The Costs of Respecting Sovereignty by demandside

TheCostsofRespectingSovereignty

byJakubGrygiel

JakubGrygiel istheGeorgeH.W.BushAssociateProfessoratThePaulH.NitzeSchoolof AdvancedInternationalStudies(TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity).Hewasawardedthe2005Rear AdmiralErnestM.EllerPrizeinNavalHistory.

Abstract: Respectforsovereigntycanbeaneffectivetooltomanagerelations betweenstates,drawingboundariesofacceptablebehavior.Butthereare alsoclearcostsofrespectingsovereignty.Aforeignpolicybasedona principleddefenseofsovereigntycanbe,infact,morallywrong,politically illegitimate,andstrategicallydangerous.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsovereignty shouldbebrokenwantonly,butonlythatprudentialjudgmentmustbe exercisedtoweighthecostsandbeneﬁtsofrespectingthesovereigntyofa state.Intheend,oursecurityandourvalues,nottheprincipleofsovereignty, shouldbethemetricbywhichweshouldjudgethenecessityandlegitimacyof U.S.actions.

ThewarinIraqhasdrawncriticismonmanylevelsandfrommanysides. Onecriticismisthatthiswarhasviolatedthesovereigntyofastate, Iraq,inanillegitimateway,therebyweakeningnotonlyU.S.authority butalsotheprincipleofsovereignty,seenasacornerstoneofinternational stability.Asapreventivewar,andconsequentlyasawarofchoiceratherthan necessity,U.S.interventioninIraqfailedtomeetthestrictstandardsofawar wagedinself-defense.ThethreatfromIraq,theargumentgoes,wasdoubtful andnotimminent,anddidnotjustifytheclearviolationofsovereignty perpetuatedbytheU.S.anditscoalition.Furthermore,theabsenceofwide internationalsupportfortheIraqinvasion(combinedwiththevocaloppositionofsomekeypowers)hasaugmentedtheperceptionoftheillegitimacyof the2003U.S.attack.

Suchcriticism,voicedbysomecurrentadministrationofﬁcials,is leadingtoarenewedappreciationfortheprincipleofstatesovereignty. Restoringrespectforstatesovereigntyisseenagainasthecornerstoneof internationalstability,aswellasU.S.foreignpolicy.InaJuly2009speechin Moscow,PresidentBarackObamaarguedthiscase,sayingthat

Statesovereigntymustbeacornerstoneofinternationalorder.Justasallstatesshould havetherighttochoosetheirleaders,statesmusthavetherighttobordersthatare

# 2010PublishedbyElsevierLimitedonbehalfofForeignPolicyResearchInstitute.

secure,andtotheirownforeignpolicies.ThatistrueforRussia,justasitistrueforthe UnitedStates.Anysystemthatcedesthoserightswillleadtoanarchy.1

Statesovereigntyiscertainlyworthdefendinginpracticeandasa principle.Violationsofstatesovereigntyshouldnotbetakenlightlybecause theintegrityofstatesimpartsamodicumofordertoanalreadyviolent internationalsystem.Sovereigntymaynotalwaysbejustorlegitimate,and ultimatelyitisstillsubjecttothattimelesslawofpower,soclearlyenunciated bytheAtheniansintheirﬁfthcenturydialoguewiththebeleagueredMelians: theweak,afterall,willcontinuetohavetheirsovereigntyatthemercyofthe powerful.Butaworldwithoutstatesovereignty—oraworldwithoutstates—is likelytobeconsiderablymoreviolentthatonewiththem.Itmaynotbe perfect,butthereisnoclearalternativetoit.

Furthermore,theprincipleofsovereignty—deﬁnedinthesimplest wayastherightofstatestobethesupremeauthoritiesintheirdomesticand externalaffairs,and,therefore,tohavetherighttotheirterritorialintegrity—is stillareferencepointtomany,especiallytoweakerpolities(e.g.,Ukraineor Georgia)whoareneighborsofexpansionarystates.PresidentObama’sspeech couldalsobereadunderthislight,asacalltorespectthewishesandfreedom ofsmallstates,especiallyinthepost-Sovietspace.

Sovereignty,ﬁnally,isalsoawayofjudgingtheactionsofstronger states,whosesuperiorpoweroftenmakestheprincipleofsovereignty expendable.Byplacingtherighttosovereigntyabovethewhimsofpowerful states,theinternationalsystemhasabuilt-inconstraintonpowerandametric toevaluatestatebehavior.Anyviolationofsovereigntyweakensthesefragile rules,makinginternationalrelationslessmanageable.Thecostsofnot respectingsovereigntyare,therefore,clear.

Havingsaidthis,itisalsoimportanttolookatthecostsofanoverly respectfulordeferentialattitudetowardstatesovereignty.Aforeignpolicy basedonastrictrespectofotherstates’sovereignty—andofviolatingtheirs onlyinaclearresponsetoaviolationofours—comeswithseveralunambiguouscostsandevendangers.Speciﬁcally,threebroadcategoriesofcostsaffect astate’ssecurity,legitimacy,andefﬁcacy.Thesecostsaremutuallyreinforcing andresultintheweakeningofastate’sabilitytopursueaforeignpolicythat maximizesitssecurity.

Thefollowingexaminationofsuchcostsshouldnotbeconstruedasan invitationforwantonbreachesofstatesovereignty.Itissimplyapresentation ofwhataforeignpolicybasedonanabsoluterespectforsovereigntywould entail.Theunderlyingpremiseisthattheuseofpower,aninherentfeatureof anyforeignpolicy,ismorallyambiguousandalwaysentailstradeoffs.Inthis speciﬁccase,thetradeoffisbetweenvalidatingtheprincipleofsovereignty andunderminingone’sownsecurity,legitimacy,andefﬁciency.Bothactions,

1 Onlineat http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/20090707062839 abretnuh3.549922e-02.html.

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thoseweakeningandthosestrengtheningstatesovereignty,canincrease threatstoastate.Forinstance,ifsovereigntystopsbeingperceivedasavalue toberespected,thereisahigherlikelihoodthatinternationalrelationswill becomeunmooredandmoreviolent.Butreverencefortheprincipleof sovereigntymayalsoleadtoanoverlytimidforeignpolicy,paralyzedby fearsofdestabilizingwhatisoftencalledtheWestphaliansystem.Intheend, therearecostsandbeneﬁtstoanyaction,andthesignofgoodleadershipisto evaluatethemandundertakethecourseofactionthatwillminimizethe dangerstoastate.Prudentialjudgmentmustbeexercisedinrespecting,aswell asviolating,sovereignty.

