Supreme Succession

Issue 1565 • July 2011

Six months after Hezbollah forced Lebanon’s cabinet to resign, the Hezbollah-led alliance has only just proved capable of forming a new cabinet

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The Human Condition

When genocide goes unrecognized, it creates a mentality that these acts bear no consequences, and society does not progress

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War and Peace

Issue 1565

Iran's Succession Crisis

The Majalla

SUCCESSION

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SUPREME

Candid Coversations

Ahmed Najib Chebbi, the most prominent contender for presidency in Tunisia, Insists that he does not want to see an Ideological state in his country

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al Toraifi Editors Azeddine Senegri Jacqueline Shoen Michael Whiting Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Designer Matt Dettmar Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: enquiries@majalla.com Note: all articles should not exceed 800 words Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2011 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: enquiries@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover image © Adel Al-Toraifi

Editorial In 1989 when the relatively untested cleric Ali Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader of Iran, it was primarily because he was perceived to be a soft option. Lacking the religious and political credentials and charisma of his predecessor, it was assumed that Khamenei would accept that the position was merely ceremonial, and the real control in Iran would be in the hands of the Presidency and the Parliament.

The powerful elites in Iran who elected Khamenei to the position, didn't bargain on him knowing the rules of the game and playing them to his full advantage. Amongst other entitlements, the constitution affords the Supreme Leader a permanent position, appoints him commander in chief of the armed forces and allows him to hold sway over the elections.

Phenomenal power.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has therefore effectively ruled Iran since day one of his appointment as Supreme Leader. In this month's feature, "Supreme Succession", Mehdi Khalaji, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute, discusses what might be the next regime in Iran following Khamenei, given the control and authority he has placed in the conservative base and the IRGC. We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

Adel Al-Toraifi Editor in Chief

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Contributors Paula Mejia A contributing editor for The Majalla based in Tunisia. As a freelance journalist and consultant for the African Development Bank, her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L'Institut D'Etudes Politiques de Paris and the University of Chicago.

Mehdi Khalaji Senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shi’ite groups in the Middle East.

A Shi’ite theologian by training, Mr. Khalaji has also served on the editorial boards of two prominent Iranian periodicals, and produced for the BBC as well as the US government's Persian news service. From 1986 to 2000, Mr. Khalaji trained in the seminaries of Qom. In 2000, Mr. Khalaji moved to Paris where he studied Shi’ite theology and exegesis in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. He currently writes a bilingual English and Persian blog, MehdiKhalaji.com.

Nicholas Birch Nicholas Birch lived in Istanbul, Turkey, from 2002 to 2009, working as a freelancer. His work from Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus appeared in a whole range of publications, including the Washington Post, Time Magazine, The Guardian and the Times Literary Supplement. Birch was a stringer for the Wall Street Journal and The London Times until the end of 2009. Based in London since the beginning of this year, and continuing to work as a freelancer, Birch is in the early stages of writing his first book, a travel book investigating Turkey's troubled relationship with its past.

Nima Khorrami Assl Researcher at the UK Defence Forum and the Middle East Future Network where he writes policy briefs and analysis on geo-economics as well as security developments in the Middle East and the Asia Pacific. Mr. Assl has carried out a number of projects for both governmental and private clients in the Middle East and has published op-eds in The Guardian, Open Democracy, and Defence IQ. Currently based in China, Mr. Assl’s main areas of interest and expertise include Political Islam and (de)radicalization, Iran, GCC, Turkey, BRICS Middle East diplomacy and geopolitics.

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Contents Quotes of the Month

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War and Peace

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On Politics

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Supreme Succession: Iran’s Succession Crisis

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Profile

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• What went wrong?

The demise of Lebanon’s democracy

• Great Expectations: What Turkey’s elections mean • The Salafi Spring: The rise of Salafism in Egypt

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Within the Islamic Republic of Iran, both the democratic movement and internal conflict raise questions of the regime’s stability. Should Ayatollah Ali Khamenei die—or become unable to carry out his position of supreme leader—the regime’s stability rests on the peaceful transition of power

• Beji Caid El-Sebsi

The Wealth of Nations

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The Human Condition

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Editor’s Choice

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Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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Thinking Out Loud

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The Arts

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The Critics

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The Final Word

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• Making up the Numbers: Oil production and ambiguity in Saudi Arabia

• When the Past is Always Present: The eradication of a community

• Kamal Salibi • Ahmad Najib Chebbi

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz is committed to the security and stability of the Arab world, and maintenance of the unity and independence of its countries The Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal

As regards methodology, I wanted to make sure - and this is a first in the history of our country - that the new Constitution is drawn up by Moroccans, for all Moroccans Morocco's King Mohammed VI

We are brothers, but Jordan remains Jordan and Palestine remain Palestine

As a peaceful solution, we offered that Muammar Gaddafi can resign Palestinian Authority and order his soldiers to President Mahmoud Abbas withdraw from their barracks and positions, Today there are new and then he can decide either to stay in democracies fighting for life, there are vicious autocrats clinging Libya or abroad to power – this is an hour of need The Libyan rebels' National Transitional Council leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil

Hillary Clinton

We are disturbed by Al Jazeera We laud the responsible statements reporting about Turkey. We cannot released by the Saudi Foreign understand why there is this hostility Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal against Turkey concerning the STL and the need for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan the Lebanese to treat it rationally There can be no fast solution and with calm. This Saudi to the NATO campaign stance is a continuation of in Libya. Libya has been many previous statements bombed for more than in which the kingdom three months now, and we reiterated its support for see no end of this process Lebanon’s stability Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt

Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov

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What went wrong?

The demise of Lebanon’s democracyterritorial waters Six months after Hezbollah forced Lebanon's cabinet, led by Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri, to resign, the Hezbollah-led alliance—March 8—has only just proved capable of forming a new cabinet. Regional calculations, clashes over key ministries and attempts by all major political actors to obtain a blocking third (allowing for veto right inside the cabinet) delayed formation. If it is true that foreign intervention, namely Syrian and Iranian, is decisive in cabinet formation, it is equally true that the Lebanese political system, traditionally based on delicate and rigid confessional balances as well as mutual vetoes, is not working anymore. Institutions are paralyzed and elites within each community treat state institutions as if they own them. Lebanon's traditional principle of powersharing is turning into a “state-sharing” one, which fragments the state and turns it into small statelets.

What went wrong?

The demise of Lebanon’s democracyterritorial waters

Ziad Majed

Image © Getty Images

I

n 1994, the Lebanese cabinet approved the first and only time the naturalization of 300,000 non-Lebanese residents. Iraqi-born 55-year-old Ali excitedly carried all the required documents to the country's Population Registrar in order to obtain his first Lebanese identity card. After sifting through Ali's papers, a middle-aged bureaucrat looked at him and said: "There is one more missing document." He added: "You have to go to the religious leader of your community and get us a certificate proving your faith."

Ali searched for the mufti of his sect and asked him for the missing document. Even though born from Muslim parents and professing Islam for all his life, the mufti asked Ali to repeat after him the Shahada, the oath non-Muslims have to take upon converting to Islam. Without his religious oath, Ali could have not obtained his Lebanese identity.

In Lebanon, the social contract is not between citizens and the state, but rather between subjects and their sects, which in turn is contracted with the government. Between the country's independence in 1943 and the outbreak of civil war in 1975, Lebanon was the envy of the region's countries for being an oasis of freedom and democracy. But the nation's democracy has proven to be a special arrangement between the different communal leaders that allowed for a zero-sum game between these leaders and their communal groups. Today, 21 years after the end of Lebanon's civil war, the original understanding between the different communal groups is proving unsustainable, or at least, judging by the country's ongoing crises, unfit for the current time and age.

And while some in Lebanon still argue that political assassinations, security threats and the Syrian regime's pressures have thwarted all efforts to restore Lebanon's democracy, others believe that the current failure of the Lebanese state is a structural one. As a result of the failure, Lebanon has witnessed long stretches of institutional paralysis, and the decline of consociational culture and practices.

How It All Started The ratification of the first Lebanese constitution in 1926 was based on the concept of inter-communal power-sharing. On the eve of independence in 1943, a national pact between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister was concluded and further specified this confessional principle. In 1989,

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Elites and Foreign Policies: The Eruption of Crises But even before Damascus' complete dominance of Lebanon, after 1990, signs that the Lebanese consociational model was declining started to appear as early as the late 1960s and became more visible with the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Reasons behind this failure included rigid quotas applied in key positions, which proved problematic especially given an always changing demography. Other factors were linked to events throughout the Middle East and their impact on Lebanon. Yet other factors were related to the Lebanese war, the post-war hegemonic tendencies among the victors, and the different leaders' attempts to monopolize representation of their respective communities.

To better understand the impact of these factors, we should examine two phenomena. The first is domestic, and linked to the evolution of Lebanon's elite as a result of changes within the large communal groups. The second is foreign, and linked to worldwide and regional developments. The ongoing influence of foreign affairs on Lebanon can be in some ways compared to 1943, when Lebanon's "unique" national pact was based on the elites' determination to stay away from the prevailing conflict at the time between two projects: attachment to France, as a mandatory power, and Arab unity.

The elite that dominated Lebanon's political life until 1969 was, more or less, a traditional elite, restricted mainly to limited regions within Lebanon and often seeing leaders presiding over people of their community. These leaders, or Zoama, were successful in exploiting all the benefits that Lebanon's consociational democracy had to offer. Because of their privileged situation, these leaders often looked for peaceful settlements of their conflicts and insisted on avoiding violence. Their political culture was based on self-interests, inter-communal trade-offs within state institutions, and maintenance of their leadership based on ties of kinship and neighborhood.

n’s waters

a national accord document, also known as the Ta'if Agreement, theoretically put an end to the civil war (1975-1990), and amended the constitution and its power-sharing formula.

Consociational democracy, which often means governance based on consensus among the communal groups rather than majority rule, has been the underlying philosophy of the Lebanese state. This is due to the fact that the principles of coalition governments, proportional representation of communities (confessions) and their right to govern or to veto government decisions, as well as institutional processes and agreements that guarantee the continuity of a self-propelling system (as presented by Dutch American scholar Arendt Lijphart when defining consociational democracies) feature in most Lebanese founding texts and legislations.

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A Broken Code: Foreign Influence and Domestic Confrontation In his book, All Honorable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon, Michael Johnson argues that even in the midst of the 1958 conflict, the Zoama neither killed nor called for the killing of other Zoama. There was almost an unspoken agreement, or an honor code, between these leaders that they would spare each other so that, when the time comes, they could negotiate a ceasefire and reign in their followers. The case has also been made that this honor code was respected in order to foment an elite solidarity that is central to the survival of the nation's consociational system.

The premise of such a system, as described by Johnson, is that an alliance of moderate communal leaders would acquiesce to the dominance of one of the communities, in the name of stability. Stability was a priority because the Zoama were often closely linked to a commercial financial elite that needed an atmosphere of stability in order to prosper. By the end of the 1960s, and as farming became mechanized and more capitalistic in nature, even the rural Zoama were absorbed into this alliance.

Political parties did not constitute in the 1940s and 1950s a source of anxiety to Lebanon's traditional elite until the Lebanese were confronted by conflicting choices over foreign policies, and foreign powers began to support and promote some parties over others. Prior to that, parties either had mar11

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• WAR AND PEACE

ginal influence or were linked to leaders whose power was independent of their help. The leaders, however, sought a modern appeal through their parties, and used them in order to stimulate local loyalties and as electoral machines.

By the end of the sixties, parties began to gain enough power to compete with traditional forces. Between parties calling for reforms, such as the Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese Communist Party, and those calling for the protection of the system, such as the Phalange Party and its allies, bipartisanship started to appear along previously unknown lineups. These alignments took a vertical shape, reflecting (with few exceptions) confessional, rather than socioeconomic rifts. Still, the prevailing political rhetoric continued to avoid confessional instigation.

In 1989, a national accord document, also known as the Ta'if Agreement, theoretically put an end to the civil war (1975-1990), and amended the constitution and its power-sharing formula At this point, the second phenomenon, that of foreign intervention became crucial. The 1943 Lebanese national pact and its consociational principles were based on avoiding domestic instigation or communal alignment with regional allies. However, starting in 1958, Lebanon's second president, Kameel Shamoun, decided to side with the Baghdad Pact, a US-sponsored alliance that included Turkey and Iraq, and was designed to counter the pro-Soviet Arab governments. Shamoun's alignment, however, came in stark contrast with the leanings of Lebanon's Muslim, mainly Sunni, leaders who were in favor of taking sides with Egypt's Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The consociational understanding was thus compromised in favor of so-called strategic alliances. In 1958, foreign events had pushed Lebanon away from implicit peace and closer to explicit confrontation. Many of the traditional leaders were forced to join one of the two camps in an attempt to catch up with their supporters who had already chosen sides. Hence, Lebanon's traditional elite were forced to follow the "street" and choose confrontation instead of leading it toward compromise.

The 1958 Temporary Fix Instead of revising their positions and arriving at a comprehensive solution, Lebanon's leaders and their regional and international patrons came up with a short-term solution that included the election of army commander, General Fouad Chehab, as president. Stability followed, and so did economic development and administrative reforms or modernization. The same arrangement, however, did not allow for serious political reforms that would reconsider the confessional formula and its fixed institutional quotas. Mobilizations within different societal and political circles therefore continued.

Palestinian military activity in southern Lebanon, Israeli attacks, and the surge in the number of young activists joining political parties, or volunteering to undergo military training in the late sixties and early seventies, combined with the rejection of political

and socio-economic reforms, all contributed to the buildup of an inevitable confrontation. Civil war broke out in April 1975.

War, Syrian Hegemony and a Changing Elite Civil strife ended in 1990 with Syria winning the upper hand over post-war Lebanon. The country's Syrian rulers promoted civil war leaders, most of whom proved to be short-fused, always attempting to impose their stances on others, or at least obstruct state institutions if their opinion was not taken into consideration. Their leadership was vertical and ran exclusively along communal lines rather than horizontal divisions.

In fact, this elite is the product of the evolution of the war and the different foreign factors that influenced its different phases, especially after the Syrian invasion in 1976 that defeated Kamal Jumblatt and his National Movement.

Jumblatt, the father of Druze leader and current lawmaker Walid Jumblatt, attempted to change the Lebanese system, but was confronted by Lebanese Christian right-wing forces and some Muslim conservative ones. After his defeat and assassination, Damascus imposed its will and thwarted Lebanon's political transformation.

The Iranian efforts to export the revolution after 1979, Israel's invasion in 1982 and its long occupation of southern Lebanon, combined with demographic and socio-economic changes among communities, made "vertical divisions" deeper and allowed for the emergence of new "warrior elites." These elites brandished the slogan of unifying their confession, or communal, especially among Christians and Shi'ites, to protect what they depicted as their "guarantees." The Shi'ites were especially outspoken about their rights or the liberation of their land.

Starting the early 1980s, consociationalism was unable to provide a solution for Lebanon's differences or prevent violent conflicts, let alone resolve these conflicts. The domestic situation was in constant flux, and the pressure on the system grew.

Inter-communal agreements became difficult to reach, except when external forces intervened in moments of internal fatigue and forced deals on their respective Lebanese protĂŠgĂŠs. The different sides were increasingly refusing to concede to consociational requirements a prerequisite to making Lebanon's democracy work again.

The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war and amended the constitution to modify the prerogatives of the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister, among other modifications, stabilized the situation in the country under full Syrian hegemony. It appeared that the price of stability was the sacrifice of most aspects of national sovereignty and the political marginalization of large groups of Lebanese, especially Christians. In a way, the post Taif policies were coups against consociationalism, which were designed to be as inclusive as possible and help find compromises. The "Ta'if republic" proved to be about Damascus and its allies imposing specific regulations, thus creating winners and losers.

Post Syrian Dominance and the Rise of Hezbollah It is hard to look at the years following the Independence Intifada, which broke out in the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minsiter Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 due to the consequences of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April that year, without noticing the major changes that had occurred in Lebanon's post-civil war political scene.

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This change was mainly due to a shift in division from Muslim-Christian to Sunni-Shi'ite. The Sunnis are represented by the leadership of Hariri, and his son Sa'ad after him, and their sponsor Saudi Arabia. The Shi'ites are represented by the heavily armed Hezbollah and are allied to Iran and Syria. Christians are divided along these lines and are split between the two camps.This division has thus made it extremely hard for the foundation of Lebanon's political system, consociationalism, to work. Implicit inter-communal respect has emerged into mutual veto rights, or blocking thirds within cabinets, rather than finding common grounds.

In fact, "veto" power has been at the center of all inter-communal disputes over the past four years. While such "veto" is supposed to reflect a desire to avoid clashes, it revealed in Lebanon the difficulty of keeping consociationalism as the guiding philosophy when vertical divisions are so steep and when external pressures keep these divisions violently opposed to one another.

If Hezbollah's weapons are added to Lebanon's mix, the survival of Lebanon's democracy will be at stake altogether. What seems to be keeping Lebanon's system alive, however, is more the fear of the consequences of a collapse rather than the urge to make it work. The current situation is not sustainable, volatile and might take dramatic turns in the case of regional shakeups.

Against this background, one can understand why Lebanon's cabinet collapsed in January, but could not be replaced until June.

Frozen System, Changing Society Consequently, one could say after all experiences that Lebanon went though in the last 50 years that consociationalism in the political system seems to be an inert formula that has proven incapable of dealing with the transformations occurring in Lebanese society. The demographic balance started to shift in the 1950s in favor of the Muslim community, leading to Muslim calls for a greater share in institutions. With Muslims outnumbering Christians, and Syrians marginalizing Christian political forces, fault lines changed and divisions became focused on Sunni-Shi'ite instead of Christian-Muslim. Rigidity and rejection of reforms, modifications of quotas and power-sharing formulas seem strangely dissociated from a society that is moving and evolving demographically and socio-economically.

Therefore, Lebanon's consociational democracy is no longer able to moderate disputes or give recourse to constitutional mechanisms to settle differences. Foreign interventions and Hezbollah's arms make the country's arrangements more difficult to observe.

Perhaps the only way to keep the consociational arrangement alive until new rules of the game are defined, both regionally and domestically, would be to adopt a series of reforms that would allow the system to better function, handle crises and contribute to the production of a new modern elite. Such reforms should include the approval of a new electoral law, a new nationality legislation, a new decentralization law, the gradual de-confessionalisation of parliament (with the creation of a senate), as well as the approval of new (optional) personal status laws that would foster the principle of citizenship as opposed to confessionalism.

Without such reforms, a lasting and stable government in Lebanon seems improbable in the near future.

Ziad Majed – Assistant Professor at the American University of Paris and coordinator of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

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Key events leading to the crisis

The ratification of the first Lebanese constitution in 1926 was based on the concept of inter-communal power-sharing 13

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• ON POLITICS

The AKP in Turkey is riding an unprecedented wave of political success. Now that Prime Minsiter Erdogan has led the party to another landslide electoral victory, he is faced with the responsibility of capitalizing on a newly self-confident Turkey. His first challenge will be to oversee the drafting of a new constitution.

Nicholas Birch

A

Image Š Getty Images

victory in 2002; a landslide in 2007; an avalanche on 12 June this year: Turkey has never seen a party like the Justice and Development Party, or AKP. Half of Turkish voters vote for it. Its attraction seems immune to electoral fatigue, winning a higher percentage of the vote at three consecutive elections, something no other Turkish party has ever managed. Small wonder the thou-

sands of supporters cheering outside AKP headquarters last Sunday night were shouting, "Turkey is proud of you."

So what is its secret? To put it very simply, Turks have never had it so good. The AKP came to power after a decade of boom and bust culminated in a 2001 banking crisis triggered when the President threw a copy of the constitution at the Prime Minister, who told reporters. Nearly 10 percent was wiped off the country's GDP.

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Since then, Turkey's economy has tripled in size. Its stock exchange has rocketed by roughly 600 percent. Once an economic house of cards, Turkey has shrugged off the latest global slump: eight per cent growth last year, estimates of more than five per cent this year.

