July 1952 Free Officers revolution, the writer of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s speeches, Mohammed H. Heikal, punctuated Nasser’s words with the name of Allah. Anwar al-Sadat, who succeeded Nasser to the presidency bringing capitalism with him, was called the “faithful president.” He described himself as a Muslim president of a Muslim nation.

The situation has not changed in modern Egypt. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), has sought to keep the loyalty of the major religious foundations in Egypt; namely AlAzhar and the Coptic Church. The support of these national religious institutions has served to give the NDP a veneer of legitimacy before the Egyptian public. Yet as a result of so visibly involving religious figures as political actors the Egyptian political space has been polarized into the NDP and radical Islamist camps.

This complex relationship between the state and religious bodies was illustrated during the 2005 presidential elections.

The government used Al-Azhar by encouraging the institution's scholars to publicly undermine the religious credentials of the Muslim Brotherhood. The aim was to ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood could not influence the outcome of the vote. For its part, the Coptic Church backed president Hosni Mubarak absolutely. Pope Shenouda and the Coptic Holy Synod published statements in the official church magazine declaring their full support for Mubarak and even went so far as to bus Copts to polling stations.

The next presidential election in 2011 will be even more hotly contested. The return of Nobel Prize winner and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed El Baradei, to Egypt and his dramatic entry into Egyptian politics has added a new dynamic. El Baradei founded a National Association for Change but ironically there are signs that he will succumb to the established pattern of seeking recourse to religion.

El Baradei initially identified himself as an independent candidate. This created a problem because Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution prohibits independent candidates from contesting the presidential elections. A candidate must be a

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member of a recognized party and should have been part of its senior leadership for at least one year. Consequently, he has judged that he needs to gain broad public support and fast, in order to call for an amendment to the constitution.

As indicated, the general public has typically been accessed through the language of religion. This explains why El Baradei symbolically started his campaign by visiting the mosque of Al-Hussein in the heart of old Cairo. Despite his secular liberal speech, in his first interview after arriving back in Egypt in February, El Baradei did not rule out a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and has appeared to become increasingly aligned with the group.

On Friday, the 4th of June, El Baradei traveled to El-Fayoum city where he began his rally by performing Friday Prayers at Mubarak mosque along with thousands of supporters, many of whom were Muslim Brotherhood members. Mustapha Awadalla, a Muslim Brotherhood and Parliament Member, stood beside him during the prayers and presented him to the public afterwards.

At the same time as courting the Muslim Brotherhood, El Baradei is trying to access Copts from the same point of entry, namely religion. Such support could be pivotal for El Baradei, particularly because the Coptic patriarch is not merely a spiritual father for the Copts but also the political leader and representative of the Coptic minority before the state. In the last four decades, this patriarchal role in the social and political life of the Copts has reached its climax due to the charismatic role of Shenouda III. However, being the official Christian religious foundation in Egypt, the church is in a full and complete alliance with the government, giving its support to the NDP in the recent Shura Council elections. This close relationship to the ruling party led to the snubbing of El Baradei at the Easter liturgy presided over by Pope Shenouda and attended by Egypt’s leading political players. El Baradei claimed he was invited by Pope Shenouda, yet on arrival he was intentionally ignored and his reserved place was deliberately moved to sit him away from the cameras It seems then that this gate is closed to El Baradei, at least for the present. This realization and the knowledge that the secular liberal political streams cannot offer El Baradei the support he needs to push for the amendment of Article 76 have pushed him further into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood.

El Baradei is counting on this to bring him the “silent majority” because the official Islamic foundation, Al-Azhar, no longer has the credibility to provide alternative access to the Muslim vote.

Therefore, although he admits that there are “some differences,” El Baradei has affirmed that he welcomes the Muslim Brotherhood into his Assembly. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood will surely call for promises based on the religious ambitions which were spelt out recently in their manifesto for the 1st of June Shura Council elections.

Using the mosque as the springboard for his leap into Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain momentum for the Association for Change indicates that El Baradei understands the importance of religion to the Egyptian public.

However, this strategy does not support his campaign for reformation. There is a danger that this will increase the spirit of radicalism, which has already served to ignite sectarian tensions in Egypt. When Sadat began to rely on religion for legitimacy, Egypt witnessed its worst period of sectarian violence.

To avoid further fragmenting Egyptians into Muslims and Christians, El Baradei needs to establish a new base for his campaign. He has so far avoided joining or starting a new party that could develop and promote his agenda without the need to compromise with the radical political streams. Having a political party would also help him overcome the obstacle of Article 76. A new party with the capacity to bring together the other political movements in an alliance or a coalition may help him to change the future of the political landscape in Egypt without making recourse to religion.

Using religion to reach the public is easy because it is expected and even accepted. But it also hinders the ability of a democratic culture to mature and take root. Although the impact would be less immediate, changing this reliance on rhetoric that politicizes religion could eventually lead to the real change that the Egyptian street is calling for.

Elizabeth Iskander is the Director of the Next Century Foundation's research programme. A Middle East analyst and writer based in London, she has published in both the English and Arabic-language media and has a particular interest in the politics, law and society of Egypt and Iran. She is also currently a Ph.D. candidate in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Minas Monir is a Cairo-based journalist, translator and writer. He works on the politics, culture and religion of the Middle East. The authors of several books, his main areas of expertise are Egyptian affairs and political theology.

A Warning for the US “…a successful Islamist push for power in Egypt would result in a fundamental shift in the regional order that would pose a far greater threat—in magnitude and degree—to U.S. interests than the Iranian revolution.”

This bold statement came from the pen of Steven A. Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. In an August 2009 report entitled “Political Instability in Egypt,” Cook warns against a wave of political instability in Egypt once President Hosni Mubarak steps down. In light of the upcoming elections and Mubarak’s ailing health, there is no doubt that Egypt is entering a period of political transition. This transition, however, can take many forms, some less significant than others.

To prepare for the possibility of a succession crisis that would likely hamper America’s capacity to achieve US foreign policy goals historically facilitated by the Egyptian government, Cook recommends that the US take a four-pronged approach. Among his recommendations are to further develop intelligence resources inside the US and inside Egypt; continue to promote positive political change; use development aid to support the standard of living for Egyptians; and to plan and operate with the understanding that different crisis scenarios require qualitatively different approaches. Finally, he cautions against the prevailing view among analysts and government officials that Egypt will remain stable into the far future.

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• ON POLITICS

Where the Sun Rises The AKP’s gradual shift to the East

Turkey's increasingly confrontational policy towards the West does not have just ideological roots but business ones too. Turkey’s diversification of diplomatic relations, and the economic ties it has been developing with several Middle Eastern countries, allows it to move away from its traditionally pro-Western foreign policy.

Iason Athanasiadis

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NKARA: When the Kocatepe mosque first opened in 1987, it came as a shock to Turkey’s political system.

Above ground, the cement neo-Ottoman structure reared its domes and minarets on a hill, defiantly facing the mausoleum where lies Turkey’s secular founder, Kemal Ataturk. Underground, snuggled a two-level shopping mall. Not only was it one of the biggest religious complexes in the Muslim world, it was a direct economic challenge to the commercial status quo where Kemalist elites controlled the majority of capital.

Until then, shopping centers had only existed in solidly upper crust Republican neighborhoods. Now, Turkey’s religious majority had combined mosque and mall and was finally facing down the dominant class. In the next decade, the Nineties, Turkey’s conser-

vative industrialists came in from the religious hinterland to claim for themselves the moniker “Anatolian tigers.” Sleepy backwaters such as Kayseri and Gazyantepe turned into boomtowns.

The ruling AK Party’s (AKP) new assertive Middle Eastern policy draws confidence from these humble commercial beginnings.

Equally, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo_an very publicly chastises Israel, he has one eye not so much on the Arab street as Arab markets. A popular theory doing the rounds in Turkey is that the AKP could afford to turn away the IMF last year because of billions of dollars of direct Arab investments in Turkey.

The AKP’s strong rhetoric during June’s Gaza flotilla incident is part of a trend that has been described since 2007 as neo-Ottomanism. Just as the House of Osman’s expansionism was driven

One year after the official fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, a well-known military officer by the name of Mustafa Kemal declared Turkey a secular Republic.

From that moment on, everything changed.

Immediately identified as a modernizing (and westernizing) leader, Atatürk, or the Father of the Turks as the founding president was come to be known, spent his first years implementing radical reforms intended to stamp out the country’s Ottoman Muslim identity.

In establishing his republic, Atatürk and the Turkish national movement developed a “Kemalist” ideology, whereby the Western philosophies of Positivism, Rationalism and Enlightenment were to guide educational and scientific progress. The Atatürkian principles of republicanism, populism, secularism, statism, nationalism, revolutionism became the foundations for his reforms.

Under the direction of Kemalism the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic alphabet; classical music replaced folk songs; Western legal codes, dress, and calendar were introduced; women were emancipated; and Islamic institutions were abolished.

This ideology was reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy with Turkey’s pro-Western stance, and it has continued until very recently, as acknowledged in this article.

(Source BBC)

Image © Getty Images

Where the Sun Sets

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by profit, so the new Turkish political-bazaari class is motivated both by Islamic traditionalism and the thirst for new markets.

Direct flights to Kabul are packed with businessmen. Kabul’s sandbag-shielded bars buzz with the sound of Turkish and so do its Sufi séances. Turkish restaurateurs feed Libya’s oil-fuelled boom, and its construction magnates sign contracts to shape Tripoli’s steel-and-glass skyline. Brazilian-style soap operas featuring amorous escapades set against glamorous lifestyles hold Syrian, Egyptian and Emirati TV audiences spellbound with an alternative vision of how Muslims could live. Arab tourists increasingly visit Istanbul, not to sample its Ottoman cuisine and architecture but to walk around the districts where favorite soap operas were filmed. Politically, Erdogan has usurped Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the world stage as the Muslim leader who dares tell it as it is.

Over the past two years, Erdogan spun NATO member Turkey away from its traditionally pro-Western foreign policy. He famously walked out of a debate with Shimon Peres at the Davos Forum in 2009 after publicly accusing Israel of mendacity for continuing to negotiate on Syria even while it planned to invade Gaza in 2008. This June, even urbane foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu lost his calm during a closed-door security conference in Istanbul and issued a red-faced ultimatum to the Israeli ambassador that his state could no longer continue behaving unilaterally, one of the diplomats present reported.

“On the one hand they’re pushing away Israel, on the other they’re coming closer to the Arab and Muslim world, as if one step is a consequence of the other,” said Dogan Tilic, a leftist and author of Utaniyorum ama gazeteciyim (I’m Ashamed to Admit I Am a Journalist). “Israel has no commercial significance for Turkey while the Arab Middle East is a huge market for Turkey so these frictions are not just because of Erdogan’s ideological background but there are also commercial and political reasons.”

As Asia’s westernmost country, Turkey engaged with the West just after its founding upon the ashes of an Ottoman Empire whose territories once stretched to the walls of Vienna.

Mustafa Kemal, a westernizing leader from the Greek port city of Salonica, discarded the Arabic alphabet for the Latin one, imposed classical music over folk songs, banned Sufi brotherhoods, turbans and all other examples of what he considered superstitious folk religion.

During the Cold War, Turkey became a western bulwark. Currently, it has the ninth largest number of troops in Afghanistan.

And despite the economic crisis roiling the European Union, Ankara still nourishes help of entering the western club.

Nevertheless, Turkish politics were and remain tinged by Ataturk’s distrust of the West. Despite embracing western culture, he could not forget how the Allies encouraged the Greeks to invade in 1919, hoping it would prompt the dismemberment of the tottering Ottoman edifice. He was similarly aware that, at the end of World War One, the British and French navies moved to within striking distance of the metropolis on the Bosporus. With this in mind, Ataturk created a new capital safe from seaborne intervention in the epicenter of the Anatolian landmass.

Now, Turkey has regained its confidence. Erdogan is refocusing Turkish foreign policy onto the Middle East and the Balkans, and he increasingly holds high-profile meetings in the old seat of Ottoman government, Istanbul. At the same time, he continues to modernize the country by presiding over the greatest expansion of government-funded, low-cost public

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accommodation through a government subsidiary known as TOKI. Battalions of high-rises have sprung up across Anatolia, forever changing the traditional way of life.

“It encourages individualism,” said Christos Teazis, a Turkey specialist who wrote his dissertation on the AK Party.

“When urbanization started in the 1950s, entire villages were transplanted into the city as neighborhoods. These apartments destroyed this phenomenon by breaking the culture of living with family relatives and encouraging the atomization of the living unit.”

Turkish society is changing too. The very public struggle over wearing the hijab in official buildings was settled in favor of the government’s preference for lifting the ban. On breakfast TV shows, university professors have been replaced as experts by theology researchers who give opinions based on the Koran.

“Turkey is coming full circle after 150 years or so, and looking beyond even the confines of the Ottoman state,” argues Graham Fuller, a former CIA analyst and author of The New

Erdogan is refocusing Turkish foreign policy onto the Middle East and the Balkans, and he increasingly holds high-profile meetings in the old seat of Ottoman government, Istanbul Turkish Republic and A World Without Islam who believes that Ottomanism is still relevant. “You still have the meaningful Turkish-Turanian past, one of the most widespread language groups in the world, distant links to universal cultures like the Mongol Empire, Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia and Turkish roots in China.”

When Fethullah Gulen, a religious icon for millions of Turks, broke his silence from his US exile to criticize the Gaza flotilla raid, it gave an insight into how the rise of Muslim influence in Turkish politics is splintering the Islamist front and bringing its infighting into the open. Erdogan was a one-time disciple of Gulen but, worried more than ever that Washington is looking to unseat him, he appears to have moved away from his mentor. Erdogan has recently publicly stated that “the Turkish nation knows very well on whose behalf the terrorist organization works as a subcontractor.”