Beforedwellingonthecostsofrespectingsovereignty,itisimportant toclarifywhatthisconceptmeans.Inthesimplestformulation,sovereigntyis theideaofauthoritythateachstateisentitledtoexerciseoveritsterritory. Statesaresupposedtobeindependentfromotherpolitiesandsupremewithin theirownterritory,regardlessoftheirsize,population,orpower.Sovereignty is,therefore,conceptuallydistinctfrompower,whichismeasuredinrelative terms.Thatis,stateshavemoreorlesspowerbutareeithersovereign (independentfromforeigninﬂuencesandsupremewithinitsterritory)or arenot.Sovereigntyisaneither-or,absoluteconcept.Aparticularstatemaybe moreorlesscapableofenforcinganddefendingthisauthority,butrespectfor sovereigntyis,atleastinprinciple,notconditionalontheperfectimplementationoftheexternalindependenceandinternalsupremacyofastate.Aweak statedeservesrespectasmuchasasuperpower.

Territorialsovereigntyisanintrinsicpartofthisconceptbecausein modernhistorytheideaofsuchauthoritybecametiedtoaclearlydelimited pieceofrealestate.Bordersareliterallylinesinthesandthatcircumscribe sovereignpoliticalentitiesandcrossingthemisperhapstheclearestsignofa violationofsovereignty.Oftentheterm‘‘sovereignty’’referssimplytothe territorialintegrityofstates,butitismuchlargerthanthatbecausethe geographiccontoursareonlyoneofthemanyfeaturesofstates.Inpractice, whatsovereigntyentailsistherighttobefreefromforeigninterferenceinthe internalworkingsofone’sownstate.Statebordersdeﬁnethegeographicarea thatis‘‘offlimits’’tootherstates.2

Theprincipleofsovereigntydoesallowforthepossibility,evennecessity,ofviolatingtheintegrityofanotherstate.However,thestandardsforwhen sovereigntycanbeviolatedareverystrictandtraditionallyareconﬁnedonlyto actionstakeninself-defense.Thismeansthatastateisjustiﬁedtobreakthe sovereigntyofanotherwhenithasbeenattackedorisclearlyabouttobe attacked.Therighttoimmediateself-defense,thatis,trumpstheneedto respectsovereignty.Thefartheronemovesfromclear,immediateself-defense, themorecontroversialtheviolationofstatesovereigntybecomes.Aviolationof

2 Foragoodsummaryoftheconceptanditschangingmeaningandpractice,seeRobert Jackson, Sovereignty (Cambridge,UK:PolityPress,2008). 270 | Orbis

sovereigntyisanactionthatneedscarefulconsideration,oughttobeararityin internationalrelations,andshouldbeanactionoflastresort.Reality,however differentfromtheideal,oughttoaspiretoit,andtheprincipleofsovereignty shouldserveasaconstantguide.

Yet,asIargue,theprincipleofsovereigntyandrespectforitarenot costfree.Inwhatfollows,Idescribethreesuchcoststhatstemfromtoomuch reverenceforsovereignty.First,statesmayneedtoviolatethesovereigntyof otherstoimprovetheirsecurityposition,andnotonlyinimmediate(oreven anticipatory)self-defense.Second,legitimacy,bothdomesticandinternational,isnotgroundedintherespectforthesovereigntyprinciplebutin boththeabilityandwillingnessofthestatetoprovidesecuritytoits ownpopulationandtodefendahigherlaw.Third,foreignpolicyislargely aseriesofconstantattemptstoalterthewill,capabilities,andactionsofthe otherstates,andbyitsverynatureengagesinaspectrumofsovereignty violations.

Security

Toputitsuccinctly,theabsolutedefenseoftheprincipleofsovereigntyandthedefenseofone’sstatearemutuallyexclusive.Onecannotargue forrespectingthesovereigntyprincipleatalltimeswithoutsimultaneously underminingone’sownsafety.Inotherwords,itisoftennecessarytoviolate thisprincipletoprotectone’sownsovereignty.Thereisnocontradictionin suchaposturebecausethestakesofinternationalrelationsarestatesurvival, notthesurvivaloftheprincipleofsovereignty.Stateschoosetodefendtheir ownsovereignty(ashorthandfortheirsecurityandindependence)evenby infringinguponotherstates’sovereignty;theydonotrevereanabstractrule thatcanbeonlyself-enforced.

Statingthistensionbetweenthevalueoftheprincipleofsovereignty andthevalueofone’sownsovereigntyis,byitself,notterriblycontroversial. Afterall,asmentionedabove,therighttoself-defenseisperhapstheclearest andmostlegitimatereasontoviolatethesovereigntyoftheattackingstate,and ithasbeenenshrinedinArticle51oftheUNCharter.Yet,thereareseveral constraintsimposedoneventhisright.Article51,forinstance,statesthatselfdefenseislegitimate‘‘untiltheSecurityCouncilhastakenmeasuresnecessary tomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.’’Moreover,astatecanactinselfdefense,andtherebyifnecessaryviolatethesovereigntyoftheaggressorstate, onlyifanactualarmedattackhasoccurred.Oncesovereigntyhasbeen violated,thatis,thetargetstatehastherighttorespondinkind.Thismeans, forinstance,thatstatesupportofarmedgroupsofterroristsdoesnotconstitute an‘‘armedattack’’andthereforecannotjustifyaviolationofthatstate’s sovereignty.Furthermore,accordingtosomelegalexperts,apreemptive attackisclearlyunlawfulbecausestatesdonothavetherighttoattack

