In much of the development literature, neoliberalism is portrayed as an innovative new development strategy which was created to address the key contradictions of previously dominant development frameworks, such as the modernisation approach and other Keynesian models. Despite such claims, however,manyofthemostseriouscontradictionsofmodernisationtheoryseem tobereappearingintheneoliberaldevelopmentframework.Theseshortcomings makeneoliberalismsusceptibletomanyofthesamecriticismsthathaveplagued modernisationtheoryand,eventually,contributedtoitsdemise.Thispaperwill concentrate on problems stemming from the common shortcomings between thesetwodevelopmentframeworks.
Inordertounderstandandexplainprocessesofdevelopment,weneedtobecome more sensitiveto thecomplexitiesofvariousdevelopmentexperiencesand to forgemoreappropriateconceptualtoolswithindevelopmenttheoryforinterpretingsuchexperiences.Fromthemoretraditionalmodernisationparadigmtothe newer neoliberalframework,mainstream developmenttheory has been almost entirely rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few Western industrialisedsocieties.However,asBrutonnotes:`Knowledgeaboutthedevelopmentprocessinaparticularenvironmentataparticulartimedoesnotexistin transferableform, rather it is the productof the developmentprocess itself.’1
An ongoingtensionexistswithindevelopmenttheorybetweenthedesireto formulateuniversallyvalid principlesand formal models (based on a stylised versionofthedevelopmenthistoryoftheWest)andtheneedtounderstandthe greatvarietyofactualexperiencesandpotentialalternativesfordevelopmentin differentsocieties.GiventheirWesternsocialsciencebackground,manydevelopmenttheoristsacrossarangeofdisciplineshavebeenpreconditionedtolook for parallelsbetween the developmenthistory of the West and contemporary development in non-Western societies; as a result, the actual development experiencesofdifferentsocietieshavebeensimpli® edanddistorted.2 Becauseof this, many analyses have been conceptuallyincapable of addressing the root causesofcriticaldevelopmentproblemsinthesesocieties.
No formalistic development orthodoxy, whether that of economic JohnBrohmanisAssistantProfessorofGeographyatSimonFraserUniversity,Canada.
0143-6597/95/010121±20Ó1995ThirdWorldQuarterly
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liberalisation or state interventionism, can provide universal solutions to the problemsofallsocietiesatalltimes.Solutionstodevelopmentproblemsmust be found in the `contextuality’ of development as a product of particular historicalprocesses.3 The contextof developmentis constantlychangingat a varietyofscalesovertimeandamongsocieties,creatingbothnewobstaclesand newopportunitiesforvariationsindevelopment.Becauseofthis,itisdif® cult to draw conclusionsfrom the developmentexperiencesof particularsocieties duringparticularperiodsandexpectthese ndingstobevalidforothercases. Strategies and theories of development must come to grips with the basic pluralismsofdevelopment(iebasedinthedynamicsofconcretesocialformationsstructuredbyclass,ethnicity,gender,religion,language,etc)thatproduce importantdifferencesamongsocietiesacrossbothtimeandspace.Geographical andhistoricaldiversityattheglobal,nationalandlocal/regionalscalesneedsto be recognised within development frameworks, especially those designed to contributetowardspolicymaking.Suchdiversityisresponsibleforthetendency ofparticulardevelopmentproblemstoconcentrateinspeci® cplacesatspeci® c times. At the global scale, for example, particularitiesof developmentwithin eachoftheSouth’smajorregionshavecausedimportantvariationsindevelopmentproblems(egfoodshortagesinAfricaasaresultofpeasantexploitation and rural impoverishment,external indebtednessin Latin America because of excessiveforeigndependencyandexorbitantstatespending).
Theneedto`unlearn’ ourgrandtheoriesofdevelopment
Inrecentyearsanalystsinavarietyofdisciplineshavedepictedbothneoclassicaltheory4 andmainstreamdevelopmentstudies5 as`grandtheories’ characteristic of the Age of Enlightenment and 19th-century thought. Grand theoriesÐwhether neoclassical economics, orthodox Marxism, or KeynesianismÐconstructatotalisingvisionofsocietywhichattemptstoprovidearational basis for understanding all aspects of development. Such theories, however, neglect much of the richness and diversity of developmentby reducing it to some fundamental essence. Postwar development studies, for example, have been largely dominated by the concept of modernisationÐthe equation of development with modernisation and the construction of a single model of modernitybased on the experience of a few (industrialised)countries. If this modelisfollowed,itisassumedthatallcountriesmayreachthegoalofasimilar typeof`modernsociety’.Thistypeofgrandtheorisationispronetoproblems ofreductionistbias,wherebysimplisticmonocausalexplanationsaresoughtfor complexdevelopmentrealities.Withinsuchexplanationsthereislittleroomfor plurality;muchoftherichnessanddiversityofsocietiesthatproducesdifferent trajectoriesofdevelopmentisexcludedfromanalysis.By contrast,a relativist approachrecognisessocial diversityand theparticularitiesofplace withinthe theorisationprocess.Relativisminsiststhathumanbehaviouranddevelopment can only be understood within its proper contextÐthere are no models or theoretical constructs that are universally applicable. A growing number of socialtheoristshaverecentlyadoptedthisposition,rejectingtendenciestowards 122
grand theorisation which are regarded as outdated and inapplicable to contemporaryglobalconditions.
At a methodologicallevel,a theoryis largelydeterminedby itsunderlying frameworkorpresuppositions,andthusthereexistsacloseconnectionbetween the framework, the theory and the subject and methods of research. It is a commonobservationof the post-Kuhnianphilosophyof science thata theory allowsresearcherstostudyonlythesubjectmattertowhichthetheorydirects them. A theory is determined by its own framework and, in turn, the theory interpretsitssubjectsinaccordancewithitsownlogic.Alternatively,adifferent underlyingframework will yield a different theory that will address different subjectsusingdifferentmethods.Accordingly,if the frameworksand theories thatarecommonlyemployedindevelopmentstudiesomitimportantelementsof ThirdWorlddevelopment,weneedtorethinkourkeyconceptsandtheoretical discoursesandengageinaprocessoftheoreticalrenewal.Inarecentreviewof contendingtheoriesof development,6 Davisasserts that the development eld currently faces three broad challenges: rst, to identify untenable concepts, categories,andtheoreticalpropositionsaboutThirdWorlddevelopment;second, totracethehistoricalandideologicaloriginsoftheseconceptsandtheoretical propositions;and, third, to `unlearn’ our preconceived notionsand prevailing discoursesthatpreventusfromunderstandingthecomplexitiesofdevelopment in variousThirdWorldareas. Ourapproachtodevelopmentneedsto foster a sensitivitytothelocalcontextratherthanindiscriminatelyreplicatingideasand modelsgeneratedoutofcontext.Developmentprinciplesshouldnotbeformed via the direct transplanting of preconceived approaches; instead, they should be reconsidered in terms of particular sociocultural, political, economic and environmentalconditions.
Theimportanceofhistoryandculturetoeconomicgrowth
Giventheprominanceofeconomicswithinmainstreamdevelopmenttheory,the generation of economic growth has usually been afforded a central place in developmentstudies.Formostneoclassicaleconomistsandrelateddevelopment theorists, the concept of economic growth is neither culture-speci® c nor is it basedonhistoricallychangingconditions.Instead,economicgrowthissubject toitsownuniversallawsirrespectiveofthesocioculturalorhistoricalcontexts withinwhichitoccurs.7
Prescriptionsfor economicgrowthare derived from generalised hypotheses and are presumed to have universal applicability. Variations in historical or socioculturalcircumstancesaretreatedas`noise’ thatshouldbe lteredoutto increasetheparsimonyofthedevelopmentmodels.Cultureandhistory,when theyhavebeenconsideredatall,havebeenregardedasbarriersontheroadthat neoclassicaldevelopmenttheoristssoughttotravel.Perhaps,asSomjeenotes,a complexfactorsuchasculturecouldhavenoplaceintheneoclassical`search fororder’ indevelopmentbecauseitwouldmakeacceptedmodellingtechniques impossibly dif® cult.8 Or perhaps it would expose the irrelevance of such modellingtechniquestomanypressingdevelopmentproblemsthatarerootedin socialand culturalvariations.At any rate,economicgrowthand development
However, no universally valid strategies for generating either economic growth or development have yet been found. The variety of development experiences in different regions and countries cannot be understood via the neoclassicalparadigmor,forthatmatter,anyothersimplemechanisticframework. Different strategies need to be conceived for different countries and differenttimeperiods.Toalargeextent,developmentiscontextuallyde® ned;it isanopen-endedconceptthatshouldbeconstantlyrede® nedasourknowledge of the development process deepens and as new problems of development appear.Atitsbest,developmenttheoryhasbeeninterdisciplinaryandhasmoved away from dependenceon any oftheexcessivelyspecialisedand staticsocial sciences to examineinterelationshipsamong sociocultural,political,economic andenvironmentalfactorswithinparticulargeographicalandhistoricalcontexts. Inordertoaddressthiscomplexsubjectmatter,arangeoftheoreticalconstructs andmethodologicaltechniquesfromthesocialsciencesandhumanitiesneedsto beemployedand,ifnecessary,transformedtomakethemmoreappropriateto diverseThirdWorldsettings.
Theimportanceofstudyingprocessesofdevelopmentwithintheirsocialand cultural contexts has been ignored by most development theories. Hettne observes that development theorists have often stressed the importance of `non-economic’ factorssuchasculture,onlytoforgetaboutthemafterhaving made the obligatory reference.9 Within modernisation theory, cultural factors suchasethnicitytypicallyrepresentedobstaclestodevelopmentthatwererooted in traditional societies and that were destined to disappear in the course of development.Theneglectofcultureand `ethnodevelopment’ isnotmerely an oversightof mainstream theories, but should be seen as a paradigmaticblind spot.10 First, the sociocultural context within which economic processes are shaped has been virtually ignored in the universalist concepts developed by neoclassical theory and related frameworks. Second, development theory has focusedalmostexclusivelyon`states’ and`nationaleconomies’asitsbasicunits of analysis, precluding any serious treatment of local cultures and ethnic identities. In most countries, the `national’ culture is a relatively recent and rather arti® cial construct that is often associated with elitist and centralised (neo)colonial interests rather than traditional sources of identity based along regionalandethniclines.Indeed,theriseofculturalpluralismandethnodevelopment represents a challenge to the top-down, integrationist and outwardoriented developmentprojects of transnational capitals, international nancial institutions,corecapitalistcountriesandmostThirdWorldgovernments.
A couple of decades ago Joan Robinson remarked: `Economic theory has nothing to say on the questions that, to everyone except [mainstream] economists,appeartobemostinneedofananswer.’11 Thesamemightalsobe 124
said of mainstream developmenttheories, includingboth the more traditional modernisationapproachand thenewerneoliberalframework,for many ofthe same reasons (eg use of universal concepts that exclude the contextualityof socialreality,relianceonunrealisticassumptions,neglectofsocialrelationsand structures,failuretoconsidermeaningsandvalues).Modernisationtheorycanbe regarded,atbest,asaheuristicdevice;itwastoosimplisticandtoovaguetobe takenseriouslyasacomprehensivetheoryofdevelopment.Intheend,itcould not establish its relevance to the developing world because it was really a celebration of the achievements of the advanced industrial countries. The frameworklackedbothasatisfactoryhistoricalinputfromtheSouthitselfand anadequateanalysisofsocial relationsandstructuresinspeci® c countries.In particular, patterns of discrimination and inequalities based on social class, ethnicity,genderandothersocialrelationswerevirtuallyignored.
Moreover,littleattentionwas givento the views, wishesand valuesofthe peoplethatweresupposedlybeingdeveloped.Valuesthatdifferedfromthose thatwerethoughttocharacterisetheindustrialisedNorth(howeverfarthiswas fromreality)wereinvariablyportrayedasobstaclestodevelopmentthatshould beeradicatedasmodernisationproceeds.Inahighlynormativeandethnocentric manner,Westernvalueswereuniversalisedandlinkedwithprogress,whilethe valuesoftraditionalThirdWorldsocietiesweredenigratedandtiedtostagnation andunderdevelopment.Modernisationtheoriststendedtorelyonatautological orcircularlogicintheirtreatmentofvaluesandculture.Societiesthatwereable tomodernisethroughindustrialisationwerebelievedtopossesstheappropriate values; those which failed to industrialise along Western lines lacked those values.Thepresenceorabsenceoftherequisitevaluestructurewasdetermined a priori by the degree of industrialand economicgrowthÐthe effect created the cause.12 Although, in reality, the relationship between values and development processes is complex and dynamic, it is not well conceived by simplistic dichotomies between traditional values/economies and modern values/economies.
