StateSovereigntyandInternational HumanRights
JackDonnelly
Iamskepticalofourabilitytopredict,orevenforecast,thefuture ofhuman rightsoranyotherimportantsocialpractice.Nonetheless,anunderstanding ofthepathsthathavebroughtustowherewearetodaycanfacilitatethinkingaboutthefuture.Thus,Iapproachthetopicbyexaminingthereshapingof internationalideasandpracticesofstatesovereigntyandhumanrightssince theendofWorldWarII.Iarguethatintheinitialdecadesafterthewar,internationalsocietyconstructedanabsolutistconceptionofexclusiveterritorialjurisdictionthatwasfundamentallyantagonistictointernationalhumanrights.Atthe sametime,though,humanrightswereforthe firsttimeincludedamongthefundamentalnormsofinternationalsociety.Andoverthepasttwodecades,dominantunderstandingsofsovereigntyhavebecomelessabsolutistandmore humanrights–friendly,atrendthatIsuggestislikelytocontinuetodevelop,modestly,inthecomingyears.
Sovereignty
Supremacy especiallysupremeauthority isattherootofsovereignty.The OxfordEnglishDictionary defines “sovereignty” as “supremacyorpre-eminence inrespectofexcellenceorefficacy ” and “supremacyinrespectofpower,domination,orrank;supremedominion,authority,orrule.” Similarly, “sovereign” is definedas “ofpower,authority,etc.:supreme.” Internationallawreplicatesthis understanding: “Sovereigntyissupremeauthority,” writeRobertJenningsand ArthurWatts; Black’sLawDictionary definesthetermas “ )Supremedominion, authority,orrule. )Thesupremepoliticalauthorityofanindependentstate.... Supremacy,therighttodemandobedience.”
Ethics&InternationalAffairs
Internalsovereigntyinvolvessupremedomesticauthority.Externalsovereignty isaprincipleandsetofpracticesforregulatingtheinteractionofthosewhoclaim internalsupremacy.Givenmyfocushereontheinternationallawandpoliticsof sovereignty,Iwillbeconcernedonlywithexternalsovereignty.Myfocusisfurther limitedtoactualsovereigntypractices,notphilosophicaltheoriesorideal-type models.Forreasonsofspace,Iwillsimplyassertfourpreliminaryconceptual points.
First,sovereigntyisprimarilyamatterofauthority ofthe right toregulateor rule notmaterialcapabilities.Wecertainlyhavegoodreasontobeinterestedin boththeauthorityofinternationalactorsandtheircapabilities.Buttheyarevery differentthings.
Second,sovereignty(supremeauthority)comesinmanydifferentforms.Daniel Philpottusefullyidentifiesthree “faces” ofsovereignty,whichcorrespondtothe threequestions: “Whoorwhatholdssovereignty?”“Howdoesonebecomearecognizedsovereign?” and “Whatrightsdosovereignshave?” Differentinternationalsocietieshaveansweredthesequestionsinverydifferentways,making “sovereignty” highlyvariableinitssubstance.
Third,externalsovereigntyisamatterofmutualrecognition:sovereignsare thosewhoarerecognizedbyothersovereignsassovereign. “Objective” criteria ofstatehood forexample,agovernmentthatexercisescontroloveraterritory andapopulationandparticipatesininternationallaw areneithernecessary norsufficientconditions.Notallsovereignstatesmeetthesecriteria:consider “failed” states,suchasSomalia.Andsomeentitiesthatdo,mostnotably Taiwan,areuniversallyconsiderednottobesovereign.Internationalrecognition createsratherthanacknowledgessovereignsandtheirrights.
Finally,externalsovereigntyisastatusininternationalsociety.Itisnot,and neverhasbeen,anabsoluterighttodowhateveronewishes.Therightsofsovereignsaredeterminedbytheinternationalsocietythatauthorizesthosesovereigns.
ThePost-WorldWarIIConstructionofSovereignty Peaceconferencesconcluding “generalwars” oftenprovokeeffortstoreconstruct foundationalinternationalpractices.Westphalia()andUtrecht()are typicallyseenasestablishing “modern” internationalrelations.Vienna() setthetoneforinternationalrelationsinthenineteenthcentury.Thestatesthat cametoSanFranciscoin tocompletethedraftingoftheUnitedNations
Charter deeplycognizantoftheirfailuresinParisin madeaserious(and surprisinglysuccessful)efforttochangesomefundamentalprinciplesofinternationalrelations.