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‘‘anotherstatebecauseofspeculativeconcernsaboutthatstate’spossible futureactions.’’3

Yet,evenwithoutaclearattack,itmaybenecessarytobreakthe sovereigntyofanotherstate.Atthispoint,opinionsonthelegalityofviolating astate’ssovereigntybegintodiverge.Ontheonehand,somearguethat Article51oftheUNCharteristheacceptedlegalpositionforthelegitimateuse offorceagainstanotherstate,whichisonlywhenanarmedattackhas occurredorwhenthevictimstateis‘‘morallycertainthatthearmedattack isunderway’’orisinthefinalstagesofbeingmounted. 4 Preemptivestrikes againstastatethatisintheprocessoflaunchinganattackarelegitimateforms ofself-defensewars.Ontheotherhand,amoreexpansiveinterpretationof self-defenseallowstheuseofforceandtheviolationofstatesovereigntyin anticipation,broadlydefined,ofanattack.Suchanticipatoryself-defense, accordingtothisview,ispartofcustomaryinternationallaw,whichhasnever clearlyprohibitedsuchactions.Asonelegalscholarwrites,‘‘itwouldbe difficulttoconcludethatthereisanestablishedruleofcustomaryinternational lawprohibitingthepreemptiveuseofforcewhenundertakeninanticipatory self-defense.Ifanything,thereseemstohavebeengreatersupportforthe doctrine’’inthecaseofIsrael’s‘‘OperationOpera’’againstIraq’sOsirak nuclearreactorin1981.5

Thelackoflegalclarityconcerningwhenself-defenseisacceptable maymatterinsomeinternationaldiscussions,buthasneverpreventedstates fromactingwhenthey—andonlythey—deemitnecessary.Moststates recognizethatinordertoprotecttheirsecuritytheymayneedtoactin(often veryearly)anticipationofanattackandwithoutanyinternationalapproval. Statesare,afterall,theultimatearbitersoftheirownsecurity,anditisup tothemtodecidewhenandhowtoactinself-defense.Indeed,thereisno consensusevenonwhat‘‘aggression’’means;itisuptoindividualstatesto determinewhatconstitutesathreattotheirnationalsecurity.6 Itisnot surprisingthenthatsupportforpreventivewar—thatis,forclearviolations ofstatesovereigntydonewellinadvanceandperhapsevenwithavery genericexpectationorfearofanattack—isgainingstrength.The2002National SecurityStrategyformulatedbyGeorgeW.BushclearlystatedthattheUnited Stateswillbreakstatesovereigntywhenitconsidersitnecessarytoprotectits

3 MaryEllenO’Connell,‘‘TheMythofPreemptiveSelf-Defense,’’AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw,TaskForceonTerrorismPaper,August2002,21.Onlineat http://www. asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf

4 YoramDinstein, War,Aggression,andSelf-Defence (NewYork,NY:CambridgeUniversity Press,2005),p.187.

5 AnthonyClarkArend,‘‘InternationalLawandthePreemptiveUseofMilitaryForce,’’ WashingtonQuarterly,Spring2003,p.96.

6 MichaelJ.Glennon,‘‘TheFogofLaw:Self-Defense,Inherence,andIncoherenceinArticle 51oftheUnitedNationsCharter,’’ HarvardJournalofLawandPublicPolicy,Vol.25,No.2, p.556.

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citizensanditssecurity.7 DespitevocaloppositionbymanyintheUnitedStates andabroad,theideathatsecurityconcernspermittedstatestointerveneinthe affairsofotherstatesthroughavarietyofmeans,includingwar,andwithout evenaclearexpectationorintelligenceofapotentialattack,gainedsupport. Astwoanalystswrite,a‘‘sizeablenumber[ofstates]seemtoagreethattherisk ofcalamitoussurpriseattacks,especiallywithchemical,biologicalornuclear weapons,mightwelljustifypreventivestrikesagainstterroristsorpreventive warsagainsttheirstatesponsors.’’8 Indeed,thenoveltyandradicalismof supportingpreventivewarhasbeengreatlyexaggerated,andtheUnitedStates hasalonghistoryofacknowledgingtheneedtoconductaninterventionist foreignpolicywhichincludespreventiveattacks.9

Respectingsovereigntyatallcosts,andinallcases,alsoundermines nationalsecuritybecauseitdeprivesastateofakeytoolofforeignpolicy, namelytheabilitytothreatenotherstates.Sovereignty,andthevaluestates attachtoit,isusefulexactlybecauseitcanbeviolated.Thethreatofbreaking anotherstate’ssovereigntyisapowerfultoolinthehandsofstates,andcan servetocoercetheenemytoalteritsbehavior.Thecredibilityofthatthreatis affectednotonlybytheabilityofthestatetocarryitout,butalsobyits willingnesstoviolateanotherstate’ssovereignty.Thelesswillingastateisto breakthesovereigntyofanotherstate,thelesscrediblethethreat—and paradoxically,themorevulnerableastatebecomes.Astate’scredibility diminishesandwithit,leverage.Ifastatecannotcoerceanotherstateto changeitsbehavior,forcebecomestheonlyoption.Inbrief,aprincipled defenseofsovereigntymayundermineastate’sabilitytodefenditssecurity andultimatelymayleadtogreaterviolenceandmoreactsofintervention.

Asignoftheimportanceofthisideaofsovereigntyasasourceof strategicleverageisthedifficultytheUnitedStatesfacesfromnon-stateactors. Whenencounteringactorswhodonotvaluesovereignty,officialsareoftenat alossonhowtodealwiththembecausethestatelacksakeyarrowinthe foreignpolicyquiver,namelytheabilitytoviolatesovereignty,toweakenit,to breakit,andinextremecases,todeprivetheenemyofit.Thisisthecasewith theU.S.conflictwithalQaedaanditscellsthatfunctionoutside,orunderthe cover,ofthesystemofstatesovereignty.Thebestapproximationthatthe UnitedStatescanachieveistothreatenstateswhoareinsomewayresponsible forabettingorshelteringthesegroups.Bydoingso,theUnitedStatesisagain

7 TheWhiteHouse, TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Washington, DC,September2002.Availableonlineat http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/ 2002/

8 PeterDombrowskiandRodgerA.Payne,‘‘TheEmergingConsensusforPreventiveWar,’’ Survival,Summer2006,p.115.SeealsoColinS.Gray,‘‘TheImplicationsofPreemptiveand PreventiveWarDoctrines:AReconsideration,’’StrategicStudiesInstitute,U.S.ArmyWar College,CarlisleBarracks,July2007.

