Listing of tax havens by the EU by demandside

ListingoftaxhavensbytheEU

SUMMARY

Broadlyspeaking,'taxhavens'providetaxpayers,bothlegalandnaturalpersons,with opportunitiesfortaxavoidance,whiletheirsecrecyandopacityalsoservestohidethe originoftheproceedsofillegalandcriminalactivities.

Onemightaskwhyestablishingalistoftaxhavensorhigh-riskcountriesisuseful.Drawing upsuchlistsstartedwithactiontostopharmfultaxpracticesarisingfromthediscrepancy betweentheglobalreachoffinancialflowsandthegeographicallylimitedscopeof jurisdictions,matchingorinsidenationalborders.

Howevertaxhavensarereferredto,theyallhaveonethingincommon:theymakeit possibletoescapetaxation.Distinctivecharacteristicsoftaxhavensincludeloworzero taxation,fictitiousresidences(withnobearingonreality)andtaxsecrecy.Thelasttwoare keymethodsforhidingultimatebeneficialowners.IntheEU,theprocessofadoptinga commonlistofnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictions,whichisalsocentraltodetermining whetherathirdcountrypresentsahighriskinrelationtomoney-laundering,wasinitiated aspartofeffortstofurthergoodtaxgovernance,anditsexternaldimension.On 5December2017,theCounciladoptedafirstcommonlistresultingfromtheassessmentof thirdcountriesagainstdistinctivecriteria.Pursuingtheassessmentprocess,theCouncilhas updatedthelistonthebasisofcommitmentsreceived,whilealsoreviewingcountriesthat hadnotyetbeenassessed.

Thisbriefingupdatesanddevelopsanearlierone,fromDecember2017'Understandingthe rationaleforcompiling'taxhaven'lists',PE614.633

InthisBriefing

Introduction Background:theglobaleconomyandtaxhavens Listingtaxhavens EuropeanUnionlists Furtherreading ANNEX–EUnoncooperativetaxjurisdictionsandhighriskthirdcountrylists

Contents

Notableofcontentsentriesfound.

Author:CécileRemeur

Introduction

Taxhavenshavelongexisted,andhavebeenwidelyusedsincethe1930s.Yettheyhavebecomea prominentconcernoftaxandeconomicpolicieswiththeglobalisationoftheeconomy,inwhich taxpayerscantrytostructuretheiractivitiesandchoosethegeographicallocationoftheirwealth, andplanthelocationoftheirtaxbasesaccordingly.Thedigitalisationoftheeconomyhasmade establishingthelinkbetweenajurisdictionandflowofmoneyevenmoretenuous.

Thereisnosingledefinitionofataxhaven,althoughthereareanumberofcommonalitiesinthe variousconceptsused.Inthisbriefing,thetermstaxhavens,secrecyjurisdictionsandnoncooperativejurisdictionsareinterchangeablesincetheysharecommonalities.

Background:theglobaleconomyandtaxhavens

Taxjurisdictions1 coveradefinedterritory,whereassomeglobaltaxpayers–multinational enterprises(MNE)andhighnetworthindividuals(HNWI)2–areabletomoveprofitsandtheirtax basesaroundtheglobe,fromonetaxjurisdictiontoanother.3

Taxavoidance,aggressivetaxplanning,andbaseerosionand profit-shifting

Asrecentlyhighlighted,forexample,bythePanamapapersandParadisepapersleaks,thosestriving fordiscretionoranonymitywillseektheassistanceoffacilitatorssuchasadvisors,lawfirmsand banks,andusevarioustypesofinstruments,suchasshell,offshoreand/orletterboxcompanies,as wellastrusts,androutefundsviaanumberofcountrieswhichhavecreatedtaxregimesthatare attractiveforthoseofferingorseekingsuchpractices.The,legalandillegal,tax-planningschemes uncoveredhaveonceagainhighlightedtheroleplayedbytaxhavensintheroutingandsheltering offunds.

Opaquetransactionshidemoneylaunderingcarriedoutinsupportofallkindsofillegalandcriminal activities,includingtaxevasionandfraud.Asregardstaxchallenges,eventaxavoidance(whichisa priorilegal)canalsorelyonopacity,asrisk-takingtax-strategies(minimisingthetaxliability)areless likelytobescrutinisedinashadowyenvironment.Opacityhelpsinkeepingaggressivetax-planning schemesundetected,andthereforelowersthetaxburden,nottomentionthattaxavoidanceis legalaslongasitisnotdeemedillegalbythetaxauthoritiesor,ultimately,bythecourts.Uncovering aggressivetaxplanningschemesresultsinnegativepublicityandreputationcosts.

