TravisProulx1*andStevenJ.Heine2
1 UniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbara
2 UniversityofBritishColumbia
Abstract
Muchexistentialphilosophicaltheorizingandexperimentalpsychologicalresearchisconsistent withthenotionthatpeopleexperiencearousalwhencommittedbeliefsareviolated,andthis promptsthemtoaffirmothercommittedbeliefs.Peopledependonmeaningframeworkstomake senseoftheirexperiences,andwhentheseexpectedassociationsareviolated,theoffendinganomalyisofteneitherassimilatedintotheexistingmeaningframework,ortheirmeaningframeworkis alteredtoaccommodatetheviolation.Themeaningmaintenancemodelproposesthatbecause assimilationisoftenincompleteandaccommodationdemandscognitiveresources,peoplemay insteadrespondtoanomaliesbyaffirmingalternativemeaningframeworksorbyabstractingnovel meaningframeworks.Empiricalevidenceandtheoreticalimplicationsarediscussed. Thebasicthesisofthismanuscriptisthatagooddealofwhatwecallthe‘threat-compensation’literatureinsocialpsychologycanbesummarizedinonesentence:whencommittedbeliefsareviolated,peopleexperienceanarousalstatethatpromptsthemtoaffirm otherbeliefstowhichtheyarecommitted.Thissentencealsohappenstosummarizethe meaningmaintenancemodel(MMM;Heine,Proulx,&Vohs,2006;Proulx&Heine, 2006),whichattemptstointegrateavarietyofsocialpsychologicalperspectivesinprovidingsupportforthisclaim.ThisisnottosuggestthattheMMMisthefirstpsychological perspectivetomakethisbroadclaim.Infact,theabovesentencecouldjustaseasily summarizethebulkofexistentialisttheorizingoverthepastcenturyandahalf.Looking allthewaybacktoKierkegaard,asimilarclaimwasfullydiscussedanddevelopedbythe mid19thcentury,thoughthefulltheoreticalimplicationsofthisclaimhaveyettobe importedanddevelopedbythecurrentsocialpsychologicalliterature.Overthecourseof thenextfewpages,we’llattempttodojustthat–summarizethisexistentialperspective, pointtofindingsthatsupportthisperspectiveinthesocialpsychologicalliteratureand arguethattheimplicationsofthisperspectivewillmovethesocialcognitionliteraturein directionsyettobeexplored.
AnAcknowledgmentoftheAbsurd
In19thcenturyCopenhagen,afailedacademicnamedSorenKierkegaardbrokeoffwith hisfiance ´ esohecouldfocusonhiswriting.Overthenext7years,anincreasinglyisolatedKierkegaardexpressedhisgrowingmiserytoarapidlydiminishingaudience.Then hecollapsedinthestreetanddied.Afewdecadeslater,thewritingsofthismelancholy daneendedupinitiatingadominantphilosophicalguideforlivingofthe20thcentury: Existentialism.It’snotclear–andnotlikely–thatKierkegaardactuallysurmountedwhat
heidentifiedasthecentralbarriertohumanhappiness,eitherinhislifeorinhiswritings. Rather,hiscontributionliesinhisclear-eyedidentificationofthisbarrier:ourexperience ofrealitydoesnotmakesense,weallrealizethis,andit’smakingusmiserable.
AccordingtoKierkegaard,thegreatphilosophicalsystemsofHegelandKantwere riddledwithcontradictions.Theemergingfieldsofscientificinquirywereuncovering contradictoryphenomenafasterthantheycouldbeexplained.TurningtotheGood Bookwasnohelpeither;God’sdemandthatAbrahammurderIsaac,thelasthopeof theIsraelites,madeaboutasmuchsenseasGodsinglingoutJob,theworld’smostgodfearingman,forthemostdegradationheapeduponanyman.Ofcourse,ifourownlives madesenseinanysatisfyingway,wewouldneverhaveinventedthesesystemstobegin with.Alltoooften,theplanswemaketoattainourgoalsfailtoaccountforreality, wherethesegoalscontinuallycontradictoneanotherandareultimatelyrendered irrelevantbyourunavoidabledemise.Absurdity,itappears,iseverywhere.
ForKierkegaard,andtheexistentialtheoriststhatfollowed,the‘feelingoftheabsurd’ (Camus,1955)couldbeevokedby any perceivedinconsistency,thoughthefeelingitself wasremarkablyconsistentinhowitwasexperienced,whetheritfollowedfromfinishing abeerandfindingalivefrogatthebottomofthemug(Kierkegaard,1846 ⁄ 1997)or contemplatingone’sowndeath(Heidegger,1996 ⁄ 1956).Existentialanxiety,writlarge, wasunderstoodasthecommonpsychologicalresponsetothebreakdownofexpected relations– meaning –thatconstituteourunderstandingofourselves,theworldaround us,andourrelationtothisworld.Evenastheseexpectationsareviolatedbycontradictoryexperiences,ouruniquecapacityforreflectionallowsustocompareexpectations andnotetheirfrequentlycontradictorynature.Existentialanxiety,itappears,canbe experiencedinanygivensituation–andoftenis.
IfthiswastheextentofExistentialistpsychologicalinsight,it’sunlikelytheirideas wouldhaveproliferated–notbecausetheywerewrong,butbecausetheyweretoo depressing.Existentialistswerenot nihilists,however,asthecentralaimofmostexistentialisttheoristswastofindasolutiontothecrisistheyhadhighlighted.Evenifthings don’tmakesense,wecananddocompensatefortheawarenessof‘nonrelations’(Heidegger,1953 ⁄ 1996,p.232)inavarietyofways.Themostcommonofthesecompensatoryresponsestononrelationistosimply‘returntothechain’(Camus,1955,p.10)and affirmexistingrelationselsewhereinourenvironment.Were-integratewith‘thethey’ (Heidegger,1953 ⁄ 1996,p.235),whichmeansthrowingourselvesintoourwork,our relationships,ourgeneralinterests–anythingelsethatwefind meaningful.Importantly, themeaningframeworksweaffirmfollowingthe‘feelingoftheabsurd’canbeentirely unrelatedtotheabsurditythatprovokedit.Infact,thisis commonly thecase,particularly whentheabsurdityinquestionisdifficult(impossible?)torendersensible.
PsychologyandtheAbsurd
Althoughtheexistentialisttheoristsmayhaveproposedtheirideaswithoutmuchthought toexperimentalpsychology,therearecentralpsychologicalassumptionsmadebythe existentialiststhatpsychologistscanaddress:(a)peoplearemotivatedtoconstruct expectedrelationsthatcoherewithoneanotherandtheirexperiences;(b)adistinctmode ofarousalisassociatedwithanawarenessthatthisisnotalwaysthecase;(c)motivatedby thisarousal,weoftenengageineffortstoaffirmothermeaningframeworks;(d)doingso makesusfeelbetter,atleastintheshortterm.