That growth has benefited everybody, western investors, Turkey's old business clans, the Kocs and Sabancis, which bought the lion's share of the state companies privatized between 2003 and 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's pet businessmen, with their accelerated rags-to-riches stories, the rapidly industrializing cities of Anatolia.

But the biggest beneficiaries have probably been the millions of Turks who were born into poverty and are now able to permit themselves dreams of a middle-class future, however modest.

Whatever he came up with, his aphorisms epitomized an inferiority complex that had its roots in centuries of Ottoman decline, and the conviction of Republican modernizers that the people were backward children who had to be brought into line Identity in Conflict: the Kurdish Challenge At the heart of the modern state of Turkey, a pivotal question about its identity lies unresolved. Turkish nationalism, a product of Ataturk’s state building and Turkey’s post-World War I struggle for independence from European powers, firmly rests on a uniform conception of the Turkish nation. In terms of language, tradition, and customs, the Turkey’s identity is viewed as unshakeable and homogenous.

For the ethnic minority in Southeastern Turkey, the Kurdish population has never accepted this wider identity as their own, and the government in Ankara and its large constituency in the urban strongholds of Western Turkey do not view the Kurdish identity as ethnically unique. At most, they are dismissed as uneducated “Turkish mountain people” and their demands for an independent or autonomous state are viewed as challenges to the integrity of the Turkish state and its identity.

In response, the Kurdish population has continuously challenged their position within the Turkish state, and a large socioeconomic chasm exists between the prosperous West and the Southeast. Throughout much of Turkey’s history, this challenge has been met without the lack of any initiatives to address their concerns, but instead swift repression through military force. The emergence of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in the 1980s and their launching of terrorist strikes against the military and civilian targets in Turkey further deepened the differences between Ankara and Diyarbakir.

The majority of the 17 million Kurds living in Turkey who feel marginalized and excluded from the present Turkish state do not identify with the militant approach of the PKK and their push for an independent state, but oppose the exclusion and lack of opportunities Ankara has provided them. Deep support exists for an autonomous status for their community within Turkey, which would allow the preservation of their culture, language, and identity within the Turkish state.

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• ON POLITICS

These were the people Erdogan was addressing when he said on Sunday evening "we are here not to lord it over you but to serve." A sweeping reform of the health sector was aimed at them. So were support schemes for families with children of school age. So were the 350,000 cheap flats built under his watch, with another 150,000 on the way.

"If it is not broken, don't fix it," says political commentator Sedat Ergin. "That was the moral of the AKP's electoral campaign this time. And it worked." He points out that 48 percent of Turks interviewed by the American pollsters Pew on 7 June described themselves as "happy" with their lives, a percentage point less than the government won on Sunday. "Why vote for change?"

The economic transformation has changed mentalities too.

Throughout the nineties and the early 2000s, years of squabbling coalition governments and a brutal Kurdish war, a leading Turkish columnist used to end his daily column with a question, ne zaman adam oluruz, a phrase perhaps best translated as "when will we grow up?"

His answers to the question changed from day to day: when we stop picking our noses in public, when we learn to hold doors open for ladies. Whatever he came up with, his aphorisms epitomized an inferiority complex that had its roots in centuries of Ottoman decline, and the conviction of Republican modernizers that the people were backward children who had to be brought into line.

Erdogan's greatest success is to have smashed the anti-democratic system born from that attitude. From 2002 onwards, his party was to all intents and purposes at war with what Turks call vesayet, the guardianship of a military-led bureaucratic elite which considers itself the superior of elected politicians.

Erdogan defeated the army, which threatened intervention in 2007, and he faced down its supporters in the judiciary, who tried to close his party down in 2008.

He defeated them because he had public support. Stability and dreams of prosperity had made people pushy and obstreperous. The days of doffing caps at supposed superiors was over.

Four times since 1960, the army has overthrown elected governments. After 12 June, it is difficult to imagine it doing so again.

So the old system is gone. But what form will the newly self-confident Turkey spearheaded by the AKP take? And is a country run by civilians necessarily more democratic than one where politics takes place in the shadow of the army?

Despite all the AKP talk of "forward democracy", many Turks say they don't know. "Turkey is a political building site", says Metin Munir, a political commentator. "The old foundations have gone. But there is no blueprint for the future. We don't know what sort of system Erdogan dreams of."

We probably soon will: he has made drafting what he called on Sunday "a new, civilian, liberal" constitution a priority of his third administration.

Turks of all stripes agree the current constitution needs to go.

Sponsored by the military in 1982, it is a legislative straitjacket several sizes too small for a rapidly developing country.

But many have serious doubts about AKP's intentions. Part of the problem lies with Erdogan himself, increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of criticism as his power has increased.

But analysts see a problem with wider conceptions of democracy in Turkey. "Like Ottoman Sultans, Turkish rulers think of state power as a whole", not a carefully constructed set of checks and balances, says Metin Munir.

Recep Erdogan’s Initiatives In response to the rise of an autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Recip Erdogan’s government has taken small steps such as recognizing aspects of the Kurd’s cultural identity, but has avoided the larger issues of political rights and the massive development gap between the Southeast and the West.

During the run-up to the election, despite the growing number of seats won by the Kurd’s Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the last election, Erdogan avoided the Kurdish issue beyond promising Constitutional reform and stressed primarily Turkish nationalism to win support amongst his constituency in the West. His promises of constitutional reform, which would recognize the Kurdish community as an ethnic community within Turkey, has failed to satisfy the demands of the Kurdish population who face high unemployment, low education levels, and political exclusion. Erdogan’s third term will have to address the Kurdish question in a substantive and concrete manner if he wishes move Turkey beyond this conflict which has cost 40,000 lives in the past 27

Throughout the nineties and the early 2000s, years of squabbling coalition governments and a brutal Kurdish war, a leading Turkish columnist used to end his daily column with a question, ne zaman adam oluruz, a phrase perhaps best translated as "when will we grow up?"

Erdogan appears to be no exception. In the run up to last Sunday's elections, he made no bones of the fact that he wanted a super-majority in parliament, so that his party could draft and ratify a new constitution without consulting the opposition.

He failed to get the mandate, and promised compromise in his victory speech.

Then, just before launching into a song from his native Black Sea, he turned to the crowd and said, "what we have done is a guarantee for what we will do." His supporters cheered ecstatically. The skeptics sighed: that is exactly the problem.

Nicholas Birch – Worked as a freelance reporter in Turkey for eight years.

His writings have appeared in a broad range of publications, including Time magazine, The Wall Street Journal and The Times of London.

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The Salafi Spring

In post-Mubarak Egypt, Salafism is on the rise The political landscape in Egypt has shifted beyond the wildest expectations of any observer in the past six months. In the aftermath of Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, several new political parties have formed in the newly permissive atmosphere. Of these groups it is the traditionally apolitical Salafists who have changed direction most radically, by actively entering the political realm and potentially becoming a dominant force.

Alistair Beach

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he sheikh sat in a slick office on the ninth floor of a tower block and twiddled with his mobile phone. Bathed in bright light from the floor-to-ceiling windows overlooking the Nile, he outlined what kind of punishments Egyptians could expect under his ideal judicial system.

“In Shari’a law we have sharp sentences for every crime,” he said. “Whipping the back, cutting off hands. Shari’a involves big punishments for any people who do wrong things.”

Sheikh Abdel Moneim El-Shahat, a preacher who follows the increasingly high-profile strand of fundamentalist Salafi Islam, continued by saying that most people in post-revolutionary Egypt agree with his vision—they just don’t know it yet.

“In the end, Salafis will not oblige communities to use Shari’a if they don’t understand it,” he said. “But with explanation, all the Muslim people will accept it.”

Image © Getty Images

Sheikh Abdel Moneim, a podgy, roly-poly preacher with the kind of Fidel Castro-style beard sported by many of his followers, is a prominent spokesman for the Salafi movement in Egypt.

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which engaged in underground political activity despite being banned for more than half a century, the Salafist movement—which first emerged in the mid-1800s from an intellectual base at Cairo’s long-established Al-Azhar University—has traditionally shied away from politics.

Yet, during the race to grab a toehold in the chaotic postMubarak period, some Salafis are abandoning their previous aversion to the political limelight. The Political Parties Affairs Committee gave the Al-Nour party permission to form on 13 June 2011, while a second fledgling party, Al-Fadila, is also scrambling around for support. A number of others are said to be in the pipelines.

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Salafis in Egypt There is no accurate statistics of Salafis in Egypt due to many reasons, ahead of which is that they do not have an organized association or party. Salafis are the people who call for general Islamic principles that require returning back to the initial founding period of Islam.

They have expanded since the beginning of the past century, so that Salafi trends have become sophisticated and have intricately diverse visions and ideas.

All over Egypt, there are groups that claim that they are following the footsteps of the righteous Salaf.

Some Sheikhs estimate that the number of Salafis is about 5 millions, however it is not credible.

Some Salafi movements in Egypt are Ansar AlSunnah Al-Muhammadiyyah and Al-Da’wa Al-Salafia in Alexandria, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamia that is widespread in the far upper Egypt, for example in Sohag, Asyut, and Qena governorates, Al-Jihad in Giza, Minya, Faiyum, and Beni Suef, Ansar Al-Sunnah in the Delta, especially in Dakahlia and Kafr Al-Sheikh governorates, and AlJam’eyah Al-Shar’eyah particularly in Cairo.

Salafi expansion has mostly taken place easily, without organization. The main bulk of Salafis has no organizational structure, representation or spokesman, though it is extraordinary because of their known concept of loyalty and affiliation to specific Sheikhs.

This comes at a time of heightened tension between Christians and Muslims in Egypt, which many have blamed on the supposedly baleful influence of Salafism.

A total of 12 people were killed this month when violent clashes broke out in the Cairo slum of Imbaba. The riots were triggered by rumors that a Christian woman who had converted to Islam was being held captive in a church, and most reports the following day focused on the large group of Salafi men who were present during the trouble.

The incident came after a flurry of other Salafist scare stories hit Egyptian newsstands, with reports about off-licenses being closed following demonstrations by Salafis, and protests over other alleged kidnappings or killings of female Muslim converts. After one incident, the Associated Press even went so far as to say that Salafism was “a few shades away” from AlQaeda—a sloppy comparison at best.

There is no doubt that some of Egypt’s liberals and secularists are not particularly fond of Salafism. As Ramy El-Swissy, a member of the April 6 Youth Movement, put it: “I like religion but I don’t like that kind of religion. There is a difference between Islam and extremism.”

Moreover, it seems understandable that Christians might be concerned about their influence given the intransigence many Salafis have often shown to accommodating them. Speaking recently, another Salafi preacher, by the name of Sheikh Khalid Abdullah, explained how he thought that Egypt’s Copts were guilty of treason for establishing contacts with the West.

“It’s very sad when the Christians here go to the US and Europe and say, ‘Come to us and save our souls.’ They are betraying us. They don’t understand what the US did in Iraq and Pakistan.

“The Christians are against the Muslims now. They don’t want Egypt to be Islamic.”

But others believe that the Egyptian media and political elite are guilty of scare mongering. In March, Egyptian voters decided overwhelmingly to approve a referendum on constitutional amendments—a result that paved the way for parliamentary and presidential elections later this year.

The result was a blow to many liberals who wanted a longer transitional period to help develop a more robust body politic.

Many blamed the Salafis.

Gamal Sultan, editor of the Al-Masryoon news website and himself a Salafi, said: “It was probably during the referendum on the constitutional amendments when the political forces realized the huge ability of Salafis to mobilize and vote yes.

“That’s what got to the other political parties in Egypt.

They got really mad at the Salafis when they realized their political abilities.”

According to Professor Stephane Lacroix of Sciences Po, who has spent many years studying fundamentalist Islamic movements, the main Egyptian sheikhs have publicly denounced the violence between Muslims and Christians that took place after the fall of Mubarak.

He said: “If you look at the statements from the majority of sheikhs, they have all condemned the violence. They have said it is to the detriment of Salafism.”

Mr. Lacroix added that Salafism has no over-arching structure or rigid top-down leadership, and that the Salafis who went to Imbaba were probably bad apples under the guidance of rogue “neighborhood sheikhs.” He also said that it would probably be a while before any of their political parties made a splash.

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The modern history of Salafism in Egypt dates back to the 1970s—a time where campus activism was at its height and AlGama’a Al-Islamiya, which is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the EU, first made its appearance.

Initially there were tensions between the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood, with both trying to attract followers and spread their message to a wider public. In an effort to co-ordinate more affectively, during the 1980s Egypt’s Salafis began to develop strong grassroots networks spreading across the country. With a base in Alexandria, the fundamentalist movement began to grow in popularity.

Analysts have divided the Salafi movement into a number of different sub-groups—most of which eschewed political participation up until the January 25 revolution.

One such group, sometimes referred to as the “activist Salafis,” trace their origins to the 1970s university movements and operated under the tutelage of sheikhs who preached that a ruler is heretical if he does not govern by divine decrees.

These Salafis have always refused to partake in democratic elections, viewing them as heretical and a departure from God’s law. Yet a number have since undergone a volte face, embracing the concept of democracy and using their vote to full effect when preachers called on their followers to go and vote in favor of constitutional amendments in the recent Egyptian referendum.

The establishment of Al-Nour is testament to this latest trend in Salafi thinking. As a result, and despite in the past being wholly opposed to any kind of political participation, the Salafis now have the first political party in their history.

There has, of course, been one particular brand of Salafism that has never shied away from making its political voice heard. Salafist jihadism, the strand of ultra-regressive Islam that counts Al-Qaeda members as some of its most strident adherents, holds that Muslims are duty-bound to fight any government s which do not apply Islamic law.

It came to the fore in the 1990s when the traditional Salafi aversion to politics morphed into the most absolute form of activist rejectionism. Yet this kind of “Semtex Salafism,” though adept at making headlines, never constituted more than a fraction of the overall movement’s followers.

You could make a similar case for Egypt’s Salafis when compared to the rest of the country’s Muslims today. Although Sheikh Abdel Moneim El-Shahat claimed that there were “millions” across the whole of the country, Stephane Lacroix said the number of is more likely to be around 200,000—though he conceded that the figure is not accurate , given how difficult it is to determine who exactly is a Salafi. Yet, despite this, it seems clear that many Salafis have already permeated deep into Egyptian society. The movement is named after the al-salaf al-salih, or so-called pious predecessors of the early Muslim community.

Followers believe that only the early disciples of Mohammed practiced Islam correctly, and can often be identified by their short galabiyas, which are worn to comply with an early Islamic teaching that long clothing is a sign of vanity.

But such stereotypes are as unhelpful as they are misleading, according to Gamal Sultan. “The West is more concerned with looks: the beard, the clothes and the way they live,” he said. “But Salafism is a large phenomenon. You can see them in the poor neighborhoods, but it also reaches the higher classes.

You see them as street vendors and professors or soccer players.

They are everywhere.”

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Camps and Contradictions The Salafi Camp is branched into many trends whose differences may go as far as to contradict each other.

The group of Ansar Al-Sunnah Al-Muhammadiyah believes that the democratic system is infidel, but it is permissible to run in the elections and contest with the people of democracy in order to lessen their evils. This group does not allow loyalty to any party except for the Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s traditions) and the community. Similar to them is Al-Jam’eyah Al-Shar’eyah, which has hundreds of thousands of followers. On the other side, some dynamic Salafis reject forming their own group, but encourage their followers to cooperate with every active group, even with Al-Qaeda.

Another stream may oppose everybody else, it is AlMadkhali group led by Osama Al-Qusi and Mahmoud Amer, who issued previously an edict permitting the assassination of Mohamed Al-Baradei, because he believes that one should not disobey the Muslim ruler even if he commits sins. After 25 January, Al-Qusi has allowed protests and apologized for the young protesters, while Mahmoud Lotfi Amer has decided to run for Presidency.

There are many Salafi groups, that may reach hundreds of thousands. Some of them may ally with regimes, such as those belonging to traditional and Madkhali Salafism, while others, opposes them and may brand them infidels, as Jihadist Salafism does.

These Salafi groups have different positions on politics.

In March, Egyptian voters decided overwhelmingly to approve a referendum on constitutional amendments Mr Lacroix said that the movement has definitely grown in the past 10 years—in large part because of the Salafi televangelists who were licensed by the Mubarak regime in order to counter the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he added that Egypt was unlikely to see any kind of serious political Salafism for a while.

Many ordinary Egyptians seem to agree. If you speak to liberal voters—the kind of people who are meant to be tearing their hair out with anxiety over the supposed Salafi threat—most seem unperturbed, preferring to dismiss the movement at an irritating irrelevance rather than a sinister force to be reckoned with.

The real influence, as Stephane Lacroix points out, seems cultural more than electoral—though perhaps this should worry the liberal elite just as much. “If you take a taxi, very often the driver seems to think the niqab is the correct form of Islamic dress. He will say something like, ‘My wife doesn’t wear it. She should, but we’re weak.’ You never heard that in Egypt 50 years ago.”

If you believe the likes of Sheikh Abdel Moneim and Shekih Khalid Abdullah, every Muslim is a Salafi even if he or she thinks otherwise. The forthcoming elections will prove just how far this theory goes.

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• SUPREME SUCCESSION

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Supreme Succession Iran’s Succession Crisis

Within the Islamic Republic of Iran, both the democratic movement and internal conflict raise questions of the regime’s stability. Should Ayatollah Ali Khamenei die—or become unable to carry out his position of supreme leader—the regime’s stability rests on the peaceful transition of power.

Mehdi Khalaji

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orn on 16 July, 1939, Khamenei was a noticeably young politician when he took the office of supreme leader in 1989—in the wake of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini‘s death. In comparison to his predecessor, who came to power when he was 77 years old, as well as with other founders of the Islamic Republic such as Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri or Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khamenei was considerably younger.

In 1979, after suffering a heart attack, the Ayatollah Khomeini reduced his practical role considerably. For the next ten years while he maintained the title of supreme leader, a triangle of close advisers, including his son, Ahmad Khomeini, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Ali Khamenei, had influential roles in running the country. When Khomeini died, a young clericpolitician became his successor with the task of preventing other religious authorities, grand Ayatollahs, or high-profile revolutionary politicians from claiming his succession or taking power.

According to Rafsanjani and others, the death of Khomeini meant the end of a position suited only to the founder of the Islamic Republic—due to his unique historical condition, charisma, and religious status. By appointing someone who lacked both religious and political supremacy as well as charisma, Iran’s powerful circle of elites intended the office of supreme leader to be merely ceremonial. The constitution was revised and the executive power became concentrated in the hands of president.

This could have been a significant shift toward democracy, diminishing the role of religiously legitimized authority in favor of political institutions that rely on the will of the people.

This equation proved to be totally wrong for several reasons: the constitution offers the ruling jurist a permanent position while other democratically elected bodies hold limited posi-

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tions. In addition, the ruling jurist can constitutionally manipulate any election and alter the results. The guardian council, of which six jurist members are directly appointed by the supreme leader, should qualify the candidates and approve the election results; though in practice they disqualify the majority of candidates. Most importantly, the president maintains the exclusive role of executive power, though the revised constitution still recognizes the supreme leader as the commander-in-chief of armed forces—including the army, police, revolutionary guard and basij militia. The supreme leader also appoints the head of the judiciary, state radio and television (which holds a monopoly over television and radio in Iran. Finally, the supreme leader appoints the custodian of Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad and the clerical establishment.

Khamenei, who began his leadership conscious that his weaknesses were the main reason for his appointment, tried to betray the image others had created of him. In his pursuit of power he first attempted to rebuild the office of supreme leader from a supervisory position to a practical and effective leadership with a very sophisticated, modern bureaucracy. Unlike Khomeini, Khamenei tried to take control of the armed forces and other institutions under him. While Khomeini never acted like a commander-in-chief, leaving authority to either the president or the speaker of the Majlis (parliament), Khamenei has never abdicated his authority over the military or the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to anyone else.

When Khamenei came to office, his first act was the appointment of two former deputies of the ministry of intelligence, Gholam Hossein Mohammad Golpayegani and Asghar Hejazi, to head of the office and security deputy, respectively.