ConsiderSections and ofArticle oftheCharter: “AllMembersshallsettle theirinternationaldisputesbypeacefulmeans. ...AllMembersshallrefrainin theirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorial integrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate.” Warasanextensionofpoliticsby othermeans(whatnineteenthandearly-twentiethcenturylegalmanualsoften called “therightofwar”;thatis,therightofeachstatetodecideforitselfwhen andwhyto fight)wasreplacedbytherestrictionoflegitimateinternational forcetoself-defense.Andsuchpioussentimentshavebeenlargelyputintopractice.Notonlyhasnostatebeeneliminatedbyforcesinceatleast (since , ifweaccepttheofficialChinesestoryofTibet),butfewterritorialchangesimposedbyforcehavebeenwidelyaccepted.
Throughoutmostofhumanhistory,aggressivewarwasgenerallyacceptedasan inevitablereality.Inthelatetwentiethcentury,however,itwaseffectivelyeliminatedasapracticeofinternationalsociety,layingafoundationforavarietyof othermajorstructuralchanges(although,aswewillseeinmoredetailbelow, statesremained “fullysovereign” whentheylosttheirrightofwar).Thisnormativelydrivenchangewasstronglysupportedbytheintroductionofnuclearweapons,whichdramaticallyincreasedtherisksofaggressivewar.Doctrinesofmutual assureddestructionmoreorlessintentionallymaximizedthoserisks,creatinga powerfulstatusquobiasinpost-WorldWarIIinternationalsociety atleast withrespecttodirectconflictsbythesuperpowers,especiallyinthecoreofthe internationalsystem.
Theprincipalexceptionwasdecolonization.TheUNCharterimplicitlyacceptedcolonialism.Duringthe s,however,thebalanceofinternationalopinion, evenamongcolonialpowers,shiftedtofavorrapiddecolonizationofWestern overseasempires.Symbolicofthetransitionisthe Declarationonthe GrantingofIndependencetoColonialCountriesandPeoples(UNGeneral AssemblyResolution ).Inthe sand s,decolonization(oftenexpressedas “self-determination”)wastheprincipalexceptiontotherestrictionof theuseofforcetoself-defense.Warsofnationalliberationfromcolonialdominationwerenotconsideredviolationsofthepoliticalindependenceorterritorialintegrityof(Western)salt-waterempire-states.Decolonizationcreatedscoresof weakandoftenfragilestates,whichinearliereraswouldhavegeneratedlocal
warsandforeigninterventionstopartitionoreliminatemanyofthemandtocreaterelationsofhierarchicalsubordination.(Nineteenth-centurylegalmanuals calledthesesemi-sovereign,part-sovereign,imperfectlyindependent,not-fullsovereign,orhalf-sovereignstates.)Almostallofthesenewpostcolonialstates,however,retainedeverysquareinchofterritoryheldbytheformercolonialpower. Thiswasbotharesponsetotheemergingnormofterritorialintegrityandapowerfulforceinentrenchingthatnorm.Furthermore,formalhierarchicalinequalities betweenstateswerealmostcompletelyeliminated,againbothinresponsetoand contributingtothestrengtheningofthenormofsovereignequality.
Sovereignty,inotherwords,wasconstructedasequal,territorial,andexclusive. States,definedbyaninternationallyagreed-uponterritory,heldsovereignty. Thosestatesthatexistedin ,plusthoseentitiessubjecttooverseascolonial domination,wereentitledtorecognitionassovereignstates.Theirjurisdiction wasexclusiveover(andrestrictedto)theirownterritory.Andformallegalinequalitiesbetweenstateswerelargelyeliminated. Sovereignty thusunderstood precludesinternationalimplementationandenforcementofhumanrights. (Humanrightsarelargelyabouthowastatetreatsitsownnationalsonitsown territory,which,inthepostwarconstructionofsovereignty,isamatterofthe sovereignprerogativeofstates.)Thisunderstandingofsovereignty,however,is anhistoricallycontingentfeatureofthepostwar andespeciallythepostdecolonization era.Compare,forexample,EuropeatthetimeofthePeaceof Westphalia(),whichisusuallytakenasthedawnofmoderninternational relations:theholdersofsovereigntyweredynasts(notstates);formaldistinctions betweensovereignswerethenorm;differentsovereignshelddifferentrights;territorywaspassedfreelyamongdynasticrulers;andoverlappingjurisdictionswere common.
TheColdWarConstructionofInternationalHuman Rights
ThePreambleoftheUNCharterstatesadetermination “toreaffirmfaithinfundamentalhumanrights.” Article declaresoneofthefourprincipalpurposesof theorganizationtobe “toachieveinternationalco-operation ...inpromotingand encouragingrespectforhumanrightsandforfundamentalfreedoms.” Thiswasa sharp,andintentional,contrasttotheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations(andall earliermodernpeacetreaties).
TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,adoptedbytheUNGeneral AssemblyonDecember , ,quicklybecameanauthoritativestatementof themeaningofhumanrightsforthepurposesofinternationalrelations insignificantmeasurebecauseiteffectivelycodifiedthehighestactuallyrealizedstandardsofhumanrightsideasandpracticesatthetime.The International HumanRightsCovenantssubstantiallyelaboratedtherightscontainedinthe UniversalDeclaration(and,inrecognitionofarapidlydecolonizingworld, addedarightofpeoplestoself-determination).Treatiesonracialdiscrimination, discriminationagainstwomen,torture,andtherightsofthechildwerealsoadopted.Bytheendofthecoldwararichandrobustbodyofinternationalhuman rightslawwasendorsed inwordatleast byvirtuallyallstates.
Thisnormativelystrongglobalhumanrightsregime,however,wasprocedurally extremelyweak. Reflectingtheabsolutistconstructionofstatesovereignty,cold war–erastatescreatedasystemofexclusivelynationalimplementationofinternationalhumanrights.Thestandardmechanismof “enforcement” ininternational humanrightstreatieswas(andremains)theuseofperiodicreportssubmittedtoa committeeofexpertsthathasnoauthoritytodeterminecomplianceornoncompliance.AndUNbodiesthatdealtwithhumanrightsweresimilarlylimitedto purelyverbalmeans(whichwereusuallyemployedinhighlysovereigntyrespectingways).Inotherwords,inpractice,thesovereignrightsofstatesincludedtherighttoviolatethehumanrightsoftheircitizenswithimpunity.Nearlyall states,byratifyingoneormoreinternationalhumanrightstreaties,voluntarilyacceptedauthoritativeinternationalstandardsgoverningthetreatmentoftheirown nationalsontheirownterritory.Buttheyreservedtothemselvesanexclusivesovereignrighttoimplementandenforcethoserightsontheirownterritories.
Beginninginthemid-sanincreasinglyrobustbilateralandtransnational internationalpoliticsofhumanrightsemerged.Themeansused,though,were largelyrestrictedtowords. “Shameandblame,” thedominantNGOstrategyfor promotinghumanrights,describesmoststateactionsatthetimeaswell. “Middlepowers” (forexample,Canada,Norway,andtheNetherlands)didincreasinglylinktheirdevelopmentassistancetothehumanrightspracticesofrecipientstates.EventheUnitedStatessporadicallyaltereditsaidpoliciesin responsetohumanrightsviolations.Nonetheless,recalcitrantstateshadanabsolutesovereignrighttomakethe finaldeterminationoftheadequacyoftheir humanrightspractices.Thiswasalmostuniversallyagreedtobepartofthe “ politicalindependence” protectedbystatesovereignty.States,however, chose to
createasystemofnationalimplementationofinternationalhumanrights.They also chose toconstructsovereigntyasradicallyequal,exclusive,andterritorial. Andinthe stheybegantorethinkthosechoices.
GenocideandtheReconstitutionofSovereignty
Theendofthecoldwarfundamentallychangedthecontextofinternationalrelations,bothingeneralandforinternationalhumanrights.TheendofbipolarideologicalandgeopoliticalrivalryremovedmanyincentivesfortheUnitedStatesand otherWesterncountriestosupportrights-abusiveregimes.Inaddition,thedeepeningpenetrationofinternationalhumanrightsnormscreatedamuchgreater willingnessofWesternstatestotakeadvantageofamorepermissiveenvironment topursuehumanrightsmoreseriouslyintheirforeignpolicies.Western(and otherinternational)actionalsometasubstantiallyreducedpushback.The SovietUnionwasfallingapartintheearly s,andtheRussiathatemerged wasamuch-reducedpower.Chinawaspreoccupiedwiththedomesticandinternationalaftermathofthe Tiananmenmassacre(andstillalongwayfrom beingwidelyseenasanemergingglobalpower).Andthenear-universalsupport ofThirdWorldcountriesforahuman-rights–hostileunderstandingofsovereigntywasreplacedbyasubstantialdiversityofviewsamongstatesoftheglobalSouth (andCentralandEasternEurope).