Infact,psychologistshavespentthebetterpartofthelastcenturytellingthisvery story,albeitfromtheperspectiveofmanydifferentauthorsofferingdisjointedandsome-
timesoverlappingaccounts.AccordingtoBartlett(1932),allpropositionsareorganizedas psychologicalschemata.AccordingtoBrunerandPostman(1949),theviolationofa schema(nowcalleda‘paradigm’)initiatescognitiveprocessesthatpreservetheschema,as wellassomekindof‘emotionaldistress.’AccordingtoPiaget(1937 ⁄ 1954),theemotional distress(nowcalled‘disequilibrium’)thatfollowstheviolationofaschemamotivatesthe constructionofnewschematathroughassimilationandaccommodation.Accordingto Festinger(1957),arousalfollowingfromaschemaviolation(nowcalled‘dissonance’)also promptseffortstorepairthedamagedschema.Accordingtonumeroussocialpsychologicalresearchersoverthepast20years,violationsofbeliefsaboutliteralimmortalitylead peopletoaffirmworldviewsinanefforttoattainsymbolicimmortality(Greenbergetal., 1992),violationsofsocialaffiliationsprovokeeffortstoaffirmsocialaffiliations(Baumeister&Leary,1995),violationsintheperceivedintegrityofasocialsystemleadpeopleto makeeffortstojustifythatsamesystem(e.g.,Jost&Banaji,1994;Lerner,1980),violationsofsubjectivecertaintyleadpeopletoaffirmothersourcesofsubjectivecertainty (Hogg&Mullin,1999;McGregor,Zanna,Holmes,&Spencer,2001;VandenBos, 2001),violationsofsecurityleadpeopletostrivetoregainasenseofsecuritythrough otheravenues(Hart,Shaver,&Goldenberg,2005),violationsofbeliefsaboutcontrol provokeeffortstoaffirmotherbeliefsaboutcontrol(Kay,Gaucher,Napier,Callan,& Laurin,2008;Whitson&Galinsky,2008),violationsoftheself-schemaareameliorated byunrelatedaffirmationsoftheself(Fein&Spencer,1997;Sherman&Cohen,2006; Steele,1988)andviolationsofbeliefsaboutvalueandpurposeprovokeeffortstoaffirm beliefsaboutvalueandpurpose(Park&Folkman,1997).Underlyingallofthese‘threatcompensation’processesmaybeaneedforcoherence(Antonovsky,1979),aunityprinciple(Epstein,1981),aneedforcognitiveclosure(Kruglanski&Webster,1996)ora needforstructure(Neuberg&Newsom,1993).
MeaningMaintenanceModel–GatheringUptheThreads
Therearetwogeneralperspectivesonecouldtakewhensurveyingthevastandmultiplyingliteraturesinsocialpsychologypresentingthreat-compensationprocesses.Thefirst wouldbetoimaginethateachoftheseliteraturesexemplifiesanentirelydistinctpsychologicalprocess.Asnoted,peoplemayaffirmcommittedbeliefsfollowingdeathreminders forreasonsthatareuniquelyrelatedtomortality(Greenbergetal.,1992),whileothers affirmcommittedbeliefsfollowingself-relatedthreatsforreasonsthatareuniquetothe self(Sherman&Cohen,2006).Entirelyseparate,analogousprocessescouldunderlie compensatoryaffirmationfollowingcontrolthreats(Kayetal.,2008)orself-certainty threats(Hogg&Mullin,1999;McGregoretal.,2001;VandenBos,2001).Thesecond perspectivewouldsuggestthatthevariousthreat-compensationeffectsthatfollowfrom theseliteraturesarenotentirelydistinct,butratherrepresentpartialmanifestationsofthe samepsychologicalmotivation.Westronglyadvocateforthissecondperspectiveandsubmitthatthisunderlyingmotivationisadesiretomaintainmentalrepresentationsof expectedassociations,thatis,meaning.
TheMMMisanintegrativeframeworkthatarguesthattheanalogousthreat-compensationprocessescataloguedinthesocialpsychologicalliteratureare,atleastpartially,manifestationsofanunderlyingefforttoaffirmcommittedbeliefsfollowingtheviolationsof other–oftenunrelated–committedbeliefs.Whilespecificelementsofthisprocessmay varydependingonthecontentofthethreatenedbeliefsandthecontentofthebeliefs thatonesubsequentlyaffirms,wearguethatthecognitiveandmotivationalmachinery thatunderliesthisprocessislargelyinvariantacrossdomains.Approachingthe
threat-compensationphenomenafromthisperspective,weargue,allowsforuniquetheoreticalhypothesesthatarenotcurrentlyexploredbyotherperspectives.Inwhatfollows, wewillelaborateonthisframework,presentevidencethatsupportsthisgenerallyintegrativeperspectiveandsuggestdirectionsforsocialpsychologiststotakewhensubsequently exploringthisphenomenon.
WhatisMeaning?
Acrossthevariousanalogousprocessesthatconstitutethethreat-compensationliterature, wesuggestthatineachinstance, meaning isthreatened,and meaning isaffirmed.However, thisexpression–meaning–hasbeenusedbysomanytheoristsinsomanydisciplinesto describesomanyseeminglydifferentnotionsthatitbeginstosound,well,meaningless. What,then,isthismeaningstuffthatisbeingchallenged,threatened,violated,regainedor affirmed?Ingeneral,wedefinemeaningas relationships.Specifically,weunderstandmeaningtobementalrepresentationsofrelationshipsbetweencommittedpropositions.For example,‘snow’meanssomethingthatiscold,fallsfromthecloudsinthewintermonths, leadstobaddrivingconditions,affordsskiingopportunitiesandtheconstructionofsnowmen.Snowwouldcometomeansomethingentirelydifferentifitweencounteredit warm,oritcameoutofthebathtubpipes,arrivedinthesummerorwasassociatedwith badminton.Thisunderstandingofmeaningfindsitsoriginintheexistentialistliterature. Camusunderstoodthe‘fundamentalimpulseofthehumandrama’asaneedforconsistent ‘systemsofrelations’(p.10).Heideggerunderstoodallexistentialthreatsasinstancesof ‘nonrelation’(Heidegger,1953 ⁄ 1996,p.232),wherethegreatestanxietyarosefrom threatstorelatedpropositionstowhichweweremostcommitted.AccordingtoKierkegaard,thenetworkofpropositionstowhichweweremostcommittedconstitutedoursense ofselfhood,whichhedescribedasa‘relation,whichrelatesitselftoitsownself,andin relatingitselftoitself,relatesitselftoanother’(Kierkegaard,1848 ⁄ 1997p.351).
Nottobeoutdonebythephilosophers,psychologistshavealsooperationalizedavarietyoftermstorepresentthesesamerelations.Theyhaveelaboratedonsuchconceptsas paradigms(Bruner&Postman,1949),scripts(Nelson,1981),narratives(McAdams, 1997),worldviews(Thompson&Janigan,1988),systems(Jost&Banaji,1994),assumptiveworlds(Janoff-Bulman,1992)–andsometimes,meaning(Baumeister,1991).Each oftheseexamplesrepresentrelationsthatjoindifferentkindsofpropositions,whether theyinvolvevalueandpurposenarratives(Park&Folkman,1997),objectcategories (Waxman,1998),analyticandholisticassociations(Nisbett,Peng,Choi,&Norenzayan, 2001),justicenarratives(Lerner,1980),self-schema(Markus,1977)orperceptualschema (Intraub,Gottesman,&Bills,1998).Regardlessofthenatureofthepropositionsbeing joinedtogether,wearguethatthemeaningofmeaningremainsthesame:theexpected relationshipsbetweenthesepropositions.