Taxcompetition,byitsverynature,isasymmetric.Thismeansthatsomebenefitfromtax competitionattheexpenseofothers,4andhigh-taxcountriesaremorelikelytolosetaxresources aswellasfacereducedeconomicactivity(andultimatelylowergrowth).Byitsnature,theissueof taxhavens–inbreachoftaxgoodgovernanceprinciples–hasanexternalrelationsdimension, whichextendstothedevelopmentfield.Itisconnectedwithtaxfairness(notalltaxpayersareable touseglobalaggressivetax-planningschemes)andthelinkbetweenrealeconomicactivityand taxation(thenexusconnectingthetaxableeventwiththetaxauthorities).

Harmfultaxcompetitionandtaxhavens

Identifyingandlistingterritoriesastaxhavenswasenvisagedaspartofthestrategytoidentifyand addressharmfultaxcompetitionusedbycompaniesandMNEs.Taxhavensarealsocloselyrelated withsecrecyandanonymity,whicharecentralelementsintaxevasionandaggressivetaxplanning. AreportpreparedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD) entitled'Harmfultaxcompetition:anemergingglobalissue',publishedin1998,respondedtothe requesttocounterthisphenomenon.Itwasintendedinparticular'todevelopabetter understandingofhowtaxhavensandharmfulpreferentialtaxregimes,collectivelyreferredtoas harmfultaxpractices,affectthelocationoffinancialandotherserviceactivities,erodethetaxbases

ofothercountries,distorttradeandinvestmentpatternsandunderminethefairness,neutralityand broadsocialacceptanceoftaxsystemsgenerally'.

Subsequently,identifying'taxhavens'andseekingtheircommitmenttotheprinciplesof transparencyandeffectiveexchangeofinformationwasoneoftheareasofworkdefinedinthe projectonharmfultaxpracticesin1998.

Overlappingtax-relatedterms:taxhaven,non-cooperative jurisdiction,offshorecentre,andsecretivejurisdiction

Thetermstaxhaven,offshorefinancialcentre,andsecrecyjurisdictiondescribejurisdictionsthat featuredistinctivecharacteristicssuchasloworzerotaxation,fictitiousresidences(withnobearing onreality)andtaxsecrecyEachofthemputsthefocusonadifferentfeature:theforeignlocationfor offshorecentres,andtheanonymityornon-disclosureoffinancialdealingsandownershipofassets, inthecaseofsecrecyjurisdictions.Low-taxjurisdictionsdounderlinethefactthatthereisnoor minimaltaxationonincomeandassetsofnon-residents.Themapofjurisdictionslabelledwithoneof thosetermsisnotstatic.Sincethepurposeofdrawingupsuchalististoencouragejurisdictionsthat donotcomplywiththechosencriteria(rules,standardsorprinciples)tocommittoadoptingor endorsingthem,oncetheydosotheymaybede-listed.

Alookattaxcompliance:behaviouraleconomicsandtaxation

Taxcompliancereferstowillingnesstocomplywithtaxlaws,declarethecorrectincome,claimthe correctdeductions,reliefandrebates,andpayalltaxontime.Atthetaxpayerlevel,complianceis encouragedbythefightagainsttaxevasionandfraud,withoutwhichnon-abidingtaxpayerswould gainaneconomicadvantagelikelytodetercompliance.

Classiceconomicmodels5describetaxpayersasdecision-makersseekinganeconomicallyoptimal situation.Behaviouraleconomicsintaxationdrawsamorecomplexandnuancedportraitof taxpayers,wheremoralsuasionintaxcollection,culture,andthelikelihoodofbeingauditedplay animportantrole.However,studiesmostlyconcentrateonpersonalincometaxandindividuals.

Listingtaxhavens

Currentlytherearelistswhichareestablishedbyinternationalorganisations,non-governmental organisationsandcountries.(ThesituationintheEuropeanUnionanditsMemberStatesiscovered inthesectionbelow.)