Golpayegani and Hejazi are clerics, but spent the first decade 21

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Pyramid of Power in the Shi’a State

With 89 percent of Iranian citizens Shi’a, it’s no wonder that the state religion is also Shi’a. Originally created by the leader of the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the current political system is based on the absolute “rule of the jurists” or Velayat-e faqih.

At the pole position of the political power structure is the supreme leader, selected by the clerics who make up the Assembly of Experts. This position is currently held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The supreme leader dispenses the majority of crucial and influential political decisions—confirming the president’s election, selecting Friday prayer leaders, the head of radio and television as well as the chief of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The supreme leader is also charged with appointing commanders of the revolutionary guard, assigning the leader of the judiciary and choosing members of the expediency council.

Members of the Revolutionary Guard report primarily to the supreme leader. A joint command of the regular forces and the Revolutionary Guard was formed after the revolution to protect the constitution and fight off the opposition. It has a powerful presence in many other institutions as well.

Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi currently heads the independent judiciary, which is accountable only to the supreme leader. Its role is to supervise the proper enforcement of Islamic law (See “Ja’fari School of Islamic Jurisprudence: The Iranian Way”). The Iranian judiciary, which was previously under clergy rule, was secularized in the beginning of the 19th century.

Following the revolution, the supreme court revoked all laws deemed un-Islamic and applied new Shari’a and Islamic text based law. The judiciary also nominates the six non-clergy members of the powerful and influential Guardian Council – which vetoes parliamentary bills relating to the constitution.

The Expediency Council acts in advising the supreme leader. It has ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the majlis (parliament) and the Guardian Council. The supreme leader appoints its members, who come from religious, social and political circles. In October

Source: BBC Wilfried Buchta "Who Rules Iran?" (2001)

2005, the supreme leader granted the Expediency Council "supervisory" powers over all branches of government. It is believed that the position of its present chairman, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was defeated in the last presidential election by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is likely to be strengthened by this decision.

Since the Prophet Mohammed was considered the most pious of all believers, his life and ways became a model for all other Muslims and were collected by scholars into what is known as the hadith. As each locality tried to reconcile local customs and Islam, hadith literature grew and developed into distinct schools of Islamic thought: the Sunni schools, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanafi; and the Shi’ite school, Ja'fari.

Named after the 6th Shi’a Imam, Ja’far Al-Sadiq, the Ja’fari school maintains one commonality with its four Sunni counterparts: The adherents of all five schools agree to this day to draw from three primary legislative sources: The Qur’an, sunna (example of the Prophet), ijma’ (scholarly consensus) and quiyas (analogical reasoning)—a method of applying the law to unprecedented cases.

The main difference between the Sunni and Shi’a schools is that Ja’fari jurists rely more heavily on what is called ijtihad, the use of reason to interpret Islamic law, and other matters of family and social life. Those who are skilled in ijtihad, Mujtahids, interpret sacred sources as an intermediary of the Hidden Imam, in order to provide guidance to their communities. The practice of ijtihad developed as a way to keep up with the changing times.

Very much like the belief among Christians that Jesus will come a second time to administer a final judgment upon all of humanity, the Hidden Imam in Twelver Shi’ism is the 12th Imam or Al-Mahdi, who will return to earth to redeem the righteous. This revered being is essentially a culmination of the eleven imams who came before him—from Imam Ali to Imam Hasan Al-‘Askari.

He is always present, but perpetually hidden. Twelver Shi’a, who make up the majority, are waiting for AlMahdi to reappear.

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of the Islamic republic in the army and IRGC or in the ministry of intelligence. With Khamenei’s succession, they took the lead in building the new leader’s executive office. By recruiting commanders of the IRGC or intelligence officers, the supreme leader’s office—now with more than one thousand employees—became the central command of both the armed forces and the intelligence apparatus rather than a political office.

The institutions which have enabled the ostensibly weak supreme leader to gain unparalleled power are the armed forces, the ministry of intelligence, and the judiciary. As commanders of war returned to cities after the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and financial foundations provided competition to the government’s revenues, young Khamenei was given ample time to erect his monument of power. He transformed himself from a weak leader into a self-assertive leader who challenges the power of the president by intervening in his affairs and matters of the parliament. Ayatollah Khamenei’s increasing authority has been the main obstacle to state-building in Iran because he deliberately and systematically undermines political institutions in order to keep them from acquiring the necessary autonomy.

Khamenei’s leadership style has changed the nature of the Islamic Republic. Since the ruling jurist has absolute authority and defines the expediency of the regime, he is able to suspend all Islamic and constitutional laws as he wills. In such a system, the regular function of institutions can never become normalized. In every situation, the ruling juror can veto all rules and any decision made by parliament, president, or judiciary. In such politics, the extreme elements can be identified on the ruling juror’s authority to announce every situation as an emergency. Hence the Islamic Republic is transformed from a revolutionary government to a religious despotism.

Succession scenarios can be as varied as the ways the current supreme leader’s reign could end. One could imagine Khamenei overthrown by popular uprising like Ben Ali and Mubarak.

Alternatively, one might think of his end in the form of a coup d’état by IRGC intervention after rifts widen between the governments’ factions. In each case, the leader’s successor will differ in the way he inherits power and in the nature of his leadership.

But if Khamenei dies tonight, would a peaceful transition of power—similar to what took place twenty-two years ago—be the most likely option? The constitution declares that the task of appointing the new supreme leader should be vested with an assembly of experts comprised of 86 shi’ite jurists (or mujtahids), qualified and shortlisted by the guardian council and elected by the people. The constitution reads, “The experts will review and consult among themselves concerning all the fuqaha' possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the event they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations, the subjects of the fiqh, or in political and social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such superiority, they shall elect and declare one of them as the leader.” It continues, “Till the appointment of the new leader, a council consisting of the president, head of the judicial power, and a faqih from the guardian council, upon the decision of the nation's exigency council, shall temporarily take over all the duties of the Leader.”

The constitution, however, does not specify a time frame for the temporary council, leaving the possibility of such a provisional council running the country for a very long time.

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It is hard to believe that the appointment of Khamenei as supreme leader in 1989 was a natural election by the assembly of experts. Rather, it seems more plausible to think that he was first elected by a handful of influential political elites—before the assembly of experts held its meeting and was then suggested to others for voting. At that time, the political power was not concentrated in the hands of one person or one faction, requiring powerful factions to come to a consensus in order to appoint a new leader. The situation today is very different.

First, the power circle in Iran has become increasingly narrow, especially after Khamanei marginalized the first generation of revolutionary politicians such as Akbar Hashemei Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Moussavi.

Khamenei has refashioned the political spectrum by elevating a new generation of politicians who were weak and owe him their political credentials. Second, the nature of government changed from a revolutionary government to a military government, relying on neither constitution nor political institutions.

Khamenei identified himself with the entire political regime. In

Assembly of Experts The Assembly, consisting of 86 Islamic scholars, is responsible for the selection of the Supreme Leader.

Members serve eight-year terms, and are popularly elected by the people, but the candidates for the Assembly are approved by the government in advance.

According to the Constitution, in addition to electing the Supreme Leader, the assembly formally supervises the Supreme Leader, and has the authority to dismiss him. "Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in the Constitution, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed."

In practice, the assembly has never dismissed a Supreme Leader, and has not objected to a single one of the Supreme Leader's decisions. Thus, the Assembly’s most important function is the ceremonial role it plays in choosing the next Leader.

Article 109 Essential qualifications and conditions for the Leader: 1. Scholarship, as required for issuing fatwas in different fields of fiqh 2. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah 3. Right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facility and adequate capability for leadership In case of multiplicity of persons fulfilling the above qualifications and conditions, the person possessing better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be given preference.

The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.

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the political vocabulary of the Islamic Republic, when officials refer to “regime,” they usually mean “Khamenei.” Lastly, as a consequence of the political transformation, the clergy does not have influence on the management of the country, greatly diminishing its ability to affect the process of choosing a leader.

The regime demystified the clergy by dividing them into good and bad and marginalizing those clerics who have the potential to form an actual religious power. It made the clerical establishment economically and bureaucratically dependent on the government. Regardless, the clergy views the position of the supreme leader as a military position rather than an autonomous clerical power.

Although Khamenei’s appointment twenty-two years ago was surprising for society and shocking for the clergy, the government managed to establish him as a supreme leader—exploiting the emotional atmosphere created after a long war which exhausted the country Finally, the socio-political fabric of Iranian society has changed in twenty-two years. Not only has society’s elite widely questioned the notion of velayet-e faqih (guardianship of jurist), but the existing constitution also outlines a dual power structure that guarantees a perpetual conflict between positions that are democratically legitimate and positions with divine legitimacy and zero accountability before the people. Opposition leaders like Moussavi have mentioned on several occasions that the constitution is not perfect and it might need to change.

Any discourse surrounding constitution change or reform primarily targets the supreme leader’s position and his authority.

Although Khamenei’s appointment twenty-two years ago was surprising for society and shocking for the clergy, the government managed to establish him as a supreme leader—exploiting the emotional atmosphere created after a long war which exhausted the country. At this time, the death of a charismatic leader attracted millions to his funeral ceremony. Now, particularly after the government has been significantly discredited in the wake of the 2009 rigged presidential election, it would be difficult to introduce a new leader to society whose background and records would be undisputed by a large part of society.

In order to go forward and appoint a new leader—even before the formation of a temporary council—the government must apply tough security measures and suspend ordinary law to keep Iranians from seizing the opportunity to revolt.

It seems that whoever has power now will maintain power after Khamenei’s death. The armed forces, especially the IRGC, which controls over one third of Iran’s economy, military, and nuclear program, will have the biggest say in appointing the next supreme leader. It is unlikely that their choice will be a highly influential Ayatollah. Learning from the experience of

Next in Line?

Serving as the chairman of the powerful Guardian Council since 1988, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati is one of the possible successors to the Supreme Leader and a close ally of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A co-founder of the widely influential Haghani School of Shi’a political thought, Jannati has been a permanent feature of the conservative clerical establishment since the days of the Revolution.

He notably holds positions as well on the Expediency Discernment Council and the Assembly of Experts, and this institutional gravitas has given him a powerful voice to shape the policies of the Islamic Republic.

In the competition for influence amongst the various divisions of the clerical establishment, Jannati has acted as a bulwark against the rising influence of the reformist clergy in Iran. He has actively used his formal and informal position to exclude as well reformist political candidates from participating Iran’s quasidemocratic system, and has worked to undermine and block any legislation that goes against the interests of his conservative vision for Iran.

Jannati has been one of the most outspoken opponents of the Green movement in Iran, and has publicly gone so far to encourage the fast tracking of executions of these dissidents. He notably remarked, “God ordered the prophet Muhammad to brutally slay hypocrites and ill-intentioned people who stuck to their convictions.

Koran insistently orders such deaths. May God not forgive anyone showing leniency toward the corrupt on Earth.” the past twenty-two years, they might prefer to appoint a weak, ailing Ayatollah as the supreme leader in order to justify the constitutionality of their own power. Removing an iconic figure like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and appointing Mohammad Reza Mahdavid Kani as a head of the assembly last March is a model that will most likely be followed by the IRGC in appointing a new leader. A weak leader would be a suitable successor for Khamenei because Iranian society will not tolerate a powerful person who imitates Khamenei’s toughness and autocratic tendencies. The IRGC would grasp power more firmly if his successor holds a genuinely ceremonial position.

All of this depends on how the armed forces and the IRGC solve the conflict between their political and economic interests. Now Khamenei has full control over them and manages its factionalism, but in the absence of such a commander, the power balance within the armed forces and the IRGC should also change. Often in such a situation, more radical groups have a higher chance of success. In sum, Khamanei’s successor may allow the government to become more militarized and most likely more radical.

Mehdi Khalaji – Senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shi’ite groups in the Middle East. He currently writes a bilingual English and Persian blog, MehdiKhalaji.com.

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The real game of power-politics in Iran has just begun Nima Khorrami Assl

A

"long-brewing" power struggle has come into the public attention over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's dismissal of Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi. On the surface, the battle appeared to be over when Ahmadinejad backed down. Nonetheless, there are deeper issues at stake which remain unresolved given that Khamenei's ultimatum to the president to "reinstate the minister or resign" was not merely an attempt to preserve his own power but that of the entire clerical establishment.

Ahmadinejad's style of leadership, his favourable stance on Iranian nationalism, and his preference for minimal clerical presence in the Cabinet have collectively persuaded the Supreme Leader and his supporters to see him as an existential threat that needs to be slapped down. For example, reactionary clerics such as Mesbah Yazdi and Ahmad Janati have both criticised the president for challenging "supreme clerical rule"; a criticism that has been echoed by other senior officials including the commander of the IRGC, the commander of Basij, and the deputy representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC. And this is not the end of "heavy artillery shelling" against the President. Ahmadinejad's bid to merge eight ministries into four was blocked by Ali Khamenei in a private meeting attended by Ali Larijani. Unable to proceed with his initial plan, Ahmadinejad fought back by dismissing three ministers and temporarily taking over the Ministry of Energy which drew unprecedented criticism from Khamenei's camp. Then came the parliament publicization of what it calls “illegal behaviors of the government” which have been referred to the Judiciary for further proceedings and possible criminal prosecution of certain key figures including the first vice-president.

As such, some Iran observers have claimed that President Ahmadinejad and his supporters have lost the fight to Ali Khamenei and that Ahmadinejad has become a "lame duck President" who might not even finish his second term. However, this is a simplistic reading of events in Iran. Ahmadinejad, despite Maj. Gen. Mohammad-Ali Jafari's warnings, still has powerful supporters inside the IRGC and Basij. Many high-ranking officers share Ahmadinejad's political ideology and have greatly benefited from his government's policies in the past six years.

What is more, Ahmadinejad's resignation is likely to create a power vacuum which in turn could trigger violent mass protests thereby accelerating ayatollahs demise as evident in the antigovernment protests held in Tehran and other major cities on 11 and 12 June. Finally, Mashaei, an ex-intelligence officer at the IRGC between 1980 and 1997, is reported to be in possession of certain documents that outline dealings of certain officials with foreign intelligence services which he has threatened to release in case of his arrestment or Ahmadinejad's resignation.

Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the real game of powerpolitics in Iran has just begun and that Iran is going to witness some major political changes in the months prior to the upcom-

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ing Parliamentary elections. Ali Khamenei saw an opportunity in the sacking of Intelligence Minister to abort the president's, and indeed his allies, political ambitions. However, he underestimated the consequences of his overtly public interference in the daily business of government believing that he could unify competing forces under the banners of national security and regime survival.

On June 4, Ali Khamenei made a speech commemorating the 22 anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. He called for an easing of tensions between the President's camp and that of his own stating that “if we insult our brothers in the name of revolutionary sentiments and justice, we will stray away from Ayatollah Khomeini’s path”. Nonetheless, both Ahmadinejad’s faction and loyalists to the Supreme Leader continue to attack each other with no sign of slowing down, indicating that the struggle has escalated to an intensity which is proving hard for Iran’s rulers to ameliorate.

Clearly, the president's close relationship with Mashaei lies at the heart of the clergy's current antagonism. Although the two factions have disagreed in the past – i.e. on nuclear negotiations prior to 2009 elections – what makes their current wrestling unique is the fact that there seems to be a disagreement on the future direction of Iran's Islamic system. There is an internal power rift which has been descended into "stand-offs, flouting of accepted procedures, and attempts to discredit each other". The ongoing infighting has limited the regime's ability to take decisions and is distracting it from its other problems, including a possible loss of regional influence in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Ahmadinejad's neglect of parliamentary procedure, moreover, has hardly strengthened state organs. And the internal power struggle has made the regime appear weaker in the eyes of Green movement activists.

In short, "the guy" who emerged from relative obscurity to win the presidency in 2005 is now seeking to assert the presidential prerogative in hiring and firing ministers. The real fight, however, is neither about cabinet ministers nor the limits of the executive power. It is rather part of a "test of wills" between the Ahmadinejad loyalists and the ruling clerical establishment over "ideology, religion, and the survivability of the Islamic Republic".

For the very first time in its history, the Islamic Republic has started shaking from within and that the discourse of "regime survival" is gradually but surely losing its unifying vigour. Economic hardship is the order of the day with double digit inflation and unemployment rates as well as an ever increasing price of food and electricity. In addition, Iranian polity is now so polarised that no single political faction can be expected to win an election on its own. Therefore, there could very well be a radical change in Iran should various factions fail to form an alliance in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections unless, as some conspiracy theorists put it, the current rift is wholly orchestrated by the government because appearing to be in enmity benefits both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad politically.

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• PROFILE

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The Spirit of Youth Beji Caid El-Sebsi

On 27 February, 2011, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi resigned from his position, relenting to the demands of protesters who saw him as too close to the Ben Ali regime. By the end of the day the vacant office of prime minister had been occupied by Beji Caid El-Sebsi, an 84-year-old man who could fill the need for a politically seasoned statesman; not merely a technocrat to temporarily take charge of the state's affairs in the most critical period in Tunisia's history since gaining independence in 1956.

Michael Whiting

S

ince the coup that brought him to power in 1987, until his ouster in 2011, President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali has tried to eradicate the memory of his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, from the minds of Tunisians. However, since 14 January, Bourguiba's name has been repeated frequently in Tunisia, 11 years after his death.

Everybody in Tunisia is experiencing a Bourguibian return in the person of Caid El-Sebsi, the interim prime minister, who has returned to the political spotlight after a 20-yearlong political retirement.

On 27 February, 2011, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi resigned from his position, relenting to the demands of protesters who saw him as too close to the Ben Ali regime. By the end of the day the vacant office of prime minister had been occupied by Beji Caid El-Sebsi, an 84-year-old man who could fill the need for a politically seasoned statesman; not merely a technocrat to temporarily take charge of the state's affairs in the most critical period in Tunisia's history since gaining independence in 1956. That said, the appointment by interim President Fouad Mebazza took most people by surprise.

Tunisians who lived through Bourguiba's era know all about El-Sebsi Si Beji, as he is popularly known, because he served the Bourguiba government in several capacities. But Ben Ali's generation and younger Tunisians now see an elderly man leading a government brought about by a youth revolution.

Soon, Tunisians young and the old will learn much about the veteran politician. He is an eloquent man who does not fear TV cameras or reporters questions, and above all has spent more than half a century serving Tunisia in varied positions and on sensitive missions. On the other hand, some people reject his approach in conducting contemporary Tunisian affairs using old concepts and methods. On facing this predictable criticism he is sanguine, accepting that his role is difficult but not impossible and acknowledging that criticism is natural and good for democracy in Tunisia, as nobody can have unanimous acceptance from all parties.

El-Sebsi was born in 1926, in a northern suburb of Tunis, Sidi Bou Said. From birth he had the advantage of family connections to the Tunisian Beys, the ruling royal dynasty of Turkish descent. So as a young man he took the opportunity to leave Tunisia and study law in Paris. After graduating in 1950, he returned to Tunis and started his career as a lawyer in 1952.

His interest in politics began before Tunisia's independence, when he joined the Neo Destour (New Constitution) Party, which would later lead the independence movement. Indeed,

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some of his first legal work was in the defense of Neo Destour activists. Following independence he became an advisor to Habib Bourguiba, with whom he had close relationship. He would maintain this working relationship until Ben Ali's coup on 7 November 1987.

GPI 2011 ranks Tunisia 44th worldwide Tunisia ranks 44th worldwide out of the total of 153 countries surveyed, according to the 2011 Global Peace Index (GPI), released by the Institute for Economics and Peace in Sydney, Australia.

The ranking acknowledges that the "Arab Spring" is the cause behind the most important change ever recorded by this ranking. Thus, Tunisia ranks 5th in the Arab world, after Qatar (12th worldwide), Kuwait (29th), United Arab Emirates (33rd) and Sultanate of Oman (41st).

Egypt, for its part, ranked 73rd, and Saudi Arabia 101st, Syria 116th and Yemen 138th. Libya, at the 143rd rank, is down 83 points, the sharpest fall ever realised in the GPI's history.

It is worth reminding that Tunisia ranked 37th in the 2010 Global Peace Index, this slight drop is due to the events in the country, following the January 14, 2011 Revolution.