Somemeaningframeworksrelateoneeventtoanother.Othersrelatefeaturesofobjects, whileothersjoinabstractconceptstoformcomplicatedtheories.Someareexplicitly maintainedsuchthatwecanconsciouslyreflectandreporttheircontent.Othersare entirelyimplicitandguideourbehaviorsinamannerthatliesoutsideourconscious awareness.Manymeaningframeworksareformedonthebasisofobservationandinduction,whileothersareorganizedasabstractedprinciplesclusteredtogetherinwaysthat seemtomakesense.Andwhatisperhapsmostsimilartohowmanypeopleintuitively considermeaningintheirlives,somemeaningframeworksareteleological,andlink ouractionswithasenseofpurposeorhighercalling.Regardlessofwhatpropositions arestructuredbymeaningframeworks,howtheywereformed(directexperienceor
consciousreflection),orhowtheyarerepresented(implicitlyorexplicitly),thesestructuresbottleneckatthesamecognitivejuncture:expectation(Bruner&Postman,1949; Kuhn,1962 ⁄ 1996;Peterson,1999).
WhatisaMeaningThreat?
Weexpecteventstohappenforareason.Weexpecttohavecontroloverouractions, bachelorstobeunmarriedmen,badthingstohappentobadpeople,andobjectstobe permanent.Earlyinourlivesweexpecttoliveforever,andlateronwedon’t(Maxfield etal.,2007;Taubman-Ben-Ari&Findler,2005).Weprojectexpectationsontonovel environmentsevenifthatexpectationisthatwedon’tknowwhattoexpect(Proulx, Heine,&Vohs,2010).Meaningthreatsareexperiencesthatviolateorcontradictthese expectations,whethertheyinvolveunusualevents(Proulx&Heine,2009),inconsistenciesbetweenattitudesandbehaviors(Festinger,1957),alackofcontrol(Whitson& Galinsky,2008),perceivedinjustice(Lerner,1980),threatstooursenseofsecurity(Hart etal.,2005),orareminderofourownmortality(Greenbergetal.,1992).Sometimeswe havepositiveexperiencesthatneverthelessviolateourexpectations(Plaks&Stecher, 2007);theseshouldalsoconstitutemeaningthreats,whereasnegativeexperiencesthat confirmourexpectationsshouldnotconstituteameaningthreat(Major,Kaiser,O’Brien, &McCoy,2007).Indeed,muchworkonself-verificationtheoryrevealsthatpeoplefind positiveinformationabouttheselftobedistressingwhenitisinconflictwiththeirown, morenegative,self-views(forareviewseeKwang&Swann,forthcoming).
HowDoPeopleMaintainMeaningintheFaceofAnomalies?TheStoriesof AssimilationandAccommodation
Regardlessofwhatmeaningframeworkprovidedthebasisfortheviolatedexpectation–beitaperceptualschemaora‘JustWorldHypothesis,’aremarkablyconvergentpicture hasemergedofthebehaviorsweengageinwhenmeaningframeworksarethreatened. Themodesofmeaningmaintenancemostcommonlyencounteredcanbetermed assimilation and accommodation (tousePiaget’sterminology),althoughtheseprocesseshavebeen appliedtoviolationsofscientifictheories(Kuhn,1962 ⁄ 1996),violationsofvalue-laden worldviews(Park&Folkman,1997;Thompson&Janigan,1988)orimplicitperceptual paradigms(Bruner&Postman,1949)underdifferentlabels.Whenexpectationspredicatedonameaningframeworkarethreatened,itisoftenthecasethatweeitherassimilatetheexperiencesuchthatitnolongerviolatestheseexpectations,orweacknowledge theanomalyandaccommodateourmeaningframeworktoaccountfortheviolation.
Examplesofassimilationarecommonacrossthepsychologicalliterature.Ifyou’re presentedwithananomalousplayingcardthatisablackfourofhearts,youmay see itas afourofspades(Bruner&Postman,1949).Ifyouseeamouthmakingavowelsound thatdoesn’tmatchthemovinglips,youmay hear itasthoughitmatcheswhatyousee (McGurk&MacDonald,1976).Ifyouhearaboutsomeonewhohasexperiencedatragedy,youmightimaginethepersondeserveditsomehow,therebypreservingyourbelief inajustworld(Lerner,1980).
Examplesofaccommodationareequallyeasytocomeby,astheycangenerallyfollow fromthesamekindsofmeaningthreatsthatcanevokeassimilation.Ifyou’represented withananomalousplayingcard,perhapsyouconsciouslynotetheanomalyandrevise yourexpectedassociationsforplayingcardsbyacknowledgingthatitcomesfrom analtereddeckofcards,therebynotingalloftheotheranomaliesmuchmorequickly
(Bruner&Postman,1949).Ormaybeyou’reastudentwho’sjustarguedinfavorofa tuitionincrease.Thisbehaviordoesn’tseemtocoherewithyouractualbeliefs,unless, perhaps,youfavoratuitionincreasemorethanyoumighthaveoriginallythought(Festinger,1957).Orperhapsyou’rea5-year-oldwhohasnoticedforthefirsttimethatyour judgmentsaboutthevolumeofliquidhavebeenlargelyincorrect–onehastotakethe height and widthofacontainerintoaccount(Piaget,1960).
Assimilationisacommonresponsetomeaningthreatsbecauseit’sfastandrequires littleinthewayofcognitiveresources,however,theassimilationoftenisnotcomplete andthusdoesn’tfullyreducetheunpleasantarousalthatfollowsfromameaningthreat (Bruner&Postman,1949;Piaget,1960).Conversely,accommodationisamoresatisfying responsetomeaningthreatsinthatitfullyintegratestheanomalouseventintoameaning framework–itinvolvesthecreationofnewmeaning.However,thecostofaccommodationisthattheeffortstoconsciouslyreorganizemeaningframeworksmayinvolvesignificantcognitiveresourcesandmaytakeconsiderabletime.Asanextremeexample,the accommodationofanomalousobservationsintonewscientifictheoriesmaytakedecades (Kuhn,1962 ⁄ 1996).
