The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies
University of California, San Diego
Rescaling the “Alien,” Rescaling Personhood: Neoliberalism, Immigration, and the State
Monica W. Varsanyi
John Jay College, City University of New York
Working Paper 173 January 2009
MonicaW.Varsanyi DepartmentofGovernment,JohnJayCollege,CityUniversityofNewYork
Throughanexplorationofrelevantlegislationandcourtcases,thisarticlediscussesthecontemporaryconstitutionofneoliberalsubjectsviathedevolutionofselectimmigrationpowerstostateandlocalgovernmentsby thefederalgovernmentoftheUnitedStates.Sincethelatterdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,thefederal governmenthashadplenarypoweroverimmigration,whichhasenabledittotreat“peopleasimmigrants”(or as“nonpersons”fallingoutsideofmanyConstitutionalprotections),simultaneouslyrequiringthatstatesand citiestreat“immigrantsaspeople”(oraspersonsprotectedbytheConstitution).Beginninginthemid-1990s, however,thedevolutionofwelfarepolicyandimmigrationpolicingpowershaschallengedthescalarconstitution ofpersonhood,asstateandlocalgovernmentshavenewfoundpowerstodiscriminateonthebasisofalienage, ornoncitizenstatus.Indevolvingresponsibilityforcertainimmigration-relatedpoliciestostateandlocalgovernments,thefederalgovernmentisparticipatingintherescalingofmembershippolicyand,byextension,the rescalingofadefiningcharacteristicofthenation-state.Thisrecentrescalingisevidenceofthecontemporary neoliberalizationofmembershippolicyintheUnitedStates,andspecificallyhighlightsthelegal(re)production ofscale. KeyWords:citizenship,immigration,neoliberalism,scale.
Atrav ´ esdeunaexploraci ´ ondelalegislaci ´ onrelevanteydecasosjudiciales,enesteart´ıculosediscutela constituci ´ oncontempor ´ aneadetemasneoliberalesmedianteladevoluci ´ ondeciertospoderessobrelainmigraci ´ on alosgobiernosestatalesylocalesporpartedelgobiernofederaldeEstadosUnidos.Desdelas ´ ultimasd ´ ecadas delsiglodiecinueve,elgobiernofederalhatenidoplenopodersobrelainmigraci ´ on,quelehapermitidotratar alas"personascomoinmigrantes(ocomo"seresinexistentes"quesonexcluidosdemuchasdelasprotecciones constitucionales),requiriendosimult ´ aneamentequelosestadosylasciudadestratenalos"inmigrantescomo personas"(opersonasprotegidasporlaConstituci ´ on).Sinembargo,apartirdelamitaddelad ´ ecadadelos noventa,ladevoluci ´ ondelospoderesdelaspol´ıticasdebienestarydelcontroldelainmigraci ´ onhadesafiado laconstituci ´ onescalardelacondici ´ ondepersona,yaquelosgobiernosestatalesylocalestienenpoderes recientementeadquiridosparadiscriminarenbaseacondici ´ ondeextranjer´ıaodenociudadano.Aldevolver laresponsabilidaddeciertaspol´ıticasrelacionadasconlainmigraci ´ onalosgobiernosestatalesylocales,el gobiernofederalest ´ aparticipandoenlareescalaci ´ ondelapol´ıticadeafiliaci ´ on,yporextensi ´ onlareescalaci ´ onde unacaracter ´ ısticadedefinici ´ ondelanaci ´ on-estado.Estarecientereescalaci ´ onesevidenciadelaneoliberaci ´ on contempor ´ aneadelapol´ıticadeafiliaci ´ onenEstadosUnidos,yrecalcaespec´ıficamentela(re)producci ´ onlegal delaescala. Palabrasclave:ciudadan´ıa,inmigraci ´ on,neoliberalismo,escala.
Scholarsofneoliberalismhavemaderecentcalls forempiricalcontributionsthatprovidefurtherevidenceandunderstandingoftheemergence,expansion,andinstitutionalizationofneolib-
eral“spaces,states,andsubjects”(Larner2003,511; seealsoPeck2002,2004).Inseekingtoanswerthat call,Iexploreonewayinwhichneoliberalsubjects— anestimated11.6millionlegalpermanentresidents
(Rytina2006)and12millionundocumentedresidents (Passel2006)livingintheUnitedStates—arebeing constitutedthroughthedevolutionofselectimmigrationpowersfromthefederalgovernmentoftheUnited Statestostateandlocalgovernments.Ifocusonthe shiftingscalarconstitutionofpersonhoodandalienage intheUnitedStatesor,inotherwords,historicaland contemporarychangesintheabilityofdifferentscales ofgovernmenttocreateandenforcelawsdiscriminatingagainstindividualsasafunctionoftheir“alienage,” ornoncitizenstatus.Theabilitytodiscriminateonthe basisofalienagehasbeeninterpretedbythecourtsas theabilitytoregulatemembershipinthenation-state. AtdifferenttimesinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates, nation-statemembershiphasbeendifferentlyscaled.
Thiscontemporaryrescalinghasbeenenabledbya suiteoflawspassedin1996,aproductofthe“RepublicanRevolution”ofthe1994midtermelectionsand ensuing104thCongress.ThelawsincludetheAntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyAct(AEDPA),the IllegalImmigrationReformandImmigrantResponsibilityAct(IIRIRA),andthePersonalResponsibilityand WorkOpportunityReconciliationAct(PRWORA). Pairedwiththerecent,rapidgrowthofgrassrootsimmigrationpolicyactivisminlocalandstategovernments throughouttheUnitedStates(NationalConference ofStateLegislatures2008;Varsanyi2008),1 thepartialdevolutionofwelfarepolicyandimmigrationpolicingpowerschallengesratherstrictjurisdictionallines inplaceforoveracentury,andgivesstateandlocal governmentsnewfoundandincreasingpowerstodiscriminateonthebasisofalienageornoncitizenstatus. Thisrecentblurringofthelong-heldboundarybetween federalandlocalgovernmentsinthispolicyrealmis evidenceofthecontemporaryneoliberalizationof membershippolicyintheUnitedStatesand,toinvoke HannahArendt’swords,therescalingof“therightto haverights”([1951]2004,298;seealsoBenhabib2004).
Inwhatfollows,Ifirstplacethiscasestudy—thedevolutionofmembershippolicy—intoabroadertheoreticalcontextregardingneoliberalismandtheprocess ofneoliberalization,thechangingrelationshipbetween thestateandnoncitizen,andthecontemporaryrescalingofnationalmembership.Inexttracethestatutoryandcaselawthat“fixed”therelationshipbetween scaleandmembershipfromthelatterdecadesofthe nineteenthcenturythroughthemid-1990s.2 Idiscuss thecontemporary“scalarflux”(Brenner2000,373)of membershippolicythatbeganinthemid-1990s,focusingspecificallyonthepartialdevolution,fromthefederalgovernmenttocitiesandstates,ofwelfarepolicy andimmigrationpolicing.Iconcludebyhighlighting theinstabilitiesandtensionsemergingfromthesecontemporaryrescalingprocesses,whichprovidesfurther evidencetosupporttheideathat“allisnotwellwith theneoliberalstate”(Harvey2005,78).
Rescalingthe“Alien,”Rescaling Personhood:Neoliberalization,Migration, andtheState
NeoliberalizingeconomicpoliciessuchastheNorth AmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)thathave challengedrurallivelihoodsinMexicoandelsewhere (Nevins2007),combinedwithaconsistentlyhighdemandforinexpensive,flexiblelabortofuelthegrowth of,interalia,theconstruction,service,andhospitalityindustriesintheUnitedStates,actaspowerfulpush andpullfactorspromotingcross-borderlabormigration.
Throughananalysisofrelevantlegislationandcourt cases(inotherwords,statutoryandcaselaw)thisarticlebringsattentiontothelegalproductionofscaleand thewayinwhichlawplaysaprominentroleinthe rescalingprocessesassociatedwithneoliberalization. Contemporarycriticalgeographicscholarshiponscale productivelyhighlightsapoliticsandpoliticaleconomy ofscale(Agnew1993;Smith1995;DelaneyandLeitner 1997;Swyngedouw1997a,1997b;Marston2000;Brenner2001,2004;MarstonandSmith2001;Peck2002; Mansfield2005),butgeographershavegivenlittleattentiontothewaysinwhichlawplaysanimportantrole inboththeproductionofscaleandneoliberalrescaling processes(althoughseeMitchell2002).Byengaging withlaw,thisarticleadmittedlyremainsfocusedonthe realmof“politicswithacapitalP”andformalstate structures,asopposedtoexploring,forinstance,the waysinwhichpoliticalcontestationbetweendifferent societalandpoliticalactorsplaysaroleinproducing scale(Agnew1997;DelaneyandLeitner1997;Leitner1997;Leitner,Peck,andSheppard2006).AsDon Mitchellhasforcefullyargued,however,“lawmatters” (2003,6),aslawshavesignificantandrealimpactson people’slives.Legalgeographicscholarshiphasplayed acrucialroleinilluminatingthewaysinwhichlawand legalprocessesproducesociospatialopportunitiesand limitations,particularlyalongtheaxesofrace,gender,andsocialclass(Kobayashi1990;Blomley1994; Mitchell1994,2003;Delaney1998;Forest2001).This articleaimstocontributetothatdiscussionbyengaging legalgeographywithgeographicresearchonscaleand rescaling.
Rescalingthe“Alien,”RescalingPersonhood:Neoliberalism,Immigration,andtheState879
Nonetheless,observersofcontemporarymigration,particularlyundocumentedmigration,increasinglypoint toacontradictioninourneoliberalizingpoliticaleconomicsystem:Barrierstotheflowofcapitalarerapidly falling,atthesametimeasenhancedborderenforcementandmilitarizationincreasinglystanchtheflowof laborandpeople(Andreas2000;Nevins2001,2007; Massey,Durand,andMalone2003;Coleman2005; VarsanyiandNevins2007).Inotherwords,theneoliberalideologyoftheglobalfreemarkethasnot,as amatterofaffirmativepolicy,extendedtothelabor market.
JamesHollifield(2004a,2004b)furtherreflectson thisgrowingcontradictioncharacteristicofthecontemporary“migrationstate.”Ontheonehand,liberalnation-statessuchastheUnitedStates,Canada, andAustralia,aswellassupranationalregionssuchas theEuropeanUnion,increasinglyoperateaccordingto alogicofneoliberaleconomicopenness,privileging andcreatinginstitutionstoenablethefreemovement ofgoods,technologies,currencies,andideasbetween nation-states.Ontheotherhand,thenation-stateis stillamembershipcommunity,whichmustnecessarily maintainadistinctionbetweeninsidersandoutsiders. Underthispoliticallogic,theliberalnation-statesimultaneouslyoperatesunderconditionsofclosure,carefully selectingwould-beimmigrantsandexcludingundesirable“others.”Thesecompetinglogicsleadnation-states intowhatHollifieldcallsthe“liberalparadox,”but whichwemightalsocallthe neoliberalparadox:How cannation-statesmanagethetensionsthatemergebetweentheseeminglycontradictoryforcesofeconomic opennessandpoliticalclosure?
