A Decade of War

Issue 1566 • September 2011

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A Decade of

War 09

9 770261 087119 The Majalla

The Human Condition

Children have much to gain from the uprisings in the Arab world, but they are also paying a heavy price that might be too much to bear

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On Politics

What next for Libya? The NTC’s road plan is more a schedule of milestones along the path of transition than a map of the terrain to be traversed

Issue 1566

Candid Conversations Former governor and first secretary for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, comments on the Arab Spring and America’s role in the region

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al-Toraifi Editors Azeddine Senegri Michael Whiting Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Designer Matt Dettmar Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: enquiries@majalla.com Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2011 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: enquiries@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al-Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover image © Getty Images

Editorial This month we observe a decade since the beginning of what is widely known as ‘War on Terror’. It began with the events of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington and within a month had mired several western nations in an intractable war in Afghanistan that spilled into Pakistan.

Within three years it spread to Iraq and continues today.

This first war of the 21st century demanded a steep learning curve on the nature of assymetrical warfare, the cost of long wars and about the human condition on the ground. The technology has changed, the leaders have changed but the same questions remain: Are these wars achieving their objectives and are they worth their heavy price?

We present to you in this issue some of the most experienced analysts in examining these very questions.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on our website at majalla.com/en.

As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and invite you to take the opportunity to leave your comments on our website or contact us if you are interested in writing for our publication.

Adel Al-Toraifi Editor in Chief

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Contributors Jason Burke Jason Burke is the South Asia correspondent of the Guardian and a frequent commentator in Islamic militancy, a subject he has reported on for more than 15 years. His previous books have included the best-selling Al-Qaeda: The true story of radical Islam and On the Road to Kandahar. The 9/11 Wars, is published this September.

Fawaz Gerges Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He earned a doctorate from Oxford University and has taught at Oxford, Harvard and Columbia universities. Mr. Gerges is the author of Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Harcourt Press, 2007), The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge University Press, 2005), and is currently writing a book tentatively titled The Making of the Arab World: From Nasser to Nasrallah.

James Denselow A writer on Middle East politics and security issues based at Kings College London. He has worked extensively in the Middle East, including research for foreign policy think tank Chatham House, writing and reporting for several media publications. He writes for The Guardian, The Huffington Post and the New Statesman and appears regularly on all forms of international media. He is a contributing author to "An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?" and "America and Iraq: Policy-making, Intervention and Regional Politics Since 1958" and currently advises the British Government on its policy towards the Arab Spring. He is a board member of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and a Director of the New Diplomacy Platform (NDP).

Manuel Almeida A contributing editor for The Majalla, and previously a senior editor for The Majalla’s English edition. Mr. Almeida is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he also teaches. His areas of expertise are failed states, international development and political violence. Mr. Almeida is currently working on a forthcoming book, based on his PhD thesis, tentatively titled From Godless Barbarians to Failed States: A History of the Problem of Disorder.

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• CONTENTS

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Contents Quotes of the Month War and Peace

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On Politics

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10 A Decade of War

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Profile

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The Wealth of Nations

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The Human Condition

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Editor’s Choice

38

Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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Thinking Out Loud

52

The Arts

56

The Critics

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The Final Word

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• The War Business: Are Private Security Companies the new free market?

• The Long Game: What Next for Libya

The 9/11 attacks took 2,573 victims, but the ensuing reaction and wars have cost hundreds of thousands more in Afghanistan and Iraq on all sides. The cost has been enormous, still the question remains: is the enemy vanquished?

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• Mahmoud Jibril – Chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council • The GCC Time Bomb: Growing food security concerns amid rising food prices and population growth

• Children of the Uprising: What price are children paying for the uprising in the Arab World?

• Ten Years Later: 9/11 and the Freedom Agenda • Attempts to Revive the Al-Assad Regime • Tom Ridge • Andrew Card

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

“Our biggest challenge is still ahead. There are two battles. The first battle is against Qadhafi and his regime; this will end by the capturing or the elimination of Qadhafi.

However, the battle that is more difficult is against our selves. How can we achieve reconciliation and achieve peace and security and agree a constitution? We must not attack each other or push each other away”

Chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Coucil, Mahmoud Jibril

“In the decade since the 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorists have succeeded only in the murder of innocents, often from among those they claim to represent. Al Qaeda is now weaker than at any time in the decade since 9/11 - and political progress through peaceful protest in the Middle East and North Africa has shown it to be increasingly irrelevant to the future”

British Foreign Secretary William Hague

“The dramatic scenes we are witnessing in Libya, Tripoli, are testimony to the courage and determination of the Libyan people to seek a free and democratic future” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

“This is a historic moment that marks a milestone in the history of the Libyan people. We hope the council's efforts are successful in leading the new phase and protecting the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Libyan lands”

Arab League General Secretary Nabil Al-Arabi

“Any action against Syria will have greater consequences [on those who carry it out], greater than they can tolerate” Syrian President Bashal Al-Assad

“Those who went to the University Square to support the youth revolution that demands the ouster of the regime... have fed on corruption, and are dealers of arms and land” Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

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• WAR AND PEACE

The War Business

Are Private Security Companies the new free market?

The exponential growth in demand for private security and military companies in the wider Middle East raises troubling questions about the accountability of the companies’ employees, the commercialization of security that generates billions of dollars in profits, and the growing tendency to banalize armed conflict. As war is increasingly privatized, the proliferation of these companies deserves special international scrutiny.

Manuel Almeida

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The legal battle against the former Blackwater employees of US nationality involved in the 2007 Nisoor Square incident is not over. The case was re-opened in April this year by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a decision the court justified with its finding of “systemic” errors in the December 2009 ruling to dismiss the charges.

The Nisoor Square tragedy is perhaps the darkest chapter— or at least the episode that received the most media coverage in recent years—of the involvement of Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs) in conflicts across the wider Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Given the risky nature of their work, and particularly considering the huge number of staff these companies currently deploy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia (to name three prominent examples), reports about similar incidents involving PSCs/PMCs carry a sense of inevitability. Other disturbing episodes include security

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n September 2007, seventeen Iraqis were killed in Baghdad’s Nisoor Square by Blackwater personnel. While the private security firm’s employees claimed that they opened fire in response to an ambush, the investigations that followed concluded that the seventeen Iraqis were all civilians, not militants, and that the Blackwater staff fired without provocation. At the time of the massacre a 2004 measure issued by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, which prevented foreign security contractors from being prosecuted in Iraq’s courts, was still in place. Thus, the case against the Blackwater employees of US nationality was opened by a US federal court. In February 2010, shortly after a US judge dismissed all criminal accusations against the contractors charged with manslaughter, Iraq ordered the expulsion of all individuals contractually linked to Blackwater Worldwide (the company had already change its name to Xe Services).

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contractors of the British firm Aegis Defense Services deliberately killing civilians in Iraq as a form of entertainment, or the massacre of internally displaced people by Liberian mercenaries loyal to the former Ivory Coast strongman Laurent Gbagbo.

The mushrooming activity of PSCs/PMCs contrasts with an ineffective body of international law to deal with the issue. In 2007, a United Nations report on mercenary activity, compiled by a group of independent human rights experts, alerted the world to the fact that most private contractors deployed in armed conflict areas were accountable only to the companies that employ them.

The report revealed that the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (better known as the UN Mercenary Convention), in force since 2001, has only been ratified by 32 U.N. member-states.

While Article 47 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions does not distinguish between defensive and offensive actions in its definition of “mercenary,” the claim that these companies are only involved in defensive activities has been repeatedly used to justify their deployment. One of the difficulties is that, in highly complex and unpredictable conflict scenarios, the thin borders between providing protection and involvement in offensive actions can be easily blurred.

PSCs and PMCs provide a variety of services, including the protection of diplomats and buildings and the training of police forces and secret services, to an equally diverse range of clients, comprising embassies, corporations (including media), and non-governmental organizations. Although the terms PSC and PMC indicate a distinction in theory between the former’s focus on protection and security and the latter’s emphasis on military aspects, there seems to be an increasing overlap between the services offered by the two types of companies.

The firm formerly known as Blackwater, with estimated earnings of $1 billion from the US government in the last decade, was just one of more than 40 PSCs/PMCs that continue to operate in Iraq. Last year, according to available data, there were 52 registered PCSs/PMCs in Afghanistan and 30,000 private security contractors, of which almost 19,000 worked for the US Department of Defence. DynCorp, one of the leading companies in this field, won a three-year contract worth up to $1 billion to assist NATO in training Afghan police forces. PSCs/PMCs are also present in Somalia where they train Somalia’s security services and protect commercial ships against piracy. Saracen International (backed by Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater) is rumored to be involved in fighting activities against Al-Shabaab militants, as well as preparations for future operations against inland pirate bases.

The protection PCSs/PMCs provide to diplomatic, military and reconstruction personnel is sometimes cited to argue in favor of a private sector security industry. However, a report by the Center on International Cooperation of New York University—titled The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan—argues that those short term gains come at the expense of other, at least as vital, long-term goals. In particular, the report notes that financing private security firms and alternative power structures diverts funds that could be invested in beefing up the Afghan National Police, which would contribute to much needed “public trust in public security.”

Aside from legal (un)accountability and the moral issues raised by the enormous profits made by a whole industry that feeds off insecurity, there are other aspects about the work of PSCs/ PMCs that deserve scrutiny. Contracting the services of private Issue 1566 • September 2011

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security companies is a tempting option for potential clients who want to protect their interests—whatever those may be—in conflict zones and avoid tough questions that would otherwise come up. Take the case of a government struggling with the traditionally complicated decision of whether to send regular army troops to a given conflict scenario. The replacement of the troops by mercenaries allows that government to avoid being the target of public scrutiny at home in the case of soldiers’ deaths, as happened for example to the Clinton administration after the killing of 19 US soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu. Mercenaries are also, at least in principle, a much more discreet foreign presence than a battalion of regular troops with flags on their shoulders, but in practice they can perform roughly the same functions.

Beyond these political and strategic aspects, there is also the question of whether or not these companies are contributing to both a banalization and privatization of armed conflict. One party pays, the other does the job with no questions asked, and there is little or no accountability in the event that things go wrong. Long gone seem to be the days of “war” as “the continuation of politics by other means,” the famous aphorism by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Thanks to the growing demand for the service of PSCs/PMCs over the last two decades, complex conflicts are increasingly being handled as a matter of unregulated business.

A contributing editor for The Majalla, and previously a senior editor for The Majalla’s English edition. Mr. Almeida is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he also teaches. His areas of expertise are failed states, international development and political violence.

Mr. Almeida is currently working on a forthcoming book, based on his PhD thesis, tentatively titled From Godless Barbarians to Failed States: A History of the Problem of Disorder.

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The Long Game What next for Libya?

The NTC’s “road plan” is more a schedule of milestones along the path of transition than a map of the terrain to be traversed between an uncertain present and a desired future.

Thomas Alberts

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ational Transitional Council (NTC) spokesperson Guma Al-Gamaty announced on 2 September that a constitutional council of approximately 200 members would be elected in eight months to draft a new constitution to be put to a referendum within the following year. Al-Gamaty told BBC Radio, “We have outlined a clear road plan, a transition period of about 20 months. Hopefully by the end of about 20 months, the Libyan people will have elected the leaders they want to lead their country." He was speaking even as Tripoli was not yet fully secure, Qadhafi remained at large, and forces loyal to the deposed ruler vowed to begin a guerrilla war.

How wise is it for Libya’s new rulers to set timetables they will likely have to revise? The answer depends on balancing the costs of dithering at a decisive moment versus the risk of struggling to deliver on those commitments. Given the immediate implications of the former, the NTC may be forgiven for attaching greater weight to stating a bold vision and making a firm commitment.

Still, the long road ahead is uncharted, and in truth the NTC’s “road plan” is more a schedule of milestones along the path of transition than a map of the terrain to be traversed between an uncertain present and an aspired future.

The Destination The fluid ease of the NTC’s vision belies the challenge. After 42 years of autocratic leadership, the entire political system must be overhauled. Designed to materialize Qadhafi’s patchwork theory of direct democracy, the General People’s Congress is distorted, lethargic and irrelevant, the judiciary lacks legitimacy, and the executive hardly bears mentioning. In short, there is little of Libya’s political infrastructure worth retaining, and little of it would be helpful in the interim.

Crucially, whatever shape and form an overhauled political system takes, it must come from Libyans and be shaped to their needs and interests. These go beyond the minimums of rights and freedoms. Libyans will expect economic policies that create decent work and affordable living, social policies that meet their health and education needs, and competent and efficient administrative capacity. Given that these were key factors stimulating the uprising, Libya’s new rulers would be well advised to address them sooner rather than later.

Add to this the physical and psychological destruction of the war and the desperate security situation facing Libyans today, and something of the challenging road ahead comes into focus.

The Road Ahead Although the NTC’s compass points to representative governance and policy coordination in the national interest, the uncharted terrain between today and twenty months hence is mined with challenges and competing interests.

The immediate challenges include shortages of food and water, shelter, medication, sanitation, and fuel. Disarming fighters on both sides, collecting and securing tens of thousands of light and heavy weapons, and establishing a civilian police force accountable to a civilian authority present further pressing challenges. Beyond that, infrastructure must be repaired, and neighborhoods, towns and cities rebuilt.

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Although these challenges are considerable, the NTC is not without resources. For starters, there is the $15 billion of Libya's frozen assets released to the NTC at the Friends of Libya summit in Paris on 1 September. This is only a small portion of the estimated $170 billion in assets Libya secured abroad during Qadhafi's rule. Libya is also not short on technical skills or competence, although it will take time to lure back skilled workers from among the 860,000 people reportedly estimated

by Ban Ki-moon to have left Libya since February. The NTC also has at its disposal an enormous store of goodwill with foreign governments, although it would be naïve to think the parade of well-wishers at the Paris summit do not expect their measure of reward.

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Herein lies the rub. Although Al-Gamaty pointedly noted the incompatibility of democratic accountability with favoritism in awarding contracts, and David Cameron has implied the same (“It is their revolution, it is their change”), Vitol, the world’s largest oil trader with links to the UK’s International Development Minister Alan Duncan, is reportedly leading the field in securing oil contracts. Of the $700 million of Libyan assets released by the US at the Paris summit, $300 million reportedly went directly to Vitol in payment for fuel delivered to Benghazi rebels during the uprising.

What started as an uprising is now a successful revolution, and business in Libya has seldom looked more favorable, especially for NATO member states. But non-NATO states still have influence. In early September, an NTC spokesperson sug13

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• ON POLITICS

gested China was delaying recognizing the council as Libya's new government until the NTC committed to honoring China’s Qadhafi-era contracts. At the time of writing, Russia is the only one of the BRICS governments to recognize the NTC as Libya’s new government.

With the NTC now in government, changing priorities and competing interests will test the unity of the erstwhile rebel movement in the months and years ahead. Like Saddam Hussein, Qadhafi is a metonym for an arrangement of interests that conflate personal, private, business, and security with family, aids, advisors, ministers, and government officials. During the uprising, these interests extended to Benghazi where defectors included former judge and justice minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, former cabinet minister and ambassador to India Ali Al-Isawi, and Abdel-Fatah Younes, the assassinated rebel army commander who until his February defection held the rank of Major General in Qadhafi’s army.

Not casting aspersions on the NTC leadership, this observation is only to note that objections to Qadhafi-era figures in a post-Qadhafi government are already overruled. How that fact plays out in practice may be an ongoing test for NTC Chairman Abdel-Jalil, especially as more figures are co-opted into the new national project.

On the military side, there is the problem of what to do with fighters from both sides. How should they be integrated into a single unified command? Is this possible? What should be done with prisoners? Is the fighting over for Islamist elements among rebel forces? What about foreign mercenaries? What about the hundreds and possibly thousands of African migrant workers detained on suspicion of being mercenaries? What about the missing and dead? All these questions and more speak to the challenges of reweaving the social fabric after a brutal and bloody war. It may be a long time before former neighbors are willing to break bread again.

A final observation about the road ahead is that the conflict is not yet over. At the time of writing, the NTC does not have control over all of Libya and Qadhafi is still at large, a fact that suggests he still has supporters and capacity inside Libya. Qadhafi must be captured, killed, or turn up in exile before the NTC can claim the post-Qadhafi era has begun, although which of those options actually transpires will have divergent implications that are difficult to comprehend in advance.

Map is not territory The timeframe to which the NTC has committed itself itemizes specific milestones against which progress can be measured.

Although the NTC’s vision and commitment is laudable and its timing in the week of the Paris summit was necessary, it was arguably premature to frame it in terms of measurable outcomes and a schedule of ‘due by’ dates. With a timeframe now set, the NTC needs to move quickly.