Even as heuristic devices, the categories of `modern’ and `traditional’ employed by modernisation theory are low grade because of their imprecision, narrownessand distancefrom reality. Because it neglectssocial relationsand structures, the traditional±modern dichotomyfails to accountfor many of the importantsocioeconomicforcesresponsiblefordevelopmentinparticularsocieties. In fact, both the basic societies described by modernisation theory are largely ctional:manyofthesupposedlybene® cialtraitsofmodernsocietyare onlyrarelyfoundinreal-worldindustrialcountries,whilethedetrimentaltraits of traditional societies are equally dif® cult to nd in developing countries. Moreover, most societies contain some combination of both traditional and moderntraits,afactthatisobscuredbythemutualexclusivityoftheidealtypes inthemodernisationmodel.Blankettermslike`traditional’and`modern’ donot dojusticetothevariabilityofsocietieseitherintheNorthorSouth,neitherof which are homogeneousbut are invariably ssured by factors such as class, gender,ethnicityandreligion.Inaddition,inreal-worldsituationsmostelements oftraditionalandmodernsocietiesarenotmutuallyexclusive;constantinteractionnormallytakes placebetweenthe traditionaland modernsectors of most
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developingcountries,a fact that is well illustratedby de Janvry’s account of `functionaldualism’ betweenthepeasantryandcapitalistagro-exportsectorsin LatinAmerica.13
Liketheoldermodernisationapproach,thenewerneoliberalframeworkalso employsuniversalistic(ideal)theoreticalconstructsthatarebasedonunrealistic assumptionsandexcludemuchofthevariabilityofThirdWorldsocialformations.NeoliberalismisrootedinwhatHirschmancallsthe`monoeconomics’ of orthodoxneoclassicaltheoryÐthenotionthatthereisonlyonebodyofeconomic theory with universally applicable concepts, just as there is only one physics or chemistry.14 This approach is a product of the rational±deductive methodofpositivistscience;thebehaviourofindividualsispredeterminedbya set of universalrationalrulesthatare deductivelyposited.15 Privateproducers andconsumersarepresupposedtobeutilityandpro® tmaximiserswhorespond rationallyandef® cientlytocorrectmarketsignals.Asinneoclassicaltheoryin general,neoliberalscontendthatunfetteredmarketswillproducerationalbehaviourthatef® cientlyre¯ects marketsignalsbasedon principlesofscarcity and choice.
However, while neoliberals examine markets using ideal theoretical constructs, governmentsand states are treated as they exist in practiceÐwith all theirvariousimperfectionshighlighted.Theidealisedneoliberalconceptofthe marketneitherre¯ectsthediverserealitiesofThirdWorldmarketsnordoesit formalogicalbasisfromwhichtocompareThirdWorldstatesastheyexistin practice.16 Highly skewed power relations and structural inequalities within manysocietiesproducereal-worldmarketsthatarefarremovedfromtheideal types of neoliberaltheory. Given such complexity,developmentpoliciesmay workindifferentwaysindifferentplacesatdifferenttimes.Universalanswers cannotbefoundtothedevelopmentproblemsofparticularcountriesandregions and, because of this, the simple market-based solutionsof the neoliberalsare unlikelytosucceedinmostplaces.
Withinmanyneoliberaldevelopmentstudies,aswellasinneoclassicaltheoryin general,increasingattentionhasbeendevotedtothesophisticationofmodelling proceduresandquantitativetechniquesattheexpenseofanumberofconcerns. Theseincludeconcernsover:theneglectofsocialcomplexityanddiversity,the omission of non-quanti® able aspects of development,the use of methodsand conceptsinappropriatefornon-Westernsocietiesanddependenceonunreliable andunsuitablestatistics.Inordertoaccommodateitspositivisticmethodological imperatives,neoclassicalresearch hasbecomenarrowlyfocusedononlythose variablesthatcanbeempiricallyobserved,reducedtoquantitativemeasurements and generalised across all instances. Broader social, human,and moral issues thatare notamenabletoquanti® cationandmodellingtechniquesare excluded fromanalysis.Ineffect,thisremovesmuchofthehumanfactor(attheindividual level) as well as social relations(at the societal level) from the development paradigm.
Neoclassical researchers who commonly use aggregate socioeconomic 126
statisticsintheirempiricalmodelsnormallypaylittleattentiontothequalityof their primary data sources.17 Widely acknowledged problems basic to Third Worlddataareignored,including:thepoorqualityofmanystatisticalseries,the inadequate training and other de® ciencies of primary researchers and the notoriously inaccurate information offered by some groups of informants. Moreover,inordertomakeThirdWorldcomplexitiesconformtopreconceived Western categories and concepts, misplaced aggregationsare often employed that inappropriately combine conceptually discrete social forms (eg different typesofpeasantsandotherfarmers, variousinformalsectoractivities,diverse household types). In Third World settings marked by extreme inequalities, aggregatestatistics(eg GDP growthrates, percapitaincome)mayalsoconceal morethantheyreveal.Ingeneral,manyoftheuniversalconceptsofneoliberal, andbyextension,neoclassicaltheoryaretingedwithethnocentrism,whilethe methodsthatarecommonlyemployedyieldinaccurateresultsandareinappropriatetomostThirdWorldsettings.AsMillernotes:`[R]ealityistrimmedto t thetheory Irrespectiveofthepoor tbetweenthefactsandthetheory,neither the theorists not the theory is ªin dif® cultyº. The facts are simply assumed away.’18
Many of these conceptualand methodologicalshortcomingscontributeto a yawninggapbetweenthetheoryandpracticeofThirdWorlddevelopment.As a result, a large amount of theoreticalresearch is of littlesigni® cance to the actual practitioners of development in the eld, while many development projects and other practical developmentefforts lack direction or repeat past mistakes for want of a rmer theoretical grounding. All too frequently, the theoreticiansandpractitionersofdevelopmentseemtooccupydifferentworlds andspeakdifferentlanguages.Forthemostpart,ourtheoreticalapproachesare tooformalisticandabstract,toodependentonaggregatedata,andtoouniversal andgeneraltoberelevanttotheeverydayworldoftheirwould-bebene® ciaries. Atthesametime,thereisanaccumulatedwealthofpracticalknowledgederived from actual development experiences and on-the-job training that has yet to informthetheoreticalliterature.Oneofourmostvaluableresourcesfortheory constructionoughttobethedevelopmentexperienceitselfinparticularregions and countries.Thishas led some analysts to call on developmenttheoriststo adoptamorepracticalandappliedstanceinordertobecomemoreinvolvedin policy-making, planning and other direct development efforts. For example, Hulmeand Turnercontendthatdevelopmenttheoristsoughtto abandontheir `conceptualandtheoreticalstraight-jackets’19infavourofapproachesthatre¯ect thediverserealitiesofThirdWorldsocietiesandthatarefocusedonthepractical problemsofdevelopment.
theircomponentpartswithinindividualacademicdisciplines.21 Withindevelopmentstudies,ithasbeen associated withtheneglectofgeographicaldiversity and the misreading of the social and historical experiences of individual countriesandregions.Western-basedconceptsandresearchmethodsareinfused with a false universalism that serves to legitimate their application as isÐ withoutbasicre® nementsorreconstructionÐindiverseThirdWorldsocieties.22
Characteristically,parallelsare sought in non-Westernsocieties thatcan be relatedtothehistoricalexperienceoftheWest.Researchaddressesonlythose phenomenaandeventsthatcanbeconceptuallycompartmentalisedandtakeon theoreticalsigni® cancewithintheaccepted(ideological)versionoftheWest’s developmentexperience.Other subjects are typicallyignored,includingthose thatmightprovetheoreticallychallengingorofferunconventionalsolutionsto practical developmentproblems.In addition,littleattentionis affordedto the views,desiresandambitionsofThirdWorldpeoplesthemselves,particularlyif theyarefromtraditionallydisadvantagedandmarginalisedsocialgroups(egthe lowerclasses, thepeasantry,women,ethnicminorities).
EurocentrismhasimpededprogressindevelopmentstudiesinboththeNorth and South.In theNorth,it has impoverisheddevelopmentstudies and related disciplinesbyblockingaccesstoalternativeconceptsandindigenoussourcesof knowledge from the developing countries themselves. In the South, it has perpetuatedintellectualdependenceonarestrictedgroupofprestigiousWestern academicinstitutionsthatdeterminethesubjectmatterandmethodsofresearch. Categoriesandconceptsareborrowedwhichmayhavebeenusefulandmeaningful within their original Western contexts, but which lose much of their meaningandutilityintheprocessofbeingtransposedintoThirdWorldcontexts. Commonly,theThirdWorldisrelegatedtothestatusofaresidualcategoryÐa typeofconceptual`grabbag’ forwhateverhappenstoremainaftertheimportant elementsofdevelopment(characteristicofmodernFirstWorldsocieties)have beenaccountedfor.23 Thisbothobscurestherealsigni® canceofdevelopments intheSouthandconditionsitsinhabitantstoacceptthe`inevitability’ oftheir inferiorposition,giventheclearsuperiorityofeverythingWestern.
Animportantpartofthisprocessalsoinvolvesdistortingtherealimpactof (neo)colonialism and its discourses on Third World countries. As Nederveen Pieterse notes, the `Eurocentric perspective [has] served as a manual for imperial management of [Third World] societies’.24 Accordingly, mainstream developmentframeworkscanbeseen asa formofneocolonialdiscourse.The universalismoftheconceptsofthemodernisationapproachor,morerecently,of neoliberal theory is an adjunct of the hegemonic power of the advanced industrialcountries.AsWesternhegemonyhasexpanded,sohasthepowerof theuniversalconceptsoftheWest’smain intellectualframeworksÐinvariably at the expense of alternative frameworks that do not accord with Western interests.25
One of the main reasons why postwar development has so often produced disappointingresultsindevelopingcountriesisthatithasattempted,forthemost 128
part,toreplicatetheWest,ratherthanpromoteprocessesofindigenouschange withintheThirdWorlditself.Inevitably,effortstoreplacethetraditionalvalues, relationshipsandinstitutionsofThirdWorldsocietieswithalienWesternones have created rising tensions, uncertainties and feelings of anomie. Typically, Eurocentricdevelopmentmodelspaylittleattentiontothehistoricallegacythat createdThirdWorldsocieties,tosociolculturalfactorsandotherparticularities ofthosesocieties,ortonationalorglobalstructuralconstraintsthatmaymake developmentalongclassical Westernlineshighlyunlikely.Universalconcepts andtheoriesbasedon an idealisedimageoftheWestmayhavequitelimited relevanceto societieswithdifferenthistories,socioculturaltraditions,political institutionsandeconomicstructures.
TheglobalconditionscurrentlyfacedbyThirdWorldcountriesoftendiffer dramaticallyfromthosewhichpropelledtheinitialstagesofindustrialgrowthin thecorecapitalistcountriesduringthelastcentury.SocialrelationsandstructureswithinThirdWorldsocietiesmayalsodepartradicallyfromthosefound intheWest(egtheprolongedpresenceofthepeasantryandothernon-capitalist socialforms,therapidgrowthoftheinformalsector).Ratherthandisappearing undertheforceofmodernisation,traditionalThirdWorldsocialstructures(eg tribes, castes, kinship groups) have often proven remarkably ¯exible and resilient.Inmanycases,theyhaveactedas`® lters’ forthespreadofmodernisationandcapitalistrelations,causingimportantvariationsinpatternsofdevelopment. Many Third World institutionsbear little resemblance to and function quite differently from their First World counterparts. For example, the land, labour,creditandproductmarketsofmostdevelopingcountriesnormallydonot obeytheuniversalassumptionsorformalisedeconomicprinciplesofneoclassical theory.26 Such differences render many of the universal concepts and ready-made strategies of the mainstream development models inoperative. In most cases, if Western-style structures and institutions are to exist in Third Worldsocieties,theyhavetobearti® ciallycreatedandsustained.
