Historical Fundamentalism? by demandside

Historical Fundamentalism? Christian Nationalism and Ignorance About Religion in American Political History

Article in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion · December 2021

DOI: 10.1111/jssr.12760 CITATIONS 8 READS 3,999

4 authors, including:

Samuel Perry

University of Oklahoma

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Joshua B. Grubbs

Bowling Green State University

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Philip Gorski

Yale University

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HistoricalFundamentalism?Christian NationalismandIgnoranceAboutReligionin AmericanPoliticalHistory

SamuelL.Perry DepartmentofSociology UniversityofOklahoma

PhilipS.Gorski

DepartmentofSociology

YaleUniversity

RuthBraunstein

DepartmentofSociology UniversityofConnecticut

JoshuaB.Grubbs

DepartmentofPsychology BowlingGreenStateUniversity

ReligiousrightleadersoftenpromulgateviewsofChristianity’shistoricalpreeminence,privilege,andpersecution intheUnitedStatesthatarefactuallyincorrect,suggestingcredulity,ignorance,orperhaps,aformofideologicallymotivatedignoranceonthepartoftheiraudience.ThisstudyexamineswhetherChristiannationalism predictsexplicitmisconceptionsregardingreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryandexplorestheoriesaboutthe connection.Analyzingnationallyrepresentativepaneldatacontainingtrue/falsestatementsaboutreligion’splace inAmerica’sfoundingdocuments,policies,andcourtdecisions,Christiannationalismisthestrongestpredictor thatAmericansfailtoaffirmfactuallycorrectanswers.Thisassociationisstrongeramongwhitescomparedto blackAmericansandreligiosityactuallypredictsselectingfactuallycorrectanswersonceweaccountforChristian nationalism.Analysesof“donotknow”responsepatternsfindmoreconfidentcorrectanswersfromAmericans whorejectChristiannationalismandmoreconfidentincorrectanswersfromAmericanswhoembraceChristian nationalism.Wetheorizethat,muchlikeconservativeChristianshavebeenshowntoincorrectlyanswerscience questionsthatare“religiouslycontested,”ChristiannationalisminclinesAmericanstoaffirmfactuallyincorrect viewsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory,likelythroughtheirexposuretocertaindisseminatorsofsuch misinformation,butalsothroughtheirallegiancetoaparticularpolitical-culturalnarrativetheywishtoprivilege.

Keywords: Christiannationalism,history,America,politics,religion.

Introduction

Inhis2003book, WhatifAmericaWereAChristianNationAgain?,thelateevangelical pastorandMoralMajorityboardmember,D.JamesKennedyinformedhisreaderswithinthe firstfewpagesthat“Americawasthefirstnationinthehistoryoftheplanetthathadfreedomof religion”(2003:10),that“thenationwasfoundedbythePilgrimsandthePuritans,”(2003:10), andthat“Aslateas1775,98percentofthepeoplewere[evangelicals]”(2003:10).Similarly, anotherMoralMajorityleaderandbest-sellingauthor,TimLaHaye,inhis1990book FaithofOur FoundingFathers,remindedhisreadersthatAmerica’sfoundersclaimed“InGodWeTrust”and “onenationundergod”astheirmottos(1990:193,199).Citingevidenceofgrowinganti-Christian persecution,formerSpeakeroftheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesandauthorof Rediscovering GodinAmerica (2006),NewtGingrichdecriedthat“mostpeopledonotrealizethatit’sillegal CorrespondenceshouldbeaddressedtoSamuelL.Perry,DepartmentofSociology,UniversityofOklahoma,780Van VleetOval,Norman,OK73019.E-mail:samperry@ou.edu

topray[inschool]”(Goodstein1994).Andina2010interviewonhisshow,BillO’Reillyasked SarahPalin,“WhydoyouthinkAmericaisaChristiannation?”Palinresponded:

YoucanjustgotoourFoundingFathers’earlydocumentsandseehowtheycraftedaDeclarationofIndependenceandaConstitutionthatallowsthatJudeo-Christianbeliefstobethefoundationofourlives…[Secularsare attempting]torevisitandrewritehistory.Ithinkweshouldkindofkeepthisclean,keepitsimple,gobacktowhat ourfoundersandourfoundingdocumentsmeant.They’requiteclearthatwewouldcreatelawbasedontheGod oftheBibleandtheTenCommandments.

Eachofthesestatements,amongmanysimilarclaimsthatcouldbecited,isconsistentwitha particularnarrativeoftheUnitedStatesasprofoundlyChristian—indeed,evangelical—andsingularinitsvalueoffreereligiousexpressionuntilitstraditionswererecentlyattackedbyseculars, includingactivistSupremeCourtjudges.Yeteachstatementisdemonstrablyfalse.1 Moreover, theseareonlyafew explicitly inaccurateclaimsaboutreligion’spreeminenceandpersecutionin AmericanciviclifeoftenpromotedinChristianRightliteratureandrhetoric.Farmorefrequent arethemoredebatableor“interpretative”claimsabout,forexample,therelativepietyororthodoxyofthe“foundingfathers,”howJamesMadisonintendedtheestablishmentorfreeexercise clausesoftheFirstAmendment,orwhatThomasJeffersonmeantby“wallofseparationbetween Church&state”(Fea2016;Kidd2010).Likethemoreexplicitfactualinaccuracies,historians oftencriticizeChristiannationalistinterpretationsofAmericanpoliticalhistoryasrevisionist “politicalmythology”(Tudor1972)orwhatLepore(2010)calls“historicalfundamentalism”(see alsoGreen2015;Kruse2015;Noll,Hatch,andMarsden1989).Nevertheless,suchinterpretations reflectapervasiveunderstandingofreligion’splaceinAmericancivicandpoliticallifethatnot onlymanifestsitselfamongpundits,butinpublicdiscourse(Bellah1967;DuMez2020;Kruse 2015;ThePresident’sAdvisory1776Commission2021),far-rightmovements(Braunstein2021; BraunsteinandTaylor2017;GorskiandPerry2022;Lepore2010),andultimatelytheballotbox (Baker,Perry,andWhitehead2020a;Whitehead,Perry,andBaker2018;Bean2014).

Althoughthetendencyfor“whiteevangelicals”orthoseontheReligiousRighttoholdparticularviewsaboutAmerica’sreligioushistoryisoftenassumed(Delehanty,Edgell,andStewart 2019)andevendocumented(DuMez2020;Goldberg2006;Hedges2006),weactuallyknow verylittleabouthowreligionandpoliticsintersecttoshapeconcretehistoricalinterpretations andunderstandingsoftheUnitedStatesamongthegeneralpublic.WeproposethatAmericans’ understandingofreligioninthenation’spoliticalhistoryhasfarlesstodowithreligiousidentityandpractice,orevenpoliticalidentityandideologystrictlyspeaking,butismorespecificallyconnectedtopoliticaltheology.Inthisstudy,weexaminethelinkbetweenageneralideologicalorientationregardingChristianity’sproperplaceinAmericanciviclife—whatscholars call“Christiannationalism”(Bean2014;Djupe2020;Marti2020;McDaniel,Nooruddin,and FaithShortle2011;O’BrienandAbdelhadi2020;Perry2022;WhiteheadandPerry2020a)— andAmericans’relativeknowledgeaboutcertainfactualclaimsregardingreligioninAmerica’s foundingdocuments,policies,andSupremeCourtdecisions.

StudiesofreligionandscientificliteracyshowtheChristiansmostinclinedtowardChristiannationalism(EvangelicalProtestants;seeBean2014;GorskiandPerry2022;O’Brienand

1 NumerousothernationsinEuropeandAsiahadinstitutedreligiousfreedombeforetheUnitedStates(Gill2008).Obviously,thenationwasinhabitedbyindigenouspeoplesbeforethePilgrimsandPuritanslandedonAmericanshores;but evenintermsofEuropeans,theSpanishhadsettledinpartsofthecountrylongbeforeEnglishPilgrimsandPuritans. And98percentofAmerica’spopulationwasnot“evangelical”in1775,evenifoneisonlyreferringtowhiteEnglishmen (FinkeandStark2005).Thephrases“InGodWeTrust”(America’snationalmotto)and“onenationundergod”(inthe PledgeofAllegiance)werenotintroduceduntilthe1950s.Gingrich’sstatementaboutprayerbeingillegalispatentlyfalse asstudentshavealwaysbeenabletoprayorreadtheirBiblesinschools.AndcontraSarahPalin,theU.S.Constitution makesnoreferencetoGod,theTenCommandments,ortheBible;andtheDeclarationofIndependenceonlyreferences “ourCreator”and“nature’sGod,”possiblyreflectingJefferson’smoredeisticviews(Fea2016;Nolletal.1989).

