Majalla 1557

Issue 1557 • October 2010

Khamenei’s Balance of Power Ayatollah Khamenei tries to avoid an excessive power-grab from Ahmadinejad and his close supporters

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9 771319 087105 The Majalla

War and Peace

The change in Iraq from a US militaryled effort to a joint Iraqi-US politicaldiplomatic enterprise is one of the most complex transitions in history

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On Politics

The issuing of fatwas, or religious rulings, by sometimes badly trained Islamic scholars is proliferating all across the Muslim world

Issue 1557

Candid Coversations

His Excellency Homayoun Tandar, Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, talks about the prospects for stability in his country and region

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al Toraifi Editors Paula Mejia Jacqueline Shoen Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield New Media Development Officer Markus Milligan Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: editorial@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2010 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: editorial@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover image © Getty Images

Editorial This month, The Majalla brings to you an analysis of Iran’s political climate. In the feature “Khamenei’s Balance of Power”, Arash Aramesh, Iran researcher at the Century Foundation, notes that following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 electoral victory over Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani an important cleavage within the conservative camp in Iran was exposed. Ayatollah Khamenei is trying to create a balance of power between the two main conservative factions in order to avoid an excessive power-grab from Ahmadinejad and his close supporters.

In “The Security Dimension of Pakistan’s Floods,” St. Andrews lecturer, Rashmi Singh, explains how this natural disaster may impact the country’s future stability. She explains that the July floods in Pakistan have naturally had great impact in the poorest areas of Pakistan where extremist, militant and separatist movements thrive.

Glada Lahn of Chatham House contributes an important article for those interested in the future of energy. She brings to light the fact that some of the most ambitious clean energy projects in the world are taking place in the Gulf, explaining that capital, which green European countries can only dream of, is being ploughed into cities and centers for low-carbon innovation.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at Majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and we invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

Adel Al Toraifi, Editor-in-Chief

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Contributors Arash Aramesh Iran Researcher for The Century Foundation and InsideIRAN.org in Washington DC. Before joining The Century Foundation, he was at the London School of Economics where he focused on the influence of Iran on Shi’ite political parties in Iraq.

Mr. Aramesh has been published in a number of print and online publications including The International Herald Tribune, The New York Times online, The Diplomatic Courier, and The Huffington Post. He has appeared as an analyst on a number of broadcasts including BBC Persian, Sky World News and AlJazeera English.

Glada Lahn Research Fellow in Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Development programme. Her areas of expertise are transitions towards energy sustainability in the MENA region; government-industry relations in petroleum exporting countries; development impacts of oil and gas investment; and energy security and geopolitics. A graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Ms. Lahn has published in various journals and magazines, including First Magazine, House Magazine and Chatham House’s Working Papers.

Daniel F. Rivera Gómez Middle East scholar (Arabic philologist) specializing in international relations in the Arab world. Mr. Rivera is a PhD candidate at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. His thesis focuses on the constitutional history of Iraq and the role of Western powers in shaping Iraq's constitutional order. In 2008, he worked with UMAM Documentation and Research on the projects “What is to be done?” and “Missing.” At present, Rivera is working as Arabic translator for the Ministry of Interior in Madrid, Spain.

Roya Wolverson Economics writer at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Previously, she worked as a staff reporter covering finance and investing at The Wall Street Journal’s “Smart Money” magazine, and wrote on foreign policy, domestic politics and culture as a reporter for Newsweek.

Her freelance work has appeared in the Boston Globe, The Wall Street Journal, the St. Louis PostDispatch and on National Public Radio's “On Point” show.

Issue 1557 • October 2010

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• CONTENTS

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Contents Quotes of the Month

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War and Peace

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On Politics

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• Iraq’s New Dawn? Up to the Iraqis now • Rethinking the Taliban: Afghanistan's Northern Front • The Wounds of War: PTSD in Iraqis and veterans

• Fatwa Chaos: The widespread issuing of religious edicts • History Repeats Itself: Conflict and uncertainty threaten to divide Lebanon again • The Security Dimension of Pakistan’s Floods: A tragedy for millions, an opportunity for some

Khamenei’s Balance of Power 28

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Ayatollah Khamenei is trying to create a balance of power between the two main conservative factions in order to avoid an excessive power-grab from Ahmadinejad and his close supporters

The Wealth of Nations

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The Human Condition

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A Thousand Words

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Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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The Arts

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The Critics

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The Final Word

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• The German Austerity Trap: Germany and the economics of austerity • Over the Zagros: The geostrategic currents keeping Iranian-Turkish energy and trade relations afloat

• A Green Gulf? The prospects of the Gulf's clean energy projects • Welcome to the Age of Forever: New technologies in pre-empting law enforcement

• Dr. Theodor Waigel • Homayoun Tandar

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

"The US and Israel asked us not to supply Syria with Yakhont. But we do not see the concerns expressed by them that these arms will fall into the hands of terrorists" Russian Defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov, vowing to supply Yakhont missiles to Syria as promised in a contract signed in 2007

"The siege will remain until those elements hand themselves in and we manage to uproot terrorist groups from the region" Governor Ali Hassan Al-Ahmadi on a new offensive pursued by the Yemeni government, which has caused as many as 15,000 civilians to flee their homes

“What are three or four months for the sake of the continuation of the peace talks?”

“We all know there is no alternative to peace other than negotiating peace, so we have no alternative but to continue peace efforts” Mahmoud Abbas before meeting US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the West Bank city of Ramallah

“In spite of what has happened because of security, people intimidating voters … the initial results so far are that we have a very good number of winners from provinces all over the country” Abdullah Abdullah, leader of the opposition alliance after elections had been held in Afghanistan

"In the present episode of global recovery, after this shock we had in the previous years, uncertainty is the enemy in a way. With this decision...

Hosni Mubarak contended we eliminate uncertainty in a large in an interview for Israeli television about extending area which is a major contribution in the settlement freeze consolidating the global economy.

"At a certain point we made a mistake It's a work in progress" Jean-Claude Trichet, in accusing Syria of assassinating the president of the European Central Bank, about martyred prime minister. This was a Basel III agreement political accusation, and that political the ruling that banks must accusation has now come to an end" increase the amount of Saad Hariri about the assassination of his father, Rafiq Hariri

top quality capital they hold to withstand future shocks

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• WAR AND PEACE

Iraq’s New Dawn?

Up to the Iraqis now

The change in Iraq from a US military-led effort to a joint Iraqi-US political-diplomatic enterprise is one of the most complex transitions in history. Those involved confront a myriad of security, economic and political challenges. But if it succeeds, the transition could result in a major improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people, as well as an end to the historically confrontational relationship between the governments in Baghdad and Washington.

Richard Weitz

Image © Getty Images

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he last US “combat” troops have now left Iraq and the American role in that country has changed from a military effort led by the Pentagon to a civilian mission led by the US State Department. This transition is one of the most complex military-to-civilian handoffs in US history. If this transition succeeds, it could result in a major improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people, as well as in the traditionally troubled relationship between Iraq and the United States. Although the Obama administration has termed this new period in US-Iraq relations the “New Dawn,” several challenges still remain between the Iraqi people and their deservedly bright future.

One uncertainty concerns the future security environment.

The internal security situation is worrisome but not alarming.

The upsurge in terrorist attacks in recent weeks was expected.

In addition to their objectives of inciting sectarian hatred and causing Iraqis to lose confidence in the ability of Iraq’s internal security forces—which now number about 670,000 people—the Islamists are eager to create their own narrative to compete with that presented by Iraqi and US government officials. The terrorists want to claim that, like the guerrillas in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Somalia in the 1990s, their operations forced a superpower to end its unjust occupation of a Muslim country.

Fortunately, unlike during the nightmare years of 20062007, the recent waves of violence have not triggered waves of sectarian reprisals. In addition, one of the surprising successes of the US occupation during the last few years has been rebuilding Iraq’s army. As is well known, one of the first decisions of the occupation authorities was to disband Saddam Hussein’s military, which had the unfortunate effect of leading many newly unemployed fighters to become guerrillas. For several years, foreign troops had to lead the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. In the past two years, however, the Iraqi army has become sufficiently effective in denying the guerrillas control over any major geographic area, forcing the remaining fighters to engage in acts of terrorism against civilians and other weaker targets.

Unfortunately, efforts to restore the Iraqi police have yielded poorer results, requiring Iraqi army personnel to man urban checkpoints and assume other counterinsurgency missions rather than patrol Iraq’s international borders. One of the main tasks for American diplomats and contactors will be to continue training the Iraqi national and local police in such

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important law enforcement functions as community policing, intelligence gathering and counter-terror techniques.

Meanwhile, the 50,000 US troops that will remain in Iraq until the end of next year will continue training, advising and equipping Iraqi military personnel. The intent is to enable the Iraqi army to prevent a resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq or other terrorist groups even without direct US combat support. Furthermore, the US military will continue participating in joint patrols and other security confidencebuilding measures between the Iraqi national army and Kurdish paramilitary units. The American forces will also help restore the Iraqi military’s ability to counter external threats. Although Iraq faces no immediate dangers, most analysts think it will take until the end of this decade before Iraqi forces, which lack combat air power and have focused

on counterinsurgency operations, can defend their borders against a major foreign attack. Until then, the United States and other friendly governments will need to help safeguard Iraq’s territorial integrity.

Perhaps even more challenging and important for Iraq’s future will be the ability of its government to achieve the country’s economic recovery. Though they provided billions of dollars in economic reconstruction aid, the United States proved unable to raise Iraq’s oil output much above prewar levels or provide Iraqis with uninterrupted electricity, safe water or other essential public services. If the Iraqi government cannot do any better, then these economic difficulties could undermine popular support for Iraq’s newly democratic political system before it becomes well established. Iraqi voters have repeatedly displayed surprising courage in coming out to vote in large numbers despite the risk to their own security, but their patience is not unlimited. Iraqi officials will also need to address the country’s other non-military challenges. These include refining the country’s election procedures, finding the right balance of authority among Iraq’s key executive offices, and integrating released detainees as well as returning refugees and displaced people.

But first Iraq’s competing political factions need to form a new government. Until this occurs, the Iraqi parliament cannot adopt badly needed energy, investment and tax laws. Fortunately, the process of crafting a new Iraqi government coalition is occurring through dialogue and discussion rather than violence. Vice President Joseph Biden and other American officials have been urging the Iraqis to form an inclusive coalition that would not leave any significant Iraqi group—especially Sunnis or Kurds—politically excluded and alienated, but US officials have refrained from supporting any particular Iraqi party or leader. Although this respect for Iraqi sovereignty is praiseworthy, pressure will increase on the Obama administration to become more deeply engaged in the coalition-formation process if this protracted political stalemate does not end soon.

Richard Weitz – Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC. This article was first published in The Majalla 1 September 2010

Security in Numbers US Troops (September 2010) 50,000 (Six advisory and assistance brigades) Iraqi Security Forces 660.000 – to increase to 700,000 by the end of the year Iraqi Army 220,000, Iraqi Police Force 440,000 (Source: Reuters and CSIS) Issue 1557 • October 2010

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• WAR AND PEACE

Rethinking the Taliban

Afghanistan's Northern Front Despite conventional wisdom, the focus of the coalition forces’ strategy in Afghanistan should cease to neglect the south. Recent reports have demonstrated that the insurgency is spreading, and this indicates that the Taliban is much more than a Pashtun movement. Military strategy should reflect and counter the spread of the organization’s influence to the south lest the early mistakes of the war are repeated.

Nick Srnicek

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hile most Afghanistan observers are looking to major operations in Marjah and Kandahar for signs of how President Obama's new counterinsurgency strategy is progressing, it is perhaps in the north that one should be looking to get a true sense of the war. Long neglected by both the media and coalition forces, there are new signs that the insurgency is spreading to these previously peaceful areas. The past few weeks have seen the murder of 10 medical aid workers in the northeastern province of Badahkshan, a largely quiet area until recently. The release of the Wikileaks data revealed a consistently growing number of attacks in the northern provinces. A recent UN report also showed an increasing number of civilian casualties throughout the country. While this is in itself unsurprising, the regional distribution of the deaths has been notable: While the south saw a 43 percent rise in civilian deaths, the southeast saw a 24 percent increase, and there was a massive 136 percent surge in the northeast. These figures were confirmed by Afghan scholar Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, who also claimed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda began to shift their strategic focus to the north at the end of 2006.

The spread of the insurgency to the north poses a conceptual paradox though: The Taliban are widely depicted as a Pashtun movement, yet these new fronts in the war are predominantly non-Pashtun areas. Contrary to the dominant perception, emerging evidence suggests the Taliban is not simply a Pashtun nationalist movement but something more pragmatic and flexible. Despite—or perhaps because of—its simplicity, the assumption that ethnicity or tribe determines one’s orientation in the conflict is false.

In their initial form, the Taliban were a primarily Pashtun movement arising from Pashtun areas. Their ethnic origins, however, didn’t prevent them from spreading across a diverse range of areas and allying with a number of non-Pashtun groups— even Shi’ite Hazaras in a few cases. The leadership of the early Taliban was also at times populated with Uzbeks and Tajiks.

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Image © iStockphoto

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• WAR AND PEACE

After their removal from power, the Taliban have shown an even more refined ability to adapt. As various scholars have noted, with their ousting in 2001 the Taliban underwent a major shift in strategy, including a newfound appreciation for the media and propaganda, and an expanded knowledge of guerrilla tactics borrowed from Iraqi insurgents and other foreign advisors.

The question that arises from the new trends in the north is what can be inferred about this neo-Taliban? Organizationally, the pragmatism and flexibility of the Taliban structure should not be a surprise. Their command and control system is noted for the significant degree of autonomy given to local commanders. The Quetta Shura, headed by Mullah Omar, has had its greatest impact on day-to-day fighting through its financing of operations, rather than through its operational guidance. The result is that local commanders are free to buy, negotiate and fight for alliances at their own initiative, creating a shifting and often disparate set of actors.

With coalition forces looking to begin a drawdown in 2011, attention must be given to the future of Afghanistan The result of this loose command and control structure means that penetration into the northern provinces is easier than many think. The guiding principle for aligning with the Taliban has never been a desire for Pashtun nationalism—a motivation which appeals to relatively few. Rather, collaboration with the Taliban is a complex mix of seeking order, security, redress for grievances, elite greed and power struggles— factors which are not limited to the southern provinces.

In terms of ethnicity, the evidence from the north suggests that far from being a rigidly ideological movement, in fact, the Taliban are quite adept at employing local grievances for their own purposes. This is particularly the case from 2007 onwards, as Antonio Giustozzi has recently reported, with the Taliban making a number of inroads from Badghis to Badakhshan.

The importance of tribes therefore appears to lie less in their ethnic character—Pashtun or non-Pashtun—and more in their capacity to provide a preexisting network of personal relations through which mobilization can occur. Who a tribe or village or local authority allies with is determined less by rigid identity formations and more by local history and context. The crucial religious networks, in turn, operate as a trans-tribal network that brings together numerous madrasa students from all over. Again, ethnicity matters less here than the religious orientation of individuals.

The open question surrounding all this increased activity in the north is simply, what is the strategic rationale behind it?

A number of explanations have been cited for this northern expansion, including a desire to spread out the insurgency and subsequently, coalition forces, and a desire to provide support to similar Islamist groups in Central Asia. With supply lines predominantly originating in Pakistani territories however, the difficulty in providing resources for their own struggle, let alone for other Central Asian states, makes the latter seem unlikely.

The former strategy, as an attempt to develop national distribution in preparation for the withdrawal of the coalition forces, appears more in line with the evidence.

In achieving this goal, the Taliban has typically followed a three-stage process to control an area. First, a propaganda party is sent out to sway local opinions, establish contacts and intimidate officials. Second, small armed-groups move in or are mobilized from the nearby population, initiating a stage of intimidation and violence against local security forces. Finally, if successful in the previous stages, the Taliban begins to setup a functional administration of courts, taxes and governors.

If this model holds for the northern provinces as well, the increased number of attacks suggest that the Taliban has already shifted to the second stage. As Gilles Dorronsoro has noted, the north has recently seen increased sophistication in attacks as well, including coordinated attacks against police posts. Such sophistication suggests that the Taliban may be well entrenched already, and seeking to expand even further into the north.

The spread into the north raises important questions about the future of the conflict. With the International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) attention turned to the south, one risk is that the current coalition strategy is repeating the early mistakes of the war. At that time, the insurgency was sidelined and proper government structures could be established relatively easily, yet the coalition forces looked the other way (westward, to Iraq) and ignored the opportunity. Similarly, a one-sided focus on the south today leaves the north open to mobilization that will make it increasingly difficult to stabilize in the future.

This is particularly alarming due to the presence of a number of dormant mujahideen (Muslim fighters) and warlord networks in the north. Their allying with the Taliban may help them expel coalition forces, but at the long-term risk of strengthening armed groups and producing numerous decentralized commanders in a tension-filled environment.

This leads to the major danger in ignoring the north. With coalition forces looking to begin a drawdown in 2011, attention must be given to the future of Afghanistan. The rising levels of violence in the north are already signaling the increased organization of armed groups in these areas. In addition, the disproportionate resources (both in terms of aid and political power) dispensed to the south and the east is capable of furthering resentment in the ignored areas. The key threat is that while the Taliban may succeed in mobilizing disparate groups to fight against coalition forces, their very reliance on decentralized organization for this success will make it impossible to control that network afterwards.

The fragile web of Taliban affiliates already bends and fractures frequently, exposing the limits of centralized governance in the present day. As Abdulkader Sinno has argued, this type of fragility among the mujahideen was one of the primary reasons why the Najibullah regime was able to survive (to everyone’s surprise) three years after the Soviet withdrawal, and one of the primary reasons why the Taliban were able to sweep to power in 1996. Yet, this post-Soviet period also saw a full-blown civil war, which should be foremost in the minds of any policymaker. With a number of armed groups mobilized and with none of them strong enough to maintain centralized power, the conditions for a similar catastrophe may already be emerging.

Nick Srnicek – Independent researcher based in London. He has written for a number of publications and is a co-editor of The Speculative Turn (Re.press, 2010).

This article was first published in The Majalla 30 September 2010

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• WAR AND PEACE

The Wounds of War PTSD in Iraqis and veterans

Despite having experienced the war from different perspectives, Iraqis and American veterans have been impacted similarly from a psychological perspective. In war the physical scars are often the first to be treated, but the psychological ones, for both civilians and soldiers, can be equally dangerous.

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s the end of the war in Iraq appears increasingly closer, another conflict is far from ending. Despite having experienced the war from different perspectives Iraqis and American veterans have been impacted similarly from a psychological perspective. There is a crisis of mental health in the American military experienced by those returning from second and third deployments to Iraq (and Afghanistan). The number of suicides in the military is disproportionately higher than that of the civilian population, and veterans and their families are starting to make known their concerns about the treatment available to them. The American government owes much to these veterans, and helping them cope with the trauma of war should be amongst its priorities if only because their inability to reintegrate in their civilian lives is dangerous to themselves and their communities.