ThedominationofdevelopingcountriesbyEurocentrictheoriesandstrategies of development has had far-reaching consequences. In broad terms, it has arrested processes of indigenousdevelopmentand preempted possibilities for alternative development projects based on principles of greater self-reliance, more balanced development, and broader popular participation.Inappropriate policies resulting from basic misapprehensions of Third World realities have exacted heavy social, economic, and psychological costs, particularly for the poor majority in most developing societies. Indigenous social structures that have traditionallysupported majority interests and have served as sources of identityandpopularparticipationhavebeenunderminedwithoutbeingreplaced byviablefunctioningalternatives.Agrowingnumberofanalystsnowcontend thatmuchofthediscontentwithdevelopmentintheThirdWorldcanbetraced tothedisplacementoftraditionalvalues,institutions,andrelationshipsbyalien Westerncounterparts.Bruton,forexample,states:
thebasicdif® culty[with development]arises from the impositionof Western mechanicsandWestern artifactsonasocietywhosetraditionsandvalues,whose routines and mores, whose cultural and social arrangements, whose concepts of
Inlargepart,thenewinstitutionscreatedbymodernisationhavefailedto nd rootsintheindigenoussocialandculturaltraditionsofThirdWorldsocietiesand havethereforeremainedtenuous.Inmanycountries,importedinstitutionshave createdanarti® cialformofdevelopmentthathasheightenedfeelingsofanomie anddisillusionmentandfuelledethnicallybasedsocialcon¯ict.Contrarytothe preceptsofmodernisationtheory,theinternalisationofWesternideasandvalues thathasaccompaniedthespreadoftheseinstitutionshasoftenproventobemore ofanobstaclethanavehicleofdevelopment.Commonly,ithasbeenpowerful ThirdWorldeliteswhohaveinternalisedWesternconceptsandhaveusedthis specialised knowledge to defend their privileged position within the existing socialorderfromalternativeideasaboutdevelopmentarisingfromindigenous sources of popular knowledge. Typically, Western concepts have paid little attentioneithertotheviewsandwishesofthepopularmajorityortothetypes of structural constraints(eg based in relations of class, gender and ethnicity) withinwhichThirdWorldinequalitiesareso frequentlyrooted.
Disregardforindigenousknowledgeandpopularparticipation Powerhasalwaysbeenacentralcomponentofdevelopment;withoutitthereis littlethat the popularmajoritycan do to changetheirsituation.WithinThird Worldsocieties, the `professionalisation’ of developmentstudies underexclusionaryEurocentricframeworks,thecontrolofthisknowledgebyelitesintheir owninterests,andthedevaluationofalternativesourcesofpopularknowledge haveallpreventedthemajorityfromparticipatingincentresofdecision-making power.Localself-con® dencehas been underminedand most grassrootssocial groupsandpopularorganisationshavebeenblockedfromacquiringtheknowledgeandskillsthattheyneedtoanalyseandsolveproblemsforthemselves.The transformationofpeopleintoagentsoftheirowndevelopment,whichoughtto bethefocalpointofany broadlybased democraticdevelopmentstrategy,has beenretardedbyexclusionarytheoriesandelitistpracticesthatblockthesharing of knowledgeand information.At the same time, developmenttheorists and strategistsare preventedfromunderstandingmuch abouttherealworldofthe popular majority to which development is ostensibly directed because these `experts’ areso farremovedfromthatworld.
Becausetheyareproductsofanarrogantandethnocentriceraindevelopment thinkingdominatedby Western experts and modern scienti® c techniques,the mainstreamdevelopmentframeworksaredesignedontheassumptionsthatthe development process is undirectional.Knowledge lters down from a select groupofFirstWorldacademicinstitutionstotheintellectualeliteofdeveloping countries(many of whom have been trained at those institutions)and is then dispersedtothose(generallyupper-middleclass)elementswiththecapacitiesto absorbit.Progressisenvisionedasauniversal,undirectionalprocess,alwaysto beledbyelitegroupsandtherichestcountries.Ahighlyexclusionary,technical view of development becomes the norm, in which `the ªtransmitterº and
ªreceiverº ofinformationaredistancedfromeachotherbyabasicinequalityin theamountoftechnicalknowledgetheyeachpossess’.28 Knowledge,aswellas the powerto controlit, becomes concentratedamong the educated elites that possess theskillsnecessary to understandthetechnicallanguageandmethods beingemployed.Developmentprofessionalsandotherexpertsbecometheonly people capable of mediating the transfer of knowledge and skills from one society or group of people to another. Because knowledgeis associated with formal Western education and technical training, indigenous concepts and methodsareignoredorrelegatedtoastrictlysubordinateposition.Development studies from the Third World itself thatdo notconform to accepted Western theoriesandmethodsareneglected,asareotherpotentialsourcesofnewinsight, understandingandcreativesolutionstodevelopmentproblemsoriginatingfrom thepopularsectorsthemselves.
Thesearch forindigenousdevelopmentalternatives
Therealisation thatexternaltheoriesand modelshave blockedoutalternative sourcesofindigenousknowledgehasnotcomeeasilytotheSouth.Thereare strongintellectualandmaterialreasonsforthisdelay.Intellectually,muchofthe developmentcommunity(includingmanyleadingWestern-educatedprofessionalsfromtheThirdWorlditself)havemaintainedthattheconceptsandmethods of the mainstream developmentmodelsare universallyapplicable.Materially, thesedevelopmentmodelshavebeencloselyalignedtotheinterestsofthemost powerful fractionsof capital and their political allies, at both the global and nationalscales.Inrecentyears,however,risinginteresthasbeenshownbysome Third World social groups and organisations(particularly those linked to the popular sectors) in the formulation of alternative indigenous concepts and methods of development. Demands for the indigenisation of theories and strategies of development ¯ow from two interrelated concerns: rst, that the Western models contain too many false universals and Eurocentric biases to comprehend many crucial issues and problems of Third World development; and,second,thatdevelopmentprogrammesandpoliciesbasedontheWestern modelshavebroughtdevastatingresultstomostdevelopingcountries,particularly to their poorest, most vulnerable and disadvantaged classes and social groups.
The search for relevant indigenousmodels and paradigms has taken many directions based on the different development experiences and intellectual traditions of particular Third World areas. Examples include: the rise in the MiddleEastofadistinctivelyIslamicmodelofdevelopmentbasedontheethical principlesoftheQuran,thedevelopmentin Indiaofanalternativeeconomics groundedin Gandhianphilosophy,theappearanceincountriessuchas Burma and Sri Lanka of a Buddhist economics stressing cooperation and selfsuf® ciency,theformulationinAfricaofruraldevelopmentstrategiesbasedon the traditional egalitarian values of African communalistic societies, and the creationinNicaraguaofaSandinistamodelofpopulardevelopmentthatrejects theready-madeframeworksoftheWestandtheEastinfavourofamore¯exible alternativemoreappropriatetoLatinAmericanparticularities.
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Commonly,thesearchforindigenousmodelshasalsoledtoareexamination of basic notions about the role of Third World social relations, values and structures in development (eg African tribalism as an important vehicle for constructingnew, more egalitariansocieties rather than as a dysfunctionalor obsolete social form; traditional Confucian values concerning interpersonal relations and social obligations as a key component of East Asian state-led developmentratherthan as a barrier to capitalist modernisation).Followinga carefulandsensitivereassessment,manyoftherelations,valuesandstructures that characterise traditional societies may prove surprisingly conducive to developmentÐparticularly of alternative forms of development that seek to maximisepopularparticipation.Inmanycases,traditionalsocietieshavemutual supportsystemsthat,becauseoftheir¯exibilityandef® ciency,maybeadapted foruseindevelopmentprojects.Forexample,InghamreportsthatinmanyThird World rural areas, traditionalsavings institutionscan be adapted to mobilise hithertounutilisedresourcesfordevelopment.29
Thetrendtowardstheindigenisationofdevelopmenttheory,whichhasalso oftenincludedastrongelementofThirdWorldnationalism,hasgainedmomentuminrecentyears.30 FormanyintheSouth,ithasbecomeincreasinglyevident thatdevelopmentmayfollowmanydiversepathsthatliebeyondtheexperience oftheadvancedindustrialcountries.Becauseofthis,manyofthecoreconcepts andtheoriesofthemainstreamdevelopmentframeworksareseentobe,atbest, of only limited relevance to Third World societies. Accordingly, a growing numberofdevelopmentanalystsarecallingforadeconstruction/reconstruction process to commencein developmenttheory.First, to deconstructourpresent universalistic development paradigms to sort out what, if anything, remains relevanttotheSouthandwhatshouldbediscarded.Second,toreconstructour developmentframeworkssothattheymightbetterservethediverseinterestsand needsofthepopularmajorityinvariouscountriesandregions.Thisprocesswill not entail a single reconstruction, but will undoubtedly involve `polycentric’ reconstructionsbasedonthevaryingitinerariesand circumstancesofdifferent countries.31
At the same time, questions over what, if anything, may be universal in processes of development need to be posed in new ways that will avoid Eurocentrismand permittheuse ofpolycentricconceptsbasedonthedistinct experiencesofvariouscountriesandregions.Conceptsandcategoriesmay be employed that address general aspects of development characteristic of most ThirdWorldareas(egthepopularsectors,thepeasantryandsemiproletariat,the informalsector),butwhichcanalsobemodi® edtoincorporatelocalparticularitiesinsocialrelationsandforms.Thistypeofconceptualreconstructionshould obviouslybecloselylinkedwithincreasesinprimarylocal/regionalresearchand comparative studies within the Third World itself. Such links underscore the needtodevotemoreresourcestoimprovingtheresearchcapabilitiesofdevelopingcountries.Inaddition,thesecountriesneedtodiscernbetterwaysofpooling theirresearchcompetenceandresourcesto ndsolutionstotheirownproblems. Networks of cooperation and interdependence can be envisioned at several scales, includingsub-regionaland regionalgroupingsas wellas thoseencompassingtheentireSouth.Atthesametime,newmethodsofglobalcooperation 132
and interdependence must be worked out so that interested groups in the North may assist effortsin the Southto create more appropriateand relevant developmentframeworks.
Ideologicalbiases in earlypostwardevelopmentframeworks
InadditiontotheirEurocentrictendencies,mainstreamdevelopmentframeworks in the postwar era have also provided broad ideological supports for the expansion of global capitalism. From growth theory and the modernisation approachintheearlypostwareratoneoliberalismmorerecently,thedominant postwar development theories have been ideologically linked to generalised capitalistinterestsinopeninguptheSouthtotransnationalcapital,aswellasto more particular US interests in maintaining its hegemonic global position in economic,politicalandmilitaryterms.
Thepresenceofadirectrelationshipbetweentheriseofmodernisationtheory andthatofUSnationalinterestsintheexpansionofglobalcapitalismhasbeen thesubjectofmuchconjectureovertheyears.Forexample,Klarenremarksthat it can hardly be coincidental that the rise of modernisation theory, with its intellectual roots in the `liberal developmental thought’ of American social sciences, coincided so closely with the global expansion of US economic, politicaland militarypower.32 Likewise,Hulmeand Turnernotethatitisnot surprising that modernisation theory maintaineda `conservative,pro-capitalist ideologicalframework’,giventheColdWarenvironmentandtheestablishment of close links between the postwar American academic community and `the political,military,administrative,and business elites in the US’.33 These and otherdevelopmenttheoristsargue that the modernisationapproach,as a Cold War product of Western, liberal, capitalist values, was inexorably put into service supportingthe expansionof globalcapitalism underAmerican leadership. Modernisation theory is seen as `still another imperialist Cold War strategy’ aimed at tyingthe ThirdWorldintoa Western, liberaldevelopment patternwithinthesphereofin¯uenceoftheUSAandotherWesternpowers.34 At the same time, adherence to the basic principlesof modernisation denied possibilities for the rise of alternative development strategies (eg indigenous frameworks,socialistmodels)thatmightextricateThirdWorldcountriesfrom theWesternorbit.