Iceland is topping the 2011 GPI's ranking, followed

by New Zealand, Japan, Denmark and Czech Republic, while France is 36th, Italy 45th and the United States of America 82nd.

Afghanistan (150th), Sudan (151st), Iraq (152nd) and Somalia (153rd) are at the bottom end of the ranking.

The Global Peace Index is the world's leading assessment of global peace. It gauges ongoing domestic and international conflict, social safety and security, as well as militarisation in 153 countries by taking into account separate indicators.

The GPI report estimates that the world is less peaceful for the third straight year and that this situation costs the global economy more than ĂŞ 8.12 trillion in 2010.

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• PROFILE

Only a few weeks ago, the Arabic translation of Si Beji's 2009 book ”originally written in French” was published. Habib Bourguiba: Le bon grain et l'ivraie (The Wheat and the Chaff) gives an eye-witness account of important stages in modern Tunisian history, which can only be tackled with reference to Tunisia's first president of the republic ”or the supreme combatant, as Habib Bourguiba was known.

El-Sebsi, ”who shares elements of his former president's forceful personality and charisma," notably emphasized in his book that the future generations will better acknowledge [Bourguiba's] merits than his own generation or the generation among which he lived. As for the nation, it will evidently give him his due recognition in history, because [Bourguiba's] role did not stop at building the modern state, but went as far as raising Tunisia to the same level as respectable and credible countries.

In this paean to his friend, he adds, Bourguiba was only human, with his own tendencies. He faced troubles and he bore the sins of the years. Nevertheless he was a great example of a politician, because he never hesitated to sacrifice his freedom in his struggle, never sought personal gains when he was in power, and did not abandon his fight for dignity throughout his life.

Si Beji worked as a regional director in the Tunisian Ministry of Interior before being named the general director of National Security in 1963. In 1965, he was appointed minister of interior, then a supervisor of the ministry of defense from November 1969, to June 1970. Afterwards, he acted as Tunisia's ambassador to France.

His relationship with his friend and president was not always smooth. His liberal orientations led to a dispute with Bourguiba, when he advocated a reform of the political regime, and subsequently his activity in the Socialist Destourian Party (formerly Neo Destour and later the Constitutional Democratic Rally) was frozen in 1971. He eventually was expelled from the party in 1974, and later joined the group that would form the Movement of Socialist Democrats in 1978, led by Ahmed Mestiri. During this period he was responsible for the opposition magazine, Democracy.

After a two-year estrangement with Bourguiba, El-Sebsi was welcomed back into the government fold as a minister in December 1980 under former Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali who himself sought political reform in Tunisia. In April 1981, El-Sebsi was named foreign minister, and played a significant role in the UN Security Council's condemnation of the Israeli air strike on the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Hammam Chott, south of Tunis. In September 1986, he left the ministry to be named Tunisia's ambassador to West Germany.

After the coup of 7 November 1987, El-Sebsi was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and was its Speaker from 1990 to 1991, before retiring from public political work.

Immediately after accepting the post of the interim Prime Minister, Beji Caid El-Sebsi admitted that only his duty towards the country motivated him to accept the challenge in such an old age, and warned that with his long past career in serving the state, he would not allow its future collapse.

In his first speech to the Tunisian people after assuming his new position, he reiterated that his first duty is to restore security and to revive the economy”which is on the verge of collapse. In addition, he committed to re-imposing the authority of the state, which has been weakened so much by the recent upheaval.

Adoption of three human rights documents Tunisia adopted three international documents on human rights protection, which shows the country's commitment in this field after the revolution.

On the day after its joining the Rome Status, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Tunisia confirmed its commitment to human rights.

Tunisia became the first North African country to ratify the international convention for protecting any person from forced missing.

This text considers as crime against humanity generalised or systematic forced missing, strengthens detention guarantees and provides the victims' families and relatives with the right to know the truth.

Tunisia is also the first country in the region to join the Optional Convention Protocol against Torture and other sentences and treatments that are cruel, inhuman or degrading. This text allows independent experts to visit detention places.

Tunisia adopted the first Optional Protocol of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights which acknowledges the Human Rights Committee's competence to receive complaints of private individuals.

Immediately after accepting the post of the interim Prime Minister, Beji Caid El-Sebsi admitted that only his duty towards the country motivated him to accept the challenge in such an old age, and warned that with his long past career in serving the state, he would not allow its future collapse Tellingly, in an interview with AFP in March, the octogenarian prime minister stated that he does not feel too far from the youth who protested in the streets and on the internet to oust Ben Ali. He asserted that he is under permanent observation by the young guardians of the revolution, and considered the internet generation belongs to my grandchildren, but youth is a question of spirit.

Caid El-Sebsi has promised his people that he will ultimately leave the position that the revolution has forced him to accept and return back to the role of the husband and grandfather of the nation. He seems to recognize that the new Tunisia is still at the beginning of a long road when he says revolution is not democracy, it is its first gate, and we need to exert efforts to reach democracy... definitely there are risks of slipping, and whoever assumes power should be attentive, and we are attentive.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

Making Up the Numbers Oil production and ambiguity in Saudi Arabia The world’s oil market is in a precarious state. Surging global demand and a dwindling US dollar have pushed prices skyward, while lingering political unrest continues to trouble investors and market players.

In February, when civil war broke out in Libya, Saudi Arabia quickly confirmed that it would ramp up its own crude production, in order to ward off any potential supply shortages. At the time, Libya had been producing about 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd), most of which were destined for Europe. On 28 February, Saudi officials vowed to increase production to 9 million bpd, in a move that seemed to ease the completely understandable concerns of investors and policymakers alike. Now, however, some are openly speculating that Saudi Arabia may not have been entirely forthcoming about its production spike.

Amar Toor

Image © Getty Images

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n April, Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi confirmed to reporters in Kuwait that the Kingdom had reduced output by about 800,000 bpd, in order to compensate for what he called an “oversupplied” marketplace. “The market is overbalanced,” Al-Naimi explained. “Our production in February was 9.125 million bpd, in March it was 8.292 million bpd. In April we don't know yet, probably a little higher than March. The reason I gave you these numbers is to show you that the market is oversupplied.”

The news itself was not terribly surprising; OPEC had already decided against holding an emergency meeting to discuss surging oil prices, and all signs seemed to suggest that the producers wouldn’t intervene to quell the market.

Al-Naimi’s explanation, on the other hand, has stirred significantly more controversy.

Assuming that Al-Naimi was quoting monthly production averages, per OPEC protocol, his statement implies that Saudi Arabia was already producing over 9 million bpd in February—even before issuing its public, post-Libya promise. Shortly after the country’s 28 February declaration, officials claimed that output had increased by 500,000 to 600,000 bpd—thereby allowing Saudi Arabia to reach its stated goal. They later said that production had been cut by about 500,000 bpd, in March, due to declining demand for Saudi crude, which isn’t compatible for refiners of Libyan oil.

Taking these figures into account, Saudi Arabia’s production should have averaged 9.4 million bpd in March—not the 8.3 million that Al-Naimi cited. In fact, the only way the country could have averaged 8.3 million per day is if it drastically cut production to around 7 million barrels per day, during the second half of March.

The Wall Street Journal picked up on this inconsistency, and consulted with Barclays analyst Amrita Sen, who confirmed that the kingdom had been “producing at nine million barrels a day since November in response to the strength of demand.” Analysts at Goldman Sachs echoed these sentiments, in a note to The Wall Street Journal. “While Saudi Arabia announced a boost to production to offset the [Libya] shortfalls, the production increase had likely already happened some time ago,” they wrote.

On the very day that Al-Naimi issued his statement in Kuwait, the Joint Oil Data Initiative released its own data, cov-

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Oil Production in Middle East

Source: Graphic News

ering 90 percent of the world’s oil supply, which showed that Saudi Arabia’s output for February was actually about 105,000 bpd lower than what the minister cited.

What we have, then, is a disturbingly obtuse statistical conflict, and the resultant concern is understandable. With political and institutional uncertainty permeating ever deeper into the oil market, investors desperately need transparency, and they certainly need to be able to trust any governmental figures or statements they receive. What some have failed to realize, however, is that the oil market is rife with statistical uncertainty, and that producers and international organizations have yet to arrive at a uniform metric to express production.

This is largely due to the protean nature of the oil market in general and OPEC in particular. OPEC’s true oil reserves are impossible to gauge with 100 percent accuracy, and the figures that the organization reports are not audited. Twice every year, the member countries will meet to determine production quotas, though the cartel lacks the hard mechanisms necessary to enforce these limits. Nevertheless, the quotas are always set to allow each country to have enough spare capacity to increase production relatively quickly, in response to external market shocks.

As OPEC’s biggest oil producer, Saudi Arabia can exert considerable control over the ebbs and flows of the region’s supply and can help smooth out volatile price fluctuations, but this control doesn’t extend to the global market. The oil market, after all, is incredibly fragmented, comprising dozens of major futures, over the counter, and physical markets around the globe. When Saudi Arabia churns out a barrel of crude, it’s doing so to meet the demands of not one market or consumer, but of myriad investors, manufacturers, governments or speculators, all of whom have purchased their share for a predetermined price, at a unique delivery date.

“Production,” therefore, doesn’t exist as a singular, all-encompassing metric, but as a composite figure that can take on any number of equally accurate values at any given time, depending on the variables one chooses to toss into the equation.

According to Muhammad Ali Khatibi, Iran’s OPEC governor, “there is a difference of 500,000 to 700,000 barrels a day between the highest and lowest” production figures, depending on the source.

The discussion surrounding Al-Naimi’s comments shouldn’t raise suspicions about the country’s market manipulations. If anything, the incident should underscore an inherent statistical ambiguity that pervades the entire energy market—and one that deserves more careful attention.

Amar Toor Paris-based journalist, specializing in technology and economics.

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

When the past is always present

The eradication of a community Examined here are the circumstances of the underreported ethnic cleansing of religious minorities under Ottoman rule. When genocide goes unrecognized, it creates a mentality in the community that these acts bear no consequences, and society does not progress.

A. Lilith

Assyrians today in Enschede, The Netherlands, where a run was organized to raise awareness of the Mor Gabriel Monastery court case. T-shirts read ‘Hands off Mor Gabriel’ and ‘1915 Assyrian Genocide never again’

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Bishop Timotheos and Samuel Aktas stand outside the Mor Gabriel monastery in Midyat, Turkey. The 1,600-year-old monastery is located in a part of Turkey that was one of the original cradles of the Christian church, though today only around 3,000 Christians are left in the area

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Image © Getty Images

R

ecent attacks on churches in Egypt and Iraq show that indigenous Christians face an uncertain future in the Middle East. In a region where religion is a fundamental component of life, religious violence is an issue that appears to have been sidelined in news covering the Arab Spring. Yet these attacks are profoundly significant.

They lead us to question whether the issue of religious conflict has undermined any democratic intentions in its aftermath.

Where there is no religious tolerance, there is no hope for democracy, only conflicts of self-interests. Good relationships between religions and creeds are crucial to building a healthy, democratic and stable society, providing equality before the law, and protection from arbitrary violence. More importantly, every society needs a moral conscience. Wherever there is religious intolerance, it is the minority communities that suffer the most. Sadly, these indigenous minorities of the Middle East are dwindling, and becoming even more vulnerable.

Illustrative of this is the case of the Saint Gabriel Monastery in Turkey, founded in 397 AD. The monastery is the oldest and most significant cultural and religious hub of the ancient Assyrians, but its future is under threat. In 2004, when a new “property land registry work law” was introduced by the Turkish government, the three surrounding Kurdish villages were enabled and subsequently encouraged to take the monastery to court. In 2008, the village leaders accused the monastery of proselytization for accepting students to whom they could pass down the Christian faith.

They also claimed that there was previously a mosque at the site of the monastery, despite the monastery having been built over two hundred years before the advent of Islam, and requested that its land be divided among the villagers. In its 2006 resolution, the European parliament considers this issue a matter of human rights law. What is felt to be the latest “campaign of intimidation” against the Assyrian community also serves to remind them of their painful past.

The Assyrians and other indigenous Christians of the Middle East constitute a rapidly declining population in the region.

The Assyrians, a once strong and vast nation of around one million members in Turkey, pioneers from the year 2400 BC in the fields of medicine, education, law and astronomy, have been reduced and indeed, all but erased by endless persecution.

They now number a mere 5,000. Before the First World War, Christians comprised 33 percent of the population in Turkey.

Presently they make up 0.1 percent—a result of massacres, forced emigration and later migration. Today, the Assyrians are not even recognized by Turkey as a minority group. Many in this community feel they have been victims of a cycle that seems destined to wipe out not only their existence but also the memory of their existence. To be sure, this, along with the deprivation of land rights, has been cited by genocide scholars such as Raphael Lemkin as the final the step in the act of genocide.

On 14 November 1914, at the onset of the First World War, Sheikh Al-Islam declared a holy war against all Christians of the Ottoman Empire. The ensuing Armenian genocide, of 1915, is well known and documented, but few are aware of the massacres of Assyrians, Chaldeans and Syriacs that also occurred. Professor Richard Hovannisian asserts in his volume of essays on the Armenian genocide, Anahit Khosroeva of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, that between the 33

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

years 1895-1922 in Turkey, when 802,947 Armenians were slaughtered, two thirds of the entire Assyrian population also lost their lives. This “missing chapter” in history can be explained by its being overshadowed by the Armenian plight and also by legally sanctioned censorship in Turkey, as well as the government’s active funding of alternative historical literature in the US and Britain, praising the Ottomans and portraying their victims as rebels deserving of their punishment.

Turkey has attributed the events to “civil war and unrest,” not to genocide, and this is their reason for the absence of an official apology. Yet eyewitness accounts and testimonies from diplomats and missionaries left in telegrams, letters and reports to their superiors tell a different story. In April 1916, the German imperial chancellor was informed by a report that the Assyrians of the east Ottoman Empire had been exterminated.

While an initial 1922 Assyrian assessment set the number at 250,000, recent revisions have brought the number of Assyrians killed to 750,000. Can this really be accounted for by the ravages of a civil war?

The violent events of 1915 have come to be known as Seyfo, or the Year of the Sword, to the Assyrian community It is widely known that the Turks mobilized local minority Kurdish tribes by using anti-Christian propaganda, as well as bribery and the provisions of arms, thus employing a divide and rule strategy. In 1995, the parliament of Kurdistan in exile issued this acknowledgement: “Ottoman administrators began a policy of annihilating the Armenians and Assyrians…with the aid of some tribal Kurds,” with the result that “millions of Armenians and Assyrians were murdered.”

In January 1915, in just the one district of Urmeiea, 70 villages were attacked and plundered.

Turks and Kurds massacred the Assyrians of Amadia in May 1915 before turning their attention to the Chaldeans in the district of Siirt. The Assyrians of the Gawar district, Harput, Husankeyf and Urfa were also decimated in June. All those who were not killed were forced to flee their destroyed and burning villages, and make the long journey to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan by horse-drawn carts and caravans, or on foot, leaving behind their homes and possessions. Many died during the long and arduous journey.

Reasons for the genocide may have been to cleanse the Turkish heartland, for fear of Christian collaboration with minority Kurds or with Russia in the impending world war. Some argue it was a Turkish response to the Armenian uprising against them for occupying some of their land, although the massacres extended far beyond armed resistance and do not justify the killing of the Assyrians, Syriacs and Chaldeans, who were not involved.

Social historian David Gaunt found that, although wholly unfounded, Turkish fear of a Christian revolt seems to be central to the massacres. Whatever the reason, no argument could ever excuse the destruction of villages, the butchering of thousands of innocent victims, young and old, and the rape, slaughter and kidnap of women and children, documented in detail by eyewitnesses as being some of the most relentless and inhumane acts.

The violent events of 1915 have come to be known as Seyfo, or the Year of the Sword, to the Assyrian community but were by no means isolated. Rather, they were a climax to the continual massacres that had occurred during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. In just two years from 1843-1845, according to British representatives and western missionary sources, 10,000 Assyrians were slaughtered. Since then there have been many more massacres of this community, but 1915 was by far the most brutal in terms of numbers. The Assyrian genocide has been recognized by the European Parliament (EU) the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and the Armenian American Association (AAA). Turkey continues to deny the genocide, though it has officially and rightly recognized genocides elsewhere, involving smaller numbers of victims and smaller target groups, such as Bosnia and Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia.

In 2009, Turkey’s prime minister, Tayyip Erdogan, made the bold statement that the incidents of ethnic cleansing by past Turkish governments were acts of fascism, saying that, “for years those of different identities have been kicked out of our country.” It was a move criticized and contested by his parliament, yet welcomed by the minority communities. However, reservations have been cast on his sincerity, and the much requested official apology has yet to come.

In order to find a solution to current conflicts we need to revisit recent history, study what happened, acknowledge positive aspects and condemn negative ones. Otherwise, fundamentalist and racist behavior is implicitly condoned with silence. When genocide goes unrecognized, it creates a mentality in the community that these acts bear no consequences, and society does not progress. The persistence of the denial of Ottoman crimes also contributes to the mistrust and continuous persecution of their victims today. According to Sabri Atman, founder of the Assyrian Seyfo Centre in Europe, “The denial... has perpetuated the current condition seen since 1915 to that currently being perpetrated against the Assyrians in modern day Turkey, Iraq and Iran.” The pressure is now on Turkey to take this opportunity to set a good example to other states. Before this can happen, Atman asks: “Should they leave behind the same mentality today that was in existence when the genocide took place?’

Hannibal Travis, author of Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq and Sudan, argues that “implementation of international law would solve the problem,” adding “International law prohibits denial of genocide or crimes against humanity, requires the payment of reparations and ensures equality for members of cultural, religious, ethnic and political minorities as well as indigenous people.”

Almost every member of the Assyrian, Syriac and Chaldean communities have had a family member killed or kidnapped and forced into marriage during the events of 1915. But justice can come in many forms, and while some might fear that the Assyrian community would demand reparations—as in the case of Nazi Germany—families of the victims simply want an official Turkish apology—an admission that this was genocide, and a one sided attack against their own, innocent people. Many feel that, until this happens, the souls of millions so unjustly killed cannot rest in peace. The community needs closure, because for all those who lost an aunt, uncle and grandparent, as well as their homeland, the gruesome tale of an attempted systematic destruction of their people is still felt today, and still very much alive.

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

Determined to hold onto power in their respective countries, President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria and President Muammar Al-Qadhafi of Libya are further entrenching themselves in hard-line positions against their compatriots, thereby planting the seeds of their own destruction. Editor in chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Tariq Alhomayed, and Ali Ibrahim, the Saudi newspaper’s deputy editor in chief, examine here the current state of affairs in Libya and Syria from the points of view of the government and the people. Ibrahim’s “The Dilemma: To leave or not to leave” is notable for its analysis of the different considerations the Libyan National Transitional Council has discussed regarding the likely transfer of power from Qadhafi to the transitional council, as well as the implications of bringing the leader to justice. At the same time, in “After Hama…No reform in Syria,” Alhomayed points out that Assad’s decision to sack the governor of Hama for this man’s refusal to allow security forces to attack demonstrators on the “Friday of Departure” indicates that Damascus will neither lead the reform process, nor was it ever interested in meeting the Syrian people’s demands. More worrying is that the Assad government is keen on maintaining an oppressive system of control so that when one of his own refuses to carry out orders, he is duly replaced. This, or course, spells more trouble for those Syrians resisting the regime.

After Hama… No reform in Syria Tariq Alhomayed

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fter approximately 700 thousand Syrians came out to demonstrate in Hama, President Bashar al-Assad issued a decree relieving Ahmed Khaled Abdul Aziz from his duties as governor of Hama. But what is the meaning of this?

It is true that the governor of Hama was the third governor in Syria to be sacked since the outbreak of this unprecedented uprising; however the implications of this recent decision are worth highlighting. Firstly, the promises of the Damascus regime to implement reform have become hard to believe, or count upon. The Hama demonstrations, on the Friday of Departure, were widespread, and included an unprecedented number of participants, but the other distinguishing feature [of this protest] was that the people of Hama were not suppressed like those in other regions of the country. There is one simple reason for this, and that is that

the security and the army did not interfere with the demonstrators [in Hama], in order to disperse and suppress them; this action is believed to have led to the dismissal of the city's governor. In other words, the governor of Hama was not fired because there were a large numbers of dead and wounded, rather his offense was allowing peaceful demonstrations to take place [in Hama].