Abdelhadi2020;WhiteheadandPerry2020a)arenotsomuchignorantofsciencegenerally,but influencedbytheirsubculturetotakecontrarystancesonscientificclaimsthatare“religiously contested”(Evans,2011,2013;Perry2022).Andrecentexperimentalresearchsuggeststhatpartisandisagreementsoverpoliticallyrelevantfactsareexacerbatedbya“motivatedreasoning” leadingpartisanstosincerelyadoptincorrectbeliefsthatmaketheirpartylookbetter(Peterson andIyengar2020).Buildingontheseinsights,wetheorizethatthepotentialconnectionbetween historicalawarenessandChristiannationalismislikelyrootedbothinthemisinformationpromulgatedbyChristiannationalistthought-leaders(e.g.,FalkirkCenter;ThePresident’sAdvisory 1776Commission;WallBuilders)andreinforcedbya“motivatedignorance”thataffirmsinaccurateclaimsaboutreligioninAmericanhistorythatareconsistentwithanarrativeseekingto magnifyconservativeChristianity’sroleinthepresent.Wealsoassesstheextenttowhichsuch anassociationispotentiallymoderatedbyeducationandracialidentityaswellastheinterplay betweenChristiannationalism,confidence,andaffirmingfactuallycorrectorincorrecthistorical claims.

Thisstudyextendsourunderstandingofthecurrentpoliticallandscapeintwoimportant ways.Firstandforemost,wedocumentthatChristiannationalismisfundamentallyconnectedto beliefsaboutreligion’splaceinAmericanpoliticallifethatarenotmerelydifferencesof opinion (e.g.,“ThegovernmentshouldadvocateChristianvalues”),butare factuallyincorrect (e.g.,“The ConstitutionreferencesourobligationstoGod,”or“The1stAmendmentallowsforCongress tomakelawsprivilegingChristianity”).Weproposetheassociationislikelybidirectionalwith Christiannationalistideologydependingonhistoricalfalsehoodsforstrengthandyetalsofosteringcredulityor“motivatedignorance”towardexplicitlyinaccurateclaimsaboutAmerica’s religiousheritage.Second,indemonstratingthelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandfalsebeliefsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory,weelucidateanideologicalsourceofcredulity supportingandspreadingfar-rightmisinformationcampaignsregardingotherissues(e.g.,racial inequality,vaccinations,COVID-19,QAnon,voterfraud,etc.).Inlightoffindingsthatsuchmisinformationcanspreadnotonlywithinclosedmedia“echochambers,”butalsoamongpartisans exposedtorivalperspectives(Bail2021),wecallattentiontoChristiannationalism’spoweras anhistorical-mythicalnarrativeandinterpretiveframeinadjudicatingbetweenconflictingfactualclaims,encouragingsuspicionof“rival”secularauthoritieslikeacademicsandscientists (Baker,Perry,andWhitehead2020b;Perry,Baker,andGrubbs2021)andfaithininformation thatsupportstheirpreferredpolitical-culturalnarrative.TotheextentChristiannationalismgrips Americanconservativesandthoseontheextremefar-right,politicaldivisionswillbefurtherriven notonlybydivergentideologicalcommitmentsbutalternativeunderstandingsofbasicfacts.

PoliticalMythologyandHistoricalFundamentalisminAmericanPolitics

Inhis1790lettertoBenjaminRush,JohnAdamsexpressedhisfearthatthecomplexstory ofAmerica’sfoundingwouldquicklybespunintomyth(withhimleftout):“Thehistoryofour revolutionwillbeonecontinuedlyefromoneendtotheother…Butthismyfriend,tobeserious, isthefateofallagesandnations.”Ononehand,thehistoryofanysocietyornationconsists,in part,ofactualfactsandevents(aboutwhichstatementscanbetrueorfalse).But“history”also representsthemythologicalnarrativesthatennobleapeoples’self-conceptionandunitethem aroundsharedvalues(Braunstein2021;Kammen1991;Lepore2010;Stanley2018;Tudor1972). Asaresult,“history”isinevitablypolitical.Historicaldebatesarenotmerelydebatesoverfacts, butbecausesignificantnationalfigures,documents,andeventsoftenbecomesacralized,decisions abouttheirinterpretationholdimplicationsforhownationsandtheirleadersareexpectedtoact inthepresent.AsKammen(1991:38–39)explains,“Whatpeoplebelievetobetrueabouttheir pastisusuallymoreimportantindeterminingtheirbehaviorandresponsesthantruthitself.”And whenthoseinpowerworktoelevatecertaininterpretationsoffigures,documents,oreventsover

others(orsimplyinventfactsentirely),historybecomespropaganda(Stanley2018).Thispattern isnotinanywayuniquetotheUnitedStates(Tudor1972),buttheUnitedStatesstandsoutas anexampleofnationalhistory(includingthebeliefsofthe“foundingfathers”andmeaningof itsfoundingdocuments)beingdebatedinproxy-warsoverwhosevalueswillholdsway(Lepore 2010;ThePresident’sAdvisory1776Commission2021).

Intheory(ifnotinpractice;Kammen1991),theprojectofacademichistoryinthemodern eraisdistinctfromthatofpartisanmyth-makingandpropagandainitsrecognitionofcomplexity andcontingency.Academichistoriansunderstandactorsandtheirsocialcontextsascomplexand eventsasconditional,andthus,applyreasonedskepticismtomythicalaccountsbyscouringnew datasourcesandoverturningpreviousunderstandings.Partisansandideologicalthought-leaders inclinedto“historicalfundamentalism,”incontrast,findcomplexityunusefulandcontingency heretical(Stanley2018).Consequently,theyarepronetoreductionism,ifnotoutrightmisreading ofhistoricaldatatosuitpre-formed,anachronisticconclusionsabouttheinevitablecourseof events,theirprimaryactors,andthesignificancesofboth(Lepore2010).2

ThoughstatementsappealingtotheChristiancharacteroftheUnitedStatescanbefound fromtherevolutionaryyearsonward(Fea2016;GorskiandPerry2022;Green2015),Kruse (2015)arguesthattheconservativeprojectofreadingevangelicalChristianitybackintothenation’sfounding(andthusmakingitpartofthenation’sessentialcharacter)beganinearnestjust afterWWII.AconfluenceoffactorsincludingthethreatofsocialismandemergingColdWarwith Russia,themachinationsofelitebusinessmen,thepolitickingofevangelicalcelebrity-preachers likeBillyGraham,andthestrategicthinkingofpoliticianslikeDwightEisenhowerresultedina nation-widepushtoinstitutionalizeAmerica’s“heritage”asChristianandcapitalistasopposed toatheisticandcommunist(seealsoMarti2020).ItwasatthistimethattheU.S.Congressfeltit necessarytoadd“underGod”tothePledgeofAllegiance(1954)andadopt“InGodWeTrust” astheofficialmottooftheUnitedStates(1956)inplaceofEPluribusUnum(outofmanyone). Shortlyafterthisinthe1960sand1970s,aseriesofculturalandpoliticallossesamongwhite evangelicalscontributedtotheirsenseofpersecutionandembattlementthatwouldfurtherfuel theneedforrevisionisthistoricalfundamentalism.TheSupremeCourtdecidedin Englev.Vitale (1962)and AbingtonSchoolDistrictv.Schempp (1963)thatpublicschoolofficialscouldnot instituteschoolprayerorBiblereading,respectively(thoughstudentshave always beenfreeto prayorreadtheirBibles).Andthough Roev.Wade (1973)iscitedasawatershedmomentforthe mobilizationofAmericanevangelicals,itwasrace,andspecificallytheSouthernStrategyfollowingtheCivilRightsActandforcedintegrationofsegregatedChristianinstitutionslikeBob JonesUniversitythatcatalyzedtheChristianRightofthe1980s(Balmer2014;Marti2020).