Linkageofmodernisationto USandglobalcapitalistinterestsalsohelpsto explainthestronglyethnocentricandself-servingworldviewthatmanyanalysts attributeto modernisationtheory.Thissuggeststhattherise of modernisation theory(as well as otherUS social science frameworks)shouldbe understood withinthecontextoftheUSasagrowingpostwarsuperpower.35 Theincreasing popularity of the modernisation approach both re¯ected and duplicated the expansionofUSglobalpower,aswellasservingtojustifyit.Moreover,this alsosuggeststhatthedominationofdevelopmenttheorybyAmericanparadigms inthepostwareramaybelessaresultoftheintrinsicmeritsoftheseframeworks thanoftheirassociationwithUSpower.Kolko,forexample, ndsthatmuchof theintellectualrationaleforUSinterventionism(eg USAID programmesofrural development and `state-building’, CIA security assistance) was supplied by a 133
generationof American modernisation scholars.36 By the late 1960smany of thesescholarshadbecomedisillusionedandembarrassedbytherealisationthat USforeignpolicyhaddominateddevelopmentinmanyThirdWorldcountries underthe guise of modernisation.However,otherprominentUS development theorists(egRostow,Huntington)neverbelievedthatthiswasa problemand, in fact, quite openly used their work as an instrument of American foreign policy.37
Likemodernisationtheory,neoliberalismhasalsobeenideologicallylinkedto theinterestsoftheUSAandotheradvancedindustrialcountriesintheexpansion ofglobalcapitalismintoThirdWorldareas.Therecentriseofneoliberalismhas accompaniedtheincreasingpoweroftransnationalcapitalbasedlargelyinthe core capitalist countries of the North. In addition, neoliberalism was rst championedinthe1980sbytheconservativeadministrationsofmanyOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)countries(egReaganin theUSA,ThatcherintheUK,KohlinGermany)andbypowerfulinternational organisations(especially multilateral nancial institutionssuch as the IMF and World Bank) that have historically been linked to the expansion of global capitalismunderthedirectionofthetransnationals.Atthesametime,neoliberalism’stheoreticalagenda,basedonneoclassicalprinciplesofeconomicliberalisation, free trade and open markets, has provided intellectual support for the integration of international markets in the interests of these transnational corporations(TNCs).
The emergence of the neoliberal`counterrevolution’ in developmenttheory during the early 1980s should be understood in the context of the general anti-KeynesianideologicalwavethatsweptthroughtheWestatthesametime. Aspartoftheglobalideologicalagendaofthe`NewRight’,neoliberalismalso turned attention away from basic inequalities in international economic and geopoliticalstructuresbyplacingtheonusforThirdWorldunderdevelopment rmlyontheSouthitself(especiallyonill-conceivedpoliciessuchasexcessive statespending,theerectionoftradebarriersandthefailuretoliberalisemarkets). ThispositionreactedagainstandrejectedtheWestern`guilt-complex’thatsome analysts have linked to the emergence of `Third Worldist’ postures in the alternativedevelopmentframeworks(egdependencyandworldsystemstheory) ofthe1960sand1970s.38
In the early 1980s, as the USA under Reagan struggled to shake off the `Vietnam syndrome’ and reassert its position of global capitalist leadership, neoliberalismbegantodominatethemacroeconomicthinkingoftheAmerican (transnational)eliteandtheiralliesintheReaganAdministration.Theystoodfor apositiveapproachtodevelopmentpromotionandtheexpansionofUSglobal in¯uenceratherthanaretreatintoAmericanisolationismandself-doubt.Infact, itwasthe1981globaleconomicsummitinCancuÂn,MexicoÐatwhichReagan himself gave a major address extollingthe bene® ts of economicliberalisation andreducedstateinterventionÐwhichbestmarkstheascendencyofneoliberalismwithinmainstreamdevelopmentstrategy.Italsomarkedanewreadinessby 134
theUSAandotherOECD countriestoasserttheirglobalpower,afteraperiodof introspectionduringthe1970s.Thiswasaccomplishedviatheimpositionofa neoliberal agenda on a recalcitrant Third World that had run out of other developmentoptionsin the face of a devastatingeconomiccollapse. The last time that the Western powers, and particularly the USA, had moved so con® dentlytosettheworld’sdevelopmentagendahadbeenintheearly1960s, asmodernisationtheoryreacheditszenith.
In addition to its links with the TNCs and core capitalist countries, the neoliberaldevelopmentagendahasalsobeenpromotedbymultilateral nancial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, especially through the impositionof structural adjustmentprogrammes (SAPs) on Third World countries.FormuchoftheSouth,submissiontoastructuraladjustmentpackagehas becomeaconditionforreceivingexternalloansorother nancialassistanceÐ notonlyfromthesemultilateralinstitutions,butalsofrommostothersourcesof privateorbilaterallending.Despitetheirglobalscopeandformallyindependent structure, these institutionsremain closely associated with the interests of the Western powers(particularlytheUSA)andtransnational(especially nancial) capital.Analystshavenotedthatboththe IMF and theWorldBankhavebeen subjected to regular interference from the USA and other major Western contributorsaccordingtoideologicalandgeopoliticalconsiderations.39 Inconsistencies in the dealingsof these institutionswith many Third World countries seem comprehensibleonlyin terms ofideologicaldifferencesand the playof major power interests. For example, in the 1980s Fund/Bank lending programmes were either drastically reduced or denied altogether to a series of countries at odds with US foreign policy(eg Cuba, Mozambique,Nicaragua, Vietnam),whilelendingwasmaintainedorincreasedtomanycountriesaligned with US interests (eg Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cote d’Ivoire, Zaire) despitechargesofpervasivehumanrightsabuses,corruptionandotherquestionable practices by the governments of these latter countries. These types of inconsistenciesinthelendingrecordoftheWorldBankduringthe1980sledone analysttochargethatitspolicieshavebeen`highlyconditionedbythedominant politicalagendaoftheUSadministration,andthatthishasco-optedthescienti® c agendaandtransformeditintoamanipulativeexercise’.40
Other commentators have suggested that informal alliances supporting the neoliberaldevelopmentagendahavebeen creatednotonlyat theglobalscale between the IMF/World Bank and the major OECD countries, but also at the nationalscaleinmuchoftheSouthbetweenthesemultilateralinstitutionsand dominantfractionsofthelocalelitelinkedwithtransnationalcapital.41 Ithasnot escapednoticethat,especiallyinmanyseverelypolarisedsocieties,theinterests of the popularmajoritymay not be wellserved by such elitistarrangements. Moreover,theimpositionofFund/BankconditionalitiesoftenentailsasubstantialreductioninsovereigntythatrestrictstheabilityofgovernmentsintheSouth todeterminepoliciesandshapedevelopmentintheirsocietiesaccordingtolocal values,aspirationsandtraditions.
Right ideologyof politicalconservatism. This was made clear by one of the intellectualfoundersof neoliberalism,MiltonFriedman,in his argumentsthat laissez-fairecapitalismisanecessaryconditionforbroadersocialandpolitical freedoms.42 Insubsequentneoliberaldevelopmentstudies,anoverarchingideologicalconceptionofthemarketandpoliticalsystemshascharacteristicallybeen substitutedforcarefulanalyticalandempiricalinvestigationsofsocioeconomic andpoliticalrelationsindifferentThirdWorldsocieties.43 Typically,theneoliberalobsession with`gettingthe pricesright’ has ledto the abstractionofone sphereofeconomicactivity,thatofexchange,fromthetotalityofrelationsof productionandpower.Thisinevitablyproducesdistortedresultsandanarrow, rathersuper® cialanalysisthatmissestherootsofmanydevelopmentproblems withinparticularsocioeconomicstructures.
Neoliberalpoliticalanalysis,especiallythatframedbypublicchoicetheory, combinesamoretraditionalelementofeconomicliberalismwithamoremodern component of political conservatism that provides an ideological defence for systemsofmarketpowerversusstateintervention.Thepro-marketandanti-state ideological biases of neoliberalism prevent it from addressing many crucial structural aspects of economic and political relations in the South. Rival traditions of development scholarship that might deepen understanding of developmentprocesses are eitherignoredorcaricaturediftheydo notaccord with neoliberalvalues. This has led many developmenttheoriststo decry the dominationof much of neoliberalismby ideologues.44 It is suggestedthatthe `analytic dice [of neoliberal developmentstrategy] are value-loadedfrom the very start to reach predetermined policy positions that are then fed into the politicaldebateasprivilegedªscienti® cº conclusionssupposedlydevoidofany ideologicalbias ’45 The strength of this ideologicalcommitment has meant thatneoliberalpolicyprescriptionshaveoftenbeen basedon valuejudgments andquestionableassumptionsratherthansolidempiricalevidenceandlogically coherentanalysis.
Ideologicalbiasoftenmanifestsitselfintheprocessesbywhichscholarsand otherdevelopmentprofessionalsbecome`socialised’ totheworldviews,theoreticalconceptsandmodels,andanalyticaltechniquesofthemainstreamdevelopment paradigm.Thissocialisationprocess often takes place quitegradually and usually proceeds through years of intensive training at one of a limited number of internationally recognised development institutes in leading First World universities.Normally,any connectionsbetween the models and techniques of the mainstream development paradigm and particular ideological interestsarewellobscured.Thosewhohavebecomesocialisedthroughyearsof painstakingstudyintotheeliteoftheinternationaldevelopmentcommunitytend toregardtheirviewsandmethodsasscienti® callyobjective,theoreticallysound and analyticallysuperior. Opposingconceptsor techniquesthatdo notneatly t into the well-de® ned scienti® c parameters of the set body of (Western) knowledgethattheyhavebeentaughtseemabnormalandunscienti® c.
The ethnocentric and ideological biases of the mainstream development framework(iepreviouslymodernisationtheory,presentlyneoliberalism)towards theinterestsoftheWesternpowersandglobalcapitalarethusobscuredunder layers of seemingly objective scienti® c discourse. Such bias has become a 136
seriousproblemnotonlyforNortherndevelopmentscholars,butalsoformany developmentprofessionalsfromtheSouthitself.Thisseems tobeparticularly thecaseamongThirdWorldprofessionalswithinmultilateralinstitutionssuchas the IMF and the World Bank and other elitist organisations of the global developmentcommunity.These professionalstendto see theirrole as one of using their specialised knowledgein the concepts and methods of (Westernstyle) development to instruct and guide Third World countries that are incapable of generating their own knowledge. The rm belief in the need to instruct and guide the `Third World other’ may be regarded as `one more re¯ectionofamuchbroaderethosofOccidentalsupremacy’ 46
Alargesteptowardsovercomingthesebiasesmightbetakenbytheestablishment ofindependentdevelopmentinstitutesorlearningcentres,perhapsunder the auspices of the United Nations or some other equivalent international organisation,to promotemore meaningfulNorth±Southand South±South dialogue.In contrastto theone-way,top-down¯ow ofknowledgethatpresently characterisesneoliberaldevelopmentplanning,especiallyunderthetutelageof the IMF/WorldBank,thesecentresmightcreateamorecooperativeatmosphere and `levelplaying eld’ for theexchangeofdevelopmentmethodsand ideas. Towardsthisend,emphasisshouldalsobeplacedonbuildinguptheindigenous capabilitiesof developmentinstitutesand learningcentres in the South itself. This would overcome the South’s absolute dependency on Northern-based developmentframeworksandwouldhelptoinstillasenseofcon® denceamong ThirdWorldpeoplesthattheycanusetheirindigenousknowledgeandpractices tode® nedistinctpathsofdevelopmentappropriatetotheirindividualneedsand interests.
Conclusion
Neoliberalismisoftendepictedinthedevelopmentliteratureasanewinnovative strategy whichshould be contrasted with the discreditedframeworks, such as modernisation theory and other Keynesian approaches, that dominated mainstream development studies during the early postwar period. However, an analysisofthemodernisationandneoliberaldevelopmentframeworksrevealsa number of common problems, including those associated with universalistic models, Eurocentrism and ideological biases. In the end, these shortcomings leave neoliberalism prone to many of the same criticisms that have plagued modernisationtheoryforthepasttwodecades.
Fromtheoldermodernisationapproachtothemorerecentneoliberalframework, an ongoing tension has existed in mainstream development studies betweenthewishtoformulateuniversallyvalidprinciplesandformalmodels,on the one hand,and theneed to understandthe diversityof actualdevelopment experiences among different countries, on the other. The grand theories of mainstreamdevelopmentstudiesseekuniversalsolutionstodevelopmentproblemswhichneglectthecontextualityofdevelopmentasaproductofparticular historicalprocesses. Developmentapproachesthatare sensitivetothevarying needs and interests of different peoples cannot be generated via the direct transplantingofpreconceivedNorthernmodelsintodistinctSouthernsocieties.
Accompanyingthe universalismof itsformal models, theneoliberalframeworkalsoexhibitsastrongtendencytowardsEurocentrism.Aswiththeearlier modernisationapproach,thismakesmanyofitsconceptsandmodelsinappropriatetotheconditionsprevailinginparticularThirdWorldcountries.Typically, parallelsaresoughtinnon-Westernsocietiesforthehistoricalexperienceofthe West.Researchaddressesonlythosesubjectsthatcanbecompartmentalisedand take on theoretical signi® cance within the accepted version of the West’s developmentexperience. Othersubjects which could provetheoreticallychallenging or might offer unconventional development solutions are commonly ignored,asareindigenoussourcesofdevelopmentknowledgefromtheSouth itself.Thishasblockedaccesstoalternativeconceptsandindigenousknowledge and has fostered an intellectualdependenceon Northernconceptsand models whichhavelostmuchoftheirmeaningandutilityintheprocessoftransposing themintoThirdWorldcontexts.Nevertheless,thesearchforindigenousdevelopmentalternativeshaspickedupmomentuminrecentyearsinsomepartsof theSouth,encouragedespeciallybypopularsocialmovements.