Inmyview,thestateispursuingapathwaythrough thisparadoxthatdoesnotemergefromaneither–or choice—eitheracceptingthataconsequenceofeconomicopennessistheincreasedmovementofpeople, orchoosingapathwaythatrestrictstheflowofpeopleattheexpenseofeconomicgrowth.Rather,over thepastseveraldecadesandparticularlysincethemid1990s,thestate—andforthemoment,Iamreferring specificallytotheU.S.federalgovernment—hasbeen abletomaintainatensecompromisebetweeneconomicliberalizationandpoliticalclosurebypursuing asuiteofseeminglycontradictorypolicies,including intensivebordermilitarization(Dunn1996;Andreas 2000;Nevins2001),laxinternalimmigrationenforcement(Brownell2005;Cornelius2005),3 and,more recently(thefocusofthisarticle)thedevolutionofselectimmigrationpowerstolocalandstategovernments. Devolution,combinedwithbordermilitarizationand
laxinternalenforcement,allowsthefederalgovernmenttoappeartoughonborderenforcement(vis- ` a-vis thewaronterrorandincreasinglysophisticatedmigrant anddrugsmugglingsyndicates),whileleavingthemessy andcostlydetailsofservicingandpolicingexpanding noncitizenpopulationstostateandlocalgovernments. Assuch,thesepoliciesenableatense(althoughasI willconclude,tension-riddenandlikelyunsustainable) compromisebetweencompetinginterests—freemarket,neoliberalexpansionists,ontheonehand,andnationalistic,security-mindedexclusionists,ontheother.
ImmigrationlawscholarLindaBosniakhasrecently asked,“thepowertodefinemembershipinthenational communitybeginsatthenation’sborder,butwhere exactlydoesitend?”(2006,52).Inotherwords,the federalgovernmenthaslonghadauthoritytoregulate whomayentertheterritoryofthenation-state(immigrationpolicy)and,furthermore,whoisadmittedto thepolity(naturalizationpolicy),buthowfardoesthe federalgovernment’spowertoregulatemembershipextendwithintheterritoryofthenation-state?Thereare severalwaysinwhichwecouldbegintoanswerthis question,butoneimportantcutoffhasbeenframedin jurisdictionalandscalardimensions.
Withafewinterestingexceptions,priortothemid1990s,thecourtsintheUnitedStatesupheldthe federalgovernment’s“plenarypower”overtheformulationandenforcementofimmigrationor,assomehave calledit,membershippolicy:the“lawpertainingtothe entryofnoncitizensandtheircontinuedstayinthe UnitedStates”(Motomura1999,1361;seealsoScaperlanda1996;Aleinikoff2002b).Sincethelatenineteenthcentury,immigrationpolicyhasbeenframedas foreignpolicyintheUnitedStates,asdecisionsinfluencingtheadmissionorexclusionofforeignnationals havethepotentialtoaffectrelationshipswithother nation-states.Asforeignpolicy,theformulationand enforcementofimmigrationlawisconsideredapoliticalmatter,aconcernoftheexecutiveandlegislative branchesofthefederalgovernmentandoutsidethe purviewofthejudicialbranch.Plenarypowerauthorizesthefederalgovernment’streatmentof“peopleas immigrants,”or,inotherwords,individualsas“aliens,”4 essentially“nonpersons”beyondtheprotectionsofthe Constitution.Inafamousstatement,SupremeCourt JusticeJohnPaulStevensadmittedthatplenarypower effectivelyupholdsadoublestandard:“intheexercise ofitsbroadpowerovernaturalizationandimmigration,Congressregularlymakesrulesthatwouldbeunacceptableifappliedtocitizens”(Mathewsv.Diaz 1976, 1891).
Instarkcontrast,untilthemid-1990s,localandstate governmentswerealmostwhollyexcludedfromthis policyrealmandrelegatedinsteadtotheformulation ofimmigrantpolicy:lawsthatgovernedthe“treatment ofnoncitizensintheUnitedStateswithrespecttomattersotherthanentryandexpulsion”(Motomura1999, 1361).Asaresultofcaselawstretchingbacktothe latenineteenthcentury,stateandlocallawsimpacting noncitizenswerejudgedagainstConstitutionalnorms suchastheFifthAmendment’sDueProcessClauseand theFourteenthAmendment’sEqualProtectionClause. Assuch,stateandlocalgovernmentswereheldbythe courtstoa“personhood”standard:Theywererequired totreat“immigrantsaspeople,”or,inotherwords,as personsprotectedbytheConstitution.5
LindaBosniak(2006)arguesthatthefederalgovernment’spowertodiscriminateonthebasisofnoncitizen statusdoesnotendatnationalboundaries,butthat thestatusof“alienageentailstheintrojectionofborders”(5),or,inotherwords,that“thebordereffectively follows[noncitizens]inside”(4)theterritoryofthe nation-state.Thisisundoubtedlytrue,asthefederalgovernmenthasimmigrationenforcementpowers withintheterritoryoftheUnitedStates,aswellasatits borders;however,inlightoftheneoliberalizationofthe state,itisaccuratetosaythattheborderisbeingboth internalizedandrescaled.Duringthelastdecade,state andlocalgovernmentshavebeenincreasinglyrecruited bythefederalgovernmenttoformulateandenforce membershippolicy,enablingthemtodiscriminate,as doesthefederalgovernment,againstpeopleasimmigrants:onthebasisoftheirnoncitizenstatus.Inother words,membershippolicyisinthemidstofascalarflux asdevolutionhasgivenrisetowhatsomeobserversare calling“immigrationfederalism”(Spiro1997).
Themodernterritorialstateischaracterizedbya numberofprocessesandinstitutions,butoneofthe mostfundamentalhasbeenthenation-state’ssovereign poweroverdeterminingitsmembership,includingits poweroverimmigrationandcitizenship.AsHannah Arendtoncenoted,state“[s]overeigntyisnowhere moreabsolutethaninmattersofemigration,naturalization,nationality,andexpulsion”([1951]2004, 278).Importantly,Arendt’swords,comingtousasthey dofromtheperiodimmediatelyfollowingWorldWar II—“theapogeeofnationalism”(Hobsbawm1990)— reflectnotatimelesstruthaboutadefiningcharacteristicofthestate,butratheranastuteunderstanding oftheproductionofthescaleofthenation-statein themid-twentiethcentury.WhenArendtwroteher words,sovereignnation-statesintheinternationalstate
systemhadcodifiedintolawandpracticetheirpower over“monopolizationofthelegitimate‘meansofmovement”’(Torpey2000),notonlyvis- ` a-visoneanother, butcruciallyaswell,vis- ` a-visotherscalesofpoliticalorganization:cities,subnationalstates,andsupranational organizations.
Thenation-statewasnotalwaysdefinedbyitsabilitytoregulatemembership.IntheUnitedStates,the federalgovernment’spoweroverimmigrationandnaturalizationpolicytookshapeinthelatterdecadesof thenineteenthcentury,onecenturyafterthenation’s founding.ForthefirsthundredyearsofAmericanhistory,duringwhatlegalscholarGeraldNeuman(1996) callsthe“lostcenturyofAmericanimmigrationlaw,” statesinparticular—notthefederalgovernment— maintainedasignificantdegreeofpower,bothinlaw andpractice,overimmigrationpolicy.Ashedetails, statesformulatedandenforcedvaryingstatutesthat barredtheimmigrationofconvicts,paupers,andthose withcontagiousorotherdiseases.
Thefactthatwhatwenowthinkofasoneofthe definingcharacteristicsofthenation-state—thepower toregulatemembership—didnotconsolidateatthat scaleuntilthelatenineteenthcenturylendsweightto theideathat“[p]articularscalarfixesare political constructionsthataresubjecttoperiodiccontestation; theyarenottranscendentallydetermined”(Peck2002, 337).Geographicscalesarecommonlyunderstoodas ontologicallygiven,anunchangingandnestedhierarchyofboundedterritorialspacesincludingtheurban,regional,state,federalornation-state,andglobal. Ratherthanbeingaconcernforresearchinandof themselves,scalesarefrequentlyandunproblematically consideredthelocationsinwhichothersocial,political,andeconomicprocessestakeplace.Inrecentyears, however,geographershavedevelopedarenewedinterestintheconceptofscaleandhavefruitfullydebated thewaysinwhichscalesaresociallyandpolitically produced—notontologicallygiven—particularlyinthe contextofneoliberaleconomicrestructuring(Agnew 1993;Smith1995;DelaneyandLeitner1997;Marston 2000;Brenner2001,2004;MarstonandSmith2001; Peck2002;Mansfield2005).
Scalarfixesgivewaytoscalarfluxes,eventhough, asHannahArendt’swordsimply,weoftenbelieveexactlytheopposite:thatparticularscalarconfigurations arepermanentandtranscendhistory.Therefore,justas thepowertoregulatemembershipwasrescaledinthe latenineteenthcenturyfromstateandlocalgovernmentstothefederalgovernment,Iarguethatweare inthemidstofanotherscalarflux—symptomaticofa
Rescalingthe“Alien,”RescalingPersonhood:Neoliberalism,Immigration,andtheState881
neoliberalizingstate—asthepowertoregulatemembershipisbeingrescaledyetagain,fromthefederal governmenttostateandlocalgovernments.Giventhe federalgovernment’s120-yearlockonitspowersover immigrationpolicyandthewayinwhichwehaveunderstoodpoweroverimmigrationtobeconstitutiveof thescaleofthenation-state,itisnoteworthywhenthe nation-stateeitherlosesorrelinquishespowerinthis policyrealmtoscalesbothbeyondandwithin(Soysal 1995;Leitner1997).Asafacetofneoliberalrestructuring,thedevolutionofselectimmigrationpowersby thefederalgovernmentoftheUnitedStatesissuchan occasion.
Thiscontemporaryfluxresonateswithrecenttheorizationsoftheneoliberalizingstate(Peck2001,2004; PeckandTickell2002;BrennerandTheodore2002; Brenner2004;Harvey2005).Althoughtheprocessof neoliberalizationhasproceededinmultiplephasesand hasmeantdifferentthingsindifferentplaces,thefundamentalorthodoxyattheheartoftheseshiftshas remainedthesame:to“purgethesystemofobstaclesto thefunctioningof‘freemarkets’;restrainpublicexpenditureandanyformofcollectiveinitiative;celebratethevirtuesofindividualism,competitiveness, andeconomicself-sufficiency;abolishorweakensocialtransferprogramswhileactivelyfosteringthe‘inclusion’ofthepoorandmarginalizedintothelabor market,onthemarket’sterms”(Peck2001,445;see alsoHarvey2005,2).Thepassageofthe1996laws undoubtedlyreflectedandinstitutionalizedafurthersecuritizationofthestate,astheywerepassedshortly afterthe1993WorldTradeCenterbombingandthe 1995bombingoftheOklahomaCityFederalBuilding(Coleman2007a);however,thepassageofthese bills,alongwiththePRWORA(which,asPresident BillClinton[1993](in)famouslysaid,“endedwelfare asweknowit”),alsoreflectedtheneoliberalpolitical economicagendaoflegislatorselectedduringtheRepublicanRevolutionofthe1994midtermelection,in whichRepublicanstookcontrolofboththeU.S.SenateandHouseofRepresentativesforthefirsttimein fortyyears.Theincomingclassoffreshmanlegislators, ledbyNewtGingrichasSpeakeroftheHouse,moved quicklytoimplementandinstitutionalizetheirContractwithAmerica,adocumentwritteninpartwith textfromRonaldReagan’s1985StateoftheUnionAddress.IntheopeninglinesoftheContract,theHouse Republicanspromisedthat“[t]hisyear’selectionoffers thechance,afterfourdecadesofone-partycontrol,to bringtotheHouseanewmajoritythatwilltransformthewayCongressworks.Thathistoricchange
wouldbetheendofgovernmentthatistoobig,too intrusive,andtooeasywiththepublic’smoney...” (ContractwithAmerica1995).TheContractgoeson todetailtenactsthatitssignatoriespromisedtopass withinthefirstonehundreddaysofthe104thCongress, mostofwhichespousedneoliberalizinggoals—subtly oroutright—ofslashingfederalgovernmentbudgets, decreasingthesizeofthefederalbureaucracy,increasingregulatoryflexibilityforbusiness,andpromoting “individualresponsibility”andworkethicsbydismantlingthewelfaresystem(ContractwithAmerica1995). AnumberofbillsemergedoutoftheContractwith Americaandthe104thCongress,amongthemthe PRWORA,AEDPA,andIIRIRA.