Itiswithinthiscontextthatpoliticallyengagedevangelicalleadersbegantoproducealternativehistoriestocounterwhattheyfeltwereintentionaleffortsonthepartofacademichistorians toscrubtheChristiancharacterofthenationinanefforttojustifytheprogressiveagenda(seean earlydocumentingandresponsetotheseeffortsinNoll,Hatch,andMarsden1989).Someofthese claimsweremadewithinthecontextoflongerdiatribesonthemoralrebellionofthenation(e.g., Falwell1980:29–54),whileotherswereexplicitlywrittentoarguefortheChristianorJudeoChristiancharacterofthenation(e.g.,Barton,1989,1996;Flood1975;Gingrich2006;Kennedy 2003;LaHaye1990;TonksandDeweese1976).3 Withinthepastfewdecades,theprojectof historicalfundamentalismhasalsoinvolvedorganizations(e.g.,WallBuilders)and“thinktanks”

2 Indeed,Lepore(2010)referstohistoricalfundamentalismas“anti-history”inthatitdeniestheveryprojectofacademic AmericanhistoryitselfthewayChristianfundamentalistsrejectanycriticalanalysisoftheBible.

3 Althoughhistoriansoftencriticizetheaccuracyofthesenarratives,somehavemisrepresentedhistorysomuchthat publishersthemselveshavegotteninvolved.Forexample,in2012theChristianpublisherThomasNelsonrecalledamateur historianDavidBarton’s(2012)book TheJeffersonLies,citingthat“Therewerehistoricaldetails–mattersoffact,not mattersofopinion,thatwerenotsupportedatall”(Hu2012).

(e.g.,FalkirkCenteratLibertyUniversity)thatexisttodisseminate“Christiannation”narratives tothepews;multimediacampaigns(e.g.,TheTruthProjectbyFocusontheFamily);nicheStudy Bibles(e.g., TheAmericanPatriot’sBible;TheFounder’sBible);andcollectiveorganizing,includingeffortsbytheTexasSchoolBoardtochangehighschoolhistorytextbooks(seeLepore 2010).TheseeffortshavebeenongoingleadinguptoTrump’s2016electionvictory(e.g.,Cruz 2016;Jeffress2016)andthroughouthispresidencyandre-electioncampaign,manifestedmost recentlyin The1776Report,writtenbyThePresident’sAdvisory1776Commission(2021).

ThoughtheseeffortshavebeenconnectedtotheChristianRightandwhiteevangelicals, webuildonrecentresearchshowingthatitisnotChristianityperse,butrathertheideology of“Christiannationalism”thatsuppliestheconceptualframeworkandbeliefsystemconnecting activismtoward“ReclaimingAmericaforChrist”(Smith2000:21)andhistoricclaimsaboutthe country’sChristiancharacter.Belowweconsiderthisideologyanddevelopexpectationsabout howitwillrelatetoclaimsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.

ChristianNationalismandAlternativeFactsAboutReligioninAmerican PoliticalHistory

Bellah(1967)conceivedof“civilreligion”intheDurkheimiansensethatallsocietieshavea “publicreligiousdimension”thatunitesandanimatesthem.4 ThoughoftenusedtosanctifypatriotismaroundtheU.S.Constitutionandthecreedsofliberaldemocracy,BellaharguedAmerican civilreligion“hassufferedvariousdeformationsanddistortions”including“anAmericanLegion typeofideologythatfusesGod,country,andflag…usedtoattacknonconformistandliberalideas andgroupsofallkinds”(1967:109,111).WewouldgobeyondthistoargueBellah’s“distortion” ofcivilreligion,Christiannationalism,carriesethnoracialassumptionaswell.Thus,itrepresents anidentitarianstrainofpoliticaltheologyfocusedonpreservingnationalpower,socialorder, symbolicboundariesofnationalbelonging,andhierarchicalrelationshipsbetween“trueAmericans”(white,native-born,culturalconservatives)and“outsiders”(typicallynon-white,nonnative, noncitizen,religiousminorities).5 ResearchonChristiannationalistideologyhasfoundthatitis oftenamongthestrongestpredictorsthatAmericansholdprejudicialattitudestowardoutsiders (Stewart,Edgell,andDelehanty2018),includingnon-whiteminorities(PerryandWhitehead, 2015,2019),immigrants(Al-Kireetal.2021;EdgellandTranby2010;McDaniel,Nooruddin, andFaithShortle2011;SherkatandLehman2018;StraughnandFeld2010),Jews(Djupe2020), andMuslims(EdgellandTranby2010;Merino2010;SherkatandLehman2018;Shortleand Gaddie2015;WhiteheadandPerry2020a);supportmilitarismandauthoritarianformsofsocialcontrol(Davis2018;DavisandPerry2021;FroeseandMencken2009;GorskiandPerry 2022);favorheterosexual,patriarchalrelationships(EdgellandTranby2010;Whiteheadand Perry,2015,2019,2020a);andvoteforpoliticalcandidateswhorepresenttheseviews(Baker, Perry,andWhitehead2020a;Whitehead,Perry,andBaker2018).

RecentresearchhasalsofoundthatAmericanswhoscorehigheronindicatorsofChristian nationalismarealsohighlysuspiciousofsecularscientists(Baker,Perry,andWhitehead2020b)

4 Bellah(1967:110),argued“TheAmericancivilreligionwasneveranticlericalormilitantlysecular.Onthecontrary,it borrowedselectivelyfromthereligioustraditioninsuchawaythattheaverageAmericansawnoconflictbetweenthe two.Inthisway,thecivilreligionwasabletobuildupwithoutanybitterstrugglewiththechurchpowerfulsymbolsof nationalsolidarityandtomobilizedeeplevelsofpersonalmotivationfortheattainmentofnationalgoals.”

5 Otherscholarshaveuseddifferentterm,suchas“culturalpreservationism”(EdgellandTranby2010);“Christianheroism”(Aho2013);“tribalcivilreligion”(Williams2013);“sacralizationideology”(FroeseandMencken2009);“secularizedevangelicaldiscourse”(Delehantyetal.2019);“publicreligiousexpression”(Stewartetal.2018);and“identitarian Christianism”(Brubaker2017).Despitetheterminologicaldifferencesandslightdifferencesinoperationalization,we aredescribingasimilarconstructinChristiannationalism.

andreluctanttofollowtherecommendationsofexperts,evenwhenitcomestomedicalissues (Perry,Whitehead,andGrubbs2020).ThiswouldsuggestthatnotonlywouldChristiannationalisminclineAmericanstolistentodisseminatorsofalternativehistoricalaccountsofChristianity’s prominenceandpersecutioninAmericanlife,butwouldalsoinclinethemtodoubtthewritings ofacademichistorianswhowouldcomplicateoroverturnthehistoricalclaimsofChristiannationalistleaders.Supportingthisidea,recentexperimentalworkbyPetersonandIyengar(2020) showedthathighlypartisanAmericansaremorelikelytoseekoutandaffirminformationabout politicallyrelevantissuesthatcasttheirpartyinapositivelight,whichaccountsfortheirhigher likelihoodofaffirmingfactuallyincorrectbeliefs.Andwewouldexpectthereverseaswellfor Christiannationalism.Thatis,ChristiannationalismwouldinfluenceAmericanstorejectfactuallycorrectstatementsiftheydonotfavora“Christiannation”or“Christiansasvictims”narrative ofreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.