“The sun no longer rises and falls on western preferences,” said Fuller. “The foreign policy vision of Davutoglu is sweeping and likely to persist in one form or another after the AK Party falls from power.”

At one of Ankara’s chic malls, Teazis is hanging out, watching the crowds pass. “It’s a sign of the times,” he says, “when the ones buying a lot are the covered ladies while the uncovered secular ones just window-shop.”

Iason Athanasiadis – journalist based in Istanbul. He covers Turkey, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since 1999, he has lived in Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Sana’a and Tehran.

This article was first published in the Majalla 21 July 2010

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• ON POLITICS

Turkey’s Achilles Heel

The “zero-problem” policy must include solving Cyprus Turkey should take great care to retain the international sympathy that has been accumulating since 2003 with its “step ahead” policy in solving Cyprus. Recently, Turkey’s focus on Gaza, Israel and Iran’s nuclear program has led it to overlook the Cyprus issue that matters greatly to the EU, the platform from which Turkey has been able to achieve so much in the region in recent years.

Hugh Pope

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urkey's energetic “zero problem” foreign policy of recent years has often been compared to a juggler trying to keep several balls in the air: rediscovering the Arab world, engaging with Iran, trying to help Israel and Syria make peace, normalizing relations with Armenia, partnering with Russia, mediating in the Balkans and maintaining the US/NATO alliance—to name just the most obvious issues that keep Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto_lu almost permanently en route to somewhere.

Turkey's handling of this bewildering whirl of issues brought plaudits from far and wide. In recent months, however, the act has become difficult to sustain. In the past year, well-negotiated protocols to open borders and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia got stuck when Turkey insisted on linking normalization to progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Perceptions that Turkey was too close to the authoritarian regimes of Iran, Sudan and Syria have raised suspicions in Washington. And relations with Israel have hit a new low over Gaza, including the 31 May flotilla incident, which was surely not foreseen by either government, but has still robbed Turkey of its treasured image as a neutral player in the region.

Often overlooked, however, is the most important question of all: What is happening to Turkey's negotiations to join the EU, and the inextricably related question of how to settle the dispute that divides EU-member Cyprus. Convergence with the EU is the strategic enabler that has helped Turkey win the attributes that underpin its regional charisma: a real Muslim democracy, a largely secular, pluralist society and a broadbased, fast-growing economy that has now grown to be worth half as much as the two dozen countries of the Middle East put together. Adopting EU standards has been the locomotive of a reform project that has kept Turkey's demons at bay: tensions between Turks and Kurds, civilians and the military, secularists and Islamists, democrats and promoters of authoritarianism.

Since negotiations on full EU membership started in 2005, however, Turkey has faced a big problem: Leading politicians in France, Germany, Austria and some other EU states have done their best to derail Turkey's talks. Strong support in the recent Dutch elections for an anti-immigrant party implacably opposed to Turkey in Europe shows that this tendency remains, and it is making Turkish leaders increasingly bitter. They should keep their cool. EU leaders change and the history of the relationship shows that with time and hard work, Turkey has been able to coexist and even overcome European skepticism in the long term.

But Turkey's ability to sustain its EU negotiations, and all the great reforming energy that flows from the process, cannot survive without a settlement, or at least an accommodation, over Cyprus. It is here that Turkey faces a big short-term problem.

The Greek Cypriot-run Republic of Cyprus is currently blocking half of Turkey's 35 EU negotiating chapters, and, after the expected opening of one chapter on food safety this summer, only three chapters will remain that can be opened. If there is no progress on resolving the Cyprus problem soon, therefore, the accession process will grind to a halt.

This is somewhat unfair on Turkey. All sides have played negative roles in driving apart the majority Greek Cypriot and minority Turkish Cypriot communities, divided politically since 1963 and militarily since 1974. Turkey has tried since 2003 to persuade the Greek Cypriots and the world that it is seeking constructive ways to withdraw its troops from the northern third of the island.

Indeed, Ankara supported the Turkish Cypriots' 65 percent vote in favor of reuniting the island in 2004 with a UN plan for a bicommunal, bi-zonal federation. It was the Greek Cypriots who voted 76 percent against the EU-backed deal.

A new Greek Cypriot leadership under Demetris Christofias took power in 2008 and quickly reopened reunification talks. However, Christofias' refusal to start negotiations from

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the existing UN text, his frequent postponement of meetings, his choice of anti-compromise parties as coalition partners and his attacks on Turkey eventually persuaded Turkish Cypriots that the talks were going nowhere. In April, the Turkish Cypriots ousted their pro-compromise leader and voted in veteran hardliner Dervi_ Ero_lu. Even though Ero_lu has accepted Turkey's advice to keep pushing for a settlement, it is clear that much momentum has been drained from the process.

If this fourth major round of UN-facilitated talks on a bicommunal, bi-zonal federation breaks down, UN officials are making clear they do not foresee a fifth round anytime soon. If a miracle doesn't happen, therefore, the Cyprus talks will deadlock, with Turkey stuck on the outside of the EU. Turkey's new interest in becoming a regional power, and the EU's own internal difficulties, make some believe that Turkey will not regret the end of its EU membership bid. But aside from the psychological importance of the EU reform engine, this ignores the reality that EU states take more than half of Turkish exports, supply 90 percent of Turkey's foreign investment, and host four million Turks. The Middle East, while currently a growing market, takes just one quarter of Turkey's exports, hosts a mere 110,000 Turkish guest workers and supplies only 10 percent of Turkey's 27 million tourists.

So while all eyes are focused on Turkey's dramatic juggling with Gaza, Israel and Iran's nuclear programme, Turkey should take great care that it retains the international sympathy it has begun to win since 2003 with its “step ahead” policy in solving Cyprus. If Turkey lets the Cypriot ball drop to the ground in any way that can be construed as its fault, it will drive an immovable wedge between Turkey and the EU, and remove the platform from which Turkey has been able to achieve so much in the region in recent years.

Hugh Pope – International Crisis Group's Turkey/Cyprus Project Director and the author of “Dining with Al-Qaeda: Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East.”

This article was first published in the Majalla 7 July 2010

All sides have played negative roles in driving apart the majority Greek Cypriot and minority Turkish Cypriot communities Thirty-Six Years of Partition 1974 Cyprus is divided between the north and south.

Turkey enforces the partition, causing many Greek Cypriots to flee their homes.

1975 A separate administration is established in the North. The two sides agree to a population exchange.

1980 UN-sponsored peace talks resume.

1983 Talks are suspended and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is proclaimed, recognized only by Turkey.

1996 Increased tension with violence along buffer zone.

1998 EU lists Cyprus as potential member.

2001 UN Security Council renews its mission, which had begun in 1964.

2002 January The two sides begin UN-sponsored negotiations, with their sights on EU membership.

November UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presents a comprehensive peace plan for Cyprus.

2004 Twin referendums on whether to accept UN reunification plan in order to enter the EU as a united country. Turkish Cypriots endorse the plan; Greek Cypriots reject it.

Cyprus joins EU as a divided island.

2006 In UN-sponsored talks, the two sides agree to a series of confidence-building measures.

EU-Turkey talks on Cyprus break down over Turkey's continued refusal to open its ports to traffic from the Republic of Cyprus.

2007 Greek and Turkish Cypriots demolish barriers dividing the old city of Nicosia.

2008 Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders launch intensive negotiations. No progress is made.

Image © iStockphoto

2010 Dervis Eroglu, pro-independence candidate for the north, is voted into the presidency.

(Source: BBC) Issue 1555 • August 2010

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• SHATTERED EXPECTATIONS

Shattered Expectations Arabs and Muslims Lose Heart with Obama One year after Obama’s speech in Cairo, a global survey shows a steep decline in US approval ratings in Muslim countries. An increasing number of Arabs and Muslims say that the young president talks the talk, but does not walk the walk, and that his policies are an extension of his neoconservative predecessor—a sweetened poison.

Fawaz Gerges

Image © Getty Images

A

new global survey by the Pew Research Center affiliated with Harvard University shows that President Barack Obama continues to be popular and to improve America’s standing in much of the world. The notable exception is Muslim countries—where he is less favorably viewed than he was a year ago.

For example, in Egypt, the setting of the president’s muchheralded address, only 17 percent said they had a favorable view of the US, the lowest rating in five years, a “pre-Obama rating.” Last year, 27 percent of Egyptians polled said they had a favorable view. In Jordan, US approval rating has fallen to 20 percent.

The most surprising finding was in Turkey where support for Obama fell by a third, from 33 to 23 percent, and many of those polled in Turkey—a well-standing NATO member—said they were disappointed with current US foreign policy.

A majority of Muslims say that the US represents a military threat to them, especially in Lebanon, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. This is a very alarming development, given Obama’s determined efforts to improved America’s damaged relations with Muslim populations since his inauguration.

A year after his historic speech to the Muslim world from Cairo, Obama’s favorability ratings are as low as his predecessor’s, George W. Bush, a surprisingly hard blow. “The lack of support in the Muslim world is coincident with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,” said Andrew Kohut, president of Washington’s Pew Research Center, which conducts the annual survey.

There’s also “disappointment” among Muslims about the US under Obama, added Kohut. Many have a perception, for example, that the US still “does not deal fairly” in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Indeed, Arabs and Muslims are deeply disappointed and uniformly cite a gap of credibility between Obama’s rosy promises and his actions. Almost a year after Obama's address to the Muslim world, the reality of his Middle East policy is in sharp contrast to the promising rhetoric and high expectations

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he raised. Obama's address, coupled with a concerted outreach strategy, made a deep impression among Arabs and Muslims.

Many hoped that the young African-American president would seriously confront the challenges facing the region and establish a new relationship with the world of Islam.

Obama raised expectations that concrete action would follow. Even oppositional forces, such Hezbollah, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, conceded that what Obama said represented a breath of fresh air in US foreign policy. But across the political spectrum, all stressed they would assess his policies and actions, not only his words.

A year after his historic speech to the Muslim world from Cairo, Obama’s favorability ratings are as low as his predecessor’s, George W. Bush, a surprisingly hard blow A year later, as the new global survey by the Pew Research Center shows, there is an increasing belief among Arabs and Muslims that Obama has failed to live up to his sweet words.

The terminology of the “War on Terror” is no longer in use, but Guantanamo Bay is still open and President Obama has escalated the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere. His Arab-Israeli peace drive has reached a deadlock and Obama lost the first round against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His promise to free the Palestinians from Israeli military occupation and to help bring about an independent Palestinian state will unlikely materialize in his first term in the White House.

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who co-chairs the Global Attitudes Project, acknowledged the gap between Obama’s rosy rhetoric and the stark reality of US foreign policies in the region. “Cairo was a very large departure, a speech by an American president in a Muslim country ... and there was a lot of hope that there would be a lot more intervention” by the US on issues of interest to Muslim populations, such as the Middle East peace process, Albright said.

“There is recognition of this [sense of unfulfilled expectation] in the administration,” Albright stressed. Initiatives such as Obamas’ recent “entrepreneurship summit” with Muslim business representatives and organizations in Washington DC, suggest “they are trying to find ways that there can be more interaction,” she added.

An increasing number of Arabs and Muslims say that the young president talks the talk, but does not walk the walk, and that his policies are an extension of his neoconservative predecessor—a sweetened poison. For them, Obama's rhetoric rings hollow, empty talk.

Public opinion polls and surveys like the Pew study do not fully reflect the depth and intensity of the disillusionment with Obama. An entrenched view has taken hold among Muslims that the US is not genuine about engagement and pays lip service to their hopes, fears and aspirations.

Obama likely misjudged the complexity of the region and the exuberant political costs associated with a transformational strategy. His promises of genuine engagement and building a 27

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• SHATTERED EXPECTATIONS

new relationship with Islam's 1.3 billion people are no longer taken as seriously—a fact that undermines the credibility and efficacy of his foreign policy in the Greater Middle East, including the wars against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban in Afghanistan and their Pakistani cohorts and counterinsurgency in general.

Obama has implicitly conceded that his Cairo speech rhetorically overreached. In an interview with Time magazine, Obama surprised his interviewer when pressed on the IsraeliPalestinian issue, "This is just really hard... and if we had anticipated some of these political problems on both sides earlier, we might not have raised expectations as high."

Although it is not too late for Obama to close the gap between rhetoric and action, sadly for now, he has not taken bold steps to achieve a breakthrough in America's relations with the Muslim arena. His foreign policy is more status quo and damage control than transformational. Like their American counterparts, Muslims desperately long for real change that they can believe in.

If Obama really wishes to repair the damage wrought by his predecessor and to build a new relationship based on mutual interests and respect, he must have the will and vision to chart a new course of action and invest some of his precious political capital in resolving festering regional conflicts. First and foremost ought to be the establishment of a viable, independent Palestinian state, and making structural investment in institution building and civil society.

Given the gravity of domestic challenges facing the US, the worst environmental disaster in history and a declining economy, many Americans wonder if it matters what the world thinks of their country.

“It matters because no matter how strong we are, the US cannot do everything by itself,” said the former secretary of state, Albright. America’s biggest challenges—including the economy, terrorism and energy—require multinational and cross-border solutions, she added: “All these issues ... affect our day-to-day life, [and] “if the US is doing well and is popular, then the US can do something.”

For example, according to the survey, support among Muslim populations for terrorist actions like suicide bombings and for Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda has declined considerably.

But what complicates US efforts to combat terrorism is suspicion among Muslim populations of American leaders’ rationale and political agenda.