This is no secret. In fact the media reported, following the demonstrations in Hama, that the Syrians were not surprised by the decision to sack the governor of Hama, as this dismissal had been preceded by rumors of dissatisfaction in some official circles – particularly the security apparatus – with regards the governor's method of handling the crisis in Hama. According to reports, the governor of Hama had earned, to a large extent, the trust of his people; granting them promises that they would be allowed to demonstrate peacefully, and pledging that the se-

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curity forces would not confront them, in exchange for the people not chanting slogans that were offensive to the head of the regime, or calling for the regime to be overthrown. The governor also removed pictures and statues of the regime's symbols from the city, so that the protestors would not destroy them.

Thus it is easy to conclude two important things here: Firstly, it is difficult to say today, following the dismissal of the governor of Hama, that the Syrian regime is keen on meeting the people's demands, and that it will lead the reform process itself.

How is that possible as long as the regime fires a man whose only fault was that he didn’t allow the security forces to kill demonstrators in the city of Hama on the Friday of Departure?

The other important thing that those concerned with Syrian affairs must understand is that the actions of the governor of Hama towards his people earned their trust which suggests that there are some Syrian officials today who are seriously re-evaluating what is happening in the country, either out of sincerely sympathizing with growing popular demands, or because they are wary of the consequences of what may happen in Syria should the regime fall, in any way. This is especially because the Syrian officials today are able to see with their own eyes what is happening to those affiliated with the Hosni Mubarak regime Issue 1565 • July 2011

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in Egypt, and how officials in Libya are now jumping ship one by one from Colonel Gaddafi, out of fear of the consequences.

Therefore, we must pay attention to these implications from the dismissal of the governor of Hama, rather than be distracted by the promises of the Damascus regime, especially as none of these promises have been yet to be implemented. Indeed rather than implement these promises [of reform], the Syrian regime has sacked a governor that protected unarmed demonstrators from the wrath of the security forces.

Tariq Alhomayed – Editor in Chief, Asharq Al-Awsat. Mr Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field including; Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Managing Editor of Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, Head of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper's Bureau-Jeddah, Correspondent for Al - Madina Newspaper in Washington D.C. from 1998 to Aug 2000. Mr. Alhomayed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al-Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia.

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

The Dilemma: To leave or not to leave Ali Ibrahim

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ollowing on from Turkey, Colonel Gaddafi now seems to be the latest to recognize the National Transitional Council in Libya, in light of a Tripoli spokesman announcing that negotiations are under way with rebels in more than one European capital. Here the word negotiations implies recognition that the other party is indeed a factor on the ground.

But as the saying goes, the devil is in the details, and the details here are about how to conduct the transfer of power, and [resolve] the Gaddafi situation. Does he stay or does he leave?

He is not believed to be considering taking a step backwards, but it is likely that he is aware that the days of his regime are almost over, and all that remains is to find a way out.

The head of the Libyan National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, has announced that he previously offered Gaddafi the option of staying in Libya if he chose to relinquish power, and withdraw his forces to their barracks. He then returned yesterday to say that there is no room for Gaddafi to remain, and that the only option is for him to step down and be brought to justice.

Accountability would serve as a lesson to others not to behave in this manner The first offer demonstrated the flexibility of the rebels stationed in the east of the country, in an attempt to emerge from the current impasse in light of the uncertainty surrounding their ability to reach a military solution to the crisis. However, it was clear that this offer was impractical.

The evidence of this [the offer's impracticality] was the negative reaction it elicited, not only from Gaddafi's side who did not even bother to respond to it, but also from the rebels themselves who, at the very least, want Gaddafi to leave the country and go into exile, if not be brought to trial for the crimes he has committed.

To leave [power] and stay in the country is the best option, as in the case of former President Mubarak in Egypt, but it is a solution to be employed at the beginning or in the first few weeks of the crisis, not months after increasing bloodshed, feuds, and a rapidly rising death toll. Gaddafi and his entourage must be well aware of this, as staying in Libya after handing over power will mean facing future demands for accountability when the dust settles, particularly from the relatives of those who were murdered, and inhabitants of cities that were destroyed.

Even the rebels themselves would face a dilemma if Gaddafi accepted this offer. The problem is not him alone – and this goes for every Arab country currently facing a revolutions – the leader is just the tip of the iceberg, for there is an entire regime that benefits from this leader's presence, and they will fight to ensure that he does not leave. It takes a lot of effort to remove a leader and cripple those who fight in his name, in order to build

a new system of governance that is acceptable to the people.

Gaddafi has brought his country to this critical situation, and he is the proponent of the infamous Zenga Zenga speech in which he dubbed the protestors "rats". Yet he was not aware that the "revolutionary farce" that he practiced, and which he wanted to continue through his sons rule until the end of time, allowed people to realize that during his reign the Libyan citizen was far less economically and politically prosperous than his peers in countries that do not possess Libya's oil wealth, which was squandered on foreign adventures and the purchase of meaningless titles.

Returning to the initial question of whether to leave or not to leave, this is not a question of Gaddafi's authority, for he practically possesses no authority today particularly after a number of countries have recognized the National Transitional Council, most recently Turkey and now Gaddafi himself. Likewise, more than half of the country is outside of his control and thus in his current position he is more like the mayor of Tripoli than the leader of Libya. The question here is where will he go? If an agreement on the transfer of power can be secured, will he stay in Libya or live in exile? Furthermore, is there anybody that will be prepared to reach an agreement with Gaddafi and guarantee that he will not be subject to prosecution, particularly after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him?

A possible exit could be ensured by an international agreement, with the consent of the National Transitional Council and the rebels, in which there is an explicit offer providing guarantees of non-prosecution, reconciliation and amnesty, as was the case in South Africa following the collapse of the Apartheid regime. Gaddafi would leave power and be placed in a safe location under house arrest, whilst those who stood by him until the end would be prevented from public and political activities, and if there were crimes against humanity, then this would fall under the domain of the judiciary.

Some may say that this solution will not achieve justice, and this is true. There must be accountability for the crimes committed so that there is never a repeat of a regime such as this, which fought against its own people. Accountability would serve as a lesson to others not to behave in this manner. Yet some cases require taking public interest into account first and foremost, especially if this spares the country the risk of prolonging this division for a long period of time, and shortens the transition period towards the creation of a new Libya.

Gaddafi is certainly aware that he has lost his authority and that it is only a matter of time [until his regime collapses], and therefore there may be an opportunity to shorten his time in power by pressuring him, showing him there could be a way out for him personally if he agrees to step down.

Ali Ibrahim – Asharq Al-Awsat's Deputy Editor-in-Chief, based in London This article was originally published in “Asharq Al-Awsat” on 5 July 2011

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

Revolutions Well Begun, Half Done An Interview with Kamal Salibi, Lebanese historian

The History of Lebanon, Syria under Islam, A History of Arabia and The Modern History of Jordan are a few of the many books that Kamal Salibi wrote about the Middle East. In addition to being one of the region’s most seasoned historians, Salibi has been around for a while. At 82, Salibi knows the Arab countries well. He knows the culture and the history. He has met decision-makers of past and present, most of whom consult him on various issues. With a lot of wisdom, Salibi has many things to say about the ongoing developments in the region.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain

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midst raging popular protests that have spread from Tunisia to Syria, The Majalla interviewed Kamal Salibi. Are these protests the equivalent of Europe 1848, or the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in 1919? Does he worry about probable instability, or does he think the Arabs are ready to build their modern day democracies?

Salibi is a proud Arab who thinks that time is up for those who have been dishonest on different counts. When asked about the comments of his one time academic advisor, Bernard Lewis— who coached Salibi while a PhD student at the University of London—Salibi said the issue of whether the Arabs are ready for democracy or not can be answered by Arab people alone.

A few observers have argued that the ongoing Arab revolutions are similar to Europe 1848. Do you agree with such assessment?

The ongoing Arab revolutions—if revolutions they are—do bear a striking surface similarity to the European revolutions of 1848. Beneath the surface, however, the differences are blatant. The European revolutions of 1848 aimed at replacing an existing European order that had outlived its use with a new one that was, hopefully, more promising and flexible. I have been observing the ongoing Arab revolutions from their onset to date, and apart from the catharsis they inspire, it seems to me that they still need to find their bearings. And these they would have to find from their own resources, rather than import them from friendly parties, no matter how well-meaning. As Goethe once put it, "No true refreshment can restore thee, save from what from thine own soul spontaneous breaks."

Many argue that Mohamad Bouazizi's self-immolation caused the revolution in Tunisia that eventually spread to other countries. History, however, teaches us that such events are only the spark. In your opinion, what is the fuel that the Bouazizi spark has ignited?

Anything said regarding Mohamad Bouazizi's self-immolation will remain pure speculation until it comes to be supported by some shred of concrete explanatory evidence. To my knowledge, history by itself teaches nothing in particular about selfimmolation, especially that it is not the sort of thing that regularly occurs. I can think of no end of reasons for which may get people to immolate themselves. My guess, however, is that they are not the sort of reasons for which bear rational explanation.

To what extent have the traditional complaints of so called imperial schemes or the occupation of Palestine affected the Arab popular rage?

Popular rage can be real, and it can be played as a game. To be enraged, one has first to be serious, and take things seriously.

Otherwise, rage becomes an insipid game of charades. The problem is, a person or body of people playing rage as a game, if caught at their game and exposed as being dishonest, can turn very dangerous. There is nothing more dangerous than someone caught at his lie.

Do you fear of the consequences of the ongoing revolutions? Do you prefer stability over governmental uncertainty?

Sometimes, unbearable situations can only be corrected by revolutions. But the norm is for situations to be bearable, and not requiring correction by any means more radical or threatening than a vote.

Do you feel, a few years from now, new autocrats will simply replace the ones that are being toppled instead of seeing democracy striking root?

Well-structured constitutions that provide adequate means for their amendment when necessary can last a long time, and perhaps indefinitely. Well begun, half done.

In February, Bernard Lewis told The Jerusalem Post in an interview: "We, in the Western world particularly, tend to think of democracy in our own terms—that’s natural and normal—to mean periodic elections in our style. But I think it’s a great mistake to try and think of the Middle East in those terms and that can only lead to disastrous results, as you’ve already seen in various places. They are simply not ready for free and fair elections." Do you agree with Lewis that the Arabs are simply not ready for democracy?

The proposition advanced by Professor Lewis is not of the sort that can be settled by argument. Arabs who are ready for democracy periodically hold free and fair elections following set norms and abide by the outcome, whatever it may chance to be. The same applies universally. Arabs who are not ready for democracy do not do this, or fail in doing it on enough scores to end up being ruled by tyrants. Denials of the Arab readiness for democracy will remain valid for as

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long as the Arabs (as a people, and not as a panel of brittle intellectuals) do nothing about it. It is they, and they alone, who can prove the proposition advanced by Professor Lewis right or wrong.

A few demonstrations do not seem to make sense. In Iraq, the Sadr Movement rallied in the streets, even though the movement is well represented in both parliament and cabinet. Do you think the understanding of democracy is not yet as mature as it should be in certain cases like in Iraq?

To confuse healthy body fat with edema is a common error in judgment which one must try one's best to avoid.

The case of Lebanon. Lebanon was always viewed as vanguard on issues of democracy and governance.

However, amidst the Arab spring, Lebanon seems to be the furthest away from fundamental change that is sweeping through some countries. Why is Lebanon behind this time?

Why do you consider Lebanon "behind this time?" I consider it far ahead, for as long as nobody bashes it on the head to destroy it. Next to the US, Lebanon has the oldest constitution in the world which remains in operation, ever since its promulgation on 23 May 1926. The Lebanese may not love the law as much as they should; but there is hardly a Lebanese person who cannot distinguish constitutional and legal from unconstitutional and illegal procedure, or spot the least fault in due process. Breaking the law is one thing; knowing what one is breaking is another. In political sophistication, the Lebanese are hard to beat. And one mark of their addiction to democracy is their political corruption. While I personally hate corruption in whatever form it takes, I recognize, at the same time, that only the free can be truly corrupt.

Will the region see the mushrooming of democracies while Lebanon is left behind? Or do you believe that Lebanon will catch up?

Lebanon is so far ahead of the region of which it forms part that her neighbors will need centuries to catch up with her. That is, unless someone bashes us on the head and destroys us to no return.

The role of women. TV footage from Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen show that women were heavily involved in their respective revolutions. In Syria, little or no women are visible with the exception of outspoken opposition women. Why do you think this is the case?

Is the Levant traditionally more conservative on women issues than other Arab countries?

Your guess, for better or worse, is correct. Levantine culture does tend to be a male culture, with men playing the star roles, and women tucked away in the chorus.

What's your view of the role of the United States and Europe. Do you think they are doing enough to help the Arabs achieve freedom? Are they doing too little or should they do nothing at all?

I am an Arab and I am Lebanese, and I would consider it disgraceful for me to depend on any non-Arab or non-Lebanese potentate in the world to do the things I and my ilk can do for ourselves.

What's your view of the role of other powers, such as Russia, China, and now Turkey, who seem to be the first to defend the status quo (Turkey voiced support toward Qadhafi and Assad, Russia and China shows support too).

Lebanon can have friends; and friends are preferable to enemies. On the other hand, I do not relish seeing foreign powers getting overly involved in our happy little world—so it can remain a happy little world.

Israel in Arabia Historian, Kamal Salibi, was born in Beirut in 1929 and is the author of an extensive body of work, spanning over four decades. ‘The bible came from Arabia’, Salibi’s first book, advocating his controversial “Israel in Arabia” theory was finalized in the summer of 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Although innovative and groundbreaking, strangely Salibi’s discoveries have since instigated little momentum in the academic world.

Salibi’s hypothesis specifies that certain place names in the Hebrew Bible actually refer to areas in southwest Arabia, and that many of these were later reinterpreted to refer to places in Palestine where the Hasmonean kingdom was established in the second century B.C. The inspiration of this research came after Salibi was given a gazetteer of Arabia. Upon looking through it, he discovered that a number of biblical place names were found in the province of Asir. He then correlated the names of places to the distances traveled according various Old Testament books of the Bible.

Salibi’s findings reveal there was a closer relation to the distances between all the locations in Asir

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and those in the Old Testament, than those found between areas in Palestine. Salibi concludes that the Asir province, situated in the southern part of Al-Surat Mountains, stretching along the western coastal border of Arabia, between Yemen’s northern borders and the holy city of Makkah, was in fact the original Israel. He also proposes that the Jordan, rather than being a river, was the great West Arabian escarpment of the Sarawat Mountains, located between the highlands of Asir and the lower coastal plain.

Salibi has written two further books in conjunction with this theory, named ‘Secrets of the Bible People’ and ‘The History of Biblical Israel’. Although his historical analyses have been considered controversial, they are recognized for their innovative, accurate objectivity and scientific approach. Salibi strongly asserts that he does not seek to invoke a religious scandal. Many readers seem to agree that ‘The bible came from Arabia’ does not challenge the validity and importance of religion, but in light of his theory, there becomes a greater emphasis on the futility of the violent struggles between Palestine and Israel today.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

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Democracy on the Horizon Ahmed Najib Chebbi, Tunisian presidential candidate

Ahmed Najib Chebbi, the most prominent contender for presidency in Tunisia, insists that he does not want to see an ideological state in his country—be it Islamic, military or communist—and that he would not like to see himself in a coalition government with Islamists having had disagreed the experience of dealing with them in the past.

In his interview with The Majalla, Mr. Chebbi also points out that he is against the idea of banning the former ruling party from the political scene that will follow the demise of Ben Ali. The only exception, he thinks, should be those proved to have been involved in repression and corruption.

Shehrezad Akacha

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hmed Najib Chebbi is the founder and former secretary-general of the Progressive Democratic Party and one of the most prominent contenders running for president of the Tunisian Republic following the ousting of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. Chebbi has been a fierce opponent of both Ben Ali and the first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba. Many have not yet forgiven him for the brief bout of “confidence” he expressed towards Bin Ali when the latter won the presidency in November 1987, but Chebbi definitively changed his mind during the first elections held under the rule of the former president.

At a time when most Tunisian opposition, especially Islamic leaders, were in exile, Chebbi was thought to be the key agitator against the regime. He was accused of having a bias towards the United States, an accusation that follows him to this day, levelled at him by former allies turned enemies. Chebbi strongly denounces these accusations as slanderous and stresses that his loyalty has always been to God and to Tunisia. He dreams of a Tunisia with a truly democratic presidential system, and hopes one day to be president if his party accepts his candidacy. But, before looking ahead to the presidential palace in Carthage, Chebbi must win the confidence of Tunisian voters when they elect a National Constituent Assembly whose job will be to write the country’s new constitution and provide a legitimate transitional government.

The Majalla interviews Chebbi just prior to the postponement of elections in Tunisia until October of this year.

A major debate is now taking place in Tunisia regarding the postponement of the date of the coming elections. The Tunisian independent Electoral Commission announced that it would be impossible to conduct the elections on 24 July 2011 as initially planned. Many political players share these misgivings. Will there be a lot of tension if the provisional government insists on the initial date?

The statement of the Election Commission means there is a great danger that the elections will not take place on time even if the government guarantees to provide the right conditions and resources. I am worried that the whole project is ridden with difficulties. The commission surprised us all. Both the provisional government and the political parties did not expect this. As to

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

Trying Ben Ali According to Al-Jazeera, of the 93 charges Ben Ali and his inner circle now face, 35 will be referred to the military court. Five public defenders have been assigned to Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi. It is clear that in the days that follow, Tunisia’s legal system will provide the country a means not only to pursue justice, but hopefully to begin a period of political reconciliation that will allow the country to move beyond its autocratic past.

Five months after the revolution in Tunisia, former President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and his wife have been tried in absentia and sentenced to 35 years in prison against charges of embezzlement and misuse of public funds associated to the 27 million dollars found in their two palaces. In addition to the prison sentence, according to the BBC, the judge also ordered Ben Ali to pay $36m and his wife $30m.

The defendant’s court-appointed lawyers have requested a postponement to prepare his defense for a number of other charges including drug and weapons possession, trafficking of archeological artifacts, torture and murder. According to Al jazeera of the 93 charges Ben Ali and his inner circle now face, 35 will be referred to the military court. Five public defenders have been assigned to Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi. The defendants have been denied the ability to use nonTunisian lawyers.

Monday’s ruling has been considered by many Tunisians an important step for ensuring the successful completion of the revolution’s goals by ending the culture of impunity that allowed Ben Ali and his family myself, although I am opposed to this state of affairs, I consider it an opportunity to re-open dialogue and review the work of the Supreme Council to protect the revolution, and political reform which is supposed to oversee the transition to democracy.

Do you not think that the independent Electoral Commission, in this instance, is responding to demands from some political players who are calling for the postponement of the elections?

I do not think so. I prefer to take things at face value. I do not lean towards conspiracy theories. I believe that the members of the commission are honest and that the decision to postpone is a result of technical concerns. It is people like me who have to weigh the political implications, especially in the light of the security situation. Today, most roads between the districts are closed. There is a general strike in the south of the country, and an overwhelming sense of tension brought about by the revolution and the political void that has been created. I am concerned about complications should this state of affairs last much longer.

You called for an immediate transition to presidential elections after the success of the revolution. Instead, Tunisia will first elect a National Constituent Assembly whose mandate and term of office, apart from the drafting of the constitution, remain unclear.

to abuse their position for so many years. And while other more significant charges associated to the killings that took place during the revolution are awaited, it is unlikely that Ben Ali will serve any time in prison as Saudi Arabia has yet to respond to the Tunisian government’s extradition requests for Ben Ali and his wife. Analysts have noted that in the trials to come it is likely Ben Ali will be given capital punishment, rendering his extradition even more unlikely.