Butthenatureofourdataissuchthatafailuretoaffirmfactuallycorrectanswersmaybedue toseveralpossiblefactors.Likeotherstudiesexaminingreligion’srelationshiptoscientificliteracy(Evans,2011,2013;Johnson,Scheitle,andEcklund2015;Sherkat2011),thestatementswe useinourstudyallowfor“true,”“false,”and“donotknow”responses.ItispossiblethatAmericanswhoscorehigheronindicatorsofChristiannationalismmayfailtochoosefactuallycorrect answersbecausetheyaremorelikelytoselect“donotknow”responses,suggestingtheythemselvesrecognizetheyareuninformedontheissues.Alternatively,Americanswhoscorehigher onChristiannationalismindicatorsmaybemoreinclinedtoselectfactuallyincorrectanswers, suggestingthattheyarenotconsciouslyignorantabouttheissues,buteithertrulybelievefalsehoodsorareideologicallymotivatedtoaffirmstatementsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticallife thatalignwithChristiannationalistideals(Evans2011;PetersonandIyengar2020).Inlightof thefactthatEvangelicalProtestantsaretheChristiansmostinclinedtowardChristiannationalism(WhiteheadandPerry2020a),andthatpoliticizedevangelicalismtendstobeassociatedwith dogmatismratherthanintellectualhumility(responsivenesstofacts,recognitionoferror)(Perry 2021),weexpectthatthelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandlowerscoresonourreligious historyquizwillnotbeattributableto“donotknow”responses,butbecauseChristiannationalisminclinesAmericanstoaffirmfactuallyincorrectstatementsiftheyaffirma“Christiannation” or“Christiansasvictims”ideology.6

Finally,weexploretwopotentialmoderatingeffects:educationalattainmentandracialidentity.TotheextentthatthelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandaffirmingfactuallyincorrect viewsregardingreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryisduetolackofexposuretoeducation (suggestingactualignorance),wewouldexpecteducationalattainmenttomoderatethisconnection.Specifically,wewouldexpectChristiannationalismwouldbemorestronglyassociated withfailuretoaffirmfactuallycorrectanswersamongthosewithlessformaleducation.However,ifeducationalattainmentdoesnotmoderatetheassociationbetweenChristiannationalism andselectingfactuallyincorrectanswers,thismaysuggestthattheconnectiondoesnothinge onexposuretoinformation,butisrathermotivatedideologically(e.g.,Evans2011).Thiswould alsobeconsistentwithfindingsshowingbotheducationalattainmentandappreciationforfactual knowledge(thoughnotknowledge-producers)hasbecomeuncoupledfromreligiousandpolitical conservatism(MannandSchleifer2020;Schwadel2014).

AndfollowingrecentresearchindicatingthatChristiannationalistideologydoesnotseem toinfluencethesocialandpoliticalviewsofblackAmericansthewayitdoesforwhites(Braunstein2021;Perry,Cobb,Whitehead,andGrubbs2021;PerryandWhitehead2019;O’Brienand Abdelhadi2020),wetestfordifferencesbyChristiannationalismandracialidentity.Because

6 Researchdemonstratesthatincertaincontextsevangelicalsdopracticeformsofintellectualhumility(Markofski2019; MoonandTobin2019),butthatthisisachallengetoprevailingnormswithinevangelicalculture.

ChristiannationalismiscloselyconnectedtoethnicboundariesandintoleranceforwhiteAmericans,butnotforblacks,weexpectitwillbeaparticularlysalientpredictoroffailuretoaffirm correctanswersforwhitescomparedtoblackAmericans.Thiswouldsupportthenotionthat thelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandaffirmingfactuallyincorrectanswersaboutreligion inAmericanpoliticalhistoryhasmoretodowithasubculturalpoliticaltheologythanfactual ignoranceperse.

Methods

Data

DataforthisstudycomefromthePublicandDiscourseEthicsSurvey(PDES),whichis anationallyrepresentativepanelsurveyofAmericanadults(Grubbs,Tosi,andWarmke2019; Grubbs,Warmke,etal.2019).Wave1wascollectedinAugustof2019;Wave2inFebruaryof 2020;Wave3inMay2020;andWave4inAugust2020.Forthepresentanalysis,weuseWaves1 and4,whichcontainournecessarymeasures.Surveywavesweredesignedbytheauthorsandthe surveyinstrumentwasfieldedbyYouGov,aninternationalresearchdataandanalyticscompany.7 YouGovrecruitsapanelofrespondentsthroughwebsitesandbannerads.Theserespondentsare notpaiddirectlybutareenteredintolotteriesformonetaryprizes.Todrawanationallyrepresentativesample,YouGovemploysamethodcalled“matching.”Drawingarandomsamplefrom theAmericanCommunitySurvey,YouGovthenmatchesarespondentintheopt-inpanelwho istheclosesttotheCensusrespondentbasedonkeysociodemographicfactors.Becauseofthe specificrecruitmentandsamplingdesignusedbyYouGov,thecompanydoesnotpublishtraditionalresponserates.However,YouGovdevelopssamplingweightsinordertoensurethatthe surveysampleisinlinewithnationallyrepresentativenormsforage,gender,race,education,and Censusregion.ResultsfromthePDEScomparefavorablywithresultsfromthe2018GeneralSocialSurveyondemographicfactorssuchasage,gender,race,maritalstatus,region,educational attainment,andevangelicalaffiliation(seeTableA.1intheSupportingInformation).Theresultingoriginalsurveysampleincluded2519AmericansthatwerematchedandweightedatWave1. Withsampleattritionbetweenwavesandaverymodestamountofmissingdatathefinalanalytic sampleincludes1378casesinfullmodels.

Measures

KnowledgeofReligioninAmericanPoliticalHistory

InWave4ofthePDES,adultswereaskedtorespondtofivetrue/falsestatementsabout religioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.8 Thesefivestatementsinclude:

(1)The1stAmendmentsaysCongresscannotrestrictreligiousliberty,butCongresscould makelawsprivilegingChristianity.(False)

(2)TheU.S.Constitutionreferencesourcountry’sobligationstoGodseveraltimes.(False)

7 Duetononresponse,theuseofonlinenonprobabilitysurveyshasincreasedinrecentdecadesandcertainvendorsare betterthanothers(Kennedyetal.2016).Independentevaluationsofseveralvendorsusingonlinepanelsincomparison withtraditionalprobabilitypanelsfoundYouGov“consistentlyoutperformedtheothersincludingtheprobability-based [sample]”(Kennedyetal.2016;Rivers2016).

8 Itispossiblethatrespondentstakingthissurveyonlinecouldhavelookedupanswerstoquestions.However,thisis unlikelyasanalysesofsurveytimesyieldednocorrelationbetweentimeandcorrectresponses.Moreover,thepatterns weobserveinselectingcorrectandincorrectresponsesaresoplausiblethatassumingtheywereduetosystematiccheating bycertaingroups(thosewithhighereducation,liberals,whites,seculars)strainscredulity.

(3)Thephrase“InGodWeTrust”didnotbecomethenation’sofficialmottountilafter1950. (True)

(4)Thephrase“underGod”wasnotaddedtothepledgeofallegianceuntilafter1950.(True) (5)SupremeCourtdecisionsinthe1960smadeitillegalforstudentstoprayorreadtheir Biblesinpublicschools.(False)

Respondentscouldindicatethattheythoughtthestatementwas“true,”“false,”or“donot know.”InorderforustoassesstheoverallperformanceofAmericansacrossallfivequestions, wefollowedpreviousresearchlookingatscoresontheGSSscientificknowledgequestions(e.g., Perry,Baker,andGrubbs2021;Evans,2011,2013;Johnson,Scheitle,andEcklund2015;Sherkat 2011)andrecodedresponsessuchthat1 = correctresponseand0 = wrongresponseordonot know.Wethenaddedupthecorrectresponsesandcalculatedanaverage.Theresultwasascale rangingfrom0to100(thoughwithonlysixpossiblevalues),whichmakesforeasierinterpretation.Becausetherearesixtotalvalueswithafairlynormaldistribution(ratherthanlargenumber ofzeros,whichwouldmakeacountsmodellikePoissonorNegativeBinomialmoreappropriate), weestimatemodelsusingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regression.