On balance, Muslims do not buy the US narrative about either the gravity of the terrorist threat or the definition of terrorism. For many Muslims, America’s lumping together of legitimate “resistance” groups, such as Palestinian Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, with terrorist Al-Qaeda is unacceptable and politically motivated.

Perhaps Muslims must ask themselves some hard questions: What influence can Muslim states and leaders exercise in Washington, and what they are willing and able to do to support the desired transformation of relations? Will they be willing to employ

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their rich assets and present a genuine unified position? If history is a guide, the answer is a resounding no. If they really want to see meaningful change, then Muslims must lend a helping hand to steer the US foreign policy ship in the right direction.

For after all, Obama does not possess a magical wand and does not bare all the blame for the lack of political progress in the region. Unfortunately, Arabs and Muslim placed high and unreasonable expectations on a new president without considering the complexity of the US foreign policy decision-making process nor the reality of American domestic politics. The imperial presidency is powerful but presidents' hands are often constrained by Congress, the foreign policy establishment, domestic politics and the media and public opinion and advocacy groups. Obama's domestic and foreign policy agenda is crowded and, on his own, he cannot deliver an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Instead of putting their eggs in the US basket, Arabs and Muslims must be masters of their own destiny; they must realize that Obama’s ability to structurally change US foreign policy is limited, and that he should not held accountable for all the festering crises in the region.

Fawaz A. Gerges – Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics, London University. He has written extensively on America's relations with the Arab world. Among his books is "America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or A Clash of Interests?"

This article was first published in the Majalla 26 July 2010 Issue 1555 • August 2010

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

Running Out of Gas GCC running out of cheap energy

Most GCC countries just about ran out of options to continue fueling their surging economies with cheap gas. The most obvious choices are Qatar and Iran, but price and politics have all but derailed any chance of negotiating any significant supplies in the short term. That inevitably points to higher energy costs and careful planning ahead.

Image © iStockphoto

Andrés Cala

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t’s all but official. Some of the world’s biggest oil producers grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) face higher future energy costs now that cheap natural gas is getting scarce and more expensive alternatives will have to fuel the region’s voracious economic growth.

It’s not that gas is hard to come by. Indeed, the region accounts for a huge share of the world’s production and reserves. A seven-fold regional production increase over 25 years though hasn’t kept up with even higher growth in demand to meet long-term gas export contracts, to enhance oil recovery, to boost electricity generation, and to build huge petrochemical industrial capacity.

What is now almost certain is that a combination of economic and geopolitical decisions have stacked up to ultimately deny Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates access to the huge neighboring gas supplies of Iran and Qatar, the cheapest and most secure options.

This scenario has long been brewing. GCC countries have unsuccessfully tried to negotiate for almost two decades with Iran and Qatar, which together account for about 30 percent of the world’s reserves. But differences over price, as well as regional rivalries and border disputes, have so far derailed most efforts.

In the meantime, regional electricity demand is expected to continue to increase more than six percent annually, and gas is not flowing fast enough to simultaneously feed the region’s subsidized petrochemical, power and desalination plants, with countries like Kuwait forced to prioritize power over industrial output. The outcome is that GCC countries are hard pressed to find new energy supply quickly because Iran and Qatar will have no spare gas to export in the short term.

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Qatar earlier this year allocated supplies from one of its last two uncommitted gas projects to local demand. It was equivalent to about 17 percent of its annual production and more than Kuwait or Bahrain’s gas production in 2009. The remaining project will not come online before 2015, while the moratorium on new exploration is expected to remain in place at least until then.

Qatar, which processes three quarters of its gas to export as liquefied natural gas under long-term contracts, is only connected via pipeline to the UAE and Oman via the Dolphin Project in a politically-forced deal. It was completed in 2007 and Qatar is in effect subsidizing the industrial growth of its neighbors by accepting about a quarter of the market value prices for the gas.

A similar venture that would have connected Qatar via pipeline to Bahrain and Kuwait was thwarted in 2006 when Saudi Arabia denied permission to use its territorial waters. Since then, Qatar has grown frustrated at its neighbors’ unwillingness to pay for its gas.

As for Iran, last month it signed a huge, 25-year gas export contract with Pakistan to export the equivalent to about 60 percent of Kuwait’s or Bahrain’s production, and its own local demand and sanctions make any significant additional export deal unlikely for years to come.

The Islamic Republic, which exports less gas to Turkey than it imports from Central Asian countries, has never really stopped negotiating with all GCC countries, expect for Saudi Arabia, but geopolitical and price differences once again have derailed all negotiations.

Even now, the UAE and Kuwait are reportedly close to signing a deal with Tehran, but similar announcements have been made in the past.

Indeed, GCC have been drafting contingency plans to address future energy shortages. The UAE and Saudi Arabia want to build a nuclear fleet, Oman is turning to coal, Bahrain and Kuwait both want a share of nuclear power from its neighbors and will also resort to Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports, and all are investing in renewable energy to some extent.

Regardless, the alternatives to Qatari and Iranian gas are more expensive and will take much longer to develop. For at least a decade the region will have to plan for higher energy costs, whether it’s because more petroleum is burnt instead of exported, because oil production falls as gas for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) decreases, or because other energy supplies are significantly more expensive than indigenous gas.

The question is how governments will react.

Further price subsidizing threatens to be an untenable drain on already overly generous public spending, while eliminating all incentives for more indigenous gas production. More importantly, it will also certainly increase gas demand, as it has until now, exacerbating the energy crisis further. But the political risks of passing the costs down are huge and local industries would lose their main competitive advantage internationally. At the end though, it’s a question of time before energy costs become a major political and economic issue that will require careful balancing.

Issue 1555 • August 2010

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The Lion’s Share 23% of global gas reserves in GCC Breakdown of GCC Gas Reserves (Figures in Billion Cu. Meters) Qatar 25,260 Kuwait 17,948 Saudi Arabia 7,319 UAE 6,071 Oman 850 Bahrain 92 Total 41.39 Trillion Cu. Meters

(Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2010 Areas in RED indicate major Gas Fields in the GCC region. Source: CS) What will GCC governments do about the growing deficit it will have to pay to maintain their cheap energy economic growth? Will it not be cheaper to import as much gas from Qatar and Iran, even at a higher price, than all other available options?

GCC gas-hungry countries still have to meet future energy demand and will have to resort to even more expensive alternatives, such as renewable energy or importing LNG at much higher prices than Iran and Qatar were willing to negotiate.

Even in the case of the UAE, which still has significant untapped sour gas reserves, the costs of developing new projects will likely be as expensive as importing it from its neighbors. In fact, earlier this year ConocoPhillips pulled out of a $12 billion sour gas contract over concern the UAE’s subsidized consumer and industrial prices would undermine profitability.

That is, the additional costs are unavoidable, at least in the short term. The least exposed country is Saudi Arabia, thanks to its huge spare oil production capacity that gives it some wiggle room. But even Riyadh has to explain why it will resort to burning its lucrative oil production to generate subsidized energy at a huge loss.

Andres Cala – Madrid-based freelance journalist.

This article was first published in The Majalla 14 July 2010 31

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

The signing of an economic cooperation agreement between China and Taiwan on 29 June 2010 heralds a new phase in cross-Straits relations and Asian economic integration. This agreement, however, is not without political uncertainties, not least for Taiwan. Indeed, although the agreement has some clear (and greater) economic advantages for Taiwan, the question of independence still hovers over the island’s future.

Not So Quiet on the Eastern Front A historic cross-Strait agreement is signed

Kil Dosanjh

Image © iStockphoto

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n 29 June 2010 Taiwan and mainland China signed a historic bilateral agreement that paves the way for closer economic cross-Strait ties. The Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) puts forth a general set of guidelines for future arrangements relating to the trade in goods and broader commercial ties. But it is not a true free trade agreement (FTA). Since Ma Ying-jeou became president of Taiwan in 2008, a range of liberalization measures, including the relaxation of rules governing air links, have already taken place, without the need for an ECFA, and, as such, some domestic constituents that oppose the deal have questioned its need. Nevertheless, the agreement will help to formalize already burgeoning trade links, and Mr. Ma has argued that it will send a positive diplomatic signal to other countries that have thus far been unwilling to sign trade agreements with Taiwan owing to fears that this would offend China. As the ECFA negotiations progress the two sides will expand the range of goods that enjoy reduced or zero tariffs, and include areas relating to services, investment and dispute resolution.

The “early harvest” list—an initial list of goods that will enjoy a reduction in tariffs—was finalized in June and favors Taiwan.

The island will enjoy reduced tariffs and exemptions on 539 items that it exports to China, the value of which in 2009 was US$13.8bn (this represented 16.1 percent of the island’s crossStrait exports in value terms). China will see a reduction in 267 items that it exports to the island, amounting to US$2.9bn last year (and represented 10.5 percent of the mainland's crossStrait exports). The bias in favor of Taiwan reflects two main factors. Firstly, that Taiwan is far more reliant on the mainland as an export market than the other way around. Secondly, it is clearly hoped that an agreement that appears to benefit Taiwan will help the island’s government to stave off domestic criticism over the ECFA. Taiwan’s government has also argued that the need for such an agreement has increased since an FTA between China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) came into force in January 2010. A range of products that have seen an exemption or tariff reduction in the ChinaASEAN FTA have left Taiwanese exporters at a competitive disadvantage over ASEAN countries. There are therefore clear economic benefits for Taiwan in relation to its own deal.

However, the deal remains controversial, largely for political reasons. The main opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has argued that ECFA will accelerate the island’s growing economic dependence on China, and thus raises the specter that Taiwan risks losing its de facto independence. This official view is partly political—the party wants to portray Mr. Ma’s cross-Strait

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rapprochement as a risk to the island’s sovereignty in order to bolster its core supporter base, but economic linkages rose sharply during the DPP’s own period in power (between 2000 and 2008).

But there are certainly reasons to warrant such concerns. It is likely that the mainland has been generous as it does believe that Taiwan’s growing reliance on the Chinese market will gradually give the mainland greater leverage over Taiwan’s political parties and voters in the future. Already, opinion polls suggest that the majority of Taiwanese voters believe that cross-Strait economic integration is essential if Taiwan does not wish to become marginalized internationally. Indeed, the ability of the DPP to use the sovereignty card against the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party is already being undermined by the fact that, although many in the main opposition party do not believe that the ECFA will be the panacea for Taiwan's economic problems that the KMT has suggested, there is now pressure within the DPP for its leadership to adopt a more pragmatic approach to cross-Strait relations.

The mainland's political motives will remain a concern in Taiwan, but the trend of countries seeking bilateral or regional FTAs is likely to continue Cross-Strait rapprochement is likely to continue during the next three years. Although the DPP has done well in a series of by-elections and local elections in recent months, the KMT will control both the Legislative Yuan (parliament) and the presidency until 2012. Recent demonstrations that the DPP has organized to highlight its opposition to the ECFA have failed to find support outside its core support base, and thus such moves will at best keep the ECFA issue in the local media spotlight. Taiwan's government has been particularly mindful of the concerns of farmers, who would face losing out to the more competitive Chinese agricultural sector. The KMT has therefore already insisted that it will not agree to an increase in the number of Chinese farm exports allowed to enter Taiwan. It has also indicated that there will be no change in the ban allowing Chinese workers to enter the island (another concern among voters has been that cheaper Chinese labor could flood the market).

The mainland's political motives will remain a concern in Taiwan, but the trend of countries seeking bilateral or regional FTAs is likely to continue, given the failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to push another round of trade liberalization. These bilateral and regional trade agreements also allow the involved countries to focus their efforts more on investment and services than would arguably be the case under the WTO. The trend is likely to continue as a result, particularly where individual countries or trading blocs are seeking to promote themselves as financial and/or services hubs (as is the case in Taiwan, South Korea and several Gulf Cooperation Council states).

Kil Dosanjh - Senior Economist and Analyst Manager in the Country Risk Services Department for Asia & Australasia at The Economist Intelligence Unit.

This article was first published in The Majalla 20 July 2010 Issue 1555 • August 2010

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

Clash of the Deficit Hogs

A look at the transatlantic divide on government spending The resignation of White House budget director Peter Orszag is a telling sign of the fiscal tensions that grip Washington today. As much of Europe pursues budget-tightening agendas, the US has thus far resisted taking substantive steps to reduce its massive deficit—thanks, in large part, to the relative security of its currency and securities. Yet, while Europe recovers and as China gradually liberalizes, Washington’s reluctance to rein in its debt may have serious, long-term consequences.

Image © iStockphoto

Stephen Glain

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owever dramatic was the dismissal last month of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as America’s field marshal in Afghanistan, it paled in significance compared with the departure of White House budget director Peter Orszag, a policy geek who goes by the nick-name “propeller head.” Orszag may be an obscure personality outside the Washington Beltway, particularly when compared to the swaggering McChrystal, but his exit from the White House signals important consequences for a global economy divided between stubborn Keynesians on one side and tight-fisted monetarists on the other.

According to press reports, Orszag resigned in frustration with his colleagues’ unwillingness to address America’s enormous fiscal deficit—estimated at more than 11 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)—with sufficient ardor. In particular, he appealed for tax increases as well as spending cuts in order to right the nation’s heavily indebted public accounts, a proposition vetoed by President Barack Obama’s political aides with mid-term elections only four months away. Nor did Orszag, a Princeton-educated economist and protégé of Robert Rubin, the powerful Clinton-era treasury secretary, have reason to believe that a bipartisan commission tasked by Obama to produce a deficit-reduction plan would yield anything of substance; Republican Party leaders have made clear they will block any scheme that includes tax increases, period.