9 JohnLewisGaddis, Surprise,Security,andtheAmericanExperience (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,2004).

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usingsovereigntyasleverage,assomethingthatthosestatespresumablyvalue andthattheUnitedStatescan,andifnecessarywill,break.Whilesucha strategyhascertainlyapositiveimpactbecauseitlimitsstatesupportforal Qaeda,itdoesnotfullyresolvethechallengeofdealingwithgroupsthatdo nothavesovereigntyandforwhomsovereigntyismerelyapotentialcover.In brief,itispreferabletohaveenemieswhoconsidersovereigntyofgreatvalue, becausetheywilllikelyrespondtothreatstothatsovereignty.

Insum,theﬁrstcostofrespectingtheprincipleofsovereigntyatall timesisalossofoursecurity.Ifsovereigntyisaninviolableprinciple,and shouldalwaysberespected,stateslosetheabilitytoprotectthemselves.

Legitimacy

Thesecondcostofanoverlydeferentialattitudetowardsovereigntyis alossoflegitimacy,bothinternationallyanddomestically.Legitimacy,understoodasadherenceoratleasttheperceptionofadherencetolaw,ismurky fromaninternationalperspectivebecauseitisunclearwhatlaw—UNCharter, customarylaw,ornaturallaw—shouldbefollowed.Domestically,onavery basiclevel,itisveryclearthatlegitimacyisattainedbyprovidingsecurityto one’sowncitizens.Inbothcases,absoluterespectforstatesovereigntywillnot bringlegitimacy.

Internationallegitimacy.Unsurpisingly,oftenthestaunchestdefendersofsovereigntyaretyrannicalandauthoritarianregimesthatusethis principleasaﬁgleaffortheirowninternaldepredations.Grantingsuch regimestherighttoremainundisturbedinthenameofstatesovereigntyisan abdicationofthedutytofollowahigherlaw,onethatelevateshumanlife abovethepoliticalindependenceofstates.Andthathigherlawisanaspiration formanypeople,whobybirthorbythevagariesofpoliticalhistoryhappento beatthemercyofoppressivegovernments,megalomaniacaltyrants,orviolent ideologies.Byrefusingtoacceptthevalidityofsuchalawandbygiving preferencetoablindrespectforstatesovereignty,statesloselegitimacyinthe eyesofthoseforwhomsovereigntyisabarriertofreedom.

Forinstance,theinitiallyverymutedsupportoftheObamaadministrationforthepopularprotestsfollowingIranianelectionsinthesummerof2009 wascarefullywordedtoavoidanyimpressionthattheUnitedStateswas violatingIran’ssovereignty.PresidentObamatriedtowalkaﬁnelinebetween ‘‘condemningtheviolence’’onthestreetsofTeheranwhilemakingclearthatthe UnitedStates‘‘respectsthesovereigntyoftheIslamicRepublicofIranandisnot interferingwithIran’saffairs.’’10 Suchapolicymaybeprudentatthatparticular momentintime.Butitisimportanttorecognizethatthereisanunsolvable tensionbetweenthedesiretohelpoppressedpeopleandtherespectofthat

10 PresidentObama’spressbrieﬁng,June23,2009,onlineat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 06/23/us/politics/23text-obama.html. 274 | Orbis

state’ssovereignty.Apositionthatvaluesthesovereigntyofastatemorethanthe freedomofitspeopleislikelytogarnerlittleinternationallegitimacy.Itmaybe applaudedbyothergovernmentsbutthepopularitygatheredfromtherulers alsobringsdisappointmentanddisdainfromtheruled.

Theideathatinternationallegitimacyisbasedonrespectingsovereigntymust,therefore,bequaliﬁed.Sovereigntydoesimplythatthestatehas thesupremeandultimateauthorityoveritsterritoryanditsactions,butthis authoritycannotbeuntrammeled.Inforeignpolicy,therespectforthe sovereigntyofastateiscontingentonitsbehavior.Ifastateattacksanother one,itssovereigntyisnolongerworthyofrespect.Analogously,respectofthe sovereigntyofastateshouldbecontingentontheinternalbehaviorofthat state.Ifthestatemistreatsitsowncitizens,itdivestsitselfoftherighttobeleft aloneininternalpolitics.Inotherwords,sovereigntyoughttoberespected whenitislegitimate—andsuchlegitimacyisafunctionofthatstate’sbehavior towarditsneighbors,aswellasitsowncitizens.Thus,violatingthesovereignty ofanotherstate,deemedtobeillegitimateduetogrossdomesticabuses,isnot anillegitimateaction.

Thereisagrowingacceptanceoftheideathatstatesovereigntyis conditionalongooddomesticbehavior.In2001,agroupoflawyersand academicsarguedthat‘‘UNmemberstateshavearesponsibilitytoprotectthe lives,liberty,andbasichumanrightsoftheircitizens,andthatiftheyfailorare unabletocarryitout,theinternationalcommunityhasaresponsibilitytostep in.’’11 Thismovement,called‘‘responsibilitytoprotect’’(R2P),hasbeenlimited sofartostatingaprinciple,whichhasbeenopposedbysomeUNmembers fearfulofotherstatesmeddlingintheirinternalpolitics.12 Whileskepticism abouttheroleofthe‘‘internationalcommunity’’or,morespecifically,theUN asthearbiterofwhatisrightandwrongisjustifiedbecauseUNdecisionscan leadtoprofoundlynon-democraticoutcomes,13 theR2Pmovementpointsto animportantcostofelevatingstatesovereigntytoaninviolableprinciple—that ofsacrificingthelibertyandrightsofmanypeople.Thelegitimacyofinterveninginanotherstatetoredressgravehumanrightsviolationsdoesnotstem fromtheinternationalcommunityortheUN’sapproval,butfromthepurpose ofthatintervention.Therefore,theactionofasolitarygreatpowerdefending thelibertyorhumanrightsofagroupofpeople,evenifthatactionviolates