But the American government also owes Iraqis, who share the distress that American soldiers are experiencing.

When discussing reconciliation and state building in Iraq, politicians often neglect the importance of mental health in building stable communities. For a country that has been ravaged by war for years, and is still coping with the legacy that Saddam Hussein’s human rights abuses have on their mental health, the alarming lack of resources available to treat these traumas should likewise be prioritized. In war the physical scars are often the first to be treated, but the psychological ones, for both civilians and soldiers, can be equally dangerous.

Iraq has a population of approximately 31 million people, but the country has no more than 200 psychologists, few of whom are trained to treat mental disorders related to war. According to a New York Times article, although the number of Iraqis with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is under documented, the World Health Organization and the Iraq’s Health ministry believe that half of the population suffers from some sort of psychological trauma as a result of the conflict.

Children in particular have been victims of PTSD in Iraq.

In an interview with NBC, Dr. Haider Maliki, an Iraqi psychologist working at the Central Pediatric Teaching Hospital in Baghdad, noted that “28% of Iraqi children suffer some degree of PTSD, and their numbers are steadily rising.”

Having been exposed to violence on a daily basis for the majority of the last seven years, Iraqi children have been especially vulnerable to this trauma. According to UNICEF, almost 2 million children have been displaced since the war began, many of whom have been living in temporary

shelters where education is difficult to obtain, further adding to the disruption of a normal upbringing.

Dr. Maliki has explained that PTSD in children can affect the long-term development of their brain. These children are likely to “experience a decreased in size in the area of the brain known as the hippocampus, which is a brain structure important in memory processing and emotion,” noted researchers at Stanford University’s School of Medicine.

PTSD is equally prevalent amongst Iraq’s adult population, and because its symptoms can be debilitating, it is difficult to foresee how a country with enough political problems can be expected to create stability if fundamental health care issues go unaddressed.

In a special report by the Washington Post on living with PTSD, Dr. Arthur Blank Jr. explains that PTSD can be understood as a fixation, freezing or stoppage from the recovery of a traumatic event. After individuals experience any trauma symptoms, including nightmares, involuntary recall of the events and flashbacks, some interfere with memory. In many cases, after a year or so, these symptoms fade away. However, for those who continue to experience the symptoms with no respite in the long-term are individuals who suffer from PTSD. Anything that serves as a reminder of the traumatic scene— loud noises, a language, and other triggers—can cause these

Image © iStockphoto

Paula Mejia

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symptoms to occur, and, as a result, individuals with the trauma have a difficult time living normal lives.

The same report by the Post features an interview with former soldier Emile Tracy, who is experiencing trauma after deployment in Iraq. He explained what its like to live with PTSD: “I think what caused my PTSD was my deployment to war, all of the action I saw and the things I had to suppress didn’t have time to process, people being killed, cleaning up vehicles with the flesh of my comrades. You literally don’t have time to grieve and process. Dealing with flashbacks and nightmares in a combat environment is part of that also. Hearing the scream of women and children when going on a raid… You can function with PTSD you can do things, how well is the problem…

My reaction to someone touching me from behind is totally different… I am consistently on survival mode, and I am constantly perceiving things as a threat.”

It doesn’t take much extrapolating to understand that while post-traumatic stress disorder may be a psychological issue, it certainly has social and economic implications. The trauma can seriously undermine the livelihood of individuals suffering with the disease, but taken on a large scale, as is the case in Iraq and troops returning from war, those individual hardships can become obstacles to the overall livelihood of entire communities.

As Emile Tracey’s account suggests, the number of veterans from the war returning with PTSD is staggering as well.

The US Congress commissioned a yearlong study by military and civilian experts in response to the increasing suicide tally amongst veterans. “From 2005 to 2009, more than 1,100 members of the military killed themselves, with the highest tolls among Army soldiers and Marines carrying the burden on the battlefronts,” reported The New York Times. The article further noted that one in five veterans returning form the conflict report signs of PTSD and depression. However, less than half have sought treatment. What is maybe more alarming is that a 2007 survey of soldiers found that 17 percent of active-duty troops and 25 percent of reservists had screened positive for symptoms of stress disorder. In other words, not only are few of these individuals receiving treatment for the trauma of war, many are returning to war with potential consequences to their ability to recover.

While its combat troops fight two wars, its mental-health professionals are waging a battle to save soldiers’ sanity when they come back, one that will cost billions long after combat ends in Baghdad and Kabul In an investigative report on the mental health issues facing the US army, TIME reporter Mark Thompson put it clearly when he said that “While its combat troops fight two wars, its mental-health professionals are waging a battle to save soldiers’ sanity when they come back, one that will cost billions long after combat ends in Baghdad and Kabul.”

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Iraq’s Mental Health and the Way Forward With 29% of the population estimated to suffer from PTSD and 63% from depression, a largescale mental health assessment was conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Planning, in close collaboration with World Health Organization (WHO). In March 2006, the organizations examined 18 governorates of Iraq. As a result of this assessment, the Iraqi Ministry of Health rehabilitated eight mental health units in Rusafa and Karkh (Baghdad), Mosul, Baquba, Karbala, Babel, Basrah, and Nasiriyah. Also, six mental health units were newly constructed in Erbil, Najaf, Baghdad, Sulaymania, Wassit and Kirkuk.

In addition to the rehabilitation of mental health units, the Ministry of Health and WHO are targeting stigma associated with depression, anxiety and other mental health symptoms, as well as with retardation.

Posters and brochures on depression, anxiety, warspecific Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and retardation have been disseminated to health facilities to help identify symptoms and provide solutionoriented tips. The campaign materials emphasize the importance of physical and psychological support, as well as the role of religion and cultural practices as ways of coping with conflict.

(Source: World Health Organization) While programs to prevent suicide and treat PTSD have increased, many of those at risk fall through the cracks of an inefficient system. What is more, mental health issues carry a significant stigma, and this prevents many from seeking the help they need. For members of the military who are defined by courage in the face of life threatening danger, the prospect of admitting this problem is difficult. Moreover, in the military, records of mental health disorders can be seen as detrimental to careers. The problem of the stigma affiliated with PTSD is not exclusive to US soldiers either. Iraqi civilians have also demonstrated that the stigma of mental health disorders prevents them from seeking access to the psychiatric resources in the country, limited as they are.

Clearly, the legacy of the Iraq war needs to be dealt with from the perspective of mental health both at home and abroad. The US has improved its efforts to prevent suicides in the military and provide counseling to soldiers experiencing PTSD. Likewise, in Iraq, the government is attempting to rebuild the mental health care system by collaborating with the US and other NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders to build a network of clinics that reach out to at-risk civilians. However, the extent of the problem is bleak and much more needs to be done to ensure that the people who have suffered most during the Iraq war are not forgotten once its end is made official.

This article was first published in The Majalla 22 September 2010 17

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• ON POLITICS

Fatwa Chaos

The widespread issuing of religious edicts The issuing of fatwas, or religious rulings, by sometimes badly trained Islamic scholars is proliferating all across the Muslim world. The purposes of some of these fatwas, which are supposed to be based in the knowledge and wisdom of those who issue them, are quite disturbing and are tarnishing the image of Islam. For Muslim governments, this expansion of fatwa-issuing is becoming a growing concern.

Caryle Murphy

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IYADH–A well-known Saudi religious scholar recently advised that a woman could become kin to a man—and thus be alone with him without violating the Islamic ban on gender mixing—by giving him five sips of her breast milk. This religious ruling, or fatwa, followed one in Somalia prohibiting Muslims from watching the soccer World Cup; one in Malaysia saying Muslims should not do yoga; two in Egypt, one saying married couples should not disrobe when having sex and the other one labeling Facebook users sinners; and one in Pakistan forbidding polio vaccination because it’s a Western plot to harm Muslims.

These rulings on trivial matters are not the most disturbing fatwas these days. Far more worrisome are takfir rulings, which declare someone an apostate from Islam, usually to justify killing him. Takfir rulings, favored by extremist groups like AlQaeda, first came to prominence in the West in 1989 when Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa sanctioning the murder of British author Salman Rushdie for his controversial novel Satanic Verses. The writer spent many years in hiding as a result.

Questionable religious rulings, sometimes by badly trained Islamic scholars, are proliferating in Islam, tarnishing the image of this global faith. This fatwa chaos, as some Muslims call

Image © Getty Images

This fatwa chaos, as some Muslims call it, stems from Islam’s lack of a central authority comparable to, for example, the Roman Catholic Church’s Vatican. For centuries, this wasn’t a problem because most people could not read and write

it, stems from Islam’s lack of a central authority comparable to, for example, the Roman Catholic Church’s Vatican. For centuries, this wasn’t a problem because most people could not read and write. They were content to follow the religious advice of scholars respected within their communities.

But the explosion of literacy and global communications created conditions in which more Muslims could aspire to be

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fatwa-issuing scholars, and transmit those rulings to a wide audience—sometimes with political agendas. In remarks to a January 2009 international conference of Muslim scholars in Mecca, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz lamented that “the Islamic world has been plagued by an extremely negative phenomenon, which is the tendency to deliver fatwas by unqualified persons, especially on satellite television channels, the Internet Issue 1557 • October 2010

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and other modern channels of communication … Issuing illconsidered fatwas without following any criterion offers biased, ignorant, extremist or careless individuals the opportunity to pose as religious experts qualified to issue fatwas,” added the king. The modern proliferation of fatwas raises a key question: When is a fatwa a fatwa, and when is it just the personal opinion of someone who calls himself a sheikh?

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Traditionally, fatwas addressed major life issues and were presented by a scholar after careful consideration of Islamic scriptures, prior relevant rulings, and the current conditions in which Muslims lived. But today, many “rulings” are issued on the spur of the moment by scholars in response to questions called in by television viewers. For Muslim governments, this expansion of fatwa-issuing is a growing concern because it challenges the state’s authority and control. And “battling” contradictory fatwas confuse their citizens.

Saudi Arabia, once a bastion of carefully controlled fatwa-giving, has sought for more than a year now to resolve this predicament. Its most far-reaching move came in the first week of Ramadan when King Abdullah issued a royal order that only clerics on the Council of Senior ‘Ulema, a body of religious scholars appointed by the king, are permitted to issue fatwas on matters of public concern. The decree does not apply to personal fatwas that address specific issues for individuals. "All those who violate this order subject themselves to accountability and punishment, whoever they are, because the interests of the religion and the nation are above anything else," the decree warned.

A few weeks prior to the king’s order, the Council of Senior ‘Ulema had announced that it is setting up regional panels to issue fatwas in each of the kingdom’s 14 provinces. The idea is that residents of the provinces should go to these official panels for religious guidance. The measure comes just months after the Ministry of Islamic Affairs banned the issuing of fatwas by anyone not on the Council of Senior ‘Ulema—a ban widely ignored.

Earlier, in January 2009, the Saudi-led Muslim World League sponsored an international gathering of scholars in Mecca to establish guidelines for issuing fatwas. “The occupation of issuing religious edicts,” stated its final communiqué, “should not be looked upon as a mere office for expressing personal opinion.” Addressing takfir fatwas, it also cautioned Muslims “to take every possible precaution not to call an individual Muslim infidel as it is not permissible at all...unless he commits an act that clearly violates Islam.”

Listen Up! In short, a fatwa is an authoritative legal opinion given by a mufti (Muslim legal scholar) or a follower of tradition (muqallids). It is neither binding nor enforceable. Typically issued in response to a question posed by an individual or a court of law, fatwas are most commonly used when the question is not adequately answered by fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) literature. A Muslim is permitted to seek more than one opinion, however, once he or she settles on one, he or she is expected to adhere to it.

The word fatwa has been in English usage since the 17th century, however it remained obscure until 1989 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran issued a fatwa sentencing the British writer Salman Rushdie to death for publishing The Satanic Verses, a novel regarded by many Muslims as blasphemous.

(Source: Oxford Dictionary)

Another major effort by the Saudi government will occur in September when Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University stages an international conference on takfir aimed at limiting fatwas on this topic to scholars allied with Muslim governments.

Saud Al-Sarhan, a Saudi doctoral student specializing in the kingdom’s Islamist community, said he doubts these efforts to control fatwa-giving will be successful, partly “because it’s a big business” now as “every TV channel” has fatwa-issuing programs with their own scholars.

Traditionally, fatwas addressed major life issues and were presented by a scholar after careful consideration of Islamic scriptures, prior relevant rulings, and the current conditions in which Muslims lived The breast milk fatwa, which came from Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Al-Obeikan, an advisor to the royal court, was an entirely novel interpretation of an ancient story in Islamic tradition and of an old custom in which Muslim women breastfeed an infant so the child becomes the equivalent of her own. The fatwa was met with outrage from all quarters in the kingdom and sparked ridicule of Islam by non-Muslim commentators. But weird fatwas like these are not the only ones causing controversy in the kingdom. Rulings that please progressive Muslims often draw fire from conservatives. That was the case, for example, with Sheikh Ahmed Al- Ghamdi’s ruling in December that Islam allows men and women to mingle in public places like universities. And more recently, conservatives were upset by Riyadh scholar Adel Al-Kalbani’s finding that singing is permissible as long as lyrics are decent.

Al-Kalbani later reversed himself, telling Al-Hayat newspaper he had been wrong.

Official scholars denounced such rulings and the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Aal Al-Sheikh, told a religious television station that "those who offer abnormal fatwas which have no support from the Quran should be halted." Other conservative sheikhs resorted to personal attacks, calling authors of such fatwas “ignorant” scholars who risk going to hell.

Observing this fatwa chaos, Abdullah Bajad Al-Otaibi suggested that ordinary Muslims do their part to stop it. “The permissible and the non-permissible are quite often self-evident and may be resolved through the application of commonsense,” Al-Otaibi, who writes about Islamic affairs, said in an essay in the Saudi Gazette. “People do not need to solicit a fatwa for each and everything they do,” he added. “It is rather strange and unfortunate that people have become so reliant on fatwas that they do not try to think for themselves.”

Caryle Murphy – An independent journalist based in Riyadh and Pulitzer Prize Winner in Journalism in 1991. She is the author of “Passion for Islam.”

This article was first published in The Majalla 23 August 2010

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History Repeats Itself

Conflict and uncertainty threaten to divide Lebanon again The intense diplomatic activity surrounding Lebanon is a clear sign that something is afoot in this divided and vulnerable country. At stake is Lebanon’s political and military security, threatened at once by the controversy surrounding the Hariri tribunal, and the country’s tenuous borders with Israel. The possibility of a new conflict is real, but exactly when and for what reason is difficult to predict. Internal and regional players agree, however, that urgent measures are to be adopted to prevent an undesired escalation that could result in a new occupation of Lebanon, or a regional conflict involving Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

Daniel Rivera

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considering the turbulent and sometimes violent relationship between it and the Lebanese government. The increasing success of Hezbollah as a political actor in Lebanon has posed a serious threat to the authority of the Lebanese government. The 2006 Lebanon war fast eroded the momentum that the Hariri government had enjoyed during Lebanon’s so-called Cedar Revolution, giving way to the rising power of Hezbollah as a non-state actor.

Image © iStockphoto

he intense diplomatic activity that is taking place at different levels in Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Beirut and Damascus is a clear sign that something is afoot in the Middle East. Just about every country in the region may come to mind as the possible cause for such activity, however in this particular case Lebanon is the talk of the town. Deeply fractured internal politics and bad neighborly relations have been the usual culprits for unrest in this country, and this time it is no different.

At stake is Lebanon’s political and military security, threatened at once by the controversy surrounding the Hariri tribunal that may lead to the indictment of Hezbollah members, and the country’s tenuous borders with Israel—violently disrupted just last month when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) opened-fire on members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) who were thought to have crossed into the Lebanese border while trimming an olive tree. Both issues raise again the question of how Lebanon would defend its borders, and how Hezbollah’s military ambitions fit within a genuine national strategy. The possibility of a new conflict is real, but exactly when and for what reason is difficult to predict. Internal and regional players agree, however, that urgent measures are to be adopted to prevent an undesired escalation that could result in a new occupation of Lebanon, or a regional conflict involving Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

The fragile coalition government headed by Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri is currently facing a serious issue that could greatly contribute to the destabilization of the country and weaken Lebanon’s position in the region—namely, the unconfirmed reports published by the German and Israeli media over the possible indictment of some Hezbollah members by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in a car bomb in 2005. At that time Saad Al-Hariri and members of his coalition accused Damascus of backing Hariri’s murder. Soon after, Syrian troops were forced to withdraw from Lebanon in the spring of 2005. Considered to be the end of Syria’s 29-year-old deep and lasting political influence over Lebanon, it opened the door for Western and Saudi support, and it gave Saad Al-Hariri a chance to push for an international investigation into the murder of his father.

The involvement of Hezbollah in such a murder would have enormous implications for the future of Lebanon, especially

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The group’s ability to survive the Israeli offensive strengthened its control over southern Lebanon, thus preventing the Hariri government from taking any serious measure regarding Hezbollah’s weapons, a long-time American and Israeli demand in exchange for negotiations regarding a comprehensive peace and the normalization of relations with both Lebanon and Syria.

The deepening political crisis between Hariri’s coalition and the resistance peaked during the bloody clashes that erupted in 2008 in Beirut when Hezbollah’s telecommunication network and their illegal surveillance cameras were found working at Beirut’s international airport. The 18-month political gridlock was terminated at the end of 2008, but only after five gruesome months of coalition talks that began in Doha in May and involved diplomats from Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Known as the Doha Agreement, the power-sharing deal marked the beginning of the re-establishment of normal relations between Syria and Lebanon since Hariri’s assassination.

The tough lesson Hariri learned after his official visit to Damascus in December 2009 was that in order to consolidate his position and survive in such an unstable political environment, he needed to be on good terms with Syria.

This included, among other gestures, an effort to resolve disputes over a wide variety of issues ranging from cabinet appointments to the very existence of Hezbollah’s military movement. The new diplomatic tone that US-Syrian rela-

tions took after Obama’s election to office, and earlier media reports published by the German magazine Der Speigel announcing important breakthroughs in the STL investigation in connection with the possible indictment of Hezbollah members surely smoothed the path for the rapprochement between Beirut and Damascus.

The anxiety surrounding the STL investigation prompted a tripartite meeting between Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. Held in Lebanon on 31 July, the summit was an apparent gesture to boost the current government, and to prevent an expected escalation of political conflict amongst coalition members due to possible Hezbollah involvement. The brief gathering finished after almost four hours and concluded with an ordinary statement stressing the need to strengthen “national accord and internal stability and the need to avoid violence.” Such a proclamation is understood as an attempt to defuse the tension created by the tribunal investigation.