Finally,neoliberalismdisplayssimilar ideologicalbiases to those that have long marked the modernisation approach. Neoliberal development strategies serve the interests of TNCs, based largely in the Northern core capitalist countries,inexpandinganddeepeningglobalcapitalismintheSouth.Therecent riseoftheneoliberalcounterrevolutionshouldalsobeunderstoodinthecontext ofthegeneralanti-state,anti-Keynesianideologicalwavethatsweptthroughthe Westatthesametime.Neoliberalismhasespeciallybeenpromotedbytransnational nancialcapitaland associated nancialinstitutions,such as theWorld BankandtheIMF,whichhavesucceededinimposinganewdevelopmentagenda onmuchoftheSouthvia SAPsandotherformsofconditionallending.Inspite oftheirglobalscopeandformallyindependentstructures,theseinstitutionsare closelyassociatedwiththeideologicalandgeopoliticalinterestsoftheWestern powers, especially of the USA. In addition,many elements of the neoliberal policyprogrammeitselfhave, from the start, been openlyassociated withthe New Right ideology of political conservatism. This is particularly true of neoliberalpoliticalanalysis,whichhaslongbeenaccusedofignoringreal-world evidenceto reach predeterminedconclusionsin supportof itspro-marketand anti-stateideologicalbiases.
6D Davis, `Unlearning languages of development: from rhetoric to realism in recent studies of Latin America’,LatinAmericanResearchReview, 27,1992,pp152±153.
10 EthnodevelopmentisatermcoinedbyStavenhagenfordevelopmentprocessesthatarenotuniversalbutare appropriateforparticularethnicgroups.Stavenhagen ndsthatcultureandethnicityhavebeenneglectednot onlybymodernisationtheoryandothermainstreamdevelopmentparadigms,butalsobymanyalternative frameworks, including dependency theory and much of the Marxist tradition. Because they focused on external factors, dependencytheoriststypicallypaid littleattentionto culturalissues. Formost Marxists, culturehasnormallybeendiscussedinthecontextofthe`nationalquestion’,whichliesoutsideandbeyond orthodoxMarxist theorising(R Stavenhagen,`Ethnodevelopment:a neglected dimensionin development thinking’,inRApthorpe&AKrahl(eds),DevelopmentStudies:CritiqueandRenewal,Leiden:EJBrill, 1986,pp71±94).
13 WithinmanyLatinAmerican countries,deJanvry ndsthattheriseofa`modern’ capitalist agro-export sectorhasbeenaccompanied bylandconcentrationsthathavesqueezedmuchofthe`traditional’ peasant sectorintomicro-farms thatareinsuf® cienttomeet subsistenceneeds.Inordertosurvive,thesepeasants areforcedtoseekseasonalwagelabourduringtheagro-exportharvests.Ratherthandevelopingseparately, asispositedbymodernisationtheory,importantlinksexistbetweenthetraditionalandmodernsectorsthat areresponsibleforsupplyingagro-exportcapitalwithmuchofits`comparativeadvantage’ (basedoncheap land and labour) in international commodity markets. Dualistic (but closely linked) structures in Latin America’s rural areas have thus been functional to the requirements of capitalist growth based on the agro-exportmodel(AdeJanvry,TheAgrarianQuestionandReformisminLatinAmerica,Baltimore,MD: JohnHopkinsUniversityPress, 1981).
16 For example, B Lesser, `When government fails, will the market do better? The privatization/market liberalizationmovementindevelopingcountries’,CanadianJournalofDevelopmentStudies,12,1991,pp 159±172.
17 For example, P Hill, Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986.
21 For example, Eurocentric biases have been uncovered in economics, geography, history, mathematics, psychologyandsocialanthropology(egJosephetal,`Eurocentrismasinthesocialsciences’,andRPeet, `Thesocialoriginsofenvironmentaldeterminism’,Annals,AssociationofAmericanGeographers,75,1985, pp309±333).
24 J Nederveen Pieterse, `Dilemmas of development discourse: the crisis of developmentalism and the comparativemethod’,DevelopmentandChange, 22,1991,p8.
25 Forexample,CKay,`Forarenewalofdevelopmentstudies:LatinAmericantheoriesandneoliberalismin the era of structural adjustment’, Third World Quarterly, 14, 1993, pp 691±702; and D Slater, `The geopoliticalimaginationandtheenframingofdevelopmenttheory’,TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritish Geographers,18,1993,pp419±437.
30 However,theriseofneoliberalismandstructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs)alsorepresentsapowerful counter-tendency towards the reassertion of a Eurocentric development model that supports Western interestsandemploysuniversalconceptsbasedonWesternhistory.
32 P Klaren, `Lost promise: explaining Latin American underdevelopment’, in Klaren & T Bossert (Eds), PromiseofDevelopment:TheoriesofChangeinLatinAmerica,Boulder,CO:WestviewPress, 1986,pp 8±9.
33 Hulme&Turner,SociologyandDevelopment,p34.
34 H J Wiarda, `Toward a non-ethnocentrictheory of development: alternative conceptions from the third world’,JournalofDevelopingAreas, 17,1983,p438.
35 For example, F Gareau, `The political economy of social science: where the trail leads’, International JournalofComparativeSociology,31,1990,pp49±66;andGAHuaco,`IdeologyandGeneralTheory:the case ofsociologicalfunctionism’,ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory,28,1986,pp34±54.
36 G Kolko,ConfrontingtheThirdWorld:UnitedStatesForeignPolicy 1945± 1980,New York:Pantheon, 1988,pp131±134.
39 OtherempiricalstudieshaveshownthatthemajorWestern powersabsolutelydominatedecisionmaking within these institutions. In the IMF, for example, J Gold (Voting and Decisions in the International MonetaryFund,Washington,DC:InternationalMonetaryFund,1972,p68)foundthattheUSA,Japanand WesternEuropecontrolled88.94%ofthevotesamongtheExecutiveDirectors.Forotherexamplesof IMF andWorldBankinterference,seeGBiggs,Lacrisisdeladeudalatinoamericanofrentealospercedentes historicos,BuenosAires:GrupoEditorLatinoamericano,1987;andJPetras&MMorley,LatinAmerica intheTimeofCholera:ElectoralPolitics,MarketEconomics,andPermanentCrisis,NewYork:Routledge, 1992.
41 For example, R Broad, Unequal AllianceÐTheWorld Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Philippines,Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1988;SGeorge,AFateWorsethanDebt:The Financial Crisis and the Poor, New York: Grove Press, 1988; and P Ruccio, `When failure becomes success: class and the debate over stabilization and adjustment’, World Development, 19, 1991, pp 1315±1334.
43 Forexample, JDietz&DJames, `TrendsindevelopmenttheoryinLatinAmerica: fromPrebischtothe present’, in Dietz & James (eds), Progress Toward Development in Latin America: From Prebisch to TechnologicalAutonomy,Boulder,CO:LynneReinner,1990,pp1±11;andGWhite,`Towardsapolitical analysisofmarkets’,IDSBulletin,24,1993,pp4±11.
WilHout’sbookconsistsof,inhisownwords,`aconfrontationofdependencytheory withempiricaldata’,thoughofcoursehisisnotthe rstexerciseinempiricaltestingof dependencyhypotheses.Curiously,however,despiteitsinitialtermsofreference,thebook seldom speaks directly to InternationalRelationstheory or theorists, not even in the conclusion,whichismainlydevotedtoassessingtheresultsoftheempiricalexamination. Nevertheless,thetextdoespointoutthechallengesthatdependencytheorycontinuesto pose to the dominant InternationalRelationstradition regarding the central problems (subordinationandexploitationvsdiplomacyandwar);theunit(s)ofanalysis(thecapitalist worldsystemvssovereignnation-states);andtheimageoforderintheinternationalsystem (hierarchyvsanarchy).Thisisalltothegood.
The strongest direct critiques in the book, however, are those of the Marxist and neo-Marxisttheoriesofimperialism,theliberaltheoryofinternationaltrade,theECLA perspectiveonimportsubstitutionindustrialisation,andmodernisationtheory.Inallthese cases Hout adroitly identi® es key problems left unsolved by these predecessors and competitortheoriesthatdependencytheoryseemstohaveaddressedinamore`progressive’ manner,inascienti® csense.Indeed,thissectionofthebookhasoutstandingmeritasa pedagogictoolforundergraduateandpostgraduatecoursesrequiringaconcisereviewof suchtheoreticalcontroversies.ItmaybeparticularlyhelpfulthatHoutstrivestoclarifythe importantdifferences rst betweentraditionaltheoriesofimperialismanddependency theory,andthenbetweenneo-Marxisttheoriesanddependency,despitetheresemblance interminologytheyshare.Houtdoesinfactdefendtheverdictthatdependencyconstitutes asigni® cantprogressive`problemshift’ Inthisrespect,thecriticalproblemaddressedanew bydependencytheoryisofcoursetheexplanationof`thelackofdevelopmentintheThird Worlddespitethesupposedlyprogressivenatureofcapitalism’.
Houtisgenerousinhiscriticism,inthathelikewisesubjectsdependencytheoryitself to a systematic rigorous inspection,seeking out the `anomalies of dependency’ with BarryGillsisLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofNewcastle-upon-Tyne.
0143-6597/95/010141±06Ó1995ThirdWorldQuarterly
considerablevigourandprecision.ThelitanyofsinshererecantedbyHoutarefamiliar bynow,forinstance`toomuchemphasisupontheidenticalin¯uenceoftheinternational capitalistsystemonThirdWorldcountries’;and`overemphasisontheeconomicworld order and its consequentneglect of politicalfactors’; and a failure to recognise that `policiespursuedbyindividualcountriesmaycauseimportantdifferencesinthesituation inthosecountries’ Houtreturnstothesethemesofcriticisminhisconclusions.
While this book provides a very concise and useful summary of the dependency theory of AndreÂGunder Frank, Samir Amin and Johan Galtung (again to be highly recommendedto students),its treatment of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system approachissomethingofananomalyinitself.Ontheonehand,WilHoutrightlyidenti® es Wallerstein’sworkasavariantofdependencytheory Hethusrecti® esthetoooftenheld notionthatworld-systemtheorysupercedesdependencytheory,andplacesWallerstein’s opus in its proper context in intellectual history. On the other hand, Hout’s general treatmentoftheworld-systemapproachisotherwisesomewhatodd,sincehedoesnot subject it to the same empirical examination as dependency. Hout explains this by arguingthatWallerstein’sworkisinfact`lessadependencytheorythanadescription andanalysisofthedevelopmentoftheªcapitalistworldeconomyº’;thatWallerstein’s magnumopus,beingmainlyhistorical,hassofarnotreachedthecurrentperiod;andthat hisvariousessaysonpostwaraffairsare`eithertooschematicortoodetailedtobethe sourceofanempiricalmodelofinternationalrelations’ Whilealloftheabovemaybe accuratestatements,itisneverthelessoddthatHoutomitsWallersteinfromtheempirical testing(givenhedecidedtoincludehimatall),sincethisbookpurportstospeaktothe InternationalRelationscommunityandWallerstein’sapproachseemstoembodysomething most like a comprehensive alternative conception of International Relations in comparisonwithotherdependencytheories.