Whereasearlierdiscussionsofglobalizationtended tofocuson(andinsomeinstances,celebrate)thewitheringanddeclineofthenation-state(Ohmae1996), scholarsofneoliberalismhavemorerecentlyargued thatthestateisnotsomuchindecline,asitisinredistribution(Peck2001,2004;BrennerandTheodore2002; PeckandTickell2002).Withonedecadeofhindsight, thebillspassedduringtheContractwithAmericaera didachieveanumberoftheneoliberalgoalspursued byitsadherents.Reflectinganinherentcontradiction oftheneoliberalizingstate,however,manyfunctions thatwerepreviouslyinthedomainofthefederalgovernmentweresimplyshiftedandreorganizedtoother scalesofgovernment.AsanumberofthelawsemergingfromtheContractdecreasedthesizeandfunding offederalgovernmentprograms,theysimultaneously devolved(andsimplypassedon)substantialadministrativeandfinancialresponsibilityforthoseprograms tocitiesandstates,frequentlyasunfundedorhiddenmandates(ZimmermanandTumlin1999,19–20). Whathasresulted,therefore,isnotnecessarilydiminishedstatecapacity,butratherthe“hollowingout”of “ahistoricallyandgeographicalspecificinstitutionalizationofthestate,whichinturnisbeingreplaced, notbyfreshairandfreemarkets,butbyareorganized stateapparatus”(Peck2001,447).Inotherwords,the relativelystable“scalefix”(Smith1995,61)ofthe Fordist–Keynesianera—crystallizedaroundtheterritorial,sovereignnation-state—isreplacedunderneoliberalrestructuringby“ahighlyvolative scalarflux in whichinterscalarhierarchiesandrelationsarecontinuallyreshuffledinresponsetoawiderangeofstrategic priorities,conflictsandcontradictions”(Brenner2000, 373,emphasisadded).
AsIdiscussinwhatfollowsregardingthedevolutionofmembershippolicy,thisneoliberal,devolved state,isnotlesspowerfulasmuchasitis“differently
powerful ... notnecessarilyalessinterventioniststate; ratheritorganizesandrationalizesitsinterventionsin differentways”(Peck2001,447,emphasisinoriginal). AsJamiePeckremindsus:
‘devolution’canbeasignifierforawidearrayofinterscalarshifts[which]may,ormaynot,adduptoa‘real’ transferof(national)statepower.Infact,initsneoliberal guise,devolutionusuallyexhibitsa‘thin’form,byway ofdispersal‘out’tomarketsand/ordelegation‘down’to localagencies,whilepowersofinstitutionalcoordination andideologicalcontrolremainfirmlylocated(albeitina restructuredform)atthecenter.(Peck2001,452)
Reflectingtheseneoliberalizingtendencies,thecourt casesandpoliciesdiscussedinthefollowingsectionsindicatenotacompletedevolutionofimmigrationpower tothelocalscale,butapartial,incomplete,andcontingentdevolution,withstatesandlocalgovernmentsbeinglefttofigureoutthedetailsofhowtoimplementthe federalgovernment’smandate,andthefederalgovernmentstillmaintainingultimateConstitutionalcontrol andvetopoweroverthispolicyrealm.
AnoutcomeofthispiecemealdevolutionofmembershippolicyhasbeentheconstitutionofwhatIcall the“neoliberalsubject”:analternative,evolvinginstitutionof“membership”fornoncitizenslivingwithin theterritorialboundariesofthenation-state.AsLinda Bosniak(2006)pointsout,weoftendonotthinkof noncitizensashaving“membership.”Ineverydaythinking,thereisan“us”—thebodyofcitizensontheinsideandfullmembers,orcitizens,ofthestate—and a“them”—asGeraldNeuman’s(1996)languageimplies,“strangerstotheConstitution,”orthosewhoare outsidersto“us”andfalloutsideoftheprivilegesof membership.Crucially,however,themembershipof citizensisnotpairedwithanabsenceofmembership fornoncitizensbut,rather,asthisarticledemonstrates, withabodyoflawthatestablishesaparticularconfigurationofmembershiprightsfornoncitizens(whichhappenstobeconstituted,inlargepart,bythesamerights accordedtocitizens).Furthermore,justascitizenship rightsandthoseadmittedtothecircleofcitizenship haveshiftedandchangedthroughoutthehistoryofthe UnitedStates,thepresentconfigurationof“citizenship foraliens”(Bosniak2006)isnotfixed,buthaslong beensubjectofcontestation(Scaperlanda1996,718). Membershipforneoliberalsubjects(noncitizensinthe contemporaryperiod)reflects,therefore,aparticular neoliberalizingconstellationoflegalandpoliticalinstitutionsandissubstantivelydifferentthannoncitizen membershipofpasteras.
Theaimofthisarticleisnottoelaborateonthesubstanceofneoliberalmembership(indeed,thiscouldbe thesubjectofanotherarticle),butrathertotracethe creationofthismembershipstatusvianeoliberalrescalingprocesses;however,itisworthtakingamomentto reflectbrieflyonthreeintertwiningcharacteristicsthat markthecontemporarymembershipofnoncitizens,and thattakeonaparticularlyneoliberalflavorgiventhe currentrescalingofpersonhood:shiftingconceptionsof illegality,arollbackofrights,andtheincreasingspecter ofdeportation.
First,theneoliberalsubjectismarkedmorethanever bythestatusofillegality.Anactofmigrationisdesignatedasillegalduenottoatimelessstandardofwhatis rightandwrong.Rather,illegalityisactivelyproduced byachangingsuiteoflawsthatdeterminewhatis,or isnot,againstthelaw(Nevins2001;Ngai2003;De Genova2004).Forinstance,the1965Hart–CellerAct abolishedimmigrationquotasinplacesincethepassage oftheNationalOriginsActin1924andiswidelycelebratedasanexampleofenlightened,liberallegislation oftheCivilRightsera.TheAct,however,simultaneouslyplacednumericallimitsonimmigrationfromthe WesternHemisphereforthefirsttime(atthattime, 120,000peryear),thusdrasticallylimitingthenumber ofquotasavailabletoMexicanlabormigrants,despite alonghistoryof,andcontinueddemandfor,theirlabor(Calavita1992;Ngai2003).Therefore,afterthe Actcameintoeffectin1968,Mexicanlabormigrants continuedtocrosstheborderastheyhadbeendoingfordecades,butasaresultofthenewlyinstituted visalimitsandadearthofavailablevisasforMexicans, manymigrantsnowcrossedtheborderwithoutlegal authorizationandweremarkedasillegal(Nevins2001; DeGenova2004).Theillegalityofthecontemporary periodreflectsiterationsoflawssuchasHart–Celler, butalsoreflectsuniquelyneoliberalconfigurationsof lawsandpracticesmarkinganincreasingrangeofactionsasunlawful.Contemporaryillegalityisexemplified,forinstance,bythepassageofHR4437inthe U.S.HouseofRepresentativesin2006,which,among otherthings,criminalizedtheactofcrossingtheborderwithoutauthorization.HR4437didnotultimately becomefederallaw,andfirst-time,unauthorizedbordercrossingremainsacivil,notcriminal,violation,but theapprovalofHR4437intheHouserepresentsyet anothersignificanttrendinshiftingconstructionsof illegality.
Second,inthedecadespriorto1996,therightsavailabletononcitizenshadconvergedwiththerightsofcitizenstosuchanextentthatPeterSchuck,aprominent
legalscholar,wroteof“thedevaluationofAmericancitizenship”(1989;seealsoJacobson1996).Noncitizens, regardlessoflegalstatus,haddueprocessrightsincriminalproceedingsandlegalpermanentresidentswere entitledtofreedomofspeechandthepress(Bosniak 2006,49).Plenarypowerandtheexclusionaryabilityof thefederalgovernmentnotwithstanding,noncitizensin theUnitedStateswere,onthewhole,excludedmainly frompoliticalrightssuchastherighttovote,serveon juries,andholdcertainkindsofgovernmentemployment.In1996,however,newlawsbeganarollback oftherightsofresidentnoncitizens—bothlegaland unauthorized—suchaslimitingaccesstofederal-and state-fundedwelfareandmedicalprograms,andnarrowingConstitutionalprotectionsincriminalproceedings.
Third,relatedtotherollbackofrightsandthechanginglandscapeofillegality,neoliberalsubjects—both legalandunauthorizedresidents—arealsoincreasingly vulnerabletodeportation.The1996lawsgreatlyexpandtherangeofcriminaloffenses(includingmany offensesthatwerepreviouslymisdemeanors)forwhich noncitizensaresubjecttodeportation,whiledecreasingoreliminatingjudicialoversightoverdeportation hearings(Coleman2007a,2007b).Furthermore,aslegalscholarDavidCole(2005)discusses,thepost–11 September2001(hereinafter9/11)enforcementclimatehasalsowitnessedarevivaloftheAlienEnemiesActof1798,authorizingthefederalgovernment toarrest,detain,anddeportalienswhoarecitizensofa “hostilenationorgovernment”duringatimeofwar.In theperiodimmediatelyfollowing9/11,insweepstargetingsuspectedterrorists,thousandsoflaw-abidingArab andMuslimnoncitizensintheUnitedStatesweredetainedbythefederalgovernmentoncivilimmigration chargesandundertheAlienEnemiesAct,thusmakingthemsubjectsofplenarypower(“noncitizens”as opposedto“persons”)anddramaticallyreducingtheir Constitutionalprotectionsagainstdetentionanddeportation.Furthermore,the1996legislationenabled “expeditedremoval,”ortheabilityofimmigrationauthoritiestodeportcertainunauthorizedmigrantsatairportsandseaportswithoutanydueprocessandjudicial oversight.Arecentexecutiveorderhasfurtherexpandedexpeditedremovaltoincludeundocumented immigrantsapprehendedwithin100milesoftheland borderswithMexicoandCanada,againwithoutprovidingthemtheabilitytocontesttheirdeportationin immigrationcourt(DepartmentofHomelandSecurity 2004).