Reconstruction and meeting the challenges this entails is urgent, but revolution is a long game. Tentative lessons from the incomplete and stuttering revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia caution that popular legitimacy has a short shelf life, hence the NTC’s rush to ration theirs into 20 equal portions. If the NTC pays as much attention to bolstering the legitimacy of the constitution-drafting process as it does to the stabilization and

reconstruction effort, then it will be improving where Egypt and Tunisia have stumbled. The NTC also will have made a store to sustain it in the plausible circumstance that timetables must be adjusted.

Particularly, the NTC can clarify the procedures for electing constitutional council members, where these councilors will be drawn from, who has nominated them, and their mandate. If these questions and more are addressed transparently and well in advance of the eight months mark, the transition is less likely to become mired in controversy at the first milestone.

At the same time, the NTC will have to balance demands for constitutional reform of the kind they have committed to, with demands for more substantive (and less easily deliverable) structural reforms of the economy and society. These reforms do not necessarily compete, but their respective champions and opponents might.

Building unity and sufficient consensus to match is the art of the long game, but it requires a kind of double vision that keeps one eye on the road ahead and another on the rocky ground under foot. Focusing exclusively on either will put the NTC in the back foot and see it responding to events rather than directing them.

Thomas Alberts – a PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. From Cape Town, South Africa, Thomas has previously written about South African political history, human rights, and legacies of apartheid. He is based in London.

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• A DECADE OF WAR

A Decade of War You can still ask anyone where they were the moment they realized that the World Trade Center had been attacked. At 8:46 am EST, the first plane hit the South Tower, leaving most bystanders perplexed: it was probably only a small plane that had gone astray from the route to LaGuardia or Teeterboro airports. But the moment the second plane slammed into the North Tower between the 77th and 85th floors, the world would not be the same again, and everyone watching knew it. It was within those minutes between sleeping and waking; sixteen minutes.

The coverage of the attack was unbroken on major US networks for nearly four days. It was a global event, the reach and impact of which continues today. The initial policy level reaction to September 11, 2001, was colored by panic. This was an unfamiliar operating environment, one that was emotionally charged to a level not seen in a long time. A name emerged from the fervor of analysis: Al-Qaeda. The enemy was now in sight and the dash to confront this amorphous foe took the world onto a course it could not have predicted on September 10. Over the next decade the way war is declared, funded, and waged changed profoundly and new warfare emerged, a warfare that pits large armies against small, mobile units. The rules have changed and winning does not look the same as it used to. The day's attacks took 2,573 victims, but the ensuing reaction and wars have cost hundreds of thousands more in Afghanistan and Iraq on all sides. The cost has been enormous, still the question remains: is the enemy vanquished?

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• A DECADE OF WAR

9/11: Ten years in retrospect After a wasted decade, what have we gained?

The real lesson of the last ten years might be simply that foreign policy should be far less ambitious.

Jason Burke According to The New York Times, American intelligence officials identified 30 top Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and along the Afghan-Pakistan border two years ago. “We took 15 off the battlefield last year,” one official told the newspaper, and five more this year.

Nor is Al-Qaeda a big organization. Of a total strength of perhaps 200 currently in Pakistan’s tribal areas, less than half could be considered senior players. The casualties from the drone strikes are thus very significant. There are some capable operators left—such as the Libyan Atiyah Abd Al-Rahman—and some with a gift for public relations—such as his compatriot Abu Yahya Al-Libi—but there is no one who combines the two qualities like Bin Laden did. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, might be experienced and respected but he lacks charisma and, crucially, the ability to bring together militants from across the Islamic world.

The flow of recruits to the tribal zones from Europe, the Arab world and elsewhere continues—there has been a recent increase in the number of those from Germany –but overall the totals are much lower than they were a few years ago. Never more than a few score in any one year, those traveling from the UK are now no more than “a handful,” British intelligence officials say. Though a capacity to harm evidently remains, it has been significantly reduced.

Beyond the senior leadership was the network of networks, or the affiliates. Again, there is little good news here for Bin Laden’s successors. In Iraq Al-Qaeda’s local presence is largely restricted to the northwestern province of Nineveh and, to a much lesser extent, Baghdad. It poses an undoubted threat to the ongoing stabilization of the nation but not to the region as a whole, let alone internationally. In North Africa and the Sahel, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is scattered and has failed to gain any serious

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ack in the summer of 2008, there was an odd and tense meeting in the Pakistani tribal areas. Six recruits, from immigrant communities in France and Belgium, had decided to confront their Al-Qaeda handler. Before leaving their homes, they had watched AlQaeda videos on the internet and seen massed battalions of mujahedeen training on assault courses, exciting ambushes and inspiring speeches by Osama bin laden.

Now they had spent months in Pakistan’s rugged frontier zones and had done nothing more than basic small arms training, some physical exercise and religious instruction. They had neither fought, nor met ‘the sheikh’ nor even seen one of the main camps. They had been deceived they complained to the militant—an Austrian of Syrian origin—who had been tasked with looking after them. The videos had lied.

Their handler was unapologetic. The sensational videos were a “trick” that served a dual purpose, he told them with perhaps surprising frankness, “to intimidate enemies and to attract new recruits.” In short, they were “propaganda,” Driss, whose real name is Abdullrahmen Hilal Hussain, said.

The exchange, revealed in the interrogation statements of the volunteers, went to the heart of a key question asked repeatedly since 2001—and even before: What is the true nature and capability of Al-Qaeda? The answers have varied and evolved—along with the phenomenon they try to describe and the policies designed to counter the threat.

With the ten year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks now upon us, a certain degree of historical perspective on the phenomenon of Al-Qaeda and its role within the broader spread of contemporary Islamic militancy is possible. It shows us that the death of Osama Bin Laden was not the beginning of a new evolution of the extremist group he led, but the end of a long period of decline.

That decline set in around the time the Al-Qaeda leader first took up residence, with three wives and a dozen children, in the three story house that appears to have been his home until his death. The rot has affected all of the three key elements of Al-Qaeda—the senior leadership or so called hardcore, the network of affiliates and the broader ideology. Significantly, it was at the moment when the extent of extremist violence looked greatest—between 2004 and 2006 there was an intense rhythm of attacks from Western Europe to the Far East and pretty much everywhere in between—that the deterioration began.But before turning to the recent history of Al-Qaeda, a survey of the present is needed.

First: the leadership. The senior ranks of Al-Qaeda have been suffering damaging attrition for some time. Bin Laden survived longer than many of his associates. One British intelligence official in July remembered briefing agents in 2009 on ten individuals of key interest. Today only one, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, remains alive, he said.

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local traction. There are occasional incidents of violence but the Arab Spring has shown the extremely limited influence of local internationalist militants. Al-Qaeda’s presence in the Far East is minimal. Activism in the Philippines has reverted to criminality after being earlier co-opted into the global jihadi web and Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim majority state, is quiet following the 2009 death of key militant Nooruddin Top. There are some problems in central Asia—particularly in Uzbekistan—but none as critical as during the 1990s. Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan is small too—probably no more than 150 individuals of whom only a handful are interested in international operations— and relations between the organization and the Taliban are often tense and complicated. In Pakistan, though closer to Al-Qaeda organizationally and ideologically, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba are still independent, pursuing local or regional agendas even if their rhetoric is now that of international jihad. There are connections too between Al-Qaeda and the coalition of groups known as the Pakistani Taliban but these are ad hoc. There has certainly been no fusion. Overall, what was once a network of networks is also now in the process of fragmenting, if indeed it exists at all.

Two exceptions could be Yemen and east Africa. In the latter, there are now groups claiming allegiance with Al-Qaeda. But it is hard to consider deeply parochial elements such as Somalia’s ShaIssue 1566 • September 2011

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bab as much of a strategic asset in a global campaign to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate. Indeed, even the embattled leadership of Al-Qaeda shows some reluctance to engage with the Somali groups. In Yemen, there is of course Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This mixed group of foreign and local militants is undoubtedly a threat, as has been shown by a variety of recent security operations. But it still seems extremely unlikely that Yemen could become, as Afghanistan was in the late 1990s, an industrial scale production line for trained militants, and AQAP is largely autonomous of the remaining Al-Qaeda leadership.

Finally, and most importantly, is the ideology. One of the undeniable achievements of Al-Qaeda is to have propagated their particular amalgam of rigorous conservative Muslim thought, political Islamism, radical revolutionary methodologies and secular politics to a vast new audience. The result, as can be seen particularly in the US, is a steady and continuing level of threat from individuals or small autonomous cells attracted to violence for a wide variety of reasons. Yet the key aim of Al-Qaeda—to radicalize and mobilize the masses of the Muslim world in the cause of extremist Islam—has been a singular failure. As the Arab Spring has shown, Al-Qaeda-ism remains marginalized socially, politically, ideologically, culturally and, as outlined above, geographically. It does not look likely that this will change soon.

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What is left then is a threat and a phenomenon that is chaotic, diverse and unpredictable. Specifically, the danger comes from a free-floating ideology that can create violence where other factors allow or encourage it to do so. This could be state involvement, criminal activity or a particular set of local elements. It is inevitable that a chaotic and rapidly evolving world without overarching narratives has generated conflict and militant groups that share those characteristics.

Quite what this means for US policy is unclear. One clue may be to examine the crucial period of 2005 to 2006. Above I mentioned that the decline in al-Qaeda’s fortunes set in earlier than often thought. For me, this period of extreme anxiety and widespread violence—which saw jihadi strategists such as Ayman al’Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri optimistically anticipate major victories—was the key moment when the tide of radicalism began to ebb.

The extent of this decline is of course now much more obvious than it was five years ago when hidden by the smoke and dust of conflict. There are many indications that this was the case if we examine the three elements of Al-Qaeda and how they fared at this time. First is the news that, according to US officials involved in trawling the stash of material seized from the Abbottabad compound, the attacks in London in 2005, and the thwarted Airlines Plot of the following year were the last over which Bin Laden retained close knowledge and some degree of close control. From that date on, apparently, the AlQaeda’s leader’s role was restricted to broad strategic direction.

This does not mean, as some have argued, that Bin Laden was simply a figurehead. But it does mean that, against his will, his knowledge of and influence over the planning of attacks was limited from a much earlier date than often previously thought.

The second indication is the fact that though recent years have seen an accelerated rate of attrition of senior Al-Qaeda figures in Pakistan and elsewhere, the pace of the process of thinning the ranks of top active Islamic militants had begun to pick up much earlier. There were the high profile arrests in 2002 and 2003 of Abu Zubaydah, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin Al-Shib et al. But a key event indicating the degree of trouble Al-Qaeda was already in was the death of Al-Qaeda affiliate leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2006. This was the result not only of effective intelligence work by American, Iraqi and other local agencies but also the gathering strength of the Sunni Awakening movement in the Western provinces of Iraq which forced AlZarqawi out of relatively secure areas and into locations where he was more vulnerable to the northeast of Baghdad.

More generally, of course, the Awakening movement led to the effective marginalization of international jihadi extremists in Iraq and its strategic defeat in a key theatre. It points too to a third key element of evidence indicating the extent to which Al-Qaeda was already in decline by the middle of the last decade: a series of polls showing the degree to which support for Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and their methodology, always far from unanimous, was failing rapidly in key countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia and elsewhere. Disaffection among erstwhile supporters of Al-Zarqawi following his bombing of hotels in Amman in November 2005 was key in generating information which allowed Jordanian services to penetrate his networks. Significantly too, the years from 2004 to 2007 saw the highpoint of the flow of volunteers from the UK to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

American strategy and counter-terrorist tactics around the world evolved at this period in radical ways too. The strategic opportunity offered by the shifts outlined above was thus exploited. Key to this was the understanding that global solutions based in global ideologies were almost inevitably bound to fail. The famous FM-24, the manual of new counter-insurgency doctrine, compiled by General David Petraeus for use by troops surging into Iraq emphasized “cultural awareness as a force multiplier” and spoke of how local norms of behavior needed to be respected. This was very far from the belief of a significant proportion of the American political establishment that only the spread of American values or at least free market capitalism and US-style liberal democracy could ensure security in the twenty first century. Allied to this new emphasis on the local community as opposed to “global good” was an increasing emphasis in counter-terrorist circles on the specific not the general.

Profiling was dumped in favor of a meticulous analysis of the process of radicalization. Hierarchies were out and network analysis emphasizing the role of peers and associates in the journey of any one individual to violent radicalism was in. As the new counter-insurgency doctrines allowed US generals to exploit the strategic opportunities emerging in Iraq during the period as Sunni communities turned away from the jihadis—whose ideology and behavior was as disrespectful of local difference and local communities as anything that had ever emerged from Washington—these new tools—in conjunction with new powers and new resources— were able to exploit the strategic opportunities offered by the more general turning away from radical Islamic ideologies seen at the time. Since 2006, these new ways of working have been increasingly imbedded in policy-making and strategy with positive results.

As ever the approach the US and other nations take in the future to the protean threat posed by the violent fringe of the latest of the many historic waves of religious revivalism to shake the Islamic world will not be determined solely by the nature of the problem alone. Domestic politics, financial capability and other threats which are equally if not more significant will play a major role.

The real lesson of the last ten years may well be simply that foreign policy should be far less ambitious. American intelligence agencies reported in their quadrennial review in late 2008 that they –around the time of the meeting of Driss and his frustrated charges in Pakistan—judged that within a few decades the US would no longer be able to “call the shots.” Instead, they predicted, America is likely to face the challenges of a fragmented planet, where conflict over scarce resources is on the rise, poorly contained by ramshackle international institutions. The previous review, published in December 2004, when President Bush had just been re-elected and was preparing his triumphal second inauguration, had foreseen continued US dominance for many years to come, considering that most major powers had effectively forsaken the idea of balancing the US. The difference over the intervening years from 2004 to 2008 is thus stark. If these years brought victory, then America and the West more generally cannot afford many more victories like it.

Jason Burke – South Asia correspondent of the Guardian. His latest work, “The 9/11 Wars”, is published this September.

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• A DECADE OF WAR

America's Lost Strategy in Afghanistan The False Premises of US policy and Afghanistan's Future has forced the US to abandon state building and employ new tactics instead, but will it work?

Professor Fawaz A. Gerges examines the flaws in US policy towards Afghanistan, paying particular attention to the false conflation of the Taliban with Al-Qaeda and the misunderstanding of local sympathies. The limits of state building having been exposed, new tactics must forge a viable future in the region.

Photo © Getty Images

Fawaz Gerges

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n his address announcing a substantial withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan last June, President Obama said that the United States had largely achieved its goals in Afghanistan. “When I announced this surge at West Point [sending an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in December 2009], we set clear objectives: to refocus on Al-Qaeda, to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, and train Afghan security forces to defend their own country … Tonight, I can tell you that we are fulfilling that commitment … we are meeting our goals.”

Obama has implicitly acknowledged that the premises upon which US strategy in Afghanistan is based are misguided.

Namely that the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda function more or less as a single entity; the Afghan Taliban can be militarily defeated; and a related implication concerning the indispensability of American power in nation-building.

Let us start with the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. One of the major drivers behind the US military surge was that the Obama foreign policy viewed the Taliban through the lens of Al-Qaeda and the global War on

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Terror. Yet one of the key goals of the Afghan Taliban movement is to get off the list of terrorist organizations, and gain international recognition as a legitimate national-Islamist force.

Although elements of the Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani in eastern Afghanistan do have limited ties to Al-Qaeda, it is clear that Haqqani is not interested in AlQaeda’s transnational agenda and is opposed to waging war against the Pakistani state. The so-called Haqqani network is an independent insurgent organization headquartered in Pakistan and run by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani—along with his son Sirajuddin. The Haqqanis tend to do what their Pakistani patrons tell them to do, and are rewarded accordingly.

In other words, the conflict in Afghanistan is far broader and complex than an entity called “Al-Qaeda,” rather it involves a formidable coalition of Pashtun tribesmen and a non-aligned Islamist movement against what they view (rightly or wrongly) as a foreign threat to their identity and way of life. A case can be made that the Taliban are a “peasant army” on the Afghan side.

The war has drawn a few hundred militant Islamists from Kashmir, the Arab world, and even from Central Asia. AlQaeda is only a very small element in this coalition, the twenty to fifty Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan cannot drive, let alone lead, a potent insurgency, notwithstanding all the speculation that Al-Qaeda is a force-multiplier—they are more like a parasite nourished on lawlessness and instability.

The Taliban have reportedly made it clear that they have no need for foreign fighters because they have plenty of recruits.

