Ruling America by demandside

RulingAmerica

RULING AMERICA

Editedby

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData RulingAmerica:ahistoryofwealthandpowerinademocracy/ editedbySteveFraserandGaryGerstle. p.cm.

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-674-01695-5(cloth:alk.paper)—ISBN0-674-01747-1(paper:alk.paper)

1.Elite(Socialsciences)—UnitedStates—History. 2.Socialclasses—Politicalaspects—UnitedStates—History. 3.Power(Socialsciences)—UnitedStates—History. 4.Democracy—UnitedStates. I.Fraser,Steve,1945–II.Gerstle,Gary,1954–HN90.E4R852005 305.5 ′ 2 ′0973—dc22 2004059769

Introduction 1 SteveFraserandGaryGerstle

1TheDilemmasofRulingElitesinRevolutionary America 27 GaryJ.KornblithandJohnM.Murrin

2The“SlavePower”intheUnitedStates,1783–1865 64 AdamRothman

3MerchantsandManufacturersinthe AntebellumNorth 92 SvenBeckert

4GildedAgeGospels

DavidNasaw

5TheAbortiveRuleofBigMoney

AlanDawley

6TheManagerialRevitalizationoftheRich 181 JacksonLears

7TheForeignPolicyEstablishment 215 GodfreyHodgson

8ConservativeElitesandtheCounterrevolution againsttheNewDeal 250 MichaelLind

RulingAmerica

Introduction 4

STEVEFRASERANDGARYGERSTLE

Thisbookisfoundedonaparadox,onethathasbafﬂedhistorians andcitizensgenerallyforaslongastherehasbeenaUnitedStatesof America:Howcananationconsecratedtofreedomandequalitynonethelessgiverisetogreathierarchiesofpowerandwealththatunderminetheveryfoundationsofthatextraordinarypromise?Theparadox ismorepointedthanthat.Thecountryisademocracy.Thepeople rule.Andyetthepeopledonotrule;elites,patriciates,castes,classes haveruledintheirstead.Sometimestheyseemtorulewiththepeople’sinterestsinmind,sometimesnot.

Phraseslike“rulingclass”or“rulingelite”soundadiscordantnote. TheydonotfeelasthoughtheybelonginthevocabularyofAmerican politicsanditshistory.Afterall,theveryopenness,ﬂuidity,andsocial heterogeneityofAmericansocietydefyanythingasexclusive,ongoing,andinaccessibleasa“rulingclass.”Thereissomethingineffably alienaboutsuchnotions,stepchildrenimportedfromthelinguafranca oftheOldWorldanditssedimentarylayersoftitledaristocrats, landedgentry,militarycastes,anddynasticfamilies.Itisacherished

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Americanfolkbelief,afterall,thatclassesdonotexistor,iftheydo, arealwaysgoingoutofexistence.Democraticpoliticalinstitutions, whatevertheirdefects,willnottolerateacontinuousmonopolyof powerbyatinycliqueofself-anointedoverlords.Andevenifsuch usurpationmightbeattempted,thesheeroverwhelmingtidalforceof theAmericaneconomywouldwashitawayinanonrushingﬂoodof newenterprise,newtechnology,andnewsourcesofwealththatwould inundatetheoldrulinggroupsandeitherforcethemopentorisingelementsofthemiddleclassesordissolvethementirely.So,too,theethnicpromiscuityofAmericansociety,itsopeninvitationtopeoplefrom everycountryandculturetocomeaboardandgrabashareofthe Americandream,inexorablywearsawayattheinternalcohesion,that vitalcomplexofsharedtraditions,beliefs,andcustomsthatanyruling milieudependsonforitsélananditssenseofentitlement.

Overthelastquarter-century,historianshavebyandlargeceased writingabouttheroleofrulingelitesinthecountry’sevolution.Orif theyhavetakenupthissubject,theyhavedonesotoargueagainstits salienceforgraspingtheessentialsofAmericanpoliticalhistory.Yet thereissomethingpeculiaraboutthisrecentintellectualaversion,even ifweacceptastruethebeliefsthatdemocracy,socialmobility,andeconomicdynamismhavelonginhibitedthecongealingofarulingstratum.Thisaversionhascoincided,afterall,withoneofthelargestand fastest-growingdisparitiesinthedivisionofincomeandwealthin Americanhistory.Wehaveallgrownusedtocharacterizingthe1980s and1990sasthesecondcomingoftheGildedAge.“Cronycapitalism” hasreenteredoureverydaypoliticalvocabulary,atermcarryingunsavoryassociations,suggestingthecross-fertilizationofprivilegedeconomicandpoliticalcirclesinopendeﬁanceofthenormalprotocolsof democraticpolitics.Sincehistorians,likeeverybodyelse,arehardly immunetothesubtleinﬂuenceofthepressingissuesoftheirownday, evenastheyburrowdeepintothedistantpast,itisnoteworthythatso fewhavefelttheurgeoflatetoexploretheclassdimensionsofpower

inyearsgoneby.Somehave,ofcourse,andtheeditorsofandcontributorstothisvolumeareamongthem.