Finally,asthelandscapeofillegality,rights,and deportationshifts,whatmakescontemporarynoncitizenmembershipparticularlyuniqueisitsconstitution vianeoliberalrescalingprocesses.Priortothemid1990s,thestatetowhichnoncitizenswerevulnerableas noncitizenswasthenation-state.Nowthe“state”isno longeronlythefederalgovernment,butthestates(and cities)of,forexample,Arizona,Georgia,andNorth Carolina.6
TheU.S.–Mexicoboundaryisanimportantsite atwhichtheseeminglycontradictorypoliciesof economicliberalizationandpoliticalclosurecollide(in MattSparke’swords,a“neoliberalnexusofsecuritized nationalismandfreemarkettransnationalism”[2006, 153;seealsoColeman2005]),butthecontradictions ofthissystemdonotstopatinternationalborders;they simultaneouslyextenddeepwithintheterritoryofthe nation-state.AsMatColemanargues,thedevolution ofimmigrationpolicingtostateandlocalgovernments representsanovel“immigration geopolitics”andtoolof statecraft.Inthenameofnationalsecurity,fightingterrorismandthe“undocumented-migrant-as-threat,”the pairingoftwopolicies—thecriminalizationofimmigrationlawandtheexpandedeffortsbythefederalgovernmenttoengagelocalandstatepoliceinenforcingcivil immigrationviolations—hasresultedinthecreationof “newlymaterializingspacesofimmigrationgeopolitics” notonlyattheU.S.–Mexicoborderbutwithin(and beyond)theUnitedStatesaswell(Coleman2007b, 56).
Additionally,immigrationpolicy—thepowerofthe statetoexclude,admit,andexpel—isproductivelydeployednotonlyasatoolofstatecraftbutasatoolfor neoliberalcapitalaccumulationviatheconstitutionof neoliberalsubjects.AsBrennernotes,“itisnolonger capitalthatistobemoldedintothe(territoriallyintegrated)geographyofstatespace,butstatespacethatis tobemoldedintothe(territoriallydifferentiated)geographyofcapital”(2004,16).Therescalingofimmigrationpolicyis,therefore,asmuchabouttherescaling ofgeopoliticsasitisawayinwhichthedeployment ofgeopolitics(intheformofimmigrationpolicyasforeignpolicy)playsanimportantroleintheproduction ofneoliberalsubjectsandanationallybounded,relativelyfreeinternallabormarket,populatedbydisciplined,divided(alongthelinesoflegalstatus),largely nonunion,andvulnerablelaborforceforwhichthe statebearsfewcostsandhasfewresponsibilitiesor obligations.7
Inthissection,Idocumentthelawsandpoliciesthat governedthetreatmentofnoncitizenslivingwithin theUnitedStatesuntilthemid-1990s,whenscalarflux inthispolicyrealmbegan.8 Fromthe1880sthrough themid-1990s,withafewinterestingexceptions,the federalgovernmenthadsoleauthorityovermattersconcerningimmigrationandtheconstitutionofthenationalcommunity.Whenstatesandcitiesattemptedto treatnoncitizensasimmigrantsor,inotherwords,when subnationalgovernmentsattemptedtodeveloppolicies thatwereinterpretedbythecourtsasimpactingmembershipinthenationalcommunity,theseeffortswere eitherpreemptedbythefederalgovernmentordeclared unconstitutional,becausenoncitizens,whenseenfrom theperspectiveofstatesandcities,mustbetreatedas peopleandprovidedequalprotection.Inthissection, then,Itracethewayinwhichthelinebetweenthe treatmentofpeopleasimmigrantsandimmigrantsas peoplewasdrawnfairlyrigidlyonscalarandjurisdictionallinesuntilthemid-1990s,withthefederalgovernmentchargedwiththeformerandstatesandcities chargedwith,orrestrictedto,thelatter.
AsSupremeCourtJusticeCharlesEvansHughes wrote,“[t]heauthoritytocontrolimmigration—toadmitorexcludealiens—isvestedsolelyintheFederal Government”(Truaxv.Raich 1915,42).Foroveracentury,theU.S.federalgovernment,specificallythelegislativeandexecutivebranches,hashadplenarypower overthecreationandenforcementofpoliciesthat determinewhowillconstitutethepolity(Aleinikoff 2002b).Thishasmeantthatthefederalgovernment hashadsoleauthorityoverthetwo“gates”leadingto membershipinthenationalcommunityofcitizens:the gateofterritorialentry,governedbyimmigrationpolicy (determiningwhotoadmit,exclude,andexpelfrom theterritorialnation-state),andthegateofentryto thepolity,ornaturalizationpolicy(determiningwho isqualifiedtobecomeacitizenandwhatmeasureswill beusedtotestthisworthiness;Hammar1990).Given thepersistenceofplenarypowerforover120years,itis surprisingtonotethatimmigration,assuch,isnotmentionedintheConstitution.Instead,thefederalgovernment’spowerinthispolicyrealmwasfirmlyestablished throughcourtcasesdecidedinthelatterdecadesofthe
nineteenthcentury,whichdrewontheNaturalization (Art.1,Sec.8,Cl.4),ForeignCommerce(Art.1,Sec. 8),andForeignAffairsClauses(Art.1,Sec.8;Art.2, Sec.2,Cl.1and2)oftheConstitution.
Althoughittookshapeinpiecemealfashionprior to1889,9 theplenarypowerdoctrinewasmostclearly articulatedintheSupremeCourtcase ChaeChanPing v.UnitedStates (1889),alsoknownastheChineseExclusionCase.TheinfamousChineseExclusionActs, passedin1882and1888,prohibitedtheimmigration ofChinesenationalstotheUnitedStates.ChaeChan PinghadbeenlivinginSanFranciscofrom1875to 1887whenhedecidedtoreturntoChinaforavisit. Althoughhehadfollowedtheletterofthelawand obtainedareentrypermitrequiredbythe1882Act, whenheattemptedtoentertheUnitedStatesafter themorerestrictive1888Acthadgoneintoeffect,he wasdeniedreentry.Hisappealeventuallyreachedthe SupremeCourt.Initsdecision,whichultimatelydeniedhimtherighttoentertheUnitedStates,theCourt outlinedthreemaincharacteristicsoftheplenarypower doctrine.
First,theJusticesemphasizedthe“inherentsovereign powers”ofthefederalgovernmentoverdetermining membership,orinotherwords,thefactthattheexclusionofnoncitizenswasafundamentalrightofany sovereigngovernment:
[TheChinese]laborersarenotcitizensoftheUnited States;theyarealiens.ThatthegovernmentoftheUnited States,throughtheactionofthelegislativedepartment, canexcludealiensfromitsterritoryisapropositionwhich wedonotthinkisopentocontroversy.Jurisdictionover itsownterritorytothatextentisanincidentofevery independentnation.Itisapartofitsindependence.Ifit couldnotexcludealiensitwouldbetothatextentsubject tothecontrolofanotherpower.(ChaeChanPingv.United States 1889,603)
Furthermore,“[t]opreserveitsindependence,andgive securityagainstforeignaggressionandencroachment, isthehighestdutyofeverynation Itmattersnot inwhatformsuchaggressionandencroachmentcome, whetherfromtheforeignnationactinginitsnational character,orfromvasthordesofitspeoplecrowdingin uponus”(ChaeChanPingv.UnitedStates 1889,606). Second,ascontroloverimmigrationwasthusdefined asanelementofforeignpolicyandinthesovereigninterestofthefederalgovernmenttocontrol,theCourt considereditalegislativeandpoliticalissue,thusremovingitfromjudicialreview:
ifthepowermentioned[thepowertoabrogateontheconditionsoftheBurlingametreatywithChina,andtoexcludeChinesenationalsfromtheUnitedStates]isvested incongress,anyreflectionuponitsmotives,orthemotives ofanyofitsmembersinexercisingit,wouldbeentirely uncalledfor.Thiscourtisnotacensorofthemoralsof otherdepartmentsofthegovernment;itisnotinvested withanyauthoritytopassjudgmentuponthemotives oftheirconduct.(ChaeChanPingv.UnitedStates 1889, 628)
AsChaeChanPingwasanoncitizenandthetreatment ofnoncitizenswasgovernedstrictlybythelegislative andexecutivebranchesofthefederalgovernment,the Courtdeclaredthatitwasnotappropriatetoruleon hiscase.10 Finally,theCourtmadeclearthatlocalgovernmentsdidnothavepoweroverimmigration:“[The federalgovernment]isinvestedwithpoweroverallthe foreignrelationsofthecountry,war,peace,andnegotiationsandintercoursewithothernations;allofwhich areforbiddentothestategovernments.... Forlocal intereststheseveralstatesoftheUnionexist,butfor nationalpurposes,embracingourrelationswithforeign nations,wearebutonepeople,onenation,onepower” (ChaeChanPingv.UnitedStates 1889,629).
Therelatedcaseof FongYueTingv.UnitedStates (1893)alsoplayedanimportantroleinthearticulationofplenarypower,specificallyregardingthefederalgovernment’srighttodiscriminateonthebasisof noncitizenstatus.UnlikeChaeChanPing,whopetitionedtoentertheUnitedStatesataportofentry, thedefendantsin FongYueTingv.UnitedStates were permanentlysettledintheUnitedStates(forbetween fourteenandnineteenyears),yetfaceddeportationbecausetheyrefusedtoobtainarequiredcertificateof residenceinaccordancewiththeExclusionActs.Althoughthedefendants’presencewithintheterritoryof theUnitedStatesmightimplytheprotectionoftheir rightsaspersonsundertheEqualProtectionClauseof theFourteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution,the Courtdefinedthecaseasanimmigrationcaseandthereforetreatedthedefendantsasnoncitizens(asopposed topersons),andthuscametothesameconclusionsasin ChaeChanPing: First,regardlessofanoncitizen’sresidenceandterritorialpresencewithintheUnitedStates, itisthesovereignrightofthefederalgovernmentofthe UnitedStates(specificallythepoliticalbranches)to excludeandexpelforeignersfromitsterritory.Second, giventhepowersoftheCongressinthismatter,this exclusionisnotamatteronwhichthejudicialbranch cancomment.
Thefederalgovernment’sjurisdictionandpower overmembershipwasthensolidifiedthroughaseriesof casesthatsimultaneouslytestedandsettheboundaries oflocalgovernments’abilitiestocreatepolicyvis- ` a-vis noncitizenslivingwithintheirjurisdictions.Examining thelegaldoctrinalcontextinwhichlocalgovernments’ policiesvis- ` a-visnoncitizensareconstraineddrawsattentiontothe“scalarfix”inimmigrationpolicythat wasinplaceuntilthemid-1990s.
Localgovernments’treatmentofnoncitizenslegally presentwithintheirjurisdictionswasandhasbeenconstrainedandshapedbyfederallawinthreeways.First, asdecidedin Hinesv.Davidowitz (1941),localpolicies regardingimmigrantsthatmirrorfederalpolicieshave generallybeenstruckdownonpreemptiongrounds.As thefederalgovernmentoccupiedthefieldofimmigrationandnaturalizationpolicy,aPennsylvaniastatelaw thatincludedalienregistrationprovisionswasstruck downasitwaspreemptedbytheFederalAlienRegistrationAct.