Becauseaccommodationissucharesource-heavyprocess,inthefaceofananomaly peopleoftendonothavethewherewithaltobegintomakeanysenseofwhatthey’ve encountered.Insomesituations,peoplearenotconsciouslyawareoftheanomaly becauseithasbeenpresentedsubliminally(e.g.,Arndt,Greenberg,Pyszczynski,& Solomon,1997;Randles,Proulx,&Heine,2010)orhasbeenimmediately(butnot completely)assimilated(e.g.,anomalousplayingcards;Bruner&Postman,1949)andare thereforeincapableofaccommodatingtheirmeaningframeworkstorendertheabsurdity sensible.Insomeothersituations,peoplemightbeconsciouslyawareoftheanomalybut donothavetheavailablecognitiveresourcesneededtohealtheanomalyinasatisfying waythroughaccommodation.Thismaybebecauseyou’rea5-year-oldchildwholacks theshort-termmemorycapacitytosolvetheconservationtask(Piaget,1960)oryou’rea 35-year-oldKierkegaardwhocan’tfigureoutwhyalovingGodwouldcreateaworld filledwithsenselesssuffering(Kierkegaard,1843 ⁄ 1997).Alternatively,onemightnotbe abletomakesenseofananomalybecausetheyhaven’thadthechancetothinkaboutit sufficiently.It’sacommonfindinginthethreat-compensationliteraturethataffirmation effectsareheightenedifparticipantsaregivenadistractortaskfollowingthemeaning threat(Greenberg,Pyszczynski,Solomon,Simon,&Breus,1994),whichmayserveto placethemundercognitiveload,oriftheanomalyispresentedsubliminally(Arndtetal., 1997),andthuscannotbeaccommodated.Theremightalsobesituationsinwhichthe anomalyisassociatedwithanexperiencethatissotraumatizingthatconsciouslyreflecting ontheeventistooanxiety-provokingtoeasilyendure(e.g.,PTSD),andthusnevergets fullyaccommodated.Insum,therearevarioussituationsinwhichpeopleareunableto createanykindoflastingmeaningfromananomaly.
WhenitisnotPossibletoCreateRealMeaning,HowdoPeopleRespondto MeaningThreats?TheStoryofAffirmation
Inthesituationssummarizedabove,peoplecometorelyonanotherstrategyfordispellingthearousalaccompanyingthemeaningthreats;thestrategythatconstitutestheubiquitousthreat-compensationeffectsreportedinvariousexperimentalexistential psychologicaltheoriesdiscussedearlier.Thatis,inresponsetoameaningthreat,people oftenengageincompensatory affirmation,whichinvolvesincreasingone’scommitmentto analternativemeaningframework.Totheextentthatthemeaningdisruptioncannotbe
resolvedinanentirelysatisfyingway,peoplewillrecruitunrelatedpatternsofrelationsin anefforttoimmediately–iftemporarily–dispelthefeelingoftheabsurdthatarosefrom theirinabilitytoestablishachainofrelationstoconnecttheoriginalmeaningthreatwith existingmeaningframeworks.
Forexample,imagineamantravelingforthefirsttimetoParis,enjoyingaCafe ´ auLait inabeautifulandornatelydecoratedcafe ´ .Whilegazingacrosstheroom,heobservesa waiterrespondsomewhatrudelytoacustomersittingnearby.Althoughthemanknows thatthisishisfirstvisittothiscafe ´ andthathehasneverseenthewaiterorcustomerpreviously,hesuddenlyexperiencestheprofoundsensethathehaswitnessedthisexact exchangebefore.Thehumofthecafe ´ fan,thedisdainfullookonthewaiter’sface,the pungentaromaofthecoffee,thepictureonthewall,thestringofwordsthathanginthe air,allleavethedisturbingimpressionthatthismanisexperiencingtheidenticalmoment forthesecondtime.Thisdiscomfortingde ´ ja ` vuexperiencemayprovedifficulttoresolve asthemanisunabletounderstandhowthispoignantsenseoffamiliaritycouldhavepossiblyemergedinthisunfamiliarsetting.Withoutbeingabletomakesenseofit,hemight respondtothismeaningbreakdownbysecretlywishingthatthecafe ´ ownerwouldcome stormingoutofthebacktofirethewaiterforhisrudecomments.Wishingthatthewaiter wouldgethiscomeuppancehasnodirectrelevancetotheman’sconfusion;however, affirminghiscommitmenttothebeliefthattheworldisajustplaceandbadbehavior doesn’tgounpunishedallowsthemantoreducehis‘feelingoftheabsurd’bydwellingon acoherentmeaningframeworkratherthanreflectingonhisdisjointedexperiences. Inresponsetomeaningthreats,peoplemayseekmeaningindomainsthatareeasily recruited,ratherthansolelyinthedomainunderthreat.Themanintheabovescenario doesnotneedtomakesenseofwherethisunexplainedsenseofmeaninglessnessis comingfrom;hemaybecompletelyunabletodoso.Whenpeoplearenotabletofind waystointegrateananomalousexperienceintotheirmeaningframeworks,theymay affirman unrelated meaningframeworksothattheycanregainageneralsenseofmeaning. Unrelatedmeaningframeworksmaybeparticularlydesirabletargetsforaffirmation preciselybecausetheyremainunconnectedto,andthusundamagedby,theoffending incongruity.Suchcompensatoryaffirmationsdolittletowardprovidinganykindoflongtermresolutionofthesekindsofmeaningthreats.Nevertheless,thiskindof‘covering overnonrelation’(Heidegger,1953 ⁄ 1996,p.232)maytemporarilydispelthearousalthat aroseastheresultoftheoriginalanomaly.
Thereareseveralexamplesofcompensatoryaffirmationfromthesocialpsychological literaturewherepeopleaffirmanalternativeschemainthefaceofananomalythatare consistentwiththeMMM.Forexample,BurrisandRempel(2004)foundthatwhen peopleencounteredananomaly(i.e.,theyweretoldaboutdustmitesthatwereburrowingintotheirskin–unexpectedandundesirableassociations),theyaffirmedmoralbeliefs (i.e.,theybecamemorecriticalofoutgroups).Navaretteandcolleagues(Navarrete,Kurzban,Fessler,&Kirkpatrick,2004)foundthatwhenpeoplehadmeaningframeworks threatened(i.e.,theyimaginedbeingburglarized,andthushadtheirexpectationsofsecurityviolated)theyaffirmedalternativemeaningframeworks(i.e.,theybecamemorecriticalofsomeonewhocriticizedtheircountry).SteeleandLiu(1983)foundthatalthough peopletypicallyfeeldiscomfortinmakingclose-calldecisions(whichinvolveconfronting manyinconsistencies),thesefeelings,andtheaccompanyingrationalizations,can beassuagedbyallowingtheparticipantstoaffirmthemselves,suchashavingscience studentswearacovetedlabcoat.HoggandMullin(1999)foundthatparticipantswho experiencedsubjectiveuncertaintylateraffirmedasocialschema(i.e.,theyengagedin moreintergroupdiscrimination).Greenberg,Porteus,Simon,Pyszczynski,andSolomon
(1995)foundthatwhenpeopleconsideredameaningthreat(i.e.,theywerereminded thattheywouldsomedaydie),theybecamemoredefensivetowardtheirculture(i.e., theyavoideddefacingculturalicons).Thesestudies,allconductedwithotherparadigms inthethreat-compensationliterature,areconsistentwiththenotionthatwhenpeople encounterthoughtsandperceptionsthatareincongruouswithactivatedmeaningframeworks,theyaffirmunrelatedmeaningframeworksinresponse.
