METHODOLGY FOR MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT OFFICES; A CASE STUDY By Muhammad Akram Khan Former Deputy Auditor General of Pakistan makram1000@gmail.com
1. OBJECTIVE The objective of this paper is to present the results of a study aimed at measuring the performance of four account offices of the federal government. Auditors normally express an opinion on the financial statements prepared by the account offices. They hardly ever look into the management aspects of these offices. The performance auditing, as it has evolved over the last two decades has concentrated mostly on development expenditure, public sector programmes or entities. I have not come across any study where the efficiency of the account office itself has been the subject of study. In this perspective, the results of present study are interesting both from the point of view of the government as well the Auditor General. The government is the both a beneficiary and a stakeholder in the performance of account offices. The Auditor General maintains the accounts of a large part of the government at the federal as well as provincial level. This study is also topical in the perspective of the controversy whether the Auditor General should continue maintaining the accounts of the government or he should hand over this function to the executive. In the background of this controversy is the World Bank financed project known as Program for Improvement of Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA), which envisages a complete separation of accounting and auditing functions of the government, relieving the Auditor General of its accounting responsibility. In this context, the question arises: how successful has been the experience of the separation of accounts of those offices which was done in the past and which have been operating independent of the Auditor General now for quite some time? This question was posed by a group of officers in the Department of the Auditor General who argued that theoretically, the idea of independence of accounts is quite plausible but in the specific circumstances of Pakistan, it will not be workable. This group feared that the separation of accounts from the auditing and handing over of this function to the government would play havoc with the financial management of the government. They apprehended that the internal controls and budgetary discipline among the departmentalised account