Commonfeaturesoflists

Atfirst,theterm'taxhaven'designatedcountriesofferingattractivelow-taxregimestoattract financialservices.Later,itwasusedtodescribejurisdictionsthatdonotrespectthetaxgood governanceprinciplesvis-à-visotherjurisdictions,sincetheirobjectiveistoattracttaxbasesor investment.

Threeelements,commonlyusedasdistinctivecriteria,contributetotheconclusionthatalocation isataxhaven:

lackofeffectiveexchangeofrelevantinformationwithothergovernmentsontheir taxpayers,minimalornodisclosureonfinancialdealingsandownershipofassets, noorminimaltaxationonincomeandassetsofnon-residents,taxadvantagestononresidentindividuals, generallynotapplyingacceptedminimumstandardsofcorporategovernanceand accountability.

Establishinglistsgenerallyfollowsasimilarpattern,startingwiththedefinitionofcriteria,followed bytheestablishmentofthelistitself.Thatissupplementedbyincentivestothosenamedonthelist

toremedytheshortcomingswithaviewtocomplyingwithconditionsnecessarytobede-listed.In short,settingandmonitoringlistsisadynamicprocess.

(Black)listingisawaytobringaboutregulatorycompliance.Standardsandrulesservingascriteria areappliedbythemembersoftheorganisationwhichsetsthelist,inrespectofothersjoiningor gainingmembership.Theobjectiveofthelististhustoputpressureontaxhavenstoapplythose rulesandstandards.Thisimpliesthatmembersoftheorganisationthemselvesareoutofthescope ofthelist,whichdoesnotautomaticallymeanthattheyareimmunetocriticism.Blacklistingis howeveratoolratherthanasolution.Eachsuchlistdescribesthestateofcomplianceornoncompliancewithidentifiedcriteria,offeringasnapshotoftheglobalsituationatasetdate.

Someexistingtaxhavenlists

Internationalorganisations

Intheearly2000s,theOECDdrewupalistofuncooperativetaxhavens,whichwasupdatedonthe basisofcommitmentsbycountriesplacedonthelistwithregardtothespecificcriteriaconcerned. FollowingtheinterventionoftheG20(2010Toronto),the'blacklist'wascomplementedbya'grey list'anda'whitelist',accordingtothecommitmentsmadeandtheirlevelofimplementationinthe late2000s.TheIMFoffshorelistassessmentin2014wasestablishedonthebasisofpredefined standardsfromseveralinternationalbodies.

Amongtheorganisationssettinglistsofcountrieswhicharerelevanttotaxmatters,theGlobal ForumonTransparencyandexchangeofinformationfortaxpurposes(oftenreferredastheGlobal Forum)hasaparticularroleontaxtransparency,asitisthemultilateralframeworkgathering togetherOECDandnon-OECDeconomiessince2000.Regardingtheassessmentofthe implementationofthestandardexchangeofinformationonrequest(EOIR)theGlobalForumon TransparencyregularlyreviewsthecommitmentstojointhemultilateralConventiononMutual AdministrativeAssistanceinTaxMatters.

NGOs

SecrecyjurisdictionsaredeterminedonthebasisofanassessmentmadebytheTaxJusticeNetwork (TJN),whichappliesasecrecyscoremeasuringbankingsecrecy,thecapacitytocreateshell companiesoroffshorestructures,andbarrierstocooperationandinformationexchange.Onthis basis,everytwoyearssince2009,TJNhaspublishedalist–theFinancialSecrecyIndex(FSI)–which ranksahundredjurisdictionsaccordingtotheirsecrecyandthescaleoftheiroffshorefinancial activities.

On28November2017,Oxfampublishedastudycontainingalistoftaxhavensassessedwithregard tothecriteriaoftransparency,fairtaxationandparticipationininternationalforaontax,asdefined fortheestablishmentofanEUlistbytheCouncil.

Closebutdistinct:high-riskthirdcountrylists

Listsofthirdcountriespresentingahighriskwithregardtomoneylaunderingfocusonlegaland institutionalindicatorsrelevantinmoney-launderingandconnectedactivities(namelyfinancingof terrorism),includingsecrecyandanonymity,thatarealsocriteriaintheassessmentoftaxhavens.