Indeed, over the last three to four years, the Afghan Taliban nearly quadrupled their numbers, going from 7,000 to more than 25,000. According to US intelligence they have gained more followers within the Pashtun tribes, who are a majority in Afghanistan, as well as other ethnic groups in the North, such as the Uzbeks and Tajiks, who also resent the presence of foreign troops in their country.

Yet President Obama framed his decision to deploy an additional 30,000 soldiers and marines to Afghanistan by early 2010 (bringing the number of US troops in Afghanistan to almost 100,000) as a domestic necessity—to protect the United States from Al-Qaeda. Like the war in Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan was portrayed as taking the fight to the enemy rather than being struck at home. But the surge had more to do with a rising Taliban than a declining Al-Qaeda, and was designed to undermine the Taliban’s momentum, split it from Al-Qaeda, and break it down into more manageable parts to facilitate a political settlement.

Nevertheless, in his addresses to the troops at home and in Afghanistan, Obama equated the Taliban with Al-Qaeda. For example, in spring 2010, Obama defended his decision to escalate the fight, telling US troops that their victory is imperative to America’s safety. “If this region slides backwards,” said Obama, “if the Taliban retakes this country, Al-Qaeda can operate with impunity, then more American lives will be at stake.”

Although there are minor operational ties between the Taliban in Afghanistan and some Al-Qaeda operatives who provide inspiration, as well as training in how to make roadside bombs. The Afghan Taliban have also gone out of their way to distinguish themselves from both Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, although in practice the guidance issued by the leadership is not always followed.

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the now-defunct Mullah Dadullah of the Quett a Shura, which pioneered suicide attacks in Afghanistan—attacks carried out by the Haqqani network.

It is therefore misleading to group together Al-Qaeda, a transnational, borderless jihadist group waging a worldwide terrorist campaign, with the Taliban, a local armed, nationalist-Islamist insurgency whose focus has always been the Afghan front. Although the two groups have ties, they are separate and distinct groups with different constituencies and different goals.

American authorities have never accused the Afghan Taliban of carrying out strikes or attacks outside Afghanistan.

Some Taliban elements, such as the Haqqanis, flirt with AlQaeda, but the relative consensus that has emerged among scholars of the Taliban is that if the Taliban return to Afghanistan in one form or another, they would most likely try to push Al-Qaeda out of the country. Make no mistake: the Pashtuns harbor no love for Al-Qaeda, who brought disaster to the Taliban when they sheltered Al-Qaeda militants in the 1990s.

According to Douglas Saunders of Canada’s Globe and Mail, Mullah Omar remains “very opposed” to Al-Qaeda, and most allied commanders in Afghanistan that Saunders has talked with think it “very unlikely” that Al-Qaeda would establish a base there even if the Taliban were to take over. Richard Barrett, a leading specialist on Afghanistan, says of the Taliban, “They don’t want Al-Qaeda hanging around.”

That conclusion was implicitly affirmed by Mullah Mohammed Tayyab Agha, head of the Taliban political bureau, in an interview with Al-Hayat, a London-based pan-Arab newspaper, when he said: “The world must recognize us before asking us to be committed to anything.”

The current marriage of convenience between the Taliban fighters and Al-Qaeda operatives will hold as long as the West confuses and conflates the two, and wages all-out war against them. But the Taliban in Afghanistan view Al-Qaeda as a sword of Damocles. According to people close to the Taliban, the key is for the West not to confuse the Taliban and the Pashtun with Al-Qaeda, but instead try to separate them, just as it did in Iraqi with the Sunni tribesmen in Anbar.

If there is one person who knows the state of relations between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the past and the present it is Abu Al-Walid Al-Masri, a legendary figure among the Afghan Arabs and the first foreigner to swear allegiance to Mullah Omar in the 1990s. In an online interview with The Australian, Masri—who worked closely with Omar and other Taliban chiefs and was close to Osama bin Laden and his cohorts—said that the differences between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are greater now than they were before the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. He is emphatic: the Taliban will no longer welcome Al-Qaeda, which stabbed them in the back in Afghanistan. According to Masri, Al-Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan would threaten the future Taliban rule because “the majority of the population is against Al-Qaeda.”

Bin Laden’s death in Pakistan provides another reason for the Taliban to distance itself from Al-Qaeda, though it would be futile to expect Omar and his cohorts to formally disassociate themselves from the Afghan Arabs.

There is no denying that the killing of bin Laden provided President Obama with precious political capital and allowed him to begin the process of extracting US troops from Afghanistan’s killing fields. “We are starting this drawdown from a position of strength,” Obama told the US public during a 15-minute address

Image © Graphic News

• A DECADE OF WAR

from the East Room of the White House last June. “Al-Qaeda is under more pressure than any time since 9/11.” Obama said that an intense military campaign had crippled Al-Qaeda’s original network in the region, leaving its leaders either dead or on the run in the rugged border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

By announcing a substantial withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, President Obama has finally acknowledged that the Afghan Taliban cannot be militarily defeated, and that the only way out of the Afghan killing fields is a political solution that engages the Taliban.

Despite repeated denials and assertions by top US leaders that the military tide turned against the Taliban, assessments from the US intelligence community has presented a gloomy picture of the Afghan war, contradicting Obama and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

The new shift in US strategy reflects a stark reality: there is no military solution to the civil strife in Afghanistan. Although American military commanders report limited progress in their campaign against the Taliban, saying that there has been a shift in momentum in favor of the NATO coalition, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, their conclusion is that the Taliban could not be defeated, only degraded and prevented from taking over the country.

The coalition forces have inflicted major losses on the Tali-

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By announcing a substantial withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, President Obama has finally acknowledged that the Afghan Taliban cannot be militarily defeated, and that the only way out of the Afghan killing fields is a political solution that engages the Taliban ban, especially on their mid-level leadership and field lieutenants. US Special-forces raids at nights have exacted a heavy toll on Taliban’s commanders. Tactically, the US has won the war. Strategically, the Taliban remain formidable because they are a peasant-like army fighting asymmetric warfare and retain considerable public support within Afghanistan.

Leaked diplomatic cables covering recent years of US strategy in Afghanistan paint a bleak portrait of the war-torn country, depicted

by American officials. Time and again, recently replaced US Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry lamented the difficulty of achieving sustained success against the insurgency and the pervasive corruption at the highest level of the Afghan regime and portrayed President Hamid Karzai as erratic, paranoid, and unreliable.

Although President Obama and his military commanders say they have broken the Taliban’s momentum, the classified documents show US officials’ sense of futility and resignation: “No matter how effective military performance may be, the insurgents will readily fill any vacuum of governance, and without political competence, lasting [counterinsurgency success] . . . will remain one more operation away,” Eikenberry concluded, in an assessment that echoes concerns expressed over the current coalition offensive in the southern province of Kandahar.

Ironically, the weight of evidence indicates that domestic politics, ideology and institutional constraints also played a key role in Obama’s decision to surge troops in Afghanistan in 2009. Obama’s eagerness to keep his presidential campaign promise was a key factor, as well as deference to the military’s view that reducing troops meant loss of America’s prestige.

Now Obama seeks an end to America’s costly commitment in Afghanistan—already the longest military escapade in US history—a commitment that has eclipsed the Soviet Union’s reckless adventure there. Americans have turned against the war with a vengeance, especially Obama’s liberal base. The annual costs of the Afghan war top $100 billion, a huge sum in a country that faces a serious economic crisis. In America, all politics are local. Obama’s decision to begin drawing down American troops is designed to send a clear message to his base and the US public at large that he hears their voices. An unpopular war is a liability to a president like Obama who is seeking a second term in office.

What Obama and his generals plan to do is to rely on specialforces raids to keep the Taliban off-balance, kill and capture their field lieutenants and degrade their capability. Special-forces operations have been deployed extensively and their numbers have Issue 1566 • September 2011

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increased astronomically, averaging nearly 300 a month. Drone attacks are also being deployed widely more in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Although technically effective, these tactics are controversial politically and morally. Drone attacks and special-forces raids cause numerous civilian casualties and violate the sanctity of homes and bedrooms and alienate the very publics that the United States aims at winning over; they are a double-edged sword that does more than harm than good in the long term.

Another component of US strategy is to rely on warlords and tribal chiefs to prevent the return and resurgence of the Taliban. This method undermines the central authority of state institutions and the integration of Afghanistan. Obviously, the United States seems to have given up on nation-building in the war-torn country, a testament to the limits of American power and the limits of foreign intervention.

Reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan require a regionwide political settlement that addresses the legitimate grievances of the tribal communities and nationalist Islamist sentiments, as well as the geo-strategic concerns of Pakistan, Iran, and India. There is also agreement among observers that reform of the political and legal system, integrating the tribal region into the mainstream and lifting the inhabitants out of extreme poverty, is crucial to achieve lasting peace. Unless and until the western coalition invests in the political economy of the tribal areas and protects civilians, the Taliban will continue to prey on the vulnerabilities of the Pashtun tribesmen and impose their own system of extremism.

A negotiated settlement with the Pashtun tribes would inevitably bring the Taliban into the government and would very likely result in the expulsion of foreign militants from the area and even extremist Taliban elements. The case of Iraq is particularly instructive in this instance. The challenge is to give the Pashtun tribes a real stake in the political and economic order, and to win their hearts and minds. It is hoped that bringing closure to America’s war in Afghanistan will allow warring groups and communities to begin the difficult task of putting their own house in order, a task pregnant with risks and possibilities.

President Obama’s decision to begin bringing US troops home and to shift attention to diplomacy and the political horizon is a step in the right direction.

Fawaz Gerges – The Director of the Middle East Centre and Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

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Bloody Investment Has the US state building project in Iraq resulted in nothing more than a bleak cautionary tale?

As Qadhafi’s regime toppled, the world held its breath in the hope that Libya wouldn’t become “another Iraq.”

This concern is testimony to the abject failure of America’s project in Iraq, post Saddam Hussein. Today the country is racked with ethnic and sectarian divisions, and is the arena for a proxy war between Iran and the US James Denselow

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Its democracy suffers from corruption and an enduring gridlock; in 2010 it took 249 days for a government to form. Although George W. Bush and Tony Blair regularly appeal to history to vindicate their Iraq adventure, the reality of what was a disastrous experience was highlighted by concerns during the fall of Qadhafi as to whether the lessons from Iraq had been learnt. As Qadhafi’s compound in Tripoli was captured a plethora of articles compared Libya with Iraq with the headlines asking “how can the new authorities stop an Iraq-style slide into chaos?”

Wracked by deadly regular bombings, Iraq, now largely ignored by the international media, is currently undergoing a crucial transition. According to the State of Forces Agreement (SOFA) all US troops will leave Iraq by the end of the year.

However the continued fragility of the security situation has

Photo © Getty Images

he sheer size of the US Embassy in Baghdad says a lot about Washington’s intentions for the country. It is one of the largest and most expensive embassies on the planet, with 21 buildings fitting into an area that is two and a half times the size of the Vatican City. Yet, when it comes to the subtleties of international diplomacy, size isn’t everything. Indeed despite the US war in Iraq costing $750 billion and 4,470 lives there is a danger that the super embassy could become a white elephant, an enduring testimony to the failure of the US project in the country. As one of the 1.5m US veterans of the Iraqi war recently bemoaned to The Economist; “at a great cost of blood and treasure, we achieved nothing tangible.”

Iraq has become a quasi-ethno-sectarian state, a hyper-version of Lebanon with oil and a restive population of 30 million.

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led to an ongoing debate about whether or not the Iraqi government will ask for a US presence to remain, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta explained that “whether it’s diplomatic or whether it’s military, we’ve got a long-term relationship with Iraq. We’ve invested a lot of blood in that country.”

While a future agreement on troop presence will be a defining characteristic of future US-Iraq relations, the inability of Washington to influence its ally’s behavior has been shown up in the case of Syria. In August the Obama administration, in close coordination with Europe, announced that President Assad had lost all remaining legitimacy and should stand aside.

Washington subsequently looked to organize an isolation of the regime in Damascus with a White House statement celebrating that Syria “can look only to Iran for support for its brutal and unjust crackdown.” In response Syria’s Ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Abdul Karim Ali, told Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television that “Syria is self-sufficient and has a lot of friends.”

One of these friends appears to be Iraq, which is currently in the process of doing exactly the opposite of what Washington wants by actually enhancing ties with Syria. Last month Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki hosted a Syrian delegation of business and government figures to agree on the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries, and the sale of subsidised oil to Syria. In addition Maliki has also ordered the shutdown of a United Nations camp for refugees from Syria in Iraq.

Maliki has a long and varied history of relations with Syria, having spent three years there in exile from Saddam’s regime (19791982). Iraq expert Professor Juan Cole explained Maliki’s decision making as determined by two main factors; firstly a fear of a hard line Sunni regime emerging in Damascus and secondly the fact that he “owes his position as prime minister to the support of Iran for coalition building of the Iraq Shiites. So he may be paying back a debt.” Another key pillar of Maliki’s fragile coalition, Muqtada Al-Sadr, issued his own statement rejecting western calls for Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad to quit, calling the embattled leader a “brother” who stood in opposition to the United States. Maliki has said that he hopes that Assad regime will “respond to the people’s demands and quicken the implementation of reforms,” whilst warning that “Israel is the first and the biggest beneficiary of this process” (the Arab Spring). Such language is noticeably similar to that of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who stated that “the Syrian government and people should be careful and implement the necessary reforms by themselves.”

Traditionally the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis has been the bedrock of Iran’s power in the region. However the removal of the staunchly anti-Iranian Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the rise of the Shi’a political alliances in Iraq, led to Iranian influence spreading further. The expansion of Iranian influence into Iraq has foreshadowed a very real clash with the Americans. This low level conflict has been characterized by the use of Iranian supplied Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFPs) in attacks on US soldiers, as well as high profile raids on US interests—including the kidnapping of 3 US hikers from inside northern Iraq. There have been reports of the US supporting anti-regime elements in southern Iran and hosting thousands of members of the Iranian opposition movement MEK in Camp Ashraf in southern Iraq. Major General Jeffrey S. Buchanan, the top US military spokesman in Iraq, declared that the Iranian government’s Quds force is “providing direct support” to Iraqi Shi’a militias, and that those militias are working

to undermine the Maliki government. August even saw the rare use of US airpower against what US officials described as Iranian backed elements in the south of the country.

So against this backdrop can Washington isolate Syria from its neighbours by persuading Baghdad to support its, not Tehran’s, agenda? While the US and Iran continue to fight a low level proxy war in Iraq, it would appear that Tehran’s influence over the foreign and economic policies of an embattled Maliki regime is currently holding sway over that of Washington.

Considering the scale of US efforts in Iraq over the past eight years this can only be described as a damning testament of the US failure to shape events in the country.

James Denselow – Writer on Middle East politics and security issues based at Kings College London. He is a board member of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and a Director of the New Diplomacy Platform (NDP).

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• PROFILE

A Herculean Task Mahmoud Jibril

Since the chaos in Libya began in mid-February, over 30,000 people have been killed and 50,000 wounded. Following a six-month long military stalemate that effectively split the country in two, a turning point arrived when anti-Qadhafi forces were able to take Tripoli in late August. Important as Tripoli is to the outcome of the war, the transitional government—headed by Mahmoud Jibril—know that the troubles Libya faces are far from over.

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ahmoud Jibril, who has been de-facto prime minister of the country since 23 March, when the National Transitional Council (NTC) was instituted, explained from Tripoli last Thursday that despite recent military advances: "The greater challenge is still there. The first challenge is to achieve a victory over ourselves. The second challenge is to be able to be tolerant and to forgive and to go forward towards the future.”

Indeed, for Libya to achieve political stability in the near future it will first have to overcome its political divisions, and ensure that peace is maintained through a process of reconciliation. A number of recent events have demonstrated the difficulty of the NTC’s objective, from battles with Qadhafi loyalists in Bani Walid and Sirte, failed negotiations with loyalist forces, and recent demonstrations against the NTC by protestors who feel the nomination of the new administration has not been transparent enough and that too many members of the old guard are prominent in the lists issued thus far. Beyond these obstacles there is the economic damage that resulted from a halt to the country’s oil exports, and the legacy of a 40-year long dictatorship that was dependent on a patronage system and left no political institutions in place for a transitional government to inherit. Jibril—as prime minister, head of international affairs and chairman of the executive board of the NTC—is faced with the herculean task of ensuring political stability, a feat that requires the NTC to successfully address every single one of these challenges.

Jibril, however, is up to the challenge. His education, for one, seems to have predestined him for a career in transitional politics. In 1975 Jibril graduated from Cairo University with a bachelor’s degree in political science and economics. He continued his studies at the University of Pittsburgh where he received a Masters and a Doctorate in political science. His academic background focused primarily on strategic planning and decision-making, an expertise that will surely come in handy as he leads the way for Libya to establish—for the first time since Qadhafi came to power—the types of institutions that were hollowed out by the former leaders’ Green book philosophy.