Thatthisrecentneglectofthewayrulinggroupsformed,exercised theirpower,andcametoanendhasfollowedthe“socialhistoryrevolution”ofthe1960salsoseemspeculiar.Thatrevolutiongenerateda remarkablyfertileoutpouringofhistoricalresearchandwritingthat focusedontheexperienceofoppressiongoingallthewaybacktothe colonialoriginsoftheNewWorldandbeyond.Butthismeticulousexaminationofthelivesofslaves,immigrants,industrialworkers,Native Americans,impoverishedunderclasses,women,disenfranchisedminorities,andothershas,forthemostpart,notconcerneditselfwiththesocialandpoliticalhistoryofthosepresumablyresponsiblefortheiroppression.Mostofthiswritinghasexhumedtheundergroundhistories ofpeopleswhoselives—familyorganization,religiousbehavior,communityrelations,workexperience,anddiverseformsofracial,ethnic, andpoliticalsolidarity—hadremainedvirtuallyinvisibletohistorians forgenerations.“Invisible”istheoperativewordhere.Thetacitassumptioninformingsomuchofthishistoryfrombelowwasthat, preciselybecausetheseweresubordinatepopulations,theyhadbeen robbedoftheirownhistories;indeed,thehiddennatureoftheirdistinctpastswasitselfacardinalsymptomofthatsubordination.Torecoverthosepasts,tobringthemintothelightofday,wastohelprestorelong-effacedidentities.Forsomehistoriansthisbecameawayof assertingthoseidentitiesinthepoliticalpresent.Moreover,whatmight becalled“identityhistory”naturallyenoughtendedtochannelitsenergiesinward,thatis,towarduncoveringtheinternalsocialmetabolism ofagroup’scoherenceandendurance,howitdefendeditsfragileand imperiledexistenceagainstawholearrayofforces—economicupheavals,culturalsuasionandcoercion,massprejudices,andparanoid scapegoating—andnotmerelyonthosemenacingitfromabove,from theranksoftheputative“rulingclass.”

Howevervaluableandinnovativesuchhistoricaldetectiveworkon

theexperiencesofthesubordinateoftenwas(andis),itdrainedintellectualattentionawayfromthecollectivelivesofthesuperordinate. Ofcourse,thesehistoriestreatedasaxiomaticthepowerandexploitationexercisedbyupperclasses,masterraces,andpatriarchs.Beyond that,anymoreintimateexaminationofhowrulinggroupscoalesced, howtheyexercisedtheirauthorityinanostensiblydemocraticpolitical environment,howtheyformulatedtheideologicaljustiﬁcationsfor theirempowerment,howtheyfaceduptocrisesandchallengestotheir supremacy—theseandadozenothersimilarlyintriguingquestions abouttheworldofAmericanhierarchsoftenfellfromview.

Neglectingthepowerfulhadnotbeencharacteristicofhistorical workpriortoWorldWarII.Tothecontrary,thestoryoftheruling eliteshadpreoccupiedhistoriansforaverylongtime.Moreover,to talkaboutclassesandthestrugglesbetweenthemwascommonparlance.Indeed,fortheﬁrst150yearsofthenation’slife,thelanguageof rulingandsubordinatesocialgroupsdeﬁnedthecontoursofoneofthe grandnarrativesofAmericanhistory.Measuredbythelongsweepof thathistory,stretchingbackintothecolonialera,itistherecentmuting oftheseconcernsabouttheconcentrationandexerciseofpowerthat seemsodd.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthosewhooncestressedsuchmatterswereright.Butitdoesmeanthatawholesetofhistoricalmetaphorsandcategoriesofanalysisoncetakenforgrantedhavelostmuch oftheirlegitimacy.

BeginningsometimeafterWorldWarII,andwithincreasingforce inthewakeoftheReagan“revolution,”agatheringconsensusconcludedthatevents,“History,”theimpersonalforcesofthemarket,or someotheranalogousabstractionsrule,notclassesorelites.Certainly theculturalColdWarhelpedstigmatizenotionsof“classstruggle” and“rulingclasses”assomuchcommunistverbiage,apurelypropagandistrhetoricthatfailedtocapturethemorecenterless,polymorphous,andpluralistmakeupofAmericanpoliticsandsocialorganization.Yetpreciselytheoppositeconvictionrunslikesaredthread throughmuchofthenation’spast.Itisvirtuallyimpossibletomake

senseofanyofthegreatepochsinAmericanpoliticalhistoryorofthe granderchronicleofdemocracyinAmericawithoutcomingfaceto facewith“Tories,”“moneycrats,”“theMonsterBank,”“theslaveocracy,”“robberbarons,”“plutocrats,”“themoneytrust,”“economic royalists,”“theEstablishment,”the“powerelite,”orthe“military-industrialcomplex.”Allthesecolorfulvariationsechoasingletheme: that,theﬂuidandanarchiccharacteroftheAmericanexperiencenotwithstanding,organizedpoliticalandsocialgroupingshavearisenat keyjuncturesinthecountry’shistoryandhavesucceededformoreor lessextendedperiodsoftimeinexercisingbroaddominionoverthe nation’spoliticaleconomyandevenitsculturalandsociallife.