The team investigating the murder seems to be following various clues that indicate Hezbollah’s involvement. Although it has cooperated with the investigations so far, fears that some of its members could be indicted and eventually prosecuted has prompted the Hezbollah leadership to refuse any further cooperation due to what Hassan Nasrallah has described in public as an “Israeli project” aiming to destabilize and divide the country. On the other hand, STL Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare has recently pointed out that the indictment has not been drafted yet, adding that he will only file the indictment when he is fully satisfied with the quality of the evidence. This recent statement indicates his intention to deny several rumors circulating in the media that the investigation report would be released as early as autumn this year.

The fragile coalition government headed by Prime Minister Saad AlHariri is currently facing a serious issue that could greatly contribute to the destabilization of the country The 2010 summit must be interpreted as the normalization of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria, or as Steven Heydemann of the US Institute of Peace has put it in a recent article: “What we are now watching […], is not the run up to disaster but the end stages of a brokered settlement aimed at preserving the current political order intact.” It is clear that the Lebanese government sought with this summit to re-configure its former relations with Syria and now Saad Hariri’s decision to withdraw his accusations against Damascus shows Hariri’s determination to consolidate a new relationship between both nations.

It is believed in broad terms that King Abdullah has reached an agreement with Bashar Al-Assad to try to bridge the gap between Syria, the US and Egypt. At the same time the king has committed to finding a way to delay the release of STL’s indictment. A favorable scenario for Syria would be to see the cancellation of the tribunal since there is still the possibility that some of its men could be linked to the assassination, though it Issue 1557 • October 2010

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is very unlikely that such an maneuver could be orchestrated under the table when a more than probable indictment of Hezbollah members would put significant pressure on Hezbollah in the interest of the US and its allies.

Therefore, delaying the release of the indictment, especially in light of Hezbollah’s claims that Israel was behind Hariri’s murder, would prevent Lebanon from falling apart, at least in the short term. Although the quality of the information presented

by Hassan Nasrallah is unconvincing, a delay would grant extra time to Syria and Hezbollah to prepare for what promises to be a fierce and long legal struggle for both. Saudi economic and political interests in Lebanon would hence be safeguarded and give the kingdom enough leverage to pressure the Syrian regime into accepting an intermediary role in talks with the Hezbollah leadership regarding its military apparatus. This is perhaps the price that Syria has to pay to see its influence re-established in Lebanon, and to see the Israeli peace talks re-launched after they were abandoned by Syria when Israel initiated its operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in December 2009.

The poor performance displayed by the unprepared LAF in the 2006 war with Israel definitely raised Hezbollah’s profile as the only force capable of defending the country Time is also needed to make a deal regarding the indictment of Hezbollah members; the summit has opened the door for new negotiations between the government and the opposition.

According to the Lebanese newspaper, Assafir, negotiations between Prime Minister Hariri and the Hezbollah leadership continue to take place in order to agree upon their course of action should Hezbollah members be indicted. Whatever the tribunal results, the leadership of the movement must remain intact in order to maintain internal calm and stability.

Both leaders are well aware that if a robust political deal is not reached, violence could result. Such violence could occur not only between political opponents, but also between different sects as had recently happened in downtown Beirut when fighting erupted on the streets between Shi’ite Hezbollah’s supporters and a Sunni conservative group in the mixed residential area of Bourj Abu Haidar.

National Security Fuelled by the shaky political situation is the contentious security situation. Lebanon has gone through enough interventions and wars with its neighbors to understand that often history repeats itself. The poor performance displayed by the unprepared LAF in the 2006 war with Israel definitely raised Hezbollah’s profile as the only force capable of defending the country.

The LAF would not function without US support and funding; and most probably the Western support that Hariri’s cabinet enjoyed would vanish if the LAF were to face the IDF again.

A recent example is Congress’ decision to withhold 100 million USD from the Lebanese army just two days after last month’s

border incident took place. The familiar question facing the country of 4.2 million is how will they protect their southern border without losing Western support, the latter of which clearly hinges on its relationship with Israel.

The renewed urgency for a comprehensive defense strategy was addressed in a meeting at the Beiteddin presidential palace on 19 August between Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, members of the government and members of the opposition primarily addressed Lebanon’s ineffective defense strategy and Hezbollah’s role in it. Samir Geagea, leader of the right wing Christian party, Lebanese Forces (LF), introduced a draft for what he calls a National Defense Strategy—a plan that would incorporate part of Hezbollah’s military capabilities into the Lebanese Army. According to the plan around 4,000 of Hezbollah’s special operation troops would join the Lebanese army deployed in South Lebanon in order to strengthen LAF capabilities. According to Geagea: This plan is temporary and would provide Lebanon with the best possible chance to defend its border for the time being, taking into consideration the army’s special capabilities, Hezbollah’s status and all the factors surrounding the current situation. In the meantime, ongoing discussions around the dialogue table would proceed to find a definitive solution for Hezbollah’s arms.

Hezbollah and other opposition members opposed the plan due to what Hezbollah MP, Muhammad Raad, declared to be Geagea’s scheme to undermine Hezbollah’s resistance rather than setting the foundation for a Lebanese National Strategy: “The proposal was meant to limit Hezbollah forces and eventually confiscate its huge weapons arsenal.”

These statements are not surprising if we take into consideration that the plan has been put forward by one of the most outspoken opponents of the resistance, and it included a precondition that Hezbollah accept the supremacy of LAF control over national defense. More importantly, Hezbollah would be required to “place all its groups and weapons under the command of the army, even it is does not inform the army about its location and presence.”

The meeting was just another example of the yawning chasm between Hariri’s block and the Hezbollah-led opposition regarding the latter’s role in Lebanon. Left out of the discussion entirely were paramount issues such the LAF response to violations of its sovereignty, and the conditions required for the resistance to abandon its armed struggle. Any movement on the disarmament of Hezbollah is highly unlikely as long as political infighting among the government continues, and no lasting settlement is achieved with Syria and Israel.

For now the summer sunshine is bright in Lebanon again.

But it seems we are witnessing the classical calm before the storm. The US Arab-Israeli initiative announced by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to begin soon, and the US sanctions approved by the UN Security Council regarding Iran’s nuclear program are delaying any possible Israeli attack on either Iran or Hezbollah. Israel’s patience will be running short if no advances are achieved on the peace process, Iran’s nuclear question and Hezbollah’s military power.

Daniel F. Rivera – Arab philologist and translator. He is currently a PhD candidate at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

This article was first published in The Majalla 13 September 2010

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The Security Dimension of Pakistan’s Floods A tragedy for millions, an opportunity for some

The July floods in Pakistan have naturally had great impact in the poorest areas of Pakistan where extremist, militant and separatist movements thrive. What this means is that these floods, in addition to being a humanitarian crisis, also represent an unparalleled challenge for not only the national security of Pakistan but also regional and international security.

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he most recent report released by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) states that the floods in Pakistan have now directly impacted nearly 21 million people.

The death toll in Pakistan has reached 1,752 and over 1.8 million houses have been damaged or destroyed as a result of the flooding. As the floodwaters wreck a path of devastation across large swaths of the country many are beginning to compare the resulting humanitarian calamity to the forced migration of millions that occurred in 1947 during partition. Indeed, though it has been more than a month since the floods devastated Pakistan’s northwest region—one of the poorest and least literate parts of the country—over half of the affected population has still not been reached by aid workers. This translates into a staggering 17 million people who, thanks to the unsanitary conditions and lack of clean water, are falling prey to outbreaks of diarrhea, malaria, cholera and skin disease.

Most small towns remain inaccessible, as the floods have damaged roads and bridges.

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The floods that began in July 2010 have impacted the poorest parts of Pakistan where extremists and separatist movements thrive: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North Western Frontier Province), the poverty-stricken plains of southern Punjab and northern Sindh and finally, Balochistan. Ironically, Central Punjab, where literacy and income levels are at least double those of other areas, has mostly escaped the calamity.

What this means is that these floods, in addition to being a humanitarian crisis, also represent an unparalleled challenge for not only the national security of Pakistan but also regional and international security.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is where both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are based and also where the Swat valley is located. Once a popular tourist destination, by late 2008 the valley was almost totally under Taliban control. While the systematic military offensives conducted by Pakistan’s army in 2009 successfully took back control of the area, almost 64 percent of the inhabitants of Upper Swat were forced to join Pakistan’s already swollen ranks of internally displaced persons as a result

Image © iStockphoto

Rashmi Singh

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An Opportunity for Some: Militant organizations in Pakistan

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): the main Taliban militant umbrella group in Pakistan. Unlike the Quetta Shura, which directs the insurgency in Afghanistan, the TTP is in conflict with Pakistan’s central government. Their stated objectives include enforcing Shari’a, and attacking NATO and American forces in Afghanistan. The group is also financially and organizationally linked with Al-Qaeda.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Yet another militarized organization based in Pakistan, Jaish-e-Mohammed, or Army of the Prophet, is primarily dedicated to separating Kashmir form India. Although it is officially banned in Pakistan, the group continues to operate from there with links to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD-now called Falah-e-Insaniat): This Islamic organization is considered by the United Nations to be an alias for the terrorist group Lashkar-eTaiba. It was launched in Lahore in 1985.

Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Army of the Righteous is a militant terrorist organization in South Asia operating form Muridke near Lahore in Pakistan. It was founded

by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan and has several camps in Pakistan administered Kashmir. Although the organization’s focus is challenging India’s sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, the organization also aims to restore “Islamic rule over all parts of India.” It is active in Kashmir, Chechnya and other parts of Central Asia.

The organization is also closely linked with the Pakistani ISI, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

There now exists a very real danger that the Taliban could quickly capture outlying areas, especially those that lie close to the Afghanistan border

Image © iStockphoto

Quetta Shura: a militant organization that is comprised of the Afghan Taliban’s top leaders.

The Shura was formed after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, and the Taliban’s senior leadership was forced to flee to Pakistan. The organization is based in Quetta, in the Balochistan province of Pakistan where Taliban leaders are able to direct the insurgency in Afghanistan. It is believed

by American intelligence, as recently highlighted in a Wikileaks report, that the Pakistan intelligence agency, the ISI, supports the Quetta Shura.

of the fighting. By March this year almost 90 percent of those who had left had trickled back into the region only to be pushed out again by the devastating floods. The floods have destroyed roads, bridges and other infrastructure across the province, which has effectively disrupted communication and loosened the state’s control over the area. There now exists a very real danger that the Taliban could quickly capture outlying areas, especially those that lie close to the Afghanistan border.

The rains have similarly devastated the areas of southern Punjab and northern Sindh. Flash floods have washed away millions of acres of crops and hundreds of villages. Power stations in this region are flooded; electricity pylons and gas lines ripped out, and over half the livestock destroyed. These poverty-stricken provinces are already a key recruitment center for extremist organizations, and these militants are now busy portraying the floods as Allah’s wrath against the government.

Without a doubt, the floods are contributing to the acute joblessness and poverty in this region and may well serve to push more young men into joining extremist groups.

Resource-rich Balochistan is Pakistan’s poorest region. Beset with a separatist insurgency, which is driven primarily by the political and economic marginalization of the Baloch tribes, Balochistan is also where the Afghan Taliban is active. Indeed, many analysts believe that Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leaders of Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Afghan Taliban, respectively are in all likelihood hiding in the Balochi city of Quetta. The floods have destroyed what little infrastructure existed in this province and its below-subsistence economy.

Not only do hampered communications and infrastructures promise to strengthen the Quetta Shura, i.e. the top leader-

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ship of the Afghan Taliban, but Baloch separatists are already berating the Pakistani government for its poor relief efforts and calling for an escalation in their struggle for independence.

In short, the floods are exacerbating what is an already tense internal security situation. The fact that the Pakistani government is unable to provide effective and timely relief aid is further intensifying this existing discontent. Indeed, the floods have effectively exposed the government’s incompetence and corruption. Flood victims are seething at what they see as the government’s sluggish and inadequate response.

President Asif Ali Zardari lost considerable public support and was intensely criticized when he left Pakistan on 2 August for a scheduled tour of France and the United Kingdom despite the fact that his country was so obviously in the midst of a crisis. At the same time, while the government struggles to meet the needs of the millions of homeless, its credibility is further weakened by various organizations, such as the banned charity Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which has set up relief camps providing food, medicine and wads of money to flood victims. JuD has known ties to the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group that was responsible for the deadly 2008 attacks on Mumbai. Makeshift camps run by groups such as Falah-eInsaniat, JuD’s latest reincarnation, are operating across Pakistan and effectively filling a vacuum left by the democratically elected government. Similarly, the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban) has also been quietly operating in the northwest, extending aid to flood victims in this area. The government, in turn, has responded by shutting down a number of such camps in the name of fighting the spread of extremism. While no group claimed responsibility Issue 1557 • October 2010

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it is believed that the half a dozen terror attacks in the northwest and eastern Punjab provinces of Pakistan in late August were conducted in response to this crackdown. However, unless and until the Pakistani government can provide sufficient and timely assistance to the hundreds of thousands of victims still waiting for aid such crackdowns will do no more than lead to social unrest, food riots and perhaps even fuel enough resentment to engender a challenge to the government’s rule before its term ends in 2013.

Of course, all of this also has serious implications for the rising militant activity in Pakistan’s populous Central Punjab province. While much has been written about the fight against terrorism in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the rising militant activity and growing AQ and Taliban influence in Punjab has been largely ignored. However, thanks to US drone attacks and the Pakistani army’s unrelenting offensive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FETA), both AQ and the Afghan Taliban are looking at Pakistan’s heartland for refuge. As a result, new alliances are being forged between banned Punjabi extremist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and TTP and AQ. Rural districts in southern Punjab are increasingly being used as sanctuaries and training grounds for not only banned Punjabi terrorist groups but also for the Pashtun and AQ fighters escaping the FATA. The Punjabi militants undoubtedly pose a more serious threat to both Pakistan’s stability and global security. For one, they are much more hard-line and more closely connected with the global jihadi agenda.

Second, they provide both the Taliban and AQ access to Pakistan’s heartland where the growth of terrorist activity can effectively weaken Pakistan in a way that terrorist activity in its border regions cannot, and has not.

This also has serious implications for regional and international security. JeM, for instance, is believed to have recruited the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. In short, long-sheltered by the Pakistani army and intelligence agency (the ISI), the Punjabi militant groups are now expanding their operational reach beyond South Asia and constituting a direct threat to European and US security. Furthermore, given that nearly the entire Pakistani helicopter fleet and over 60,000 Pakistani troops that were engaged in fighting the Taliban in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been pulled into flood relief activities, it is unlikely that the army will be in a position to hold the areas that it had recently regained from the militants in the near future.

As the US and NATO attempt to secure southern Afghanistan and more US troops are deployed in eastern Afghanistan, the fact that the Pakistani troops have been pulled away from the border means that the 1,500 mile long Durand Line is once again porous enough to afford fleeing Taliban fighters access to refuge and safe havens. For the Taliban then, these floods have offered a great opportunity to cross the border into Pakistan in order to train and recruit new fighters. For Pakistan, the floods have made clear that its political future is dependent upon bringing the very militants it has so long used as proxies back under its control. Of course, the real question is if it has already let the genie out of the bottle.

Rashmi Singh – Lecturer in Terrorism Studies at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews.

This article was first published in The Majalla 21 September 2010 27

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• KHAMENEI’S BALANCE OF POWER

Khamenei’s Balance of Power Managing the tensions among Iranian Conservatives

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 electoral victory over Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani brought to the fore an important cleavage within the conservative camp in Iran, a cleavage that has widened ever since. Ayatollah Khamenei, an astute politician who has weathered many storms, is trying to create a balance of power between the two main conservative factions in order to avoid an excessive power-grab from Ahmadinejad and his close supporters.

Arash Aramesh

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t was only five years ago when the then unknown mayor of Tehran kissed the hands of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during his inauguration as president. At the time, the unknown mayor surfed on a wave of public anger towards the establishment, and with the blessing of Khamenei and his loyal armed forces, this man became the fifth Iranian president. It was not long before the unknown mayor became a well-known president, who, along with his powerful friends, asked for a bigger share of power in Iran.

The defeat of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in 2005 at the hands of then Tehran’s Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought to the fore a major cleavage within the conservative camp in Iran.

And this rift has only widened in the years since. Those on the conservative side considered moderates feel that they have been marginalized by the hardliners. The hardliners, led by President Ahmadinejad and his allies in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), are unwilling to allow any room for their political rivals. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has been one of Ahmadinejad’s ardent supporters, has felt the threat posed to the regime by Ahmadinejad and the IRGC’s recently growing and unchecked powers. Acting accordingly, he has taken a number of steps to check their influence and clear the path for moderateconservatives to return to the table.

Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president to kiss the hand of Supreme Leader Khamenei on inauguration day to show his gratitude—a move that served to further his image as refreshingly humble and relatable A unifying conservative cause During the years of reformist President Mohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2005, Iranian conservatives faced a common political enemy. After their candidate, Parliament Speaker Ali-Akbar Nategh-Nouri, lost the election in a landslide, the conservative camp retreated into the political wilderness. It took them many months to regroup and strategize major blows to the reformist movement and the reformist administration.

Conservatives in control of the Iranian parliament successfully impeached Abdollah Nouri, Khatami’s minister of interior, and made a serious but unsuccessful attempt to unseat Aiatollah Mohajerani, the minister of culture and Islamic guidance.

Such strategic artillery fire from the parliament against the Khatami administration was halted in 1999 when reformists secured a strong majority.

Despite the ideological and generational differences among them, conservatives were united in an attempt to weaken Khatami’s government in the parliament and ruin his efforts to implement political reforms. The judiciary, first under Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and then Ayatollah Ali Hashemi-Shahroudi, both of whom were appointed by Supreme Leader Khamenei, spearheaded these conservative attacks against reformist political foes in the country. Through well-organized and well-executed tactics such as the closing down of hundreds of newspapers and the arrest of large numbers of reformists and opposition activists, the conservatives began to slowly but steadily regain even the small amount of power they had unwittingly conceded to the reformists. The infamous Revolutionary Court, the equally notorious Special Court for the Clergy and the hardliner Press Court served as the henchmen for the conservatives, jailing many reformists, incarcerating outspoken clerics, and locking up critical journalists in a mass purging of the reformist camp.

In 2003, the Council of Guardians, a powerful institution composed of six clerics and six laymen responsible for monitoring and supervising elections, prevented a large number of reformist candidates, many of whom were sitting members of parliament, from running in parliamentary elections. These restrictions handed a huge victory to their conservative brethren.

With both the judicial and legislative branches again in their firm clasp, the conservatives had only to wait out the remainder of Khatami’s second term in office and defeat a fragmented, disorganized and at times disorderly reformist camp during the 2005 presidential elections.