Thedemocratizationandliberalizationwaveofthe sand screated governmentswithoftenstrongcommitmentstohumanrightsandamemoryof thevalueofinternationalsupportfortheireffortsatreform.Thesegovernments werealsomoreopentopressuresfromtheirpopulations,whichhadlongbeen sympathetictointernationalhumanrights.Furthermore,fearsofabusivemanipulationofthelanguageofhumanitarianinterventionwerereducedbytheendof thecoldwarrivalryandthedeepeningentrenchmentofnormsofnonaggression andterritorialintegrity.Althoughmoreaggressiveinternationalhumanrightsactionwasinconsistentandofteninept,thecumulativeeffectwasarealrestrictionof therangeofsovereignprerogatives.InFebruary theUnitedNationsbegana seriesofinterventionsinresponsetogenocidalethnicconflictintheformer Yugoslavia involvementthatcontinuestoday,underEuropeanUnionauspices, inBosnia-Herzegovina.Andguiltoverinactioninthefaceofthe genocide inRwanda,giventhatevenamodestpeacekeepingmissioncouldhavesubstantiallylessenedthecarnage,provokedafundamentalrethinkingoftherights
(andobligations)ofstates.Asnotedabove,afterWorldWarIIitbecameillegalfor statestouseforceaggressivelyagainstotherstates.Ithaslongbeenillegalfora statetokillforeignnationalsonitsownterritory(ortokillciviliansoutsideits territory).IntheaftermathofRwanda,italsobecameillegalforastatetokill largenumbersofitsownnationalsquicklyandarbitrarilyonitsownterritory.
Theoryandpracticeevolvedwithremarkablespeed,thedecisiveeventsoccurringin .InresponsetoethniccleansinginKosovo,NATOlaunchedanultimatelysuccessfulthree-monthcampaignofairstrikesagainstSerbiathatwas widelyseenas,inthewordsoftheIndependentInternationalCommissionon Kosovo, “illegalbutlegitimate.” AndonJune ,justonedayafterthebombing stoppedinKosovo,theUNSecurityCouncilauthorizedapeacekeepingforcein EastTimortostopIndonesianmilitaryandparamilitaryviolenceagainstthe localcivilianpopulation. This interventionwasunquestionablylegalandalmost universallyseenaslegitimate.Bythecloseofthedecade,internationalsociety hadlargelyacceptedarightofarmedhumanitarianinterventionagainstgenocide, whichatthebeginningofthedecadehadbeenacceptedbynostates.
Statesovereigntywasfurtherredefinedbythecreationofmechanismsforholdingindividualscriminallyresponsibleforcertainseverehumanrightsviolations. AdhoccriminaltribunalswereestablishedfortheformerYugoslavia() andRwanda().In theRomeStatuteestablishedapermanent InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC),whichbeganoperatingin withamandatetoprosecuteindividuals,especiallystateofficials,responsibleforgenocide, crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimes.In ,UNSecretary-GeneralKofi Annannicelycaptured,andhelpedtoconsolidate,thenewunderstandingofsovereigntyreflectedinthesechanges: “Statesarenowwidelyunderstoodtobeinstrumentsattheserviceoftheirpeoples,andnotviceversa....Whenwe readthe[UN]Chartertoday,wearemorethaneverconsciousthatitsaimis toprotectindividualhumanbeings,nottoprotectthosewhoabusethem.” Thiswas(andremains)anexaggeration.TheUnitedNationsisatleastas muchconcernedwithprotectingthepoliticalindependenceandterritorialintegrityofitsmemberstates.Annan,however,accuratelynotedafundamentalshiftin thebalancebetweenindividualhumanrightsandthesovereignrightsofabusive states atleastinsomeextremecases.
Butonlythegravestofcrimes,suchasgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,and warcrimes,aresubjecttointernationalenforcement.Allotherhumanrightsviolations thatis,nearlyallhumanrightsviolations remaincoveredbythe
principleofnationalimplementationofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights. Furthermore,evenintheseexceptionalcaseswehaveonlya right ofhumanitarian intervention,notanobligation.(Talkofaresponsibilitytoprotectisprescriptive oraspirational,notdescriptive.)Andtherecordofactionoverthepastdecadeis mixed.
ConsiderSudan.ThegovernmentthathasperpetratedgenocideintheDarfur regionremainsinpowerandcontinuestoexerciserepressivecontroloverDarfur, whichhasinconsiderablemeasurebeenethnicallycleansed.ButasubstantialUN andAfricanUnionpeacekeepingpresence,alongwithintenseandextendeddiplomaticandpublicpressure,undoubtedlymoderatedthelevelofviolenceandsignificantlyreducedthenumberofdeaths.Furthermore,afterahalf-centuryof sporadicbutoftenintensegenocidalviolenceinthesouthofthecountry,South Sudanwasallowedtosecede,becominganindependentstatein .