Importanly, Jibril’s experience in strategic planning was not limited to the ivory tower of academia. Between 1987 and 1988 he led a team the drafted the United Arab Training manual, and administered a number of training conferences on the

subject. His experience in management and administration grew further as he took over the training programs of senior management in a number of Middle Eastern countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE, and Turkey.

According to Jibril he was eventually coerced into to serving Qadhafi’s government where he worked as the head of the National Economic Development Board between 2007 until his defection in 2011. His account, which is supported by a number of documents released by WikiLeaks, explains that in 2007, Saif Al-Islam, then the presumed heir to Qadhafi and perhaps one of the few voices in government supporting economic and political reforms, sent Jibril on a private jet to Libya from Cairo where he resided at the time. Upon his arrival in Libya, Saif offered Jibril the position of minister of National Planning, and asked him to join his effort to restructure the Libyan economy.

According to an interview with the Telegraph, although Jibril asked for a year to consider the offer, the following day a state television report confirmed his ministerial role.

In 2009, Jibril was appointed chairman of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) and was involved in three of the five implementing committees—budget, economy and wealth distribution.

Jibril’s work at the NEDB did indeed make strides in liberalizing the Libyan economy, although his efforts had varying degrees of success reflecting the reluctance of a number of re-

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In 2009, Jibril was appointed chairman of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) and was involved in three of the five implementing committees—budget, economy and wealth distribution

gime insiders to give up their control over large portions of the state-dominated economy. As a result, Jibril became increasingly frustrated by the obstacles the government placed in front of his efforts to reform the economy, prompting him to submit three letters of resignation. In spite of his best efforts to leave Qadhafi’s administration, Jibril was not able to do so until the revolution in Libya began.

Since Jibril’s appointment at the NTC his efforts have been directed at three fronts. The first has been a focus on unifying Libyans. The second has been in gaining recognition from the international community for the NTC as Libya’s legitimate government. And finally, Jibril has taken important steps to revive the Libyan economy.

By focusing on unifying Libya, Jibril has set the stage for the country to establish long lasting peace. Recognizing the possibility that Libya’s recent bloodshed may have a long-term impact on how eastern and western Libyans perceive one another, Jibril has, on a number of occasions, called for fighters to respect justice mechanisms and avoid revenge killings. The Tripoli Post reported that Jibril has threatened to resign if “infighting were to erupt in the movement that toppled the former dictatorial regime.” Likewise, during his first press conference from Tripoli, Jibril warned that “some have made attempts to start a political game before reaching a common consensus on the rules," adding that the priority for the new administration was to finish the battle against Qadhafi forces.

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“Once the battle is finished … the political game can start.

Our biggest challenge is still ahead. There are two battles. The first battle is against Qadhafi and his regime; this will end by the capturing or the elimination of Qadhafi. However, the battle that is more difficult is against our selves. How can we achieve reconciliation and achieve peace and security and agree a constitution? We must not attack each other or push each other away.”

Though Jibril has promised to step aside once a new government is formed, he has on a number of occasions asserted his leadership in an effort to mitigate “factional squabbling between the interim government’s political leadership previously based in the country’s east and the various militias from the country’s west that seized Tripoli and drove Colonel Qadhafi into hiding” according to the Financial Times most recent analysis on his tenure.

On the diplomatic front, Jibril has been successful in obtaining for the NTC the recognition of a number of important allies including France, the UK, the US and the Arab league amongst many others.

The importance of obtaining international recognition for the NTC cannot be overstated. For one it allowed NATO to support the rebels militarily at the onset of the war, and since then recognition has permitted the NTC to receive important funds that were previously frozen. These funds will allow the NTC to pay public sector wages, while beginning other reconstruction efforts, including boosting its oil sector.

Jibril has also made significant strides in reassuring the international community of Libya’s ability to continue managing their $170 billion investment portfolio. He explained to The Financial Times that the NTC’s executive committee was committed to maintaining the same team overseeing Libya’s financial holdings for at least the next month or two. He argued that “It is not wise to appoint someone new and we are now agreeing that the previous leadership should remain as far as investments are concerned.

In other words Jibril’s management style is practical. He has encouraged restraint in the country’s internal politics, acknowledging that transition will be a long road for Libya. At the same time he has acknowledged that to successfully manage the transition of the country, members of the former government will need to be retained in order to support the continuity of policies that were functional before, although these are mainly limited to the oil sector and the country’s investment fund.

In a late August interview with Al-Ahram, Jibril put his plans for the future succinctly. “The first priority will be to liberate territory remaining under Qadhafi loyalists and maintaining a secure and stable Libya.” If Jibril is able to continue implementing pragmatic policies, while upholding the values of the revolution, Libya will likely be able to escape prolonged political instability.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

The GCC Time Bomb Growing food security concerns amid rising food prices and population growth Food security is becoming a critical issue for many countries around the globe. Fearing that some day they might not be able to provide their citizens with enough food, GCC states have all increased government subsidies, built up strategic storage, and invested in agriculture overseas. Yet, much more needs to be done if governments are to successfully balance import risks with costs associated with increasing domestic production, thereby defusing a potential political crisis over food scarcity.

Nima Khorrami-Assl

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n the 1920s, British novelist and critic George Orwell famously observed that “we may find in the long run that tinned food is a deadlier weapon than the machine-gun.”

Today, food security is indeed becoming a critical issue for many countries around the globe and the GCC is no exception.

According to the most recent IMF Regional Economic Outlook, GCC will see inflation rise to 5.3 percent in 2011 from 3.2 percent last year, and “the key driver of headline inflation will be food prices.” The report goes on to warn that prevention of “a resurgence of inflationary pressures” requires GCC governments to “monitor the second-round effects whereby food inflation translates rapidly into non-food inflation.”

Meanwhile, the key dilemma for governments in the region, explains Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Agriculture Fahd bin Abdul-Rahman Balghunaim, is that any move towards selfsufficiency will intensify food insecurity for future generations because the very high investments in land and water management required to achieve such a goal will take resources away from critically important sectors, such as education and health.

As such, there is nothing controversial in claims that food security is one of the Gulf region’s most pressing challenges over the next several decades, especially since the region is highly reliant on imported food. This reliance, in turn, can be attributed to supply and demand. Demand will be raised by factors include rising population, rapid urbanization, and changing consumption patterns due to, among other things, increased income levels. Supply factors include limited natural resources including land and water. Added to these are the negative effects of climate change, which will adversely affect the already fragile state of food security in the region. It will have a direct impact on agricultural production and the availability of water,

while its indirect impact includes higher prices for imported foods and changes in the cost of energy and agricultural inputs. Needless to say, lack of adequate investment in research, and coordination deficiencies between ministries of agriculture and ministries of water and irrigation, are major obstacles to increasing agricultural productivity.

The food and oil price spikes of 2007–2009 were a stark reminder of the potential fragility of the food security in the region. And to make matter worse, GCC governments have plenty of budgetary, political, and historical reasons to be concerned

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with the region’s “food trade deficit.” So far, GCC states have been able to absorb high food prices thanks to high oil revenues.

However, a sharp and (or) sustained decline in oil prices, in combination with persistently high food prices, could lead to a depreciation of trade surpluses—thereby reducing foreign exchange earnings, states’ revenues and investment options. In this way, fiscal and trade surpluses become so-called chronic deficits.

Politically, as the Arab Spring vividly illustrates, high food prices can provide a catalyst for protest movements which have the potential to turn violent and prompt regime change. AccordIssue 1566 • September 2011

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ing to a recently published report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Future Global Shocks, the Arab Spring began as a consequence of the wildfires that destroyed a fifth of Russia’s wheat crop in 2010, and floods in Australia and Canada which generated price hikes worldwide.

Historically, western threats of curbing food trade in response to the Arab oil boycott in the 1970s are still alive in the thoughts of GCC governments. The US food embargo against the Soviet Union and repeated failures to establish an international food reserve have also helped the Gulf countries to 31

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

come to terms with the highly politicized nature of global food markets. Therefore, their food import dependencies are now regarded as a strategic liability which ought to be addressed by all means at their disposal.

As a response, in the past few years all the GCC member states have sought to improve local food supplies by buying and (or) leasing arable farm land in various Asian, African, and Latin American countries—with the stated aim of gaining “privileged bilateral access to food production and reduce the exposure to market failure and export restrictions.” Governments and private companies alike are also exploring new technologies to help the region develop more of its own food supplies at affordable costs. The Qatar National Food Security Program, and the Abu Dhabi Development Fund initiative on food security—to name only a few.

Despite their enormous national wealth, Gulf states are facing a potential food crisis as world food prices continue to rise Investment in foreign land is thought to reduce the amount of cereal that GCC countries need to import at world prices.

In addition, food exports from third-party countries would enable Gulf governments to reduce the role of so-called middlemen in the food trade—therefore bypassing speculation on world food exchanges. Meanwhile, host countries acquire an injection of capital to their agricultural sectors while benefiting from new agricultural technologies that investors’ capital brings in. Possible benefits for the rural poor include the creation of a potentially significant number of jobs and the development of rural infrastructure.

However, “land grabbing,” according to the World Bank and International Federation of Agricultural Producers, does “very little to address the food security concerns of GCC states.” Investing in third-party countries, as opposed to using the market, requires the investor to take into account all of the climate and political risks of the host country rather than simply “choosing which country to secure food from.” Moreover, Nasser Mohamed Al-Hajri, chairman of the Qatari owned Hassad Food Company, claims that issues also arise concerning the inability of the affected population to defend their interests, as well as the potential impact on the local food production in target countries—provided that most of these countries have their own food security concerns. In fact, due to concerns about the implementation of land deals, some projects have sparked strong protests from local smallholders in host countries. The Bin Laden Group, for instance, had to cease a $4.3 billion project to grow rice in Indonesia after violent protests.

GCC governments, furthermore, are responding to rising food prices with a combination of public sector wage increases and safety-net programs in the form of cash for transfer. Yet again, these policies create more problems than solutions. In social settings where family bonds and tribal loyalties are of paramount socio-political importance, cash for transfer programs are more likely to increase official corruption which in turn leads to targeting problems. Increasing public-sector wages is an untargeted response which tends to fuel inflation-

ary pressure, and can dangerously augment public expectations that might prove difficult to curb in the long-run.

Despite their enormous national wealth, Gulf states are facing a potential food crisis as world food prices continue to rise. They face tighter global food markets because of strained export surpluses, a decline in domestic food production, and population growth. Fearing that some day they might not be able to provide their citizens with enough food, they have all increased government subsidies, built up strategic storage, and invested in agriculture overseas.

Yet, more needs to be done and it needs to be done now. A comprehensive strategy that balances import risks with costs associated with increasing domestic production is still missing. There is thus an urgent need for the articulation and implementation of a three-dimensional strategy that enables states to simultaneously cope with rising domestic consumption through education and family planning. It must also enhance domestic productivity via multilateral, cross-regional investments in R&D and technology transfer as well as improvement in water management. Finally a reduction in exposure to market volatility is needed, through the use of financial instruments such as future contracts and options as well as joint ventures with local farmers rather than land grabbing.

Nima Khorrami Assl – Beijing-based writer and researcher specializing in policy and analysis on geo-economics and security development in the Middle East and Asia Pacific. Mr. Assl has carried out a number of projects for both governmental and private clients in the Middle East and has published op-eds in “The Guardian,” Open Democracy, and Defence IQ.

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Children of the Uprising

What price are children paying for the uprising in the Arab World? And is the burden too heavy to bear?

Children have been front and center in the uprisings of the Arab World but the impact on them has not been weighed. The violence and instability caused by the recent uprisings in the Middle East may stay with them creating a generation traumatized long after the dust settles.

Maryam Ishani

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Video has documented the way in which children are often the direct target of efforts to clamp down on the uprising

Image © Getty Images

ustafa is watching carefully. His brother Amr is sensibly taking apart an assault rifle, snapping parts apart and laying them onto a table in their father’s garage in Ras Lanuf, Libya, which also operates as a mechanical repairs shop. “It always needs to be cleaned, the dust gets into even the smallest parts,” says Amr. Mustafa’s eyes move with each piece being laid out. It is part fascination, part boredom. Since the middle of February school has been on an indefinite holiday brought on by the uprising to topple Libyan President Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. While Mustafa stays home or plays with his friends his brother Amr, 19, goes with a group of friends from their neighborhood to support the rebels in the patrols of their town.

Their mother won’t let 13-year-old Mustafa join them, she reiterates this from their living room not far from the mechanic shop.

But, on quiet afternoons with nothing else to do, Mustafa follows his brother out to as far as a checkpoint at the beginning of the downtown area and watches as Amr’s group inspect cars arriving into the critical oil port. “I’m not old enough,” he laments, “But one day, God willing, I will be able to fight for my city too.”

In the midst of the political turmoil both children often bear the greatest impact of both the short and long term challenges, but their needs frequently take a back seat to the larger goals of the political movements. Yet they are not a marginal population of their societies. According to UNICEF, children make up around 40% of the population in the countries where the “Arab Spring” uprisings have been most intense: Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria.

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• THE HUMAN CONDITION

Children have been critical participants in the recent upheavals. In Tahrir Square in Cairo, eight-year-old Niyaz became famous for sitting atop the shoulders of his father and leading chants demanding the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. His strong voice drew large crowds. His patriotically painted face and the faces of children like him, camping in the square with parents and siblings, have often been used in international reporting, to represent the promise of an emerging new order—young and hopeful.

Tragically, their frozen smiles captured in class photos also fill the walls and posters that commemorate the fatalities of the bloody clashes. In Syria, video has documented the way in which children are often the direct target of efforts to clamp down on the uprising. “Attacking children is a way in which the regime forces families to be quiet, to keep their loved ones at home,” describes Moustafa Ayad, an Egyptian-American online activist who has been traveling around the region pursuing the evolution of digital media and its role in the uprisings. Videos like the ones that depict the brutally tortured body of 13-year-old Hamza Al-Khatib—who was arrested in the Dera’a clashes at the end of April—are not surprising in Syria, Ayad insists. Other terrible videos have since followed, many of them featuring friends of the young victim Hamza, all showing signs of torture and disfigurement. The families have chosen to broadcast what many Syrians felt they already knew, that the young are not always spared because of their age.

The presence of children in combat zones is not new.

The Iran-Iraq war produced stories of children who were said to have been tied together and sent in waves into minefields, to clear the way for ground infantry—with plastic keys hung around their necks to open the doors to heaven upon their martyrdom. There have been few reports of children at the front lines of the Libyan conflict. Some of the youngest combatants in Libya are as young as fifteen, an age when even Mustafa’s mother says she might think about letting him go on patrol with his brother. Officially, the rebel administration in Benghazi only takes recruits over 18 for training. Still, in places where the fighting is more intense, someone Mustafa’s age might be asked to go further than the downtown checkpoint. In Ziltan, boys as young as seven-years-old have been reported by Reuters to be acting as porters for the rebels, sometimes assembling and cleaning weapons as large as they are.

In Bin Jawad a young rebel follows very closely behind another much older fighter. He is at another checkpoint down an important stretch of road from Mustafa’s town, which connects the two oil ports. Like Mustafa, he is not aware of the full scope of the conflict as he is only fifteen. Although relatively far from the fight he fires his rifle in the air and throws up the V for victory sign—always staying close to the video equipment of several journalists nearby. For the cameras he yells “Allah U Akbar” God is Great and stops to ask to see the videotape. As far as he knows, the rebels have held the line, some three kilometers from his position, for another day. His school is being used as a trauma center for the wounded and for those still dealing with the mental effects of the days where Qadhafi’s forces were still pounding towns like Bin Jawad.

The Iran-Iraq war produced stories of children who were said to have been tied together and sent in waves into minefields, to clear the way for ground infantry— with plastic keys hung around their necks to open the doors to heaven upon their martyrdom When they are not in combat, children’s lives have been drastically altered by the upheavals of violence. At the intersection where Mustafa watches cars being inspected, boys as young as nine-years-old are working as traffic controllers for as much as six hours a day, alongside police. Others collect trash in roving units, all of them part of community orchestrated effort to keep the city’s school-age children occupied until the return of classes.

In the turmoil of the uprisings the economic impact on families fall hard on children who are forced to join the work force at younger ages and push schooling aside. Children in the Arab world are participants in the labor force at rates around 36% in the Middle East and 38% in North Africa exposing them the risk of injury or recruitment into armed groups as they navigate disrupted streets without the means or experience of adults in the same situation. To survive children take their cues from the adults around them who frequently forget that they are being watched by the next generation.