ChristianNationalism

TherehavebeenseveralmeasuresofChristiannationalismorsimilarconstructs(e.g.,BraunsteinandTaylor2017;FroeseandMencken2009;GorskiandPerry2022;McDaniel,Nooruddin, andFaithShortle2011;Merino2010;StraughnandFeld2010;Stewart,Edgell,andDelehanty 2018;WhiteheadandPerry2020a).OurmeasureisascaleconstructedfrommeasuresrepeatedlyaskedinsurveysliketheBaylorReligionSurveysandtheChapmanUniversitySurveyof AmericanFears(Baker,Perry,andWhitehead2020a,2020b;Djupe2020;FroeseandMencken 2009).Thisscaletypicallyincludessixlevel-of-agreementquestionsusingthesamestatements: “ThefederalgovernmentshoulddeclaretheUnitedStatesaChristiannation,”“ThefederalgovernmentshouldadvocateChristianvalues,”“Thefederalgovernmentshouldenforcestrictseparationofchurchandstate(reversecoded),”“Thefederalgovernmentshouldallowprayerin publicschools,”“Thefederalgovernmentshouldallowreligioussymbolsinpublicspaces,”and “ThesuccessoftheUnitedStatesispartofGod’splan.”Followingpreviousresearch,wecombinethesemeasuresintoanadditivescalerangingfrom0to24,withhigherscoresindicating greateradherencetoChristiannationalism(Cronbach’salpha = .902).OurChristiannationalism measuresweretakenfromWave4ofthePDES.9

ControlVariables

AnalysesalsoincludedavarietyofcontrolstheorizedtoberelatedtoresponsestothestatementsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryandChristiannationalistideologyinlightof previousresearch(GorskiandPerry2022;Perry,Whitehead,andGrubbs2020).Allcontrolsare fromWave1ofthePDES.Sociodemographiccontrolsareincludedforeducationalattainment (1 = lessthanhighschool,2 = highschoolgraduate,3 = somecollege,4 = 2-yeardegree, 5 = 4-yeardegree,6 = postgraduatedegree),age(inyears),gender(male = 1,female = 0), race(dummyvariables:black = reference,white,Hispanic,Asian,Otherrace),familyincome (dummyvariables:zeroto$29,000peryear = reference,$30,000–99,000peryear,$100,000or more,didnotreport),andregion(Southernresidence = 1,other = 0).10

9 WehavealsotestedmodelswithourChristiannationalismmeasurelaggedfromearlierwavesofthePDES.Oursubstantivefindingswerenotonlylargelythesame,butwereinfactstrongerusingtheChristiannationalismmeasurefrom earlierwaves.Thus,wearepresentingthemoreconservativeresultshere.

10 WefocusedonSouthernresidenceasthereferencecategorybecauseoftheconnectionwithChristiannationalism, religiousconservatism,Republicanidentification,and“LostCause”mythology(GorskiandPerry2022;Jones2020). Othercodingdecisionsforregiondidnotaffecttheoutcome.Wealsotestededucationalattainmentasbothaseriesof

PoliticalandreligiouscharacteristicsarecriticaltoincludesinceChristiannationalismmay simplybeaproxyforpoliticaland/orreligiousconservatism(Djupe2020;GorskiandPerry2022; McDaniel,Nooruddin,andFaithShortle2011;WhiteheadandPerry2020a).Politicalcontrols includepartyidentification(dummyvariables:Republican = reference,Democrat,Independent, notsureaboutpartyID),andpoliticalideology,whichwemeasurewithaseriesofdummyvariables(veryliberal = reference,liberal,moderate,conservative,veryconservative,notsure).Religioncontrolsincludereligioustraditionandreligiosity.Religioustraditionismeasuredwithsix categories:Born-againProtestant(reference),liberal(i.e.,non-born-again)Protestant,Catholic, OtherChristian,OtherReligion,andSeculars(includingatheists,agnostics,andtheunaffiliated). Religiosityisasummativescalefromthreestandardizedmeasures:religiousserviceattendance, prayerfrequency,andreligiousimportance(Cronbach’salpha = .85).Fordescriptivestatisticsof allvariablesincludedinmodels,seeTable1.

PlanofAnalysis

Theanalysisproceedsasfollows.Toestablishbivariaterelationships,Table1presentszeroordercorrelationsbetweenChristiannationalismandallvariablesincludedinmodels.Wealso presentcorrelationsbetweeneachofourmodeloutcomevariablesandallpredictorvariablesin ordertoassesshowvariousfactorscorrelatetohigherorlowerscoresor“donotknow”response patterns.Toaccountforpotentialconfounds,Table2presentsOLSregressionmodelspredicting averagecorrectanswersonthe“ReligioninAmericanPoliticalHistory”quiz.Model1represents thebaselinemodelwithoutChristiannationalism.Model2addsChristiannationalismtothefull arrayofcontrols.Model3introducestheinteractiontermforChristiannationalism × educational attainment.Model4introducestheinteractiontermforChristiannationalism × white,Hispanic, Asian,andOtherrace.

Breakingtheanalysisdownfurtherinordertoassessthemoderatinginfluenceof(acknowledged)ignoranceinthelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandcorrectanswersonthequizquestions,Table3presentsfullOLSregressionmodelsinwhichthe“donotknow”responseshave eitherbeenremoved(Model1)orinwhichtheaveragepercentageof“donotknow”responses isthepredictedoutcomeandchoosing“true”or“false”arethereferencecategory(Models2and 3).Allmodelspresentbothunstandardized(b)andstandardized(β )betacoefficientsinorderto assessbothstatisticalandsubstantivesignificance.

Results

BivariatecorrelationspresentedinTable1establishthatChristiannationalismismoderately andnegativelyassociatedwithaffirmingfactuallycorrectstatementsaboutreligioninAmerican politicalhistoryinwhich1 = correctanswerand0 = incorrectordonotknow(r = –.28, p < .001)asistypicallycodedinstudiesofreligionandpropositionalknowledge(Evans,2011, 2013;Johnson,Scheitle,andEcklund2015;Perry,Baker,andGrubbs2021;Sherkat2011).When the“donotknow”responsesareremoved,thisnegativeassociationincreasessubstantially(r = –.49, p < .001)suggestingChristiannationalismisnotmerelyassociatedwithfailingtoaffirm factuallycorrectstatements(whichcouldbeduetoapreponderanceof“donotknow”responses), butwithintentionallyaffirmingfactuallyincorrectstatements.Interestingly,however,Christian nationalismisunassociatedatthebivariatelevelwithselecting“donotknow”responses(r =

dummyvariablesandabinaryvariable(lessthanbachelors = 0,bachelorsorhigher = 1)andneitheryieldeddifferent resultsinthemainmodels.Andinfact,thecontinuousvariableforeducationyieldedthehigher R2 .Thus,weretainedits inclusionasacontinuousvariable.

Table1:Descriptivestatistics

VariablesRange Meanor % SD r withCN r with DV1 r with DV2 r with DV3

DV1averagescore religioninpolitical historyquiz

DV2averagescore religioninpolitical history(w/odonot know)

DV3averagescore“donot know”responses

0–10044%.31-.28***

0–10069%.26-.47***

0–10032%.34-.03

Christiannationalism0–2411.27.2-.28***-.47***-.03

Education1–63.41.5-.22***.24***.21***-.17***

Black(reference)0–110%.02-.22***-.21***.21***

White0–168%-.02.20***.23***-.17***

Hispanic0–113%.02-.07**-.19***.03

Asian0–13%-.04-.05-.02.05

Otherrace0–15%.02.03.05-.01

Age18–905416.2.22***.08**-.11*-.16***

Male0–147%-.12***.20***.07-.18***

Incomelessthan$30,000 (reference) 0–123%.07**-.19***-.15***.16***

Income$30,000–$100,0000–149%.01.07*.07-.07*

Income$100,000ormore0–117%-.06*.08**-.01-.10***

Income(didnotreport)0–111%-.05.05.10*.01

Southern0–138%.10***-.01-.07-.01

Republican(reference)0–128%.46***-.09**-.21***-.02

Democrat0–137%-.42***.03.07.04

Independent0–128%-.03.08**.10*-.06*

NotsureaboutpartyID0–17%.04-.05.06.07*

Veryliberal(reference)0–115%-.43***.19***.31***-.07*

Liberal0–118%-.34***.10***.12**-.01

Moderate0–127%.03-.09**-.11*.05

Conservative0–119%.27***-.03-.09*-.04

Veryconservative0–117%.41***.01-.14**-.10***

Notsurepolitically0–16%.06*-.25***-.18***.25***

Born-againProtestant0–123%.42***-.07*-.15**-.03

LiberalProtestant0–114%.05.02-.02-.04

Catholic0–117%.06*-.06*-.19***.01

OtherChristian0–13%.02.02-.06-.07*

Otherreligion0–112%-.07*.01.08.02

Seculars0–132%-.43***.08**.27***.07*

Religiouscommitment 4.0to 3.94 -.142.7.60***-.12***-.32***-.08**

Note:PDESWaves1and4.

*p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001(two-tailedtests).

–.03, p = ns).Subsequentanalyseswillshowthisnonsignificantfindingisduetothenonlinear natureoftheassociation.