The tremors from Orszag’s losing battle may be felt well beyond the US, where world leaders have vowed to reduce their own record-high deficits with aggressive belt-tightening. At the recent G-20 summit meeting in Toronto, member states agreed to a compromise deal that would cut fiscal deficits in half by 2013, five years after the 2008 global financial crisis forced upon them the need for huge stimulus packages and bank bailouts. Since 2007, according to the International Monetary Fund, the average annual budget shortfall among the world’s developed economies has increased by more than eight times, to 8.4 percent this year, while overall public debt is expected to grow from 73 percent to 110 percent by 2015. The Keynesian revival that appears to have stabilized the global economy has provoked a backlash against its legacy: chronic deficits, the threat of inflation and looming fears of sovereign defaults. David Cameron, Britain’s new Conservative prime minister, for example, hopes to reduce his country’s deficit from 8 percent of GDP to 0.6 percent by 2015 with some of the most draconian fiscal and monetary policies in his country’s history.

Orszag resigned in frustration with his colleagues’ unwillingness to address America’s enormous fiscal deficit

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Not all deficit-ridden states are so ambitious. Spain, for example, with a budget gap equal to 11 percent of national income, has tried to calm investors with cuts in civil-service wages. Nor is there agreement that the global economy is sound enough to endure such fiscal pain. Theoretically, deficit reduction, particularly if managed through spending cuts rather than tax hikes, inspires confidence in an economy’s long-term future, which encourages consumers and business owners to spend and invest more. The result is low interest rates, rising employment and an expanding economy.

The problem is that there is little evidence that fiscal retrenchment by itself will persuade investors and consumers to loosen their purse strings in what is still an anemic economy worldwide. Despite harsh austerity drives mounted by Greece and Ireland, for example, investors continue to demand high risk premiums for their sovereign debt. On the other hand, many economists fear that aggressive deficit-reduction measures like those advocated by countries like Germany may derail a fragile global recovery by starving markets of badly needed liquidity.

In Toronto, President Obama appears to have succeeded in staving off a one-size-fits-all austerity drive. It was a brazen appeal given his government’s own lamentable fiscal condition.

He must now prove he is willing to correct America’s yawning fiscal deficit by taking the painful steps prescribed by the outgoing Orszag once the US economy stabilizes. That means cutting politically sacred entitlements and defense outlays, which, along with debt interest, account for 80 percent of total government spending.

When it comes to fiscal discipline, Washington gets a free pass; though America’s budget shortfall is greater than the eurozone’s, the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency insulates it from the prospect of default. With several European countries in danger of going the way of Greece, investors have flocked to US securities as a safe haven. So long as the European economy is perceived as weak, Washington will have little problem financing its record debt burden.

Thanks to foreign investors, then, the reckoning economists like Orszag have been warning about for years has been forestalled. Even Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, was largely ignored when he said publicly that the nation’s biggest national security threat was the magnitude of its national debt. America may be too big to fail, particularly given Europe’s sorry state. It may also be too soon to phase out economic stimulants for deficit reduction.

Europe will eventually recover, however, and as China liberalizes its foreign exchange policies and as its economy continues to expand, the dollar’s primacy will erode. Unless Washington gets serious about deficit reduction soon, it may find itself in the same corner as countries like Greece and Ireland with nothing more than the dated idea of American exceptionalism to console it.

Stephen Glain is a former correspondent for Newsweek and covered Asia and the Middle East for the Wall Street Journal for a decade.

Now based in Washington as a freelance journalist and author he is currently working on his forthcoming book about the militarization of US foreign policy.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

Agreeing to Remain Poorer The GCC-EU Economic Cooperation

The GCC and the EU have been debating economic cooperation for over 20 years. As negotiations collapsed again on 12 May 2010, many were amazed at the stubbornness of politicians to keep shooting themselves in the foot. By succeeding in fostering disagreement for 20 years, both regions seem obstinate in refusing the greater economic growth and dynamism that deeper bilateral cooperation would bring.

Daniel Capparelli

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Even if dwarfed by such major historical events, 1988 was also marked by the signing of a cooperation agreement between the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which pledged to enhance political and economic cooperation, and to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 22 years and 20 annual Joint Council meetings later, few if any international economic pundits, EU officials or business leaders know what this cooperation framework has really achieved. The general feeling remains that the GCC-EU cooperation framework constitutes a phenomenal forum for restating general and meaningless platitudes. Nothing more and nothing less.

Image © Getty Images

he year is 1988. The Soviet Union lives on and the Berlin Wall has not yet fallen. Two years before, the great historian Paul Kennedy published a book (The Rise and Fall of Great Powers) predicting the rift between the US and the USSR to continue for centuries to come. 1988 was a world where Osama bin Laden was a mujahedeen hero in the West, responsible for dealing a mighty blow to the Soviet Empire in Afghanistan. It was a world where China was an economic nonissue, when the eminent Tiananmen Square riots were to signal a strong comeback of the anti-reform hardliners to the Politburo.

Finally, 1988 was a world where Japan was today’s China, threatening the economic supremacy of the Western world.

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Within this context, the 20th EU-GCC Joint Council of ministers’ communiqué released on 14 June 2010 was merely symptomatic of history repeating itself. The meeting held in Luxembourg between H.E. Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Sabah AlSalim Al-Sabah, deputy prime minister of the State of Kuwait, H.E. Abdulrahman Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, representing the GCC Secretariat, and H.E. High Representative Catherine Ashton from the EU was full of best-endeavor statements and devoid of any concrete measures. The joint communiqué reemphasized support and condemnation in every area where interests and positions have historically converged—such as the situation in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and “continued efforts” in all issues where positions have historically diverged—i.e. economic cooperation and coordination.

Even if this lack of cooperation reflects divergent positions, it certainly does not reflect divergent interests. The EU and the GCC are in fact important economic partners. By the end of 2007 bilateral direct investment stocks between the EU and the GCC had reached over 22 and 27 billion euros, respectively. In 2008, trade between the two regions reached over 105 billion euros. If the GCC were to be considered a country, it would be the seventh largest EU trading partner, just behind Japan. The EU is the GCC’s second largest trading partner, just behind Japan but with a 40 billion euro edge over a third place USA. Given the trade barriers between the two regions, one can only expect these figures—and the real economic benefits that they imply—to improve with deeper economic cooperation.

Talk is Cheap EU-GCC Trade Relations 1981 GCC created, comprising Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait.

1989 GCC-EU Cooperation Agreement.

1990 Free Trade Agreement (unsuccessful).

1999 Free Trade negotiations resumed following GCC promise of “Customs Union” (actualized 2003).

2002 Wider mandate for trade introduced based on a Sustainability Impact Assessment.

2002 – 2007 Accelerated trade negotiations and actual bilateral trade.

2008 GCC Common Market established.

2009 Establishment of Monetary Council announced.

GCC is the EU’s 5th largest export market, at €61.5 bn, comprising mainly industrial and transportation machinery.

The EU is the largest trading partner for the GCC, at €30.7billion, comprising mainly fuels and derivatives.

This owes in part to preferential access to markets under the ‘Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

EU direct investment in GCC region is €2.5billion.

(Source: All trade data courtesy of the European Commission for Trade)

Although research on the economic impact of an FTA between the EU and the GCC is scarce, the existing studies, such as a July 2004 study carried out by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), confirm that an agreement between both regions would be mutually beneficial. According to the CEPS study, an FTA between the two regional blocks would boost the GDP of the GCC by 2.3 percent and the EU’s by 0.3 percent.

The smaller size of GCC markets relative to the EU economy means that the GCC would benefit relatively more than the EU from enhanced trade relations. The conclusion of an FTA would also help to reduce the financial imbalances between the two regions, by reducing the current account surplus of GCC countries, leading to an appreciation of their exchange rates (another area where bilateral cooperation has been lackluster).

The 20th EU-GCC Joint Council of ministers’ communiqué released on 14 June 2010 was merely symptomatic of history repeating itself In a situation where the GCC benefits relatively more from an FTA than the EU, one is no doubt surprised to learn that it is in fact the GCC that is hampering the conclusion of these negotiations. Indeed, the Saudi refusal to phase out oil exports subsidies and the region’s unwillingness to allow foreign ownership of domestic companies derailed, once more, the 20 year old negotiation process on 12 May of this year. What is more surprising is that this attitude goes against the GCC’s interest doubly: first, by constricting trade, and second, by fortifying the very domestic distortions that render the process of economic diversification so difficult.

Laxer foreign ownership restrictions would increase the region’s attractiveness to foreign investors, bringing greater investment and know how to the region’s economy. Furthermore, higher imports would not only significantly increase consumer welfare (by lowering prices and increasing choice), but would also lead to the appreciation of the exchange rate. This appreciation would in turn lead to a reallocation of national resources and an expansion of the non-oil sector. In other words, freer trade between the EU and the GCC would not only increase the latter’s economic welfare, but would also facilitate the development and viability of post-oil strategies.

The past 20 years have brought changes that were unthinkable even to such great minds as Paul Kennedy. The Soviet Union is no more; heroes have become villains; and a poor and backward country has surpassed Japan as the West’s main political and economic “competitor.” When one thinks of how much has changed in 20 years, one is dazzled by the fact that so little is achieved in areas where interests converge. While empires rise and fall, politicians have been unable to agree to stop shooting themselves in their own foot. If the power of empires does not last forever, political stubbornness just may.

Daniel Capparelli - Consultant and Researcher at the LSE International Trade Policy Unit This article was first published in The Majalla 5 July 2010

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

News Behind the Graph Afghanistan’s Domestic Economy Although Afghanistan is a country rich in natural resources, it has historically lacked the infrastructure necessary to exploit such resources to its advantage. A large part of this discrepancy can be chalked up to natural circumstances. The country’s mountainous, rugged terrain makes it difficult to implement the transit networks necessary to mobilize and explore its vast resources of natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper and various other minerals. Another major factor hampering the country’s export development is, of course, political instability, which has been especially tumultuous in recent years. As a result, the country’s economy has been largely restricted to agricultural exports, thus preventing it from developing a robust, industrial backbone upon which it could flourish. In June, however, a team of geologists and Pentagon officials discovered a vast deposit of nearly $1 trillion worth of minerals, including iron, copper and lithium. Officials were quick to hail the discovery as one that could drastically alter Afghanistan’s economic landscape by providing materials to both expand domestically and export to resource-hungry nations abroad. Before we start looking forward to what the country’s economy could become, though, it’s worth taking a look at where it is today.

Imports, Exports and Trade Balance As Graph 1 shows, Afghanistan has experienced a not altogether unsurprising divergence in its trade balance over the course of the past decade, thanks in large part to a war that’s ravaged the domestic economy, as well as an overwhelmingly agrarianbased export economy that’s hampered growth. According to the UN, Afghanistan’s exports have declined, on average, by 16.3 percent each year from 2004 to 2008, while imports have increased by an average of 12.3 percent during the same time span. As a result, the country’s trade deficit had already ballooned to over 2.5 billion USD in 2008. According to the CIA Factbook, Afghanistan’s primary export partners in 2008 were India (23.5%), Pakistan (17.7%), US (16.5%) and Tajikistan (12.8%). On the import side of the coin, Afghanistan received 36.5 percent of its imports from Pakistan in 2008, 9.3 percent from the US, 7.5 percent from Germany and 6.9 percent from India. It is precisely this widening gap, in fact, that many hope can be bridged by the rise of a robust mining industry.

Fixed Capital Investment As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan’s modern economy relies heavily on agricultural production. From 2002-2006, investment as a percentage of GDP steadily increased, peaking over 30 percent in the year 2006-2007. Since then, the growth of fixed capital formation has steadily decreased. By 2008-2009, investment in fixed capital had dropped all the way to 28 percent of GDP. The one silver lining, perhaps, is the fact that the majority of investment (both public and private, alike) continues to go toward sorely needed construction projects. Even this ratio of durable goods to construction, however, has gradually inched closer to parity in recent years. Although overall investment is still substantially greater than investment figures at the

beginning of the decade, this recent downward trend is still worrying and will likely have to reverse if the country hopes to implement the kind of ambitious, long-term infrastructure required to start even a fledgling mining sector.

Domestic Banking Sector Since 2004, the value of deposits and loans circulating in and out of Afghanistan’s banking sector have both risen. Beginning in 2007, however, the total value of deposits began to far outstrip that of banks issued loans. As the World Bank notes, a full 71 percent of deposits in July 2009 were executed with foreign currency, although consumers have gradually begun making more deposits in Afghan currency in recent years. Still, the relatively tight lending market poses a significant obstacle to spurring private sector development. In order to ignite the sector, the government issued the Mortgage Law and Secured Transaction Law in May, 2009, while several other NGOs and international organizations have launched initiatives to create a more stable regulatory framework for e-money institutions.

With a relatively stifled lending environment, though, it’s clear that any large-scale mining industry will almost certainly have to be funded from the top down, and not from the bottom up.

Total imports, exports & trade balance

Source: UN Comtrade Investment Share in GDP (gross fixed capital formation, nominal %GDP)

Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO)

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Challenging Dictators The promise of Kampala’s ICC conference

The success of the ICC's June conference itself should not be assessed solely on the negotiations on whether to add the crime of aggression to the court's docket. The ICC members came into their own in Kampala as a community of states united to fight impunity. Debate planted the seeds for revitalizing discussion of cooperation, including when it comes to assisting the court in arrests. If the promise of Kampala to put a priority back on bringing to justice those responsible for the world’s worst crimes is realized, it will be a legacy well worth having.

Elizabeth Evenson

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t the International Criminal Court (ICC) review conference last month in Kampala, negotiations to add the crime of aggression to the court’s docket topped the agenda. The crime of initiating offensive warfare had been prosecuted after World War II. But when the Rome Conference established the ICC in 1998 as the first permanent court to try crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, it deferred a decision on aggression to another day.