TherearealsoseveraluniquefindingsthathaveemergedfromtheMMMthatwould seemtobedifficulttoexplainwithvariousotherthreat-compensationtheories.For example,ProulxandHeine(2008)observedthatwhenpeopleencounteredaperceptual anomaly(i.e.,theexperimentersweresurreptitiouslyswitchedonthemwithoutthem consciouslynoticing)theybecamemoreprotectiveofthestatusquo(i.e.,theywere morepunitivetowardsomeonearrestedforprostitution).Likewise,ProulxandMajor (2010)observedthatparticipantswhoplayedBlackjackwithadeckofcardswherethe colorsforsomeofthecardsweremismatchedtothesuits(asinBruner&Postman, 1949)yieldedthesameeffectwiththeprostitutionscenario.Thissametendencyto punishaprostitutealsoemergedwhenparticipantsweresubliminallyexposedtoword pairsthatwereincoherent(e.g.,quickly-blueberry)butnotwhentheywerecoherent (e.g.,juicy-blueberry;Randlesetal.,2010).Further,readinganabsurdstorythat containedmanynonsequitursyieldedthisidenticaleffect,exceptwhenparticipantswere forewarnedthatthestorywouldcontainunexpectedelements(Proulxetal.,2010).Quite remarkably,theextenttowhichparticipantswerepunitivewashighlysimilarinmagnitude,regardlessoftheparticularmeaningthreatthattheyencountered.Theseeffectsare notspecifictothepunishmentoflaw-breakers.Otherstudieshavefoundthatparticipants whoencounteredmeaningthreatsembeddedinsurrealistartandliteraturerespondedby makingincreasedbelongingnessaffirmationsandexhibitingaheighteneddesireforstructure(Proulxetal.,2010).Heine,Proulx,MacKay,andCharles(2010)foundthatthose whowereledtobelievethattheirlifewasmeaninglessbecamemorecriticalofanoutgroupmemberandcametodesirehighstatusproductsmore.VanTongerenandGreen (forthcoming)demonstratedthatthesubliminalexposureofmeaninglessness-relatedwords ledpeopletobolstertheirself-esteem,belongingness,needforclosure,andsymbolic immortality.Hence,thereisconsiderablesupportacrossadiversesetofmanipulations designedtoengenderameaningthreat,thatpeoplerespondtosuchthreatswithavariety ofmeaning-affirmationalresponses.
Ofcourse,someoftheaboveexperimentshavebeeninterpretedaccordingtotheoretical frameworksotherthantheMMM.Variousothertheoriesaboutdeath(e.g.,Greenberg etal.,1995),amorphousboundariesofself(e.g.,Burris&Rempel,2004),security(e.g., Hartetal.,2005;Navarreteetal.,2004),self-consistency(e.g.,Steele,1988),anduncertainty(e.g.,Hogg&Mullin,1999;McGregoretal.,2001;VandenBos,2001)aimto accountforthreat-compensationprocessesaswell.TheMMMintegratestheseotherthreatcompensationframeworksthroughitsdomain-generalnature.Forinstance,thethreat targetedinterrormanagementtheoryisthatself-awarehumansneedtoseeksymbolic immortalitytoassuagethe‘potentialterror’inspiredbytheirabilitytoforeseetheirultimate demise(e.g.,Rosenblatt,Greenberg,Solomon,Pyszczynski,&Lyon,1989;butforother interpretationsseeKirkpatrick&Navarrete,2006;Renkema&Stapel,2008).Incontrast, theMMMviewsthoughtsofone’sloomingmortalityasbeingincommensurablewiththe typicalundergraduatesubject’sdailyplansandaspirations–theirto-dolistdoesn’tcontain theconsciouslyreflecteduponentry‘avoiddying’(Heidegger,1953 ⁄ 1996;Proulx&Heine, 2006)andisthusoneparticularinstanceofakindofmeaningthreatthatisnodifferentinits affirmationalconsequencesasthatofthede ´ ja ` vuexperiencedescribedabove.Likewise,
self-affirmationtheoriesdescribehowpeoplerespondtothreatstotheirselfbyaffirming keyvaluesthattheindividualupholds(e.g.,Steele,1988).TheMMMviewsself-affirmationsasoneparticularclassofaffirmations,inthattheyrepresentonewell-developedmeaningframeworkthattheindividualiscommittedtoandstrivestoprotect.Encounterswith anomaliesunrelatedtotheself,suchasimplicitlydetectingachangedexperimenter(Proulx &Heine,2008),shouldleadtosimilartendenciestoaffirmothermeaningframeworks.The tripartitesecuritysystemproposesthatadesireforsecurityunderliemotivationstodefend worldviews,self-esteem,andattachments(Hartetal.,2005).TheMMMviewssecurityas onekindofcoherentmeaningframeworkthatisviolatedwhenanomalouseventscannotbe integratedwhichleadtofeelingsofinsecurity.Studiesfollowingfromuncertaintytheories oftenhaveparticipantsrecallatimewhentheyfeltuncertainaboutthemselves(Hogg& Mullin,1999,VandenBos,2001)ortheirgoals(McGregor,2007)anddemonstratecompensatoryaffirmationofalternativemeaningframeworks.Whileuncertaintynodoubtplays aroleinallmeaningmaintenanceefforts,‘uncertainty’onitsowndoesnotaddresswhywe engageinonemeaningmaintenanceeffortratherthananother(i.e.,assimilation,accommodation,oraffirmation).Insum,eachofthevariousthreat-compensationaccountsunderlies researchthatdemonstratesthatpeoplerepairameaningthreat(e.g.,desireforimmortality, self-threat)withsubsequentaffirmations.EachoftheseaccountsisconsistentwithandoverlapstoacertaindegreewiththeMMM,yettheMMMisabletoaccountforallofthefindingsfromtheseotheraccountsandcanalsomakeuniquepredictions(e.g.,perceptual anomaliesshouldleadtomoralaffirmations,Proulx&Heine,2008;surrealartexperiences shouldleadtoaheighteneddesireforstructure,Proulxetal.,2010),thatdonotappearto beeasilyamenabletotheseothertheoreticalaccounts.Hence,wesubmitthattheMMMis themostintegrativeperspectivethatcanaccountforthebroadestsetofpredictions.
WhenAlternativeMeaningFrameworksarenotReadilyAccessible,Howdo PeopleRespondtoMeaningThreats?TheStoryofAbstraction
Allofthereviewedthreat-compensationstudiessharedacommonmethodologicalcharacteristic–followingananomalousexperience,participantswereprovidedwithanalternativemeaningframeworkthattheycouldaffirm.Forexample,uponwitnessinga perceptualanomaly,participantswereprovidedwithanopportunitytomakeamoral affirmationbybeingaskedtosetapunishmentforawomanarrestedforprostitution (Proulx&Heine,2008).Aquestionarisesregardingwhatpeoplewoulddoifanalternativemeaningframeworkwas not madereadilyavailabletothem.Intheabsenceofan availablemeaningframework,whenencounteringananomaly,wouldpeoplecometo createanovelframeworkinstead?Istheneedtofeelthatone’sunderstandingofthe worldissuspendedinacoherentwebofrelationsurgentenoughthatpeoplewillbegin toconstructnovelmeaningframeworksinresponsetoameaningthreat?