11 LeeFeinsteinandAnne-MarieSlaughter,‘‘ADutytoPrevent,’’ ForeignAffairs, January/ February2004.p..137.Seealso http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/

12 SeeNeilMacFarquhar,‘‘WhentoStepIntoStopWarCrimesFissures,’’ NewYorkTimes, July23,2009,online.Interestingly,theGeorgeW.Bushadministrationwassupportiveofthis principle.SeealsoKristenSilverberg,‘‘DoestheUNStillValuethe‘responsibilitytoprotect’?’’, July23,2009,onlineat http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/23/does_the_un_still_ value_the_responsibility_to_protect

13 See,forinstance,AmitaiEtzioni,‘‘SovereigntyasResponsibility,’’ Orbis,Winter2006,pp. 71-85.

unilaterallystatesovereignty,ismorelegitimatethanthecollectiveinaction (andcorrespondingrespect,evenifonlybydefault,ofsovereignty).

Thereiscertainlyatrade-offbetweeninternationalstabilityand interventionsinotherstates.Butnoteveryactionmeanttopreserveinternationalstabilitythroughrespectforsovereigntyislegitimate.So,too,notevery actionthatbreaksthesovereigntyofanotherstateisillegitimate.AsTheodore Rooseveltwrote,‘‘[t]herearebigandpowerfulnationswhichhabitually commit,eitheruponothernationsoruponsectionsoftheirownpeople, wrongssooutrageousastojustifyeventhemostpeacefulpersonsingoingto war.’’Thecostsofinternationalstability,therefore,canoftenbeenormous tragedies.‘‘Theworstinfamiesofmoderntimes—suchaffairsasthemassacres oftheArmeniansbytheTurks,forinstance—havebeenperpetratedinatime ofnominallyprofoundinternationalpeace,whentherehasbeenaconcertof bigPowerstopreventthebreakingofthispeace,althoughonlybybreakingit couldtheoutragesbestopped.’’14

Toputitinanotherway,absenceofinternationalsupportfora violationofstatesovereigntydoesnotlead ipsofacto tolackoflegitimacy. Conversely,widespreadinternationalsupport,sayintheUNGeneralAssembly,foranactionisnot ipsofacto asignoflegitimacy.Somepoliticalleaders andscholarslikelywilldisagreewithsuchanunderstandingofinternational legitimacy.Forinstance,DominiquedeVillepin,thenFrenchForeignMinister, arguedin2003thattheUNisthenecessaryinternationalinstitution‘‘[b]ecause theUnitedNationsistheplacewhereinternationalrulesandlegitimacyare founded.Becauseitspeaksinthenameofpeoples,’’15 Villepin’spaeantothe UNisbasedontheideathatinternationallegitimacyisgroundedinclearly statedrules(presumably,inthiscase,resolutionsoftheSecurityCouncilorof theGeneralAssembly)thathavebeenformulatedthroughaprocessof negotiations.Accordingtoonescholar,legitimacyis‘‘thatqualityofarule whichderivesfromaperceptiononthepartofthosetowhomitisaddressed thatithascomeintobeinginaccordancewithrightprocess.’’16 Thisview, however,isnotacceptedbyall,includingthosewhointhedaysprecedingthe Iraqwarin2003supportedit.WesternEuropeanstates,forwhomVillepinwas speaking,wenttowarinKosovowithoutUNapprovalanddidnotarguethat theirmilitaryactiontherewasillegitimate.Itmayhavebeenillegalfroman internationalperspective,butitwascertainlynotillegitimate. Internationallegalitydoesnotalwayscoincideneatlywithinternationallegitimacyandwithrespectforahigherlaw.Legitimacyandlegal

14 TheodoreRoosevelt, AnAutobiography (NewYork,NY:TheMacmillanCompany,1916), pp.548-549.

15 AddressbyMinisterDominiquedeVillepin,FrenchMinisterofForeignAffairstotheUN SecurityCouncil,March19,2003,onlineat http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/ 030319_cs_villepin_irak.htm

16 ThomasM.Franck,‘‘LegitimacyintheInternationalSystem,’’ TheAmericanJournalof InternationalLaw,October1988,p.706.

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documentsaretwodifferentthings,andrespectingtheprocessthrough whichinternationaldecisionsshouldbemadeisnotsufficienttoelevate themtolegitimacy.Legitimacymustreflectahigherlaw,alawnot‘‘inthe senseofenactmentorlegislation,butintheCiceroniansenseof‘right reasoninagreementwithnature:ofuniversalapplication,unchanging andeverlasting’—whatourownRichardHookercalled‘thelawwhich humannatureknowethitselfinreasonuniversallyboundthereto.’’’ 17 Alegitimateactionis,therefore,onethatreflectsthishigherlaw,giving precedence,forinstance,tohumanrightsoverstatesovereignty.TheFrench philosopher,JacquesMaritainputitsuccinctly:‘‘Anunjustlaw,evenifit expressesthewillofthepeople,isnotlaw.’’ 18 Byextension,international supportandpopularityarenotbythemselvessignsofthelegitimacyand justiceofanaction.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatinternationallegitimacydoesnotexist.Itdoes, butnotnecessarilyinastaunchsupportofstatesovereignty.AsRobertKagan writes,‘‘legitimacyisagenuinelyelusiveandmalleableconcept.Discovering wherelegitimacyliesatanygivenmomentinhistoryisanart,notascience reducibletothereadingofinternationallegaldocuments.’’19