Not far away from Benghazi, in Cairo, Ahmed rises quickly and assuredly from an up-turned bucket used as a seat. He and four friends are operating a checkpoint along a busy road leading away from Tahrir Square and towards Coptic Cairo, a major thoroughfare for Cairo’s tightly packed traffic. Ahmed is headed towards a taxi, confidently. When he reaches it he bangs on the window to get the passenger’s attention.

It is past curfew in the middle of February and though the car was just checked fifty meters up the road, Ahmed and his friends have set up their own additional checkpoint and would like an inspection of the passing vehicle too. The passengers are foreign: a Canadian and a Nigerian. Ahmed demands they exit the car and inspects the contents of their bags. The driver and passengers wait quietly until Ahmed and his friends are satisfied, partly because another checkpoint—a more ‘official’ one—is not far off, but mostly because Ahmed and his friends are carrying sticks and heavy pieces of banister railing. Ahmed and his friends are all between 10 and 13 years old.

Not until a man in his thirties from the next checkpoint joins the inspection, with an assault rifle slung over his shoulder, is Ahmed satisfied and lets the travelers go. Ahmed watches the older officer from the other checkpoint walk away and he resumes his position on his plastic bucket, to discuss with his friends the last exchange—with curiosity and interest. Gunfire crackles in the distance but they don’t flinch. Only one of the friends looks around briefly before he resumes their debriefing of the night’s events and their plan for the next day.

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

Ten years later: 9/11 and the freedom agenda Amir Taheri

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unday marks the 10th anniversary of the triple terrorist raids against the United States, dramatically symbolised by the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York.

Ten years after the event, people are still debating its ideological provenance. To those who have made a career of blaming every evil on Islam, the 9/11 tragedy was the inevitable fruit of its’ authors’ faith. To others, the raids might appear more Nietzschean than Islamic: the fruit of hubris and the cult of action. The best one could do is to assess the consequences of the attack in terms of the aims claimed by its authors.

At the time, Al Qaeda presented 9/11 as the second stage of a strategy that, so it claimed, had destroyed one of the two “superpowers” of the modern world, the Soviet Union. In that second stage, it was the turn of the United States, the remaining “superpower”, to collapse. That has not happened and looks unlikely to happen anytime soon. If anything, 9/11 boosted the sense of patriotism among most Americans in the same way that the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor did six decades earlier. In other words, what does not kill me makes me stronger.

Like other nations, America is sustained by common memories, both joyful and tragic. For most Americans, the 9/11 tragedy remains a deep wound. But it is also a powerful addition to the common memories of American nationhood. More specifically, the terrorists cited five objectives.

The first was to trigger a series of attacks in “Infidel” countries, to keep the flames of “global jihad” alive. That didn’t happen. Despite attacks in Bali, Madrid, Mumbai and London, the promised “endless explosions” did not materialise.

The second was to terminate the United States’ military presence in Muslim countries. That didn’t happen either. In 2001, there were around 5,000 American military personnel in the Greater Middle East, an arc of instability spanning from North Africa to south-west Asia. Ten years later, and despite massive troop withdrawals from Iraq, US military personnel in the region number around 150,000. Today, there are American “military facilities”, a euphemism for bases, in 30 Muslim countries - an all-time record - whilst 7 Muslim countries have signed cooperation accords with NATO. The third objective was to end US support for regimes in several Arab countries. The terrorists’ hope was that the withdrawal of US support would pave the way for them. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the US did review its 60-year-old policy of backing the status quo in the region. The Bush administration saw the Middle East as “a swamp of tyranny that had become a breeding ground for the mosquitoes of terror”.

Changes in American policy produced an effect opposite to that expected by Al Qaeda.

Despotic regimes were shaken; some even collapsed. However, «pure jihadists» did not take their place. The so-called Freedom Agenda, unveiled in Washington in 2003, helped cre-

ate space for a variety of forces, including non-violent Islamic groups, thus giving Arabs a wider political choice. (I also believe that the popular uprising of 2009 in Iran has mortally wounded the Khomeinist regime.)

The fourth objective was to provoke a global “clash of civilisations” in which, so they hoped, the “downtrodden” of the Third World would side with the terrorists. That, too, has not happened. Today, outside a conference or two sponsored by the mullahs of Tehran, talk of “clash of civilisations”, so fashionable a decade ago, is seldom heard anywhere.

The fifth objective was to launch a global recruitment drive to produce a new generation of terrorists. The generation of “mosquitoes” bred in and around the Afghan conflict of the 1980s, consists of men heading for retirement age. Many key

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Chinese policy in East Turkistan (Xingjiang) is still breeding violence. Muslim minorities in The Philippines and Thailand remain restive. In Afghanistan, a moribund Taliban is still causing death and destruction in a few provinces. And in Pakistan, various terrorist groups remain active in and around Swat. However, none of those conflicts, and other similar ones, could be related to the strategy that produced the 9/11 attacks against the United States.

Unable to recruit in the Muslim world, the barons of Salafist terror are focusing on Muslim minorities in the West. In the past decade, over 800 self-styled “warriors” with Western European passports have been captured in Afghanistan alone.

Those monitoring the terrorist presence in cyberspace know that whatever is left of the show is now run by Muslims, including converts, from Europe and the United States.

This westernisation of the “jihadist” propagandists emphasises the increasing irrelevance of “the cause” to the lives of real people across the Muslim world.

This article was printed in Asharq Al-Awsat Iranian-born journalist and author based in London. His writings focus on the Middle East affairs and topics related to Islamist terrorism.

Image © Getty Images

members of that generation have perished in the post-9/11 US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, of the 30 or so “brethren” who formed the high command of Al Qaeda, fewer than five are still alive and free, though in hiding. The rest are either dead or in Guantanamo Bay. The hoped-for new generation has failed to emerge. In many Arab countries, Al Qaeda has all but disappeared for want of new recruits.

Far from enthusing Muslims to rush to arms in a new round of “global war against the Infidel”, the 9/11 attacks have produced a slow but growing sense of revulsion against terrorism throughout Muslim countries.

Late in the day, Al Qaeda tried to appeal to radical Palestinians by calling for the elimination of Israel. However, that tactic also failed. Apart from a few desperados of Palestinian origin who fought, and died, in Iraq, Al Qaeda has failed to attract Palestinian recruits. Some armed groups, a mixture of bandits and holy-warriors, use the Al Qaeda label, now without a credible claimant, to win a measure of illusionary legitimacy. We find them in several of the poorest mini-states of West Africa as well as in the Shabab (Youth) gang in Somalia. An Algerian terrorist group also used the Al Qaeda label for a while before discarding it.

To be sure, there are several armed conflicts involving Muslims. Despite brutal repression Chechnya is not yet “pacified”.

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

Attempts to revive the Al-Assad regime Tariq Alhomayed

Image © Getty Images

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here are regional models designed to revive the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, rather than save the Syrians. Some of these models have already failed, while others are still trying with all their strength to the degree that it has become blatant, but this is a good thing.

There is the Turkish model which has tried to appear friendly to both the people and the regime in Syria, where it has sought to inject the wretched Baathist body with the blood of the Muslim Brotherhood, in an attempt to revive the al-Assad regime by placing a Brotherhood member in an influential position, such as the Prime Minister. However, this attempt failed for several reasons, the most important of which is that the al-Assad regime will not accept reforms. Furthermore, the magnitude of crimes committed against the Syrians would make the Muslim Brotherhood partners in blood with the Al-Assad regime, and this would be political suicide for the Brotherhood.

There is also the Arab model, which does not have a consensus but is represented by several endeavors. First we can recall the Saudi monarch’s speech, which continues to place the highest ceiling in defense of the Syrians. As the Arab attempt is represented by several models, there have also been attempts to neutralize the al-Assad regime away from Iran. This is like trying to make the weather in the Arabian Peninsula like the weather in London, and therefore this attempt failed and will continue to fail as long as Al-Assad rules Syria. Another Arab model has attempted to revive the al-Assad regime by trying to ward off Iran altogether. Here it is suffice to consider the reasons behind the failure of the latest Syrian opposition conference in Doha, the principal reason being the attempt to pressure participants in the conference to adopt the Arab initiative towards Syria, an initiative which the al-Assad regime acts as if it does not exist, and deals with the Secretary General of the Arab League like he is completely irrelevant.

Well, what’s left? What remains, of course, is the Iranian model. Tehran has attempted to save Al-Assad on the ground, through financial support for the regime and providing it with equipment and security expertise, including the famous Israeli plan of dividing cities into security quadrants. This is what has happened today in Damascus and other cities. According to a statement by the Iranian President, Iran today is also seeking to call for an Islamic conference in Tehran, attended by influential Arab countries, in order to discuss the Syrian crisis.

The conference is also intended to be the nucleus of any other emergency that happens in the Arab countries in the future.

This means that Iran is not only stoking flames, but it has also revealed the extent of its own plight. The Iranian attempt, just like the Arab attempts outlined above, means that everyone has become certain of the end of the Al-Assad regime, no matter how they try to revive it. This also means that Iran wants to reduce the size of its losses from its grave political situation in

the region, due to the fragmentation of its ally, Al-Assad. It is doing so by trying to save the regime through an Islamic partnership, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Tehran hopes to either save Al-Assad or appear friendly to the Syrian people. This is reminiscent of how Iran morally compensated for the painful political slap it received after the intervention of the Joint Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain. The Islamic conference has also been established to open a new window for future Iranian interference in the Middle East, in the event of the fall of the AlAssad regime, and Iran’s hand being cut off from the region.

The above reflects the failed attempts to revive the Al-Assad regime, and all are now convinced, including Iran, of the inevitability that it will come to an end. Therefore, it is necessary now for the Arabs to move on to the next basic and required stage, namely freezing the membership of Syria in the Arab League, and demanding that the Security Council act to protect the defenseless Syrians from the Al-Assad regime.

Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. Mr. Alhomayed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al- Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia. He is also the first journalist to conduct an interview with Osama Bin Ladin's Mother.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

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Uncertain Outcome

An interview with Tom Ridge, first United States Secretary for Homeland Security

The distinguished Republican, former governor and first secretary for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, is now the founder and CEO of a security consulting firm based in Washington. His varied experience in the area of international security make him a valued analyst on the current turmoil in the Middle East. In this interview with The Majalla, Mr. Ridge comments on the Arab Spring, and America’s continuing role and interests in the region.

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he Pennsylvania-born Republican, Tom Ridge, has had a long and distinguished career in government, holding posts as congressman, governor, Homeland Security advisor, and finally first secretary of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush. As the person responsible for consolidating all US federal security agencies and formulating a robust national security strategy against terrorist attacks, Tom Ridge was under significant pressure to pre-

vent another 9/11. Though successful in this, he left the post in 2005 to mixed reviews, largely for his failure to set priorities, the preponderance of turf wars amongst the different agencies, and the gray areas in the secretary’s responsibilities.

Nevertheless, Ridge’s varied and long experience in the area of international security makes him a valued analyst on the current turmoil in the Middle East. The Majalla interviews the Harvard graduate, now the founder and CEO of a security consulting firm called Ridge Global, about the Arab Spring, America’s continuing role and interests in the region.

What is your opinion of the Arab Spring, and how does it affect US interests in the Middle East?

The Arab Spring and the ultimate consequences for the citizens of these countries and their relationship with the United States remains to be seen. I frankly think there is still so much more to learn as to the nature of the dissent; who is leading the dissent. The hope that most of the unrest is generated by those who seek a freer, more open, more tolerant, more democratic society remains to be seen. Until history plays out it will be difficult to determine how it’s in the interest of the western community or the United States.

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I view it as a hopeful sign. The regimes have been oppressive, and at some point in time, with the globalization of communication and the globalization of travel, those who do not enjoy the opportunities, freedoms and liberties that others enjoy, will make it known, so the uprisings come as no surprise, but we still do not know what the outcome is. I’ve always said that within the hearts and minds of everyone anywhere, any place, anytime, the desire to be free, to chose your own course, to select your own leaders, to live and practice your own religion, to say what you feel without fear of recrimination or prosecution, is something that is inherent in just human aspiration. I believe that’s at the heart of what’s going on in North Africa and elsewhere, and hopefully will be resolved in different forms of government that accept the fundamental human rights and allow that freedom of expression and conscience and religion to blossom.

What do you think the United States can learn from the events that are happening in the Middle East?

I think the lesson in my mind, the most obvious lesson, is that in the 21st century it is unlikely that countries controlled by small groups of people, whether military elites, religious leaders or economic elites, cannot forever withstand the relentless search for a better, freer society. And at some point in time—given the nature of the world within which we live and within which we must, as a global leader, operate and influence events—working with these independent regimes to pave the way for self government is in our long term best interest.

Does the United States still have a role in the Middle East, and what is the nature of that role?

Well it’s quite obvious that our role to date has varied, and has been somewhat inconsistent. I mean we are participating with NATO in Libya, but we are still somewhat silent with repression in Syria. But for the stability offered by the military in Tunisia and Egypt, we didn’t necessarily have to intervene in any significant way, perhaps diplomatically, and it appears that a major crisis has been averted in terms of physical oppression.

Still, the ongoing concern is what’s the next level of government going to look like? Who is going to lead it? So to the extent that we can be involved diplomatically, and involved in providing assistance sometimes, including financial assistance, to help these countries work their way through these perilous times, I think there’s a continuing role for the United States, but I also think there is a huge role for NATO and our western allies. Whether or not they step up to it remains to be seen.

Why is the US so incapable of implementing consistent policies in the Middle East?

It should come as no surprise that we are finally seeing pressure hopefully toward freer institutions, more self-government, but it has erupted dramatically and across the board. And I don’t think any administration would have necessarily been prepared to be able to deal with multiple countries, the multiple leaders, all at the same time. And so I think, although I don’t want to excuse the inconsistencies, because there are plenty of them out there, the basic principles need to be the same, but probably handled slightly different on a bilateral country-by-country basis, depending on who is providing the stability right now in the government, depending on who the rebel leaders are, so you have different situations in different countries. And while Issue 1566 • September 2011

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I do think you need to apply the same set of principles, I do think that it’s probably pretty difficult until things settle down a little bit, and you are dealing with different institutions in each country, which may require a different approach at this time.

Is the US at war with Islam?

No, hasn’t been, shouldn’t be. The great challenge of, I think, much of the western world and much of the Islamic world is that we really don’t understand and know each other very well.

I think the western world is really at war with that very small, marginal group of radical jihadists that have basically subverted a religion and a belief system that is practiced by a billion plus people around the world. So the western world is not at war with Islam, but with those who use it as a justification, a rationale, to advance a cause that is contrary to the values of the western world itself. And Islam itself is not inconsistent with how the western world lives; it’s just those who have hijacked the religion.

“It's after 9/11, and you're facing an unknown enemy, and your friend, who happens to be the president of the United States, calls and says that you can be of assistance, not just to him, but to the country. In my heart of hearts, I knew there was only one answer that I could give him”

In the aftermath of 9/11, president George W. Bush recruits Tom Ridge to head up America’s new Office of Homeland Security. Ridge presided over efforts to protect America against further terrorist attacks. He now states that the legacy of 9/11 has been the emergence of America as a very specific target, saying that the one issue he thought had impacted America’s brand was Guantanamo, “I fully supported president Bush. If there’s anything that diminished the American story or the American brand overseas it was probably those couple of years when they were there in Guantanamo without the appearance of any kind of due process.”

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

A Walking Contradiction

An interview with Andrew Card, former White House Chief of Staff

Image © Getty Images

Former White House chief of staff under George W. Bush, Andrew Card, divides the world into those who are with America and those who are against it as originally required by Bush’s “war on terror.” In this interview with The Majalla, Mr. Card reflects on his five and a half years in the White House and President Obama’s foreign policy performance to date, and gives his take on the Arab Spring.

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Andrew Card is a controversial figure. Most remembered as the man who whispered to President George W. Bush that America was under attack on 9/11. As President Bush’s White House chief of staff, Mr. Card stood by the president’s side for five and a half years while America was led into two colossal wars, during which time the government made numerous unforgiveable blunders and fatal mistakes, costing the lives of thousands, and ruining the lives of millions more. Meanwhile, terrorism is on the rise, and 147,000 thousand US troops remain in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While in office, Card established and ran the infamous Iraq Group that was responsible for communicating to the Ameri-

can government and public the reasons for invading Iraq. And, until now, the long-serving Republican makes no apologies for America’s war in Iraq, nor does he hide his view that, ultimately, President Bush was good for America. A staunch supporter of America’s “war on terror,” Andrew Card, like President Bush, divides the world into those who are with America and those who are against it. This bull-headed approach to the issue of terrorism ignores the causal factors of the phenomena and buys into the view that the end justifies the means, thus implicating the US and its allies in a vast number of human rights abuses, and completely destroying, once and for all, America’s image abroad.