To the surprise of many, the conservative leadership failed to produce a single frontrunner candidate. By spring of 2005, and only a few months before election day on 17 June, there were as many as six conservatives struggling for victory in the race. By late spring, the field had shrunk to four contenders: former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; then Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council on National Security Ali Larijani; former commander of IRGC air force Bagher Ghalibaf; and then Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

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The conservative rift No candidate managed to win more than half of the votes on 17 June 2005. For the first time in Iranian history, a runoff election between candidates—Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad—had to be held in order to determine the fate of the presidency. The runoff election between the two conservatives became an early battleground between the old guard, establishment conservatives represented by Rafsanjani, and the radical, populist supporters of Ahmadinejad. Despite rumors that Supreme Leader Khamenei supported Ahmadinejad’s candidacy, he was still viewed by many as a renegade outsider, fighting the invincible Rafsanjani political machine.

Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad were polar opposites in many regards and represented vastly different values. In the eyes of many Iranians, Rafsanjani represented wealth, power and corruption while Ahmadinejad epitomized the everyman among the downtrodden. Ahmadinejad’s campaign strategy was to portray the Rafsanjani clan, especially his three sons, as corrupt nepotists who had looted the country for years under the protection of the Rafsanjani name. The level of personal attacks waged in the 2005 election was unprecedented in the history of presidential races in the Islamic Republic.

The personal feud between the victorious President Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani did not end on election night. As chairman of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani was determined to undermine Ahmadinejad despite the fact that the new president seemed to enjoy the backing of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president to kiss the hand of Supreme Leader Khamenei on inauguration day to show his gratitude— a move that served to further his image as refreshingly humble and relatable. In his first cabinet, Ahmadinejad appointed more IRGC generals and former commanders than any preceding president as opposed to clerics and technocrats.

Despite the support he enjoyed from the masses as the representative of the downtrodden, Ahmadinejad had a fair number of opponents, in addition to the Rafsanjani clan, looking for an opportunity to undermine the upstart president. Many conservatives, who now feared being rendered obsolete by the new radical generation, joined the fight. In 2007, Ali Larijani, a prominent moderate-conservative, became the speaker of parliament and under his leadership, the solidly conservative parliament became a battleground between the executive and the legislative branches. The executive and legislative branches of government clashed many times over major bills such as subsidies reforms.

In what seemed like a playground tug-of-war, the two branches engaged in a seemingly ongoing rhetorical, ideologiIssue 1557 • October 2010

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cal and bureaucratic battle. For instance, a bill passed by the parliament but disliked by the government would be sent to the Guardian Council, which is responsible for certifying that laws passed by parliament are neither unconstitutional nor against Islam. The Guardian Council, led by Ayatollah Ali Jannati, a staunch supporter of Ahmadinejad, would brand the bill either unconstitutional or unfit according to Islamic laws. Then, according to Iranian law, the bill would go to Rafsanjani’s Expediency Council where serious disputes between branches of government ought to be solved. In most cases, the Expediency Council would back the conservatives in parliament and disappoint the government of President Ahmadinejad. To the surprise of many, two important governmental bodies heavily dominated by conservatives had become major obstacles for a conservative president.

Ahmadinejad had a simple, sly remedy for these setbacks.

He decided to simply and quietly shy away from enforcing the laws he did not like. This also caused problems, for instance, after two of his cabinet ministers refused to enforce laws passed by the parliament. Speaker Larijani summoned the Minister of Education (K-12) and the Minister of Higher Education to parliament in this past August for questioning about their failure to implement the laws of the land.

President Ahmadinejad did not stop at refusing to enforce legislations he did not like. The administration’s efforts to defy the role of parliament and its moderate conservative leadership went as far as to ignore the legislative branch altogether.

According to Iranian law, the executive branch is required to

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• Khamenei’s Balance of Power

Iran’s Conservative Front Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei served as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1981-1989 before succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader in 1989. He survived an assassination attempt in 1981.

Ali-Akbar Nategh-Nouri ran for president in the 1997 presidential elections but lost to reformist candidate Muhammad Khatami.

In 2009, he caused a controversy when he described Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi is a member of the Guardian Council. He is also a member of the Iranian parliament's Judicial Inquiry and Review Committee, which in 2009 accused him of corruption and money laundering.

Ayatollah Ali Hashemi-Shahroudi is currently a member of the Guardian Council. Prior to this he was head of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1999 and 2009.

President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was Iranian President from 1989-1997. In 2005, he ran for a third term but was beaten by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is currently chairman of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council, and, as such, he maintains a high profile in Iranian politics.

Following the disputed 2009 elections, he gave what is regarded as the most critical Friday sermon in the last 30 years. Rafsanjani criticized the restriction of media and suppression of activists, and emphasized the importance of the people’s vote, a right that is protected in the Iranian constitution.

Ali Larijani is currently speaker of Iran's parliament.

He won the privilege of chairing parliament by a vote of 232 to 31, which has led many to regard him as a strong rival of Ahmadinejad. On the issue of nuclear proliferation, Larijani is also regarded more favorably in the West than his conservative counterparts on account of his more moderate views.

Bagher Ghalibaf succeeded Ahmadinejad as mayor of Tehran in 2005. He has also served as commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) air force, as well as chief of the police forces of the Iranian Republic of Iran.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the current president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ahmadinejad was mayor of Tehran between 2003-2005, prior to which he was governor of Ardabil province from1993-1997.

send to parliament what it passes in cabinet meetings. The parliament will then determine whether what has been passed by the cabinet is in accordance with Iranian law (not to be confused with the Guardian Council’s role). Larijani recently complained that the administration has simply stopped sending its resolutions to the parliament—an act he called illegal.

Ahmadinejad’s troubles with the conservative establishment went beyond parliament. The judiciary, headed by Larijani’s brother, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani, began to challenge the executive branch and the very person of the president. In one of his first moves as chief justice. Larijani appointed Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhei as Iran’s chief prosecutor. Ezhei had resigned his post as minister of intelligence due to clashes with Ahmadinejad.

Then, in August of this year after President Ahmadinejad had made a number of lewd remarks and used language unbecoming for a head of state, Chief Justice Sadegh Larijani warned the president in a cautionary speech that his speaking manner must be fitting to that of a president and that Ahmadinejad should stay away from using crude language.

The chief justice also accused the administration of President Ahmadinejad for being guilty of seeking direct talks with the US and bending over backwards for the Great Satan. Ayatollah Larijani, himself a Khamenei appointee, said, “Everyone must know that our policy regarding talks with the US is a matter decided only by the Supreme Leader.”

Ayatollah Khamenei against a monopoly of power While parliamentary challenges and occasional warnings from the chief justice can cause headaches for President Ahmadinejad, his biggest worry should come from losing the support of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. Though there is no evidence that the IRGC is moving away from the president, it seems that Supreme Leader Khamenei is beginning to grant more powers to moderates and reducing his support for the hardliners.

In mid August, the Supreme Leader stripped Judge Saeed Mortazavi of his judicial status pending an investigation into the killings at the Kahrizak detention facility, a notorious jail on the outskirts of Tehran where many detainees have died due to harsh treatment and disease in the aftermath of the 12 June election last year. Judge Mortazavi, who once led the notorious Press Court responsible for shutting down hundreds of newspapers and publications, was considered a Khamenei loyalist.

But his ties to Ahmadinejad and the hardliner faction were also prominent. Stripping Mortazavi of his status, and potentially allowing him to be prosecuted, demonstrates that Khamenei is willing to sacrifice a number of hardliners close to Ahmadinejad in order to curb their power in even the most sensitive positions of government.

There are more signs that the Supreme Leader is aiming to bring back the moderates. For one, direct personal attacks against Rafsanjani and his family have decreased significantly in major publications linked to the leader. Kayhan, a state-owned daily with intimate ties to the office of the Supreme Leader, has not run an anti-Rafsanjani rant in some time. In a dinner ceremony celebrating the month of Ramadan, the Supreme Leader invited key figures to his residence, including Rafsanjani. Furthermore, according to Rafsanjani’s own personal website, he regularly meets with Khamenei and the pair lunch together twice a month and discuss the most important affairs of state.

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He knows full well that both factions will need him most when there is a balance of power, and his influence as Supreme Leader is most prominent when no faction can simply eliminate the other and create a monopoly over power After one year of attacking Rafsanjani and his family, the editorial page of Kayhan and other publications close to the Supreme Leader have shifted their attention onto other individuals, including those close to President Ahmadinejad. Kayhan has become a leading force in criticizing Esfandiar RahimMashaie, Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff, his closest friend and the father of his son’s bride. The gaffe-prone Rahim-Mashaie has been the subject of criticism for many moderate conservatives and even some hardliners. Last year, President Ahmadinejad decided to appoint Rahim-Mashaie as his vice-president.

After a few days of intra-factional fighting, Supreme Leader Khamenei got involved and asked President Ahmadinejad to remove Rahim-Mashaie. When the president refused to remove him, Rahim-Mashaie, fearing a bigger backlash from the conservative base, resigned. Last week, and after Rahim-Mashaie made controversial remarks at a gathering in Tehran, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the closest military aide to Khamenei, called his remarks “treasonous” and threatened Rahim-Mashaie with prosecution.

Also in August, Morteza Nabavi, a prominent conservative, criticized Ahmadinejad for his one-year absence in the meetings of the Expediency Council chaired by Rafsanjani. Nabavi stated that the people of Iran, many key political figures, and the Supreme Leader want Mr. Ahmadinejad to return to these meetings.

His recent overtures to the moderate conservatives imply that Supreme Leader Khamenei is trying to create a balance of power between the two main conservative factions. He knows full well that both factions will need him most when there is a balance of power, and his influence as Supreme Leader is most prominent when no faction can simply eliminate the other and create a monopoly over power. There should be no doubt that Khamenei is an astute politician. He has weathered many storms including the turbulent Khatami years and the messy aftermath of the 12 June election. He is now facing the increasingly unpopular growth of President Ahmadinejad and his allies in the IRGC and, as Iran’s highest religious and political authority, he is actively trying to curb their precarious spread.

Arash Aramesh – Iran researcher at The Century Foundation and InsideIRAN.org. He has published in the International Herald Tribune, NYTimes online and the Diplomatic Courier, among other publications.

Ayatollah Ali Jannati is chairman of the Guardian Council and a member of the Assembly of Experts.

He is also a founding member of the Haghani school, regarded as one of the most influential religious schools in Iran. He has close ties to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohammad Yazdi.

Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani is an Iraqi-born Iranian hard-line cleric, politician and since 2009 head of the judicial system of Iran. He served as a member of the Guardian Council for eight years before. Following the 2009 elections, Larijani spoke out against the protestors calling their doubts ‘baseless’ and their demonstrations ‘illegal’.

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhei was the head of the Ministry of Intelligence in Iran from 2005 to July 2009, when he was abruptly dismissed following his lack of support for Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaie’s appointment as first vice-president. On 24 August 2009 he was appointed prosecutor general of the country by new judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani. He has also held a number of governmental posts since 1984.

Saeed Mortazavi, known in some circles as the “torturer of Tehran,” is a controversial Iranian jurist and former prosecutor of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, and Prosecutor General of Tehran, a position he held from 2003 until 2009 when he was demoted. During the 2009 Green Revolution Mortazavi played an active role in suppressing protests and is believed to have been instrumental in the nationwide arrests that followed demonstrations. He has also been accused of the torture and death in custody of Iranian-Canadian photographer Zahra Kazemi by the Canadian government Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaie is Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff as well as his close friend. Though a conservative himself, his outspoken nature on issues such as Israel and Islam has been known to provoke the conservative establishment. In 2009, Mashaie was appointed First Vice-President but due to his general lack of popularity was forced to resign soon after. He has always enjoyed the support of Ahmadinejad however.

Major General Hassan Firouzabadi is head of the Armed Forces General Command Headquarters.

This article was published in The Majalla 4 October 2010 Issue 1557 • October 2010

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

The German Austerity Trap Germany and the economics of austerity Germany's escalating public debt has led Chancellor Angela Merkel to pursue an agenda of fiscal austerity that has divided her country and left many Germans questioning their role in Europe's Economic and Monetary Union. In pushing for austerity measures, however, the government has only mired itself in a political dialogue that misguidedly perpetuates Germany's export dependence, and threatens the eurozone's chances of survival.

Image © iStockphoto

Roya Wolverson

G

ermany is in a tough spot. On the one hand, the country's recent roaring growth figures have validated its export-led growth strategy and claims of helping to sustain the eurozone recovery. But Germany's recent economic success has also fueled anger among German citizens who feel the country’s overall gains have not hit home. European countries such as France, meanwhile, view Germany’s outperformance as proof that the country’s export glut is exacerbating economic imbalances within the eurozone while the United States is keen to see Germany set aside plans for fiscal tightening in favor of stimulus spending to spur global demand.

If German Chancellor Angela Merkel sees any reason to change course, she has little hope of making the adjustment. In pandering to public ire over the Greek crisis and demanding harsh austerity measures for Greece and other eurozone countries, Merkel forced her government into an irreversible and misguided stance on Germany's fiscal needs and its role in reviving the eurozone.

Merkel's iron will on fiscal austerity stems in part from short-sighted politics. After facing sharp criticism for mismanaging her coalition’s internal divisions and waffling over the Greek and eurozone debt crisis, Merkel would only appear weaker if she backed away from calls for German fiscal discipline now. Her center-right coalition is losing ground in the runup to the country's state elections next year, and Christian Democrats appear especially in danger of losing control of the conservative southern bastian of Baden-Wuertemberg, after an already crippling defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia. "People understand that when countries get over-indebted the stability of the currency is at risk," Merkel's budget spokesman recently said.

Focusing on debt and currency risks may conjure the sort of fear that fuels electoral victories. But short-term fiscal austerity will not fix the country's deep-seated economic woes. By dragging down the eurozone, it may only make Germany's situation worse.

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the Deutsche Mark at an overvalued exchange rate prompted a sharp appreciation of the currency and brought the economy to a virtual standstill. The East’s heavy public and private sector debt—which became part of the federal budget—put major strain on the country’s public finances. Overall, government debt rose from nearly 50 percent of GDP in 1989 to 60 percent in 1994.

To fortify the union and revive the economy, the government poured massive subsidies into indebted East German enterprises and granted tax breaks on housing construction to bring East German living standards in line with the West. Taxpayers bore the brunt of these costs, with little social improvement to show for it. To tackle the country's burgeoning debt problem, the tight-belted Bundesbank launched a fiscal austerity campaign that many considered the backbone of Germany's recovery.

But there are key differences between Germany's situation now versus twenty years ago. First, while many argue monetary integration in the 1990s burdened the German economy, today Germany's economy has benefitted— not suffered—from its eurozone ties. The weakened euro has only strengthened the country's export-led growth.

Second, the German government is not in danger of a debt-induced rise in borrowing costs any time soon. On the contrary, its stronger economy has driven spreads on German government bonds to near record lows, even as borrowing costs elsewhere in the eurozone—Italy, Portugal, Spain—have reached all-time highs. These discrepencies are fueling eurozone imbalances since higher borrowing costs in low-growth countries mean higher business costs for exporters struggling to compete with Germany. As part of the European Monetary Union, these countries also cannot resort to devaluing their exchange rate. They are instead stuck with a currency value that strengthens Germany’s economic standing at their expense.

But that is a sacrifice which eurozone countries made to enter the monetary union. To complement that sacrifice, the German government has its obligations, too. In a system that lacks adjustable exchange rates, member countries agree to an inflation target, which implies wage levels that rise relative to productivity gains. In tightening its grip on labor costs, (German labor costs have declined over the past decade relative to increases in other European countries), Germany overlooked this obligation, driving up growth while suppressing GerIssue 1557 • October 2010

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Germany’s gross national debt Germany’s gross national debt, as a percentage of GDP, steadily rose throughout the 1980s before increasing more steeply at the dawn of the next decade. Between 2007 and 2009, however, the country’s debt rose more noticeably, due in large part to the global financial crisis and European debt crisis that Chancellor Angela Merkel must now tackle.

As Merkel has pushed her agenda of fiscal austerity, however, opposing political factions and domestic sectors have taken issue with her cost-cutting measures. A slimmer defense budget, for example, has angered many in the German military, while trade unions continue to demand that the government implement a universal minimum wage in order to save the jobs of unskilled employers. Even as Germany enjoys export-fueled economic growth, then, it appears that Merkel’s political obstacles remain steep.

(Source: IMF, 2009 World Economic Outlook) mans’ abilities to consume. German private consumption has risen only 21 percent since German reunification, compared to 71 percent in the United States over the same period.

As German economist Heiner Flassbeck argues, this “wage dumping” strategy has led to Germany's grave misconception of the monetary union's meaning, the drivers of German economic growth, and the burdens of EU membership. It is no wonder then that hardworking Germans—suffering from deep insecurity about low wages, paltry social benefits, and job insecurity—are evermore skeptical of their debt-riddled eurozone neighbors.

Had Merkel explained these dynamics when the Greek debt crisis hit, her government may have found room to discuss needed German rebalancing. Instead, the government has merely played up the repercussions of Greece-like profligacy, trapping itself in a political dialogue that perpetuates Germany's export dependence and weakens the eurozone's chances of survival.

Roya Wolverson – Staff writer on economics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Previously she worked as a financial reporter for the Wall Street Journal's SmartMoney Magazine.

This article was first published in The Majalla 1 Octember 2010 33

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

Over the Zagros

The geostrategic currents keeping Iranian-Turkish energy and trade relations afloat Improving Turkish-Iranian energy and trade relations are reflective of geostrategic undercurrents in a world in which Europe has less pull, the US is more cautious, and Asian demand growth keeps the global economy afloat.

Philip Cornell

Image © Getty Images

A

s Turkey positions itself as a regional energy hub rather than a mere oil and gas conduit to Europe (as some in Brussels may have once envisioned), its allies shouldn’t be surprised to see Ankara nurturing relations with Tehran. The example mirrors a larger picture in which those at the peripheries of the liberal West are increasingly likely to shift away from an economic and political ideology born of Cold War dualism. They are also more confident of their own local and regional knowledge when it comes to fashioning nuanced trade relationships. The notion of a staunch NATO ally reaching out to a “pariah” state, only to transit energy to Europe might indeed cause some head scratching among orthodox American realists. The graying shades of geopolitics and economics in a post-Washington Consensus world, however, account quite well for the situation along the northern border below the Zagros.

Questions about Turkey’s Iran policy came to the media fore in 2010 when Ankara, along with Brazil, brokered a deal with the Iranian government, whereby Iran would exchange 1,200 kilograms of low grade uranium for an equivalent weight of enriched uranium for civilian use. Turkey was to serve as the intermediary repository. The deal was rejected in Washington, despite evidence that the Obama administration had encouraged such an exchange. It was followed quickly by Turkish rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed stricter sanctions on Iran for its non-cooperation with the IAEA. Much has since been made of Turkey’s apparent rift with the West—or more worryingly, its drift.