Domesticlegitimacy.Thesecondcostofrespectingstatesovereigntyat alltimesisdomestic.Thelegitimacyofagovernmentisbasednotonits protectionofWestphaliannorms,but,amongothers,onitsabilityandwillingnesstodefendnationalsecurity,andthismayinvolvetheneedtobreak statesovereignty(asinthecaseofapreventivewar).Astatethatcannotor doesnotwanttoprotectitsowncitizensfromforeignthreatslosesitsdomestic legitimacy.InthecaseoftheUnitedStates,asJeremyRabkinwrites,the ‘‘Presidenthasasworndutynotto‘law’intheabstract,muchlesstouniversal principlesor‘archetypes,’butto‘preserve,protectanddefendtheConstitution oftheUnitedStates,’thatis,theparticularconstitutionalstructureofthe particularnationsoconstituted.’’20

Theonlysovereigntythatmatterstoastateisitsown.The raisond’eˆtre of astateisitsownsovereignty,thatis,itsindependencefromforeign,and supranational,powers.Thatiswhythemoderntrendtowardtheestablishment

17 CyrilE.Hudson,‘‘TheChurchandInternationalAffairs,’’ InternationalAffairs,January 1947,p.2.

18 JacquesMaritain,‘‘TheConceptofSovereignty,’’ AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,June 1950,p.354.TheFrenchphilosopherarguedevenfurtherthatsovereignty,understoodas supremepowerthatisunaccountable,isinherentlyproblematicbecauseitviolatestherightof mentoself-government.Moreover,suchaconceptalsoassumesthatapoliticallysovereign entityisitsownlawgiverandlacksaccountabilitytoahigherlaw.Asheconcludeshisarticle, the‘‘twoconceptsofSovereigntyandAbsolutismhavebeenforgedtogetheronthesameanvil. Theymustbescrappedtogether.’’Maritain,p.357.

19 RobertKagan,‘‘America’sCrisisofLegitimacy,’’ ForeignAffairs,March-April2004,p.77.

20 JeremyRabkin,‘‘AmericanSelf-DefenseShouldn’tBeTooDistractedbyInternational Law,’’ HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy,Vol.30,No.1,49.

ofsupranationalinstitutionsthatclaimauthorityoversovereignstatesisproblematic.Itunderminesthelegitimacyofstatesandmovesthelocusofdecisionmakingtoahigher,lessaccountablelevel.Suchatrendisundoubtedly supportedbysomestates,oftenthosethathavebecomeskepticalofthevalue oftheirownsovereignty(especiallyWesternEuropeanstatesthatareatthe forefrontoftheEuropeanpoliticalproject).However,itisalsoequallyopposed byothers,suchastheUnitedStatesandmanyofthenewlyindependentstatesof theformerSovietsphere.TheUnitedStates,afterall,cameintoexistence expresslytoachieveandmaintainindependencefromforeignintervention, andthis‘‘constitutionalculture’’makesitdifﬁculttoacceptalimitationofthat freedomandautonomy.21

Furthermore,todefendandsustainitsownsovereignty,astatehasto bebothwillingandcapableofviolatingthesovereigntyofothers.The momentastateelevatesthe principle ofsovereigntyabove itsownparticular sovereignty,itunderminestheveryrationaleforitsexistencebydepriving itselfofkeyforeignpolicytools.Insomeways,thereisaninherentparadoxin theideaofstatesovereignty.Astatehasexternalautonomy,thatis,itisitsown lawandtheinternationalcommunityhasnorighttoinfringeuponit,unless thestateacquiescesvoluntarily.Butastatehastherightanddutytoprotect itself,andinthisprocessitmayhavetobreakthesovereigntyofothers.Its legitimacyderives,therefore,notfromtheinternationalcommunity,butfrom itsownpeopletowhomthestateisboundandtowhomitmustprovide security.

Finally,thelegitimacyofstatesoftenarisesfromideasandprinciples thattranscendthepeculiarhistoricalsituationofthatpolity.Forinstance,the UnitedStateswasfoundedon‘‘self-evidenttruths,’’amongwhicharethe unalienablerightsoflife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness.Thesetruthsare notlimitedtothethirteencolonies,ortothefiftystates,butareuniversal.U.S. legitimacyisbasedonupholdingthesetruthsfirstandforemost,notanabstract principleofstatesovereignty.Ofcourse,thisdoesnotmeanthattheUnited Statesmustinterveneeverywhereandallthetimetoprotectthesetruths; politicsrequiresprudentialjudgment.The fiatiustitia,pereatmundus (let therebejustice,thoughtheworldperish)exhortationcannotbeappliedtothe foreignpolicyofastate.Butfromthislimitationofpoliticsdoesnotfollowthe ideathatthelegitimacyofastateingeneralandoftheUnitedStatesin particular,stemsfromaninternationalstatusquo(ofwhichstatesovereigntyis animportantfacet).TherecancertainlybeadebateaboutthelimitsofU.S. power,theprudenceofaparticularintervention,ortheapplicabilityof universalprinciples,butaforeignpolicybasedonanabsolutedefenseof thestatesovereigntyprinciplewillincurcosts,inthiscasethelossofsome domesticlegitimacy.

21 SeeJeremyRabkin, LawwithoutNations? (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, 2005),pp.233-270.

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Effectiveness

Thethirdsetofcostsincurredwhilepursuingaforeignpolicybasedon absoluterespectforstatesovereigntyisineffectiveness.Allforeignpolicy, especiallythatofagreatpower,representssomesortofviolationofthetarget states’sovereignty.Theobjectiveofforeignpolicyis,afterall,toalterthe behaviorofotherstates,moldingitintoacoursethatismoreadvantageous tous.Foreignpolicyinvolvesawholespectrumofactions,fromnegotiationsto threats,sanctions,anduseofforce,andallofthemlimit,constrain,andaltera state’sfreedomofaction.AsStephenKrasnerpointsout,sovereigntycanbe violatedinfourways:conventions(whenstatesagreetocertainnormsor behaviors),contracts(whenstatesagreetoaspecificbehaviorinexchange forsomebenefitfromtheotherside),coercion(whenstatesareforcedtodo somethingagainsttheirwill),imposition(themostextreme,yetmorecommon thancoercion,wayofviolatingsovereigntywhichoccurswhenthestatehasno powertoresist).Thefirsttwoarevoluntaryandoccurwhen,foravarietyof reasons,astaterealizesitisbetteroffabandoningfreedomofactioninaspecific area.Thelattertwoexamplesconstituteacoerciveviolationofthetargetstate’s sovereignty,resultingfromanasymmetryofpowerbetweenthetwopolitical actors.Ineithercase,itisclearthatdefenseofthesovereigntyprincipleisnotthe overarchingforeignpolicyobjectiveand,infact,maybeahindrancetoastate’s abilitytoconductaneffectiveanddesirableforeignpolicy.AsKrasnerwrites,‘‘If rulerswanttostayinpowerandtopromotethesecurity,material,andideational interestsoftheirconstituents,followingtheconventionalpracticesofWestphalianandinternationallegalsovereigntymightormightnotbeanoptimal policy.’’22