Secrecyandanonymityprovidedbytaxhavens

Secrecyresultsfromthelackofexchangeofinformationbetweencountries,aswellasfromthe anonymityprovidedbyvariousmechanismsrenderingtheidentityoftheultimatebeneficialowner difficulttoestablish,thankstoapartialorcompletelackoftraceabilityoftransactions.Situationsthat arehiddenbycomplexmechanismsspanningseveralcountries–inachainofoperationsanda stringofoperatorsandintermediaries–involvetaxhavensusingtoolssuchasletterboxcompanies, shellcompaniesandoffshorestructuresortrusts,andinparticularnetworksofthem.Asaresult,

informationessentialtoauthoritiesisobscured,thuscreatingasafehavenoutofthesightof authorities(taxandothers,dependingonthenatureoftheoperations).Forthatreasontheworkof theGlobalForumonTransparencyisbuildingontheworkoftheFATFconcerningthedefinitionof beneficialownershipinthetermsofreferencefortheexchangeofinformationonrequest(EOIR). Thesecrecyofferedbytaxhavensprovidesadvantagesfornon-residentsbyshiftingincomeaway fromitsactualgeographicalsource,andasaresultreducesthetaxbaseinthecountryinwhichthey aretaxresident.Theincomemovedtotaxhavensiskeptoutofsightbysecrecyoranonymityvisà visthecountryoftaxresidence.Thiskeyfeaturealsoprovidesopacitynotonlyfortaxpurposes (avoidanceandevasion)butalsoforillegalandcriminalactivitiessuchasmoneylaundering (bringingmoneyofillegal/criminaloriginbackintocirculation)andarangeofcriminalactivities relatedtothelatter.Regulatorymeasuresallowingtraceabilityandthesharingofinformation (concerningthemovementoffinancialtransactionsandotherrelevantinformation,withinthe frameworkofanti-money-launderingefforts,inparticularthroughcustomerduediligence obligations)areappropriatetoolsforcounteractingthesepractices.

Anti-moneylaundering:high-riskthird-countrylists

TheFinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)isofparticularimportanceforcombatingtaxevasion, corruptionandotheractivitiesgeneratingillicitflowsoffinance,asstatedbytheG20inJune2015. TheFATFidentifieshigh-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions(thosewithweakmeasuresto combatmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing(AML/CFT))usingliststhatarereviewed periodically.InitsArticle9,Directive(EU)2015/849oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncil providesfortheidentificationofhigh-riskthirdcountrieswithstrategicdeficienciessoastoprotect theproperfunctioningoftheinternalmarket.TheCommissionisempoweredtoadoptsuchalist bydelegatedactsbasedonelementslistedinthearticle'ssecondparagraph,relatingto:

(a)thelegalandinstitutionalAML/CFTframeworkofthethirdcountry,inparticular:

(i)criminalisationofmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing;

(ii)measuresrelatingtocustomerduediligence;

(iii)requirementsrelatingtorecord-keeping;and

(iv)requirementstoreportsuspicioustransactions;

(b)thepowersandproceduresofthethirdcountry'scompetentauthoritiesforthepurposesof combatingmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing;

(c)theeffectivenessoftheAML/CFTsysteminaddressingmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancing risksofthethirdcountry.

TheFATF'sworkservesasabasisforasimilarlistdrawnupinCommissionDelegatedRegulation (EU)2016/1675of14July2016,supplementingDirective(EU)2015/849oftheEuropeanParliament andoftheCouncil,byidentifyinghigh-riskthirdcountrieswithstrategicdeficiencies.Thelistwas furtheramendedbyDelegatedRegulation(EU)2018/105of27October2017andDelegated Regulation(EU)2018/212of13December2017,bothamendingDelegatedRegulation (EU)2016/1675.

TheCommissionpreparedaroadmap'TowardsanewmethodologyfortheEUassessmentofhighriskthirdcountriesunderDirective(EU)2015/849onthepreventionoftheuseofthefinancial systemforthepurposesofmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancing'followingtheEuropean Parliament's'objectiontoadelegatedact:Identifyinghigh-riskthirdcountrieswithstrategic deficiencies'(2017/2634(DEA))on17May2017.

Initsfollow-uptoParliament'sresolution,theCommissionproposedanapproachinsuccessive steps,focusingfirstonprioritythirdcountries,whichwouldbechosenonthebasisoftheirfinancial importancefortheUnion,aswellastheirexposuretorisksofmoneylaunderingandterrorist financing,namelytakingintoaccounttheCouncil'sEUlistofnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictions.The

assessmentcriteriawouldtakeasabaselinetheassumptionthatanythirdcountrypresentingarisk fortheinternationalfinancialsystem,asidentifiedbytheFATF,alsopresentedarisktotheEU's internalmarket.