Card, 63, began his political career in 1975 in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, representing the state in which he was born, followed by his position as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, and then as US secretary of transportation and deputy chief of staff under President George H.W. Bush. Mr. Card resigned in April 2006 to, according to commentators, take a break.

The Majalla interviewed Mr. Card, now the dean of The Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, at a conference in Paris to get his view on the current situation in the Middle East.

You established the Iraq Group, a task force aimed at essentially selling the war to the American public. Can you tell me about your experience in that position?

There are a lot of myths about the Iraq Group. The truth is, any significant policy that the administration considered, there was a group formed around it to help with communication. So it wasn’t just communication with the American people, it was also communication within the executive branch of government. So the Iraq Group started off as a way to bring people from the State Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community, the Justice Department, the economic interests of the United States together in one room to talk about the challenges of communicating within government about what the policy meant, and then yes, how do we communicate with members of Congress and the rest of the world.

So, there was an expectation that there was something nefarious by having an Iraq Group; it wasn’t; it was common. In fact, if you didn’t have a group like that you would have been irresponsible. So nothing nefarious, and it was not looking to “sell a war that was unjustified.” This was a war that America did not want to undertake. Even President Bush was not looking to go to war. He was trying to get Saddam Hussein to come clean, to comply with UN resolutions, to allow weapons inspectors to scour the country and talk with his bureaucrats; he denied that. The United National Security Council gave 16 opportunities to Saddam Hussein to come clean, and there had to be a consequence. I think Saddam thought the consequence would never be realized. But both the British and the Americans said, there is a limit, and you’ve got to come clean, and there will be serious consequences, and they telegraphed that quite well.

I don’t think there were many people around the world that didn’t think America was ready to demonstrate that there would be a consequence for failing to come clean with the people of the world consistent with UN resolutions. So, I’m very comfortable with the work that we did, and I actually am still very comfortable with the decision to go to war in Iraq even though

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

we did not find weapons of mass destruction. That was not the exclusive reason that we went to war. Saddam Hussein did not answer the call from President Bush to be an ally in the war on terror, and he could’ve; instead, he responded by policies that were offensive to the battle against terror when he said that he would give rewards to families that sent suicide bombers into Israel, Europe or to the United States. And that was the wrong answer for Saddam to give. He should have said, I will stand with you against terror. I won’t stand with you for anything else, but I will stand with you against terror. And President Bush gave him that opportunity and he didn’t respond appropriately.

Osama bin Laden is dead, what does this mean for America’s war on terror?

It means that we closed one chapter of the book. We didn’t finish the whole book. It was one chapter. It clearly does not end the war on terror; it does not end all the angst that America and the rest of the world have with regard to Al-Qaeda. But it was an important way to bring closure to the victims of September 11. There were 3,000 innocent bystanders that were victims of that terrorist act, and this was a way to bring closure to them.

Osama bin Laden, the great mastermind of that horrible incident, was brought to justice, and I wish it had happened sooner, but it did happen, so that closure was important.

I also feel that it was symbolically important for the rest of the world to see that America will be dogged in its effort to bring people to justice. Don’t think that just changing a president isn’t going to keep us on the path to find the people who perpetrated the crime; we are going to keep going after them until we get ‘em. And America showed the resolve to go after them and get ‘em, and bring them to justice, and we still have that resolve. So I hope that message is out there. If you are thinking about being a terrorist and killing Americans, understand, we will find you, and you will pay because of what you did. So, maybe you want to give a second thought about being a terrorist.

Do you think America’s enemies have become greater in number since the war on terror started?

Well I think we don’t know. And part of it is, we don’t know what the result of the Arab Spring is. The Arab Spring might produce more allies, or it might produce more enemies. And I don’t know what the answer to that is. That’s why the turmoil in the Arab world is very very difficult for us to analyze and understand. But I hope that those who are fighting for democracy also recognize their responsibility to be a torch for democracy that spreads the light of freedom and participation rather than a torch of terrorist activities.

What is America’s role in the Arab Spring?

I think it has continued to be a kind of example of democracy. I think America’s role is to be the hope, and to help bring that hope to more people. I hope that that’s our role. President Bush was a very strong leader. I think strong leadership from the United States is very important.

I’m going to cite a preface to Prime Minister Blair’s book, which was called A Journey. The forward to the book, at least for the US market, started right off by saying, “America wants to be loved, but America can’t be loved. America must be respected or feared…”(.) And I think it’s very important that America work very hard at being respected by those who like

us, even those who love us. I think it has to be respected by those who care about us. I think it should be respected by those people who don’t know how to pay attention to us. But I think it should be feared by its enemies. And the enemies aren’t necessarily national governments. The enemies are terrorists that have clubs, and don’t respect borders, and are looking for borders beyond those which exist today in the nation states. And I hope that they will fear America, because we’re very serious about making sure that we protect opportunities for democracy to take hold, and for people to be empowered through democracy to do what we all want to have happen, which is elevate everyone’s life rather than just divide up the spoils to a select few.

Can we apply these same ideals to Israel and Palestine?

We can, although I will say this, and this will be controversial to your readers. Israel is a great democracy in a troubled part of the world. And I think that it is a responsibility of the United States to defend that democracy’s right to exist and right to exist without the fear of terrorism or of annihilation or its borders being removed. So I do think that it’s important that that state of Israel, which is a thriving and practicing democracy, should be seen as an example for the rest of that part of the world. And I would like to see a two state solution, where there is a thriving, active democracy in the Palestinian state that would be recognized by Israel and the rest of the world, just as the whole world should recognize Israel as a state, and there are some elements within the Arab world that do not recognize Israel as a state. That’s denying the reality of the moment.

Under the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the Arab League formally agreed to recognize Israel as a state and normalize relations with the country on the condition that it completely withdraw from all occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, and that Israel support a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on US resolution 194. Why then is there no Palestinian state?

Well, it’s very hard to negotiate. I sat in the Oval Office when President Bush met with Ariel Sharon for first time. And it was a very sobering meeting, because here you had a former tank driver, a warrior, sitting with the American president. And I remember President Bush looking Ariel Sharon right in the eyes, and saying: Do you want peace in Israel, yes or no? If you don’t, just tell me. If you want peace, are you going to work for it? And Ariel Sharon looked at the president, and said: I will work toward peace. And the president said: Work toward peace or do you want peace? And Ariel Sharon said: I want peace.

And the president said: I will work with you.

President Bush then called for a two-state solution, in a very dramatic statement, and the first time a US president had said a “two-state” solution. And Ariel Sharon said that he would be a partner in that process. And it started. And Ariel Sharon ran into political challenges at home, but he hung tough. Remember he said that Gaza will be free? The elections that took place in Gaza produced results that were an embarrassment to the free world. And that was frustrating. It was a democratic process but the results weren’t comfortable for the rest of the world. And so they said: Is there a partner in Palestine ready to negotiate with the Israelis? And the partner didn’t show up. So I think that was the frustration. But you can get there; it just will not be easy.

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have an expectation and a hope to withdraw, but you don’t just withdraw on a timeline, you withdraw based on performance and results on the ground.

“I am committed to making sure people don’t forget the day” If you were in the White House now, what would you advise Obama to do about Afghanistan and Iraq?

Well, I think Afghanistan and Iraq are two entirely different challenges. Right now we have a democracy that is struggling to be viable in Iraq; we have a government in Afghanistan that is just struggling on everything. And, at the same time, we are trying to make sure that neither country becomes a safe haven for terrorism. I think we have done a better job in Iraq of removing the temptation to become a safe haven for terrorists, but we haven’t succeeded in Afghanistan; we are making progress.

We are doing the military drawdown in Iraq as the democracy there is learning how to be a democracy. I don’t think we should withdraw too quickly. But I think we should withdraw, and it should be a withdrawal that eliminates frustration rather than invites it. But I think President Obama is facing a challenge, because he really hasn’t talked to the American people about either Iraq or Afghanistan. The greater focus has been on the economy and health care reforms, but I think he has a responsibility to describe to the American people exactly what he is planning to do in Iraq, and what he hopes to do in Afghanistan, knowing that it will be difficult. After all, American soldiers are making unbelievable sacrifices to bring stability to both countries. But I do think that it would be wrong for America to abandon the opportunity for success in Iraq, and I think it would be a mistake to leave Afghanistan as a state that could slip into anarchy very easily and become a safe haven for terrorists.

So I think the president has a tough dilemma, but that’s why you elect the president, to make the tough decisions. I don’t agree with the way he makes decisions. One of his staffers said that he prefers to lead from behind. If you lead from behind, you’re just inviting people to turn around and retreat. I actually think that you have to lead from in front, and I would like him to lead in front, and tell us what he is planning to do in Iraq and what he is planning to do in Afghanistan. Yes, he can Issue 1566 • September 2011

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What challenges are we facing in Afghanistan?

I think the first thing I would say is I would like President Karzai, who is a very accomplished diplomat and personality, to demonstrate a commitment to clean government with no corruption, where opportunity for economic success would not be limited to family members or friends. I think that would go a long way in helping to bring the Afghan people on board with what would be called a democracy. Yes, they have to have a strong policy force with their own ability to protect themselves, and they’ve got to demonstrate that they are a true ally in the war on terror.

The most important question to be answered by Pakistan’s leadership, by Afghanistan’s leadership, by the Iraqi leadership, is, will you be an ally in the war on terror, because that’s the war that America is really leading the fight on with allies all around the world. No maybe they don’t stand up and say, war on terror, but I guarantee the French, and the Germans, and the Italians, the British are all together saying we want to fight terrorism and we don’t want it to have a hold in that part of the world. And I want President Karzai, and I want Maliki, and I want the leadership in Pakistan to say we have lots of challenges but you can depend on us to be allies in the war on terror, and we are going to make sure we have an increased capacity to be a good ally in that war on terror, and so far the Afghan leadership has not demonstrated that they have lived up to the responsibility that comes with that yet.

They’re getting there, but not quite yet.

How do you feel about the situation in Libya, and how the US and the international community are handling it?

My knee-jerk reaction with regard to Libya is that the US was a little tardy in its response as the Arab Spring was taking hold in Libya. I think the so-called rebels had the upper hand and we didn’t come to their aid until they had lost the upper hand, so we were a little bit tardy with the response. And we didn’t even respond as quickly as even the Arab League invited us to respond.

So we were even tardy when we had cover. And then having NATO lead the response I think was even out of a little frustration. So I don’t think America’s leadership was as defined or as strong as it should have been given that circumstance.

Having said that, it’s a tough debate inside America to argue what is America’s national security interest in Libya. Now it’s relatively to say what is Italy’s national interest, what’s France’s national interest, all of Europe’s national interest? But that’s very different from the US parochial national interest in Libya.

So that debate is a debate that I wish Congress would have and others would have. I think it’s appropriate that the reality of the mission is regime change, even though that’s not what the mission is called. The mission is called, “Protecting the People.” But clearly now, removing Qadhafi’s ability to lead is paramount to that mission, but even then I think recognition of that responsibility came too late for it to be as effective as it should have been. I think it was a mistake for President Obama to tell the American people that it would be just a few weeks. It doesn’t work that way. He should have known better. He should have said it will be a difficult mission and we will try to accomplish it as quickly as we can.

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Algeria 1962 Algeria gains independence from France.

1963 Ahmed Ben Bella is elected the president of The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.

1965 Ben Bella is overthrown by Houari Boumédiènne.

1976 Algeria adopts a new constitution and Boumédiènne becomes President in December.

1978 Chadli Bendjedid becomes President following Boumedienne's death.

1986 Violent protests and strikes.

1989 The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is among more than twenty new parties registered after the ban on political parties is lifted. The following year FIS wins 55% of the vote in local elections.

1991 After parliamentary elections are announced for June, FIS calls a general strike in protest against restrictions on campaigning in mosques. The elections are postponed and FIS leaders jailed.

1992 President Chadli resigns in early January and a state of emergency declared. FIS is ordered to disband and all 411 FIS-controlled local and regional authorities are dissolved. President Boudiaf is assassinated in June followed by clashes between security forces and a FIS off-shoot, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika is elected president and the Civil Concord agreed, although attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are attributed to small groups still opposed to the concord.

2001 The death of a teenager in police custody sparks violent clashes between Berber protesters and security forces in Kabylie. Scores of demonstrators are killed.

Official language status is granted to the Berber language Tamazight, one among several concessions that year.

2003 FIS leaders Abassi Madani and his deputy Ali Belhadj are freed after serving 12-year sentences.

2004 President Bouteflika secures a second term after a landslide victory in national polls.

2005 A government-commissioned report attributes blames state security forces for the disappearances of more than 6,000 citizens during the civil war.

2005 Bouteflika's Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation is backed by 97% of voters in a national referendum.

2006 A six month amnesty window opens. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat claims responsibility for bombing a bus of foreign workers and calls for attacks against French nationals.

2007 In February the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) carries out seven simultaneous bombings in Algiers, the first of several through the rest of the year.

2008 A constitutional amendment removes Presidential terms limits. Bomb attacks claimed by AQIM claim 60 lives in August.

Image © iStockphoto

Timeline

2009 President Bouteflika wins third term.

2009 Nigeria, Niger and Algeria agree a $13bn deal to pipe Nigerian gas to the Mediterranean.

2010 Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger establish joint command to counter threat of terrorism.

2011 Major protests erupt over food prices and unemployment. The government cuts price of basic foodstuffs, and President Bouteflika lifts 19-yearold emergency laws. In a televised address in April, President Bouteflika announced his intention to seek constitutional amendments that would "reinforce representative democracy".

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Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (L) shakes hands with Japanese Emperor Akihito as he leaves the Imperial Palace December 6, 2004 in Tokyo, Japan Image © iStockphoto

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Key Facts

Image © iStockphoto

P

resent day Algeria has its origins in Ottoman rule from the sixteenth century followed by French conquest from 1830. Extensive European settlement along the coastal plain along with repressive colonial administrative and economic policies sowed the seeds of the Algerian War, leading to independence from French colonial rule. Led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), the bloody and protracted guerrilla campaign (casualty figures are disputed but range up to a million dead) dragged on for eight years from 1954 until the Évian Accords between France and the FLN led to Algeria's independence in July 1962.

Under FLN rule, Algeria became a one party state. In 1965 President Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown by his Defense Minister Houari Boumédiènne in a bloodless coup. Boumédiènne abolished the constitution and most political institutions, and transformed Algeria into an authoritarian state ruled by a Revolutionary Command Council with extensive state surveillance, censorship, and suppression. At the same time, Boumédiènne supervised a planned economy organised around Algeria's wealth of oil and gas. His 1971 decision to nationalise Algeria's oil industry immediately and rapidly increased Algeria's revenues, and Algeria again received direct benefit from the 1973 oil price shock. Boumédiènne's years in power saw consistent economic growth, although the foundations of Algeria's over-reliance on oil and gas revenues were also cemented during this period.

Following a series of incremental liberalisations, in 1976 Boumédiènne's introduced a new constitution. The constitution confirmed socialism as the state's ideological framework, Islam as the state religion, and the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole political party. However, it did put Algeria back on the road to civilian rule. A single-candidate referendum in December installed Boumédiènne as presi-

Capital: Algiers Government: Republic State President: Abdelaziz Bouteflika Prime Minister: Ahmed Ouyahia GEOGRAPHY Area: 2,381,741 sq km (919,595 sq miles) Border Countries: Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mali, Niger Terrain: Plateau, mountains, desert Water: Mediterranean Sea PEOPLE Population: 34.4m (2011) Ethnic Groups: Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1% Religions: Sunni Muslim 99%, Christian 1% Languages: Arabic (official), French, Berber dialects ECONOMY GDP (per capita): $4,850.00 Exports: Oil, gas, iron, zinc, phosphates, sheep, oxen, horses, animal products, cereals Currency: Algerian Dinar (AD) Inflation: 5.7% (2009) Unemployment: 10.2% (2009) dent, a position he held until his death from a rare blood disorder in December 1978.

The new President Chadli Benjadid continued the modernisation policies begun by his predecessor. However, where Boumédiènne was buoyed by the previous decade's oil spikes, the 1980s oil glut coincided with an increasing youthful population, rising cost of living, and long simmering frustrations with a monolithic and corrupt bureaucracy.

In 1988 Bendjedid bowed to pressure and allowed a constitutional amendment ending one party rule. Local government elections in 1990 saw the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) sweep the polls with twice as many votes as the FLN. When FIS's support continued to grow and a FLN defeat seemed certain, the military intervened to cancel parliamentary elections and arrested FIS leaders. Benjedid was forced to resign and his successor Mohamed Boudiaf was assassinated after only six months in office.