TheICCinits firstdecadeaddressedsituationsineightAfricancountries. Perhapsthemoststrikingchangeinattitudestowardsovereigntyisthe firstindictmentofasittingheadofstate thePresidentofSudan,Omaral-Bashir forwar crimes,crimesagainsthumanity,andgenocide.Nonetheless,theconcretecontributionsoftheICCtotheinternationalprotectionofhumanrightshavebeennegligible,andarelikelytoremainnomorethanexceedinglymodestinthecoming years.Furthermore,thesenewnormsandpracticesconcerninggenocideandindividualcriminalresponsibilityhavebeentreatedaslargelyencapsulatedexceptions.Theyshownosignsofspillingoverintocomparablequalitativechanges forhumanrightsmoregenerally.Hopeforfutureprogress,itseemstome,lies insteadintheemergenceofnewpatternsofglobal,regional,andtransnational governanceassociatedwithglobalization.
Globalization,HumanRights,andSovereignty
Coldwar-era “interdependence ” spawnedvariousinternationalregimestogovern ahugerangeofinternationalissues.Bytheturnofthecentury,though,ithadbecomestandardtotalknotsimplyofinterdependencebutabout “globalization,” whichwaswidelyseenasmarkingaqualitativetransformationofinternationalrelations.Organizationonaglobalscale incontrasttothelargelystate-scaleforms oforganizationthatpredominatedinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies(and thatwerepoliticallyandlegallycodifiedinthepost-WorldWarIIpracticesofexclusiveterritorialjurisdiction) hascreatedaninternationalenvironmentmuch
moreconducivetoincreasinglyassertiveandeffectiveinternationalhumanrights action. Inissueareaafterissuearea,activitiesthatpreviouslywereperformedby stateshavecometobeperformedatleastinpartbyregionalandinternationalorganizations,andinsomecasesbyprivateactors(forexample,standardsorganizations,securitycontractors,andtransnationalhumanitariananddevelopment organizations).Theworldeconomyanditsleadingprivateparticipantshave cometooccupyaspacethatisglobal(spanningthewholeglobe),notmerelyinternational(betweennation-states).Transnationalnoneconomicactionhasspread anddeepenedtothepointatwhichitisnowcommontotalkofaglobalcivilsociety.Andsupranationalidentitieshavebecomeincreasinglyimportant,especially inEurope.
Thepostwar/postcolonialvisionofexclusiveterritorialjurisdictionsnowseems quaint andabsolutesovereigntyobsolescent,evenatavistic.Buttherehasbeen nogloballycodifiedchangeinthesovereignrightsofstatesevenclosetocomparabletothosechangesassociatedwithnonaggression,territorialintegrity,and decolonization.Significantformaltransfersofsupremeauthoritytoregional andinternationalorganizationshaveoccurredinparticulardomains,andespeciallyinternationaleconomicrelations.Consider,forexample,theDisputeSettlement BodyoftheWorldTradeOrganization,theBaselCommitteeonBanking SupervisionoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,andcompetitionpolicy intheEuropeanUnion.Suchformalsupranationalsupremacy,however,israre bothingeneralandinthecaseofhumanrights(whereithasbeenrestrictedto genocide,warcrimes,andcrimesagainsthumanity). Statesthatcontinuetoinsistonanabsolutistconceptionofequalandexclusiveterritorialjurisdictionsare inmostdomains,includinghumanrights,fullywithintheirlegalrights.
Thecontextwithinwhichsovereignrightsareexercised,however,cansignificantlytransformpractice,andinthelongrunevenformallegalrights.
ConsidertheInter-AmericanDemocraticCharter,adoptedin bythe OrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS),whichproclaimsthat “thepeoplesof theAmericashavearighttodemocracyandtheirgovernmentshaveanobligation topromoteanddefendit.” Thereisnoformalenforcementmechanism. Nonetheless,theembeddingoftheregionaldemocracynormhasseriouslyconstrainedtheresurgenceofdictatorship.Forexample,themilitarycoupagainst HugoChavezinVenezuelain wasalmostuniversallycondemnedinternationally eventheUnitedStatesfailedtosupportthetakeover,despiteitshostility towardChavez andwasrapidlyreversed.Andinresponsetothemilitarycoup
againstPresidentManuelZelayainHondurasinthesummerof ,theOAS suspendedHonduras’ membershipuntilZelayareturnedtoHondurasin . Althoughthe “politicalindependence” ofAmericanstateshasnotbeenformally altered,ithasbeeneffectivelyconstrained,tothegreatbenefitofhumanrights intheregion.