Though much of this book is occupied by a useful summary and critique of key theories,asalreadymentioned,therealthrustofHout’sworkishisempirical`testing’ ofvariousdependencytheoryhypotheses.Hisattempttomodelthevarioustheoriesand tooperationalisethekeyconceptsisfairlysuccessful,withafewcaveatstobenoted. However,thecompositionofhissamplecaseshassomeratherseriousde® ciencies.His selectionofcountriesislimitedonlytothosedevelopingcountrieswithapopulationof atleastonemillionin1967andbelowacertain GNP percapita.Thesecriteriaresultin thecompleteeliminationofmicro-statesandmanyimportantsmallstates.Forexample, in Asia andthePaci® c, such statesas Brunei,Fiji andBhutanare eliminated.In the Caribbean,countriessuchastheBahamas,Barbados,Grenada,Guyana,andBelizeare omitted.Curiously,andalmostcertainlywithimportantconsequencesfortheresultsof theanalysis,virtuallyalltheArabGulfstatesareleftout,includingBahrain,theUnited ArabEmirates,Oman, Qatar,Kuwait,andevenSaudiArabia.WhileincludingSingapore,HongKong,andSouthKorea,thefourth`tiger’ TaiwanÐisstrangelyexcluded. Inaddition,oddcasesareincluded,suchasSouthVietnam,withrealdataforonlyone `countrytime’ (1965),Laosatonly1985,Cambodiaatonly1965,andYugoslavia,and Cuba,thoughMongolia,NorthKorea,NorthVietnamandChinaareomittedaltogether, aswellaslessdevelopedsocialiststatesinEastern EuropeortheBalkans.InAfrica, Hout’scriteriahaveeliminatedBotswana,CapeVerde,Congo(Brazzaville),Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,theGambia,Guinea-Bissau,Guinea,Namibia,SaoTomeÂandPrincipe, andintheIndianOcean,bothMauritiusandtheSeychellesareleftout.Insomecases countrieswereeliminatedbecauseover40%ofthevaluesweremissingintheavailable data.Wheredataforonlysomecountrytimeswasmissing,HoutusedSPSS-X option mean-substitution.
He thusarrivedatatruncatedsampleofThirdWorldcountries,containingonly84 countries,withatotalof242countrytimes(1965,1975,1985).Tobeprecisetherefore, 142
his ndingsrelatespeci® callytothissampleofthechosen84countries.Generalisation of the results from this sample should therefore be undertaken with some caution. Eschewing multiple regression analysis, the technique often used in other empirical studiesofthiskind,Houtoptsforapooledcross-sectionalanalysis.Thegreateststrength ofhisapproachistheeleganceofhismodellingandtheprecisionofhisoperationalisationof concepts,as previouslynoted.Here it must be pointedout,however,thathis operationalisationof the critical concept, ie dependency,has tended towards quite a broad de® nition, based on seven variables (four trade-related and three nancial and technological).Throughfactoranalysishearrivesata`cluster’ ofvariablesthataccount forthegreaterpartofthevarianceinallvariables.Threefactorsaretherebyextracted: tradedependence,tradepartnerdependence,and nancialdependence.Thestrengthof this device is that it does yield more differentiated results, thus revealing more complexityindependencyrelationshipsthanmightotherwisehavebeenthecase.Iwill returntothisbelow.However,thisapproach,inmyview,tendstostrayawayfromthe strictnotionofdependencede® nedastheprocessofthetransferofsurplusthatresults in underdevelopmentrather than development.Indeed,Houthas takenthe conceptof `exploitation’ and operationalised it in a manner that resembles the strict notion of dependencede® nedasthetransferofsurplus.
ThereareseveralotherproblemsthatmustbeaddressedinHout’soperationalisation thatmayhaveanimportantbearingonourinterpretationofhisresults.First,dataonthe exportvalueoffuels is excludedfrom his calculationof theexport valueofprimary commoditiesasapercentageoftotalexports(usedtoapproximate`primarycommodity orientation’).Second,andevenmoresurprisingly,dataonthestockof MNC investment arenotincludedinhisdataforthe`degreeofdependence’ Furthermore,whenassigning valuesignstotheA/B(expansion/contraction)phasesoftheworldeconomysince1965, heassigns 1to1965(expansion), 1to1975(recession),andacuriousneutral0to 1985, designated as a period of global economic `recovery’ This assignment of the neutralvalue0to1985raisestheproblemofhowthedebtcrisisisanalysedinthisstudy. Thedebtcrisisisinitiallysweptunderthecarpetintheformalempiricalanalysis,but inexorablyraisesitsuglyheadagainintheinterpretationoftheresultsintheconclusion. Itwouldhaveperhapsbeenmoreappropriatetohavedesignated1985witha 1value, followingthesenseofthepositiontakenbyFrankandothersthattheBphasethatbegan circa 1968 continuedthroughoutthe 1980s, and indeed the Debt Crisis of the Third Worldandthesubsequentstructuraladjustmentprogrammesattesttotheseverityofthe dislocationsthiscontinuingglobalcrisisimposedonThirdWorldsocieties.
Perhaps the most crucial problem in Hout’s operationalisation, however, is his controversial decision to reject the terms of trade in his operationalisation of `exploitation’ which,asIhavealreadynoted,hetendstosubstitutefortheclassicnotion ofdependencede® nedassurplustransferfromunderdevelopedcountriestodeveloped countries.Hisalternativechoiceinfavourofinvestmentdebitsandinterestpaymentsas apercentageofmerchandiseexportsmayaccountforthenatureofsomeofhis ndings andthelogicalprescriptionsthat¯owfromthem,discussedfurtherbelow.Inshort,this choicemay have led the resultstowards af® rmation of the positivebene® ts of internationaltradeandparticularlyoftheexportorientationpursuedbytheEastAsianNewly IndustrialisedCountries(NICs). Finally,his choiceof`spin-off’ indicatorsof development seem not to be the best, where such indicators as the number of scientists, universities,researchinstitutions,andpossessionofadvancedtechnologieswouldhave beenmoremeaningful.Tomostofthesecharges,Houtpleadslackofdataasthereason forhisalternativechoice.Scienti® crigoursurelyhasitsvicissitudesfortheresearcher, butitmayalsoproduceitsownpeculiardissatisfactionforthereaderandthegeneral interestsofthescienti® ccommunity.Multipleomissions,lesspreferableoperationalisations, and even arguably `necessary’ massaging of the data may inadvertently skew
The above serves as a necessary preface to the following nal comments on the meaningful conclusions of Hout’s impressive study of dependency. As opposed to Hout’s af® rmation of the scienti® c value of the general propositionsof dependency theory,hisconclusionsfocusheavilyupontheelementsofthetheoryhe ndsweakest orunsupportedbythedata.Letusnoteinpassingthathedoesnotintheendsuf® ciently returntothesupposedlycentralconcernofthestudy,ierelatingdependencytheoryto general InternationalRelationstheory.Be that as it may, his ndingson dependency theoryitselfaresomewhatcontroversialÐnotleasttodependencytheoristsÐwhilealso somewhatcompellinginanumberofareas.Asexpected,theresultsarenotconclusive; someelementsoftheoryareupheldwhileothersarefoundtolacksupport.Whatismost striking,however,isthedegreetowhichHout’s ndingsaresometimescontradictory, asthefollowingcommentsreveal.
Onthewhole,Hout ndsthattheexplanatoryvalueofallthreedependencytheories hereviews(Frank,Amin,Galtung)ismoderatelyhigh,thoughnotexceptionallyhigh. TheproportionofvarianceexplainedbyFrank’smodelisanoverall0.53,forAmin0.55, andforGaltung0.56.Interestingly,inallthreecases,thedependencytheoryaccounts forthehighestproportionofthevarianceforthe1985countrytimes,respectively:0.62 (Frank),0.77(Amin)and0.70(Galtung).Conversely,theytendtoaccountforamuch lesserproportionofthevarianceforthe1965countrytime,respectively:0.43(Frank), 0.62(Amin)and0.53(Galtung).Thismightbeinterpretedasbeingconsistentwiththe conditionsin theworld economy,ie that 1965was a peak in the post war A/expansionary phase, while 1985 was actually a point of deepening dependency patterns, accentuatedbythedebtcrisis,ratherthanthe`recovery’ Houtdesignatesittobe.
Following this last observation more closely, Hout contends, in his assessment of Frank’smodel,thatthe`stateoftheworldsystem’,ietheA/Bphases,hasanegative(as opposedtothepredictedpositive)impacton`tradedependence’,andhasnoin¯uence on `® nancial dependence’. However, he providesonly a single overall result for the entireperiod1965±1985,andnocomputationfor thespeci® c periods1965,1975and 1985 considered separately. This may be compounded by the already mentioned mis-designationof1985asa0value`recovery’ andthesubsumptionofthedebtcrisis withinthisputativerecovery.Onthewhole,however,Hout ndssupportforthecentral dependencythesisthat`periodsofrecessionandcrisisoffermoreopportunitiesforthe developingcountriestoloosentieswiththecentre’.
Hout’spathanalysisapproachproducedapositiveandsigni® cantcoef® cientforthe relationshipbetweenthe`stateoftheworldsystem’ and`tradepartnerdependence’.The relationshipbetween`® nancialdependence’andtheconcentrationofproductionresulted inacoef® cientwhichisnegativeandsigni® cantfor1985(ieinthewakeoforduring thedebtcrisis),whereby`moredependentcountriesappeartohavebeenlessfocusedon primaryproductsthanothercountries’,suggestingthatattemptsatdiversi® cationwere actuallyrathermoresuccessfulincomparisontothe IMF/IBRD campaignsforstructural adjustment!This ndingthatthosecountriesdeemedmost`dependent’wereactuallyless reliant on a few primary commodity exports, seems to turn thesense of dependency theoryvirtuallyupsidedown.Furthermore,whenassessingAmin’smodel,Houtclaims that `the general in¯uence of primary commodity concentration on exploitation is negative:countriesthatarespecializedintheproductionofagriculturalproductsandraw materials generally experience less exploitation than non-specialized countries’ The notableexceptionto thisis 1985,admittedly`underthein¯uenceof theinternational debtcrisis’,whereinmorespecialisedprimaryproductproducers`becomemorevulnerable to exploitationthanothers’. Nevertheless,in generalHoutconcludesthatdepen144
Intermsofthegeneralrelationshipbetween`dependency’anddevelopment,thecrux ofall dependencytheory,Houtderivesaresultfrom his testofGaltung’s modelthat basicallycon® rmstheclassichypothesis:`dependenceisnegativelyrelatedtodevelopment’ Curiously,however,Houthere again throws a curveballat all `conventional’ dependencywisdom,byclaimingthat`Theperiodofthedebtcrisisisanexceptionto the general trend: duringthis period,countriesthat were more dependenton a small number of trade partners and/or on foreign nance tended to be relatively more developedthanothers’.Yet,againuponassessingGaltung,Houtsaysthat`Inperiodsof relative economic decline, countries specializing in primary commodities appear to sufferfrommoreexploitationthanothercountries,whilethesecountriestendtobeless exploitedduringeconomicupswings’ If,asIhavearguedabove,exploitationcanhere actuallybetakentobetheoperationalisedformofthestrictclassicnotionofdependency itself(surplustransfer/underdevelopment),thenHoutisreallysayingthatthe`stateofthe world system’ doesindeedseem to in¯uencedeeper`dependence’ for thosecountries `dependent’onprimaryproductexportsduringperiodsofglobalcontraction/recession/B phases.
Perhaps most provocativeof all the ndingsis Hout’s contentionthat, in both the FrankandAminmodels,therelationshipbetween`exploitation’anddevelopmentisnot negativeaspredicted,butactuallypositive Hethereforecontradictsthecentraltenetof classic dependency theory, `that countries that are subject to exploitation lose an important part of their resources to the countries of the centre’. The conclusion he derivesfromthis ndingisevenmorecontroversial.Hout’sempirical ndingsseemto bringusinexorablybackfullcircletoconventional(evenRicardian)internationaltrade theoryandthelogicalprescriptionsoftheHeckscher-Ohlinmodel.Hearguesthatinfact `the integration of developing countries in the international trade system does not hamper,but,onthecontrary,stimulatestheirdevelopment’.Goingevenfurther,Hout concludes that `On the whole, dependence has a positive in¯uence on the level of exploitation, while exploitation positively in¯uences development’. Hout admits that `This result is clearly irreconcilablewith dependencytheory’s thesis that dependence makesdevelopingcountriesmorevulnerabletoexploitationandthatthissituationleads tounderdevelopment’.Oneisthereforeinsomethingofaquandarytodecidewhether Houthasdonedependencytheoryaservicebydefendingitsscienti® cvalueontheone hand,orapparentlydemolisheditscentraltenetsontheother!