Associationsbetweentheoutcomesandothervariablesyieldlargelypredictableresults. Highereducationalattainmentisassociatedwithmorecorrectanswersandfewer“donotknow” answers.Indicatorsofconservatism(RepublicanID,born-againProtestantaffiliation,andreligiosity)wereallassociatedwithloweraveragescores,whilebeing“liberal”or“veryliberal”was associatedwithhigherscores.ThesepatternssuggestmultivariateanalysesarenecessarytodisentanglewhetherChristiannationalism’sstrongassociationwiththeoutcomesissimplyaproxy forreligiousandpoliticalconservatism.

TurningtothemultivariateanalysesinTable2,inthebaselineModel1withoutChristiannationalism,beingwhite(comparedtobeingblack)isthestrongestpredictorofaffirming factuallycorrectstatementsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.11 Thisisfollowedby being“notsure”or“moderate”aboutone’spoliticalideology(bothsignednegativecomparedto “veryliberal”),educationalattainment(positive),andbeing“conservative”politically(negative). Model2addstheChristiannationalismscaleandthevarianceexplainedintheoutcomeimmediatelyimprovesfrom.227to.254.Christiannationalismisnotonlysignificantlyassociated withfailingtoaffirmfactuallycorrectstatementsonthereligioninpoliticalhistoryquiz,butit isinfactthestrongestpredictor(b = –.112, p < .001, β = –.270).FollowingfromModel1,the nextstrongestpredictorisbeingwhite(comparedtobeingblack)followedbybeing“notsure”or “moderate”politically.However,whilethosewhoare“conservative”or“veryconservative”were significantlylesslikelythanthosewhoare“veryliberal”toaffirmfactuallycorrectstatements inModel1,withChristiannationalisminthemodel,neithernowdiffersignificantlyfrom“very liberal,”indicatingthatChristiannationalistideologyhaslikelyaccountedforthedifferencebetweenscoresacrosspoliticalideology.ThefactthatAmericanswhoare“notsure”or“moderate” politicallyarestillsignificantlydifferentfromthe“veryliberal”suggeststhatitisAmericans whoaredisengagedfrompoliticaltribes(eithernotsureaboutpoliticsoraremoderates)who areespeciallylesslikelytobeawareofhistoricalfactsregardingreligioninAmericanpolitical history.Thenextstrongestpredictor,however,iseducationalattainment,whichispositivelyassociatedwithselectingcorrectanswers.Thiswouldsuggestthatthereisalargecomponentof historicalawarenessexplainedbyexposuretoeducation.Evenso,Christiannationalismisstill thestrongestpredictorevenaftereducationalattainmenthasbeenaccountedfor,inadditionto religiousandpoliticalcharacteristics.

Interestingly,thoughreligiosityorreligiouscommitment(ourindexofattendance,prayer frequency,andreligiousimportance)waswhollyunassociatedwithaffirmingfactuallycorrect statementsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryinModel1,onceChristiannationalism isincludedinModel2,religiosityissignificantly,positivelyassociatedwithaffirmingfactually correctstatements(b = .011, p < .05, β = .115).ThissuggeststhatonceAmericans’politicaltheology—andspecificallytheirviewsaboutinstitutionalizingChristianidentity,values,and symbolsinpubliclife—areheldconstant,Americanswhoaremorereligiousactuallytendto affirmtruthfulstatementsaboutreligion’sroleinAmericanpoliticalhistory.

WhyisChristiannationalismsostrongly(andnegatively)relatedtoAmericans’average scoresonthereligioninpoliticalhistoryquiz?TheinteractiontermforChristiannationalism × educationinModel3testswhetherthehigherorderassociationiscontingentondifferentlevelsof education.Asignificant,negativeinteraction(indicatingChristiannationalismmattersmorefor predictingcorrectanswersatlowerlevelsofeducation)couldsuggestexposuretomoreformal educationweakenstheassociationbetweenChristiannationalismandincorrectanswersonthe religionquizbecauseincorrectviewscouldbeinformedandcorrectedineducationalcontexts.

11 CorrelationspresentedinTable1andsubsequentanalysesinTable3showthisispartiallyexplainedbywhitesbeing significantlylesslikelythanblackAmericanstoselect“donotknow”responsestothetrue/falsestatements.

Table2:Ordinaryleastsquaresregressionpredictingaveragecorrectanswersonquestionsabout religioninAmericanpoliticalhistory

Model1Model2Model3Model4

Predictors b β b β b β b β

Christiannationalism-.012***-.270-.011***-.256-.004-.090

Education.038***.184.030***.148.032***.157.030***.145

White.190***.279.179***.262.178***.261.288***.422

Hispanic.141***.150.135***.143.134***.142.239***.254

Asian.057.030.050.026.050.026.049.025

Otherrace.184***.132.182***.130.182***.130.204*.146

CN × Education.000-.017

CN × White-.010*-.248

CN × Hispanic-.009-.136

CN × Asian.002.010

CN × Otherrace-.002-.021

Age.002***.109.002***.115.002***.115.002***.114

Male.097***.152.091***.143.091***.143.093***.146

Income($30,000–$100,000).054**.085.047*.075.047*.075.049*.078

Income($100,000ormore).046.054.032.037.032.037.029.034

Income(didnotreport).083**.081.065*.064.066*.064.068*.067 Southern.012.019.018.027.017.027.018.027 Democrat.049.075.019.028.018.028.010.014

Independent.082***.116.065**.092.065**.092.058*.082

NotsureaboutpartyID.098**.079.085*.068.084*.068.082*.066

Liberal-.052-.063-.043-.052-.043-.052-.038-.046

Moderate-.167***-.233-.115***-.160-.114***-.160-.111***-.155

Conservative-.138***-.172-.060-.074-.059-.073-.055-.069

Veryconservative-.103**-.119-.009-.010-.008-.010.000.000

Notsurepolitically-.336***-.249-.280***-.208-.280***-.207-.275***-.204

LiberalProtestant.009.009.000.000.000.000.000.000

Catholic-.052*-.062-.063*-.075-.063*-.075-.060*-.071

OtherChristian.041.022.003.002.003.002.001.001

Otherreligion.011.012-.012-.012-.012-.012-.012-.012

Seculars.021.031.006.009.007.010.007.010

Religiouscommitment.000.002.011*.094.011*.094.011*.095

Intercept.014.164**.157*.076

Adjusted R2 .227.254.253.257

Note:PDESWaves1and4(N = 1378). *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001(two-tailedtests).

However,theinteractiontermisnonsignificant.Putsimply,thisindicatesthatChristiannationalismpredictsAmericans’incorrectanswersonthereligioninpoliticalhistoryquizregardlessof whethertheyhaveahighdegreeofeducationorlittleeducation.

Model4testswhetherthelinkbetweenChristiannationalismandcorrectanswersonthe religioninpoliticalhistoryquizarecontingentonracialidentitybyincludinginteractionterms forChristiannationalism × white,Hispanic,Asian,andOtherrace.Onlytheinteractiontermfor Christiannationalism × whiteisstatisticallysignificant(b = –.010, p < .05, β = –.248).ThisindicatesthattheaveragecorrectanswersonthereligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryquizdeclines moresharplyasChristiannationalismincreasescomparedtoblackAmericans.Infact,thelower

Figure1

PredictedaveragecorrectanswersonquizaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryacross valuesofChristiannationalismandblackorwhiteracialidentity ordertermforChristiannationalismisnownonsignificant,indicatingthatforblackAmericans, Christiannationalismdoesnotsignificantlyreducetheiraveragecorrectanswersonthequiz.The plottedtrendlinesinFigure1illustratethesedistinctpatterns.ThoughblackAmericans’average lowerscoresonthequiz(again,largelyduetoapreponderanceof“donotknow”responses),their percentagecorrectdeclinesonlyslightlyacrossvaluesofChristiannationalism(from25percent to20percentattheextremes).whites,ontheotherhand,seetheirscoresdeclinebyroughlyhalf (from67percentto34percent)asadherencetoChristiannationalismincreases.

TakentogetherwiththenullfindingforChristiannationalism × educationinModel3,this findingwouldlendsupporttotheideathatpersonswhoscorehigherontheChristiannationalism scalearemorelikelytofailtoaffirmfactuallycorrectstatementsaboutreligioninAmerican politicalhistory,notbecauseofignoranceperse(characterizedbylessexposuretoeducation), butbecausetheirethnicorsubculturalidentityhaseitherexposedthemtocertainmisinformation sources(e.g.,WallBuilders,FocusontheFamily,AmericanFamilyRadio)orinclinesthemto favoranswersthateitherreinforceafavorednarrative(AmericaasaChristiannation)oraffirms acoreidentity(conservativeChristian-American).