Twelve years later, with the ICC’s first trials under way, its now 111- member states turned their attention to strengthening the court and the global fight against impunity. They also returned to the crime of aggression. The nations struck a deal at the last minute that paves the way for the court to take up the crime.

The ICC, however, will not be acting any time soon on aggression. The deal is subject to a further decision by ICC member countries no earlier than 2017. While this looks like a punt, it may give the court the time it needs to equip itself to meet the challenges of this crime. Explaining when, where and why the court can act is already a difficult task, as evidenced by the accusations that the court’s prosecutor was “targeting” Africa after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan. Never mind that three of the four situations before the court at that time had been referred

by African governments themselves. Prosecution of the crime of aggression is likely to link the court to highly politicized disputes between states and will require further explanation of the ICC’s mission and mandate.

Time will tell the consequences of the decision on aggression, as well as of the compromises made to reach it.

An exemption for crimes committed by nationals of states that are not ICC members—the United States, China, and Russia come to mind—is likely to fuel criticism

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A History of Lawmaking 1919 Following World War I, the Versailles Treaty included minor provisions for the prosecution of war criminals, including Kaiser Wilhelm II, which in the end amounted to nothing.

1945 The Nuremburg and Tokyo trials after World War II helped codify and develop a system of international criminal justice, albeit ad hoc and tinged with the charge of “victors’ justice.”

1948 The Charter of the United Nations, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 1949 Geneva Conventions provided the basis for universally recognized definitions of particular crimes (specifically genocide and war crimes) and general consensus on the unacceptability of their use.

1992 After the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), two important precedents of the ICC. 1998 After five weeks of negotiation, 120 states adopted the Rome Statute, the legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court.

The statute gave the court jurisdiction over the “core crimes” of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression (with aggression yet to be defined).

2002 The Rome Statute entered into force after ratification by 60 countries. Today, the court has 111 member states. However, important countries such as the United States, China, Russia and India have not joined. To date, the court has opened investigations into four situations: Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Darfur.

Images © Graphic News

2009 The ICC's first trial, of Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubanga, began.

The court has indicted 14 people; seven of whom remain free, two have died, and four are in custody. Currently, only two trials are under way.

June 2010 The first Review Conference of the Rome Statute was held in Kampala, Uganda.

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

of a double standard in international justice. Already governments that tolerate impunity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or in Sri Lanka, for example, weaken their calls for accountability elsewhere. At the same time, the deal resists attempts by permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to decide which aggression cases the court can accept.

It would be a mistake to assess the Kampala conference solely on the basis of the outcome on the crime of aggression, though.

As significant as these negotiations were, much was also at stake when it comes to strengthening the current work of the court.

Talk can be cheap, and will need to be backed up by action. But for a court that relies on states to arrest powerful suspects and enforce its decisions, and at a time when crimes that shock the world’s conscience continue in too many places, the discussions in Kampala were a good start In days of debate, ICC members weighed in on challenges facing the development of international justice. New ideas were put on the table for strengthening national courts so that they also can try ICC crimes, as were tough questions about the relationship between pursuing justice during efforts to secure peace. States also considered how to bolster their cooperation with the court and to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done where it matters most—in communities where the crimes were committed.

Talk can be cheap, and will need to be backed up by action.

But for a court that relies on states to arrest powerful suspects and enforce its decisions, and at a time when crimes that shock the world’s conscience continue in too many places, the discussions in Kampala were a good start.

Nearly 40 countries came to Kampala with over 100 pledges of increased assistance to the court. The ICC increased the number of states willing to enforce its sentences of imprisonment and reaped additional offers to assist with witness protection. The test of pledges will be if they are kept, of course, but we see the promise of re-invigorated commitment in the very fact that nations thoughtfully scrutinized the international justice process and made pledges where they saw a need.

The ICC members—known collectively as the Assembly of States Parties— came into their own in Kampala as a community of states united to fight impunity. Debate planted the seeds for revitalizing discussion of cooperation, including when it comes to assisting the court in arrests. It also laid the groundwork for coordination between states in rule-of-law reform that has as its goal equipping national courts to try ICC crimes— improving national capacity to prosecute international crimes will complement the ICC’s efforts.

Much depends on what happens next. Good ideas could all too easily be left behind in Kampala. There are existing

Challenging International Law Ranked fourth in Foreign Policy‘s “The Worst of the Worst,” a list of 23 of the world’s worst dictators, Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan was recently indicted by the ICC for three counts of genocide. This comes one year after the court indicted the Sudanese leader for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

In a bold move, the president visited his counterpart on 22 July in nearby Chad, a member of the ICC, to attend a meeting of a regional bloc. It is the first time that Al-Bashir has left Sudan since ICC’s ruling in 2009.

Refusing to take part in Al-Bashir’s arrest, President Idriss Deby instead welcomed the Sudanese president, undoubtedly with previous assurances that he would be left unharmed, according to the analysis of BBC correspondent James Copnall.

Upon Al-Bashir’s arrival, Chad’s Interior and Security Minister, Ahmat Mahamat Bachir, said to AFP, “What country has ever arrested a sitting head of state?

Bashir won't be arrested in Chad.”

The significant improvement in relations between the two countries happened after Chad’s president agreed to expel the Darfur Justice and Equality Movement rebels it had been supporting for some years.

With an estimated 300,000 Sudanese dead and another 2.7 million displaced, resolution of the sevenyear conflict is urgent. Yet, to the ire of the ICC, many African and Arab countries have mobilized in support of Al-Bashir’s government, which has been in power for 21 years.

To read more about Al-Bashir’s indictment and the related debate taking place within the ICC see Paula Mejia’s blog on 26.07.10 “Omar Al-Bashir and the Road to Peace in Sudan” online at www.majalla.com/en challenges—the urgent need for a strategy to end the Lord’s Resistance Army’s reign of terror and arrest its leaders, wanted by the ICC since 2005. And there are new challenges on the horizon—the temptation to push aside the court’s warrant for Al-Bashir as Sudan’s referendum on secession nears. These and others demand that states build on the momentum generated by the conference to strengthen their commitment to the ICC. To be sure, the court has its own homework to do seven years into its operations. Delays in the first trial have left it without yet a conviction. High expectations for justice for post-election violence that rocked Kenya in early 2008—the court’s newest investigation—need to be met. In the end, however, the ICC cannot succeed without its states. If the promise of Kampala to put a priority back on bringing to justice those responsible for the world’s worst crimes is realized, it will be a legacy well worth having.

Elizabeth Evenson - Counsel in the International Justice Program of Human Rights Watch, attended the International Criminal Court review conference, held in Kampala, Uganda.

This article was first published in the Majalla 27 July 2010

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Lights Out Pakistan's Chronic Power Shortages

Energy shortages, much like any widespread natural disaster, affect everyone within a given geographic range. Unlike any controversial government mandate, or newly passed legislation, Pakistan’s power cuts do not discriminate. When the population at large is deprived of something widely considered to be a publicly provided good, a common, anti-government animosity can easily fester, transcending social, political or ethnic boundaries.

Amar Toor

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akistan is no stranger to power shortages. For the better part of the past decade, the country has been battling endemic energy droughts, as both consumer purchasing power and demand for electric goods have drastically risen in tandem. Insufficiently robust infrastructure has only compounded the persistent crisis over the years, as has the country’s publicly stated mandate to reduce its dependence on oil by pursuing hydroelectrically produced energy.

With the summer season fast approaching, however, the country once again finds itself mired in an electricity shortfall so serious, its effects may extend across not only economic and social spheres, but across Pakistan’s political architecture as well.

Experts estimate that, to date, Pakistan remains some 4,000 megawatts short of its power needs—a full one-fourth of its maximum capacity. Although it’s not uncommon to find advertisements or text-messaged promotions for electric generators, such devices are normally priced well outside of most Pakistani budgets.

All across the country, markets and storefronts are closing early, houses are dark, and, for an estimated six hours per day, a wide swath of Pakistanis are disconnected from the world.

The pernicious impact on Pakistan’s economy, therefore, is all too self-evident. A 2008 report from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics estimates that power outages have decreased output by 25 percent across textile factories in the province of Punjab, where much of Pakistan’s textile industry is concentrated.

Meanwhile, governmental response to the energy shortfall has often been heavy on rhetoric, but noticeably light on results. In 2009, Federal Minister for Water and Power Raja Pervaiz Ashraf boldly predicted that the country would enjoy steady access to power by the end of the summer, thanks to a slew of new plant facilities that were making their way down the pipeline.

In April, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani unveiled an ambitious new energy policy, aimed at limiting individual power usage in a wide array of consumer and domestic settings, including neon-lit storefronts and wedding halls.

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As the BBC reports, the country’s leaders are also looking into alternative sources of energy, in addition to the hydroelectric-generated power upon which most of the country relies. It has even been reported that the administration may choose to explore nuclear power as one such alternative.

The PM has also promised that his government will grab the crisis by the horns, and has assured that his administration will do everything within its power to further tighten usage quotas.

With this new plan alone, officials are hoping to save an estimated 1,500 megawatts per day.

As Gilani bluntly affirmed, “We are taking these decisions in the best national interest.” For the average Pakistani consumer, however, results won’t be apparent until the lights are back on—and until they stay on.

Moreover, by taking such a proactive, top-down approach to tackling the shortage, Gilani and his government are implicitly assuming responsibility for the predicament. The onus is now on the country’s political leaders to not only save power, but to begin work toward installing newer, more sustainable infrastructure within its energy sector, in order to allow Pakistanis greater autonomy over their consumption patterns.

As history has taught us time and again, whenever a palpable miasma of discontent begins wafting through the streets and airways of a sovereign nation, political upheaval is never far behind.

Economic hardship breeds social antagonism. And more often than not, that antagonism manifests itself in political tumult.

Some frustrated citizens have already begun voicing their displeasure with the outages in Pakistan, having vandalized cars and other personal property in protest. Time will tell whether or not the governmental leaders are able to douse these flames of acrimony, but the mere fact that citizens have begun taking to the streets in defiant action is still an ominous harbinger, by any country’s standards—and even more so in Pakistan.

A state historically plagued by its fractious ethnic and social composition now finds itself firmly entrenched within a decidedly more Manichean political landscape. At a very cursory glance, Pakistani politics has suddenly become substan43

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tially more binary, with upset citizens on one side of the aisle, and elected officials making promises on the other. But should Pakistan’s leaders fail to deliver solutions—and fail to do so quickly—the pupa of public restlessness may soon blossom into a full-blown, political pestilence.

Energy shortages, much like any widespread natural disaster, affect everyone within a given geographic range. Unlike any controversial government mandate, or newly passed legislation, Pakistan’s power cuts do not discriminate. When the population at large is deprived of something widely considered to be a publicly provided good, a common, anti-government animosity can easily fester, transcending social, political or ethnic boundaries.

It would be easy to write off Pakistan’s problems as part of the inexorable and often painful process of development. The country need look no further than next door in India, where, despite having enjoyed sustained and robust economic growth for the better part of two decades, the country still struggles mightily to develop public infrastructure efficient enough to keep up with its burgeoning economy and population. China, meanwhile, has likewise risen to the upper echelons of the world’s economic strata, yet continues to swim upstream against many of the same infrastructural growing pains.

Energy shortages, much like any widespread natural disaster, affect everyone within a given geographic range. Unlike any controversial government mandate, or newly passed legislation, Pakistan’s power cuts do not discriminate The difference between Pakistan and India, China, or any other mid-level developing country, however, is that the majority Muslim nation’s political might is already stretched thin on one major international front.

It’s no secret that Pakistan is crucial to US military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan, and, according to many reports, the Obama administration has made significant progress in stabilizing the notoriously tumultuous Islamic Republic.

Any domestic discomposure spurred by energy-starved Pakistanis, however, could undermine that progress, effectively throwing a major wrench into the machinery powering the coalition-led war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The US, apparently aware of these potentially dire consequences, has already promised more than one billion dollars in energy aid to its critically important ally, through modernized distribution systems, as well as upgraded thermal and hydropower plants.

At this point, however, there’s no end in sight, and as the situation escalates, there’s no telling which party or faction could seize the issue, and use it to their own political gain. And with the impending summer heat raising tempers in concert with the thermometer, it’s impossible to predict how an exasperated voter constituency might respond.

Behind the Power Outages Energy Consumption in South Asia Pakistan Population: 177,276,594 Electricity production Total: 90.8 billion kWh (2007 est.)

Per capita: 512 kWh Electricity consumption Total: 72.2 billion kWh (2007 est.)

Per capita: 407 kWh Electricity exports: 0 kWh (2008 est.)

Electricity imports: 0 kWh (2008 est.)

India Population: 1,173,108,018 Electricity production Total: 723.8 billion kWh (2007 est.)

Per capita: 617 kWh Electricity consumption Total: 568 billion kWh (2007 est.)

Per capita: 484 kWh Electricity exports: 810 million kWh (2009 est.)

Electricity imports: 5.27 billion kWh (2009 est.)

Federal Minister for Water and Power of Pakistan Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, said in December 2009 that there would be no more power shortages by summer 2010, with rental power plants and Independent Power Producers (IPP) coming into operation by June.

Raja pointed out that the demand for power increases at 8-10% every year and is predicted to double in 10 years.

Pakistan's previous government, argues Ashraf, did not add even one megawatt to the system and the shortfall increased to over 3,500MW in 2009.

Given the protean political and social winds that have blown across the country in recent years, however, injecting even the slightest modicum of uncertainty into such a brittle body politic is enough to raise the eyebrows of leaders from Islamabad to Washington.