Voluntarylimitationsonsovereigntyarelessproblematicbecause theypresumablyenhanceinternationalstabilityandwelfare.Forinstance, conventionsregulatingrelationsbetweenthegovernmentandvariousminoritieswithinastatearebeneficialtomaintainingorder,aswellashumanrights. Similarly,abandoninganationalcurrencyinfavorofaregionalone(e.g.,the Euro)hasincreasedthemarketaswellasthefinancialstabilityofthe participatingstates.Eveninsuch‘‘vol untary’’cases,theabdicationofan aspectofone’sownsovereigntycancreatepoliticalchallenges,especially domestically.Suchabdicationsofsovereignty,whilebeneficialonsomelevel (e.g.,increasingprotectionofminoritygroups,orexpandingthesizeof themarket),mayalsoleaddomesticallytoaweakerstateandultimatelya lesseffectiveimplementationoflaw.Infact,inmostcases,theagreed conventionorthesupranationalinstitutionhavelimitedenforcementcapabilitiesand,therefore,dependonthewillingnessoftheindividualstateto abidebythem.

22 StephenKrasner, Sovereignty:OrganizedHypocrisy (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press,1999),p.24.

Theother,moreforceful,limitationsofsovereigntyare,however, moregermanefortheargumenthere.Theseviolationsofsovereignty,through coercionorimposition,arepartandparcelofforeignpolicy,especiallyofgreat powers,includingtheUnitedStates.Theyrepresentinterferencesinother states,rangingfromalteringtheforeignpolicyofthetargetstatetochangingits domesticpoliticalregime.Suchinterventionscancertainlybeunjust,illegitimate,anddestabilizing.Russia’ssmallwarinGeorgiainAugust2008isa perfectexampleofamilitaryinterventionthathadnojustification(Georgia posednosecuritythreattoRussia,andallegedviolationsofhumanrightsof Russianminoritieswereatbestoverblown)andriskedalargerconflagrationin theregion.Yet,toopposesuchindividualinterventionsdoesnotnecessarily leadtosupportforstatesovereigntyatalltimesandatallcosts.Topreclude anyinterferenceinanotherstateistolimittheeffectivenessofastate’sforeign policy.FortheUnitedStates,thiswouldweakenourabilitytodefend ourselvesandourallies,toadvanceourideals,andtouseourpower advantagetoourbenefit.

Terrorismespeciallyexacerbatesthetradeoffbetweensovereignty andsecurity.TerroristgroupssuchasalQaedaoftenusestatesovereigntyas anumbrellaunderwhichtohide,regroup,andreorganize.IftheUnitedStates oranyotherstate,wantstodegradethelethalityofthesegroups,ithastobe willingandabletointerferewithinthejurisdictionofotherstates,undermining sovereigntyintheprocess.Inthecaseofstate-sponsoredgroupsitisrelatively easiertoviolatethesovereigntyofthesponsoringstate,which,afterall,is usingtheterroristorganizationtoprojectpowerandattackanotherstate.A violationofitssovereigntyisclearlywithintheparametersofself-defense.For instance,IsraelcertainlywouldbejustiﬁedtoattackIranandSyria,if Hezbollah,aidedandencouragedbythesetwostates,engagesinanother war(whethersuchanattackisfeasibleanddesirablefromamilitaryand politicalperspectiveisadifferentissue).

Butevenwhenaterroristgroupissimplyhidingwithinastate,usingit asacoverorasasourceofrecruitsandﬁnances,sovereigntyshouldnotbean impedimenttointervention.Toavoiddealingwithsuchgroups,ortopassthe responsibilityofdealingwiththemtothehoststate,simplybecauseofthe claimthatsovereigntyoughttoberespected,isanabdicationofpolitical duties.Moreover,tocriticizeaninterventionwithinastatethathasterrorist cellsandthereforetoargue,forinstance,thattheUnitedStatesshouldrefrain frombreakingthatstate’ssovereigntyerectsundueconstraintsonforeign policy.Inaworldofnon-statethreats,absoluterespectforsovereignty underminesstatesecurity.Whenthreatsarisefromwithinstates,violating theirsovereigntyisanecessity.Obviouslythereisaspectrumofviolations, rangingfrommilitaryinvasiontoprecisionstrikesortocoveroperations,but alloftheseconstituteaclearviolationofsovereignty.Somemaybemore militarilyfeasibleandpoliticallypalatablethanothers,butnonewouldbe possibleifsovereigntytrumpedeffectiveforeignpolicy.