FurthercountrieswouldbeidentifiedbytheCommissionandcomplementthisinternationally agreedlist,basedonArticle9oftheAnti-Money-LaunderingDirectiveandotherrelevantcriteria. Beneficialownershiptransparencycouldbeoneofthecriteria.Thereviewedlistofhigh-risk countriesisduetobefinalisedin2018,whenasecondlistidentifyingcountriestobeassessedis alsoduetobeadopted.

Provisionismadeforfollow-uponcountrieslisted,whichmayresultintheirremovalfromthelist.

EuropeanUnionlists

ListsintheEU

Basedontheexistenceofnationalblack/whitelistingprocessesinsidetheEU,theCommission published,onthebasisofitsactionplanpublishedon17June2015,alistofcross-referencesofthe nationallists.Itaimedatidentifyingthejurisdictionsappearingonatleast10nationallists.Thiswas notacommonlistbutamovetowardsmorecollectiveidentificationofproblemsthanthe patchworkofassessmentsavailablewouldallow.

EstablishmentofanEUlistofthirdcountries

Theestablishmentofalistofnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictions(taxhavens)isatoolforsecuringa levelplayingfield,andwasenvisagedintheCommission'scommunicationonanexternalstrategy foreffectivetaxationpresentedinthe2016anti-tax-avoidancepackage.AcommonEUsystemfor assessing,screeningandlistingthird-countrytaxjurisdictionsallowstheidentificationofthosethat playaparticularroleintaxavoidanceandevasion,whichcanbeusedinbaseerosionandprofitshiftingpractices.

Athree-stepprocesswasestablishedfordrawingupacommonlistoftaxjurisdictionswhichdonot meetsomeofthecriteriaidentifiedasessentialfornotbeingconsideredataxhaven.Theyconsist ofaneutralscoreboardofindicators(atoolforhelpingtodeterminethepotentialrisklevelofeach thirdcountrywhenassessingtaxgovernance);ascreeningofthirdcountriesidentifiedonthebasis ofthescoreboard(basedonadialogueinwhichthethirdcountriescoulddecidetobringtheirrules intolinewiththecriteriaandmakesuchacommitment–213countrieswerepre-assessed);and finallytheadoptionofanEUlistofthird-countrynon-cooperativetaxjurisdictions.

Thecriteriasetoutintheexternalstrategyrelatetothreemainaspectsfortax:

Transparency:throughcompliancewiththeinternationalstandardsonautomaticexchange ofinformation(AEOI)andexchangeofinformationonrequest(EOIR),andcheckingifa jurisdictionhasratifiedthemultilateralconvention; FairTaxCompetition:assessingtheexistenceofharmfultaxregimes,contrarytotheCode ofConductprinciplesortheOECD'sForumonHarmfulTaxPractices; BEPSimplementation:participationintheInclusiveFramework

TheCommissioncommunicationalsoincludedthelevelofcorporatetaxation(loworclose-to-zerorateoncorporatetax).

TheCounciladoptedthefirstEUlistofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposeson5 December2017,inAnnexItoCouncilconclusions6Sixotherdocumentsaccompanythelist,and areaimedatfutureupdatesandfollow-upmeasures:

a'StateofplayofthecooperationwiththeEUwithrespecttocommitmentstakento implementtaxgoodgovernanceprinciples'(asAnnexII); 'Defensivemeasures'(asAnnexIII);

'GuidelinesforfurtherprocessconcerningtheEUlistofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfor taxpurposes'(asAnnexIV);

'Criteriaontaxtransparency,fairtaxationandimplementationofanti-BEPSmeasuresthat theEUMemberStatesundertaketopromote'(asAnnexV);and 'twodocumentsspecifyingtwoofthecriteriaused(Criteriaonthedurationofthe reasonabletimeframe(AnnexVI),andCriteriaontheabsenceofacorporatetaxora nominalcorporatetaxrateequaltozerooralmostzero–asAnnexVII);)'.