Someevidenceinsupportofthishypothesiscomesfromafewrecentstudies.Whitson andGalinsky(2008)foundthatfollowingthreatstopeople’sperceivedcontrolovertheir lives,participantsreportedseeingillusorypatternsinavarietyofenvironments,fromillusorycorrelationsinadataarraytoheightenedbeliefsinconspiracytheories.Evenmore provocatively,ProulxandHeine(2009)foundthatpeoplewhoencounteredunrelated meaningthreats(eitherbyreadinganabsurdKafkashortstoryorbyconsideringthe disunityoftheirself-concept)werebetterabletodeterminethepresenceofrelationsthat areobjectivelypresentintheirenvironment;thatis,theycould learn newpatternsbetter. Likewise,Randlesetal.(2010)foundthattheseimplicitpattern-learningskillscouldbe inducedbysubliminallypresentingparticipantswithincongruouswordpairs;thisstudy
revealedthatboththethreatandthecompensationcanoccurbeneathconsciousawareness.Thesefindingssuggestthatwhenpeopledonothaveareadilyavailablemeaning frameworkthattheycanaffirm,inthepresenceofananomaly,peoplemaybecome betteratabstractingnewexpectedrelations.Bothaffirmationandabstractionare responsestomeaningthreatsthatallowpeopletorecruitpatternsofassociationsthat areunrelatedtotheoriginalthreat,andsubsequentlygroundtheindividualagainina networkofcoherentassociations.Asinthecaseoftheaffirmationstudiesreviewed above,wesuggestthattheMMMisuniquelyabletointegratethesediversefindings.
WhoMaintainsMeaningintheFaceofAnomalies?
Weshouldnotethatthroughoutthispaper,wehavebeenusingtheterm‘people’inan incautiousmanner,giventhatallofthereviewedstudieswereconductedsolelywith Western(usuallyAmerican)collegestudents,anditisnotyetcleartheextenttowhich thesefindingswouldgeneralizetootherpopulations(Henrich,Heine,&Norenzayan, forthcoming).Itisthecasethatpeopleinotherculturesdoshowevidenceforthreatcompensationeffectsinthemortalitysalienceparadigm,forexample,whichhasbeen conductedinmorethanadozencultureswithvarioussubpopulations(Burke,Martens, &Faucher,forthcoming).Curiously,however,AmericansshowmorepronouncedaffirmationresponsestomortalitysaliencethandootherWesterners,whileWesternersshow strongereffectsthandonon-Westerners.Furthermore,collegestudentsshowstronger affirmationresponsestomortalitysaliencethandootheradults(Burkeetal.,forthcoming).Totheextentthatthesepopulationdifferencesinthemagnitudeofthreat-compensationresponsesgeneralizetootherkindsofmeaningthreats,thismaypointtothe uniqueexistentialvulnerabilityofAmericanstudents.Perhapsit’sthecasethatthose participatinginhighlyindividualisticculturalcontextsarethemostuntetheredfroma protectivesystemofinterpersonalrelationsandexpectedroleobligations,andthisrenders themespeciallydefensivetoanythingthatmightfurtherpromptanyexistentialangst.It mayalsobethecasethatifnon-Westernpopulationsarebufferedagainstcertainmeaning threatsbyprotectiveinterpersonalrelations,thesepopulationsmaybeespeciallyvulnerabletomeaningthreatsfollowingfromviolatedsocialrolesandobligations.Future researchwilladdressthesepossibilities.
Furthermore,wehaveyettoexploretheimpactofindividualdifferencesinresponses tomeaningthreats.Researchfromterrormanagementtheory(Greenbergetal.,1992) anduncertaintytheory(e.g.,Dijksterhuis,vanKnippenberg,Kruglanski,&Schaper, 1996)hasfoundthatpeoplehighinaneedforclosurerespondmoredefensivelyto meaningthreats.Weanticipatethataheightenedneedforclosurewouldbeassociated withenhancedcompensatoryresponsesacrossabroadarrayofmeaningthreats.Itseems likelythatseveralotherindividualdifferenceswillprovetoberelevantinhowpeople respondtomeaningthreats.Forexample,dopeoplewhoseekouttheexperienceof meaningless,atleastasitisrepresentedinsurrealartistictraditions,havedifferentcompensatoryresponsestothreatsthanpeoplewhodonotseekoutsuchexperiences?Hence, anumberofimportantquestionsremainregardinghowmuchthreat-compensatory responsesgeneralizeacrossdifferentkindsofpopulations.
WhyDoPeopleMaintainMeaning?
Therearetwowayswecanapproachthequestionofwhyitisthatpeoplemaintain meaningframeworks,justastherearetwowaysthatwecanapproachthequestionof
‘why’asitappliestoanyhumanbehavior.Therewillbeadistalaccountwhichaddresses theultimatefunctionsthatthesebehaviorsevolvedtoserve,andtherewillbeaproximal accountofthespecificunderlyingmechanismsofthebehaviors.Thevariousfunctions thatmeaningframeworksservegenerallyfollowfromthecontentoftheseframeworks. Forexample,causalscriptsallowpeopletopredictandcontroltheirenvironment(Lerner, 1980),aswellasencodeandretrievememories(Wyer,Bodenhausen,&Srull,1984).Affiliativeschemasfacilitatesocialexchange(Clark&Mills,1979)andengenderapositive feelingofbelongingness(Baumeister&Leary,1995;Hartetal.,2005).Perceptualschemasallowpeopletomakeconsistentsenseoftheirenvironment(Intraubetal.,1998). Teleologicalworldviewshelppeopletodealwithtragedyandtrauma(Frankl,1946; Antonovsky,1979).Moregenerally,meaningframeworksservetosimplifyandprocess thevastamountofinformationthattheyencounter.Otherspecieslikelyalsoaredependentonmeaningframeworkstoprocesstheinformationthattheyencounterfromtheir environments;however,ashumansaretheonlytrulyculturalspecies(Tomasello,1999), theirrelationalstructuresarenecessarilyfarmorecomplexthanotherspecies(i.e.,there aremorepossiblemeaningsthatagiveneventcanhave).Itispossiblethathumansare moredependentonmaintainingfunctioningmeaningframeworksthanareotherspecies, althoughwenotethatcapuchinmonkeysmayshowevidenceforcognitivedissonance (Egan,Bloom,&Santos,2010),whichsuggeststhattheymightcompensateformeaning threatsaswell.Wesuggestthatthepropensitytomaintainthesemeaningframeworks likelyevolvedtoservethesevariousfunctions.
Ataproximallevel,whenameaningframeworkisviolated,we feel somethingthat motivatesustomaintainmeaning.Whilethis‘mood’(Heidegger,1996 ⁄ 1956)seldom manifestsasaconsciousemotionalexperience,theexistentialandpsychologicalliteratures havegeneratedavarietyoftermsforthispeculiararousal,whetherit’sthefeelingofthe absurd(Camus,1955),uncanniness(Freud,1919 ⁄ 1990),dissonance(Festinger,1957), disequilibrium(Piaget,1937 ⁄ 1954),imbalance(Heider,1958),oruncertainty(e.g.,Van denBos,2001).Ifthisarousalismisattributedtoanalternativesource,wearenolonger motivatedtoengageinmeaningmaintenanceefforts(Kay,Moscovitch,&Laurin, forthcoming;Proulx&Heine,2008;Zanna&Cooper,1974).Perhapsmostimportantly fortheMMM,themeaningmaintenancemotivationthatfollowsfromthisuniquearousalstatehasmultifinality(Shah,Kruglanski,&Friedman,2003),insofarasanyavailable meaningframeworkmayberecruitedineffortstoreducethispotentiallynegativearousal state(Heineetal.,2006).