In fact, many of those undercurrents have been building for some time, and some have existed for centuries. The Turks and Persians have been at peace in a turbulent region since the early 19th century, and have shared common problems of empire (like suppressing Kurdish nationalism). But more recently, rapid economic development and a more eastwardly active foreign policy have marked Turkey ever since the end of the Cold War. While always a staunch NATO ally, it was its aspirations to EU membership that encouraged a veneer of Euro-solidarity during the 1990s.

Beneath the political cover of liberalizing domestic policy, secular mantras and soothing messages to Brussels, Turkey

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Iran-Turkey Trade 2000-2009 As Table 1 clearly displays, trade volume between Iran and Turkey has steadily increased over the past decade, and over the course of the past five years, in particular. In 2008, specifically, the value of traded goods jumped noticeably, in excess of $10 billion.

While the IMF claims that the global financial crisis led to a steep drop in commerce between Ankara and Tehran in 2009, both Iranian and Turkish officials insist that cross-border commerce remained near $10 billion, and have reaffirmed their commitment to triple that total by 2015.

Year

Trade volume

2000

$1.05 billion

2005

$4.33 billion

2006

$6.43 billion

2007

$7.76 billion

2008

$10.43 billion

2009

$5.63 billion ($10 billion according to Iran and Turkey)

actively took advantage of its peace dividend and reached out to eastern neighbors. The policies of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, followed by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s “no problems with neighbors” approach, laid the political backdrop for a ballooning trade relationship since 2000. Energy was usually the driver.

Between 2000 and 2008, Turkish-Iranian trade increased from $1 billion to $10 billion per year according to IMF figures.

Of the higher figure, only $2.7 billion was in non-energy trade (mostly consisting of Iranian industrial products and Turkish textiles, chemicals and machinery). The rest is a story of an energy-hungry Turkish economy already expected by the IMF to grow by over 6.25 percent in 2010 (meanwhile, advanced economies are optimistically expecting a little over 2 percent).

Surging energy needs over the past 15 years have been the backbone of warming Turkish relations with Iran, and even with traditional rivals like Russia. Between 1995 and 2008, Turkey’s oil import dependence grew by about 100,000 barrels per day, and even that was suppressed by heavy petrol taxes.

The real story though, is gas.

Over the same period between 1995 and 2008, Turkish gas consumption rose from about 7 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year to over 36.6 BCM according to the IEA. With very little domestic production, almost all of this was imported. Russia remains the most important supplier, and Gazprom has invested heavily in a pipeline under the Black Sea to avoid intermediaries. But that being said, between 2002 and 2007 Iranian deliveries of gas to Turkey grew almost tenfold in the face of higher Russian prices, from 0.65 to 6.05 BCM. On top of all this, Turkey does of course continue to serve as a transit corridor to European markets. Indeed, Iran is considering using the country to transit gas supplies to Swiss customers under an upcoming contract. But it should be clear that the energy products crossing the border are rarely just on their way elsewhere.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

The latest EU sanctions and US pressure on the Iranian energy sector will only continue that trend, further closing Western markets to Iranian products. Those latest rounds of sanctions do seem to have had an impact on the Iranian energy market, with major European suppliers of crucial gasoline imports like Total cancelling long-standing arrangements.

But rallying support against Iranian economic interests by threatening European companies who do business in the country doesn’t carry the same weight it once did, because western refiners are no longer the only game in town. Chinese companies (particularly China Petroleum) have stepped in to take up many of those gasoline shipments to Iran, and other upcoming regional refining hubs like India are less susceptible to American pressure. Often those refined products started life as Persian Gulf crude, for which Asia is now the primary export market. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Mid-Term Oil and Gas Report expects that by 2015 dramatic non-OECD Asian demand growth will mean that the OECD rich countries will account for less than half of global oil demand.

The 2010 Turkish political overtures that caused such trepidation have to be seen then in the context of economic shifts, which prompted new political realities. Sometimes those realities were exposed by western “unforced errors” (to use a favorite phrase of the Obama administration). The flat rejections of Turkey’s EU aspirations by Paris, Berlin and Vienna over the past three years were successful in bringing Turkish political sentiment into line with the prevailing economic trends—that is, away from a future rooted in Europe. And the American handling of the Turkish-Brazilian nuclear deal seemed to expose inconsistencies within the US government while distancing a partner which has actively engaged on behalf of shared Turkish-American interests in Syria, Lebanon, the Caucasus and Iran.

Economic alternatives to American and European markets are multiplying in the wake of an economic crisis, which has left developed economies reeling and seen emerging markets, well, emerge. Concurrently, countries are embracing new political and strategic realities as well. That does not mean that most won’t continue to be strong adherents to the most basic liberal ideals and look to the US to fundamentally provide global security. In the case of Turkey, Erdogan has made clear that Ankara is no strategic ally of Iran, and NATO faces no risk from one of its most valuable and contributing members. But a more cautious and reflective American strategic stance, along with a less attractive European economic and political one, will push the development of some “South-South” or “East-East” relationships that, from an orthodox western perspective, may seem to consist of strange bedfellows. If Turkish-Iranian developments of the past decade are anything to go by, those relationships can offer significant opportunities. The West should embrace them.

Philip Cornell – Responsible for wargaming and simulations of major energy disruptions at the IEA in Paris. He is also an adjunct faculty member with NATO and a researcher with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. The views expressed in this article are strictly the views of the author and not those of his employers or partners.

This article was first published in The Majalla 6 September 2010

Iran-Turkey Trade Ties As trade volume between Turkey and Iran has skyrocketed in recent years, both countries have also sent a greater percentage of their exports across their respective borders. Such strengthening ties are also indicative of a concerted public effort to enhance economic cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. This trend began most recently in 1985 with the launch of the intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The alliance included Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its original members, and later expanded, in 1992, to include seven other regional governments.

And, as can be seen in Graphs 1 and 2, Iranian-Turkish trade ties have only strengthened in recent years. "The current level of economic cooperation between Tehran and Ankara is [unprecedented] in the history of the countries' relations," Turkish foreign minister Manucher Mottaki told the Tehran Times in 2007, before adding that further cooperation in the energy sector "can serve as a model for expansion of relations in other fields.”

Graph 1

Graph 2

Between 2000 and 2008, TurkishIranian trade increased from $1 billion to $10 billion per year according to IMF figures

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

News Behind the Graph

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n late September, the United Arab Emirates National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released new data on prices within the UAE. According to the bureau’s data, the country’s annual inflation rate held steady at a one-year peak of 0.9 percent during the month of August. At the same time, however, prices rose at the fastest monthly rate in 11 months, with food prices in particular, soaring to 2.0 percent in just one month. Here’s a closer look at price data from the NBS report, as well as a more long-term perspective of the country’s recent inflationary history.

Graph 1 shows the yearly evolution of the UAE’s Consumer Price Index (CPI)—a common metric for measuring the change in consumer prices relative to a pre-determined baseline year.

In this case, the NBS chose 2007 as its baseline, thus assigning it a value of 100. All figures, then, are measured in relation to consumer prices in the Emirates during 2007.

As the graph makes apparent, the UAE’s CPI has held relatively stable over the course of the past year (from August 2009 to August 2010). After hitting a peak of 115.08 in October 2009, the country’s overall CPI spent the next few months hovering around 114. In August, however, the index sharply rose, nearly reaching its highest peak since November.

When the country’s yearly CPI change is broken down into individual emirates, however, greater discrepancies become evident. Graph II, which measures the percent change in CPI from August 2009 to August 2010, clearly shows that consumer prices in Ras Al-Khaimah rose by the greatest amount (over 1.2 percent), while prices in Sharjah, at the other end of the spectrum, stayed relatively more stable.

This data from the IMF gives a longer-term view of the UAE’s inflationary and GDP history. From 2002 to 2008, the country’s GDP soared thanks to increased oil and gas revenue, as well as substantial inflows of foreign investment. Inflation, meanwhile, precipitously dropped shortly after Emirate economic growth stabilized.

The UAE’s CPI has held relatively stable over the course of the past year (from August 2009 to August 2010). After hitting a peak of 115.08 in October 2009, the country’s overall CPI spent the next few months hovering around 114.

In August, however, the index sharply rose, nearly reaching its highest peak since November

After the Dubai debt crisis, however, the economy began to show signs of weakness, as its years of rapid growth resulted in piles of debt. As a result, the national economy actually contracted by 1.9 percent in 2009, with the banking and construction sectors taking especially hard hits. At the same time, inflation gradually began to rise, and, as the IMF predicts, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Graph 1.

Source: UAE National Bureau of Statistics, 2010 Graph 2.

Source: UAE NBS, 2010 Annual Percent Change in Real GDP, Inflation in UAE

Source: IMF

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Some of the most ambitious clean energy projects in the world are taking place in the Gulf. Capital that Europeans can only dream of is being ploughed into “green” cities and centers for lowcarbon innovation. Gulf governments are declaring themselves “global leaders in sustainability.” Does this signal the end of the petro-state, or is it mere greenwash and vanity projects?

Glada Lahn

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n the surface, the movement to reduce Co2 emissions is anathema for big oil exporters like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Qatar. These rack up some of the biggest per capita carbon, water and waste footprints in the world and their economies hinge on export markets thirsty for fossil fuels.

But domestic concerns have been converging with the climate agenda. These turn on three pressing issues: how to ensure that such precious commodities as oil and gas are not squandered at home; how to use oil windfalls to foster long term economic growth and create jobs, and how to seize new opportunities arising from a carbon-constrained world. With global investment in power capacity from renewable sources now exceeding that in fossil-fuel generation, the Gulf ’s private sector is keen not to be left behind.

The strains of excessive, underpriced resource use are telling. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE set about replacing inefficient oil-fired electricity generation with gas in the 1990s.

They also promoted diversification into petrochemicals, which relies on gas feedstock. But power supply could not keep pace with growing populations and urban mega-projects during the 2005-2008 oil price boom. The desalination of seawater, now accounting for 70-98 percent of supply, adds to the fuel burden. In spite of being the world’s fourth and seventh largest natural gas reserve holders, as electricity demand surged, both countries suffered gas shortages and were forced to substitute fuel oil for gas or deny supplies to industry.

This is leading to some counter-intuitive choices. The Emirate of Ajman commissioned a Malaysian company to build a coal-fired power station in 2008. In spite of dependence on coal imports and increased Co2 emissions, Ras Al-Khaimah and Oman look set to follow. According to Saudi Arabia’s electricity regulator, the country burned over one-tenth of its oil production for domestic electricity at highly subsidized prices in 2009. In the last year, Kuwait has been importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia. International lobbying has championed nuclear power in the region—a course at odds with both economic sense and natural advantage.

At the same time, Gulf leaders compete in the sustainable legacy stakes. The late ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed, was first to champion environmental sustainability. After his death, sovereign wealth established the Masdar Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company in 2006 to champion clean fossil fuels and renewable energy. It commissioned the futuristic “carbon-neutral, zero-waste” Masdar City. In 2008, UAE ruler, Sheikh Mohammed, launched the Sheikh Zayed Fu-

A Green Gulf ?

The prospects of the Gulf's clean energy projects

ture Energy Prize, which incentivizes achievements in energy sustainability with cash prizes. The following year, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) chose Masdar as its headquarters—a significant move given the scant contribution to date in either carbon emissions reduction or renewable technology innovation. But money and vision talk, a fact not lost on the UAE’s bigger and more powerful neighbor.

Soon after, Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi told Reuters, “Saudi Arabia aspires to export as much solar energy in the future as it exports oil now.” In fact, Saudi Arabia pioneered an impressive solar village back in the 80s, but this was abandoned when enthusiasm waned and little happened in the interim. Then, in early 2010, work began on a solar desalination plant outside Jeddah. King Abdullah announced that a city for atomic and renewable energy would be built in Riyadh, and in August, a private sector conglomerate established the kingdom's first solar panel manufacturing company. The kingdom

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Images © Getty Images

In spite of being the world’s fourth and seventh largest natural gas reserve holders, as electricity demand surged, both countries suffered gas shortages and were forced to substitute fuel oil for gas or deny supplies to industry may even be ahead in terms of “laboratories” for innovation.

The King Abdullah University for Science and Technology (KAUST)—set up by national oil company Saudi Aramco—is a living model of sustainable construction while Masdar City is still being built.

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"Who will choose to live in Masdar?" asked one disgruntled businessman. “The buildings ignore local culture and a pedestrian city doesn’t work in 50ºC of heat! …people are asking why did they get Norman Foster to design this, why not an Arab architect like Ahmed Abdeen?" Sour grapes or not this raises an important question: How will these grand visions actually roll out to include the rest of society? What will stop them from becoming mere “islands of efficiency,” elitist compounds in a sea of profligacy? There are three interrelated challenges: price, regulation and local buy-in.

Almost unlimited utilities form part of the social contract in the Gulf petro-state. Cheap energy is a way to distribute the riches of the nation and is considered a citizenship right. This gives no incentive for either conservation, investment in efficiency or alternatives. And well before renewable and nuclear options are ready to replace fossil fuels, consumption must be reduced. Yet the vast majority of Gulf citizens—and most importantly the rich—are dismissive of sustainability issues. Ac41

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Development and Clean Energy: The Missing Link Given the World Bank’s commitment to strengthening developing countries, the organization has equally made great strides in identifying how climate change might affect these nations in the future. The bank argues that higher temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, rising sea levels and more frequent weatherrelated disasters pose risks for agriculture, food and water supplies. At stake are recent gains in the fight against poverty, hunger and disease, and the lives and livelihoods of billions of people in developing countries.

In order to mitigate the nefarious impact of climate change on development, the World Bank has initiated a strategy to support developing countries combat climate change. In 2005, the Group of Eight asked the World Bank to develop a plan for more investments in clean energy in the developing world, in cooperation with other international financial institutions. The resulting Clean Energy Investment Framework identified the scale of investment needed for countries to access energy, especially in Africa; to help their transition to a lower carbon development path; and to adapt to climate variability and change.

At the request of its Development Committee in 2007, the World Bank Group embarked on a comprehensive strategy to help address climate challenges and launched extensive global consultations. The consultations concluded in September 2008. The resulting strategic framework on development and climate change takes a demand-based approach to identifying and tapping new business opportunities for developing countries and helping them cope with new risks.

Their strategy also highlights the need for action and interaction among all countries for the greater global good. In developing countries, the bank’s aims are to: • Support climate actions in country-led development processes • Mobilize additional concessional and innovative finance • Facilitate the development of market-based financing mechanisms • Leverage private sector resources • Support accelerated development and deployment of new technologies • Step up policy research, knowledge and capacity building (Source: The World Bank)

Gulf governments know they must find ways to regulate energy demand

cording to a recent survey by Accenture, 90 percent wanted to reduce national reliance on oil-fired and gas-fired power generation, but most considered it up to the government, not citizens, to sort this out.

Gulf governments know they must find ways to regulate energy demand—which may include raising the price of fuel and electricity and enforcing efficiency standards. To be effective, this would entail a careful trade off of benefits in order to neither hurt the poor nor harm political stability. In the meantime, prestigeearning hi-tech utopias look set to win out over cheaper, more practical solutions such as public education campaigns, good public transport, and adaptation of buildings to local climate.

The energy challenges facing the Gulf states are not unlike the carbon ones we face in the West. Ultimately, the urgency to do something is outweighed by the fear that doing it will upset vested interests and derail progress. In spite of all the rhetoric, the facts on the ground reveal a hodgepodge and wildly contradictory approach. Nevertheless, it is likely that these unique multi-billion dollar clean energy projects and innovation centers will reap global benefits in showing what is possible.

Glada Lahn – Research Fellow specializing in energy and development at Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London.

This article was first published in The Majalla 1 September 2010

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Welcome to the Age of Forever New technologies in pre-empting law enforcement

Call it Total Information Awareness or the Matrix, says Iason Athanasiadis. Courtesy of surveillance technology, the all-seeing, never-forgetting society is now upon us. Resembling Steven Spielberg’s “Minority Report,” new technologies such as Deep Learning go a step further into the realm of preemptive law enforcement, while leaving several ethical issues unanswered.

Iason Athanasiais

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reek author Dimitris Nollas wrote Anyone’s Time, a novel charting the life and times of a clandestine anarchist cell in 1990s Athens. One memorable description traces a communist guerrilla as he infiltrates a city, dispatches his political opponent and then returns to his mountain fastness to sally forth another day. That was then.

We used to live in the Present. It would come, pass by, and then be consigned to the irretrievable past. But as public surveillance technology increasingly encroaches upon what used to be within the realm of the private, we increasingly live in a semi-permanent age where that which has passed remains forever accessible. Not just electronic records, mind you, but billions and billions of hours of vivid Technicolor video of our everyday lives’ blandest or most intimate details.

Today, killers can be retroactively identified. We witnessed a demonstration of this earlier this year in Dubai when a Hamas militant was killed by alleged Mossad assassins. The Dubai police held an investigation that combed through hundreds of thousands of hours of video to piece together a frame-by-frame reconstruction of the execution squad’s positioning movements around the emirate’s malls and luxury hotels. As they supplied stills and video of the killers to the international media, intelligence experts spoke of the end of clandestine operations.

Assuming that persons of interest have already been tagged by the authorities, today’s technology can alert law enforcement agencies to an assassin’s whereabouts Now, new technologies such as Deep Learning go a step further into the realm of pre-emptive law enforcement. Deep Learning is a computer code currently in development that unobtrusively works in the background. It identifies potential future threats by spotting specific objects, divining attitudes and locking onto repetitive actions. Here’s hoping that, unlike the lethal test-drive of a mechanized policeman in the film “Robocop,” it does not malfunction.

We are only at the beginning of a process of transferring the business of law enforcement away from humans to intelligent computers. Darpa, the Pentagon’s “mad science” laboratory, has given a $4 million grant to two scientists currently develIssue 1557 • October 2010

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oping a system that can spot socially unusual human activities. They could be anything from sweating and agitation in a temperature-controlled environment, to performing repetitive actions or running through crowded halls. “The final version of the software will operate unsupervised, having been programmed to hold itself accountable for errors—and then autocorrect them at each algorithmic layer,” notes Katie Drummond, a writer for Wired magazine.

This is the kind of technology that, when married with all-pervasive surveillance grids, cuts past the sloppiness of the proverbial doughnut-chewing lax policeman, whether he belongs to a state that holds itself popularly accountable to its people or a dictator43

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Tools of the Trade Surveillance Drones First used by the British police in 2008, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are lightweight, battery powered and remote controlled. They are capable of flying or hovering while transmitting live images both day and night to an operator on the ground.

Number Plate Recognition Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) reads vehicle registration plates and cross checks them with police databases. The government holds this information for two years, or more if a situation calls for it. Invented in the mid-1970s and integrated into Britain’s policing system by the mid-19990s, ANPR reads between eight to 10 million license plates a day, 2% of which come up with something of interest to the authorities.