Civil War and after FIS splintered into various Islamist factions that waged guerilla campaigns from bases in Algeria's northern mountains and perpetrated several massacres in towns on the coastal plateau. In 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president in uncontested after all opposition candidates withdrew, citing inadequate guarantees of fairness and transparency. Later that year, a referendum approves Bouteflika's Civil Concord. The result of long and largely secret negotiations with the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the Concord brought about a precarious detente and led to thousands of AIS members and other 49

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Economy and Simmering Discontent Algeria is heavily reliant on hydrocarbon industries (oil and gas), accounting for 60% of budget revenues, 30% of GDP, and over 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the world's eighth-largest natural gas reserves, is the world's fourth-larg-

Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia reviews documents before adressing the National People's Congress (NPC) to present his government policy statement before NPC members on October 21, 2010 in Algiers

est gas exporter, and ranks 16th in oil reserves. Long standing concerns about economic diversification to offset the volatility of oil and gas prices have been mired in bureaucratic inertia and high cost. However, a five-year, $286 billion infrastructure development program begun in 2010 will help boost Algeria's economy, create opportunities for sector diversification, and reduce Algeria's 10% unemployment rate. Algeria's foreign debt, currently as 3.2% of GDP, has fallen from $28 billion to $5.5 billion since 1999. The economy has averaged 4% annual growth over the same period, although it has slowed to around 2% in recent years, a reflection of the economy's over-reliance on hydrocarbon revenues.

Unemployment and rising food prices have been a simmering issue for several years. Combined with grievances about corruption and access to affordable education and healthcare, there is considerable scope for discontent. Frequent protests in recent years foreshadowed the uprisings seen in neighbouring Tunisia and Libya and elsewhere in the region. After widespread protests in January 2011, Bouteflika lifted the 19-year old emergency law, removed some restrictions on the media, and supported a measure to promote job creation, measures that have largely preempted the kinds of mass protests seen recently elsewhere in the Arab world.

Image © iStockphoto

armed groups being pardoned. Military pressure continued fighting wind down from 2002 when rebels abandoned fighting or surrendered and their leaders were killed or co-opted by government forces, although occasional fighting still occurs in some areas. More than 160,000 people are thought to have died between 1991-2002.

The conclusion of the civil war and the end of violence enormously increased President Bouteflika's political capital and gave him a landslide victory in his 2004 bid for a second term.

A veteran of the War of Independence who had been close to Boumédiènne, Bouteflika served as Foreign Minister for 16 years until 1979. He spent much of the 1980s in self-imposed exile avoiding corruption charges that were eventually dropped. In 2009 Prime Minister Ouyahia succeeded in delivering a constitutional amendment removing term limits on presidential office and two months later Bouteflika was elected for a third 5-year term. The election was boycotted by several opposition parties.

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• THINKING OUT LOUD

How Now Damascus?

President Bashar al Assad addressed the Syrian people on Sunday in only his fourth televised appearance since anti-regime demonstrations first gripped Syria in March. During his speech rebel forces rolled into Tripoli and pushed Libyan President Qadhafi out. If Assad is anxious, he's not showing it.

A

s Bashar al Assad memorised his lines before addressing the Syrian people on Sunday evening his Libyan counterpart Moammer Qadhafi went into hiding in his former regime stronghold as rebel forces streamed into Tripoli. In only his fourth televised appearance since anti-regime demonstrations first gripped Syria in March, the Syrian President appeared defiant during his well-scripted interview with Syrian state television.

If Assad felt even the slightest twinge of desperation at the thought of Gaddafi’s imminent downfall he didn’t show it.

There was no sense of urgency about his speech in which he emphasised the need “to continue dialogue” before making any concrete reforms. He also swept aside the calls for his resignation from the US, UK, France, Germany and Spain late last week, “We tell them that their words are worthless” he said. So that Turkey wouldn’t feel exempted, he added that “We don’t permit any country in the world, near or far, to interfere in the Syrian decision”.

The address conceded little to Syria’s opposition movement.

Although Assad promised parliamentary elections in February he failed to announce any progress on the scrapping of Article 8, which upholds Assad’s Baath party as Syria’s ruling party. He continued to ignore protestors’ demands, labelling the demonstrators “terrorists” as well as blaming the unrest on “Western colonialist countries”. Textbook Gaddafi. Assad has closely imitated Gaddafi’s tactics, reacting to widespread opposition with excessive force and wild fabrications. According to a UN Human Rights Council report released on Monday 2,200 civilians have been killed in the government sanctioned crackdown that began 5 months ago. The Syrian president, however, can get away with murder, quite literally, whereas Gaddafi clearly hasn’t. The difference is that Assad is aware that no one is going to send in planes to stop him.

Foreign military intervention of the NATO-Libya kind is a near impossibility in Syria. Firstly very few members of the Syrian opposition are calling for outside military support, not forgetting the significant proportion of the population who still support the president (and go largely unnoticed by Western media coverage). The international community is also weary of becoming involved, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland ruled out allied intervention in Syria despite NATO success in Libya. Practically speaking Syria’s geopolitical location, as well as population diversity and density, mean that any direct foreign military interference would end in a disaster of cataclysmic dimensions. The fall-out would include Iranian confrontation, potentially a tipping of the fragile peace in Lebanon and Israel and undoubtedly increased bloodshed within Syria itself.

Obama and the EU know this, and so does Bashar. He even said so in his interview; “As for the threat of military action…[it] will

have greater consequences than they can tolerate”, they being the accused imperialist West. Despite Syria’s immunity to attack Assad continues to milk fear of the possibility in order to win the support of nationalists and keep his followers on side.

Tripoli’s predicament has produced mixed reactions on the Syrian street. Some do fear that NATO’s attention may now turn to Syria. Syrian political analyst Sami Moubayed remarked, “many Syrians were clearly worried as news of the march into Tripoli reached Damascus…Few on the Syrian street and within the opposition have contemplated any kind of foreign intervention”. Others were more optimistic, immediately following Assad’s speech pro-democracy demonstrators took to the streets across Syria shouting “Gaddafi is gone; now it’s your turn, Bashar!”. Twitter is continually aflutter with Syrian activists’ updates celebrating Gaddafi’s demise and hoping Assad will follow suit. Yet Assad loyalists appeared equally emboldened, taking heart from their leaders’ firm defiance. In Damascus thousands of pro-regime supporters congregated on central Umaween Square to raise flags and cheer their unwavering president on Sunday night.

The Syrian media has been largely muted on the sudden change of events in Tripoli. Local news outlets, all of which are state monitored, are unsurprisingly eager to divert attention away from another rebel success story. Al-Ba’ath, one of Syria’s leading newspapers, focused on the negative effects of the Libyan opposition takeover. In particular the contradictory narratives on the extent of rebel control, introduced with the headline “Ambiguity shrouds Tripoli”- true enough, but rather selective. One prominent Syrian activist based in Damascus, going by the name of Alexander, stated that Syrian television coverage of Tripoli focuses solely on the escalation of violence and bloodshed. It is to the regime’s benefit to portray the battle for Tripoli as chaotic, with undertones of ‘sectarian strife’, just to coin one of Assad’s favourite phrases, in the hope of deterring the opposition.

In a peculiar twist given the context, the Libyan embassy in Damascus on Monday hoisted the flag of the opposition’s National Transitional Council. The graphic photographs of bloodied corpses and slogans proclaiming “NATO, Stop killing our children!” had also been removed from the embassy’s official billboards. The envoy released a statement on Monday saying “We, the ambassadors and members of the Libyan embassy in Damascus, announce our total support for the revolution of February 17 and declare our formal adherence to the National Transitional Council,”. Now the question remains as to whether Syria will formally recognise the rebel leadership. That’s going to be a fly in the ointment for Bashar’s media team.

This article was submitted from Damascus. The writer’s name has been withheld to protect the identity of the author.

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Image © Getty Images

Echoes of Baghdad

Washington, London, and Paris should not be too quick to break out the champagne. The mission in Libya is far from over.

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Andrew Bowen

he fall of Tripoli, symbolically, represents a turning point for Washington, London, and Paris after six months of bombarding Qadhafi’s disintegrating forces. Similar to the fall of Baghdad in 2003, for the moment, all of the initial reservations and criticisms about the West’s air strikes in Libya have been swept aside, and Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy, interrupting their holidays, have come out to celebrate this August political victory.

The media has embraced this euphoria with every channel from Al Jazeera to BBC running hundreds of hours of coverage of the valiant efforts by the rebels to obtain their freedom.

The BBC has triumphantly described this phase of the Libyan campaign, along the lines of great battles of the 20th century, as the ‘Battle for Tripoli’. Similar to the tearing down of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad, the image of a rebel vandalizing the large clenched fist crushing a US warplane has become an instantly recognizable symbol of the fall of Qadhafi’s regime.

With Muammar al-Qadhafi on the run, the old regime in Tripoli has been replaced with this new rag-tag, disparate group of rebels offering a simple message: a new path for Libya, but few details of what this new path will be.

Post-war planners in the West, similar to after the fall of Baghdad, are confronted by the challenge of building a state out of rubble. Unlike Iraq, where Paul Bremer recklessly disbanded many of the state institutions that could have been used for state reconstruction, Libya lacks any of such institutions.

Qadhafi’s Green Book governance operated on the principle

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of formal decentralization of power- few state institutions- but informally, through the tight control of his state security services and the whim of his own often irrational mood.

Libya represents a massive state-building project both for the new leadership and for the West. With a number of tribes, personalities, and groups that make up this new political space, the post-Qadhafi euphoria will soon wear off and deep differences will emerge amongst this coalition that took part in overthrowing Qadhafi. One cannot ignore as well the more unsavory elements of the new Libya- the militant Islamists, and a potential insurgency by former Qadhafi loyalists will be a constant security challenge for the new regime. Rebuilding Libya will be an expensive, possibly bloody, and very long endeavor.

For NATO’s most vocal members in the Libya campaign, Paris and London, and its patron, Washington, such a prospect is not one that will gain much public sympathy and support as the months of Libya’s fragile recovery will inevitably drag on with guaranteed setbacks along the way. In this new austere economic environment, Washington which pays 75 percent of NATO’s operations budget will soon discover that leading from behind will become a very costly endeavor at time when most Americans want the US to decrease its presence in the Muslim world and focus on nation building at home. The Obama administration has already alienated Congress over Libya by not seeking further authorization for its war in Libya. Any new funding requests for Libya will be met with steadfast opposition by members of Congress.

Britain and France, always up for a good fight but often absent when it comes to paying the bill, will be reluctant to invest any more into Libya, and the US inevitably will have to fill the gap.

Libya is bound to be a very expensive nation-building project, one that no state in the West should be welcoming at the moment. It’s time to hold off the celebrations, and begin serious discussions on how NATO can exit Libya without it becoming another Iraq or Afghanistan, or the very worst case, Somalia.

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• THINKING OUT LOUD

Mubarak’s Trial, a Turning Point?

Last month Egyptians and Arabs across the world were stunned as a decrepit Mubarak was held in a cage during a trial for corruption charges and the killing of protestors. It is a day few would have expected, but now that the trials have begun, it is an opportunity for Egypt to solidify the course of its revolution.

Paula Mejia

“The implication being that for any given case of murder of a protester, there must be at least two court cases: one in the locality where the death occured, involving those police officers or other public officials who pulled the trigger; and another in Cairo for those senior figures who issued the general order to shoot protestors, meaning...” where autocrats were brought to justice, such proceedings have proved equally complicated.

An interesting piece in the New Yorker reviews the successes and failures of trying autocrats—including accounts from Ceausescu to Saddam Hussein. None of these trials occurred without set backs, and although some were more successful than others, that these leaders were held accountable for their crimes makes them significant achievements in their own right.

Paula Mejia is a contributing writer for The Majalla based in Tunisia. As a freelance journalist and consultant for the African Development Bank, her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L’Institut D’Etudes Politiques de Paris and the University of Chicago.

Image © Getty Images

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eyond its capacity for creating a tradition in which Egyptians hold their leaders accountable for their actions, the timing of the trial also speaks of a different political success. It is largely accepted that the trial of Mubarak and his inner circle has been made possible thanks to the continuation of protests around the country, and their concentration in particular in Tahrir Square.

Indeed one of the defining characteristics of post-revolutionary Egypt is that protestors have maintained their positions in the streets as a means to leverage the growing power of the military that many consider to have vested interest in protecting Mubarak, or at the very least protecting a system that gave them as an institution immeasurable privileges.

That the military has conceded to protestor’s demands by prioritizing Mubarak’s trial and addressing the role of the government in the deaths of protestors however is but one small step towards reconciliation. Overall legal measures may present themselves as a means for institutionalizing accountability, but they also present a number of challenges for Egypt’s reconciliation.

As excited as Egyptians have been about progress in Mubarak’s trial, who faces a possible death sentence, previous delays have made them pessimistic about the prospects of the trial. As reported by the BBC, one cartoonist expressed this concern as he depicted Mubarak on his hospital bed surrounded by camera lights. His lawyer is in a director's chair: "Good, now is the time to play the victim," he says.

Beyond the possibility that Mubarak, who was at one point considered the father of the nation, may tug on people’s nostalgia to get off easy, there is also a grave concern that the military’s implication in the deaths of protestors may derail the success of the trial. “Mr Mubarak's defence lawyer has called on the current military leader, Field Marshal Mohamad Hussain Tantawi, to give evidence - in order to try and prove that the military leadership were complicit in the suppression of protests” explained the BBC. To make matters worse, there are also countless debates between Mubarak’s prosecutors’, defendants’ and the protestors over how to proceed with the trial. Al Masyr Al Youm has pointed to contentions over combining Mubarak’s trial with that of the former Interior Minister, Habib Al Adly.

The geographic spread of the incidents observed in the trail is another complicating factor. “The implication being that for any given case of murder of a protester, there must be at least two court cases: one in the locality where the death occured, involving those police officers or other public officials who pulled the trigger; and another in Cairo for those senior figures who issued the general order to shoot protestors, meaning...”

It is clear that reconciling Egyptians and creating a precedent of justice will probably take much more than the trial of their former leader. However, it is worth noting that in previous cases

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• THE ARTS

A Hidden Treasure Circus in Palestine gives many a reason to smile In the midst of military checkpoints, high concrete walls, menacing soldiers and loaded guns, Jerusalem-born Shadi Zmorrod and Belgian citizen, Jessika Devlieghere, had an idea: What if we brought circus to Palestine? No joke. In fact, five years on, and the Palestinian Circus School has not only gained immense popularity among many Palestinians, but it can take credit for producing a skilled and professional Palestinian circus that has performed all over Europe.

Jacqueline Shoen Clowning around in Palestine is serious business. Widely viewed as inappropriate for women and girls, and a frivolous way to spend one’s time for anyone over the age of 16, circus

in Palestine did not seem to be the best of ideas at the time of its founding in August 2006. In addition to the economic and political crisis due to Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, most who had expressed interest in joining the Palestinian Circus School (PCS), the brainchild of Jerusalemborn Shadi Zmorrod and Belgian citizen, Jessika Devlieghere, were discouraged from doing so by family and society. Five years on, and PCS has not only gained immense popularity among many Palestinians, but it can take credit for producing a skilled and professional Palestinian circus that has performed all over Europe.

Considered a second family—sometimes the only family— for PCS students and staff, the school has acted as a source of inspiration, empowerment and solace for young Palestinians, all of whom have been deeply affected by the 44-year Israeli military occupation of Palestinian lands.

“The circus has improved many aspects of our lives, especially in the context of the second intifada, which caused so

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much suffering within Palestinian society,” Ahmad Abu Taleb, a student of juggling and gymnastics told The Majalla. “It has filled up our leisure time and changed the way we deal with others in our communities,” Ahmad continued. “The circus has encouraged me to aspire for the future that I dream of.”

Severe economic hardship—chronic malnutrition affects nearly 10 percent of children under five in Palestine, according to Save the Children, the daily experiences of personal humiliation, physical and psychological abuse, destruction and confiscation of private property, arbitrary detention and outright murder on the part of the Israeli military and extremist Jewish settlers have no doubt contributed significantly to the dismal situation of children and youth in Palestine. With 1.9 million Palestinians under the age of 18, and nearly 1 million who live in refugee camps, the circus school must reach far and wide to even begin to achieve its goals.

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ers. “For many, watching young Palestinians dancing, clowning around and hanging upside down from a trapeze has been a real eye opener,” Jessika remarked. “European audiences have been clearly touched by our performances. Circus helps us to recognize our shared humanity, and like all humans, Palestinians are full of dreams and hope, but they cannot live them out.”