Moreprominently,however,anumberofstateand citystatutesthatattemptedtodiscriminateagainst legallyresidentnoncitizensonthebasisoftheirnoncitizenstatushavebeenstruckdownonequalprotection grounds.TheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenth AmendmenttotheConstitutionstatesthat“[n]oState shallmakeorenforceanylawwhichshallabridgethe privilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnited States;norshallanyStatedepriveanypersonoflife, liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflaw;nor denytoanypersonwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.”Thisclauseprovidesapowerful mechanismforprotectionofnoncitizens,asthelatter portionguaranteesprotectionfornotjustcitizens,but forallpersonsresident(legally)withinthejurisdiction oftheUnitedStates.Underequalprotectiongrounds, then,anumberofSupremeCourtcases,including Yick Wov.Hopkins (1886), Truaxv.Raich (1915), Takahashiv.FishandGameCommission (1948),and Graham v.Richardson (1971)haveupheldtherightsoflegally presentnoncitizensinthefaceofdiscriminatorystate andcitypolicies.
Themorerecentcaseof Grahamv.Richardson (1971) setthestandardsagainstwhichcontemporarystateand localpoliciesconcerningnoncitizenshavebeenheld, atleastuntilthepassageofthePRWORAin1996. AgroupofnoncitizenschallengedPennsylvaniaand Arizonastatelawsthatestablishedalienagerestrictions
forstate-fundedwelfareprogramsor,inotherwords, attemptedtocreatestatestandardsmorestringentthan federalstandardsforlegalpermanentresidentswho wereseekingwelfarebenefits.IntheArizonacase,the statewishedtoholdlegalpermanentresidentstoa fifteen-yearresidencyrequirementbeforebeingeligible forstatewelfarepayments.InthePennsylvaniacase, legalresidentswerebarredfromstatewelfareprograms altogether.Inestablishinglimitsonthetreatmentof legalresidentsbylocalgovernments, Graham wasimportantinthreerespects.First,JusticeBlackmunwrote thatinhisopinion“classificationsbasedonalienage, likethosebasedonnationalityorrace,areinherently suspectandsubjecttoclosejudicialscrutiny.Aliensas aclassareaprimeexampleofa‘discreteandinsular’ minorityforwhomsuchheightenedjudicialsolicitude isappropriate”(Grahamv.Richardson 1971,371–72).In otherwords,becauselegalresidentnoncitizensarenot abletovote,donothaveapoliticalvoice,andthereforecannotprotectthemselvesagainstdiscriminatory stateaction,stateandcitylawsthatdiscriminateagainst noncitizensonthebasisoftheirnoncitizenstatusmust behelduptostrictscrutinybythecourts.Second,because“[a]lienslikecitizenspaytaxesandmaybecalled intothearmedforces”aswellas“livewithinastate formanyyears,workinthestateandcontributeto theeconomicgrowthofthestate,”(Grahamv.Richardson 1971,376)theArizonaandPennsylvanialawsviolatedtheEqualProtectionClauseoftheConstitution, whichtreatsallthose(legally)withintheterritoryofthe UnitedStatesaspersons.Third,theCourtcommented thatindividualstategovernmentscouldnotestablish localpoliciesthatwere,ineffect,membershippolicies andthatconflictedwiththeimmigrationandnaturalizationlawsofthefederalgovernment.Withregard toimmigrationpolicy,“[s]tatealienresidencyrequirementsthateitherdenywelfarebenefitstononcitizens orconditionthemonlongtimeresidency,equatewith theassertionofaright,inconsistentwithfederalpolicy, todenyentranceandabode.Sincesuchlawsencroach uponexclusivefederalpower,theyareconstitutionally impermissible”(Grahamv.Richardson 1971,380).With regardtonaturalizationpolicy,“[u]nder theConstitution,Congress’poweristo‘establishanuniform RuleofNaturalization.’Acongressionalenactment construedsoastopermitstatelegislaturestoadoptdivergentlawsonthesubjectofcitizenshiprequirements forfederallysupportedwelfareprogramswouldappear tocontravenethisexplicitconstitutionalrequirement foruniformity”(Grahamv.Richardson 1971,382).
Afinalpointabout Graham highlightstheimportanceofhowcasesaredefinedindeterminingtheir
outcomes.ThefirstlineofJusticeBlackmun’sopinion was“Thesearewelfarecases ... ”(Grahamv.Richardson 1971,366).Indefiningthecaseinthiswayand categorizing Graham asconcerningimmigrantsaspeople,theCourtremovedthecasefromconcernsrelated toimmigrationandnationalmembership.Thishadthe effectofprotectingthecasefromfederalplenarypower (whichcouldlegitimatelyhaveuphelddiscriminatory policy)andallowingtheCourttoruleonitonequal protectiongrounds.
Although Graham seemstoindicateclearlythat statesmaynotdiscriminateagainstlegalresidentson thebasisoftheirnoncitizenstatus,acasedecidedseveralyearslaterfurtherclarifiedtheinterestingrelationshipbetweenthefederalandlocalgovernments intheareaofimmigrationandnaturalizationpolicy. In Mathewsv.Diaz (1976),legalresidentsofFlorida broughtsuitagainstthefederalgovernment,claimingthatitsfive-yearresidencerequirementforfederal welfareprogrameligibilitywasunconstitutional.The SupremeCourtdismissedtheircase.Inhisdecisionfor theCourt,JusticeStevensfirstreaffirmedthatthefederalgovernment—specificallythepoliticalbranches— heldplenarypowerovermatterspertainingtoaliens.As such,theresidencyrequirementcouldnotbebrought beforetheCourtbecauseitwasnotaConstitutional question,butinsteadwasapoliticalmatter.Torepeat hisfamousstatement,theJusticeadmittedthatplenary powereffectivelyupheldadoublestandard:“intheexerciseofitsbroadpowerovernaturalizationandimmigration,Congressregularlymakesrulesthatwouldbeunacceptableifappliedtocitizens”(Mathewsv.Diaz 1976, 1891).Crucially,givenplenarypower,justasitwas inappropriateforthejudiciarytosubjectimmigration policiesofthefederalgovernmenttoConstitutional scrutiny,itwasinappropriateforstategovernmentsto becomeinvolvedinthedevelopmentofimmigration andnaturalizationpolicy.Referringbackto Graham, JusticeStevenswrote:
Insofarasstatewelfarepolicyisconcerned,thereislittle,ifany,basisfortreatingpersonswhoarecitizensof anotherStatedifferentlyfrompersonswhoarecitizens ofanothercountry.Bothgroupsarenoncitizensasfaras theState’sinterestsinadministeringitswelfareprograms areconcerned.Thus,adivisionbyaStateofthecategoryofpersonswhoarenotcitizensofthatStateinto subcategoriesofUnitedStatescitizensandalienshasno apparentjustification,whereas,acomparableclassificationbytheFederalGovernmentisaroutineandnormally legitimatepartofitsbusiness.(Mathewsv.Diaz 1976, 1894)
Mathewsv.Diaz, therefore,strikinglyilluminates twoissues.First,ithighlightsaglaringdoublestandard inimmigrationandnaturalizationlaw:Individualstates couldnotdiscriminateagainstlegalresidents,but CongressandtheExecutiveBranchcoulddowhatever theypleasevis- ` a-visnoncitizens,protectedbytheirplenarypowerandimmunefromjudicialreview.Second, Mathews impliesthatstatesmayindeeddiscriminate againstlegalresidentsifthisdiscriminationisuniformly authorizedbythefederalgovernment.AsIwilldiscuss later,thisissuehasreemergedsince1996,withthepassageofthePRWORA,which,amongotherthings,devolvedtothestatestheauthoritytodetermineeligibilityforwelfare,eveniftheydevelopdivergentstandards.
Ihavediscussedthewayinwhichthetreatment oflegallyresidentnoncitizenswithintheUnitedStates hasbeendetermined,inlargepart,bythescaleatwhich thepolicyoriginated.Whathasbeenthereactionofthe federalgovernment,however,whenlocalgovernments attempttodeveloppoliciesspecificallyaddressingtheir populationofunauthorizedresidents?
ThedecisionoftheSupremeCourtin DeCanasv. Bica (1976)isparticularlyrelevanttothisquestion,as itspecificallyhighlightedthescalarboundarybetween peopleasimmigrantsandimmigrantsaspeople.The caseaddressedtheconstitutionalityofaCalifornialabor code,whichstatedthat“[n]oemployershallknowingly employanalienwhoisnotentitledtolawfulresidence intheUnitedStatesifsuchemploymentwouldhavean adverseeffectonlawfulresidentworkers”(quotedin De Canasv.Bica 1976,352).AlthoughtheCaliforniaSuperiorCourtandCourtofAppealsbothdeclaredthelaw unconstitutionalbyarguingthatitencroachedonthe exclusiveandcomprehensiveCongressionalregulation ofimmigration,theU.S.SupremeCourt,surprisingly, overturnedtheirrulingsbyarguingthatalthoughthe “[p]owertoregulateimmigrationisunquestionablyexclusivelyafederalpower thefactthataliensarethe subjectofastatestatutedoesnotrenderitaregulation ofimmigration,whichisessentiallyadeterminationof whoshouldorshouldnotbeadmittedintothecountry,andtheconditionsunderwhichalegalentrant mayremain”(DeCanasv.Bica 1976,354–55).Inother words,althoughthelawinquestionregulatedtheemploymentofundocumentedmigrants,theCourtstated veryclearlythatthisregulationwasnotaboutanunconstitutionallocalregulationofimmigrationperse,
andthereforepreemptedbyfederallaw,butratherfully withinCalifornia’sright,aspartofthestates’“broad authorityundertheirpolicepowerstoregulatethe employmentrelationshiptoprotectworkerswithinthe State”(DeCanasv.Bica 1976,356).In DeCanas,wesee againhowimportanttheprocessofcategorizationisto theoutcomeofthecase.AlthoughtheCaliforniacourts hadcategorizedthestatuteasanimmigrationmatter, theSupremeCourtdecidedinsteadthatitwasreallya matterconcerningemployment,andthusruledthatit waswellwithinCalifornia’sjurisdictiontopenalizeemployerswhoknowinglyhiredundocumentedlaborers.11
In Plylerv.Doe (1982),however,acaseconsidered bymanytobeaconstitutionaloddity,theSupreme Court—inacontentiousfivetofourdecision— defendedtherightsofundocumentedchildrenagainsta discriminatoryTexasstatutethataimedtodenypublic schoolenrollmenttoundocumentedchildrenwhowere notlegallypresentintheUnitedStates,althoughthey weredefactoresidentsofTexas.Becausethechildren inquestionwereundocumented—presentwithoutauthorizationwithintheUnitedStates—inafascinating attemptofterritorialmanipulation,Texasarguedthat theywerenottherefore“personswithinthejurisdiction”ofTexasandthereforenotprotectedbytheEqual ProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment.In otherwords,Texasarguedthatthechildrenshouldbe consideredimmigrantswithinthejurisdictionofthe nation-state,notthestateofTexas,andassuchineligibleforequalprotectionundertheFourteenthAmendment.Inrejectingthisargument,theCourtstatedthat theprotectionsoftheFourteenthAmendmentapplied toallpersonswithintheUnitedStatesandthat:
theprotectionoftheFourteenthAmendmentextendsto anyone,citizenorstranger,who is subjecttothelawsof aState,andreachesintoanycornerofaState’sterritory. Thataperson’sinitialentryintoaState,orintotheUnited States,wasunlawful,andthathemayforthatreasonbeexpelled,cannotnegatethesimplefactofhispresencewithin theState’sterritorialperimeter.(Plylerv.Doe 1982,215)
Plyler (1982)offersanotherfascinatingexampleofa statelawstruckdownforattemptingtodiscriminate againstpeople-as-immigrants,evenwhentheimmigrantsinquestionwereundocumented.