His nal prescriptions come uncomfortably close to af® rming the `conventional economic wisdom’ of the recent and ongoing period of liberalisation and so-called `globalisation’.Thisisnowheremore obviousthanin hisconvictionthat`policiesdo matter’ andparticularlythosethatwerepursuedbythe NICs,especiallytheEastAsian tigers.Hout’sstudy,byhisownadmission,addsweighttoothersthathave`castheavy doubt’uponthevalidityoftheassumptionthattrade,aid,foreigninvestmentandlending are trulymechanismsof`exploitation’.Nevertheless,it is notentirelynovelnoreven apostate for Hout to say that centre±periphery relations, though always existing or `threatening’,arenotimmutable,andarethereforesubjecttochange,thusaf® rmingthe possibility of `upward’ mobility towards the core as well as `downward mobility’ towardstheperiphery.Itisalsopossibletoacceptthatforsomecountries,undercertain conditions,participationininternationaltradeisaroutetowealthcreationandevento `development’
Moretothepoint,itisHout’sgeneralenthusiasmforEastAsian NICexperiencewith exportorientationthatmaybeabitmisleadingandperhapssomewhatmis-informed.He advocatestheideathat invitingforeign directinvestmentprobablyhad more positive
bene® ts than negativeconsequences,and cautionsthatborrowing ontheinternational capitalmarketisprobablythemoredangerousroad.Butweshouldpauseandnotethat SouthKorea’sprevioussuccess,onthecontrary,hasoftenbeenexplainedintermsof the reversal of Hout’s prescription, ie South Korea long succeeded in limiting its penetrationbyforeign MNCsand nanceditsaggressiveindustrialexpansionandexport orientationviaheavyforeignborrowing.HoutrightlynotesthatRobertWade,forone, has cast doubt on the notion that other Third World states could replicate the very speci® cmixofcharacteristicsthathaveaccountedforEastAsian NIC success,particularlythepoliticalaspects.
WhatHoutdoescon® rm,andapointthatinmymindhaswidervalidity,isthatthe real aim of developingcountriesshouldbe to create a `more differentiatedindustrial productionstructure’,sincerelianceona few primarycommodities`hasprovento be detrimental to their development’ Deciding the best means of achieving this goal remains an open empirical question. It is perhaps going too far to accept, as Hout contends,that`tradedependencecanbeconcludedtohavealmostnoin¯uenceonthe levelofexploitationanddevelopmentofThirdWorld countries’,apositionwhich,as Houtcon® rms,tendstoleadusstraightbacktotheneo-classicalconventionalwisdom on the `positive contribution of trade’, ie that `trade involves transactions that are potentiallybene® cialto all tradingpartners,andenhancethe welfare of all partners’. This `insight’, accordingto Hout,`has beendiscardedtooquicklybythedependency theorists’ This really is back to square one! The progressive problem shift that dependency undertook was precisely to examine why, despite supposedly benign or positiveinternationaleconomicconditionsand the `progressive’ nature of capitalism, manyThirdWorldcountrieshadnotbene® tedorhadfailedtodevelop.Nowonderthen, thatHout’sultimatepunchlineisthat`Theidenti® cationofimperialismwithcapitalism isnotonlywrong,butalsounnecessary’.Infact,`countriesexperiencingahigherlevel ofexploitationaremoredevelopedthancountriesthatareexploitedless’.Therecould hardlybeamoreappropriatedoctrinetoaccompanytherosy ngereddawnofthenew ageof`globalised’ free trade!
Butatthesametimeglobalcompanieseverywherelooktotheirhomegovernmentstoprotecttheir existing markets and to provide muscle for penetrating new markets, to keep labor and environmentalcostsdown,andtosubsidizetheiroperationsinvariousways.(p281)
OnlypartsoftheThirdWorldhavebene® tedfromthesechanges,buttheauthorsofthisbook aretooquicktosaythatthereisacrisislooming.Theyarecorrectinsayingthatmostpeoplein theThirdWorldarenowlimitedtotheroleof`window-shopping’ attheglobalshoppingmall even as they become workers in the global workplace. These people want to become full participantsintheglobaleconomywhileretainingtheirsenseoflocalidentityandauthenticity. Thatisprobablywhatwe allwant.But,for themoment,nobodyis de® ningthe statusquo as requiringarevolution.IsuspectthattheunderpaidworkersoftheThirdWorldwillformlabour unionsandlobbytheirnationalgovernmentsforbetterlabourlawsbeforetheyturntheirattention to the organisationof the global economy.Thus, while there is much useful and entertaining informationinthisbook,theauthors’ calltoglobalconsciousnessisstillpremature.
This book examines the relationship between the Third World and four main international economicorganisations(IEOs)theIMF,theWorldBank,GATTandUNCTAD Itcriticallyanalysesthe demandsoftheThirdWorldandtheresponsesofthe IEOs,aswellascompetinginterpretations oftherelationship.
Williamsbeginswithatimelydiscussionofthecontinuedutilityoftheterm`ThirdWorld’ He arguesthatthetermislessvalidasaneconomicexpressionthanasa politicalandideological concept;`anexpressionoftheperceptionandconsciousnessofacertaindegreeofpowerlessness inworldpolitics’ (p4)
The link betweenthe ThirdWorld and IEOs isseenasa cooperativeonewherebythe Third Worldnegotiateswith IEOsinordertopursueThirdWorldinterests.Oneimportantcontribution madebythebookistolookatorganisationalprocessesandhowthesedeterminethenatureof ThirdWorldparticipationintheglobalpoliticaleconomy.Theconclusionisthatfewgeneralisationsarepossible.
The book adopts a structural±functionalistapproachto IEOs. The style is easily accessible, demonstratingtheauthor’sknowledgeoftheworkingsoftheseomnicompetentorganisations.The chapterswadetheirwaythroughvariousandcompetingcritiquesof IEOsandtheirdevelopmental roleandattimesthebookcanappeardisjointed.Yettheplethoraofreferencesattheendofeach chaptergivesthereaderampleaccesstopursuefurthertheissuesraisedtherein.
WhendiscussingIMF conditionality,Williamspointsoutthat`itisfutiletowishforaworldin which bankers did not attach conditions to loans’ (p 83). Furthermore the impact of IMF conditionalityon the Third World is inconclusiveand disputed;thus `there is no correlation betweenFundprogrammesandpoliticalinstability’ (p92).
ThiswelcomeadditiontotheliteratureonNamibiaisoneofseveralnewbooksaddressingthe transitiontostatehoodbySouthAfrica’sformercolony,anditsimmediateaftermath.LionelCliffe’s teamoriginallysetouttodocumenttheUN-supervisedelectionprocessin1989,butwhathas nally emergedisafarmorein-depthandconsideredstudyofthetransitionperiodasawhole,itselfwell contextualisedinrecentNamibianhistory.Myprincipalregretisthatpublicationtookoverfouryears fromthetimeofthoseelections,thuslosingsomeoftheimmediacy.Therearecompensations, however,intermsoftheenhancedscopeandgreaterabilitytore¯ectwithhindsightthanwould otherwise have been possible. Paradoxically also, publication just ahead of the forthcoming parliamentaryelectionsinDecember1994,Namibia’s rstsinceindependence,lendsthebookanother formoftopicality.
con¯ictbetweenAngolangovernmentforcesandthoseofSouthAfricaand UNITA (p29)omits reference to the large Cuban presence which was vital to the former, although this issue is developedfullyin a laterchapter.The extentand signi® canceof changeoutsidethe military± securitysphereeffectedbytheinternaladministrationsunderSouthAfricanpatronageinthelate 1970sand1980salsowarrantedsomewhatgreatercoverage.
In discussing the constraints on SWAPO’s ability to politicise the population at large in comparisontotheMauMauinKenyaand ZANU inZimbabwe(p30),theauthorsmakeseveral valuable points about the lack of appeal to the supernaturalor to spirit media in seeking to mobilisesupport;thegreatimportanceofthechurchesintheliberationstruggle;andtheinability to use land dispossessionas a rallyingpoint in northernNamibia becausethis had not really occurredthere,unlikeintherestofthecountry.Perhapssurprisingly,inviewoftheheatedrecent debatesaboutsuchissuesintheliteratureonMozambique,theauthorsdonot,however,atany stageraisethecrucialquestionoftheextenttowhichtheavowedlyMarxistÐasdistinctfrommore generalanticolonialÐrhetoricandprogrammeof SWAPO inexilebefore1988/9 foundresonance amongdifferentsegmentsofthepredominantlyruralandconservativepopulation.
The search for an internationallyacceptabletransitionto independenceforms the subjectof Chapter 3. This is a clear and well-read account which suggests,for example, that available evidence points clearly to Cuban involvementin Angola having been motivated by `socialist internationalism’ratherthanmereSovietsurrogacy.TheimportanceofRonaldReagan’sNovember1980electionvictory,intermsofUS attitudestoSouthAfrica and the`linkage’ question, whichbecamecentraltotheinterminabledelaysinimplementingtheagreedpeaceplanembodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 (itself the subject of Chapter 4), is also emphasised.IcanattesttothisasIwasengagedinpoliticallyquitesensitivedoctoralresearchin Namibiaatthetime.UnderJimmyCarter’spresidency,therehadstillbeenachancethattheUN plan would be activated, bringing white supremacy and South African rule to an end. The uncertaintyinNamibiawaspalpable.However,thetotalchangeinmoodandatmosphere(black gloom,whitejubilation)onthestreetsofWindhoekthemorningafterReagan’svictorybecame knownisoneofmymostvividanddepressingmemoriesofthatperiod.Itinstantlybecameclear thatNamibianindependencewouldbesetbackconsiderably.
Part2ofthebook,comprisingthreechapters,focusesontheactualtransitionperiodculminating intheelectionsofNovember1989.Thepoliticalclimatewascomplexanddif® cult,particularlyas thebloodbathbetweenSADFandSWAPO ghtersatthestartoftheformalcease® reon1April1989 sonearlyabortedthewholeprocess.Thisvexedepisodeisanalysedsensitivelyanddispassionately, bothinitsownrightandintermsofitssubsequentrami® cations.Usefulcomparisonsareagaindrawn withZimbabwe,where,unlikeNamibia(despiteperiodicclaimsbySWAPO),theguerrillashadcreated signi® cant`liberatedzones’. Problemsofviolenceand intimidationduringthepre-electionand electionperiodsarewellcovered,togetherwithmoredetailedexaminationsofthesituationindifferent regionsofthecountryandtheroleoftheUNTransitionAssistanceGroup(UNTAG).Theauthorsaccept thattheactualvotingwasfreeandfair,andthatthespeci® cproblemsencountereddidnothavea signi® cantbearingontheoutcome.However,theydrawattentiontowiderissuesofintimidation,prior registrationofdubiousorineligiblevoters,andthenowwell-documenteddisinformationcampaign orchestratedby South African agents, which may have contributed to SWAPO not gaining the anticipatedtwo-thirdsmajority.Thenatureandelectioncampaignsofthevariouspoliticalpartiesare alsowellcoveredinChapter6.
Theconcludingchapteroffersasubstantivelookattheimmediatepost-electionperiod,highlighting theworkoftheConstituentAssemblyanditsStandingCommitteeonRulesandOrders,which negotiatedtheindependenceConstitutionincamera.Thisfascinatingdiscussion,basedlargelyonthe con® dential minutes of the Committee’s meetings, devotes attention to the mechanisms and procedures,butalsohighlightstheremarkablyconciliatorymannerinwhichsensitiveorcontested issueswereaddressed.Thisachievedahighdegreeofconsensusamongthepartiesrepresented, enablingformaladoptionbytheAssemblyandtheattainmentofindependenceasscheduledon21 March1990.Thescepticalreadermightbetemptedtolookforrose-tintedspectacleshere.However, myownexperience,discussionswithpeopleinvolvedandreadingsofsomeoftheCommittee’s minutescon® rmstheaccuracyofthisaccount.
The nalfewpagesofthetextseektosummariseearlypost-independencepolicyinitiatives.This istoobriefandreadsratherlikeanafterthoughtfeltnecessarybythemarchoftime.Theideaisgood, butitisnotaltogetherconvincing.Thereareseveralminorinaccuracies,themostsigni® cantofwhich istheclaim(p234)that SWAPO wasconstrainedafterindependencebyfactorsincluding`¼ an economicstrangleholdandoccupationofWalvisBay’.Infact,oneoftheunexpectedsurprisesof thechanginggeopoliticalsituationinsouthernAfricawasthatSouthAfricadidnotuseitspresence inWalvisBayasathumbonNamibia’sjugularvein,ashadbeenwidelyanticipated,notleastby myself.Instead,bilateralnegotiationsovertheportenclave’sfutureproceededquietly,albeitwith someSouthAfricanobfuscationanddelay,withnorestrictiononNamibianaccesstoanduseofthe port.On1March1994,WalvisBaywasreintegratedintoNamibia.
Whenonecivilianpresidencysucceedsanother,itmightbeassumedthatdemocracyandpeace have returned to a country. Yet Trudeau notes that, while democratic institutionsand formal constitutionalproceduresaremostlyinplaceinGuatemala,democracydoesnotexistmerelybythe factofcivilianelections.Instead,itdependsuponthecreationofademocraticpoliticalculturethrough thecessationofpoliticalviolenceandade® nablemovementtowardssocialjustice.