Thelistitselfcomprises17jurisdictionsoutsidetheEUthatarenon-cooperativeintaxmatters. Thosejurisdictionshadnotmadecommitmentsonmeetingthecriteriasufficientlyaheadofthe adoptionofthelist,ormadecommitmentsthatwerefoundinsufficient.Another48jurisdictions havebeenputonawatchlist,meaningthattheircommitmentsaredeemedsufficient,buttheir implementationwillbecloselymonitoredbytheEU.Itisworthwhiletonotethatthelistsinclude jurisdictionswhichareEUoverseascountriesandterritories(OCTs),andsomearecloselylinkedto aMemberStateas'Crowndependencies'.Finally,eightCaribbeanregionjurisdictions7weregiven moretime(untiltheendof2018)beforetheyarescreened,becauseofthedisruptioncausedbythe September2017hurricane(seetableinannex).Intotal,92countrieswerescreenedintheprocess ofsettingupthelists(20werefoundtomeetthecriteria,while72wereaskedtoaddress deficiencies).Themonitoringofcomplianceandreviewisplanned.Accompanyingcountermeasuresaretoolstoincentivisecompliance.

Updatesresultingfromthemonitoringofcommitments

Ongoingmonitoringofthecommitmentsmadebythirdcountriesledtothelistbeingupdated shortlyafteritsadoption,totakeintoaccountcommitmentsthathadnotyetbeenmadeatthetime theDecemberlistwasadopted.ThecommitmentsaremadepubliclyavailableintheCouncil registerProceduralguidelinesfortheprocessofmonitoringcommitmentsconcerningtheEUlist ofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposesweredrawnupandagreedbytheCodeofConduct Group(BusinessTaxation)on14February2018.

BoththeEUlistofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposesitself(AnnexI;consolidated versionsbeingprovidedinapubliclyaccessible8noterevisedeachtimetheCouncildecidesto updatethelist)andthe'StateofplayofthecooperationwiththeEUwithrespecttocommitments takentoimplementtaxgoodgovernanceprinciples'(asawatchlistinAnnexII,withconsolidated versionsprovidedinapubliclyavailable9noterevisedaccordingtothecommitmentsmade)are updatedfollowingtheassessmentofcommitmentsmadebythirdcountries.Asaresult,theEUlist ofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposeswasamendedbytheECOFINCouncilon 23January2018,witheffectfrom26January2018,deletingeightthirdcountries,whichwere movedtothewatchlist.

On13March2018,theCouncilagreedonafurthermodificationtotheEUlistofnon-cooperative jurisdictionsfortaxpurposesfollowingthecompletionoftheassessmentofcountriesplacedonthe 'hurricanelist'.Asaresult,threewereplacedonthelist,whilefivewereaddedtothewatchlist.The changestookeffectfrom16March2018,thedateofpublicationintheOfficialJournal.Itwasalso decidedthatfourjurisdictionsinitiallyplacedonthenon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposes listshouldbemovedtothewatchlist.Theconsolidatedversioncurrentlyshowsninethirdcountries onthelistofnon-cooperativejurisdictionsfortaxpurposes(seeannex).

ENDNOTES

1'Taxjurisdiction'defineswhichauthorityiscompetenttoadopttaxruleswithinaterritory,whichmaybesmallerthana nationalstateandcoveranareawhichforotherissuesiscoveredbythelawofthestateinwhichitissituated.

2Thisreliesontheglobalisationoflegalpersons,whichtaxpayers(naturalorlegalpersons)canmakeuseof.The consequenceisthatincomecanberelocated,withtheincreaseoffiscalengineeringstrategies,andthatrequires enormousresourcesforauthoritiestotrace.SeeforinstanceG.Sanchez-ArchindonaHidalgo,‘Reflectionsonmultilateral taxsolutionsinpost-BEPScontext’,Intertax,Volume45,issue11,p.714.

3Theinterplayofanumberofcorporatetaxpayersgoingglobal(MNEswithactivitiesspanningtheglobe)andthe developmentof'taxschemesaimedatattractingfinancialandothergeographicallymobileactivitiescancreateharmful taxcompetitionbetweenStates,carryingrisksofdistortingtradeandinvestmentand..leadtotheerosionofnationaltax bases',G7countriescommuniquéissuedbytheheadsofstateattheir1996LyonSummit.

4Seearticle'State-induced,strategicortoxic?Anethicalanalysisoftaxavoidancepractices'.