Electricity, in and of itself, may not be as fundamentally crucial a consumer need as say, clean water or food. But in today’s hyper-industrialized social and economic ecosystem, it’s more or less essential. And if the Pakistani government doesn’t act quickly to provide it on a level that measures up to contemporary standards, it may be “lights out” for many of the country’s incumbent leaders.

Amar Toor – Freelance journalist and former consultant in the Trade and Agriculture Department of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) This article was first published in the Majalla 7 July 2010

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• A THOUSAND WORDS

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King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has just been to Lebanon with Bashar Al Assad, president of Syria, smoothing the way between the two countries.

Since 2005, relations between Syria and Lebanon have been fraught, largely but not exclusively due to Lebanese suspicion regarding the direct involvement of Syrian operatives in the assassination of their then prime minister. The Syrian leadership has consistently denied such involvement, but their pleas have always landed on deaf ears. Five years, the Cedar Revolution and several bloody skirmishes later, those ears seem to many to have been opened as the Syrian president visited Beirut last week.

Significant credit must also be given to King Abdullah, the architect of this recent trip.

This strengthening of Arab unity will offer a sense of security to the people of the region, whilst bolstering Saudi Arabia’s own position.

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In this interview with The Majalla, Ismail Kara, professor of Turkish intellectual history, speaks about Islam’s relationship with modernity and the state. Professor Kara discusses, among other things, political Islamism and its origins, and the increasing visibility of Islam in Turkey.

Nicholas Birch

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orn in 1955 in the north eastern Turkish province of Rize, the son of a village religious teacher, Ismail Kara is professor of Turkish intellectual history at the Marmara University Theology Faculty in Istanbul.

An editor at Dergah Yayinlari, one of Turkey's most respected publishing houses, Kara is the author of 14 books, including Islamist Thought in Turkey, On Philosophical Language and, more recently, The Issue of Islam in Republican Turkey. Professor Kara spoke with The Majalla in his office at Marmara University, located on the Asia side of Istanbul.

In the West, Islamism tends to be understood as political Islamism. How do you define it?

To a certain extent, Islamism can be seen as the antithesis of traditional Islam, or popular Islam. From the start, back in the very early 19th century, it has been a movement of intellectuals, the product largely of people who had a western-style education.

In effect, it set out to find answers to the question “what sort of a relation should Islam build with modernity.” That was its starting point.

What were the main contradictions early Islamists saw between Islam and modernity?

Here, I think there is an issue that European scholars have perhaps not sufficiently understood. The idea of laïcité—a state without religion—is quite literally incomprehensible to traditional Muslims. Among Turks particularly, the idea of the state is infused with what you might call a religious or spiritual meaning.

How is that “spiritual” meaning expressed One of the expressions you find very frequently in the communications of Ottoman bureaucrats is din u devlet: in other words “religion and state.” The two are inseparable. Among Ottoman intellectuals, meanwhile, one of the most common expressions for the same thing is din asil, devlet fer'idir: “religion is the foundation, the state one of its parts.” These are ideas that were shared by ordinary people, and still are.

So Islamism played a sort of bridging role, then?

In a sense, yes. Islamism started because modernization movements imported from the West proved unable to provide a religious legitimization for change. It is what made modernization of the Muslim world possible, because popular conceptions of Islam were not compatible with modernity. It also had a secular character.

In what way?

Let me give you a concrete example. In the 1970s, one of the most popular slogans of radical Turkish Islamists was “the Ko-

ran is our constitution.” The slogan is a hybrid. Few words are more important to Muslims than the Koran. The word constitution is a key concept of modern, secular political thought.

Can you give any other examples Think about that most Republican of concepts—milli hakimiyet—national sovereignty. It is a concept borrowed, again, from secular western political thought. But the word millet has a double meaning: It means nation, but it also means religious community. When a modern Turk says national sovereignty, the phrase contains both those meanings. Modernization, in the Muslim world, has been conceptualized in religious terms.

That is perhaps the main reason why Islam has become more visible the more “modern” Muslim countries become.

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Islamism Versus Islam

Image © Getty Images

An Interview with Professor Ismail Kara

It would be wrong to see the increasing visibility of Islam in Turkey merely as a delayed response to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's radical secularizing reforms, then?

Yes. It is a fundamental attribute of the whole modernization process in the Muslim world as a whole. Furthermore, I would question the description of the Republic as radically secular. It is true that it represented a serious break with earlier reform movements, particularly after 1924 [when the Caliphate was abolished and traditional religious schools and dervish lodges were closed].

But it also shared some similarities with Islamist thought.

What sort of similarities?

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ideas. It does that by going back to the sources, trying to excavate what it sees as an “unadulterated” interpretation of Islam. To a degree, Republican ideology has tried to do something similar. It opposed popular Islam, which it saw as backward and superstitious. Set up immediately after the abolition of the Caliphate, the Diyanet [the state department in charge of religious affairs] has always advanced an interpretation of Islam which emphasizes the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet.

Are you talking about the Republican authorities' emphasis on Islam as a “religion of reason and science”?

That is part of it, but the real issue here is that, in the eyes of Islamist modernizers, the negative conditions of the Muslim world are not the result of Islam itself but of the fact that contempo49

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

rary Muslims have misunderstood Islam's teachings. They blame the accumulated traditions and history of the Islamic world for its backwardness. In essence, their call for a return to the sources means pulling Islam out of its history altogether.

You are an outspoken critic of the Islamist movement. Is this why you criticize it?

What differentiates me from Turkey's Islamists is that I am interested in the internal dynamics of change and they are not. Ideologically, they are internationalist, to use a Marxist concept. They defend a vision of Islam which has its roots outside Turkey.

You are talking now about the radical political Islamists influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, I assume?

I am talking about them, but I am also talking about an attitude shared by many of the products of Turkey's state-controlled religious education and many educated members of religious orders.

Political Islam was a product of a period when ideologies were everything. It grew after the 1960 coup, along with the other ideological movements of the time, socialism and right-wing nationalism When did this view arrive in Turkey?

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood began to radicalize immediately after the Second World War. Egypt was closer to the Soviet Union than the West, as you know, and the Muslim Brotherhood borrowed concepts from Marxism, became more rebellious, even revolutionary. Turkey had meanwhile allied itself with the United States. In the 1940s, the new radical rhetoric of the Egyptian Brotherhood had no equivalent here.

It only began to grow in Turkey after the 1960 coup.

Radical Islam contained an implicit criticism of the traditional idea of the state as defender of the faith, din u devlet. Is that why it took so long to put down roots in Turkey?

In part, yes. But it is also, as I implied before, because the Islamist vision of Islam clashed with the Islam practiced by many Turkish Muslims. Religious brotherhoods [tarikat] are powerful in Turkey. Radicals see them as the worst form of blasphemy.

As far as they are concerned, the attachment a follower of one of these brotherhoods feels for his sheikh is idolatry.

Are you saying religious brotherhoods are closer to popular Islam than the Islamists?

In terms of their structure and their rituals, yes. This is perfectly comprehensible. These are movements that address themselves to the masses. They are not particularly open to exceptional ideas. They seek a homogeneous style of person, a vision of the world. And that brings them closer to the views of your average Turkish Muslim.

The most powerful Muslim group in Turkey today is the Fethullah Gulen Movement, a conservative group opposed to political Islam. Is its popularity a sign that radical Islamism was a blip, that Turkey is settling back into its traditional, conservative ways?

Political Islam was a product of a period when ideologies were everything. It grew after the 1960 coup, along with the other ideological movements of the time, socialism and right-wing nationalism. After 12 September 1980 [Turkey's third military intervention], they fell together. But today's conservatives are not the same as the conservatives before 1960. Indeed, it is questionable whether they are conservative at all. Look at the AKP government. It calls itself a “conservative democratic” party. It is a good slogan. But the party behaves as though there isn't very much in need of conserving at all.

More radical Islamists criticize the AKP for having “taken its [Islamist] shirt off ” and taken on a stance indistinguishable from liberalism. Is that your criticism?

I am making a broader point. Since 1980, the ideological heart of all the major political movements in Turkey has been emptied out.

The current clash between the AKP government and secularists is an argument over bones. What worries me is that seems to me that a country needs to have an idea, an identity, if it is to carry itself forward. That requires reflection, self-criticism. I see neither.

So what needs to be done, in your opinion?

A recent article I wrote was entitled “remembering what we have forgotten.” Turkey is a country whose language has changed so fast that the speeches of the man who founded it are now understood with difficulty by the younger generation. Ottoman Turkish, because the Republic introduced the Latin alphabet, is a foreign country. What is needed is a conscious effort to recuperate the past. You can only know where you are going if you know where you come from. Otherwise all you can do is to move in the direction the international or national wind is blowing.

Every religious brotherhood has a silsile, a kind of family tree going right back to the time of the Prophet. Is this the sort of unbroken chain you are referring to when you talk about recuperating the past?

Sufism is an important aspect of this recuperation of the past, yes, but it is not enough. The silsile is a concept you find in religious schools too from the 12th century onwards. There is a concept of icazet starting with you and going all the way back to the Prophet himself. The point I am making is that Islamists' criticisms of Sufism and the culture of the religious schools shares the same logic. Both are a critique of Islamic history. Early Islamists believed, wrongly in my opinion, that the traditional Islamic world they had grown up in was incapable of building a new world, and they made a deliberate decision to cut themselves off from this web of connections and obligations. When you do this, the only thing left is you and the sources. And you can get them to talk as much as you like.

Interview conducted by Nicholas Birch – Worked as a freelance reporter in Turkey for eight years. His work has appeared in a broad range of publications, including Time Magazine, the Wall Street Journal, and the Times of London.

This article was first published in The Majalla 19 July 2010

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Change in Kurdistan

An interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa, Leader of The Movement For Change, Kurdish Opposition Party Nawshirwan Mustafa, prominent Kurdish politician and current leader of the opposition party Goran, speaks with The Majalla about the outcome of Iraq's recent elections. This opposition leader also brings to light the objectives of Goran, and explains how it aims to differentiate itself from other opposition parties.

Paula Mejia

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awshirwan Mustafa is a prominent Kurdish politician, and currently the leader of Goran, the Movement for Change. The co-founder of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and their former chief strategist, he has been at the forefront of Kurdish politics for decades. He was involved in the Kurdish uprising in 1991 which contributed to the establishment of autonomy for Kurdistan from the Iraqi government.

In addition to his career in politics, Mustafa is also known for his role in the media. In 2007 he established the Wusha Corporation in Sulaimaniyah. This media branch consists of a newspaper, radio channel and website. "We have attempted to change Kurdish politics from the inside, now let us attempt it from the outside," said Mustafa regarding the relationship between his political intentions and the creation of the media company.

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We have attempted to change Kurdish politics from the inside, now let us attempt it from the outside In your opinion how did the Iraqi elections affect the political influence of the Kurds in Baghdad?

Circumstances showed that our stance against the elections law was right. We in Goran, the Movement for Change, sharply criticized the latest modification on the elections law, calling it a complicated and unfair bill that would lead to problems and conflicts. We said it loud and clear. This law is greatly unjust to the Kurds and we expected that the number of seats of the

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Kurds in the parliament would be reduced, which is exactly what happened. Even the Iraqi President who endorsed the law and insisted on approving it criticized it strongly a few days ago.

Some claimed your participation in the elections as independent from the Kurdish National Union undermined Kurdish presence in the government. What do you think of those allegations?

Those allegations are untrue. We believe the participation in the elections through different parties strengthens the Kurds.

The most important achievement of the elections was that the Kurds’ representation has been largely and fundamentally changed. In the past the representation was limited to two parties but now Kurds have more options. This will expand the participation of Kurds in the decision making process and end the monopoly of politics by the two main parties.

What are the objectives of Goran, the Kurdish Movement for Change, as the leading opposition group?

What does change mean to you?

The objectives of Goran are clear. We refused participation in the government of Kurdistan Province because we promised to remain committed to our programs and objectives. These objectives include ending partisan interference in daily life and ending the dominant parties’ overall monopoly over the state authorities. We support a real democratic regime in which the government is free from the domination of the ruling parties and the law is above all with no exceptions. We struggle to make sure the government serves the interests of the people, not just the parties in power.

What do you offer that the PKU and the Kurdistan Alliance have failed to offer? How are you different from the other main opposition groups, namely the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Islamic Group?

The PKU and the Kurdistan Alliance failed in everything we call for in our political platform. They fell short of establishing the pillars of democracy, transparency and good governance in Kurdistan. They set up a totalitarian regime, which was received with resentment. In those circumstances Goran was established. Its emergence was a historic need.

We are different from all of the other opposition groups in many aspects. Their ideology is based on Islamism and they also support a vertical government structure similar to that proposed by other Kurdish parties. Goran, on the other hand seeks to build a broader and more democratic structure with a wider participation in a transparent decision-making process. The rise of Goran was the beginning to a real opposition in Kurdistan.

Your party recently met with opposition groups to discuss your roles in the Iraqi parliament. What did you agree on and what were the main factors of your discussions?

We met with all of the parties. The first meeting was with the opposition parties in Kurdistan, and then the other opposition Kurdish blocs that won the elections joined us. A committee was formed to draft the negotiation paper that the united Kurdish delegation would discuss with other Iraqi lists. It is now forming the bylaw of a coalition comprising the Kurdish blocs to unify stances on crucial issues.

The creation of a real partnership in decision-making among the Kurdish blocs, in defending the democratic regime in Iraq, as well as the support of the legitimate rights of the Kurds were the main issues we discussed.

Article No. 140 of the Iraqi constitution called for an official referendum in Kirkuk but it was postponed for fear of sectarian violence. Do you think it was a wise decision?