Additionally,followingthelogicin DeCanas (1976), Texasattemptedtoavoidacategorizationofthelawas dealingwithquestionsofalienage(andthereforeopeningituptoclosejudicialscrutinyandequalprotection claims),andinsteadcategorizethestatuteasaddressing thefiscalconcernsofthestate,therebyplacingitwithin
statejurisdiction.TheSupremeCourt’sresponsetothis wasinteresting.Ontheonehand,thedecisionmade veryclearthattheJusticeswerenotpromotingunlawful entrytotheUnitedStatesandthatundocumentedmigrants(incontrasttolegalresidents)werenotasuspect classdeservingofjudicialprotection.First,theCourt agreedthat“aStatemaywithholditsbeneficencefrom thosewhoseverypresencewithintheUnitedStatesis theproductoftheirownunlawfulconduct”(Plylerv. Doe 1982,219);however,theythenarguedthat“[t]hese argumentsdonotapplywiththesameforcetoclassificationsimposingdisabilitiesontheminor children ofsuch illegalentrants”(Plylerv.Doe 1982,219–20).Although “accesstopubliceducationisnotarightguaranteedin theConstitution,itnonethelessoccupiesaspecialplace inthepantheonofpublicbenefits,asdenyingeducation toachildwouldleavealastingimpactofitsdeprivationonthelifeofachild”(Plylerv.Doe 1982,221)and “denythemtheabilitytolivewithinthestructureofour civicinstitution,andforecloseanyrealisticpossibility thattheywillcontributeineventhesmallestwayto theprogressofourNation”(Plylerv.Doe 1982,223).
Atleastinthiscase,theminorstatusofthepersons inquestionmadeforauniquedecisionbytheCourt thatdidnotrelyontheusualargumentsregardingfederalpreemption,thedegreetowhichtheTexaslaw washarmoniouswithfederalimmigrationandnaturalizationpolicy,andtheprohibitionagainstlocalgovernments“doingimmigrationpolicy.”Inasomewhat contradictorymanner,theCourtargued,ontheone hand,thatundocumentedresidentswereterritorially presentandwerethereforesubjecttoequalprotection againstdiscriminationbytheTexaslawand,onthe otherhand,thatundocumentedmigrantswerenota protectedclassundertheFourteenthAmendmentor, atleast,thatundocumentedadultswerenotprotected, butundocumentedchildrenwere.
Since1982,asaresultof Plyler (1982),undocumentedchildrenhavethereforebeenguaranteedapublicprimaryandsecondaryeducationintheUnited States.Thisprecedent,aswellasthedecisionhanded downin DeCanas,waskeyin LeagueofUnitedLatin AmericanCitizens(LULAC)v.Wilson (1995).This casedecidedthefateofCalifornia’sProposition187,a heavilyrestrictionistballotinitiativepassedbythestate electorate(59to41percent)in1994,andarguablythe progenitorofallcontemporarygrassrootslocalandstate anti-immigrationlegislation.Amongotherthings,the propositioncreatedasystemenablingstateofficialsto verifytheimmigrationstatusof“arrestees,applicantsfor socialservicesandhealthcare,andpublicschoolstu-
dentsandtheirparents”(LULACv.Wilson 1995,764), reportthisstatustofederalimmigrationauthorities,restrictillegalimmigrants’accesstopubliclyfundedsocial services(health,education,andwelfare),andcriminalizedocumentfraud.Thevastmajorityoftheproposition wasthrownoutinU.S.DistrictCourtonpreemption grounds.JudgePfaelzerupheldtherightofthestate todenypostsecondaryeducationbenefitstoundocumentedstudents,aswellastherightofthestatetoprosecutedocumentfraudasanelementofitspolicepowers; however,shethrewouttherestofthepropositionby firstreaffirmingtheplenarypowerofthefederalgovernmentoverimmigrationandnaturalizationmatters,and thenarguingthatmuchofthepropositionreliedonthe developmentofastate-level“comprehensiveschemeto detectandreportthepresenceandeffecttheremoval ofillegalaliens”(LULACv.Wilson 1995,769).As “stateagentsareunqualified—andalsounauthorized— tomakeindependentdeterminationsofimmigration status,”shedeclaredtheseaspectsofthepropositionas impermissible(LULACv.Wilson 1995,770).
Asthepriorsectiondemonstrated,beforethe1990s, ifalocalgovernmentpolicywasdefinedasinfluencingmembershipinthenationalcommunity,impactingpeopleasimmigrants,thenitwasgenerallyviewed asencroachingonthefederalgovernment’splenary powerandwaspreempted.Iflocalpolicywasdeemed asconcerningimmigrantsaspeopleandwasnotcategorizedasimpactingmembership,however,itwas permitted,providedthatthenoncitizensinquestion weretreatedas“persons”andaffordedallConstitutionalprotections.Instarkcontrast,inthecurrent neoliberalizing,devolutionarycontext,thispreviously strictboundarybetweentheresponsibilitiesofthefederalgovernmentandlocalandstategovernmentsin mattersconcerningnoncitizensisstartingtoblur.The 1996lawshavegivenstateandlocalgovernmentsselectabilitiestodiscriminateagainstpeopleasimmigrants,thusfurtherconstrainingspacesofpersonhood andfurtherconstitutingabodyofnoncitizenneoliberal subjects.
ThePRWORA,passedin1996,givesstatesunprecedentedpowersindeterminingeligibilityof,and
generatinganddisbursingfundsfor,variousmeanstestedwelfareprograms,suchasTemporaryAidfor NeedyFamilies(TANF,orcashassistance),food stamps,SupplementalSecurityIncome(SSI),and nonemergencyMedicaid.Severalmajorchangesinthe lawaffectnoncitizenresidents.First,thelawcreatesnew administrativecategories;itdividesnoncitizensinto both“preenactment”and“postenactment”immigrants (legalresidentswhoarrivedtotheUnitedStatesbefore August1996versusthosewhoarrivedafter),anditdefinesacategoryof“qualified”immigrants(forinstance, legalpermanentresidents,refugees,asylumseekers),implyingthatallothernoncitizens,suchasunauthorized residents,are“unqualified”(PRWORA1996).Second, thelawexpandsthecategoriesofimmigrantswhoare ineligibleforfederalpublicassistance,includingcertain legalpermanentresidents.Third,bothpreenactment andpostenactmentimmigrantsareconsideredineligibleforSSIandfoodstamps,andpostenactmentimmigrantsarefurtherbarredfromreceivingTANFand nonemergencyMedicaidduringtheirfirstfiveyearsin theUnitedStates.Additionally,thelawreemphasizes thatundocumentedresidentsareineligibleforpublicly fundedstateorlocalservices,withthelimitedexceptionsofemergencyhealthcare,immunizations,andthe treatmentofcommunicablediseases.Ifastatewishes toprovidefundingforundocumentedresidents,itis nowrequiredtopassalawpositivelyaffirmingitscommitmenttoprovidepublicservicestothispopulation (ZimmermanandTumlin1999).
Althoughthelawhashadfar-reachingconsequences forallU.S.residents,itmarkedanimportantshiftin thepowersofthestatesoverallnoncitizenresidentsof theUnitedStates,asstatesarenowinchargeofcreatingandfundingstate-levelbenefitprogramsanddeterminingeligibilityforthoseprograms.Crucially,the PRWORAgivesstatestheunprecedentedabilitytodiscriminateagainstnoncitizensindecidingeligibilityfor theirprograms,anactthatpriorto1996wasconsidered anunconstitutionalencroachmentintofederalpowers overmembershippolicy.Tothesurpriseofmany,a numberofstatessteppedintothevacuumproduced byPRWORAandestablishedstate-levelprogramsthat providepublicassistancetoimmigrants,predominantly postenactmentlegalimmigrantsintheirfirstfiveyears intheUnitedStates.NineteenstatesprovideTANF usingtheirownfunds,seventeenstatesprovidefood stamps,andbothCaliforniaandMainehavecreated state-levelequivalentsofthefourmainmeans-tested programs(includingTANF,foodstamps,SSI,andMedicaid)forallpostenactmentimmigrantsbarredfrom
federalprogramsbythePRWORA(Zimmermanand Tumlin1999,22–23).Wheretheyexist,however,state programstendtoprovidebothfewerandlesssubstantial benefitsforpostenactmentimmigrants.Justasimportant,despitethegenerosityofcertainstates,manyother stateshaveoptedagainstprovidingstatefundingand resourcestothelegalpermanentandundocumented residentswhoarepresentlyineligible.Finally,anumber ofstatesthatdevelopedsubstitutefoodassistanceprogramsafterthepassageofthePRWORAhavespecified thattheseprogramsareaccessibleonlytononcitizen children,theelderly,andthedisabled,thusrestricting accesstoworking-ageadults(ZimmermanandTumlin 1999,23–25).12
Inreformulatingandrescalingwelfarepolicy,animportanteffectofthePRWORAhasbeentodramaticallyreducethenumberofnoncitizens(andcitizens) eligibleformeans-testedprograms,thusproducingan ever-expandingandincreasinglyvulnerablebodyofindividualslivingandworkingwithintheUnitedStates, andforwhomthestate(andstates)claimfewsocial reproductionresponsibilities.
Congressalsodevolvedauthorityoverenforcement ofcivilimmigrationviolationswiththepassageofthe AEDPAandIIRIRAin1996,whichgavestatetroopers,countysheriffs,andcitypoliceagenciestheauthoritypreviouslyrestrictedtofederalagentstoarrest individualsoncivilimmigrationviolations(e.g.,for beingundocumented;seealsoColeman2007a,2007b). TheAEDPAgavelocalpolicetheauthoritytoarrest previouslydeportednoncitizenfelons.TheIIRIRAestablishedaMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU) process,alsoreferredtoas287(g)agreementsinreferencetoU.S.code,wherebylocalandstatepolice agenciesinterestedandwillingtoenforceimmigration lawscansignanagreementwiththefederalgovernment thatspecifies“training,funding,andlegalguidelinesfor theirexpandedresponsibilities”(Gladsteinetal.2005, 6).Becausepolicepowersareconstitutionallyreserved forthestatesandtheirjurisdictionalsubunits,thefederalgovernmentcannotrequirelocalgovernmentsto doimmigrationpolicing,butitcan,andhas,createdan openingsothatlocalitiesmayrequesttobetrainedby andtojointhefederalgovernmentinenforcingimmigrationlawswithintheinterioroftheUnitedStates. Thisinnovationhasmeantthat,forthefirsttime,local policeforces,whichnormallyenforcelocalandstate
criminallaws,canassistthefederalgovernmentinenforcingfederalcivilimmigrationviolations,shouldthey choosetodoso.