5SeeforinstanceK.Devos,TaxComplianceTheoryandtheLiterature,in:FactorsInfluencingIndividualTaxpayer ComplianceBehaviour,Springer,Dordrecht,2014.

6OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion,19December2017,C438,24.

7Thelistisprovidedinpoint12oftheconclusions.

8EachamendmenthasbeenpublishedintheOfficialjournal,respectivelyC29,26January2018,andC100,16March 2018.Adedicatedwebpageprovidesinformation.

9Thedocumentnumberis6236/18andhassofarbeenrevisedtwice,thelatestversiondatingfrom24April2018.

BasedonthelistsannexedtotheCouncilconclusionsof5December2017:Non-cooperativelist, updatedon23Januaryandon13March2018.

(OCT=EUOverseascountriesandterritories;*jurisdictionalsoonthehigh-riskthirdcountrylist)

Taxjurisdictions

EUnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictionslist Additionalinformation

Afghanistan high-riskthirdcountrylist

Albania Watchlist

AmericanSamoa Non-cooperativelist

Andorra Watchlist

Anguilla

AntiguaandBarbuda

Movedfromthehurricanelisttothewatch listwitheffectfrom16March2018

Armenia Watchlist

Aruba Watchlist OCT

Bahamas

Bahrain

Barbados

Movedfromthehurricanelisttononcooperativelistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Belize Watchlist

Bermuda Watchlist

BosniaandHerzegovina Watchlist high-riskthirdcountrylist

Botswana Watchlist

BritishVirginIslands

Movedfromthehurricanelisttothewatch listwitheffectfrom16March2018

CaboVerde Watchlist

CaymanIslands Watchlist

CookIslands Watchlist

Curaçao Watchlist

Dominica

Movedfromthehurricanelisttothewatch listwitheffectfrom16March2018

Taxjurisdictions

EUnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictionslist

Additionalinformation

Ethiopia high-riskthirdcountrylist

FaroeIslands Watchlist

Fiji Watchlist

FormerYugoslavRepublicof Macedonia Watchlist

Grenada

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Greenland Watchlist OCT

Guam Non-cooperativelist

Guernsey Watchlist

CrownDependency

Guyana high-riskthirdcountrylist

HongKongSAR Watchlist

IsleofMan Watchlist

CrownDependency

Iran high-riskthirdcountrylist

Iraq high-riskthirdcountrylist

Jamaica Watchlist

Jersey Watchlist

Jordan Watchlist

Korea(Republicof)

DemocraticPeople'sRepublicof Korea(DPRK)

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

LabuanIsland Watchlist

CrownDependency

high-riskthirdcountrylist

Lao high-riskthirdcountrylist

Liechtenstein Watchlist

MacacoSAR

Malaysia

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Maldives Watchlist

Taxjurisdictions

MarshallIslands

EUnon-cooperativetaxjurisdictionslist

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Mauritius Watchlist

Mongolia

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Montenegro Watchlist

Morocco Watchlist

Namibia Non-cooperativelist

Nauru Watchlist

NewCaledonia Watchlist OCT

Niue Watchlist

Oman Watchlist

Palau Non-cooperativelist

Panama

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Peru Watchlist

Qatar Watchlist

SaintLucia

SaintKittsandNevis

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Movedfromhurricanelisttononcooperativelistwitheffectfrom16March 2018

SaintVincentandthe Grenadines Watchlist

Samoa Non-cooperativelist

SanMarino Watchlist

Serbia Watchlist

Seychelles Watchlist

SriLanka high-riskthirdcountrylist

Swaziland Watchlist

Switzerland Watchlist

Syria high-riskthirdcountrylist

Taiwan Watchlist

Taxjurisdictions

Thailand Watchlist

TrinidadandTobago

Tunisia

Non-cooperativelist high-riskthirdcountrylist

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018 highriskthirdcountrylist

Turkey Watchlist

TurksandCaicosIslands Hurricanelist OCT

Uganda high-riskthirdcountrylist

UnitedArabEmirates

Removedfromthenon-cooperativelistand placedonthewatchlistwitheffectfrom 26January2018

Uruguay Watchlist

USVirginIslands

Movedfromhurricanelisttononcooperativelistwitheffectfrom 16March2018

Vanuatu Watchlist high-riskthirdcountrylist

Vietnam Watchlist

Yemen high-riskthirdcountrylist

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