Before the implementation of Article No. 140 of the Iraqi constitution the Kurdish parties should have first built trust between the ethnic groups, second, presented an attractive administrative model, and third assured neighboring countries.

Only then could one consider implementing the article.

The success of its implementation is contingent on Iraqi national will.

If the national will on this issue is strong, talks could be held on how to implement it in a way that reinforces peace and strengthens national belonging What are the concessions Goran Movement promises to make in order to hasten the implementation of Article No. 140?

For Goran it is more about dealing in a favorable way with all of the components in the regions included in Article No. 140 of the constitution than making concessions. Reaching just solutions will guarantee peace and coexistence between the different groups. The success of its implementation is contingent on Iraqi national will. If the national will on this issue is strong, talks could be held on how to implement it in a way that reinforces peace and strengthens national belonging.

If the discussions on Kirkuk and other disputed areas do not reach a timely resolution, how might American withdrawal affect relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad?

Solving the issue of Kirkuk and disputed regions should be based on fair national grounds. I hope we reach fair solutions without the interference of foreign powers. The impact of the US withdrawal depends on the will of the Iraqi political elites.

If we reach a common solution then we do not need the US presence. If not, the situation will get worse with or without the US withdrawal.

As a Kurdish leader, how do you aim to protect the interests of Kurds living in other countries?

The Kurdish issue is a just one and cannot be solved through violence and repression. I hope the countries sharing Kurdistan reach a solution in a peaceful and democratic way, through dialogue and without the use of force.

This article was first published in The Majalla on 16 June 2010

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Iraq Timeline 1920 Britain creates the state of Iraq with League of Nations approval.

1932 End of the British Mandate. Iraq wins independence.

Image © iStockphoto

1958 The Hashemite monarchy is dethroned. Iraq is declared a republic.

1968 The Ba’ath party seizes control of Iraq following a bloodless coup led by General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr.

1979 Saddam Hussein succeeds Al-Bakr as president.

1980 Iraq invades Iran. The two countries become embroiled in a war of attrition lasting eight years and costing one million lives.

1988 Iraqi forces launch a series of poison gas attacks on the Kurdish village of Halabja in northern Iraq.

1990 Iraq invades Kuwait, precipitating the first Gulf War. The UN Security Council responds by imposing a strict financial and trade embargo on Iraq.

1991 The US-led coalition forces Iraq out of Kuwait.

The UN announces the creation of a safe-haven in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population.

1995 The "oil-for-food programme" instated by UN allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports in exchange for food and medicine for the population.

2006 Upsurge in sectarian violence following a bomb attack on an important Shi’a shrine in Samarra.

Saddam Hussein is executed for crimes against humanity.

2007 US President Bush announces the deployment of an additional 30,000 US troops in Iraq in a bid to end the insurgency.

2009 US President Barack Obama announces withdrawal of most US troops by end of August 2010.

Up to 50,000 of 142,000 troops will stay on into 2011 to advise Iraqi forces and protect US interests, leaving by end of 2011.

2010 The March parliamentary elections attract a turnout of more than 60% of Iraqis. However, no coalition manages a decisive win. 100 days after votes are cast Iraq is still without a new government.

2003 The US leads an invasion to topple Saddam Hussein's government. Saddam’s removal creates a political and security vacuum sparking years of violent conflict with different groups competing for power.

UN Security Council backs US-led administration in Iraq and lifts economic sanctions. US administrator, L. Paul Bremer, abolishes the Ba’ath Party and forces ex-party members out of office.

After eight months in hiding, Saddam Hussein is captured in Tikrit.

2005 8 million Iraqis vote in elections for a Transitional National Assembly. The Shi’a United Iraqi Alliance wins a majority. Kurdish parties come second. Parliament appoints Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as president.

Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shi’a, is named as prime minister.

Image © Getty Images

2004 The US hands sovereignty to an interim government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

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British Iraq It is at this juncture that a moth-eaten Iraqi nation state emerged under the auspices of the British Mandate. Britain having occupied Iraq during World War I was granted mandate over the country at the San Remo Conference. British control was intended as a temporary exigency to prepare the new state for independence. And it was the British who penned Iraq’s current boarders, encasing an array of peoples drawn from Iraq’s kaleidoscopic history. Over the course of 12 years, the British government went about formulating a new political framework for Iraq based on a Western-democratic system.

This was comprised of a constitution, a parliament, elections and a cabinet represented by members from all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups. Yet real power was vested in the monarch, Emir Faisal, son of the Hashemite ruler of Mecca and Medina, a longstanding British ally. In 1932, Britain granted Iraq full independence as signs of growing hostility towards British rule manifested in the general strike of 1931, and organized demonstrations in the streets.

The institutions established during the British mandate endured for a further 26 years, during which the Hashemite rulers remained pliable to British wishes. However, this period also saw the rise of a particular Iraqi identity. The Hashemite monarchs felt indebted to Iraqi supporters of the Great Arab Revolt in the Hijaz, the majority of whom were Sunni Arabs. As a sign of their gratitude the monarchs rewarded their supporters with positions in government and the army, these elites supported an Iraqi identity based on a highly secular Arab-nationalism.

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Key Facts

Image © iStockphoto

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he land now occupied by modern day Iraq bears the imprints of a colorful and diverse past. Iraq’s Sumerian and Babylonian remnants are a reminder that the world’s earliest civilizations sprung up along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates. In the Iraqi city of Karbala, the shrine of Imam Husayn ibn Ali recalls the region’s centrality during the wars of succession, which led to the Shi’a-Sunni split. Meanwhile, the city of Sammara, which lies 125km to the north of Baghdad, is home to the impressive Malwiya minaret.

The unusual helter-skelter-like structure, built by the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mu`tasim, marks a high point in Iraqi and Islamic history when Baghdad was the heart of a vast Islamic empire stretching from Western Europe to the boarders of China.

It is somewhat remarkable however, that Iraq still bears evidence of its glorious past. In 1258 the region entered a veritable dark age. The Abbasid Empire collapsed and a succession of Mongol and Turkic invaders made a sport of razing Iraq’s ancient cities. In 1534 the Ottoman’s conquered Iraq, and although their reign lasted nearly four centuries, they failed to bring prosperity and stability to the region. As their power declined in the 18th century, local tribal chiefs increasingly held sway over Ottoman administrators. Meanwhile, a succession of Ottoman-Persian wars revived Sunni-Shi’a animosity. On the eve of the Great War, Iraq had endured seven centuries of stagnation. In the absence of a longstanding central government the region was highly underdeveloped and lacked both the hard and soft infrastructure necessary to compete with industrialized Europe. To add to its woes, Iraq’s most qualified administrators were to be found amongst its minority Sunni population, the Shi’a having shunned the Sunni controlled Ottoman schools.

Capital: Baghdad President: Jalal Talabani Geography Area: 438,317 sq km Border countries: Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 181 km, Kuwait 240 km, Saudi Arabia 814 km, Syria 605 km, Turkey 352 km PEOPLE Population: 29,671,605 (July 2010 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5% Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi’a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3% Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Turkoman (a Turkish dialect), Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic), Armenian ECONOMY GDP: $112 billion GDP – composition by sector: agriculture: 9.6%, industry: 62.8%, services: 27.6% Inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.8% (2009 est.)

Unemployment rate: 15.2 % (2008 est.)

Population below poverty line: estimates vary considerably. CIA 2008 estimate is 25% The Republic of Iraq In 1958 the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown and a decade of political instability ensued. Between 1958 and 1968 Iraq witnessed four successful coups and 12 abortive ones. This period of turmoil was brought to an end in 1968 in a bloodless coup led by General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr and his coterie of Ba’athist supporters. Bakr appointed himself President and the Ba’athists quickly shored up their rule by purging the country’s institutions of non-Ba’athist members. The Ba’ath Party would rule Iraq until the US invasion of 2003.

The first 11 years of Ba’athist rule was characterized by internal stability and economic and social development. In particular the status of women improved—by the mid 1980s women made up 30 percent of university students and had broken glass ceilings in almost all professions. The only sustained opposition to the regime came from the Kurds who were angling for greater autonomy and access to oil revenues. Their dissent was expressed in terms of violent clashes with the regime.

The Saddam Years In 1979, Saddam declared himself president, stating that AlBakr’s ill health prevented him from governing. With Saddam’s rise to power, Iraqi fortunes took a turn for the worse. The new president, imbued with a strong sense of destiny, launched two very poorly calculated invasions: the first into Iran in 1980, the second into Kuwait in 1990. It was during these conflicts that Saddam employed some of his most gruesome tactics, including the gassing of Kurdish villages in northern Iraq in March 1988.

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Saddam’s foreign policy was not only misguided, it was also incredibly costly, both in human and economic terms. As a punishment for meddling in Kuwait, Iraq was subjected to crippling financial and trade embargos. The sanctions were designed to curtail Iraq’s ambitions on neighboring countries, and force Saddam to focus on rebuilding the country’s economy. Contrary to expectations, Saddam persisted with expensive military programs, including acquisition of nuclear weapons. His belligerence meant that the sanctions remained in force for 12 years, at times driving the Iraqi population to the brink of starvation.

More destructive than the Mongols?

The tale of Iraq’s most recent occupation makes for a depressing read. In 2003 the US invaded Iraq and quickly deposed Saddam. Video footage of young Iraqis toppling a statue of Saddam streamed into homes worldwide and became the defining image of Iraq’s liberation. However, such scenes of euphoria were short lived. In the months following Saddam’s fall, violence and looting broke out. The US policies of de-ba’athification and disbanding the army contributed to a growing sense of anarchy. Amidst the ensuing chaos, ethnic and sectarian militias appeared. From 2004 until the Anbar Awakening in 2006, an insurgency comprised of these militias raged throughout Iraq. Sectarian violence drove nearly three million Iraqis into neighboring countries. Within Iraq a further 2.8 million Iraqis were displaced as ethnic and sectarian militias asserted control over various regions.

Political reconciliation in post-invasion Iraq proved equally elusive. Iraqi politics were marked by an environment of mistrust. After the 2005 elections, the Iraqi parliament led by a Shi’ite majority struggled to hold together a fractious coalition.

In such a climate, the will for political reconciliation was lacking, and key issues, such as oil and gas revenues, and the extent of provincial power, were laid by the wayside.

Normal Iraqis have demonstrated increasing disillusionment with the political culture and have accused individuals of clinging to their thrones of power at the expense of the national interest Picking up the pieces In 2010 a beleaguered Iraq is still waiting for political reconciliation. In the most recent parliamentary elections, held in March this year, sectarianism prevailed as Iraqis voted according to tribal and sectarian loyalties. Equally problematic, however, was the lack of a clear victor. This led to a 100-day-long political impasse, which shows no immediate signs of being resolved. Normal Iraqis have demonstrated increasing disillusionment with the political culture and have accused individuals of clinging to their thrones of power at the expense of the national interest.

The political dilemma has seen an upsurge in sectarian violence, with attacks on Shi’ite pilgrims and assassinations of Sunni politicians. Seven years on from the US invasion, Iraq is a deeply divided country and the prospect that Iraqis can take ownership of their country remains a distant hope.

Image © Getty Images

President Obama pledged that the United States will end its combat mission in Iraq on August 31 2010

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• THE CRITICS

Inside Ecstatic Flow An Interview with Rachid Koraichi London’s October Gallery recently exhibited Koraichi’s latest collection entitled Ecstatic Flow – The Invisible Masters of Sufism where he spoke with The Majalla about his work and the state of contemporary Middle Eastern art.

Rachid Koraichi, born in Ain Beida, Algeria in 1947, now lives and works in Tunisia and France. His ability to work with an impressive range of media—including ceramics, textiles, metals and paint on silk—reflects the extensive training he received at the Institute of Fine Arts and the Superior National School of the Arts in Algeria as well as the National School of the Decorative Arts and at the School of Urban Studies in Paris.

His work has been influenced by an abiding fascination with signs of all kinds. Beginning with the aesthetic of Arab calligraphy, his work also includes glyphs and ciphers drawn from a variety of other languages and cultures. In all, Koraichi’s work integrates layered systems of signs into an organized description of the world.

London’s October Gallery recently exhibited Koraichi’s latest collection entitled Ecstatic Flow- The Invisible Masters of Sufism where he spoke with The Majalla about his work and the state of contemporary Middle Eastern art.

Can you explain the state of contemporary art in the Middle East?

I think that Middle Eastern art has been at the forefront of contemporary art for some time. Countries like Egypt have had a group of internationally renowned artists. But the country that has been especially important for Middle Eastern art has been Iraq. Iraq has had an exceptional school for plastic arts, and as such has been a reference point for contemporary art.

Although, it is true that political power has had a habit of taking advantage of these artists to give their dictatorships a better image. Saddam Hussein, for one, gave a great amount of financial support to create a museum of contemporary art. He also created art contests that encouraged international artists to participate in the Iraqi art scene.

The second school that has been of great importance is the Moroccan school. Although they were faced with a problem: The art scene there was dominated by artist associations, which brought artists together to discuss esthetics and politics, but it also made their work rather homogenous. There was bit of emulation between them.

In Algeria, after independence there were a number of official painters. The issue here was the government was constricted by soviet-style communism and a conservative culture, which created a number of antagonisms within the artistic community. Basically those that supported a particular dominant ideology had the necessary funding, but independent artists were excluded from these privileges.

Middle Eastern art and its development was also greatly impacted by the importance of tourism. Here the idea was to incorporate art into the tourism of a country. This allowed the schools that formed artists to clearly define their objectives. Culture is a profitable business. What they forgot was that art requires time, it involves preparation, communication, coordination with galleries.

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Personally, what inspired you to become an artist?