PCS, a non-profit and non-governmental organization, is based on a genre of performing art called nouveau cirque, or contemporary circus, whereby artists tell a story or convey a theme using traditional circus skills combined with theatrical technique. The school currently employs three trainer/performers specializing in acrobatics, juggling, Chinese Pole, German Wheel, tissue and trapeze, and organizes several projects throughout the year, including a three-week intensive training course for advanced students during the summer; original productions performed throughout the West Bank; the development of weekly circus clubs from beginning to advanced levels; and collaboration with local and international artists.

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• THE ARTS

“Not only it has changed me physically,but it has also helped me to become more sociable, more open to the world and what is happening around meˮ “Through the circus, I can express what I want to say to my family or community,” said Noor Abo Al-Rob, a student in his third year with PCS. Noor is taking part in the school’s current production, “Dreams for Sale,” which tells the story of four young people from the West Bank city of Jenin, who dream of becoming professional circus performers, but face criticism and pressure from their families, work, and society against the idea.

“The show unfolds within a comic context and serves to reveal the struggle within the actors themselves,” Noor explained.

The school’s three-pronged mission—to train professional circus artists; to popularize the circus arts in Palestine; and to stimulate and develop the creative, cognitive, physical, sensitive and social potential of young Palestinians through circus arts—serves the founders’ firm belief that circus has the power to contribute to a better future for Palestinians.

“Not only it has changed me physically,” Hazzar Azzeh, a student specializing in trapeze, said, “but it has also helped me to become more sociable, more open to the world and what is happening around me.” Hazzar went on to say that as a student of circus, she has also learned how to be disciplined, persistent and devoted to the tasks ahead of her, skills that she has applied to other aspects of her life.

By all accounts, PCS has been extremely successful, despite the many obstacles its students and staff have faced along the way— political and social challenges, of course, but also operational, particularly the need to attract sustainable funding. Throughout its existence, the school has relied on both local and international

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funding, but also on the support of the local community. Most recently, founder and former president of Birzeit University, Dr. Hanna Nasser, has offered PCS permanent training facilities in the historic village home to the university, located 10km north of Ramallah, to which PCS intends to move by January 2012.

This news comes at a crucial time for the folks at the Palestinian Circus School as the team strives to increase enrolment from 100 to 200 per year. Jessika explained that they would expand their geographical reach to several new locations, including Jenin, Hebron, Jerusalem, Bir Zeit and Bethlehem.

Next month, in September, PCS will hire four new trainers, Ahmad and Noor among them, to carry out the school’s new plan. Moreover, with the new training facilities, the school’s long-term goal is to further develop a full-time professional circus program from September 2014 onwards in order to offer their students and staff a more secure future in the circus arts.

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movement that make it impossible at this time for any kind of exchange. Yet, a small group of young Gazans have expressed their interest in trying to initiate something circus related. PCS staff have consulted them here and there via phone and email.

“There is enormous energy and potential in Gaza,” Jessika told The Majalla. “We know that there are many people living in Gaza who would relish the idea of losing that energy in the positive and dynamic environment that circus offers.”

Jacqueline Shoen is an American from the Southwest, who has spent much of the last 11 years studying the modern history and politics of the Middle East. From New York, Egypt, Palestine and finally to London, Jacqueline has worked as a reporter and editor with various publications, as well as in public relations and development. She has a BA in Journalism from Fordham University in New York, and an MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from SOAS in London. Jacqueline writes a bimonthly blog, “Between You and Me.” 59

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• THE CRITICS

Great Powers and Exiled Elites The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial legacy, exile, and the emergence of a new nation-state

by Anna Baldinetti Routledge 2010 “The future is certain; it is the past that is unpredictable,” goes the saying. With the National Transitional Council flying the flag of Idris Al-Sanusi’s United Kingdom of Libya, now is a good time to think about Libya’s past. Anna Baldinetti has contributed a rigorous examination of the roots of Libyan nationalism, based heavily on primary and archival sources, which serve to make her work all the more engaging.

Anna Baldinetti’s interest is the origins of Libyan nationalism and the formation of Libya as a nation-state during the period of Italian colonial rule. With a nod to Anderson’s “imagined community” and Hobsbawm and Ranger’s “invented traditions,” Baldinetti wants to get away from “the visual angle of pan-Arabism” in favor of a more locally situated analysis. Her focus is Libyan exiles’ role in imagining a Libyan nation to match an independent Libyan state.

Following a brief Ottoman background, Baldinetti argues that Italian repression, centralization, land confiscation, and scarce attention to education precluded a local political culture conducive to political aggregations foreshadowing selfgovernment. Instead, this political culture developed among clubs and associations of exiles in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and to a lesser extent Turkey, Palestine, Chad, and Niger, providing points of contact and influence between the exiled

The Voice of Civil Society in Iraq Transfers of Guantánamo Detainees to Yemen: Policy Continuity Between Administrations

by Benjamin Wittes, Matthew Waxman and Robert Chesney National Democratic Institute January 2011 As the US Military’s remaining 45,000 troops prepare to leave Iraq by the end of 2011, there is much speculation as to the readiness of the Iraqi security services to provide national security in the absence of their US allies. As troops, and money, move away from Iraq in the near future, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), asks a different questionː how ready is Iraq’s civil society sector to operate independently, and where is outside support still needed in a society still in its infancy?

nationalists and pan-Arab and Islamic networks, as well as platforms for advocating independence. Following British occupation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and French occupation of Fezzan in 1943, returning exiles transplanted these new relations of loyalty and solidarity to their homeland, impacting older patterns of tribal loyalties, affiliations, ethnicity, and kinship. However, the image of a unified national identity fractured as the parties formed from exile associations failed to agree common goals and well-defined programs. Traditional elites were recovered and emergent youth movements sidelined. The parties failed to anticipate Islam as a force of legitimization in an independent Libya because the nation imagined in exile did not envisage a future leadership role for Cyrenaica’s Sanusis. Ultimately, the centripetal force of the exiles’ nationalism was insufficient and the parties reproduced pre-exile fractures along regional lines and elite interests, ultimately resulting in “the failure of an imagined community.”

Certainly Baldinetti has written an engaging narrative drawn extensively from archival material and primary sources (the subject of a dedicated chapter). The analysis is simultaneously detailed and succinct. The book also does well to isolate the distinctions of Libyan nationalism without succumbing to exceptionalism, and demonstrates influences by and links with pan-Arab nationalism while maintaining its Libyan focus. This kind of detailed and accessible historiography is welcome, particularly in the present circumstance when a more detailed account of Libyan state formation is necessary.

Notwithstanding these merits, however, where “the emergence of a new nation-state” sits in this history is less clear.

Baldinetti’s interest is a historiography of “Libyan nationhood, which consequently became the backbone of the fu-

This report is ambitious in scope, claiming to assess the voice of civil society in Iraq. However, there is a disconnect between the civil society the NDI seeks to analyse and the method they use to go about it. The units of analysis in this report are dubbed ‘Civil Society Organisations’ (CSOs). These are described as “the principle vehicle for civil society activity in Iraq” yet, the report identifies that CSOs see themselves as trainers and educators of civil society rather than an articulation of that society’s wants and needs; “nine out of every 10 CSOs interviewed state that skills-building, training and educating citizens were their main activities.” In actuality, the report paints a picture of CSOs that are external to civil society as much as the state is, though to a lesser degree. While the CSO is defined, civil society is not. At times, CSOs are described as part of the “civil society sector,” implying NGO type operations operating within and upon civil society. At other times, CSOs are described as congruous with civil society in general.

By not defining ‘civil society’ this ambigu-

ity exists, and is not helpful in achieving the report’s aims. Often the reader is left wondering who is being talked about when the report uses language like “civic society,” “civil society,” “civil society sector”; is it referring to CSOs, the community at large, or other, unspecified peoples? We simply do not know.

Despite definitional problems around civil society, the report reveals some fascinating information. It is encouraging to highlight how CSOs are adept at engaging with the grass-roots in Iraq, and how much influence these organisations believe they have; “nearly 40 percent of all respondents... [stated] that they could increase the role of the community in decision-making.” Another encouraging finding is that 90 percent of respondents feel that Iraqi citizens could gather publicly without fear, though this is qualified in many instances with the caveat that certain topics were strictly forbidden.

However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, only half of the CSOs felt they could promote dissenting views without fear.

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ture state.” Yet if this nationhood project was basically diasporic and the exiles’ vision of an imagined community ultimately failed, then the sovereign state established in 1951 lacked a nation and a national identity to compliment it. If not a “new nation-state,” what kind of state was this? What are its distinctions from and continuities with the colonial state that preceded it? Regrettably, the story stops at independence.

Part of the difficulty is that this study adopts colonial and nationalist periodizations of Libyan history as comprising Ottoman, colonial and independence periods.

Indeed, the history of nationalism and state formation told here is a story of great powers and exiled elites. The Libyan state is a “typical example of a colonial or external creation,” as is the Libyan nation imagined by exiles. By focusing on exiled elites and accepting received periodizations, the analysis does not quite escape the mode of historiography it wants to challenge.

A different approach is to say that the ambitions here are more modest than the conclusions drawn, or the allusions of the title. At one point Baldinetti gives the study’s purpose as delineating “the role of exiles during the colonial period” in “the rise and development of Libyan nationalism before the independence.” Thus circumscribed, this study is not conceived as a social history, for example, along the lines of Ali Ahmida’s Forgotten Voices. Neither does it challenge received categories of western scholarship of nationalism in colonial contexts. Rather, it addresses the paucity of westWhile CSOs felt most able to impact civil society, and for the majority of CSOs, especially youth and women, they felt least able to impact government. This lack of communication with government is a recurring theme in this report, and the end to which it advises the most external funding in the future.

The inability of CSOs to impact government is a problem on two fronts. The report notes that CSOs in Iraq suffer from something of an identity crisis as they seek independence from political structures. For citizens to trust the work of the CSO, they believe they have to be politically neutral and un-affiliated.

However, keeping this distance from the structures of government mean that CSOs do not influence politicians as much as they would like, inhibiting their performance. Such self reflection is missing from the CSO scene at present, and another key finding of the report is that external funders need to help CSOs develop forms of internal assessment which are currently lacking.

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ern studies of nationalism in Arab countries (as opposed to Arab nationalism). This more modest goal is particularly valuable given the current turmoil and this study goes a long way towards reaching it, by adding considerable detail to Libya’s linkages with pan-Arab networks and deepening western understanding of anti-colonial thought in the Arab world. However, a more complete telling of the “Libyan Nation” and “nation-state” would necessarily bridge 1951, and include the imagined communities of ordinary Libyans whose patterns of loyalty and affiliation, on this account, ultimately trumped and assimilated those of exiles. That telling may turn out to be less predictable than much extant historiography would have us believe.

The book also does well to isolate the distinctions of Libyan nationalism without succumbing to exceptionalism, and demonstrates influences by and links with pan-Arab nationalism while maintaining its Libyan focus

The report is not without its flaws. Primarily, the language used in the report promotes a level of ambiguity which leads one to ask why, in a report based on statistics gleaned from questionnaires, it uses language like, “much of ” the work, “some” organisations, “others” felt, “a significant number” addressed, and so forth.

All of these statements beg the question, why use ambiguous language when the actual number or percentage of respondents could have been stated instead.

The report delivers its aim of highlighting the environment in which civil society groups operate, and offers evidence to say that external actors need to continue to support these groups financially and organisationally, even as international funding of the Iraqi state begins to decrease in light of its apparent stability. Beyond the need for support, the report indicates how international funders might help the fledgling civil society in Iraq by facilitating organisational development within CSOs, developing a more professional and financially sustain-

able CSO sector, as well as helping to formalise mechanisms through which CSOs, and civil society at large, might access information relating to policy making in local and national government.

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• THE FINAL WORD

Qadhafi and the CIA Adel Al-Toraifi

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n early 1970, the US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] asked a number of psychoanalysts to draw up a profile of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, who was thirty years of age at the time. Mr. Qadhafi’s psychological profile was not an exception, for the CIA had drawn up psychological profiles for most foreign leaders since the 1940s, and these were made up of a combination of political and psychological analysis. These profiles represent a major tool for US decision-makers as they revealed the psychological nature of foreign leaders that they are dealing with. Such reports usually contain information about the leaders’ background, their personal relations, their family, as well as their social, personal, and professional relations.

This scientific methodology (of producing a psychological profile) of foreign leaders – developed within the CIA and the US Department of Defense – did not utilize practical clinical methods [of psychology], as it is based – in most cases – on studying the leader in question. These reports rely on multiple sources; most prominently reports made by intelligence agents that generally rely on incidents, rumors, and lies, alongside facts. Therefore those reading such reports cannot exclusively rely on them; indeed reliance on such reports reached its height during the 1980s.

For over 40 years, the psychological profile of Mr. Qadhafi was filled with information; some of which was correct while some of it was nothing more than pure flights of fantasy. In addition to this, his profile was filled with endless analysis and comments by senior specialists on Qadhafi’s personality, and his development and experience over the past decades. One can consider the “psychological profile” of Muammar Qadhafi as being between among the largest of such files, alongside the profiles of figures like Fidel Castro and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In the early 1990s, one insider who viewed Qadhafi’s “psychological profile” told US “Foreign Policy” magazine that “there was a tendency in the beginning to view Qadhafi as a superficial (naïve) personality, but the profiles that were drawn up on him showed him to be crazy like a fox.” (Psychology and the CIA: Leaders on the Couch. Thomas Omestad, Foreign Policy Magazine, August 1994).

The CIA helped Qadhafi in exposing attempts to overthrow him at the beginning of the [Fateh] revolution; however since that time he has – as some argue – been overcome by paranoia and has begun to mistrust everybody, believing himself to be a CIA target. Colonel Qadhafi has exhibited contradictory – and occasionally outrageous – behavior, and we have sometimes heard him ramble incoherently. Even his personal appearance, wearing strange and brightly colored clothing, failed to camouflage the mistakes of his regime, and his victims, who include some of those closest to him.

More than this, his behavior – which has been the subject of criticism – as his desire to attract attention to himself, manifested in the many titles that he has bestowed upon himself, the female “Amazonian” bodyguards that he surrounded

himself with, as well as his views that were ripe for mockery.

However under all the bright clothing, changing views, and contradictory titles, there is a very resourceful and quick-witted personality who has been able to remain in power despite all the sanctions imposed on his regime and attempted assassinations. Qadhafi knows when to back down, and how to avoid the storm, and he is capable – in an extremely dangerous manner – of deception. Therefore, at times he would kill those close to him or place them under guard, and at other times allow his opponents to escape into exile, or forgive them and bestow them with gifts. This is what made many people unable to trust him, or predict his actions.

There is one defining example of Qadhafi’s ability to surrender at a critical moment, for in 2003 he signed a deal with the Americans following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. He sold the secrets of the trade in internationally proscribed weapons, and paid billions of dollars in order to resolve the issue of compensating victims of terrorist acts that his regime was embroiled in. Therefore it was not surprising for former CIA Director Michael Hayden to comment recently that Qadhafi was an important and reliable partner over the last few years in the war on terror.

There are those who consider Qadhafi a narcissistic personality who is living in a world of delusion, and who will therefore fight until his last breath. Whilst others believe that Qadhafi is nothing more than an attention-seeking dictator who has squandered Libya’s oil wealth and who has fled the country as soon as he felt the noose tightening around him. However most analysts have a bleak view of Qadhafi, viewing him as a psychopathic personality who enjoys unusual intelligence despite his abnormal behavior, and he therefore is capable of strategic planning in the manner of a cold-blooded criminal.

In his book “The Struggle for Survival” (1993), Geoffrey Simons writes that Qadhafi continued to fluctuate between supporting militias and terrorist groups and between turning on them and providing information about them to different intelligence agencies. Therefore we can view Qadhafi – and his survival in power – as if he were the leader of a gang that is involved in every illegal operation but who cooperates with the security agencies in order to eliminate his opponents or alleviate the pressure that he is facing. Therefore, dealing with Qadhafi means dealing with a “liar” – as [former US President] Ronald Reagan once said – but temporary deals can be made with him, so long as this is in his interests.

Whatever Qadhafi’s end, his mental illness has affected – directly or indirectly – Libya’s modern history, and perhaps we must ask: to what extent has his policies and his suppression altered the psyche of millions of his people who have suffered under his rule?

In reality, we are facing a country that has suffered from mentally ill governance, and it may take Libya a long time – as any victim – to emerge from the nightmare of the past, and learn to live for the future.

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