ButareAmericanswhoscorehigheronChristiannationalismactuallyknowinglychoosing incorrectanswers?PerhapsthosewhoscorehigheronChristiannationalismaremorelikelyto failtochoosefactuallycorrectanswersbecausetheyaremorelikelytoselect“donotknow”responses.12 TotheextentthattheassociationbetweenChristiannationalismandincorrectanswers onthereligioninpoliticalhistoryquizisduetopreponderanceof“donotknow”responses,this wouldsuggestthat(acknowledged)ignoranceplayedalargerrole(i.e.,Americanswhoscore higheronChristiannationalismadmittedtheydidnotknowtheanswer).

Model1inTable3predictsaveragecorrectresponsesonthereligioninpoliticalhistoryquiz afterremovingrespondentswhoselected“donotknow.”Thus,weareabletoobserverespondents whoaffirmedfactuallywronganswersratherthansimplyacknowledgingthattheydidnotknow. Model1showsthefullmodelandtheresultforChristiannationalismisnotonlysignificant,but itisevenstrongerthanitwaswhenthe“donotknow”responseswereincluded(b = –.014, p

12 Asindicatedabove,thisisactuallyamajorreasonwhynon-whiteAmericans,andparticularlyblacksinthesample, tendedtoscoreloweronthequizrelativetowhites:theyaremorelikelythanwhitestoselect“donotknow”ratherthan toguesstrueorfalse,whichresultsinthemeliminatingthepossibilitytoguesscorrectlybyaccident.

Table3:Ordinaryleastsquaresregressionpredictingaverageanswersonquestionsaboutreligion inAmericanpoliticalhistory

Without“Do NotKnow”

ResponsesAverage“DoNotKnow”Responses Model1Model2Model3 b β b β b β

Christiannationalism-.014***-.427.003.067.017***.369

Christiannationalism2 -.001**-.302

Education.013.079-.025***-.115-.025***-.114

White.179***.305-.179***-.248-.166***-.229

Hispanic.077.101-.162***-.161-.150***-.150

Asian.129.071-.068-.034-.057-.028

Otherrace.186**.163-.159**-.107-.143**-.097

Age-.001-.036-.003***-.146-.003***-.141

Male.018.036-.102***-.151-.103***-.153

Income($30,000–$100,000).037.073-.045*-.067-.042-.062

Income($100,000ormore)-.006-.010-.054-.060-.049-.054

Income(didnotreport).062.072-.027-.025-.021-.020

Southern.002.004-.011-.016-.009-.013

Democrat.008.015-.042-.060-.041-.058

Independent.036.065-.063*-.084-.063*-.083

NotsureaboutpartyID.075.070-.076*-.058-.075*-.057

Liberal-.042-.060.044.050.032.036

Moderate-.059-.100.087**.114.063.082

Conservative-.006-.009.039.046.015.018

Veryconservative-.001-.002-.004-.004-.015-.016

Notsurepolitically-.266**-.132.284***.198.260***.181

LiberalProtestant-.032-.044-.013-.013-.027-.028 Catholic-.110**-.156.035.039.019.022

OtherChristian-.101-.076-.091-.046-.103-.051

Otherreligion-.035-.044.007.006.003.003

Seculars-.002-.004-.023-.032-.027-.038

Religiouscommitment.004.039-.021***-.164-.022***-.172 Intercept.677***.765***.718***

Adjusted R2 .319.171.176 N 52013781378

Note:PDESWaves1and4. *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001(two-tailedtests).

< .001, β = –.427).Affirmingourexpectations,theassociationbetweenChristiannationalism andfailuretoselectfactuallycorrectanswersisnotduetoatendencytopick“donotknow” responses.Justtheopposite,infact:AmericanswhoscorehigheronChristiannationalismare affirmingincorrectstatements.

Models2and3breakthisdownevenfurtherbypredictingAmericans’tendencytoactually choose“donotknow”responses,indicatingtheyareadmittedlyignorantastothecorrectanswers regardingreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.Justasinthebivariatefindings(Table1),ChristiannationalismisnonsignificantinModel2,suggestingthereisnotalinearassociation,positive

Figure2

Predictedaverage“donotknow”answersonquizaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory acrossvaluesofChristiannationalism ornegative,betweenChristiannationalismandselecting“donotknow.”However,ancillaryanalysesofresponsepatternsindicatedthattheassociationmaybecurvilinear.Thus,aquadraticterm wasincludedinModel3andboththemainterm(b = .017, p < .001, β = .362)andquadratic term(b = –.001, p < .01, β = –.302)arestronglysignificantandinoppositedirections.The directionoftheassociationsindicatesthatthelikelihoodofchoosing“donotknow”responsesto thequizquestionsincreasesasChristiannationalismincreases,butonlytoapoint.Afteracertain point,higherscoresonChristiannationalismpredictadeclineinthelikelihoodofchoosing“do notknow”responses.

Figure2illustratesthisinvertedU-shapedpatternquiteclearly.Thosewhoareambivalent aboutChristiannationalism(scoringinthemiddleofthescale)arethemostlikelytoselect“do notknow”responses.However,amongtheextremes,thosewhostronglyrejectChristiannationalistideologyandthosewhostronglyaffirmitaremorelikelytoactuallyventureadefinitive“true” or“false”tothequestions.AndasweobservedinTable2,thosewhostronglyrejectChristian nationalismaremorelikelytoconfidentlyaffirmthecorrectanswer,whilethosewhoscorehigher onChristiannationalismaremorelikelytoconfidentlyaffirmtheincorrectanswer.Withother factorsheldconstant,thesepatternsinFigure2suggesttherelationshipbetweenChristiannationalismandAmericans’understandingofreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistorycenteraround ideology(ateitherextreme)ratherthanignoranceperse.

DiscussionandConclusions

ThefactthatChristianRightthought-leadersandpunditsmakefactuallyincorrectstatements aboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryiswell-documented(Fea2016;Lepore2010),but untilnowwehavehadnounderstandingofhowpervasivesuchmisconceptionsareamongthe generalpublic,andjustasimportant,theconceptualframeworkthatcontributestoaffirmingfactuallyincorrectbeliefsabout,say,religionintheU.S.Constitution,the“underGod”phrasein thepledgeofallegiance,orlandmarkSupremeCourtcasesinvolvingreligion.Buildingonrecent researchhighlightingtheimportanceofChristiannationalistideologytoshapingAmericans’ politicalattitudesandbehaviors,aswellasresearchdocumentingthetendencyofconservative Christianstoaffirmfactuallyincorrectscientificstatementsthatarereligiouslycontested,wepredictedthatChristiannationalismwouldbeapowerfulpredictorofAmericans’affirmingfactually

incorrectviewsaboutreligion’splaceinAmericanpoliticalhistoryevenafteraccountingfortraditionalmeasuresofreligiousandpoliticalconservatismorkeysociodemographicfactorslike educationalattainment.

Analyzingnationallyrepresentativesurveywithfivetrue/falsestatementsaboutreligionin Americanpoliticalhistory,wefindChristiannationalismisthestrongestpredictoroffailingto affirmfactuallycorrectanswers(eitherchoosingwronganswersorindicating“donotknow”).

Interestingly,onceweaccountforChristiannationalism,wefindreligiosityhastheoppositeassociation,predictingahigherlikelihoodthatAmericansaffirmfactuallycorrectanswersabout religioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.InteractioneffectsindicatetheassociationbetweenChristiannationalismandfailingtoaffirmfactuallycorrectanswersisslightlystrongerforwhites comparedtoblackAmericans,butitdoesnotvarybylevelsofeducation.Moreover,afterremovingthe“donotknow”responses,ChristiannationalismisanevenstrongerpredictorofAmericans’incorrectanswers,indicatingthatnotonlydoesitreduceAmericans’likelihoodofdistinguishinghistoricalfactfromfiction,butitinclinesthemtoconfidentlyaffirmfactuallyincorrect claims.