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) Government use of CCTV is a source of great debate among Britons due to invasion of privacy and the possibility of misuse by officials. Originally meant to prevent crime, CCTV has been much more effective at identifying perpetrator’s of crime. Although the exact number of CCTVs in use is unknown, certainly over one million operate throughout the UK, possibly even four million.

Bugging Devices Designed to secretly listen to communications often using a radio transmitter, which can then be activated and recorded remotely. By law, the decision to use a bugging device must be approved by a minister, who is required to sign a warrant. Telephone and internet companies play a big part in the collecting and storing of information. As long as the use of this information is deemed “necessary” and “proportionate,” the security services, police and other public bodies may access it.

Tracking Devices Tracking the movement of an individual is certainly nothing new, it is just becoming easier and more accessible. With the mass acquisition of mobile phones, which use satellite navigation technology to plot positions, it seems that everyone can track you these days.

Databases As computer technology advances, so does the government’s capability of recording every aspect of our lives, from health to law enforcement, using different techniques of identification. The main concern with databases is their lack of privacy and overall ineffectiveness.

Key Loggers A small device, usually about the size of a memory stick, used to track every keystroke and mouse operation. The data collected is then transmitted wirelessly or uploaded via the internet. It is used by both security officials to bypass standard security measures, and by employers to record productivity for example.

ship that exercises naked coercion. Equally, the harnessing of such technology by authoritarian states could bear terrifying results.

Assuming that persons of interest have already been tagged by the authorities, today’s technology can alert law enforcement agencies to an assassin’s whereabouts, then score a facial match the next time they pass in front of a camera that would allow for his eventual geo-location. The assassin’s only hope of eluding detection is to remain outside the urban camera grid, for the rest of his life or adopt some pretty radical disguises.

Such technology already exists or will be available in the very near future (Deep Learning is slated for release by 2013). Depending on where you live, facial recognition could already be functioning at a street corner near you. But despite becoming pervasive, we know negligible amounts about its capabilities.

Last year, a British cameraman told me of his surprise while filming inside a British police station control room when an officer flicked a button, populating a live feed from a busy street with the passport numbers of hundreds of passers-by. Once again, it was facial recognition software that made the matchup possible.

Spreading surveillance Those ugly, metal-necked birds with the eyeless, all-seeing spherical blue heads hanging off vertical steel poles or off the sides of buildings are not just the preserve of Western city centers. In Istanbul, they have been creeping up in recent years as part of a security system called MOBESE. Earlier this summer, participants in an ethnic riot in a middling Turkish town were arrested after they had left the scene by cops who identified them via MOBESE. Istanbul’s crowded Istiklal shopping avenue is being outfitted with up to 64 cameras capable of scanning 15,000 faces per second in a moving crowd. This comes after the two bridges over the Bosphorus became passable only with a mandatory windscreenmounted electronic pass, and mandatory biometric ID cards for

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Tools of the Trade DNA DNA profiles are primarily used to identify and track criminals. The largest DNA database per head of population was created in 1995 and is located in England and Wales. Second in ranking is Austria and third is the US. In the UK, if a person is not convicted of a crime, the DNA profile is destroyed. However, persons arrested for a serious sexual or violent crime may find their DNA profile still in the system after three years.

Biometrics The use of physical (fingerprints, face or iris recognition, and DNA) or behavioral (gait or voice) traits to identify individuals under surveillance, or to grant access to high security areas such as computers, buildings or services. Due to input error, biometrics are not 100% accurate.

Note: This information pertains mainly to Great Britain.

(Source: BBC) all Turkish citizens are being imposed. In Turkey, which is hitting the headlines for allegedly returning to its Islam-first Ottoman roots, this is being touted as progress and modernity.

Increasingly, urban camera grids are sprouting up across Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Whether in historical capitals like Damascus and Cairo or high-technology skyscraper villas like Dubai or Riyadh, new audiovisual grids governed from secret control rooms not subject to oversight are invisibly sectoring off public places. During the 2008 Olympics, veritable thickets of surveillance cameras sprouted from stadiums, advertising kiosks or Beijing airport’s soaring roof.

The military occupations of Baghdad and Kabul have allowed the US military to take its surveillance experiments a step further. White zeppelins hover over these cities with the capacity to record across such a staggeringly wide geographic area that authorities can piece together a suicide bomber’s progression through the city after his self-detonation. Though too late to pre-empt the event, the new tool allows them to scroll back through time, revealing his network and their safe houses.

Alongside software such as Deep Learning, there are other artificial intelligence programs that can carry out the work of humans, automatically picking out individuals of interest long before they are brought to an analyst’s attention. Google, a company which collects enormous amounts of data about every one of its users, has joint invested with In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s investment arm, in Recorded Future, a company that has developed software that scours tens of thousands of websites, blogs and Twitter accounts to deduce the relationships between people, organizations, actions and incidents as a way of predicting the future.

All these tools will make for unprecedentedly powerful governments in the imminent future. How responsibly will they wield their new abilities? How will pro-democracy campaigners driven to militancy by relentless state oppression get round the death of anonymity? The careless abandon with which TehIssue 1557 • October 2010

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Increasingly, urban camera grids are sprouting up across Asia, Latin America and the Middle East ran’s 2009 “green revolution” unspooled was outdated even as it happened. Even as Iran’s pro-democracy crowds were in the streets demonstrating, intelligence officials were scouring still photographs and Youtube videos to identify organizers. They uploaded stills of those they could not find onto websites and urged the public to identify them.

Tehran 2009 was one of the last contemporary urban confrontations that the unblinking eyes of CCTV networks did not record. But where the state was slow, global consumers filled in: the revolution was neither CCTVed nor was it televised. But it was viewed internationally on furtive, fear-saturated videos secreted from Tehran onto Youtube over agonizingly slow upload speeds.

A little like the “Demolition Man” movie, where post-violent humans inhabited a dystopian technologically sophisticated future society while freedom-fighters fought a guerrilla war from the sewers below, the world may soon be separated into those who live within the grid, and those few and vilified who reject the Big Brother 24/7 surveillance society and opt out. But that is still in the future. For the moment, what is truly chilling is the almost non-existent level of public information available about the society towards which we are hurtling. So enjoy the past while it lasts.

Very soon, it might be creating some unpleasant surprises.

Iason Athanasiadis – Journalist who has lived in some of our world’s most surveilled cities, from London to Tehran, Boston to Damascus, He is currently based out of Istanbul.

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• A THOUSAND WORDS

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Last Man Out Celebrating alongside Chilean President Sebastian Pinera is Luis Urzua, Shift Leader and the last of the 33 miners to be rescued from the San Jose mine near Copiapo, Chile on October 13, 2010. All 33 miners who had been trapped for more than two months were rescued in a special capsule that brought them safely from 700 meters underground to the Atacama Desert surface.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

Keeping Faith Dr. Theodor Waigel

Yes, he is the father of the euro, the European currency. Not only did Dr. Theodor Waigel propose the name of the currency in 1995 while serving as German finance minister (1989-1998), but he also played a vital role in its introduction.

Abeer Saady

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What is the purpose of your visit to Egypt?

I am not here as a former finance minister, but as an independent auditor of Siemens, hired by the Department of Justice, Security Exchange Committee DOJ/SEC. I was appointed as an observer at the request of US and German authorities. I am the first non-American to be appointed to this position, and so far I'm the only non-American observer.

The objective of my work is to ensure that internal controls at Siemens are excellent and free from corruption. I am heading a delegation of several lawyers and this is the second year of their audit in different countries. I have visited Austria, Russia, Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, and am now visiting Egypt. We have done 500 interviews and checked 10,000 documents.

What do you think of the reforms undertaken by Siemens in general and in Egypt in particular?

Siemens has made very important structural decisions. This happened under the new leadership of Peter Loescher, Sie-

Image © Getty Images

n this interview with The Majalla, Dr. Theodor Waigel, former German finance minister, and the man widely regarded as the “father of the euro,” asserts his continuing faith in the European currency, despite the damage inflicted upon it by the global economic crisis. Created as a response to the problem of world currencies, the euro can serve as a model from which to establish a global financial system with tighter controls, which Dr. Waigel says is an imperative step to preventing another global economic crisis. Predicting that it will take from 10 to 15 years for a full economic recovery, Weigel warns that we must prepare from now.

Having studied law and political science, Waigel began his career as a lawyer. He then moved to the economics ministry in the Bavarian State Government, where he took a seat as a member of the German parliament in 1972, which he held until 2002.

With an economics-related career spanning over 40 years, Mr. Waigel has held a number of other key positions, including spokesman for the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) on economic affairs and member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. After the death of Franz-Josef Srrauss, he was elected with a large majority as chairman of the CSU. The Majalla met with Dr. Waigel in Cairo where he is heading a delegation hired by the Department of Justice, Security Exchange Committee (DOJ/SEC) to audit Siemens.

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mens’ chief executive, who is a successful leader with international experience. I believe that the success and great advantage that characterizes Siemens is its ability to combine its international experience with the local spirit of the territory.

The representatives of Siemens are more in number than the representatives of the United Nations. As a German politician, I have never seen such a large number of representatives in any country. I am impressed with the work done in Egypt.

As an independent observer, I see that there is a need for collective action to promote fair competition (not just for the pricing of products), since such collective action will seek to reach the highest level of product quality, price and services, which would seriously challenge corruption throughout the world.

As a formal finance minister of Germany, how did the world crisis, in your opinion, affect developing countries?

We all know that the global financial crisis started with the United States. They were giving loans without paying any attention to the importance of making sure that people could pay them back. The value did not rise as they had expected and a crisis ensued.

The United States and Europe were hit strongest by the financial crisis. Fortunately, developing countries were not hit as hard as they didn't have such elements in their portfolios. Thus, they were lucky to walk away from the crisis quicker than the others. Not only was this in their interest, but also in the interest of the global economy.

We all know that the global financial crisis started with the United States. They were giving loans without paying any attention to the importance of making sure that people could pay them back I do believe that the solution to the problem that has been implemented on an international scale was successful. Contrary to the financial crisis of 1929, everyone has cooperated in facing the crisis together. They worked on providing the necessary cash flow through the implementation of stimulation economic reform and financial programs, which account for 3 percent of the GDP in Germany, for example.

Returning things to what was before the crises will take between 10 to 15 years. This crisis, which severely affected Europe, America and Japan, revealed the need to develop a credible strategy to cover the huge deficit. When we succeed, the problem will be solved permanently. If not, problems will continue to appear from time to time.

Do you see a way out?

There is an absolute necessity for a standard global financial system organized by tight control. Not only to audit the markets in which the elements of control are clear, but also to identify markets with no control in order to know it and its strategy.

Due to globalization, the world has become a small village, but it does not have a global system. This is extremely important and should be a priority for the coming years.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

How do you analyze Greece’s financial crisis and its impact on EU countries and the exchange markets?

Greece itself is not a problem since its share in the total GDP for the European Union is 2.6 percent, but it created a problem by constantly disbursing more than its income. Unfortunately, Greece did not provide accurate figures when it entered the European Monetary Union (EMU). It wasn't at the level of maturity to join the EMU for the euro. Moreover, there is an agreement linked to the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Its purpose was to deter countries from violating the established standards of the union through the use of warnings and fines.

Greece, like other countries, has benefited greatly from the introduction of the euro and should have used this to reduce its debt. Now, it has low interest rates, but with more debt than before. Greece must implement the reform programs in order to come out of this crisis. Europe is helping and has given assurances, but Greece must solve its own problems, first and foremost, its huge debt.

This raises a question relating to the global financial crisis. How can a country deal with such a significant increase in debt, caused by this crisis? Countries hit hardest will not recuperate in a year or two, but will require a period ranging between 10-15 years. Frankly, Greece won't cause problems for the euro, but if other euro area countries such as Germany, France and Italy solve their problems too, this will lead to a calm in financial markets.

EMU standards require that the deficit in the budget of any country not exceed 3 percent and debt not exceed 60 percent, but now almost all of the countries are no longer committed to this. Therefore, they need to work towards reaching these standards once again. This will also take time; it will be 10 years before we are able to create balanced financial relationships.

In your opinion, which countries were more effective in confronting the financial crisis? And are we ready to face another crisis?

Developing countries, for various reasons, have dealt better with the financial crisis. For example, Egypt is expecting a growth rate between 7 to 8 percent. The Europeans could never dream of this, although of course we know that higher inflation is in Egypt. Countries such as Egypt, India, China and others are already acting as a balance within the global financial system.

Though we now understand some of the reasons for the problems we have faced, we are still lacking in solutions. The G20 Summit is an ideal platform from which to discuss the global system. This is very important in order to avoid a crisis that arises for the same reasons. Because every new crisis is by nature different, we have no established mechanism to confront each one. It is no longer possible to solve these problems at the national level only; we must approach them globally.

How can this be applied to the euro?

The euro contains from 27 to 30 different European currencies.

I would say that now it is not on the same level as the American dollar and the Japanese yen and other currencies. However, even though the euro is now experiencing some pressure, it remains an important currency, and the decision to establish this currency was an important one for the Europeans. It came as a necessary response to overcome the crises of world currencies.

Image Š Getty Images

What are your expectations regarding the global economy?

There is no alternative to globalization. From time to time, there will be strikes directed at globalization, but it will continue on its path. Globalization must be equitable. In other words, people's roots and identity should be sustained.

There is famous saying: We must think on a global level, but when we work, we do it on a local level. I believe this is the correct method with which to meet the challenges of the next century.

EMU standards require that the deficit in the budget of any country not exceed 3 percent and debt not exceed 60 percent, but now almost all of the countries are no longer committed to this. Therefore, they need to work towards reaching these standards once again

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A History of Crossroads

Homayoun Tandar, Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom Nearly a decade after 9/11, and approaching yet another turning point in Afghanistan as the US begins withdrawing troops next summer, The Majalla spoke to His Excellency Homayoun Tandar, Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, about the prospects for stability in his country and region.

Eva Prag

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ince its independence in 1919, Afghanistan has been influenced by foreign forces, and the last 30 years of its existence have been characterized by particularly high levels of turmoil. Today, nearly a decade after the US invasion, the Taliban appears to be increasing its strength within Afghanistan as well as in neighboring Pakistan, and the future of the region is as uncertain as ever. The Majalla spoke to His Excellency Homayoun Tandar, Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, about the regional difficulties his country is facing and on the possibilities of national reconciliation.

Born and raised in Kabul, Ambassador Homayoun Tandar received a scholarship to study archeology at the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1981, he abandoned his PhD studies to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from Pakistan, and subsequently fought the Taliban through active diplomacy in the 1990s. In 2001, Ambassador Tandar was a member of the United Front delegation to the Rome negotiations and a signatory to the Bonn agreement on Afghanistan. Since then, he has served as an ambassador to Belgium and NATO, and has held posts as head of the Afghanistan Mission to the European Communities and as deputy national security adviser in Kabul. In short, Tandar knows the conflict in Afghanistan and the difficulties his country is facing from every which angle.

Last November, President Obama ordered an increase in troops of 30,000, bringing the total number of foreign forces in Afghanistan to about 100,000.

During the Soviet invasion there were up to 116,000 troops. Do numbers matter, and how far can stability be achieved through military means?

I refuse to draw a parallel between the Soviet occupation and the current situation. Afghanistan is not occupied, and the Afghans cannot accept any sort of national occupation. I was part of the mujahideen [Muslim fighters], I fought the Taliban in the 1990s, and I am a high-ranking civil servant now. If ever I feel for one minute that the foreign troops now are occupying my country, I will be in the mountains of Afghanistan, not in my office here in London. The war, the bombs, the weapons were never a solution to a human problem. They are a human problem. However, my personal experience is that, unfortunately, sometimes these weapons are necessary for people to become free. Having said that, the increased number in troops alone is not the solution. If we use it very intelligently, with the other instruments at hand—economic, social, political instruments—they may be useful. Alone, never.

Not in Afghanistan, not anywhere else. I only hope the decision to increase the number of troops was not made too late.

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After a decade of war, with a deadline set for the beginning of US withdrawal, do you think that the war has overshadowed the process of building a country?

Building a country is the responsibility of the Afghans, and I want to be a responsible man. What happens in Afghanistan and other countries like Afghanistan is not the duty of others.

We Afghans need a vision, within which we must define our own presence, and decide if we believe in our own existence. If the international community can help us, we have to thank that community, but if they are unable or unwilling to do so, that does not constitute the end of our own responsibilities.

Do you think the international community is still helping?

Yes. Fortunately for us, we have a historic chance, an opportunity to build our country and to go faster while the international community is present in Afghanistan. We have made many concrete achievements over the last 10 years: We have more than 6,000 miles of road throughout Afghanistan, compared to just 1,250 miles before the war. For the first time in history, we have $3 billion USD in monetary reserves and $3 billion USD in private banks. A number of regions now have access to electricity, whereas Kabul was without electricity a decade ago. We have more than 6.5 million Afghan children going to school.

We have reduced infant and maternal mortality, life expectancy has increased, and polio has been eliminated during this most unstable period. Furthermore, we have institutional, political achievements. All of this is part of a process.

How do we know that the presence and strategy of the coalition forces actually improves the situation over the long term?

I am a bit allergic to the use of the word “strategy.” Every year there are at least two different versions. I do not know what that words means. There is a risk that we are failing, but we cannot predict that before the time comes. If the strategy is just military it will surely fail, but there are also other aspects to it— governmental, economic, regional aspects. There are immediate improvements and improvements which will only become evident over time. We need time, and time is limited.

For now, we must be honest about what we are doing. Officially, foreign troops are in Afghanistan now because a group of individuals killed innocent people in New York in September 2001.

The international forces are not there mainly for the Afghans.

We have to be honest with the people about this. In terms of progress, if there is a withdrawal of troops before a real political situation, we are going to have a much greater economic crisis 51

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

and far more instability in our region as a whole. No one knows how far this would spread. There would be problems in Pakistan, in Central Asia, certainly in Yemen and beyond. I neither can nor will forget what happened after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, and that was on a very small scale. Now, if no political solution is found, extremists and fanatics will do everything possible to expand their ideology and methodology.

A coalition of forces, military institutions and a fundamentalist movement in Pakistan crushed the space for any other form of political expression, which strengthened extremism further Mistakes have been made. The invasion happened to do justice to the innocents who were killed in 9/11, and then the coalition forces themselves did the same thing in Afghan villages.

If the coalition had been more careful in their dealing with the people, I am sure the Taliban would have been defeated by now. Surely, if we do not see results quickly, if innocents continue to be killed, patience will run out. Furthermore, our task has been complicated by the US-Iraqi war. The decision to invade Iraq was a stain on democracy, just as the Taliban is a stain on Islam. There was no justification for that war. It was made in the name of democracy, and I cannot accept that. The effect on Afghanistan is one thing, but there are deeper effects in our minds and in our hearts, and the duty of democrats has been much complicated in our region.