Inthepast,directempiricalevidenceforthisproposedarousalstatewashardtocome by.Explicitmeasuresofarousal–unreliableatthebestoftimes(Baumeister,Vohs, DeWall,&Zhang,2007)–typicallyturnupnoreportsofnegativearousalfollowinga varietyofthreateningexperiences,evenremindersofone’sownmortality(e.g.,Greenberg etal.,1995).Morerecently,however,avarietyofadvancedphysiologicaland neurocognitivemeasureshavebeguntoidentifyreliablesyndromeofarousalandactivationfollowingexperiencesthatviolateexpectedassociations,regardlessoftheircontent. Forexample,Mendes,Blascovich,Hunter,Lickel,andJost(2007)foundthatparticipants experiencedaphysiologicalthreatresponsecommonlyassociatedwithpersonaldiscriminationafterinteractingwithaChineseexperimenterwhohadanAlabamaaccent.While thesetwothreatsareradicallydivergentintheirpracticalimplications,sharenocontent whatsoever–andoneisself-relevant(personaldiscrimination)whiletheotherisnot(an unusualaccent)–theybothinvolveviolationsofexpectedassociations,andremarkably, provokeasimilarnegativearousalstate.Likewise,anexpandingneuroscienceliteraturehas beguntoexploreneurocognitiveresponsestoallmannersofanomaly.Forexample,there
isreliableactivationoftheanteriorcingulatecortex(ACC)followingtheimplicitawarenessoftaskperformanceerrors(Hester,Foxe,Molholm,Shpaner,&Garavan,2005).If peoplearegiventheopportunitytoaffirmunrelatedreligiousbeliefs,thisACCactivation followingperformanceerrorsisdecreased(Inzlicht,McGregor,Hirsh,&Nash,2009). Again,it’sremarkablethatsystemsofreligiousbeliefshouldhaveanybearingonbrain activationfollowingunconsciousawarenessofunrelatedtaskerrors-unlessacommon neurocognitivesystemisinvolvedintheformation,activation,andresponsetoviolations ofanyexpectedassociations,regardlessoftheircontentormagnitudeofimportance.
ItisthecentraltenetoftheMMMthatacommonsyndromeofphysiologicalarousal andneurocognitiveactivationfollowsfromtheviolationofanyexpectedassociationsand thatthisarousalmotivatessubsequentmeaningmaintenanceefforts.Whilemeaning threatsmayvarygreatlyintermsoftheirpractical,temporalandaffectivemagnitude (e.g.,thenewsthatyouhaveterminalcancerversusablackfourofhearts),theMMM contendsthatallviolationsofexpectationsshareacommonsyndromeofimmediate arousalandactivationandthatthissyndromeisresponsibleforagooddealofthecompensationphenomenaconstitutethethreat-affirmationliterature.Whetheritinvolvesa blackfourofhearts,aKafkashortstory,athreattoone’sself-conceptorthesudden reminderofone’smortality,wemaintaintheseexpectancy-violatingexperiencesbottleneckatthesame‘oldbrain’systemthatevolvedtodetectdeviationsfromexpected associationsandrespondtothesedeviationsinanadaptivemanner.Intheshortterm,this ofteninvolvesretreatingandretrenchingwithinasetoffamiliar(andsafe)expectedassociations(alsoseePeterson,1999);thatis,theaffirmationofrelatedorunrelatedexpected associations.Thismayalsoinvolveaheightenedmotivationandcapacitytolearnnovel, reliableassociationsfollowingtheviolationofunrelatedassociationstowhichwewere committed(i.e.,abstraction).
Webelievethatthepostulationofasinglesyndromeofarousalandactivation,onethat followsfromanymeaningthreatandthatpartiallymotivatesallsubsequentmeaningmaintenanceefforts,isasignificantcontributiontothefield,forthefollowingthreereasons:
1.Itexplainswhycontentdoesnotseemrelevantintermsofwhatconstitutesameaningthreat.
Ifthesamesyndromeofarousalandactivationfollowsfromanyviolationofexpected associations,itwouldexplaintheoverwhelmingbehavioralcommonalitybetweensubsequentcompensationefforts.Moreover,itwouldofferanexplanationthatdoesnotfollow fromthreat-compensationtheoriesthatexplainthesethreatsintermsofspecificcontent. Forexample,agooddealofthethreat-compensationliteraturemaybedescribedas ego-defensetheories,insofarastheyfocusonthreatstotheself-concept(e.g.,Swann, Stein-Seroussi,&Giesler,1992),self-security(Hartetal.,2005),orself-esteem(Tesser, 2000),oftenarguingthatmostorallthreat-compensationbehaviorsfollowfromthreats totheself(e.g.,subjectiveuncertainty;Hogg,2000;andVandenBos,2009).Ifarousal thatfollowsfromthreatsassociatedwiththeselfalsofollowsfrom any committedbelief violation,thenweshouldseeanalogouscompensatoryaffirmationeffortsfollowingfrom threatsunrelatedtotheself-concept.Aswehavenoted,thisappearstobethecase,such thatimplicitlyperceivedvisualanomaliesthatareunrelatedtotheself,suchasinteracting withachangingexperimenter(Proulx&Heine,2008),playingcardswithadoctored deck(Proulx&Major,2010)orseeingsubliminallypresentedsyntacticanomalies (Randlesetal.,2010)provokeidenticalcompensatoryaffirmationsefforts.Ego-defense theoriescannotexplainwhypresentingpeoplewithablackfourofheartsshouldprovoke thesamecompensatoryaffirmationeffortsthatfollowfromthreatstoone’sself-concept (e.g.,Steele,1988).Furthermore,ego-defensetheoriescannotexplainwhynegativearousalfollowsfromthreatsunrelatedtotheself(e.g.,Mendesetal.,2007)orwhygood
newsabouttheselfthatneverthelessviolatescommittedbeliefsproducesnegativearousal (e.g.,Plaks&Stecher,2007).
2.Itexplainswhyunrelatedmeaningframeworksmayberecruitedfollowingameaningthreat.
Totheextentthatacommonarousal ⁄ activationsyndromefollowsfromanymeaning violation,itwouldseemunlikelythatthisarousalwouldnecessitatethatthemeaning frameworkthatisaffirmedwouldneedtosharecontentwiththemeaningframework thatwasviolated(e.g.,whenbehaviorsaredissonantwithattitudes,therelevantattitudes areaccommodated,Festinger,1957).Wesuggestthatcontent-specifictheories(e.g.,terrormanagementtheory)shouldhaveanexplanationforwhythesameaffirmationof moralvaluesfollowsfromathreatthatcanbeunderstoodascontentrelevant(e.g.,mortalitysalience)andthreatsthatareunrelatedfromthatcontent(e.g.,seeingachanging experimenter).