The1996changesauthorizinglocalimmigration policingdidnotatfirsthavemuchtraction.Before theattackson9/11,theonlyinstanceoffederal–local cooperationintherealmofimmigrationpolicingwere thehighlycontroversialandmuchmalignedimmigrationsweepsperformedbycitypoliceinChandler,Arizona,accompaniedbyfederalImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)authorities.The“Chandler roundups,”conductedthroughoutthesummerof1997, ultimatelydetained432suspectedundocumentedresidentsofthecityandplacedthemindeportationproceedings;however,thesweepsalsogeneratedacivil rightslawsuitinwhichthedefendantsclaimed,and successfullyargued,thattheywerethevictimsofracial profiling(M.RomeroandSerag2005).
Thepublicmoodchangedafter9/11,however, spurredonbytheBushadministration’sfocusonnationalsecurity,terrorism,andtheperceivedvulnerabilityofthecountry’ssouthernborder.InApril2002, AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftissuedaclassifiedand highlycontentiousmemoarguingthatthestateand localpolicehavetheinherent,sovereignauthorityto makearrestsforviolationsofcivil,federalimmigration law(Ashcroft2002).Thisinterpretationoverturned theconclusionsofapriormemo,issuedbytheAttorneyGeneral’sofficein1996,whichassertedthatlocal andstatepolicedidnothaveauthoritytomakearrests basedonfederalcivilviolations(suchasbeingpresent intheUnitedStateswithoutauthorization).
AlthoughnolocalorstatepoliceforcessignedMOUs withtheDepartmentofJusticepriorto9/11,thechangingenforcementclimateaftertheattacksspurredseveralpoliceagenciestoenterintoagreementswiththe newlyconstitutedDepartmentofHomelandSecurity (DHS)beginningin2002.InSeptember2002,the FloridaDepartmentofLawEnforcementwasthefirst statepoliceagencytosignanMOUwiththeDHSthat initiallyauthorizedthetrainingofthirty-fivestateand localpoliceofficerstobeinvolvedinimmigrationenforcementduties.Sincethattime,Alabama,Arizona, eightcounties(fiveofwhichareinSouthernCalifornia),andanumberofcitieshavealsoenteredinto 287(g)agreementswiththeDHS,anddozensofothers haveexpressedinterestintheprogram(287(g)Freedom ofInformationActresponse2006).
Aswiththerescalingofwelfarepolicy,therescalingofimmigrationpolicingpowerscreatesapatchwork ofenforcementregimesacrossthecountryandgreatly
increasesthevulnerability—orattheveryleast,theperceivedvulnerability—ofnoncitizenslivingwithinthe UnitedStates.Indeed,giventheprevalenceoffamilies withmultiplelegalstatuses(e.g.,familiesofnative-born citizenchildrenandundocumentedparents),thePew HispanicCenterrecentlyreportedthatoverhalfofall LatinosintheUnitedStatesfearthattheyorsomeoneclosetothemmaybedeportedinthecurrentimmigrationenforcementclimate(PewHispanicCenter 2007).
Inoureffortstounderstandthecurrentpoliticaleconomiccontext,Leitneretal.urgeustoexplorenot onlyneoliberalization,butalso,“toexamineitsarticulationwithcontestationswithinandbeyondthestate thathaveshapedandwillcontinuetoinfluenceitsconditionofpossibility”(2006,8).Indeed,theneoliberal rescalingofmembershipisrifewithscalartensions,instabilities,andvolatility,whichlendsfurtherevidence toDavidHarvey’swarningthat“allisnotwellwith theneoliberalstate”(2005,78).Therescalingofmembershipmaynotbeasustainablepathwaythroughthe (neo)liberalparadoxofthemigrationstate(Hollifield 2004a,2004b)afterall.Multiplefaultlinescutacross thelandscapeofrescaledmembershipthatreflectalltoo clearlythatnotonlyis“productionofscale ahighly chargedandpoliticalprocess,”butthat“[e]venmore politicallychargedisthereproductionofscaleatdifferentlevels—therestructuringofscale,theestablishment ofnew‘scalefixes’fornewconcatenationsofpolitical, economicandculturalinterchange”(Smith1995,61–62,emphasisinoriginal).Thesetensionsincludeheated debateswithinthelegalcommunity,aswellastensions andfissureswithinandbetweenlocal,state,federal,and internationalscales.
TherescalingofpersonhoodhasgarneredsignificantdebatebetweenscholarsofConstitutionaland immigrationlaw.Thedebateshaveturnedprimarily onthetrickyissueofwhetherthefederalgovernment “pursuanttoitsplenaryimmigrationpower,[can]authorizestatestoundertakeactionthatwouldotherwise beplainlyunconstitutional”(HarvardLawReview EditorialBoard2005,1;seealsoWishnie2001).
Inthecaseofwelfarereform,debateshaveturned ontwoissues.First,scholarsarequestioningwhether thefederalgovernmentcanauthorizestatestodevelopnonuniform,divergentpoliciesthatdiscriminate againstnoncitizens,giventheConstitution’suniform ruleofnaturalization.Second,revisiting Graham and
Mathews,theyaredebatingthedegreetowhichwelfare policyisrelatedtoimmigration—policiesthatdeterminetheentryandabodeofnoncitizens.Again,the wayinwhichthecasesaredefinedwillhavegreatbearingontheiroutcomes.Whereas Graham and Mathews madeclear,priorto1996,thatindividualstateswere preventedfromdiscriminatingonthebasisofalienagewhendeterminingeligibilityformeans-testedpublicwelfareprograms,recentcaseshavedestabilizedthis scalardivisionoflabor. Aliessav.Novello (2001)upheld Graham whentheNewYorkStateCourtofAppealsdeclaredunconstitutionalaNewYorkstatelawdenying qualifiedimmigrantsaccesstoastate-fundedMedicaid program.Nonetheless,in Soskinv.Reinertson (2004), theTenthCircuitrejected Aliessa,upholdingaColoradostatutethatdeniedMedicaidbenefitstoqualified noncitizens.
Todate,therehavebeennosignificantlegalchallengestothedevolutionofimmigrationpolicingpowersasspelledoutbythe1996ActsandAshcroft’s2002 memo(Wishnie2004,1090).Thisreflectsseveralissues.Asmentioned,veryfewlocallawenforcement agencieshavesignedMOUswiththeDHSthusfar,althoughthisnumberissteadilyincreasing.Furthermore, althoughtherehasbeenlesslegalambiguityastothe powersoflocalandstatepolicetoenforcecriminalviolationsoftheImmigrationandNationalityAct(INA), thereisstillsignificantdebateamonglegalscholarsover whetherlocalpolicecanenforcecivilimmigrationsviolations(Hethmon2004;Pham2004;Wishnie2004). In Gonzalezv.CityofPeoria (1983),theNinthCircuit determinedthatpoliceofficersinPeoria,Arizona,did notviolatetheConstitutionwhentheyenforcedacity ordinancethatrequiredthearrestofindividualssuspectedofviolatingcriminalprovisionsoftheINA.On theotherhand,inmorerecentcases,suchas United Statesv.Vasquez-Alvarez (1999),thecourtalsoagreed thatlocalpolicehadtheinherentauthoritytoarrest individualsforviolationsofimmigrationlaw,butin thiscase,thecourtdidnotdrawadistinctionbetween civilandcriminalviolations,leavingtheissueopenfor debate.
Beyondlegaldebates,thecontradictionsofneoliberalizingmembershiphavealsogivenrisetoavibrantand contentiouspoliticsofrescaling.Laxinternalimmigrationenforcementpairedwiththerecentandrapidly shiftingregionalgeographiesofimmigrantsettlement arekeytounderstandingthisemergingpoliticsinthe U.S.context(Ellis2006;seealsoClark1998).Among otherfactors,immigrantschooseparticularsettlement destinationsasaconsequenceoftransnationalmigra-
tionnetworkslinkingoriginanddestinations(Massey 1987;Menj´ıvar2000).Inthepasttwodecades,the settlementchoicesofimmigrants—particularlyimmigrantsfromMexicowhomakeupapproximatelyonethirdoftheforeign-bornpopulationintheUnited States(U.S.BureauoftheCensus2002)—haveshifted dramaticallyfromtraditional“gateway”regionsand citiesintheWestandSouthwest(forinstance,Los AngelesandElPaso)to“newdestinations”intheMidwest,South,Southeast,andNortheast(suchasOmaha,Atlanta,Charlotte,andNewYorkCity;Z ´ uniga andHern ´ andez-Le ´ on2005).Furthermore,inallareas oftheUnitedStates,immigrantsareincreasinglysettlinginsuburbsandsmallruralcommunities,incontrast tohistoricalsettlementinruralagriculturalareasand centralcities(Singer,Hardwick,andBrettell2008).As aconsequence,communitiespreviouslyunfamiliarwith immigrationaregrapplingwiththechallenges(andopportunities)ofrapidlyshiftingdemographics,demonstratingthewaysinwhichcitiesand“city-regionshave becomekeyinstitutionalsitesinwhichamajorrescaling ofnationalstatepowerhasbeenunfolding”(Brenner 2004,3;seealsoPeckandTickell2002).
In“contestingneoliberalism”(Leitner,Peck,and Sheppard2006)—particularlytheunauthorizedmigrationsymptomaticofneoliberalizingpoliticalandeconomicprocesses—citiesandstateshavetakenthelead ininnovativepolicymakingofbothinclusiveandexclusionaryvarieties.Forinstance,anumberoflocal governmentsandpolicedepartments,statingconcerns forpublicsafety,theimportanceofpolice–community relationships,andaprogressivecommitmenttotheir immigrantcommunities,haverejectedlocalcivilimmigrationenforcementandpartneringoflocalpoliceand federalimmigrationofficialsentirely.Somehavedeclaredthemselvessanctuarycities,andothersfollowa “don’task,don’ttell”policyregardingcontactbetween unauthorizedresidentsandcityemployees,including police.Althoughtheabsolutenumberofsuchcitiesin theUnitedStatesisnotlarge,thelistincludescities withsizeableunauthorizedimmigrantpopulations— includingNewYorkCity,LosAngeles,Detroit,Santa Fe,Houston,SanFrancisco,Denver,Austin,Tucson, Washington,DC,andothers(Wells2004)—thuseffectivelyshieldingasignificantnumberoftheseresidents fromlocalcivilimmigrationenforcementanddeportationresultingfromcontactswithcitypolice.13
Incontrast,asDavidHarvey(2005,81)warns,other citiesandstatesarechoosingdecidedlyexclusionary responsestoneoliberalization.Asdiscussed,asmall numberofcities,counties,andstateshavesigned,
orhaveconsideredsigning,287(g)agreementswith thefederalgovernment.AsIhavedetailedelsewhere (Varsanyi2008;seealsoEsbenshade2000),manyother citieshavestartedtodoimmigrationpolicing“through thebackdoor”:toenforcecitylanduseandpublic nuisanceordinancesthatconstrainthebehaviorsand livingconditionsofundocumentedresidents.Forexample,anumberofcitiesenforceantisolicitationand trespassingordinancestopoliceinformaldaylaborhiringsites.Morecontroversially,beginninginthesummerof2006,citiessuchasHazleton,Pennsylvania,and FarmersBranch,Texas,havepassedIllegalImmigration ReliefActsthat,amongotherthings,penalizelandlords andbusinessownersinthecityforrentingtoorhiring unauthorizedresidents.Astheseeffortsrepresenttrue grassrootseffortsatimmigrationcontrol,asopposed toeffortsemergingfromadevolutionofimmigration powersbythefederalgovernment(wemightcallthem “unauthorized”attemptstocrossthescalarboundaries ofmembership),theyarecurrentlybeingcontestedin court.Inthefirstlegaldecisionhandeddownonthese ordinances,adistrictcourtdeclaredHazleton’slawunconstitutionalbyevokingfamiliarelementsofthescalar fixinplacefromthe1880sonward:federalpreemption, thenecessitythatstatesandcitiestreatimmigrantsas peoplewithConstitutionalprotectionsfordueprocess andequaltreatment,andsoforth(Lozanov.Hazleton 2007).