Moregenerally,appealstoabsolutesovereigntyringincreasinglyhollow.With anever-growingrangeofstateactionssubjecttoformalandinformalglobal,regional,andtransnationalconstraints,andwithnationalactorsincreasinglycollaboratingwithinternationalandtransnationalallies,moreassertiveinternational humanrightspressuresincreasinglyappearasjustonesmallpartofanewkind ofglobalizedinternationalrelations.Globalizationmayevenbereshapingthenatureofinternationallegalobligation.Internationallaw,untilwellintothetwentiethcentury,wasprimarilycustomary,thatis,basedonaconjunctionofapattern ofstatepracticeandasenseoflegalobligation(opiniojuris).Duringthecoldwar eraofequalandexclusiveterritorialsovereignty,treatiescametobeseen,especiallywithinthelegalpositivistmainstream,astheonlyfullyacceptablemechanism forestablishinginternationallegalobligations.Withabsolutistconceptionsofsovereigntyonthewane,customaryobligationsbasedinstatepracticeseempoisedto makeacomeback.
Moreover,althoughstatesretainaformallegalrighttojudgetheadequacyof theirhumanrightspractices,theinternationalcostsofgrossandconsistent humanrightsviolationshavegrown,asillustratedbythepariahstatusoftheregimesinNorthKorea,Belarus,andZimbabwe.Inaglobalizingworld,participationininternationalandtransnationalrelationsisincreasinglycentraltomaterial well-beingandarichsocialandculturallife.NearlytwodecadesagoAbram ChayesandAntoniaHandlerChayescalledthis “thenewsovereignty,” centered aroundtherightofstatestoparticipateinthedevelopmentandimplementation ofinternationalnormsandpractices. Marginalized,orevenmerelydisdained, statespayforexercisingtheirsovereignrightto floutinternationalhumanrights standardswithadecreasedabilitytoenjoythebenefitsoffullinternationalparticipation.Andrecognitionofsuchcostscansubtlybutsignificantlyconstrainthe behaviorofallbutthemostshamelessregimes.
Globalgovernance,throughvariedandoftencomplexwebsofformalandinformalrules,institutions,andpractices,isthelegalandpoliticalexpressionof globalization. Statesandtheirsovereignrightshavehardlybeenreplaced,or evenmarginalized.Infact,theabsoluterightsandpowersofstatesmaybeas
JackDonnelly
extensiveastheywereahalf-centuryago.Butthe relative statusofstates thegap betweentheirrightsandpowersandthoseofawholerangeofnonstateactors hasdeclined.Andtherights,powers,practices,andexpectationsofnonstateactors alterinternationalrelationsandoutcomesevenwherestatescontinuetohave “the same ” (seeminglyabsolute)sovereignrights.
Expandingnetworksofglobalgovernancehavehelpedtocreatemoreopportunitiesforinternationalaction,agreaterwillingnesstotakeadvantageofthoseopportunities,lessresistancefrommoststates,andamoreenthusiasticembraceof internationalactionbycitizenswhoserightsareatstake.Theresulthasbeen theincreasingpenetrationofinternationalhumanrightsnormsintonational humanrightspracticesinawiderandincreasinglydiverserangeofstates.
SovereigntyandInternationalHumanRights
Ihaveconsciouslyavoided(andthusimplicitlyrejected)acommonformulation oftherelationshipbetweenhumanrightsandsovereignty,namely,thatinternationalhumanrightsnormsandpracticeshaveweakened, assaulted, challenged, eroded, undermined, orviolated statesovereignty.Onlyifone conceivesofsovereigntyasanabsoluterighttodowhateveronewantsdotheinternationallawandpoliticsofhumanrightscompromise,challenge,orerodesovereignty.Sovereignty,however,hasneverbeensuchanabsolutegeneralright. Indeed,suchaHobbesianrightofeveryonetoeverythingwouldbeafoundation notforsovereigntybutawarofallagainstall.
ThestandardstoryofthecreationofsovereigntythroughthePeaceof Westphaliarootsstatesovereigntyinthe loss oftherightofsovereignstoimpose areligionontheirstateortoseektospreadreligionthroughinternationalwar (withotherChristianstates). All internationallaw,andmostofinternationalrelations, “compromises” therightsofastatetoactasitprefers.Thereisnothing special andthusnothinginteresting abouthumanrightsinthisregard.In fact,the “compromises” tostatewillfulnessaremuchlesssevereinthecaseof humanrightsthaninmanyotherissueareas,includinginternationalsecurity andinternationaleconomicrelations.