For his part, Ben Ali has maintained that he has only ever acted on behalf of Tunisian interests while his legal team has claimed the trials taking place are politically motivated and thus an illegitimate victor’s justice.

Rather, alongside his lawyers, Ben Ali has argued that these trials are meant to “divert the attention of Tunisians from the turmoil that nobody can accuse him of or hold him responsible for.” However, given the circumstances, he has no intention to come to Tunisia to defend his position in person. As such, the continuing trials will remain a symbolic exercise of justice for Tunisians.

It is clear that in the days that follow, Tunisia’s legal system will provide the country a means not only to pursue justice, but hopefully to begin a period of political reconciliation that will allow the country to move beyond its autocratic past. Despite Ben Ali’s absence from the country, Tunisia should take advantage of the opportunity to reassert its democratic values and set the stage for strong standards of governance and anti-corruption.

Paula Mejia Are you concerned that this might be a repeat of the Libyan scenario which allowed Qadhafi to rule for more than 40 years?

You are right. I still believe that the road map proposed by Mohammed Ghannouchi’s government would have been the right thing to do. We should have moved immediately to presidential elections. This would have allowed Tunisia to vote in a national figure with executive powers and a clear vision to shape the future of the country. It would have been also possible to simultaneously elect an Executive Committee with a mandate to review the Tunisian constitution as the old one is no longer valid. This would have brought back stability. It would have reassured our foreign partners and inspired hope in our youth, who, I believe, have started feeling a little weary about the prospects of change.

The fear that the National Assembly will linger in power is very valid since there are no limits set on its powers, especially since the assembly will be the only agency legitimized by the ballot box after the elections. The assembly, therefore, will be the ultimate authority and neither current nor future authorities will be able to limit its powers. While, if we had opted to move immediately towards presidential elections there would have been a balance between two agencies voted in by the people. Our political elites did not choose this option. Instead, they went for the National Assembly and now they want to postpone. It is a shame!

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Will you be putting yourself forward as a presidential candidate?

We currently have no constitution as we are waiting for the draft of the new one. Therefore, the question is: Will Tunisia be electing a president? It could be that our new constitution opts for a non-presidential system, as is the case in Italy for example. Personally, I hope they don’t. Our party has taken part in previous elections, so if the new constitution favours a presidential system, and if my party chooses me as its candidate, then I will run.

Ghannouchi’s government explained your resignation, stating that you wished to run for president. You could not do this while remaining in government. So, the intention was always there?

Yes, our law prohibits government figures from running in any elections, so I had to resign my post considering that I intended to run for the National Assembly. Now, I am devoting all my time to the election campaign for my own party. I am not motivated by personal vanity. My ambition is to serve Tunisia by widening the chances of the Democratic Progressive Party and increasing its influence in Tunisia’s political life.

Mr. Chebbi, how do you see the role of the Tunisian army during this transitional stage? Do you think it will have a role in the country’s political life?

Personally, I am proud of two achievements in Tunisia’s national life. The first one is what we have accomplished in the field of personal status laws and women’s rights; the second is the neutrality of the army. They have defended our borders and defended their people whenever they were in danger. I hope they maintain this role. What is really needed now is that the Tunisians govern themselves by themselves through the ballot box.

When you resigned from government you warned against the possibility of the army taking power. Was this a real worry or was it simply an appeal for neutrality?

In a statement I issued back then, I pointed out that I was not accusing the army or its leadership. On the contrary, I have always praised the army. But, I also know that chaos is a sure route to dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and I do not wish this for Tunisia. I believe we need to work hard to avoid chaos, because when chaos prevails, people start to long for a strong government. We do not want to end up there so we need to have elections at the earliest opportunity.

Talking about chaos, do you believe that the barrage of statements made by the former minister of interior, Farahat Al-Rajihi, and the terrorist attacks in Tunisia which aimed to throw suspicion on the army and its leadership, point towards one single agency that may have been behind both incidents? Many seem to think so.

As I said before, I do not like conspiracy theories. Terrorism is a real and possible threat in my country but it remains a marginal phenomenon. Nothing in Tunisia could prompt or encourage terrorism apart from economic desperation. People’s economic situation could potentially be exploited by stirring religious fervour or the supply of funding, but this will remain marginal.

The Tunisian people have illustrated to the world their ability and commitment to using peaceful means.

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The quote attributed to Mr. Rajihi, which raised the doubts about the chief of staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces, Rachid Ammar, would not have aroused such turmoil if not for the precarious situation in the country. There is a lot of tension here. The social situation needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency to bring back hope to Tunisians. I believe the country can bear these conditions for another three years if people get the sense that the economy is moving forward. If people could see road-works being done, that alone could bring back a sense of stability to people. If the situation remains the same then desperation will set in to fill the void, especially in light of a weak government and a lack of security. It is essential that we move quickly to a legitimate government capable of ensuring security and creating rapprochement with the public.

Many Tunisians explain the lack of security in the country through the actions of what they call “the shadow government,” a government that consists of elements from the former regime, some new players who seem bent on imposing themselves on the political scene by force, and other anti-revolution forces that were beneficiaries of the previous regime. What is your reading of this situation, and what do you think of what people refer to as “the shadow government”?

First of all I do not believe that there is a shadow government.

We know who is in government today. Both the members as well as the head are all figures very well known to us. In fact, the leader of the new government has managed to prove to everyone in the last few weeks that he is very capable of steering this government. So, I do not see any foundation for such claims.

There are, of course, forces in our country that remain antagonistic to change. This is because some people will not benefit from change. These forces will remain active, but I do not believe that they have much power to influence the situation or exploit it to their ends. What we need today, to remedy the situation, is political legitimacy. We need to bring back hope to the young.

We need to bring back confidence to investors, and we need to bring clarity to the way we project ourselves to the outside world.

All the forces you are talking about will then be committed to the margins of history. They will be of no consequence to the events unfolding in our country. They will soon become ineffective unless we fail to swiftly execute all the tasks I mentioned above.

Before 14 January you and your party were subject to vicious attacks from the political police and the former ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally.

Now, after the revolution, you are subject to attacks from other quarters because of your refusal to ban the very party that prosecuted you. How do you respond?

It is important to differentiate between political parties and public opinion. I think that public opinion supports us in this matter. My party is keen to allow the former ruling party to continue functioning as a political party. Even before the revolution we were not calling for the dismantling of the Constitutional Democratic Rally. We were simply calling for the separation of the party apparatus from that of the state apparatus to ensure equal opportunities for other parties. After 14 January, this separation was carried out successfully by Mohammed Ghannouchi’s government, and the state has now reclaimed its offices and its assets. At this stage, we are calling for an inves45

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tigation of those members of the Constitutional Democratic Rally who are believed to have been involved in corruption and oppression. We want their case to be referred to the court of justice and for the process to be independent of outside influence, including that of public opinion.

As to political opponents, their fate should be decided by people at the ballot box. In Eastern Europe, communist parties ruled by the sword. Now they are minority parties with no means or popular support to return to power. My clash with the former government was not a personal squabble; it was a dispute over a vision for Tunisia. Today, Tunisia is free from political monopoly.

If we want to hold anyone accountable this should take place in a court of law or at the ballot box. Furthermore, everyone who wants to play a role in national politics should see national rapprochement as key, and here I would like to remind everyone of a quote from the Prophet, peace be upon him: “Whoever enters the house of Abu Sufian is safe.” He was the first to advocate turning a new page. I am looking towards the future. I would like Tunisians to find peace with each other.

A party can have a program inspired by religion, but it cannot impose religion as a state project “Looking towards the future” suggests a certain type of rule. Some people have a different vision for Tunisia. What kind of rule do you want to see?

I think that Islam is a common factor that unites the people in Tunisia, but modern life necessitates that we differentiate between politics and religion. Each of these two elements must remain independent. A party can have a program inspired by religion, but it cannot impose religion as a state project because a state has a monopoly on force. When force is coupled with ideology, be it religious or communist, it is a recipe for a totalitarian state and that we do not accept. We need to differentiate between proselytizing and engaging in political work.

In the West, for example, you do not see someone like Angela Merkel, who belongs to a Christian party, appear in church to preach against the socialist parties of her country. You do not see priests agitating people to take sides in clashes between political parties. At the same time, I am not a supporter of the French style of secular government.

You have observed Islamists and their violent ways of operating since the late eighties. In 2005, you entered a coalition with them as part of the Movement of 18 October. Most recently, you announced that you would categorically refuse to form a coalition with them. Did your coalition end the moment Ben Ali’s regime was toppled?

In the late eighties, we were at odds with Al-Nahda because of the means they used to express themselves. We believed their approach could bring about a collapse in Tunisia. On the other hand, we didn’t think that the brutality with which the government treated them was appropriate. It wasn’t acceptable morally and it wasn’t acceptable politically. It simply destroyed any hope of democracy in our country. In 2005, we met with Al-Nahda and then worked together for a year or a year and a

half, basing our cooperation on basic asks that we shared such as, freedom of expression, the right to organize politically, and a general sense of tolerance. We met and debated with them in the framework of a larger coalition called the Movement of 18 October. This coalition came to an end in 2008 when the possibility of elections was proposed for 2009. We found ourselves disagreeing on many counts. My party was at the forefront of a campaign that was challenging Ben Ali’s right to run for another term. Many parties did not come forward to support us in this battle, including Al-Nahda. After the revolution, we disagreed again. Our view was that the best way forward to transition to democracy was through a national unity government.

Our colleagues at Al-Nahda took a different view. They worked to undermine the legitimacy of this government in collaboration with Tunisia’s left wing parties and the Tunisian General Labor Union. It is up to the people now to weigh the country’s interests and the gains they want for modern Tunisia when they go to vote in the upcoming elections. We will be working towards these gains.

I believe our aspirations cannot be achieved through an ideological state. An ideological state will be a danger to freedom in this country, and to our image and standing among other nations. This is a key point of disagreement between us and Al-Nahda.

Does this mean that you will never form a coalition with Al-Nahda?

It would be best if the elections of the National Constituent Assembly produce a majority government and a minority opposition. But things do not always happen this way. Germany is an example. In this case, parties will have to find ways to co-exist in a transitional government but all this is speculative at the moment. I wouldn’t like to see this kind of government.

The former government accused you of harboring an American agenda and some parties that took part in the revolution of 14 February seem to have the same accusation. What do you say to them?

The former government tried to undermine our reputation in a variety of ways. This accusation was one of them. They would tell Americans that we were supporters of Saddam Hussein, while newspapers printed our photographs once accusing us of being Mossad agents. All these accusations are inconsequential now that the mendacity of this regime has been revealed.

Truth always triumphs.

The wave of Arab revolutions started in Tunisia. What are your predictions for the future of the region?

I believe we are witnessing a rebirth of the Arab world. We were living at the margins of history because of the absence of democracy. Now, revolutions have erupted all over and it is an honor for Tunisia that we have started it. I think the time is ripe for democratic change. We need to end this disease of despotism which has been stifling our region. Ending this era brings the promise of a new life to the Arab world. We will see a new energy emerging. There will be a greater openness, exchange and activity in our region which will affirm our cultural and geographic commonality. I think the prospects are really promising, and I feel for the first time that our feet are on the ground. Democracy is on the horizon.

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Saudi Arabia

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King Abdullah, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Six years ago, on his succession to the monarchy of the KSA, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah, pledged to his people that he would adhere to the Qur’an as a constitution and Islam as a method. He set a priority to introducing reforms that would ensure the establishment of rights and justice in the state and committed to serve all the people of the nation.

He asserted in various meetings with his people, “You have to keep patience and loyalty by the will of Allah the Almighty.”

The era of King Abdullah has not witnessed a stable regional and international environment: two devastating conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, severe Arab divisions and differences, instability in Yemen, a global financial crisis, a terrorist threat challenging the Kingdom’s security, and instability resulting from the Arab Spring.

The King has shown strong leadership in addressing the challenges facing the Arab and Islamic world. He has tried to reconcile differences in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the countries of the Islamic world. He has called for achieving just peace and combating terrorism regardless of its source. He reiterated during his visit to the Vatican the importance of dialogue between religions and civilizations in order to promote tolerance and security among the people of the world.

King Abdullah has introduced a number of domestic reforms. Since his ascent to throne, the KSA has witnessed many developments in various sectors: economy, education, healthcare, society, transportation, industry, electricity, water, and agriculture. Overall, these achievements have been integral for the Kingdom in its ability to surpass the UN millennium development goals set forth in 2002.

Education The process of education has taken fast steps forward, as the KSA has directed a large percentage of its revenues to the development of education. The country is now witnessing a complete educational revival crowned by the establishment of 21 governmental universities and 4 non-governmental universities, including 19 colleges that are distributed geographically to fulfill the needs of the kingdom. There were 70,681 students and 30,246 staff members in these universities in the educaIssue 1565 • July 2011

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Key Facts

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he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab, Muslim country forming the bulk of the Arabian Peninsula.

Known for its strategic location between three continents, it has been home to many civilizations and the cradle of monotheist religions. It’s famous for the holiest Islamic mosques, Al-Masjid Al-Haram in Mecca and Al-Masjid Al-Nabawi in Medina. Millions of Muslims annually visit the country to perform the Hajj and the Umra.

The Kingdom is famous for many historical events spanning from the ages before Islam to the emergence of Islam to the modern period commencing with the unification of the state

by King Abdul-Aziz Al Saud.The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is ranked the first in world for oil production and reserves. It is the tenth in the production of natural gas.

Having a distinctive geographical location, vast oil and mineral resources, open economic policies, large domestic markets, a growing number of privatization projects, and governmentproposed investment incentives, the country has become one of the best locations for foreign investment in the Middle East.

Capital: Riyadh Monarch: Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, from Egyptian-British rule Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister: Sultan Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud Second Deputy Prime Minister: Nayef Bin AbdulAziz Al Saud GEOGRAPHY Location: Saudi Arabia occupies the bulk of the Arabian Peninsula. It consists of narrow valleys along the coast of the Red Sea. Eastwards, there are mountain ranges extending alongside the country.

Then, there are deserts, and rocky hills in the middle (90% of the total area). The largest desert is Al-Nafud in the north and Al-Rub’ Al-Khali (the Empty Quarter) in the south. In the east, along the coastline of the Arab Gulf, there are vast coastal plains.

PEOPLE Population: 28 million, of which 7 million are foreigners Religions: Islam Languages: Arabic ECONOMY Budget of 2011: 540 billion riyals ($144 billion) Average per captia income: $16.039 Oil production: 9.5 million barrel per day tional year 2007/2008. In 32,000 schools for boys and girls, the total number of students stands at more than 5 million, who are instructed by more than 426 teachers. Many institutes and centers have been established to examine nanotechnology.

Reforming State’s Institutions The Allegiance Council is now responsible for deciding succession in the Kingdom. Also, the Judiciary and the Office of Ombudsmen have been reformed, and seven billion riyals have been allocated to the development of the Judiciary. In addition, a number of governmental agencies and departments and non-governmental organizations have been established to focus on the citizen’s affairs and interests, among which are “The National Authority for the Protection of Integrity and Combating Corruption”, “The Public Authority for Housing”. A major unit has been formed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as an agency for consumer services.

Municipal councils have assumed local responsibilities since 2005. Alongside this development, the number of civil society organizations has increased. Moreover, a human rights council has been formed and organized. A Consumer Protection Association, as well as the Saudi Food and Drug Authority have been established. The King Abdul-Aziz Center for National Dialogue has contributed to the spread of dialogue throughout society about major national issues.

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Foreign Policy The Kingdom’s foreign policy has represented the consistent commitment to the Arab nation’s issues, affairs, common interests and problems. Ahead of these issues are the Palestinian cause, the restoration of Al-Aqsa mosque, and the achievement of common interests while adhering to the charter of the Arab League.

The Kingdom has made clear contributions to the international arena through its defense of the principles of peace, security, justice, protection of human rights, and rejection of violence and racial discrimination. The country has worked hard to combat terrorism and crime according to the teachings of Islam. In addition, it has made exerted efforts to enhance the role of international organizations and has called for international cooperation in order to help the developing states meet their fundamental needs.

Economic Development Upon the instructions of King Abdullah, there have been comprehensive economic reforms and extensive efforts to improve the business environment in the kingdom, along with an inclusive program to solve the difficulties facing domestic, common, and foreign investments. These have led the Kingdom to win a World Bank award for its fast-paced economic reform and to be ranked among the 11 most reformed countries.

An IMF report, published in 2009, concluded that the Kingdom weathered the recent world financial crisis with a strong economic showing and enhanced its macro-economic status and financial sector by implementing structural reforms to push forward the growth led by the private sector. The IMF, also, praised the measures taken by the Kingdom to increase banking liquidity and stabilize transactions among banks, in addition to its action in public finance to alleviate the impact of the global recession.

Despite the hard time faced by the world economy, Standard & Poor’s has kept the credit ratings of the kingdom at (AA-).

The report emphasized the strength of the financial situation of the country, as a result of the firm balance of payments and the success of the reform and spending plans of the government. These results solidify the economic status of the Kingdom as an environment attractive to investment. This rating will also help Saudi companies acquire low-cost loans.

The World Bank report on a state’s investment climate in 2010 ranked KSA 13 among 183 countries, a three-space jump since the last publication of the report in 2009.

Economists expect the Saudi economy to grow to about 6 to 6.5% in 2011, instead of the expected 4.3%, as a result the social spending package that was recently announced. The Kingdom has pledged to spend $130 billion (30% of its annual product) on a number of initiatives including building new houses, providing job opportunities, and offering expanded unemployment benefits.

Industry The Kingdom’s industry is primarily associated with oil and natural gas: refinement and petrochemistry. The most important industrial products are tar, cement, steel, ethylene, fodder, ethylene glycol, ethanol, dichloroethylene, stearin, caustic soda, nitrogen, citric acid, oxygen and melamine. There is also desalination of sea water and food industries. About 100 million square meters of seawater are desalinated yearly, which is very small compared to 9500 million square meter provided yearly by groundwater that is consumed in agriculture. In parallel, the Kingdom is wit-

nessing today a huge growth in the sector of agricultural food industries and consumer products funded by private capital.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia owns the largest transportation network in the Middle East. It has a network of highways that link the gulf in the east through the capital, Riyadh, to the Red Sea in the west, and from the north at the Jordanian borders to Jizan in the south. The total length of these roads exceeds 50,000 km, including highways, double and single roads linking the cities. As for inside the cities, most major cities and capitals of governorates have circular highways, while a railway connects between King Abdul-Aziz port in Dammam and the dry port in Riyadh, passing through Al-Ahsa, Abqiaq and Dhahran.

Safe Investment Many reasons may call for investment in Saudi Arabia In general, investment in Saudi Arabia provides high profitability for local, joint or foreign projects, along with low risk, without multiple taxes, property registration fees, or others. The Kingdom is even ranked the fifth country in the world in terms of taxes, and fourth with regards to property registration fees, according to a business performance report in 2007 and 2006 by the World Bank.

For example, an extensive study was conducted by Arab Forbes and announced in the late 2006, to assess the performance of 1616 joint stock companies in the Arab world. The study was based upon standards among which are operational competence, market value, sales, revenues, stock returns, return on equity, and return on assets throughout two past years (20042005), in addition to the expected growth of these companies in the coming years. The first three positions on the ranking were occupied by Saudi companies, and among the best 50 companies, there were 22 Saudi companies, some of them were 100% Saudi and others combined between Saudi and foreign capital.

Another example is that the Kingdom’s 12 banks are among the best banks in the Arab world, achieving the highest growth and revenues. Most of them are even among the list of the largest 1000 banks in the world, according to a Financial Times report in 2006.

Also, the largest three banks in the Arab world are Saudi.

KSA is the largest free economic market in the Middle East. It possesses 25% of the Arab Gross National Product, in addition to having the largest oil reserves in the world (25%), and providing energy to projects at the lowest prices all over the world countries. All this has made the country the perfect destination for the energy-consuming projects, along with other promising natural resources in mining. Besides, the geographical location of the kingdom has made it an easy outlet to European, Asian, and African markets. Its market, on the other side, enjoys a high purchasing capability and its local market is continuously expanding.