For me there were multiple factors that led me to become an artist. At a certain moment everyone has to decide what they want to be. Being an artist though is not like choosing a profession. Becoming an artist is very similar to undertaking religious life, in the sense that it becomes everything for you. If its not a passion its not worth it. But like with all passions you have to pay a price, and in the case of an artist, its financial instability. There are so many artists, and only a few become successful. For an Arab artist, it’s even more difficult to compete with Western artists for a multiplicity of reasons.

But there are a number of advantages as well, especially liberty. In other professions you are constrained by schedules; as an artist I am my own boss. I work at night, I work weekends, I work whenever I want to. It also means participating in the creation of culture with other artists, musicians and writers.

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Becoming an artist is very similar to undertaking religious life, in the sense that it becomes everything for you My mother painted very much as well. She lived in Algeria when it was still a colony, and at the time there was a national French prize for drawing, which my mother won, although out of a sense of patriotism, she destroyed the diploma after the French left Algeria. She had an interest in art, and art was regularly present in our house in one form or another. Her influence is seen in my work through my use of textiles for example. But also I have been greatly impacted by Sufi culture.

The use of text within art is present in my work as a result.

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• THE CRITICS

In addition to Sufi culture, and Algerian culture more broadly, do you find that French culture—in its colonial form—impacted your work as well?

It is necessary to see colonialism as a negative force but also as a positive force. I think it’s important to understand why it was necessary for Algeria to win its independence at the time. But it is also important to understand that colonialism in Algeria has become a part of the country’s patrimony, and this influence is not limited to France. The Roman Empire for example also left its mark on Algeria, it’s part of the country’s history and makes Algeria what it is today, and you cannot ignore it.

For me the idea of national territory has very little to do with geography and more with where the heart is. Today I am in London and London is my home. To come back to the issue of the impact of colonialism on the country, it is possible that as a result of colonialism Algerians appreciate their home country more than they otherwise would.

Considering that your work is so influenced by Arab culture and Islam, do you believe that your work is understood globally by those less familiar with, for example, the importance of symbols in Sufism?

Personally, I don’t think artists create to demonstrate their work to other people. It’s ultimately a practice in autotherapy in which its necessary to be completely honest with your self. To say that we create art for others is narcissistic.

Although it is nice when others appreciate your work, it’s also important to be confident in your own work and be prepared to hear others say that it is good or it's bad, and not be affected by either.

Although it is nice when others appreciate your work, it’s also important to be confident in your own work and be prepared to hear others say that it is good or it's bad Each artist has their own language and their own sensibilities, whether its Picasso or Jackson Pollack. Gradually you can build a dictionary of sorts to read the work of an artist, and understand its meaning. It would be ideal to say there is some kind of formula to understand the work of an artist completely, but there is no recipe. Art is a form of expression. I express myself graphically in a way that I can’t in other forms, and ultimately that is what is important in my work.

Does your work then carry a political or social message?

I think that politics is a permanent lie about staying in power.

Nonetheless, it’s part of the history of humanity. That being said, art traces politics in the way memory does. Not much remains about wars of the past; what does remain are artistic representations of these events.

Paula Mejia This article was first published in the Majalla 17 July 2010

Once Burned, Twice Shy Afghanistan: A View from Moscow

by Dmitri Trenin, Alexei Malashenko Carnegie Endowment, April 2010 The legacy of the Soviet Union’s 10-year incursion in Afghanistan and its humiliating defeat at the hands of the mujahideen lives on in the memory of many Russians today.

Even post 9/11 Russia refused, and still refuses, to set foot in Afghanistan again, leaving the groundwork to the US-led coalition forces. The Carnegie Endowment report Afghanistan: A View from Moscow explains that, despite Russia’s hesitation to become involved, it does take an invested interest in the outcome of the war as Afghanistan presents several serious risks to its security and status in the region.

The legacy of the Soviet Union’s 10-year incursion in Afghanistan and its humiliating defeat at the hands of the mujahideen lives on in the memory of many Russians even today. This is especially reflected in Moscow’s hesitation to become involved in Afghanistan a second time. Even post 9/11 Russia refused, and still refuses, to set foot in Afghanistan again, leaving the groundwork to the US-led coalition forces. After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 Russia did its best to turn its back on Central Asia and, by extension, the Muslim world.

But Afghanistan is becoming harder and harder to ignore.

The authors of the Carnegie Endowment report Afghanistan: A View from Moscow discuss Russia’s attitude towards involvement in Afghanistan and the lasting effect of what they call the “Afghan Syndrome.” Russia, one of the world’s leading powers, has so far been removed from the Afghan war theater.

This report presents Afghanistan from a perspective that has previously been missing, a Russian perspective, which is vital in determining the future of the region. In fact, the report reveals that Russia has a lot at stake in Afghanistan and is part of a complex web of relations with its unstable Central Asian neighbors, the US and competing nations in the wider region.

Despite not having troops on the ground Russia is nonetheless an important actor in Afghanistan’s fate. After all, geographically, Russia is far closer to Afghanistan than the US or Great Britain. Its new buffer states, the five “Stans” in Central Asia– Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan–are all that separate it from the Afghan border. In Russia’s recent history it has already felt the tremors of instability in Central Asia with widespread bloodshed along its borders during the ethnic battles fought in Chechnya, Tajikistan and other neighboring countries. The Russian leadership is eager to contain Afghanistan before unrest spreads northwards. Operation Enduring Freedom appeared to be going swimmingly at first but things quickly took a turn for the worst. Russia is becoming increasingly anxious as the Taliban run circles around coalition forces in their backyard.

According to the report Russia has two objectives concerning Afghanistan, the first being a purely selfish one. The country’s leaders are concerned primarily with re-establishing Russia’s sphere of influence in the region. They are not so much interested in fighting Islamic extremism, nation-building or economic investment as they are determined to assert their

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authority. This simple concern becomes complicated by Russia’s delicate balancing act in keeping its neighbors and allies sweet as well as under its thumb. Russia’s relationship with Pakistan, China and India is inseparable from its treatment of Afghanistan.

This is where it gets complicated: Russia likes India, China can just about get on with Pakistan, but India and Pakistan hate each other, and China and India don’t get on too well either. Throw Afghanistan into the mix and it’s like getting all your relatives to behave at a rowdy family reunion. But between the wagging of fingers and namecalling these countries all have one thing in common and that is hope for stability in Afghanistan. Were the Taliban to succeed and the coalition forces to leave, Central Asia would be fertile land for furthering the militant Islamist cause.

This would affect the internal security of all Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider Middle East. Central Asia is already a hotbed for Islamic extremism; Kyrgyzstan’s recent unrest will further act as a catalyst for conflict in the region.

Russia’s second concern, but equally lethal to its population is drugs. The report states, “Out of about 100,000 drug addicts dying each year worldwide, between 30,000 and 40,000 are Russians.” And it’s not difficult to guess where all these drugs are coming from. The drugs trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia into Russia is slowly seeping the life out of the country. Since the arrival of coalition forces in Afghanistan the drugs trade has multiplied 44 fold. But this issue is also one that Russia can tackle from within, the report quotes that the UN considers corruption and the inefficiency of Russian anti-drug agencies to be a large part of the problem, not just the production of the drugs in Afghanistan itself.

So how does the Kremlin want to play out Afghanistan’s fate? The report details that views are divided: Some want to watch the US flounder, ensuring that their principal political rival stays entrenched in warfare for years to come. This party hopes to pick and choose the winning side at the end of the day. Others want quite the reverse in pursuing closer ties with

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the US and NATO in order to earn diplomatic brownie points and leverage in the former Soviet bloc. The authors are keen to assert that although some “senior Russians would privately like to see the U.S. fail in Afghanistan and join the Soviet Union and Britain in that ‘graveyard of empires,’” the overall consensus by Russian leaders is hope in a coalition victory.

Returning to Russia’s desire for political dominance in Central Asia, the report notes several steps the Government has taken in placing its stamp on the region. Two Russian military bases have been established in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and at the same time Russia is quietly pushing for the expulsion of US military bases in the Central Asian countries.

Russia’s interests are therefore highly contradictory.

They want the best of both worlds: The US will do their dirty work for them in eliminating the Taliban while Russia asserts its influence over Central Asia. The two are incompatible. The US’s mere presence, let alone heading the entire coalition in Afghanistan, makes it a dominant power in the region. Russia by no means has a monopoly over Central Asia. But without US presence Russia would have to fight its own war as Afghanistan presents the largest threat to its security. Although in reality China is its biggest competitor in the region, Russia perceives America’s military might as the larger risk. Russia has actually partnered with China to counter the US influence by establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that convenes meetings with Asian and Central Asian powers.

The report recommends that Russia become part of a coordinated international effort between NATO, China, India, Central Asia and the Gulf countries in securing Afghanistan’s stable future. Confusingly, the bulk of recommendations concern the US and Afghanistan, while Russia’s involvement is tagged on at the end as an afterthought. This is noticeable throughout the report, despite the title, the US’s mission in Afghanistan appears to take precedence over the Russian perspective.

Perhaps the future will hold a more active role for Russia concerning Afghanistan. There have been proposals flying around that Russia wants to spark an “‘industrialization’ drive in Afghanistan.” Yet, for the time being Russia seems happy to provide financial support and intelligence to the coalition efforts, whilst keeping Afghanistan at arms length. Above all, Russia is desperate to make sure history does not repeat itself.

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Has the Sheikh President Changed his Position?

Former President Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani’s position against the most recent US led sanctions targeting Iran’s fuel supplies is a pragmatic stance that functioned as a trade off. By supporting Ahmadinejad’s government on this issue, Rafsanjani—who today has become a leading figure in the opposition—gained the upper hand against Ahmadinejad’s attempts to control Iran’s Islamic Free University.

Adel Al Toraifi

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ast month, US President Barack Obama signed into law new US sanctions against Iran that are considered to be the heaviest unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic yet, and this comes just weeks after the UN Security Council adopted its fourth set of sanctions on Tehran. Tehran reacted sharply to the US sanctions, especially with regards to the right to inspect ships and freighters bound for Iran.

However, the surprising comments came from former President Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, who strongly attacked the Obama administration, saying "It is an overt bullying action against Iran when the US president officially announces that they are targeting the heart of Iran's nuclear program."

The latest statements by Rafsanjani could be construed as support for a president that the sheikh previously considered undeserving of the presidency. These statements have caused controversy amongst observers who would not have expected the sheikh president to defend the position taken by the regime, especially as he repeatedly warned against the manner in which President Ahmadinejad's administration was managing the Iranian nuclear file. So has the sheikh president changed his position?

It is true that Rafsanjani was, and remains, Ahmadinejad's most prominent opponent, and that he supported the Mousavi, Karroubi and Khatami camp. However, we must recall that this pragmatic sheikh was always extremely cautious and realistic when it came to threats against the Islamic Republic, and he repeatedly proved his importance and his ability to circumvent his opponents when it came to ensuring the stability of the Mullah's revolutionary regime in Iran. Over the past five years the neoconservatives have sought to reduce the influence of Rafsanjani and his family, however the sheikh president was always capable of absorbing these blows and circumventing his rivals.

After his attempt to return to the presidency during the 2005 elections ended in failure, he was able to return to the political scene through the gateway of the Assembly of Experts, becoming responsible for electing and removing the supreme leader of Iran. Rafsanjani also recorded a victory over his rival President Ahmadinejad when the supreme leader of Iran appointed him as chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council that monitors the foreign policy followed by the president.

The rivalry continued between the president and the sheikh, and it was clear that the office of the supreme leader exploited the tension between the two parties, sometimes granting victory to one side or the other. It is also worth noting that the supreme leader supported Rafsanjani during the elections for the chairmanship

of the Assembly of Experts in March 2009, however, relations between Rafsanjani and the supreme leader cooled after the supreme leader offered his support for Ahmadinejad's re-election, while Rafsanjani offered his support to Mir Hossein Mousavi.

Following the political crisis that divided the political elite and highlighted the role of the Revolutionary Guards in the management of internal affairs, a split occurred between the supreme leader and the sheikh president. Having sensed the danger, Rafsanjani left for the city of Qom. During the short period that he spent in Qom, the sheikh was able to influence the scholars and the senior clerics, something that became a great source of concern to the supreme leader of Iran.

Recently, President Ahmadinejad has tried to pass a resolution through the Shura Council placing Iran's Islamic Free University (IFU) under the supervision of his government's Ministry of Higher Education. This university is a higher body comprising a number of religious universities and institutes within Iran, and it also has branches abroad; Sheikh Rafsanjani was one of the most prominent founders of this university, and he serves as chairman of its Board of Trustees.

The IFU is considered to be one of Rafsanjani's most important domestic tools, as well as a significant source of funding for his charitable organizations. The university and its branches also continue to be a source of disturbance to the neoconservatives, and a number of Ahmadinejad's most prominent opponents, including presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, are among the board members. IFU students formed the majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets to protest against the results of the Iranian presidential elections.

The attempt by President Ahmadinejad and the neoconservatives to gain control of the university was aborted following the intervention of the supreme leader, who feared that the issue would be transferred to the Expediency Discernment Council, which is still being presided over by Rafsanjani despite the pressure that is being placed upon him to relinquish this position.

Therefore, Rafsanjani circumvented the government by offering his indirect support to the regime over the issue of sanctions.

Rafsanjani is truly one of the most cunning politicians in the Middle East; he was a revolutionary in the time of revolutions, and a pragmatist who believed in free trade during the time of post-war reconstruction. It is remarkable that the sheikh president, who was the enemy of students during the 1999 protests in his capacity as the senior conservative, has today become their leader, calling for freedom and reform. For the sheikh president, his positions are fixed, however times change.

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