Therescalingofmembership,particularlyusingcivil immigrationpolicingpowers,isalsogivingriseto bizarregeographiesofcontradictoryscalarpriorities. Forinstance,althoughDenver,Boulder,andDurango, Colorado,havedeclaredthemselvessanctuarycities, theColoradoStateLegislaturerecentlypassedlegislationthatoutlawssanctuarycitiesthroughoutthestate (Richardson2006).Inanevenmoremind-bendingexample,thePhoenix,Arizona,citypolicehavedeclared theiroppositiontolocalcivilimmigrationenforcement atthesametimeastheMaricopaCountysheriffandattorneyhavestakedtheirreelectionsonadrivetoarrest asmanyunauthorizedresidentsaspossiblewiththeir newfounddevolvedpolicingauthority(Irwin2007). UnauthorizedresidentsofthePhoenixmetropolitanregionarethereforefacedwithdailydecisionsregarding, forinstance,theirdrivetothegrocerystore:Potential routesmaycrossthroughbothcityandcountyjurisdictions,thusliterallycreatingapatchworkandlayered geographyofpersonhoodandalienage(andsafetyand fear)whiledrivingdowntheroad.
Finally,conditionsareonceagainbecomingripefor a“YickWo”moment.In YickWov.Hopkins (1886),the
casewidelyconsideredbylegalscholarsasthefoundationforthe“personhoodstandard,”theU.S.Supreme CourtruledthatSanFrancisco(andbyextension,California)couldnotdiscriminateagainstaliensonthe basisoftheirnoncitizenstatus,asthiswasarightreservedforthefederalgovernment.Amongotherreasons given,thecourtarguedthatCaliforniawasnotpermittedtomakelawsthattreatedforeignnationalsdifferentlythanrequiredbyagreementsbetweentheU.S. federalgovernmentandaforeignpower(inthiscase, theBurlingameTreatysignedwiththeChineseemperor;again,highlightingimmigrationpolicyasforeign policy).Scalartensionsarearisingonceagainaround “unauthorized”grassrootseffortsbycitiesandstatesto discriminateagainstpeopleasimmigrants.Forexample,addingtoMexicanPresidentFelipeCalder ´ on’s increasinglyvehementcritiquesoftheU.S.federal government’spoliciesvis- ` a-visunauthorizedMexican workers(McKinley2007),Mexicanconsularofficials havestartedtocontestlocalandstateimmigrationpoliciessuchasColorado’slawoutlawingsanctuarycities (Richardson2006).
Ihaveprovidedevidencetodemonstratehowthe contemporarydevolutionofselectimmigrationpowers iscreatingbothopportunitiesandrequirementsthat localgovernmentsdiscriminateagainstpeopleasimmigrants,arightoncesolelyreservedforthefederal government.Ihavearguedthatthisdevolutionreflects theneoliberalrescalingofmembershippolicyinthe UnitedStates,andthatthisrescalingisimplicatedin theproductionofneoliberalsubjects.Atthesametime asdemandforinexpensive,informallaborgrowsinthe UnitedStates,thesedevolutionarypoliciesproducecategoriesofpersonswho,particularlywhenapproached bythestateasimmigrants,areplacedbeyondtheprotectionsoftheConstitutionandthewelfarecapacity ofthestate,althoughtheymaylivewithinthenationstateformanyyears.Astherescalingofmembership createsever-increasingwallsbetween“us”and“them,” “citizens”and“aliens,”wemustconfronttheimplicationsofaseeminglypermanentexpansionofsecondclassmembershipandaworkingclassincreasinglycomposedofnonpersons(atleastintheeyesofthelaw)for social,political,andeconomicjustice.Inhisclassic text, SpheresofJustice,MichaelWalzer(1983)argues thatdemocraciescannottolerateatwo-tieredsociety ofcitizensandnoncitizens.Inlightoftherescalingof membership,andintermsofjustice,hiswordsringtrue today,astheydidwhen Spheres wasfirstpublishedin 1983:“Democraticcitizens ... haveachoice:ifthey wanttobringinnewworkers,theymustbepreparedto
enlargetheirownmembership;iftheyareunwillingto acceptnewmembers,theymustfindwayswithinthe limitsofthedomesticlabormarkettogetsociallynecessaryworkdone.Andthosearetheironlychoices”(61).
IthanktheCenterforComparativeImmigration StudiesandCenterforU.S.–MexicanStudiesatthe UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,forapostdoctoral fellowshipthatprovidedcrucialfinancialsupportduringtheinitialconceptualizationanddraftingofthis projectin2005.IalsothankDanielTrudeauandLuisa Veronisfororganizingthesession“Migrants,Migration, andNeoliberalization”attheAssociationofAmerican Geographersmeetingin2007,whichprovidedanimportantopportunitytopresentthismaterialandreceive helpfulfeedback.Finally,Igivemysincerethanksto MadelineAdelman,EvelynCruz,HelgaLeitner,Joshua Muldavin,DorisMarieProvine,membersoftheArizonaStateUniversityInstituteforHumanitiesResearch “MigrationandBelonging”researchcluster,andtwo anonymousreviewers,allofwhomprovidedconstructiveandthoughtfulcommentsatvariousstagesofthe project.
1.AccordingtotheImmigrantPolicyProjectoftheNationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,in2005,state legislaturesconsideredapproximately300immigration orimmigrant-relatedbillsandpassedapproximately fifty.In2006,statelegislaturesinforty-threestatesintroduced570immigration-andimmigrant-relatedbills, eighty-fourofwhichbecamelaw.Thesenumbersexpandedevenmorein2007,with1,562piecesoflegislationbeingintroducedinallfiftystatelegislatures, and244becominglaw(NationalConferenceofState Legislators2008).
2.Foradiscussionof“scalefixes,”seeSmith(1995).
3.In2001,whereas9,500BorderPatrolagentswerestationedalongtheU.S.–Mexicoborder(enhancedin 2005withanadditional6,000NationalGuardtroops), only124agentswereassignedtoinvestigateandenforce workplaceimmigrationviolationswithintheUnited States(Cornelius2005,786).Asaresult,workplace enforcementhasplummeted.Forexample,thenumber ofemployeraudits(investigationsintothelegalstatus ofemployees)droppedfrom10,000in1990tolessthan 2,200in2003.Similarly,thenumberofwarningsgiven toemployersfoundtobeknowinglyemployingundocumentedworkersfellfrom1,300in1990to500in2003; andthenumberoffinesleviedforviolationsfellfrom 1,000in1991to124in2003(Brownell2005).
4.AlthoughIprefertheterm noncitizen anduseitwhen possible,Ialsousetheterms alien and alienage inthis articleastheU.S.comprehensiveimmigrationlaw,the
ImmigrationandNationalityAct,isbuiltaroundthese termsandtheyarestillthetermsofchoiceinthelegal literature.Evenwithintheimmigrationlawcommunity, however,scholarsrecognizetheexclusionarynatureof thesetermsandexpressdiscomfortwiththeiruse(Johnson1996).
5.Asimplied,therearelimitedcircumstancesinwhich thisscalardivisionofpersonhoodandalienagedoesnot hold.Forexample,underthe“politicalfunctionexception,”statesandlocalgovernmentsareabletotreatpeopleasimmigrantsanddiscriminateonthebasisofalienagewhentheconstitutionoftheirpoliticalcommunities isinquestion,as“[a]liensarebydefinitionthoseoutsideofthiscommunity”(Cabellv.Chavez-Salido 1982, 439–40;seealso Sugarmanv.Dougall 1973).
6.Priortocontemporarydevolution,oneprominenthistoricalexampleofstateandlocalinvolvementinimmigrationpolicingcameduringtheGreatDepression whenmorethan400,000MexicansintheU.S.SouthwestandMidwest(approximately60percentofwhom wereAmericancitizensbybirth)were“repatriated”to MexicobythefederalImmigrationandNaturalization Service(INS),andcityandcountywelfarereliefagencies(Ngai2003,71–73;seealsoBalderramaandRodriguez1995).
7.Inthissense,neoliberalmembership(andtheneoliberal subject)differsfromSoysal’s(1995)postnationalmembershipthesisasherconceptionreliesonauniversal personhoodstandardthatdrawsstrengthfromthehumanrightsregimeanddoesnotengagewiththewaysin whichthenation-statestillwieldsconsiderablepower overitsresident,noncitizensubjects(seealsoAleinikoff 2002a).
8.ForcompellingandrecentdiscussionsofUnitedStates immigrationlawandpolicy,seeHing(2004),Johnson (2004),V.C.Romero(2005),Motomura(2006),Zolberg(2006),andKanstroom(2007).
9.See,forexample,the PassengerCases (1849), Hendersonv.MayorofCityofNewYork (1875), ChyLungv. Freeman (1875),andthe HeadMoneyCases (1884).
10.Seealso Harisiadesv.Shaughnessy (1952,588–89): “[A]nypolicytowardaliensisvitallyandintricately interwovenwithcontemporaneouspoliciesinregardto theconductofforeignrelations,thewarpower,and themaintenanceofarepublicanformofgovernment. Suchmattersaresoexclusivelyentrustedtothepolitical branchesofgovernmentastobelargelyimmunefrom judicialinquiryorinterference.”
11.Foranotherhistoricalexampleofthisdynamic,see Terracev.Thompson (1923),inwhichtheSupremeCourt upheldCaliforniaandWashingtonstatelawsprohibitingnoncitizensfromowningagriculturallandonthe groundsthattheselawsfellwithinthestates’policepowerstoprotectthepublicgood.These“alienlandlaws” mainlytargetedJapaneseimmigrants,whohadbeendeclaredineligiblefornaturalizationonracialgroundsin TakaoOzawav.U.S. (1922;Ngai2003,37–50).
12.IntheyearfollowingthepassageofthePRWORA, manydecrieditsharsheligibilitystandards,andnewspaperswerefullofstoriesaboutdesperatedisabledlegalpermanentresidentswhowouldlosetheironlylifelinesforsurvival—SSIandfoodstamps—whenthelaw cameintoeffect,aswellasunimaginablytragicstoriesof
noncitizenadultsandelderscommittingsuicide,rather thanfacingthedraconiancutbacks(see,forexample, Hastings1998).Asaconsequence,in1997,thefederal governmentreinstatedSSIbenefitsforelderlyanddisablednoncitizenswhowouldhavelosttheirassistance asofSeptember1998,andmorerecently(in2002)restoredfoodstampeligibilitytolegalimmigrantadults andchildrenregardlessofthedatetheyarrivedinthe UnitedStates.
13.Formoreonlocalpolicingpracticesandimmigration, seeLewisandRamakrishnan(2007).
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Correspondence: DepartmentofGovernment,JohnJayCollege,CityUniversityofNewYork,NewYork,NY10019,e-mail: mvarsanyi@jjay.cuny.edu.