In your view, which is a greater obstacle to peace; the internal or the external tensions facing Afghanistan?

Sincerely, I do not see the deep and real reasons in Afghanistan for our war. I know that in Western intellectual circles there is this idea of ethnicity as a root of conflict in all poor countries. As a citizen of one of those poor countries, I am certain that this is a wrong perception. Diversity cannot be an element of war. There are deeper reasons, such as economics, geopolitics, history and foreign interventions. I have to recognize that in Afghanistan and some other countries we do have a structural weakness in the political sphere—but not in society as such. Politicians use the existing di-

Image © Getty Images

Do you think the Afghan people feel that foreign forces are there to create difficulties rather than solve them? Is their patience running out?

Some people in Western countries who have access to the international media say that we are imposing Western values on Afghanistan. This is supposedly a bad thing because Afghanistan is a tribal country, etc. My view is that we are at a state in human history where universal values are created, and Afghans are part of humanity. Those values are democracy, human rights, modern state, a better quality of life. In the past, the Islamic world was the human reference and we would transmit the human values to the rest of the world. Today, as part of a historical process over centuries, things have changed, but that does not make the values any less universal. We should accept that.

versity for their own interests because of their own lack of vision for their nation. Having said that, I truly believe that there is no difference between a Pashtun farmer in Helmand and an Uzbek farmer in Jowzjan. They are in exactly the same situation.

The real obstacle to peace is to be found in our region. A few decades back, there were a number of crazy ideas of being big and powerful amongst a small group in Pakistan’s ISI, which grew stronger during the 1980s. The ISI claimed that they were the ones who had defeated the Soviets when it was really the Afghans. They put their own people in power to realize their aims, ideology and strategy. The ISI and the Pakistani military cut the democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people in half.

The military coup d’etat was the beginning of the implementation of this strategy. A coalition of forces, military institutions and a fundamentalist movement in Pakistan crushed the space for any other form of political expression, which strengthened extremism further. State institutions then became political and strategic instruments of the military to extend this strategy in Afghanistan. We saw this in the creation of the Taliban.

So is Afghanistan still an instrument to the ISI? Brilliant people in the West say that the ISI has changed, and that the problem is with a small movement within the

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the rules of the game, that is a democracy. Unfortunately, that is exactly what they do not want to do.

The Taliban represents a very small minority in Afghanistan.

Polls have shown that less than four percent of Afghans are in favor of the Taliban being in power. The Taliban is not a defender of Afghanistan. Some people are frustrated by a socioeconomic and political situation. Some feel hopeless and in this situation, maybe some are proud to say that so-called Muslims would do what the Taliban does. It may make them feel more powerful, but this is a miscalculation. The Taliban killed Muslims during Friday prayers, and no Muslim is ready to do that.

Their ideology is a great danger to Islam, and I say that as a Muslim. We have to see other ways. We have to show our force in terms of human progress, better life, better education, and better access to knowledge. Not through more killing.

Are coalition forces meant to encourage negotiations with the Taliban or to fight them?

This is a decision for Afghans to make, not the coalition forces.

My president has decided that we should start negotiations.

This process has two different elements, one of which is reintegration, the other being reconciliation. We have already started reintegration and have had some success ending violence across various cities. The decision to start a process of reconciliation was made at the Kabul conference in June. Unfortunately, the response of the Taliban has been entirely negative. They have answered this peace initiative by killing innocents. But we want to be patient. The aim of our policy is so fantastic, and personally I am a little bit afraid. I fear that peace for the population of Afghanistan is not the ultimate aim of the Taliban. Recently in an interview, I think it was on the BBC, a spokesperson for the Taliban said, “for us, Islam is the first priority, Afghanistan comes second”—what they call Islam. There are many messages in this statement. I would be happy to be wrong on this, but I am not sure. These people think that they will go to the paradise of God by killing people, Afghans or not. organization, not in the organization itself. I am not so sure.

But they say that, and I hope that they continue to use all of their influence not only to reduce the influence of this group within the ISI but to eliminate it entirely. We have to fight the ISI for what they do in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We must be behind the elected government of Pakistan and support the democratic process.

Decades after its creation the Taliban remains somewhat of an enigma. Would you say it is a movement or an organization?

I am not in a think tank nor in an academic position, which enables me to draw that distinction. To me, the Taliban represents an ideology, which causes the death of Afghans and the destruction of Afghanistan. What matters is that the Taliban threatens my future and my achievements. I, as a citizen, as a father, as a friend, have to defend those achievements. I want to say to the Taliban, “please join me in doing this. You are Afghans, like me. You have your ideas, but please do not impose them on my country by killing people. Accept the game. Propose your solutions to the Afghan people if you have any, and allow the people to decide.” Extremist movements exist everywhere, but they should accept Issue 1557 • October 2010

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Do you personally think that reconciliation is possible?

It is necessary. It is obligatory for all of us. But when I think about this question more deeply, “negotiation” means “speaking,” and I am not sure people are free to speak in Afghanistan.

With our history, as a people, as a nation, as individuals, as a culture, we have become prisoners of our own situation. A large part of Afghans, and this is not just true for Afghans, suffer because we cannot express what we feel. To me, wherever there is a war, the ability to speak is imprisoned somewhere inside humans, and we have to rehabilitate that. We have to talk about our problems, about ourselves, about our culture, about our history, and about our future.

So just the process of negotiations in itself is an important step in the right direction?

It is, and we have to show the Afghan people that the government is sincere.

We have experienced a number of different regimes. We did monarchy, dictatorship, communism, theocracy. It doesn’t work. We have to at least try democracy.

Is Afghanistan at another turning point?

I don’t know. I really don’t know.

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Kuwait Timeline 1937 Large oil reserves discovered by the US-British Kuwait Oil Company. Exploitation is delayed by World War II, but thereafter fuels the country's development into a modern commercial center.

1961 Kuwait becomes independent with the end of the British protectorate and joins the Arab League. Iraq renews claims that Kuwait is part of its territory but backs down after British military intervention.

1980 Iran-Iraq war - Kuwait supports Iraq strategically and financially.

1981 National Assembly recalled; dissolved again in 1986.

1990 Iraq invades and annexes Kuwait.

1991 Iraq fails to comply with a UN resolution ordering it to pull out, leading to a US-led and UN-backed aerial campaign in Kuwait and Iraq. By late February allied forces reach Kuwait City. Iraqi forces torch oil wells as they pull out.

2005 Parliament approves a law allowing women to vote and run for parliament. In June the first female cabinet minister, Massouma Al-Mubarak, is appointed.

2006 Women cast their votes for the first time, in a municipal by-election, comprising 60% of voters.

2009 Three women MPs win seats in parliamentary elections and the constitutional court rules women can obtain passports without the consent of their husbands.

In another ruling, it decides that female MPs are not required to wear an Islamic head cover. Later, that same year, the prime minister survives an attempt by the opposition to remove him over corruption allegations.

(Source: BBC)

Image © Getty Images

2003 US-led forces cross border from Kuwait to Iraq to disarm and oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Image © iStockphoto

1951 Major public-works program begins. Infrastructure is transformed; standard of living greatly improves

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The beginning The first permanent settlers established the state of Kuwait and elected Sabah I bin Jaber as the first emir in 1756. The current ruling family of Kuwait, Al-Sabah, are descendants of Sabah.

At this time, the state served as a hub of trade between India, the horn of Africa, the Nejd, Mesopotamia and the Levant, and had one of the largest sea fleets in the Persian Gulf region.

By the late 19th century, much of the Arabian Peninsula came under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, causing Kuwait to enter into a treaty with the United Kingdom, giving the British extensive control of the country’s foreign policy in exchange for protection and annual subsidy.

Kuwait achieved independence from the British under Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah on 19 June 1961. In the following decades, Kuwait enjoyed an unprecedented period of prosperity under Emir Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, who died in 1977 after ruling for 12 years. The country was quietly transformed into a developed welfare state with a free market economy.

Operation Desert Storm On 2 August 1991, Kuwait became the focal point of international attention when Saddam Hussein sent his army into the country after weeks of accusing the emirate of pumping too much oil and years of claiming that Kuwait was in fact part of Iraq. The international community led by US President George H.W. Bush responded promptly and with a final ultimatum given in November 1990, demanding that Iraqi forces withdraw by 15 January 1991. When this demand was not met, the allies opened an air campaign against Iraq on 17 August, constituting the biggest American-led assault since World War II. Operation Desert Storm, as the campaign was named, lasted until 28 February 1991. Following Kuwaiti liberation, the UN, under Security Council Resolution 687, demarcated the Iraq-Kuwait boundary on the basis of the 1932 and 1963 agreements between the two states. In November 1994, Iraq formally accepted the UNdemarcated border with Kuwait. The success of the campaign was seen as a new beginning for the UN and the post-Cold War international community as a whole.

Kuwait played host once again when that same international community appeared to be falling apart 12 years later as soldiers crossed the border into Iraq to begin the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. The country remains an important transit route for forces and civilians moving in and out of Iraq.

An all too powerful state While Kuwait’s very existence can be traced back to its origin as a regional trading center, many Kuwaitis today are dissatisfied with the absence of business and investment opportunities in their country. Despite having the world's fifth largest oil reserves, Kuwait does not attract significant foreign direct investIssue 1557 • October 2010

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Key Facts

Image © iStockphoto

A

small country placed at the heart of a tumultuous region, Kuwait reveals an interesting history with possible lessons for its neighbors. With a strong constitution forming the backbone of the system, the country has made exemplary strides towards more democratic and empowering rule over recent years. However, this development is fragile and threatened by internal divisions and, perhaps more importantly, Kuwait’s position in an unstable and oftentimes explosive region.

Capital: Kuwait President: Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jabir Al-Sabah (since 29 January 2006) Crown Prince: Nawaf Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah Head of Government: Prime Minister Nasir Al-Muhammad Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah (since 7 February 2007) Geography Area: 17,818 km Border countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran PEOPLE Population: 2.7 million Ethnic Groups: Kuwaiti 45%, other Arab 35%, South Asian 9%, Iranian 4%, other 7 Religions: Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shi’a 30%), other (incl. Christian, Hindu, Parsi) 15% Languages: Arabic (English widely spoken) ECONOMY GDP: $111.3 billion (2009 est.)

GDP per capita: $52,800 Main export: Oil (95%) Inflation rate (consumer prices): 4% (2009 est.)

Unemployment rate: 2.2% (2004 est.) ment (FDI), largely due to bureaucratic obstacles and barriers to doing business in Kuwait. After the 2006 elections, many Kuwaitis were hoping for changes to government rules, which would allow land to be allocated for business projects, but their efforts were blocked in parliament. Oil remains the sole driving force of Kuwait’s economy, and the dominance of the state in this sector means that the majority of the population is employed by the state. Unlike in some other oil rich countries, oil income accrues to the Kuwaiti state, not the ruling family. However, the state is immensely powerful, and its control contributes to apathy in society and protection of the status quo. Various groups are suspicious of privatization due to fear of corruption and the general failure to reform the state-controlled economy, which causes frustration among the population.

Political tensions Kuwait was the first Arab country in the Gulf to have an elected parliament. The parliament sets the emir's salary and is the nation's sole source of legislation. However, although it enjoys considerable power, it also lacks the political institutions to evaluate and recommend sound domestic policies. Furthermore, increased fighting within parliament has derailed policies without proposing alternatives. Major differences exist between factions in the opposition, particularly between Islamists and non-Islamists, who disagree over the role of Islam in state and society. Political parties are officially banned, so candidates tend to play on tribal and sectarian loyalties.

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The 2009 elections were forced when Kuwait's ruler, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, dissolved arliament to end its latest standoff with the cabinet, during which lawmakers accused cabinet members of misconduct or corruption. Tensions between parliament and the ruling family are not helped by the fact that Sheikh Sabah has consistently reappointed as prime minister his nephew, Sheikh Nasser Al-Muhammad Al-Sabah, in addition to giving other essential cabinet posts to family members. This was the third such standoff in three years and these tensions have inevitably further slowed economic reforms.

Evolutionary change Hence, as Paul Salem of the Carnegie Endowment wrote in a 2007 report, while other Arab republics have regressed into dictatorships or pulled back from a democratic process like Jordan, “Kuwait increasingly stands out as an important, even if imperfect example.” Perhaps the most important factor in this development is the Kuwaiti constitution, which has not been imported from abroad or imposed by colonial powers. The constitution, which is protected and amended by parliament, is viewed as the backbone of the entire Kuwaiti system and is not to be manipulated or disregarded. The strength of the constitution causes reformers to be reluctant to push for changes that require amendments to the constitution. This means that change is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, which may be the very strength of the process. Indeed, regional instability appears to be the greatest threat to developments in Kuwait, and sadly the evolutionary changing emirate has failed to inspire its neighbors for the time being.

Image © iStockphoto

Women’s rights Sheikh Jabir Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah issued a decree giving women full political rights in 1999, but it did was not approved by the Islamist dominated parliament until 2005. When women gained the right to vote and stand in local and parliamentary elections,it was rightfully seen as a major victory for women’s rights. "We made it. This is history," said suffrage activist Roula Dashti to the BBC. "Our target is the parliamentary polls in 2007. I'm starting my campaign from today." However, many conservatives resisted the idea, and Islamists urged voters not to elect women to the 50-seat assembly. It would take another four years for women to actually be elected, as was the case in May 2009 when four women won seats. The winners were Rola Dashti, an American-educated economist; Salwa Al-Jassar and Aseel Al-Awadi, who are both professors; and Massouma Al-Mubarak, who in 2005 became the country's first female cabinet minister. Although this was certainly a historic moment, it was an event that appeared to reflect a deep popular frustration with the political deadlock in the country born out of the parliamentary divisions and tensions

between parliament and the ruling family. Indeed, women’s rights are still a major point of contention as Kuwaiti women continue to experience legal, economic and social discrimination. In October 2009, Kuwait’s constitutional court ruled that women could gain a passport without the consent of their husbands. The ruling came as a result of one woman complaining that her husband prevented her from leaving the country. This serves as a reminder that although Kuwait has made exemplary strides towards greater protection of women’s rights, equal rights activists still have a strong cause, demanding equal rights to e.g. government housing and passing on citizenship to their children.

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• THE ARTS

Art for Art’s Sake The Beirut Art Center In the midst of Lebanon’s tumultuous contemporary history the Beirut Art Center has aimed to create a space for independent initiatives, which a handful of artists, curators and cultural practitioners have managed to profit from. As it continues to evolve, the independent art space is sure to break further ground while ruffling some more feathers along the way—and that’s exactly what the Lebanese art scene needs.

Maymannah Farhat Despite its reputation as a world-class destination for culture, Beirut’s art scene has been hindered by sociopolitical factors since the mid 1970s—as the onset of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 marked the end of the city’s reign as an intellectual center.

Once home to the region’s leading thinkers, activists and artists, nearly two decades of war not only ravaged the country’s civil infrastructure, it also viciously shook the national psyche.

During this time artists often produced in isolation or in exile against the backdrop of the Lebanese art world, which was at a virtual standstill. Although the conflict ended in 1990, Lebanon continues to be plagued by incessant squabbles among various factions, not to mention excessive bureaucracy mixed with political corruption.

A number of shattering events, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the Israel-Hezbollah war one year later, have only perpetuated its instability. As mere survival and reconstruction have been Lebanon’s focus over the past 20 years, the cultural sector has long suffered with a lack of official sponsorship and little interest from the public. This has created the desperate need for independent initiatives, which a handful of artists, curators and cultural practitioners have worked assiduously to create.

It is amidst this dismal setting that the Beirut Art Center (BAC) opened its doors in early 2009. Founded by former gallerist Sandra Dagher and new media artist Lamia Joreige with the support of private donors, the groundbreaking non-profit association has quickly become indispensable to the Lebanese art scene. With an expansive gallery space, a screening and performance room, a mediatheque and bookshop, the art space offers a wide range of events that are open to the public throughout the year, including local and international exhibitions, lectures, workshops and concerts. Located in an up-and-coming industrial area on the outskirts of the city near the Beirut River, the center has shifted the peripheries of creativity and discourse in both a physical and intellectual sense. (Another prominent organization, Ashkal Alwan, the Lebanese Association for Plastic Arts, will be opening its long awaited Homeworks Academy, geared towards artists, students and researchers, in a hallowed warehouse next door).

With a number of critically acclaimed events and projects, such as the solo shows of leading contemporary artists Akram Zaatari and Walid Sadek, and group exhibitions that step out of the so-called regional box like “America” (2009)—which brought the work of high profiled artists Kara Walker and Jenny Holzer to the Middle East—BAC has seized the attention of the global art scene furthering Beirut’s profile. It has done so because of the seasoned understanding of the Leba-

nese art scene possessed by both its founders and collaborators.

From guest curators such as art dealer Saleh Barakat to multidisciplinary artist Rabih Mroue, who serves on BAC’s board, the center has worked within an intricate network of the local scene. As such, the general reaction to its programming has been overwhelmingly affirmative and enthusiastic.

“Since our opening we are happy that the response of the local audience has been very positive,” confirmed Dagher and Joreige. “We have regular visitors and a varied audience, especially because of our weekly parallel events. We also have very positive responses from international visitors.”

When asked about the regional and international challenges they might face, the co-directors asserted, “Our challenges are not necessarily regional or international; BAC is mainly a space for the local audience. The challenges of the center are of course like most of the non profit organizations—to insure our sustainability and to widen our audience.”

Dagher, the former owner of the successful commercial Beirut art space Espace SD and a co-curator of the first ever Lebanese Pavilion at the 52nd Venice Biennale in 2007, is perhaps all too familiar with the arduous negotiations that are very much a part of the process of securing funding for cultural programming. So far the center has been able to obtain backing from several patrons and corporate sponsors in addition to the occasional support of foreign philanthropic organizations. The center’s foundational strength lies in what its co-curators refer to as its “cautious and realistic” structure, which has allowed it to execute its vision of serving as “a catalyst for the realization of contemporary art projects and for the interaction of local and international cultural players.”

Some detractors have accused BAC of focusing on a particular subset of the Beirut art scene, one dominated by new media and conceptual work created by the “post-war” generation that emerged in the 1990s and is now highly visible in the global art scene. While a number of previously featured artists do belong to this facet of Lebanese art, it is only to be expected, as both Joreige and Mroue are two of its pioneering figures. And yet the center seems to be finding the perfect balance between presenting both this world-renowned group alongside other well-known artists from across the region and those that might otherwise be overlooked.