Stateswerenomoresovereignin ,whentheyhadarightofwar,thanin ,whentheydidnot.Neitherdostatesloseanysovereigntywhentheyacquire treatyobligationstodefendallies.Inmuchthesameway,internationalhuman rightsnormsandpolicieshavenotunderminedthesovereigntyofstates.The
particularrightsofsovereignshavealwaysvaried,bothfromeratoeraandfrom sovereigntosovereign.Itisindeedsignificantthatinthe sstateslostthelegal righttomassacretheirowncitizensontheirownterritory.Itisalsosignificant thatsovereigntybytheendofthecoldwarprovidedlittleprotectionagainstinternationalscrutinyandcriticismofastate’shumanrightspractices,andthat globalizingentanglementsaremakinginternationalhumanrightspracticeseven morealegitimatematterofinternationalconcern,furtherrestrictingthefreedom ofaction(ifnotthesupremeauthority)ofstatestoabusetheircitizens.Butstates todayare differently sovereign,not less sovereign,bothingeneralandwithrespect tointernationallyrecognizedhumanrightsinparticular.
Thecumulativeeffectsofformallytransferringsupremeauthorityinmanycentraldomainsmightleadustoconcludethatstatesovereigntyisbeingundermined ratherthanredefined,particularlyifsuchformaltransfersofauthorityarecombinedwithextensiveinformalconstraintsontheabilityorproprietyofstatesto exercisetheformalrightstheyretain.Butnothinglikethishasoccurred(oris onthehorizon)intheareaofinternationalhumanrights.Moregenerally,even intheincreasinglyglobalizedworldof moststateshavenearlyaswidea rangeofsovereignrights,andinmanydomainsmuchmoreeffectivestatecontrol, thantheydidin .Andmanyofthethingsoverwhichtheaveragestateislosingcontroltoday,suchasthe flowofpeopleacrossborders,arethingsoverwhich theyhadevenlesscontrolin or whentheywere,instandardaccounts, unquestionably “fullysovereign.”
TheFutureofInternationalHumanRights
Thesimplestformofforecastingistoextendcurrenttrendsintothefuture.Thisis anattractivestrategywhen,asseemstometobethecaseforhumanrights,we believethatexistingtrendshavenotyetplayedthemselvesoutandwhenwe havenoreasontoexpecttheriseofpowerfulcountervailingforces.Theappeal andsalienceofinternationalhumanrightsnormsseemstobeincreasing,and multilateralinstitutionsareatleastasstrong,orstronger,thanbefore.(Forexample,theUNHumanRightsCouncilisamodestbutveryrealimprovementover whattheUNCommissiononHumanRightshadbecomeintheearly s.) RegionalhumanrightsregimeshaveshownmodestdeepeninginEuropeand theAmericasandstriking,ifstilllargelysymbolic,progressintheArabworld andSoutheastAsia.Transnationalhumanrightsactivitycontinuestospread
anddeepen.Furthermore,thecontinueddevelopmentofglobalizingforcesshould furtherconstraintheeffectivefreedomofactionofstatestoabusethehuman rightsoftheircitizenswithimpunity(evenwheretheyretainsupremelegalauthoritytodoso).
Whataboutcountervailingforces?Above,Iemphasizedthepermissiveenvironmentcreatedbytheendofthecoldwar.Fearsthatthe “waronterror” wouldsubstantiallyinterferewitheithertherangeortheeffectivenessofinternationalhumanrightspoliciesseemtohaveprovedmistaken. Andtheriseof China,thebiggeststructuralchangeonthehorizon,seemsunlikelytoprovoke ideologicaljustificationsforthesubordinationofhumanrightsorascrambleby repressiveregimestodeflectordefuseinternationalhumanrightsscrutiny.
Thefutureisthuslikelytoinvolveincrementalchangesfromthepresent. Althoughfarshortofwhatisinsomemoralsense “needed,” thisisnotanunappealingprospect.Itwillnotpreventsevereandsystematicviolationsbywillfully repressiveregimesandfailedorfailingstates.Eventherelativelymodestgoalof substantialprogresstowardarealresponsibilitytoprotectcitizensagainstgenocidefacesanunclearfateoverthenextdecadeortwo.Nonetheless,wecananticipatethatanincreasinglyrobustinternationalpoliticsofhumanrightswillprovide valuablesupporttodomestichumanrightsadvocates,helptoimpedebacksliding, andinatleastafewcasesbeadecisivecontributorthattipsthebalanceinfavorof humanrightsatmomentsoftransition.
NOTES
DanielPhilpott, RevolutionsinSovereignty:HowIdeasShapedModernInternationalRelations (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, ).
ConsiderSections , ,and ofArticle oftheUNCharter. “TheOrganizationisbasedontheprincipleofthesovereignequalityofallitsMembers....AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinternational relationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofany state.... NothingcontainedinthepresentChartershallauthorizetheUnitedNationstointervenein matterswhichareessentiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanystate”—thatjurisdictionbeingunderstoodterritorially.AlthoughArticle oftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNationsalsoguaranteed territorialintegrityandpoliticalindependenceagainstexternalaggression,thesewordsneverweresupportedbyapatternofstatepractice.