Furthermore,itmaybeimperativetoengageinapolicyaimedat changingthedomesticregimeofanotherstate.Asmentionedearlier,respect forsovereigntycanbeaneffectivetooltomanagerelationsbetweenstates, drawingboundariesofacceptablebehavior.Butitworksmosteffectively whenstatessharesomethingincommon,forinstancebeliefindynastic legitimacy(asduringthe1815CongressofVienna)ordeferencefordemocraticauthority.Insuchcases,statesrespecteachother’ssovereigntybecause theyperceiveeachotheraslegitimate.Whenstateslookateachotherwith mistrustandanimositybecauseoffundamentaldifferencesindomestic regimes(e.g.,SovietUnionvs.theU.S.,ordemocraciesvs.autocracies), respectforsovereigntybecomesmorefragile.Interventioninthedomestic affairsofstatesconsideredillegitimateandinthewrongismotivatednotonly byhumanitarianreasonsbutalsobyserioussecurityconcerns.Thethreatofan autocraticregime,forinstance,maybenotonlyinitsrelativepower(which mayormaynotbegreaterthanours),butalsoinitsverynature,which,asKant observed,makesthedecisiontogotowareasy.Theruleristhe‘‘ownerofthe state,anddoesnotloseawhitbythewar,whilehegoesonenjoyingthe delightsofhistableorsport,orofhispleasurepalacesandgaladays.Hecan thereforedecideonwarforthemosttriﬂingreasons,asifitwereakingof pleasureparty.’’23 Toforeswearinterventionsinthedomesticaffairsofastate, rangingfromsupportofdissidentgroupstoinvasion,seriouslyundermines theabilitytoconductforeignpolicyinpursuitoflimitingthreatsandestablishingamorebenignstrategicenvironment.

Thus,ifthegoalistoalleviatesecuritychallengesbychangingthe natureofstates,sovereigntybecomesaconstraint.Aforeignpolicybasedon absoluterespectforsovereignty,includingthatofautocracies,isanineffective tooltodealwiththethreatarisingfromsuchregimes.Byrespectingthe sovereigntyofautocracies,statesneedtorelyexclusivelyondifferentialsof power,andultimatelyonpurelydefensivemeasures.Inotherwords,an autocraticthreatneedstoconstituteanimmediatedanger,orevenadirect attack,beforeastatemayanswer.Beingproactiverequiresinterferinginthe internalaffairsofthatregime,intheattempttodestabilizeitandperhapseven changeit.Democracypromotioncanbeseen,fromthisperspective,asaform ofnationalsecuritystrategybecausethecreationofdomesticregimesbasedon popularsovereigntyandrespectforhumanrights,separationofpower,and transparencyofitspoliticalprocesses,diminishesthenumber,andtherefore, theoverallthreatofdespoticregimes.Policiesthatpromotedemocracyabroad are,however,violationsofsovereignty—violationsthat,tobesure,canbeona widespectrumrangingfromﬁnancialbackingofradiobroadcasting(e.g., RadioFreeEurope/RadioLibertyduringtheColdWar)andofgroupswithin theautocraticstatetomoreforceful,evenmilitaryinterventions.Theyareall

23 Kant,PerpetualPeace,APhilosophicalEssay(1795;OldChelseaStation,NewYork: Cosimo,Inc.,2005),p.9.

violationsnonetheless.Eventakingastandonthelegitimacyoftheleadership ofacountryisaformofdenyingsovereigntybecauseitpassesjudgmentona politicalentitythatisindependentandisalawonitsown.Inbrief,todeferto sovereigntymeansabandoningdemocracypromotionorwithholdingmoral judgment.

Theﬁnal,butperhapsthemostimportant,costinforeignpolicy efﬁciencyislossoftheadvantageinpower.Thisisparticularlytrueforgreat powers,includingtheUnitedStates,becauseoftheirmilitarysuperiority.The principleofstatesovereigntyis,infact,thegreatequalizer:accordingly,states areallequalandpowerasymmetriesoughtnottomatter.Inaworldwhere sovereigntywouldbeperfectlyrespected,stateswoulddefertoeachotheras equal,independententitiesregardlessoftheirrelativepower.Itisnotby chancethattheweakeststatesareoftenthemostvocaldefendersofthe principleofsovereignty.Theidealofaworldorganizedaccordingtothe principleofsovereignty—andaprincipleperfectlyrespected—isundoubtedly appealingbecauseitwouldmakewarararity(albeit,asdevelopedina previouspoint,itwouldalsomakepeoplesubjecttothewhimsoftheir despotswithoutthehopeofexternalhelp).Yet,becausewedonotliveinsuch aworld,thosewhofunctionaccordingtothesovereigntyprincipleare disadvantaged.Assume,forexample,thattheUnitedStatesdecidestoabide bytherulesofsovereigntyandtorefrainfrominterferingintheinternalaffairs ofanyotherstate.Bydoingso,theUnitedStatesputsitselfonthesamelevelas theweakeststateintheworld.Itbecomes,bychoice,anequalto,say,Burma orVenezuela,which,bythefactoftheirrelativepower,haveverylimited meanstointerfereinourinternalaffairs.Reverenceforsovereigntycan,thus, leadtoabluntingofouradvantageinpower.

Conclusion

Bypresentingthecostsofabsolutelyrespectingsovereignty,Iamnot arguinginfavorofcompletelyabandoningtheideaofstatesovereignty.On thecontrary,violatingstatesovereigntyshouldnotbetakenlightlybecause states,regardlessoftheirsize,areasourceofstabilityandaccountabilityin internationalrelations.Butthebeneﬁtsofrespectingstatesovereigntyshould alsonotbeoverstated.Basingone’sownforeignpolicyonreverencefor sovereigntyisnotalwaysmorallydesirable,politicallylegitimate,andstrategicallysound.Theprincipleofsovereigntyandthedefenseofaparticular state’ssovereigntyareinmanyinstancesmutuallyexclusive;toprotectastate’s securityandsovereigntyitmustoftenviolatethatofotherstates.Sovereignty, aswellassecurityandlegitimacy,cannotbesacriﬁcedindefenseofthe abstractprincipleofsovereignty.

Prudentialjudgmentmustdictatebothwhentoviolateorwhento respectstatesovereignty.Ineithercase,theprincipleofsovereigntyshould notbetheguidingideaofU.S.foreignpolicy,themetricaccordingtowhich

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analystsanddiplomatsjudgethenecessityandlegitimacyofU.S.actions.What mattersisnotanabstractruleoftheinternationalsystem—arulethatisalso historicallycontingentandfromtheperspectiveof lalonguedure´e relativelyyoung—butthesurvivalandsecurityoftheUnitedStates withitsvalues.Thesetrumptheprincipleofsovereignty.