During its first year of operation, for example, it presented a range of exhibitions—opening with “Closer,” featuring globally recognized Arab artists Mona Hatoum, Jananne Al-Ani and Emily Jacir, and continuing with “Exposure,” a juried group show of emerging talent, and “The Road to Peace: Paintings in Times of War 1975-1991,” which highlighted works that were executed by Lebanese modernists and contemporary painters during the Lebanese Civil War. With such a diverse history of art and an artistic landscape that is rapidly changing, it is actually quite striking that the BAC has been able to cover so much in such a short period of time. As it continues to evolve, the independent art space is sure to break further ground while ruffling some more feathers along the way—and that’s exactly what the Lebanese art scene needs.

Maymanah Farhat – Art historian specializing in modern and contemporary Arab art. She is based in New York.

This article was first published in The Majalla 7 September 2010

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Mapping Perspectives Witness – Mona Hatoum at the Beirut Art Center Although maps are relied upon to represent an aspect of the physical world in an objective way, they naturally reflect a perspective of its creator. In Mona Hatoum’s recent exhibition at the Beirut Art Center, the artist explores the concept of the map in various provocative ways.

Jim Quilty Consider the map: an object created to represent some aspect of the physical world, purporting to be objective but naturally reflecting the perspective of the mapmaker. If you concede that all art is basically impressions upon media, the map is, of all genres, the most totalizing in its pretensions.

It seems appropriate, then, that “the map” is one of several strong motifs in Witness, an exhibition of new and recent work

by UK-based Palestinian artist Mona Hatoum, nowadays on display at the Beirut Art Center (BAC).

This show is suffused with political content, none of it partisan or evocative of Palestine in any parochial sense, but the most impressive thing about these works, many of which emerged from the artist’s recent three-month residency at the BAC, is the sheer profusion of media she deploys. Witness features many sturdy metal works— in iron, bronze, brass and stainless steel—and others contrived from more fragile media—glass, tissue paper and the artist’s hair.

The most monumental of the map works in Witness is “Tectonic” (2010). Literally a map of glass, it is comprised of an array of 16 square, reflective panels measuring 3.5 x 510 x 510 centimeters.

Insofar as its continents do not necessarily match those found in a standard store-bought atlas, “Tectonic” evokes a post-colonial critique of the exercise of map-drawing. Reflecting the geo-political bias of the times, 20th-century world maps tended to misrepresent Europe and North America as physically larger than the southern continents.

Hatoum’s continents have been flattened to obliterate the notion of geo-political centrality and scale. South America is far larger than North America and Africa vies with Eurasia (let alone Europe) in size.

The medium demands attention as much as the represented image. The map’s panels are heavy blocks of glass, so both apparent robustness and fragility are integral to the work. In the way of maps, the panels sub-divide geography equally and symmetrically, and so are quite at odds with the contiguity of the landmasses themselves. Reflecting the gallery’s artificial lighting, the glass reminds the viewer that, unlike other maps, this one doesn’t claim to be the real world.

The glass map is reiterated in more intimate (indeed somewhat anachronistic) terms with “Blançoires” (2010). This piece returns to one of Hatoum’s oft-revisited motifs: a pair of impractically hung children’s swings.

The glass seats (40 x 65 x 355 cms each) are suspended from stainless steel chains, again evoking illusory “sturdiness.” Upon one seat is engraved a map of (“Christian”) eastern Beirut while the (“Muslim”) western half of the city is rendered upon the other. The swings are hung in a way that, if either one moves in the manner that is its wont, it will collide with the other, suggesting the two halves of the city are fixed in division and stasis.

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The map motif is also evident in some of the exhibition’s older work. 3-D cities (2008), for instance, is comprised of printed maps of Kabul, Baghdad and Beirut set upon a wooden base.

Using a cutting tool (several of Hatoum’s works use a child’s paper-doll technique to form images in various media) the artist has alternatively elevated neighborhoods into convex domes or depressed other areas into concave craters.

Apparently this additional dimension intends to represent how certain neighborhoods have undergone development while others have been depleted by violence. If that was the artist’s intent, these maps are (like those in ‘Blançoires’) very much snapshots of their time. In the two years since the Beirut map was devised, for instance, at least one of the “depressed” neighborhoods has since begun to experience its own real estate boom.

Perhaps the most intriguing of Hatoum’s map-works is “Interior / Exterior Landscape” (2010), a mixed-media installation that mimics a bedroom—the room’s arrangement being a projection of its tenant’s mental landscape.

Upon entering the room, the viewer finds a rack of wall-hung coat pegs. Dangling from one peg is a shopping bag, cleverly devised from a world map that’s been segmented with scissors.

On the next two pegs, a pair of rounded coat hangers hang alongside one another, creating the effect of partially overlapping circles. Upon the portion of wall that these hangers frame, Hatoum has pencil-sketched an outline of the eastern and western hemispheres—reproducing yet another style of world map.

The map motif is variously reiterated in the installation’s other objects as well. On the floor adjacent the coat pegs sits a metal stool. Weathered, corroded by wear and tear, drizzled with drops of paint, the seat too resembles a map—the continents comprised of a stratigraphy of spilt paint, original coloring and, at bottom, corroded metal.

Against the next wall is a worn antique desk with a chairback rising like a mountain range from the midst of the desktop. Cracks and flaws in the wood mark the desk’s landscape, as do residues of paint and coffee cup stains. The partially open drawer is lined with soiled paper, decorated in colorful cartoon images of leaves, flowers and toadstools.

In a canary cage hanging from the next wall sits a small, carefully crafted hairball. Against the same wall is an old-fashioned cot.

The pillowcase is adorned with a sewn pattern that could represent continental shorelines. The job was abandoned partway through, and the un-sewn threads emerging from the pillow resemble human hair. The same substance streams from the bedsprings, as though it had been pulled away over the years from a now-absent body, or the metal and the hair were somehow of the same substance.

A map, a piece of paper marking the path from place to place, reverberates with meaning beyond its utility. In practice, it represents how spaces used to look or how, if things go according to plan, they will look. The material restlessness of the map-works in Mona Hatoum’s Witness serves to add an extra dimension to this discussion, reminding spectators that media and representation are inseparable.

Jim Quilty – A Beirut-based Canadian journalist and the editor of the arts and culture desk at The Daily Star, Beirut’s English-language daily.

Over the last decade he has written about the politics, arts and cultural production of the Middle East and North Africa.

This article was first published in The Majalla 22 September 2010 59

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• THE CRITICS

Governance in the Arab World The Arab State: Assisting or Obstructing Development? by Paul Salem Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, July 2010 Paul Salem’s The Arab State: Assisting or Obstructing Development? focuses on governance in the Arab world, addressing both the causes for current conditions and suggestions for moving beyond them.

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ood governance is key to improving peoples’ lives, but the Arab world scores either worst or second worst after sub-Saharan Africa on most governance indicators. Most Arab states remain highly authoritarian, although there is a growing dynamism in civil society and among opposition parties, both secular and Islamist. Meanwhile, those states that are not authoritarian (Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine) are destabilized by internal division or foreign domination.

As is well known, the challenges faced by the Arab world are many, both in terms of development and security. The population of around 320 million continues to grow quickly. Roughly 60 percent of the population is under the age of 25, requiring the creation of more than 50 million new jobs in the next 10 years. Poverty persists at around 40 percent and illiteracy lies at an average of 30 percent, with women being particularly vulnerable in all respects.

In terms of security, after 60 years the Israeli–Arab conflict shows no signs of resolution, and the US-led occupation of Iraq has added to suffering and instability in the region. International tensions with Iran threaten to ignite new forms of conflict, while internal divisions have led to civil wars across the region. Although Arab–Turkish relations have improved markedly, Arab–Iranian relations are tense, adding to less than perfect inter-Arab relations.

Adding to this are the many flawed systems of governance.

All but Saudi Arabia and a few gulf emirates have elected parliaments, however these elections are tightly controlled and have become part of the legitimizing political discourse of incumbent regimes. The monarch or president is generally beyond parliamentary accountability, and the influence of the intelligence services is pervasive. In civil society, groups have been largely unable to mobilize mass followings or force major political change. As Salem asserts, the state remains the hegemonic player, and its relationship with civil society is one of convenience rather than partnership. Almost all Arab states now have written constitutions, but in practice, the executive branch dominates other branches. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that in a number of countries, a state of emergency declared decades ago remains in force.

“The state gives rights and liberties,” says Salem, “and the state can take them away.”

Against this backdrop, Salem convincingly links the lack of good governance to lack of development in the Arab world.

He contends that the political and social contract offered by the Arab state has been stalled and one-sided, which prevents residents from identifying primarily as citizens of a state rather than members of an ethnic or religious group. In the World Values Survey 2003, 70 percent of respondents in Arab countries said that they believe their “country is run for the benefit of the influential few.”

Arab civil society has sought to tackle this problem by promoting the values of equity and inclusion. This development is strengthened by increased access to non-state media, as citizens generally have access to hundreds of international television channels and dozens of pan-Arab channels. Furthermore, the internet has provided a forum for indirect participation. With these developments, the Arab state is operating in an increasingly complex and diversified society and polity, despite remaining highly authoritarian.

Still, political reforms are made only grudgingly, partly as a concession to Western pressure and partly as a way to let off steam internally. Incentives are weakened by the fact that new donors have emerged, including China and the oil-rich Gulf States, who emphasize state-to-state deals and are not sensitive to democratic or rights issues.

Even the West has shifted attention from democracy promotion—after George W. Bush’s presidency—to other issues such as climate change and the global economic crisis. Barack Obama’s presidency has clearly focused on mutual respect and security cooperation rather than democracy promotion.

In other words, full democracy in the Arab world is a distant goal. Yet, Salem maintains that considerable progress has been made and should be encouraged further. Over the past two decades the concepts of democracy, good governance and human rights have become the dominant discourse in the Arab world.

Regimes have moved slightly forward by allowing limited political openings, and Salem argues that they can no longer roll the clock back, making the current plateau a better staging ground for future “democratic moments,” should they arise.

It is impossible to predict when and where this breakthrough might emerge, if at all. Hence, Salem argues that investment must be made in a wide array of initiatives, which inform, empower, include and activate. He emphasizes the role of the international community in this respect, saying that it should maintain its moral and material commitment to this process through support for civil society, parliaments, marginalized groups and much more, while maintaining pressure and conditionality on Arab regimes.

One can only hope that Salem is right in his assertion that broader participation in the political process can be achieved, and that this modest goal is close enough for it not to fall victim to the many security and development challenges that are lurking around the corner.

This article was first published in The Majalla 21 September 2010

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Between Faith and Power Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East by Bernard Lewis Oxford University Press 2010 This new collection of lectures and articles by Bernard Lewis confirms the controversial image that has surrounded his past work. However, his vast knowledge of the region and clear analysis also solidifies his position as one of the most influential academics in his field. In Faith and Power, Lewis analyses the ever-relevant relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East.

Bernard Lewis, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, is widely acclaimed to be one of the world’s top scholars on the Middle East. His scholarship is surrounded by controversy, however, as his theories about What Went Wrong (2001) in the Middle East formed the intellectual justification for the war in Iraq. Indeed, Dick Cheney, who headed the guest list at Lewis’ 90th birthday party, stated, “ [Lewis’] wisdom is sought daily by policymakers, diplomats, fellow academics, and the news media.” American scholar Edward Said, on the other hand, has accused him of “downright ignorance.”

Lewis’ new collection of lectures and articles both confirms the controversy and solidifies his position as one of the most influential academics in his field. Drawing on his vast historical knowledge of the region, Lewis analyses the relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East, the prospects for democratic governance in the region, and how this relates to the Western world.

An underlying theme throughout the book is the separation between religion and politics, or lack thereof. According to Lewis, the formative scriptural narratives of Islam are very different from those of Judaism and Christianity. Whereas Moses was not permitted to enter the Promised Land and Christ was crucified, Muhammad conquered his promised land and hounded his own state. In other words, the separation of church and state was a Christian solution to a Christian dilemma, and has had little or no meaning in the classical Islamic context. Lewis views Christendom and Islam as civilizations that have been in perpetual collision since the latter’s advent in the 7th century. This tends to give his analysis a somewhat deterministic flair, insinuating that future clashes are inevitable.

Lewis’ new collection of lectures and articles both confirms the controversy and solidifies his position as one of the most influential academics in his field Issue 1557 • October 2010

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Lewis argues that the Middle East is currently backwards and its decline was a largely self-inflicted condition resulting from both culture and religion, as opposed to the post-colonialist view. Thus, the West and America in particular tend to be portrayed as a somewhat passive receiver of Muslim hostility. Lewis argues that Muslims have been outraged by the rise of the West and that it is “natural” that the greatest anger is turned against that power which is seen as the leader of the West, i.e. America. The recent interventions in the Middle East are also presented in this light, with Lewis emphasizing the peaceful response to the numerous attacks on US government installations during the 1980s and 1990s.

“It was not until 9/11 that Washington felt compelled to respond with force, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, which were perceived as the sources of these attacks,” Lewis asserts, while somehow leaving out the importance of the very confrontational policies of the Bush administration.

However, at times Lewis also proves his critics wrong by offering a thoroughly nuanced view of the history of Middle East, arguing that understanding is the only way forward and accentuating that at “no point do the basic text of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder.” He further asserts that “to speak of dictatorship as being the immemorial way of doing things in that part of the world is simply untrue. It shows ignorance of the Arab past, contempt for the Arab present, and unconcern for the Arab future.” In other words, the traditional system of Islamic government is both consensual and contractual and that oppressive Middle Eastern regimes are modern, indeed recent, and very alien to the foundations of Islamic civilization.

Nevertheless, while Lewis argues that “conditions have never been better for democracy to take root” he fails to clarify exactly how to best take advantage of this precious historical moment.

One statement asserting that “democratic ideas have deep roots in these countries, and given the chance, they may soon prevail, and in so doing, inspire others” is curiously followed by quite another argument in the following chapter: “No one can give, still less impose, freedom.” This is then contradicted in yet another chapter, where Lewis controversially contends: “Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.”

Faith and Power is thus a somewhat confusing mix of assertions highlighting that something must be done, offset by an unwillingness to specify how to proceed. Lewis underlines continuously that as a historian he has very little to say about the future, and yet he makes very powerful statements about it.

Bernard Lewis’ perhaps most important message is the essential importance of cooperation and understanding in what he calls a clash of civilizations, “[and] in this clash, in this generalized mood of resentment, every difference is exaggerated, every quarrel exacerbated.” In such an age of growing tension, Lewis’ work certainly constitutes an important contribution to an ever-relevant debate about the relations between faith and power.

This article was first published in The Majalla 29 September 2010 61

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• THE FINAL WORD

Sadat’s Shadow For more than two decades, the United States has tried to conclude a peace agreement between the PLO and Israel. Will the latest round of negotiations fail to challenge the status quo?

Adel Al Toraifi

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or more than two decades, the United States has tried to conclude a peace agreement between the PLO and Israel. In the beginning there were the 1993 Oslo accords—a difficult breakthrough to be sure, however, these were the agreements that provided an opportunity to form much-needed state institutions inside the Palestinian territories.

Yet this did not happen due to the influence of religious parties on both sides, and as a result of dozens of suicide attacks carried out by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements. However, the failure of the peace process cannot be attributed only to the actions of Hamas, but also to a series of errors committed by the Palestinian Authority (PA), most notably the militarization of the second Intifada, and the regional effort exerted by some parties to disable any settlement that would be capable of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Perhaps the important question here is: Will the latest round of negotiations fail to challenge the status quo?

The truth is that the US administration has chosen the worst time, in the current era, to pressure the parties to sit at the negotiating table. It is true that many people, both inside and outside the region, have continuously urged the administration to revitalize the peace process, but mere pressure does not guarantee any tangible progress on the ground.

Will the latest round of negotiations fail to challenge the status quo?

Why? The answer is clear: Whoever observes the situation inside the Palestinian territories and Israel will see that there is a (relative) sense of satisfaction among the positions of all three parties (Israel, the PA and Hamas). Let’s start with Israel, where the construction of the dividing wall has achieved concrete results: suicide attacks have dropped to their lowest level, and since the war in Gaza in September 2008 Israel has not suffered from many rocket-propelled grenade attacks, at least not from Hamas.

In other words, the Israeli siege of Gaza, whilst keeping Hamas in power, has achieved a kind of calm on the frontline, due to Hamas’ commitment to the ceasefire. For Hamas, since it assumed control of the Gaza Strip in the wake of the June 2007 coup, it has proven its ability to govern and impose its full authority on the area. At the same time, a state of neither peace nor war has provided a strong popular rationale for the movement, which has allowed it to remain a resistance movement and reject the Israeli presence. As for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, it has consented to the status quo and now focuses its work on transforming the West Bank into a stable, secure and economic model, then, perhaps, it will succeed in convincing the population to abandon the Hamas government in Gaza.

The US vision of peace is still transfixed, to a large extent, upon Sadat’s model. Despite the passing of three decades since President Anwar Sadat’s historic visit to Israel in 1977, many of those concerned with the issue of peace believe that what is lacking in the current peace process is a courageous Arab leader capable of taking the decision for peace in the face of opponents on both sides. Sadat’s model is applicable with regards to countries such as Jordan and Syria where it is possible to restore land through serious negotiations, which requires a degree of compromise (concessions) in what are considered negotiations from the ground up.

The Palestinian situation is different, as what unites Palestinian movements and groups is resistance to occupation, not any consensus on the essence of a Palestinian state. Certainly, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Fatih held the vision of what should constitute a Palestinian state, and the Oslo, Wye River and the second Camp David negotiations reflect that. But Arafat and his movement could not achieve a consensus amongst Palestinians, domestically and abroad, on the principle of a Palestinian state living side by side with the state of Israel. Palestinian parties and groups have always remained hostage to their loyalties and a foreign agenda. With the exception of the slogan, “liberate the land,” which has long been exploited financially and morally, these rival movements and groups have nothing in common in terms of a dream for a united country. Therefore, they will remain in competition and strive for funding from foreign sources, no matter how detrimental the agenda of those sources, in relation to the project of establishing a civil Palestinian state.

Like Jehan Sadat asserts in her book, I Hope For Peace (2009), in order to discover herself she must come out from the “shadow of Sadat,” so must the US administration step out of Sadat’s shadow and come to the realization that true peace will not be achieved by signing an interim agreement between the parties. Instead, America needs to encourage the Palestinians to build a state by contributing to the improvement of Palestinians’ lives and the alleviation of suffering in both the West Bank and in Gaza. Even Hamas, which rejects peace with Israel, should convince them that building institutions and strengthening the rule of law are in their favor. It may not be possible for the US to deal directly with Hamas until it abandons its military wing, but American civil institutions could be encouraged to invest in education and humanitarian infrastructure in the areas under Hamas control.

As for the PA, it must come out of the shadow of the past and begin in earnest the construction of state institutions, at least in the West Bank, while eliminating corruption. Then the door will be open for Hamas to conduct a historic review of its position, for the need for a resistance movement is only temporary, whereas the need for a genuine state institution remains.

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