GoingbacktoWestphalia,particularissuesthatwetodayconsidermattersofhumanrights mostnotablyminorityrights wereaddressed.SeeStephenD.Krasner, Sovereignty:OrganizedHypocrisy (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, ),ch. .Ageneralconcernforhumanrights,however, was firststatedintheCharter.
Forintroductoryoverviewsofmultilateralimplementationmechanisms,seeDavidP.Forsythe, Human RightsinInternationalRelations (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, ),ch. ;andJack Donnelly, InternationalHumanRights (Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress, ).Inmuchgreater depth,seePhilipAlstonandFredericMegret, TheUnitedNationsandHumanRights:ACritical Appraisal (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).
TheprincipalexceptionswerehighlypoliticizedcampaignsdirectedathumanrightsabusesinSouth Africa,Israel,andChile.
Kofi Annan, “TwoConceptsofSovereignty,” Economist,September , .
Thecentraldocumentoutliningthedoctrineoftheresponsibilitytoprotectisthereportofthe IntentionalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty().Forrecentdevelopments,see www.globalrp.org/, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ andthejournal GlobalResponsibilitytoProtect
Ratherthananindicationofregionalbias,thislargelyreflectstheintersectionofthejurisdictionofthe court(whichmustbevoluntarilyaccepted)andtheglobalgeographicaldistributionofpotentialcases. Furthermore,fourofthesituationswerereferredbythegovernmentsofthestatesinquestion.
ThestoryItellherefocuseson international actiononbehalfofhumanrights.Globalization,however, mayalsohavemaligneffectsonthenationalenjoymentofhumanrights.Becauseenforcementisalmost entirelyreservedtostates,reductionsinstatecapabilities,whicharewidelyseenasaconsequenceof globalization,mayreducetheirabilitytoprovidehumanrightsprotections unlessalternativemechanismsofprotectionandprovisionaredeveloped(whichdonotseemtometobeonthehorizon).
ThestrongregimeofregionaljudicialenforcementoftheCouncilofEuropeisacoldwareracreation thathasonlyincrementally(althoughnotinsignificantly)expandedoverthepasttwodecades.
Theideaof “softlaw” pointsinasimilardirection,butwithaproblematicassumptionthat “hard” lawis treatylaw.Discussionsofsoftlawalsooftenfocusexcessivelyonpapernorms(ratherthanstate practice).
AbramChayesandAntoniaHandlerChayes, TheNewSovereignty:CompliancewithInternational RegulatoryAgreements (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, ).
Theliteratureonglobalgovernanceisimmenseandvaried.Forusefuloverviews,seeDeborahD.Avant, MarthaFinnemore,andSusanK.Sell, WhoGovernstheGlobe? (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, )andThomasG.Weiss, GlobalGovernance:Why?What?Whither? (Cambridge:Polity, ).
BethA.Simmons, MobilizingforHumanRights:InternationalLawinDomesticPolitics,(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, );andThomasRisse,StevenC.Ropp,andKathrynSikkink, The PersistentPowerofHumanRights:FromCommitmenttoCompliance (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, ).
SallyEngleMerry, HumanRightsandGenderViolence:TranslatingInternationalLawintoLocalJustice (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, ),p. .
KurtMills, HumanRightsinanEmergingGlobalOrder:ANewSovereignty? (NewYork:St.Martin’ s Press, ),p. ;andSoniaCardenas, “NationalHumanRightsCommissionsinAsia,” inJohnD. MontgomeryandNathanGlazer,eds., SovereigntyUnderChallenge (NewBrunswick:Transaction Publishers, ),p.
WilliamJ.Aceves, “RelativeNormativity:ChallengingtheSovereigntyNormThroughHumanRights Litigation,” HastingsInternationalandComparativeLawReview, ,no. (),pp. –;Ann MarieClark, DiplomacyofConscience:AmnestyInternationalandChangingHumanRightsNorms (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, ),p.
FransViljoen, InternationalHumanRightsLawinAfrica (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, ), p. .
PeterSchwabandAdamantiaPollis, “Globalization’sImpactonHumanRights,” inSchwabandPollis, eds., HumanRights:NewPerspectives,NewRealities (Boulder,Colo.:LynneReinnerPublishers, ), p.
StephenD.Krasner, “CompromisingWestphalia,” InternationalSecurity, ,no. (),pp. –
JackDonnelly, “InternationalHumanRightsSince /:MoreContinuitythanChange,” inMichael GoodhartandAnjaMihr,eds., HumanRightsinthe stCentury:ContinuityandChangesince / (Houndmills,Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan, ).