The Saudi riyal is considered one of the most stable world currencies, since its exchange rate has not significantly changed during the last three decades. There is no restriction on exchange and conversion of foreign currencies and transfer of capital and revenues abroad. In addition, the inflation rate in the Kingdom is very low. The country, also, seeks to sign bilateral agreements with an increasing number of countries to encourage and protect investment, and prevent double taxation Hence, a report issued by Melkin Institute in February 2007 ranked KSA the first world country in terms of macroeconomic environment, the assessment of its ability to manage and finance projects. According to the report, this includes low and stable interest and inflation rates, as well as low taxes compared to international levels.

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Image © Getty Images

Pity Obama Obama is developing into a great statesman. He is able to transcend the piffling debates of merely average minds and illuminate the ideas that make life worthwhile.

Michael Whiting

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arack Obama’s recent speech—depending on who you believe—either; set a new grand strategy for peace in the Middle East and got the ball rolling on a process that could ultimately justify his Nobel peace prize, or; reiterated banal and impotent policies which have failed for successive US presidents and simply re-enforced America’s subservient relationship with Israel. I know what I think.

However, one can’t help but feel sorry for Obama, it is well known how difficult it is for any American politician, let alone the president, to offer a critically informed opinion on Israel and the wider Middle East. It is a wonder he doesn’t snap when his supposed ally, Benjamin Netanyahu, publically contradicts his well-meaning efforts at forming a resolution.

Of course, it is his job not to snap—it is his job to keep it together despite the infuriating obstacles hurled in his path.

Nonetheless, Obama should be applauded, not criticized, for doing as little as speak about the eruption of what he calls “shouts of human dignity” in the Middle East.

He may be called naïve and the likelihood of his achieving something may be questioned, but he would have snapped already by now if he wasn’t saying something. He would have gone mad if, at the core of what he says, there was no idea that he believed in.

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The fact is that politics is essentially about ideas. Economics, human rights, “facts on the ground,” are merely accoutrements and accessories for people to discuss in the hope of appearing clever. They are nothing without ideas, and Obama has expressed clear and admirable support for the idea of an end to cronyism, oppression and antagonism in the Middle East.

It would be impossible for anyone to maintain the levels of patience required of a US president alone. The first lady, Michelle Obama—a thoroughly excellent woman—doubtless shares with her husband the mental and emotional strength to stand up for the ideas and ideals they share. Her distant predecessor, Eleanor Roosevelt, said a great and true thing: “Great minds discuss ideas; Average minds discuss events; Small minds discuss people.”

While Netanyahu is making his case that Israel’s 1967 borders are indefensible, and myriad analysts and commentators are squabbling about the transitional problems of Egypt and Tunisia, and whether or not events are all happening too fast, Obama is drawing attention to the Big Idea.

And that’s important. Because nothing is bigger, stronger or faster than the ideas (those things people are thinking, that were not thought about before) sweeping the Middle East.

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What next for Morocco?

Ninety-eight percent of Moroccan voters voiced their support Monday for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The referendum follows a tradition of incremental reforms previously initiated by the King, and marks important advancements in advancing the political voice of Moroccan citizens. Although the reforms constitute an improvement in comparison to Morocco’s previous political arrangement, in and of themselves the reforms remain limited given the amount of power that would continue to rest in the hands of the King.

Paula Mejia

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Eastern countries stand to learn from Morocco’s example, and sacrifice power for stability.

However, its important to keep Morocco’s proposed changes into perspective. Although the reforms constitute an improvement in comparison to Morocco’s previous political arrangement, in and of themselves the reforms remain limited given the amount of power that would continue to rest in the hands of the King. Namely, the King would remain in control of the military, he will chose the Prime Minister from the most popular party, and finally, he will remain the supreme religious leader over Islam in the country.

These democratic caveats have not gone unnoticed by the Moroccan public, as was shown Sunday when thousands of protestors took to the streets alleging foul p lay in the voting, and criticizing the proposed changes as nothing but superficial alterations.

It is unclear how long Mohammed VI will be able to appease his constituents with these limited reforms. Yet, what is clear is that the citizens of the Middle East are increasingly unlikely to accept whatever reforms are handed to them. Although slower to come than in neighboring regions, it may very well be that Morocco is inching itself to a more radical reform of government.

Image © Getty Images

n Monday Morocco took its first steps to setting up a constitutional monarchy, as the referendum on a new constitution was backed by 98 percent of those who voted.

This monumental event in Morocco’s political history comes following a wave of reforms put in place by King Mohammed VI in an attempt to curb the destabilizing effects the Arab spring movements have had in neighboring countries.

The referendum follows a tradition of incremental reforms previously initiated by the King, and marks important advancements in advancing the political voice of Moroccan citizens.

Additionally the judiciary would become an independent government branch, and religious freedom would be granted.

The reforms will create a democratic government in which the prime minister has a wide range of executive powers and be longs to the party with most seats in parliament.

Given the number of reforms proposed, it is clear that the monarchy prefers to be the driver of change rather than toppled by it. By choosing to support the demands of its people, it has been argued that Morocco has the opportunity to become the success story of the Arab Spring. A number of Middle

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Is Saleh gone for good?

Everything seems to indicate that this is it, Ali Abdullah Saleh is gone to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, and he is not coming back to Sana’a. Yet, although Saleh’s political capital has been steadily decreasing for years, and dramatically so since the Arab revolutions began, one should not underestimate the thirst for power of the still Yemeni president. Saleh must be forced to recognize his own defeat, otherwise he will likely try to get his power back.

Manuel Almeida

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Gradually, since the beginning of Arab revolutions, Saleh has lost the support of various important figures, including General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, Sheik Sadeq Al-Ahmar, and many of Yemeni’s ambassadors abroad

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s soon as the rumour that Ali Abdullah Saleh had fly to Riyadh to treat his injuries after Friday’s rocket attack, huge celebrations exploded in Yemen’s capital, with people dancing and waving flags in the streets.

Does Saleh’s departure guarantee the end of his 33 years reign and a solution to the confrontations in the streets between pro- government forces and the opposition? Or are the many Yemenis dancing at the sound of an illusion?

On the one hand, there are news of a ceasefire agreement between Vice-President Abd-Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi and Sheik Sadeq Al-Ahmar, leader of the Hashed tribal federation and a key figure in the popular uprising against Saleh. On the other hand, there are reports of continuous fighting in the streets of Sana’a, which can either indicate that the ceasefire is not yet official, or that implementing any time soon it will be a hard task.

The indication that many of Saleh’s close family members travelled together with him to Saudi Arabia attests to the possibility that the still Yemeni president realizes he might not have the chance to go back to Sana’a. The fact that Saleh was injured carries great symbolism, it represents the ultimate sign he is no longer in control of the unfolding events, but Saleh’s worries go well beyond his physical problems.

Gradually, since the beginning of Arab revolutions, Saleh has lost the support of various important figures, including General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, Sheik Sadeq Al-Ahmar, and many of Yemeni’s ambassadors abroad. Saleh’s financial lifeline, from the GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, has been interrupted. Considering Saleh’s old strategy of buying loyalties to keep control, the lack of funds can be decisive. In the last few weeks, it seems the only allies Saleh could really rely upon are some of his family members, who hold key positions in the government security apparatus.

There is much speculation around the question of who was behind the attack that injured Saleh. For one, it is hard to find a country where, beyond the military and the police, the possession and use of weapons (of all kinds) is so widespread among societal groups as in Yemen. Given Yemen’s history of violence, including a long civil war, the number of Yemeni people who know how to fire a rocket is huge. Yet the precision of Friday’s attack feeds the idea that nobody except a trained military man could have been behind it.

It seems that this is it for Saleh, he is away and very few in Yemen and in the region support his return. Yet as Henry Kissinger once said “power is the ultimate aphrodisiac”. Ali Abdullah Saleh had it too much, for too long, and this is a golden opportunity to force Saleh to recognize his defeat, otherwise, he will likely try to get his power back.

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Should Beggars be Choosers?

The resignation of Dominique Strauss Khan presents many questions for the IMF. Chief among them is the issue of his succession. There are many valid arguments for a modernization of the institution, but for now it must remain Euro-centric.

Joel Schoppig

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ominic Strauss Kahn’s resignation as head of the International Monetary Fund stirred up a heated debate about his succession. This debate has less to do with the quality of possible candidates than with the question of how emerging economies can pull their weight in matters of global governance. When the Chinese foreign minister says he wants a candidate based on ‘fairness, transparency and merit.’ what he really means to say is ‘not a European.’ It is not about Lagarde, Brown or Shanmugaratnam—who are all suitable candidates—the question is, can a twentieth century institution be adapted to a twenty first century world? And is now the right time?

The IMF, together with its sister organization the World Bank, was conceived at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference.

Having seen how unsustainable arrangements after World War I caused economic and political turmoil, the Allies were determined to ensure post-war economic stability this time around. Under the so-called Bretton Woods System all member countries pegged their currencies to the US Dollar, which was in turn fixed at $35 per ounce of gold. The IMF’s role was to ensure that countries keep their balance of payment under control and to detect fundamental disequilib-

ria, which require an economy to readjust. But in 1971 the US government, having to finance Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ and the Vietnam War, abolished the dollars convertibility into gold—breaking down the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime. Robbed of its initial role, the fund had to reinvent itself. It began to assist economies in financial difficulty conditional to the implementation of structural adjustment programs, with mixed results.

Structural adjustments were mainly enforced in developing countries. The heavy emphasis put on fiscal prudence, capital liberalization and privatization often did more harm than good (for more on this read anything Joseph Stiglitz has ever written on the IMF). The IMF in turn was often seen as the prolonged arm of western interests, with controversial structural adjustments being more in the interest of international investors than of the struggling economies. Those who pay into the Fund, call the shots.

But the weights in the global economy are shifting. The IMF structure, above all the informal agreement that it is to always be led by a European, reflects a post-war world order, which has to be reformed if the fund wants to remain relevant. All international institutions face the challenge of including emerging powers into a structure created during a time of American hegemony. Failure to do so will render the current rules of international cooperation irrelevant. It is evident that the IMF needs to be reformed, but now is not the time.

Sovereign debt crises are political at heart, a fact that IMF programs have too often shamefully neglected. Countries cannot go bust the way corporations do. Servicing sovereign debt depends on a government’s willingness to do so and there is little investors can do should a country decide to default. Creditors cannot seize the Acropolis the way they can seize a company’s assets. Hence, dealing with the European debt crises requires someone skilled in the art of the possible. Dominique Strauss Kahn, for all his apparent flaws, uniquely combined political talent with economic competence. Whoever follows him will have to possess a similarly sound understanding of the intricate strains of European politics.

They say beggars can’t be choosers and for years developing countries had to privatize, liberalize and deregulate because that’s what the IMF, and its western stakeholders, told them to do. But in Europe the beggars and the choosers are sharing a currency. The IMF managing director after the next one should most definitely come from an emerging market. But Strauss-Kahn’s immediate successor has to be able to bring the Germans and the French in agreement with the Portuguese and the Greeks. And no candidate opposed by the Europeans will be able to do so.

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Afghanistan fading As the Middle East is recast by revolution, counter-revolution and an Iranian-Saudi Cold War, Afghanistan slips off the news agenda. But media disinterest aside, the tectonic shifts in this forsaken country are greater than ever before.

Iason Athanasiadis

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ner in new Afghanistan’s implosion. Decade of miscues in Kabul and Baghdad have arguably accerellerated the West’s decline.

Meanwhile, the elites they brought to power anxiously stuff their pockets to a backdrop of the Hazaras and Tajiks rearming for a final showdown as the Pashtun-dominated Taliban advance.

The international community is busy rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic as chaos beckons and one last last flush of Chinese-provided American largesse greases development projects, enables some last corrupt excesses and equips an incongruous and engorged First World army tailored to the whims of a Third World cleptocracy.

When wondering Kabul’s dusty, excrement-smeared streets – still unpaved a decade into the Western ‘rebuilding’ project here and populated by wretched children, unemployed men and scrabbling beggar women – Winston Churchill‘s saying pops into consciousness: “The United States invariably does the right thing after having exhausted every other alternative.”

Perhaps this will be true in Afghanistan’s case too. But one thing is certain: Afghanistan is shaping up to be as key to the West’s decline as it was to the USSR’s ultimate demise. And what place do the Arab revolts claim in this state of affairs? Nothing less than a regional realignment in the face of a new world order.

Image © Getty Images

fghanistan 2011: brazen daylight attacks, suicide bombings and public gunfights in city centres, kidnappings, executions and head-severings of alleged collaborators, all set against a backdrop of ongoing political deadlock, corruption scandals and the rearming of factions in anticipation of American withdrawal.

Still not enough to warrant the number one slot in today’s newsagenda? How about adding to the mix the IMF’s refusal to disburse tens of millions of aid dollars, raising the spectre of thousands of unpaid and armed policemen and soldiers being let loose as early as next month in a city already wracked by weekly attacks?

And yet, Afghanistan is languishing in the headlines as it hasn’t since US troops started pulling out of Iraq in 2007. Is it a case of global fatigue with Afghanistan? Or is the obscure, landlocked Central Asian nation just not as neuralgic as the changes sweeping across the Arab World, crisis-struck southern Europe and nuclear-contaminated Japan?

Back in Kabul, the actors in this tragedy – like creatures unconsciously craving extinction – slow-dance their way over the precipice. The Westerners whose cultural insensitivity and ostrich sensibilities sabotaged this nationbuilding project from its beginning are as doomed as their greedy client regime and part-

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• THE ARTS

Performance as Diplomacy Sabina Rakcheyeva, violinist One can say many things about Ms. Rakcheyeva, but what stands out the most is her interest in the use of music to instigate dialogue, particularly in the field of diplomacy.

Her success as a musician has given her the opportunity to perform for politicians and public figures, many of whom have applauded Ms. Rakcheyeva for her skilled multi-styled performances. The Majalla interviews Ms. Rakcheyeva about the making of her first album, UnVeiled, her simultaneous roles as performer and interlocutor, and her current research at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

S

Jacqueline Shoen

ince the time when Mozart, Beethoven and Haydn composed works that included the trendy Alla turca (Turkish musical style) in the late 18 century, followed

by Johann Strauss’s Persian March less than a century later, the attempt to blend western classical music with traditional Oriental styles has almost become a right of passage for musicians and composers worldwide. The act of fusing two or more styles to produce a compelling piece that also maintains the integrity of each style is challenging to say the least. Indeed, few have managed to elicit cheers beyond the concert walls.

Without a doubt, however, Sabina Rakcheyeva can be counted among those who will likely have a long and fruitful future in the ongoing development of this genre.

Slender-framed, elegant, and intriguing, Ms. Rakcheyeva is an accomplished violinist, celebrated for her skilled and impassioned performances in more than 40 countries, often under the direction of world-renowned conductors like James Levine, Zubin Mehta and Yuri Temirkanov. Originally from Baku, Ms. Rakcheyeva was raised in a classical music environment during the Soviet period, and spent her formative years as a musician in the United States, where she attended the prestigious Julliard School in New York—the first Azerbaijani ever to be accepted.

One can say many things about Ms. Rakcheyeva, but what stands out the most is her interest in the use of music to instigate dialogue, particularly in the field of diplomacy. Her success as a musician has given her the opportunity to perform for politicians and public figures, many of whom have applauded Ms. Rakcheyeva for her skilled multi-styled performances, and often call upon her when hosting diplomats from different cultural backgrounds, as she is known to ease an otherwise skeptical crowd of strangers into one-on-one conversations. So much encouragement in addition to her ongoing exploration of these themes has prompted her to redirect her

efforts to this end, which has led her to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London where she is investigating the potential for collective improvisation in musical performance to be used as a cultural diplomacy tool.

Her recently released album, UnVeiled, is a stunning example of these efforts. Comprised of six musicians—Rakcheyeva, Kinan Azmeh on clarinet, Attab Haddad on oud, Matt Ridley on double bass, Vasilis Sarikis on percussion, and Kathleen Tagg on piano—who collaborate on seven compositions, this ensemble is performing for the gods. At once bold and dynamic, delicate and genteel, the listener is taken on a long journey—maybe over the rooftops of an unknown town, on a magic carpet or sleigh, enveloped by a starry night sky. While the soft notes take you up, the more energetic ones take you forward. During this journey, the listener experiences a range of emotions—longing, sadness, anxiety, tranquility, joy and excitement. Never complacent, these musicians are always reaching out to draw you in. By far, Rakcheyeva’s signature piece is “Reflections,” improvised in her darkened Manhattan apartment as she meditated on the island’s skyline, while the entire album has the epic quality so often requested as soundtracks to films.

I would, for example, play like four or five pieces of classical music and then just play something of mine—people would always come to me after the concert and say, “this is what we liked; we have never been to this place, but we can imagine what it is.”

The Majalla interviews Ms. Rakcheyeva about the making of this first album, her simultaneous roles as performer and interlocutor, and her current research at SOAS. Rakcheyeva’s international reputation as a talented musician and her continuing success in this field will surely increase the likelihood that such an important endeavor is welcomed in the world of diplomacy.

Let us begin with the philosophy behind your music and what your intentions are.

My background is performance. And until about five, six years ago I was only a performer. Due to the nature of my background, cultural and professional, since I was a child I was performing quite a lot for political leaders, and in the political scene. Actually, the situations I found myself in made me believe that—first of all, being a musician, opens many more doors for us, and in general, if

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you are an artist you can achieve much more than if you are in a different profession—probably with my music I could do a little bit more than just being there, going on stage, performing. I started thinking about the possibilities and also took some advice with people in the field, even politicians, and they encouraged me quite a lot. I thought of doing research beyond performance, so I found this program at SOAS (University of London), in the music department, so I chose music and international relations. Basically, I am looking at music and how culture and music can improve relationships between states. It’s been quite an amazing journey.

You recently released your first album. How did you come to decide upon UnVeiled as its title?

I was thinking about different options, but mainly because of the nature of the music in the album. Basically the album consists of mostly my compositions, and a lot of improvised music, but also reflects my background. I originally come from Azerbaijan, but I spent most of my professional and formative years in the West.

And at the beginning, when I moved from Azerbaijan to New York, I found myself in this melting pot of all different cultures, and I didn’t feel anything about my background. So I was one of those people, you know when you come to, especially to New York, and you just blend in, you are a New Yorker and that’s it.

And I think it was only a few years later that people actually started to ask me, what’s the country where you are from, and can you play a piece of music. And I thought, okay, I will try to play something. So I played some, let’s say, traditional folk music, and then I thought that maybe I should do something myself as well; it would probably be better to express myself through my own music. So I wrote a couple of pieces, and to my surprise, they were quite successful. And every time when I performed—so I would, for example, play like four or five pieces of classical music and then just play something of mine—people would always come to me after the concert and say, “this is what we liked; we have never been to this place, but we can imagine what it is.” So when I thought about the album, I thought that probably unveiling is part metaphor, in that of course you know it comes from the Middle East—and also includes my culture, which is pretty secular, but, in a way, it’s also traditional. I thought of a kind of unveiling this part of myself, and also of music.

What are your favorite pieces from UnVeiled?

Probably my favorite track is “Sari Gelin,” but also very special to me is the track “Reflections,” because this was the first piece I wrote—about five, six years ago when I was still in New York, I was just sitting in my apartment and looking at the Manhattan skyline, and thinking how far I felt from my background.

Now I feel much closer actually, maybe physically, maybe because of all the communication, but back when I left 12 years ago there was almost no internet or mobile phone technology.

So I really felt like I was removed from everything—from my culture, from my family, from my friends. So I was sitting there and I just started plucking the strings with the lights off, and I came up with this piece.

Every time I perform this piece, since the very beginning, I have such a great feeling and get such a positive response from Incense burner the audience. Even though I perform it in different places, with

by Shoami an audience that has different reactions; I haveSigned yet to see people Katsuyoshi; about 1890 who are not moved by the piece.