GuatemalanPoliticsoffersathoroughreviewofthecandidatesandelectoralprocessesofthetwo civilianelectionsofthelate1980s.Thoughtheseelectionswereprocedurallycorrect,theytookplace in an atmosphereof militaryand paramilitaryintimidation.No singlecandidatewas willingto challengeeitherthesocialinequalitiesbaseduponthemostskewedlandtenuresysteminLatin America,orthecontinuedmilitarisationofsociety.
abusesbegan to escalateonce again in the rst part of the Cerezo administrationbecause of persistentmilitary dominanceand continuedpoliticalviolenceagainstthe unarmed opposition.
Trudeau emphasises that civilian governments have bene® ted Guatemalan democracy by allowinggreateropportunityforthedevelopmentofcivilsociety.Heacceptsthepossibility`that thoughelectionsthemselvesdonotsignifydemocracy,theyoccasiontheopportunityfordemocracyto be created’ (p 187).Althoughelitesmay haveintendedforciviliandemocracytobea facade,newinstitutionalstructuresgavemoreroomforthepopularsectortore-organiseitselfand gaininternationalrecognitionaftertheviolenceoftheearly1980s.
GuatemalanPoliticsendswith a realistassessmentofthepoliticalfutureof Guatemala,but indicatesthatthepopularmovementÐwomen’s groupsandMayaculturalorganisationsÐisthe only sector seeking to widen the aperture for the political participation of the majority of Guatemalans.
Myonlymajorcriticismisthatthebookdoesnotgiveenoughemphasistothewayinwhich civilianregimeswereoriginallyplannedaspartofanoverallarmycounter-insurgencyprogramme. This strategy granted formal responsibilityto civilians, while leaving the military in ultimate controlof many importantdimensionsof statepower,includingthe counter-insurgencywar, a numberofgovernmentdevelopmentinitiatives,thejudiciaryandtheprosecutionofhumanrights violaters.
The book is divided into two sections; the rst treats the political history of the special administrativeregime(ormutasarrifate)establishedinMountLebanonin1861,whilethesecond considersthe developmentof its institutionsand their contributionto the creation of modern Lebanon.
ThekeyinstitutionofthemutasarrifatewastheAdministrativeCouncil,whichderiveditspower fromitscontroloftaxationandbudgetaryexpenditures.Akarlishowsthatwhilethisbodywas confessionalincomposition,itwasnotsectarianinoperation.Electionsinwhichvillageheadmen representingvarioussectswereobligedtoselectminoritycouncillors,forexample,necessitated inter-confessional alliances and thus created common interests. Such relationships, in turn, eventuallypenetratedtheworkingsoftheCouncilitself.ThetwooccasionsonwhichtheCouncil
ThusitwasthataregimeestablishedtolimitOttomansovereigntyandenhanceforeignin¯uence providedtheOttomanstatewiththemeanstoextenditsauthorityoverMountLebanonforperhaps the rsttime.Thatthisprocesswasmarkedbystabilityratherthanstrifedemonstratestheef® cacy ofthepoliciespursuedbytheSublimePorte.Indeed,theultimatedemiseofthemutasarrifateoccured notasaresultofanyirresolvableinternalcontradictionsoftheregimebutratheronaccountofeasily identi® ableexternalfactors.AkarliconcludesthatbyprovidingLebanonwiththeexperienceof organisingandconducting`governmentalactivitywithinaconstitutionalframework’and`acommon, and democraticallyoriented, political consciousness’, the idea of Lebanon, unlike many other postcolonialnationalisms`wasnotanintellectualconstructalone,butwasrootedin fty-oddyears ofpoliticalexperienceinbuildingandactualterritorialgovernment’ Akarli,whochallengesanumber ofconventionalassumptionsaboutOttomanhistory,haswrittenanimportantbookandwrittenitwell.
Oneachoftheselectedthemes,theauthorprovidesalucidexpositionoftheissuesandarguments. TheBuddhistattitudetoeconomicenterprise,Kautilya’sviewoftheeconomicfunctionsofthestate, thefoundationsofthedraintheory,theMahalanobismodelofeconomicgrowthandothertopicsare discussedwith equal clarity and concision.The presentationof a particularargumentis often accompaniedbyahelpfulcritique.ItisonlyinthechapteronGandhithatcriticalevaluationis conspicuousbyitsabsence.
Second,womenexpressedtheirauthorityinhouseholdaffairsaswell.Ontheirownauthority, womencouldgiveloansofcommonhouseholdresources.Theynowcouldlendmoneyontheirown andthishelpedthemtobuildtheirownsavingsofcash.AsWhitetesti® es,therewasadilemma.Poor women labourers did not always get adequate remuneration from female employers. These unfortunatewomen occupied the lowest point of the social pyramid. Here, the author argues, `subordinationbyclassandgenderconverge’(p88).Singlewomenwereinafarmoredesperate situationand morehelplesscondition.Manyofthemwereengagedindomesticservice,which producedonlyinequalities.Third,asbefore,inthe marriagebondtheBengaliMuslimwomen
symbolisedfemalesubordination.Althoughearlymarriageful® lledtheiradvancementandhopeof abetterlife,newwiveswerealsonewworkersandassuchtheirlabour,sexualityandfertilitybelonged totheirhusbandandhisfamily,accordingtotraditionandsocialnorms.Dowry(paymentbythe bride’sfamily)representedasituationinwhichwomendidno`productive’labour,andsorepresented afuture`cost’ forwhichtheirhusband’shouseholdmustbecompensated.Thepositionwasnot differentfromtheHindupractices.Inshort,throughmarriage,`womeninBangladeshcomeclosest tothefeminineidealofsubordinationanddependence’(p109).Inthe`familyhousehold’,male activities were regarded as `primary’ and female as only `secondary’ For instance, one daughter-in-lawofKangaliSerkar,awealthyHindu,usedthefamilysewingmachinetomendclothes ofotherhouseholdmembersduringtheday,butshecouldonlyusethesewingmachineforherown clotheswithoutbeingrebukedwhenallthehouseworkwasdonetothesatisfactionofothermembers. Thistendency,theauthorcontends,supportedthetraditionalnormsofBengalisociety.Theincome whichawomancouldgeneratewaseventuallyusedintheserviceofthehouseholdasawhole.Dr Whiteinsiststhatwomenthemselvesidenti® edtheirowninterestswiththeadvancementofthe householdasawhole.Theythusremainedadultdependents,totheannoyanceofsocialreformers.
Thebookhassomede® ciencies.First,somesub-titlesarenotveryclear.Forinstance,chapterfour bearsa title `ScatterwithOne Hand: Gatherwith Two’, which impliesthat if onegivesaway something,orinvests,s/hehasthemoralrighttodemandsomeshareintheproduce.Inthischapter, DrWhitearguesthatthemalefactordominatedthemajormarkets.Butthequestionremains:didthe malefactordominatethehouseholdsbecauseoftheirmarketdomination?Didthemaleshaveamoral righttodictateterms?Allthroughthechapter,DrWhitefailstoexplaintheimplicationofthesaying. Likewise,thetitleinchapterseven,`Youcan’tGetGheeOutwithaStraightFigure’,meansinBengali thatonemustbecourageousenoughtodemandhisorherrights.Hereagain,therehasbeennoattempt toputforwardthewomen’sdemands,orexplainthesub-heading.Thisbringsustoanotheradverse observationonthebook.Weknowthatamovementinteractswiththestateandwithsociety.In evaluatingthepossibleoutcomesoftheBangladeshiwomen’smovement,onequestionhastoconcern whatgroupsopposeitsgoals,andwhataretheirrelativestrengths.Similarly,itisnecessarytoask twoquestionsaboutthestateandtheelders:whatincentivesandwhatcapacitydidtheyhaveto respondeffectivelytothewomen’sdemands?Inthesub-heading,`GenderandtheBangladeshistate’, Dr White notes that the Bangladeshi state’s approach to gender has been opportunistic and contradictory(p13),butshedoesnotexplainthemoralassumptionsofthestate.Nordoessheexplain whodidopposethewomen’sadvancesandwhy.
However,thisoriginalpieceofworksubstantiatesthelineofargumentthatwomen,bothHindu andMuslim,inthatpoorcountryhavemadeprogressinattainingsomerights.Thetexthasprovided thereaderswithfeministperspectives,whichcalledfornewdemands.Iftheforeigndonoragencies have already explained the traditionally accepted norms, the present book has offered more sociologicalexplanations.Inthisrespectthebookisaclearcontributiontotheliteratureonsocial strati® cationbygenderandclassinaThirdWorldcountry.
The rstsectionisalmostbiographical,anddealswitheconomistsandopinions.Itconsistsof12 essays,rangingfromadelightfulpieceonthemanyfacesofMaynardKeynesandJKGalbraithon powertothecontributionsofsomerecentwinnersoftheNobelPrizeinEconomics.Anumberof theseessaysdealwithmethodologicalissuesineconomics,asdotheessaysinSection6.Section 6containsthreeessaysthataremuchlongerthantheothers,afeaturere¯ectingthefactthatthey were originallypublishedas journal articles. The piece on `Economic theory in development economics’canvassesanumberofissuesregardingtherolethattheoryshouldplayinthisliterature.
Indiscussingmethodologyandtheroleoftheoryineconomics,ithasbecomearitualtodisclose one’sviewwithrespecttotheencroachmentofthedisciplinebythemathematicalandstatistical sciences. I share Basu’s view that the `intrusion’ has yielded more positives than negatives, particularlywithrespecttore-equippingandimprovingtheeconomist’stool-kit.Inthisrespect,`On misunderstandingDebreu’inSection1providesaluciddefenceofthemodellingapproachthathas cometodominatemuchofcurrenteconomicanalysis.Debreu’smajorcontributionsareinthearea ofgeneralequilibriumtheory,ananalyticallydemandingsubject.Forthisreason,ithasnotbeen accessibletomanyinsidethediscipline,letaloneoutside.Unfortunately,ignorancealonehasnotbeen asuf® cientreasoninpreventingmanyinsidersandoutsidersfrommisrepresentinghisworkandits relevance.
Alessfamiliartuneplayedoutinthispieceistheideathatthemoveintoproducingandexporting the`new’ labour-intensivemanufacturesneednot, and in factdid not,occurattheexpenseof agriculturalexportdevelopmentinTaiwanandSouthKorea.Inotherwords,thesearenotnecessarily policy choices,but can play importantcomplementaryroles in fuelling economicgrowth and promotingoverallexportperformance.It is surprising,however,that Basu shouldcon® ne this phenomenontotheexperienceofthesetwocountries,asanumberoftheASEANcountries,Malaysia andThailandinparticular,areperhapsbetterexamples.Hadtheexperienceofthesecountriesbeen considered,somefurtherinsightscouldhavebeengleaned.TheexperienceofMalaysiaandThailand suggeststhatif`diversi® cation’iscontemplated,thenitshouldnotbeoutofagriculturealtogether andintomanufacturing,butrathermanufacturingplusdiversi® cationwithinagriculture.Themove intooilpalmandhigh-yieldingvarietiesofrubberinMalaysia,anddiversi® cationintonewexport cropssuchasmaizeandsugarinThailand,areclear-cutexamplesoftheimportantcomplementary rolethatagriculturecanplayifitisresponsivetochangingworldmarketconditions.4
The experienceof these countriesalso ¯ies in the face of the long-standingprimary-export pessimismÐtheviewthatexportprospectsforagriculturalproductsaredeterminedpredominantly bythelong-termpatternofworlddemand,leavinglittleroomforsupply-sidepoliciestoachieve exportsuccess.Italsorejectstheview,particularlyin¯uentialintheearlypostwaryears,thatthe primaryexportsectorshouldbealtogetherdismissedinfavourofmanufacturing,becausetheformer wouldhaveunfavourableeffectsonthestructureandlong-runproductiveef® ciencyofthedomestic economy.5
BasucorrectlydismissesthetendencytoupholdtheAsianexperienceasproofofthevirtuesof governmentalnon-interference.Thereisaninterestingdiscussionofthein¯uenceofgovernmentin the Korean bankingsystem, and the complex differentialinterestrate systemused to channel investmentsintochosensectors.Heiscareful,however,nottoextendthisinvolvementtoinclude tradeprotection.
5Forasurveyofthisliterature,seeSRLewis.`Theexperienceofprimaryexportingcountries’,in HI Chenery& TN Srinivasan(eds)HandbookofDevelopingEconomies, Vol II,Amsterdam: North-Holland1989,pp1542±1600.
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