3.Hypothesizesameasurablecausalagentattheheartofthethreat-affirmationliterature. Aswehavenoted,thehuntisalreadyunderwayfortheuniquearousalandactivation statethatmaycommonlyunderliethreat-compensationphenomena.Variouselementsof thissyndrome–beitcardiovascularthreatresponsesorACCactivation–mayturnout tobenecessaryorsufficient(orboth)inelicitingcompensatoryresponsestoagiven meaningthreat.Determiningthenatureofthisprocesswillbeakeyadvancementofthe literature.Further,theMMMwouldgainadditionalsupportifitcouldbeshownthat thesamearousalandactivationstatesunderlieadiversearrayofthreat-compensatory responses.
WhereDoWeGoFromHere?
Webeganthismanuscriptbysummarizingthethreat-compensationliteratureinasingle sentence:whencommittedbeliefsareviolated,peopleexperienceanarousalstatethat promptsthemtoaffirmotherbeliefstowhichtheyarecommitted.Thissummaryisa frankacknowledgmentoftheoverwhelmingsimilaritybetweenstudiesthatfollowfroma varietyofthreat-compensationtheoriesinsocialpsychology.Thissummaryalsoprovides thejustificationforidentifyingthethreat-compensationliteratureasanidentifiableliteratureattheoutset.Inwhatfollowed,wesummarizedanexistentialistliteraturethat explicitlyelaboratedthisperspectivebackintothe19thcenturyandarguedthatstudies followingfromvarious,currentsocialpsychologicaltheoriesofferpiecemealempirical supportforthisperspective.WealsopresentedevidencefollowingfromtheMMMthat providesdirectempiricalsupportforthisclaimandoffersevidenceofcompensation effectsnotyetaddressedinthesocialpsychologicalliterature.Ultimately,thisisour centralaimwiththeMMM–togenerateandtesthypothesesthatdonotfollowfrom existingtheoriesinthethreat-compensationliteratureandtogeneratefindingsthatare notaccountedforbythesetheories.
Thedomain-generalnatureoftheMMMisarguablyboththemodel’sgreateststrength anditsgreatestweakness.Itisitsgreateststrengthinofferingaunifyingtheory,by providingalatticefromwhichthediversethreadsofthevariousthreat-compensation paradigmscanbewoventogether.Butitisalsoitsgreatestweaknessinthatamodelthat triestoexplaineverythingmayappeartobeunfalsifiableandboundaryless.Itisareasonablequestion,giventhedomain-generalnatureoftheMMM,tothenconsiderwhat kindsofeventswould not constituteameaningthreat,andwhatkindofevidencewould beneededtofalsifythetheory.
Althoughthefindingsofourstudiesthusfarindicatethatthe content ofameaningframeworkdoesnotseemtomatterintermsofwhichmeaningframeworkscanbeaffirmedin
thefaceofameaningthreat(i.e.,theydonotappeartoshareanycontentwiththemeaning frameworksbeingthreatened),the structure oftheframeworkclearlydoesmatter.The MMMmaintainsthattheuncannysensethatarisesfromthedetectionofanomaliesmotivateseffortstoperceivethattheworldasunfoldinginwaysconsistentwiththeirexpectations–acoherentstructureofrelatedassociationsmustbepreserved.Whatiscriticalisthe strengthofone’scommitment totheexpectations.Eventhoughplayingcardswithblackhearts aretrivialintermsoftheircontent,peoplearehighlycommittedtotheexpectationthat heartsareredbecausetheylikelyhavebeenforeveryotherdeckofplayingcardsthatour participantshadencountered.Blackheartswouldceasetobeameaningthreatoncepeople’s commitmenttothisassociationisweakened,asitwouldbebyinformingpeoplethatsome cardsareofdifferentcolors.Likewise,wefoundthattheinherentmeaningthreatentailedin readinganabsurdstorywaseliminatedwhenparticipantsweregivenahead’supthatthey weregoingtoreadsomethingunusual(Proulxetal.,2010).Theparticipantswerestill uncertainastowhatspecificcontenttheywouldencounter,buttheydidknowtoanticipate thatthecontentwouldnotmapontotheirexpectations.Hence,themodelcanbefalsified byvaryingpeople’scommitmenttotheirexpectations,andtheseshouldbeassociatedwith concomitantcompensatoryresponses.
Earlier,wedescribedsomeeffortstomapouttheunderlyingphysiologyofthearousal elicitedbymeaningthreats(e.g.,Inzlichtetal.,2009;Mendesetal.,2007).Totheextent thatareliablemeaningthreatsignalisidentified,thistoocouldbeimportantforidentifyingboundaryconditionsinthemodel;onecouldidentifywhichparticipantsshoweda specificphysiologicalarousalresponsetothestimulusandthiswouldservetopredictthat thesameparticipantsshouldshowaclearcompensatoryresponseaswell.Anobjective measureofphysiologicalarousalorneuralactivationwouldthusbevaluableinhelpingto identifywhatkindsofmeaningviolationswouldleadtocompensatoryresponsesandin determiningwhetherthecompensatoryresponseseffectivelyreducethenegativearousal.
Weclosebyhighlightingonepositiveconsequenceofthebroaddomain-generalnature oftheMMM:themostinterestingquestionsregardingthemodelhavenotevenbeenasked yet,letaloneanswered.Asafield,socialpsychologyisusedtodealingwithsmallerand moreconstrainedtheories,whicharelimitedtoinvolvingcertainkindsofcontentincertain kindsofsituations.Perhapstheexpansionofsocialneurosciencewillcontinuetorevealthat thesamebrainmechanismsareinvolvedinmultipleprocesses(e.g.,Eisenberger, Lieberman,&Williams,2003),andaccordingly,thefieldwillbegintoexpectthatprocesses aremoreintegratedthanhastraditionallybeenconsidered.Whatevercommonthreadis ultimatelyidentifiedasthatwhichbesttiestogetherthethreat-compensationliterature(our betisonmeaning)willleadresearcherstostrivetounderstandthenatureandconsequences ofintegratedanddomain-generalpsychologicalprocesses.Thisquestwilllargelyoccurin unfamiliarterritoryandwithanyluckwillleadtosomeexcitingdiscoveriesthatconnect previouslydistinctlandscapes.
ShortBiographies
TravisProulxisanAssistantProfessoratSimonFraserUniversity.Hisresearchinterests spanSocialandDevelopmentalpsychology,withaspecialemphasisonhowmeaning frameworksareformedandmaintainedoverthecourseofone’slife.
StevenJ.HeineisProfessorofPsychologyandDistinguishedUniversityScholaratthe UniversityofBritishColumbia.Hisresearchislargelydirectedatthreetopics:cultural psychology,meaningmaintenanceandgeneticessentialism.Dr.Heinehasreceivedthe EarlyCareerAwardfromtheInternationalSocietyofSelfandIdentityandthe
DistinguishedScientistEarlyCareerAwardforSocialPsychologyfromtheAmerican PsychologicalAssociation.HeistheauthorofatextbookentitledCulturalPsychology.
Endnote
*Correspondenceaddress:DepartmentofPsychology,SimonFraserUniversity,RCB5246,8888University Drive,BurnabyBC,V5A1S6,Canada.Email:travis_proulx@sfu.ca
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