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I called it “Reflections” because it reflects who I am; it reflects my background and where I come from, but it also reflects who I am at the moment. And since it’s an improvised piece, I noticed over the years that I also slightly change how I perform it. I have come to realize that although I also possess some universal values, cultural values, due to my knowledge of classical music, yet I probably express myself much better with my own music, because, one, when you play Bach, you want to express what he felt, but when you play your own compositions, you are completely free and expressing yourself. And having this recording, and playing this music, I feel that it has also helped me to liberate myself and my feeling, and just be who I am, rather than think about myself, and affiliate myself with a certain culture.

Can you explain to me how you felt when you were making this album—when you composed these tracks and then you played them?

I must say, that right now, I am very emotional when I listen to this kind of music, which I admit was not the case five, six years ago, and I don’t know what it is actually. I’m trying also to find… maybe it’s finding a balance. Because I grew up in an absolutely classical environment, since I was two years old all we had in our house was classical music, so in a way, maybe until I was 20 or 25, I was a product of western culture, you know, German and Russian cultural backgrounds of music, so that was all I had. Of course, somewhere in the back of my mind, there was some traditional music, but it didn’t do anything to me, so I didn’t feel necessarily connected with that until a few years ago, when I started reassessing, I started listening. And, as paradoxically as it may sound, being outside of my own culture actually connected me more to it, which was a strange thing. I think this album, in a way, is an expression of this newly discovered connection. A few compositions—two or three of them— were pure improvisation; they just happened in the studio.

When I thought about the album, I thought that probably unveiling is part metaphor, in that of course you know it comes from the Middle East— and also includes my culture, which is pretty secular, but, in a way, it’s also traditional Which ones were these?

They are two interludes. The story behind them is that we gave a break to the rest of the musicians, and me and my very good friend, a [Syrian] clarinet player, Kinan Azmeh, who’s on the recording, we just thought ‘okay, let’s just play a little bit, the two of us,’ but the microphone was on in the studio—the sound engineers went for lunch—and we just came up with these short pieces. Afterwards, when we listened to them, I realized it was exactly what I was looking for—transitions between the tracks to bridge all of them together. I have always imag57

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• THE ARTS

ined UnVeiled as one whole journey rather than a collection of separate tracks and those interludes became the transitions.

It is also an experiment. Some of it happened in the studio. The track I mentioned earlier, “Sari Gelin,” is based on a traditional Azerbaijani song, and was recorded in just one take within 10-12 minutes. And to me, these are the most precious—I’m very happy that two or three of the pieces in the recording just happened spontaneously. Definitely, I feel quite emotional. And I also feel happy that I could balance my classical background with some traditional. The aim was not to make the recording as traditional music; the aim was actually to show the balance and to show how people from different cultural and musical backgrounds connect in a recording like that, which leads me to the subject on my research.

Besides talking about how to improve international relations by cultural diplomacy, by means of music and art, I am also looking how such an experiment of bringing musicians from different cultures and musical backgrounds could be compared to the international negotiating process. Basically, in both cases you have to solve something. In one case you have to do something harmonious, and in another you have to solve some questions, and I am actually drawing the parallel between these two in my research, and just showing whether there are some similarities, and whether both sides could actually learn and benefit from each other’s experiences.

I don’t want to sound cliché, but I think it still makes sense to use both, and it still makes sense for hard core standard diplomacy to take into account some of these things and look towards soft diplomacy and soft power, and use it more.

Over the course of my performing career, so many people have come to me after the concert and said, “We never knew anything about Azerbaijan, or about the culture. So now we have an impression” Considering the positive feedback that you have received so far, what real life examples can you give me that you think you will engage with? Would it be something whereby you invite musicians from two sides to play together prior to a formal dialogue?

Absolutely, this is one of the things of course. I would say 99.9 percent of the politicians I spoke to were all very encouraging.

Even those who were a bit skeptical, they welcomed the idea, but they themselves were not open to the idea of engaging in such an approach. But besides that, there have been numerous examples everywhere I’ve performed for the last five years, and I was actually quite often invited to perform in such situations. For example, I performed at a conference in Lichtenstein, which brought together academics and researchers from the field of diplomacy and from different universities around the world to talk about ongoing conflicts—Iran and the Middle East. I also spoke a little about the reasons behind my performance, and they were just fascinated by the idea.

A few years back there was a similar seminar on the Iranian conflict, and the Iranians and Americans wouldn’t talk to one other. And then they were all invited to my performance, and strangely enough, they all came, and they were really happy. I played some classical background music; I played some classical and some eastern music. And probably because I have experience living with different cultures, I could actually relate to most of them. And then after the performance I just found myself talking to both sides, and they were happily talking about art and music, and this actually gave me the idea that this is possible to do. Another example is when I spoke to a high ranking Austrian diplomat, who told me that when he was working in DC, they tried to get in touch with a high-powered American diplomat, but were unsuccessful. Once they found out that he loved opera, they sent him a ticket to the Vienna opera performing in DC, and he went to the performance. It was there where they were able to an initial contact leading to further meetings.

What do you hope to achieve in your life as a musician, as an Azerbaijani musician?

I would like to do three main things in my life. Of course, performing, but I also realized over the years that just performing is not creative enough for me. I would also like to use my other abilities, for example, as a researcher. Maybe I will do a little teaching. And also, performing and acting as a cultural diplomat, which I am already doing now—I am on the board of the European Azerbaijan Society, based in London. Here we try to promote Azerbaijani culture and the relationship between Azerbaijan and the UK or Europe by means of culture, which is my responsibility. I am also a member of the European Cultural Parliament, a forum of culture-related professionals from all parts of Europe, where we come together to discuss certain issues and cultural policies and come up with suggestions for the European Parliament. It’s a great thing, and I really enjoy it, so you know, after a while, you grow up, you understand that when you perform it’s one thing, but when you also see other things happening because of your input or because of your experience, it is very rewarding too. For example, over the course of my performing career, so many people have come to me after the concert and said, “We never knew anything about Azerbaijan, or about the culture. So now we have an impression.” And to me this is the best thing. If I think about my friends I always associate a country with the people I know.

When I think about a certain country, I don’t think about the politics, or about diplomacy; I think about the culture. You think about food; you think about art; you think about music.

So, in my opinion, if we think about it more, and we continue to present our countries by cultural means, that’s probably the best thing that we can do.

I am very happy and fortunate to be in this field, and to be able to use arts and culture as a way of communicating on different social levels. What do I want to do in the future? Well, I don’t want to do anything radically different. I would like to continue what I am doing now, maybe slightly more, or expand regionally and globally, as I firmly believe that culture indeed should not have borders, and as Mahatma Gandhi once said: “No culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive.”

Sabina Rakcheyeva’s album is available on her website at www.sabinarakcheyeva.com

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• THE CRITICS

Diffuse Futures The Future of Power

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Public Affairs, 2011 Joseph Nye’s newest book, The Future of Power, is a strong addition to his substantial scholarship on leadership, power politics, and America’s role in the world. This work serves as a summation of his works to date and provides an excellent but concise introduction to international affairs and power politics in the 21st century.

A recent survey of American political scientists ranked Joseph Nye as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy, and one of the leading scholars in the field of international relations. As a practitioner as well, his sharp writings have had relevance and influence amongst generations of policymakers and political scientists. His terms "soft power" and "smart power" have become widely used across the entire spectrum of public debate, and rising powers such as China have been quick to embrace these terms as they define themselves in this new century.

Nye’s structuring of The Future of Power clearly reflects his own recognition that different audiences, notably, in the American public space, from academics and practitioners to informed readers and students will use his book. Introducing his over-arching conceptual argument in the introduction, he moves then to define power in an accessible but scholarly way. The heart of his book, where he examines power shifts and transfusions (notably, the most original part of the book) is followed up by policy prescriptions for how the United States should adopt a smart power strategy for this changing world. Nye notes that for a more in-depth examination of the various aspects of his arguments, his footnotes are a critical resource, and from examining them, Nye’s academic depth and breadth clearly show.

A proliferation of works on the changing nature of power in the international system as a result of the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of China, and the 2008 financial crisis (notably, Niall Ferguson, Stephan Walt, Robert Kagan, and Fareed Zakaria) start from the popular premise that America’s predominance of power in the international system is in decline and then, either support or disagree with this argument.

As a result, these works tend to have an American-centric focus to the examination of the changes in the international system.

Nye is not an exception, but Nye has no qualms in taking such an approach, and writes according to his expertise on the American experience of power. His book’s main limitation thus is that it’s an American dialogue on the future of power, and focuses predominantly on how America’s role is evolving in a changing international system and what the US should do to adapt to such changes. These questions have interested him throughout his distinguished career.

The Future of Power’s most significant contribution comes from his introduction of the concepts of"‘power diffusion" and

"power transition" in understanding the future of America’s position in the 21 century. His work compliments well and frames more empirically driven works such as Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World and Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power.

Nye makes the convincing argument that his conceptual concepts reflect the horizontal and vertical changes occurring in the world today. In power transition, power is shifting back to the East from the West as China emerges. In power diffusion, power is spreading downwards through globalization and technology to many different actors, both state and non-state actors, whose influence is being felt now for the first time. A monopoly of power no longer is held by the great powers, and this power diffusion provides new actors with growing influence. The cost to enter the game of power politics has been significantly lowered, therefore enabling new actors to enter easily and influence international affairs.

Nye introduces the term "cyberpower" to understand the role the internet is playing in transforming the ability of actors, most notably, these new transnational actors and rising states, to achieve their goals. The cyber age has significantly lowered the threshold of entry and gives these actors more capacity and leverage, but at the same time, cyberpower presents new challenges for these actors and for established actors like the United States.

For the United States, which has had a near monopoly over the power resources since the end of the Cold War, these shifts in power in the international system present opportunities and challenges. In addressing the question of American decline, Nye distances himself from writers who seek a broad narrative of America’s decline. While he disagrees with scholars that argue the US is facing an absolute decline, he acknowledges that the US is facing a world where, while it will be the leading state in the foreseeable decades, other states are rising and its economic and cultural influence will not be as preeminent as it once was.

Highlighting the multi-dimensional nature of power, Nye argues that the contest for power in the international system exists on three levels with military power on the top, economic power in the middle, and transnational relations on the bottom.

The United States still has an advantage on the top level where it is unipolar with its military primacy. On the middle level, more than one state has economic strength and, as a result, is multi-polar, though the US still has a sizeable presence; but on the lower level, where no state or actor has a monopoly of power, the US finds itself at a disadvantage. The US thus is preponderant in some areas, but limited in others.

Nye concludes his book by arguing that the US must adopt smart power strategies which merge its soft and hard power resources to win this complex chess game.

More so than any other period since the end of World War II, the US will have to work with others to confront the challenges it faces, particularly on the transnational level. Nye sees the US facing five main challenges in the coming decades: terrorism linked with nuclear material, political Islam, the rise of a potentially aggressive China, economic crises, and ecosystem challenges such as climate change.

Nye’s prescriptions for a smart power strategy provide policymakers with a useful approach to conceptually framing their responses to these challenges. Whether this can serve as a guide in practice remains to be seen, yet Nye provides a strong starting point for how the US should think about its response to the challenges of the 21st century.

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Back to the Future Morocco’s Experience With Poverty Reduction: Lessons for the Arab World

by Lahcen Achy Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2010 This report, which was written before the Arab Spring, allows us to consider some of the key issues which must be targeted at this turning point throughout the Arab world. These lessons will be just as significant for Morocco itself after the election to be held on 1 July.

Over the past decade, Morocco’s poverty rate has decreased by more than 40 percent, with less than 9 percent of Moroccans living under the poverty line, as opposed to 16.2 percent ten years ago. Morocco has thus managed to reach its Millennium Development Goals with regard to poverty set for 2015, exceeding both expectations and performances of other similar countries. Lahcen Achy seeks to map the trends behind the approximately 1.7 million Moroccans who have moved out of poverty by looking at variables ranging from demographics to investment structures and the role of infrastructure to NGOs. In doing this, he also emphasises the challenges still faced by Morocco, such as high illiteracy, inequality, and volatile economic growth. This is particularly relevant at the current time, when both Morocco, facing an upcoming election, and the Arab world at large, are at a turning point.

The first important trend underpinning Morocco’s battle against poverty is a sharply decreasing fertility rate, which dropped from 5.5 to 2.3 children per woman during the past three decades. The sharp decline in population growth has helped in sustaining Morocco’s acceleration of economic growth, going up from 2.2 to 5 percent in the period of 20002009. Achy ascribes the decreasing fertility rate to a delayed average age of marriage, caused particularly by better access to education and fewer opportunities in the labor market. It is thus clear, looking at the role of education, that the state has played an important part in creating the circumstances which have facilitated a decrease in population growth.

For decades after achieving independence, Morocco provided free education and health care without distinction between the rich and poor. Similarly, the state invested intensively in basic infrastructure programs, expanding the drinking water supply, the electricity network, and the road system. Such extensive public investments significantly increased the population’s quality of life and would not have been possible without tax revenues based on a 1980s reform of the tax system, by which exemptions were rationalized and administration reinforced. This reform led to higher tax compliance, meaning that tax revenues now account for 24 percent of GDP, compared with 15 percent in Egypt and 11 percent in Syria.

An important part of the successfulness of the fight against poverty in morocco thus has to do with it being a targeted policy with commitment from the highest levels. According to Achy, Morocco’s King Mohammad IV has been deeply engaged in the country’s poverty reduction strategy, known as the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD). This has provided strong political support for the various initiatives to reduce poverty, as particularly evident in the universal provision of public services.

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Yet, Achy contends, there is a dangerous tendency of centralization underpinning government policies. While policy makers in the 1990s initiated a new approach to public spending which sought to shift away public resources towards targeted ones and giving up centralization by involving local councils and NGOs, these efforts have increasingly been abandoned over recent years.

Achy calls for a reversal of this trend, as NGOs have been crucial in redefining power relations at the local level towards a more consultative decision-making process which includes young people and women. This development must be nurtured and sustained.

Until now, the actions of NGOs have most been tolerated by the state because NGOs have focused on single issues without engaging in confrontational politics. As difficult as this may be, it possibly provides an important insight for other Arab countries.

Importantly, the author argues, there is a fragility surrounding Morocco’s battle against poverty. For example, while remittances from Moroccan emigrants have been an important source of income for many poor families and local socio-economic programs, this is an unstable source of development. Similarly, the role of civil society at large is losing momentum as the state has adopted an increasingly centralized approach to tackling the country’s problems. A culture of advocacy and participation is generally underdeveloped in Morocco due to a lack of proper bottom-up accountability tools. These need to be reinforced through mechanisms of accountability in order to ensure that the necessary decentralization of power is not hijacked by local elites. Although the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) as mentioned above has had many benefits, the state alone has carried out and provided the financing for most projects, and the involvement of elected councils has been very limited. The strategy’s design and implementation have thus worked against the decentralization trend from the 1990s, and this trend should be reversed to ensure future growth and democratization.

There are thus crucial steps towards broader progress which must be made. First, illiteracy remains very high (45 percent), particularly in rural areas and among women. As Achy underlines, reducing poverty without increasing education, does not improve living conditions more generally, nor does it prevent people from falling back into poverty. To target this problem, Achy suggests that Morocco should provide conditional cash transfers, which allocates cash to poor families on the condition that they educate their children. Indeed, tackling illiteracy is a precondition for targeting inequality, which has remained persistently high despite the poverty rate dropping. Effective policies of income redistribution must therefore be initiated in order to increase trade and financial openness, without which the decline in poverty may be reversed in the longer term.

Achy concludes that policy makers need to think beyond poverty towards sustained growth and a strengthening of political and fiscal decentralization. This generally involves increased participation of non-state actors, including local elected councils and civil society organizations. This, perhaps, is the most evident and yet the most difficult lesson to be extracted from Achy’s report: The need for de-centralized governance. As has been evident over the past six months across the Arab world, this need is becoming increasingly pressing. For some, Morocco appears to be taking steps in the right direction, as signified by King Mohammed IV’s recent speech, in which the King promised constitutional changes. Reading Achy’s report, one can only hope that the election to be held on 1 July may be the beginning of a return to de-centralization and thus to a better future for Morocco’s poor.

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• THE FINAL WORD

Who is "running" Yemen?

Adel Al-Toraifi

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here is nothing worse than rejoicing at murder or death, yet (peaceful) demonstrators in Yemen's Change Square broke out in a flurry of raucous celebrations following the news that President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and a number of state officials had been targeted by an explosion whilst performing prayers at a mosque within the presidential palace compound. These songs and chants rejoicing at this incident completely contradict the calls that have been raised by the Yemeni people for freedom and dignity, as well as the now famous slogan, "Leave!”

Those who staged the demonstrations calling for change have long accused the existing regime of being tyrannical, yet the reaction to the attack on the president reveals that tyranny is a deeply-rooted culture in Yemen, and that malice is not confined to the Yemeni regime alone. It seems that even the opposition, which adopted the concept, "Peaceful Revolution," as its slogan, has no objection to taking up arms in order to eliminate the president.

Where is the democratic change and freedom that the advocates of the "Arab Spring” promised us?

Unable to present an alternative to Saleh, the demonstrators, tribes, and the armed forces who claim to be protecting them, aim to expel the president and his associates, replacing them with others without securing any real change in ideas.

The problem with those who advocate the Arab Spring is that they are certain that overthrowing the existing regimes will result in the establishment of better ones, yet, until now, there have been no real signs of this. They also used to tell everyone that the problem was the "dictators,” yet, what we are seeing today is that both sides (the rulers and the people) are lacking in political values and awareness. Therefore, the enthusiasm for overthrowing the existing regimes will not necessarily result in a better reality. In Yemen, influential tribes and clans are fighting over power. In Egypt, only the minority is demanding the enforcement of law, whilst the majority is striving to punish the former regime and glorify the revolution.

How can it be logical for somebody seeking to build a new state to champion the revolution every day, whilst the country's economy is collapsing? How can others speak of the martyrs and sacrifices that led to the ouster of the regime, whilst the country cannot ensure its basic requirements, and must ask others for loans and grants? What kind of [political] change will occur when those responsible for this do not know how to run a country or build the institutions of a modern civilization?

In his recent book, The Origins of Political Order (2011), Francis Fukuyama argues that good governance, freedoms and democracy cannot be ensured unless a state of institutions is established, capable of exercising its authority via constitutional legitimacy based on a liberal culture, away from the illusions of fascist and religious ideas and beliefs, and outdated tribal and popular customs. He also draws our

attention to the fact that replacing a dictatorial regime with a new system based on fair elections does not necessarily guarantee a successful government. The world has witnessed an increase in the number of states that are classified as democratic ever since The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century—as described by Samuel P. Huntington—emerged between 1973 and 1992. Yet, only one in every five global states classified as democratic is capable of providing its citizens with key services and ensuring the minimal requirements for a decent standard of living.

Those championing the Arab Spring may wake up today or tomorrow to find themselves facing an angry public reaction to the huge illusions they used to justify the overthrow of regimes—even though they were authoritarian. According to a statistical report published by The Washington Post (4 June 2011), 70 percent of Egyptians said they backed the change in regime for economic reasons, whilst only 19 percent said they supported the revolution for the sake of democracy.

In Yemen, Change Square is full of revolutionaries, who are indeed right to demand reform, yet the removal of President Saleh may not solve the political and economic problems that initially drove them to take to the streets. In Yemen, there are those who aspire to rule the country, even if this would cause a civil war. These people are less concerned about improving the economic situation of millions of Yemenis, or meeting their basic needs; so much as they desire to rule the country even if this would cause the destruction of its already fragile institutions and divide the state.

In his book "Poisonous Wind: Saudi Arabia and the Peninsula States after the Gulf War" (2002), Riyad Najib al-Rayyes narrates the story of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's meeting with the late King Fahd (may God rest his soul) following the secessionist war in Yemen. After a prolonged talk about the future of Yemeni unity, the Yemeni President said "the difference between you and us – in the Gulf – is that you own and rule [the country], whilst we in Yemen neither own nor rule, we only run [the country]"

Those who staged the demonstrations calling for change have long accused the existing regime of being tyrannical, yet the reaction to the attack on the president reveals that tyranny is a deeply-rooted culture in Yemen, and that malice is not confined to the Yemeni regime alone

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