OurfindingsextendourunderstandingofcontemporaryculturewarconflictsintheUnited Statesinseveralkeyways.OurfindingthatChristiannationalistideologyisnotonlyassociated withdifferentpoliticalorsocialvalues(Hunter1992;Smith2000),butbeliefinexplicitlywrong historicalclaimsgoesbeyondissuesofsubjectiveinterpretationormeredifferencesofopinion tounderscoretherealitythatAmericansaredividedbydifferentinformation.Largegroupsof Americansholdincompatiblebeliefsaboutissuesoffact,withthosewhoardentlyrejectChristian nationalismmorelikelytoconfidentlyandcorrectlyaffirmfactualclaimsandChristiannationalistsmorelikelytoconfidentlyandincorrectlyaffirmmisinformation.Tobesure,weareunableto disentangledirectionalityhere,whichinalllikelihoodoperatesbothways.Christiannationalist ideologyismadeplausiblebyfalseorexaggeratedclaimsabouttheevangelicalcharacterofthe nation’sfoundersandfoundingdocuments.YetChristiannationalism,asanideology,mayalso fosteraformofmotivatedignoranceorcredulitytowardavarietyoffactuallyincorrectstatements,amongthembeingthepreeminenceandgrowingpersecutionofChristianityintheUnited States.

Closelyrelatedtothislastpoint,ourfindingsextendrecentresearchbyfurtherunderscoring thepowerfulinfluenceofChristiannationalismastheideologicalsourceofcredulitysupportingandspreadingfar-rightmisinformation.WehaveshownheretheconnectionwithexplicitlyinaccurateclaimsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory.Butrecentresearchhasalso documentedthatChristiannationalismpredicts(white)Americans’denialofracialinjusticein policing(GorskiandPerry2022),holdingfalsebeliefsaboutvaccinescausingautism(WhiteheadandPerry2020b);incorrectlybelievingthatracialminoritiesaremorebiologicallymore susceptibletoCOVID-19(Perry,Whitehead,andGrubbs2021);beliefthattheIraqWarwas justified(FroeseandMencken2009);selectingfactuallyincorrectanswersregardingreligiously contestedscientificfacts(Perry,Whitehead,andGrubbs2020);beliefinQAnonconspiracies (Djupe2020);andbelievingthatvoterfraudinpresidentialelectionsisrampant(GorskiandPerry 2022;Perry,Whitehead,andGrubbs2022).Takentogetherwithourfindingsinthecurrentstudy, thesetrendssuggestthatChristiannationalism’sideologicalholdonEvangelicalProtestants andtheRepublicanPartyensurethatcurrentpoliticaldivisionswillbefurtherexacerbatednot onlybecauseofdivergentideologicalcommitments,butfundamentaldisagreementsoverbasic facts.

Thefactthattheconnectionweidentifyheredidnotdifferacrosslevelsofeducationsuggeststhatcommunityinvolvementandideologicalallegianceplaythecentralsocializingrolein linkingChristiannationalistideologywithholdingincorrectviewsofreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistory(PetersonandIyengar2020).IfAmericanshigheronChristiannationalismholdthe sameviewswhethertheyhavelessthanahighschooldiplomaoragraduatedegree,clearly

exposuretoeducationperseisnottheexplanatoryfactor.Tothecontrary,ourfindingsuggestsChristiannationalismmayencourageadherentsregardlessofeducationleveltonotonly besuspiciousoftheclaimsofcertainsecularauthorities(especiallywithingovernment,science, andacademia)(Baker,Perry,andWhitehead2020a;MannandSchleifer2020;Perry,Baker, andGrubbs2021),butalsotoexpressundueconfidenceintheirowncapacitytodiscernthe truth.

Additionally,wedemonstratedthattheconnectionbetweenChristiannationalismandholdingincorrectbeliefsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistoryisparticularlysalientamong whiteAmericanscomparedtoblackAmericans.Thoughthedifferencewasmodest,ourfindings neverthelessaffirmrecentresearcharguingthatChristiannationalismamongwhiteAmericans canmeanmorethanChristianorthodoxy,butmayoperateasa“dogwhistle”thatsignalsadesire toprotecttheprivilegesof“peoplelikeus,”meaningpeoplewhoarewhite,nativeborn,Christian, andculturallyconservative.Consequently,pastorsandpoliticalleaderswhopubliclyreference America’s“Christian”heritageinaneffortto“takeback”or“reclaim”or“restore”Americatoa previoustime(Falwell1980;Jeffress2016;Kennedy2003;Cruz2016)alsoimpliesareturnto amoretraditionalsocialorder(Marti2020;GorskiandPerry2022).Tobesure,wedidnotfind thesameinteractionpatternamongHispanicsorAsians.However,becauseHispanicandAsian Americans(especiallyconservativeChristiansinthesegroups)aremorelikelythanblackAmericanstobegrantedaccessintowhitespacesandembracewhiteracialframes,itisdifficulttoassess theextenttowhichmanyAsianorHispanicrespondentsreadourChristiannationalismmeasures similartothoseofwhites.Incontrast,muchresearchhasshownthatblackAmericanstendtounderstandAmerica’s“Christianheritage”differentlyfromwhites(GorskiandPerry2022;Perry andWhitehead2019).

Weshouldacknowledgeseveraldatalimitationsinordertochartapathforfutureresearch. ThoughthePDESisapanelsurvey,theconnectionbetweenChristiannationalismandholding falsebeliefsaboutreligion’splaceinAmericanpoliticalhistorycannotbeassessedfordirectionality.Christiannationalismquestionswereaskedateachwave,butthetrue/falsestatementsabout religionwereonlyaskedatWave4andthuswecanonlyinsureonesetofquestionsprecededthe others.Butevenifwecouldvarywhichquestionswereaskedfirstacrossthesurvey,bothChristian nationalismandincorrectbeliefsaboutreligioninAmericanpoliticalhistorynodoubtpreceded inclusioninthesurveyandthusweareunabletodiscernwhichcamefirst.Thoughtheoretically itisplausiblethattherelationshipisbidirectional,futureresearchwouldbenefitfrombeingable todisentangletherelativecontributionofeach.Secondandrelatedtothis,atpresentwecanonly theorizethemechanismsthatmightexplaintheconnectionbetweenChristiannationalismand holdinghistoricallyinaccurateviews.Specifically,wedonotknowwhetheritisexposuretoparticularinformationsources(e.g.,books,WallBuildersmaterial,sermons,etc.)thathasinformed theviewsofAmericanswhosubscribetoChristiannationalism,orwhetherChristiannationalist ideologysimplyinclinesAmericanstoanswergivenquestionsinsuchawaythattheygravitate towardanswersthatprivilegeChristianidentity,makeitseemmorecentralinAmerica’shistory, andframeitaspersecuted.Futurestudiesshouldteaseoutthesemechanismsbyaskingmore questionsaboutrespondents’mediadietsandsourcesofinformationaboutAmericanhistory,as wellasevaluatingdifferencesinresponsestoquestionsaboutAmericanhistorythatareandare notreligiouslycontested.

GiventheconnectionsnowdocumentedbetweenChristiannationalismandholdingto demonstrablyfalsebeliefsaboutAmericanpoliticalhistoryaswellasscience,medicine,pandemics,andracialinequality,itwillbeinterestingtoseehowextremethedivergencebetween evidence-basedknowledgeandpartisanmisinformationwillgo.Theemergenceofalternative newsorganizationslikeOAN(OneAmericaNews),Newsmax,Infowars,andBreitbartthatare evenmoreextremerightthanFoxNews,aswellasalternativesocialmediasiteslikeParlersuggeststhatAmericanswillbecomeevenmoresiloedintoecho-chambersofmisinformation.We

wouldexpectthatChristiannationalistideologywouldinclineAmericansnotonlytofrequent thesealternativeorganizationsandwebsites,buttobelievetheinformationfoundthereasfact.

Acknowledgments

DatacollectionwassupportedwitharesearchgrantawardedbytheCharlesKochFoundation toJoshuaB.Grubbs.Thegrantingagencyplayednorolewhatsoeverindesigningthesurvey instrumentoranalyzingtheresults.

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SupportingInformation

AdditionalsupportinginformationmaybefoundonlineintheSupportingInformationsectionat theendofthearticle.

TableA.1ComparisonofPDESW1and2018GSSonkeydemographicvariables