Onemightviewthisrichimageryofthepursuitofpowereitherasa reproachorasavindicationofthepursuitofhappiness—areproach insofarasitsuggeststhattheAmericanpromiseoffreedomandequalityhasbeenashamandadelusion,avindicationinasmuchasitimplies thatdemocracyhasbeenapermanentrevolution,foreverembattled againstthosewhohavetriedtoabrogatethatpromise.Eitherway, Americaisdepictedasdenselypopulatedwithanassortmentofsocial groupsthatallseemtobehavesuspiciouslylikerulingclassesorelites.

Surveythelandmarksofthenationaldrama.EverypresidentofenduringreputationuptoJohnF.Kennedyisrememberedforsomevital crusadeagainstausurpingorentrenchedelite.WashingtonandJeffersonoverthrewtheminionsoftheBritishmonarchyandthenfended offattemptsataristocraticcounterrevolutionbyhome-grownTories. AndrewJacksonwagedwaragainsta“MonsterBank”thatpresumed tomonopolizethecreditresourcesofafledglingnationandturnenterprisingcitizensintoitsvassals.Lincolnpurgedthenationofitsmortal sinbyextirpatingthe“slaveocracy.”TeddyRooseveltunleashedrhetoricalthunderboltsagainstthose“malefactorsofgreatwealth”whose gargantuancorporatecombinesshowednoregardforthepublicwelfareandboughtandsoldsenatorsandcongressmenlikesomanypigs atamarket.WoodrowWilsonpromised,ifsweptintooffice,totakeon the“moneytrust,”thatfinancialoctopuswhosetentacleswerestran-

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glingtodeaththeeconomicopportunityanddemocraticindependence thatwereeverycitizen’sbirthright.InthemidstofthegreatestcalamitysincetheCivilWar,FDRchasedthe“moneychangersfromthe temple”anddeclaredthathisNewDealwouldhenceforthpoliceand punishthe“economicroyalists”whohadbroughtontheGreatDepression.Eventhemild-manneredDwightEisenhowerleftofﬁcecautioningthecountryagainsttheoverweeningpowerofthe“military-industrialcomplex.”

Justbecausespectersofself-aggrandizingpowerhavetimeand againhauntedpresidentsandordinarycitizens,thatdoesn’tmakethem real.Nordoesitnecessarilyfollowthatscholarswouldnaturallyhave takenthemupasthedramatispersonaeofhistoricalnarratives.Many havenot.Beginningwiththeearliestchroniclesofthenationalsaga, historianshaveadoptedalternativescenariosforcapturingtheessence oftheAmericanstory.SomehavetalkedaboutManifestDestiny,nationbuilding,modernization,thetamingoftheWest,thesocialand politicalalchemyatworkontherollingfrontier,theextraordinaryimpactoftheAmericanmeltingpot,themoralvisionofthe“cityona hill,”oroftheworld’slongest-survivingexperimentingovernmentby Everyman.Mostofthesesynthesesofthecountry’sexperiencereducedinternaleconomic,social,andpoliticalinequitiesandrelations ofdominationandsubordinationtosecondaryissues,speedbumpson thehighwaytonationalgreatnessormalfunctionsofanotherwiseselfcorrectingsocialorder.

Still,itisnoteworthythatquestionsaboutthedistributionofwealth andpowerhaveformedthethematiccoreofthewritingsofsomeour mostdistinguishedhistorians.CharlesBeard,whodeeplyinfluenced Americanhistorywritingduringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury, becamemostfamousforhiseconomicinterpretationoftheConstitution.1 Hearguedthatthenation’sfoundingdocumentexpressedthe materialinterestsofadominantallianceofmerchants,planters,and financialspeculators.Despitetheweightinessofhishistoricalresearch, Beardwascriticizedasaneconomicreductionist,blindtotheimpactof

cultureandideology;byWorldWarII,manydismissedhimasa crankyleftistbecauseheclungtowidelyunpopularisolationistsentimentsevenafterwarbrokeoutinEurope.ArthurSchlesinger,Jr.,by contrast,wasalwaysstrictlymainstream.HisseminalwritingsonJacksonianAmerica(TheAgeofJackson wontheyoungscholaraPulitzer Prize)andtheNewDealexploredtheseturningpointsinAmerican politicalhistoryasgreatstrugglesbetweenpropertiedelitesandthe commonworkingman.2 OneofthefoundingfathersofAmericanintellectualhistory,VernonParrington,deployedtheProgressiveEra’sfascinationwithconcentratedwealthanditssocialreverberationstointerprettheworkofadiversearrayofintellectuals,theologians,novelists, andessayists.ParringtondepictedAmericanthinkerslockedincerebral combat,wrestlingwiththeforcesofinvidioussocialandmaterialdistinctionandacontraryegalitarianimpulse.3

LouisHartzandRichardHofstadter,alsopathbreakinghistoriansof liberalpoliticalculture,pushedtheirscholarshipinadifferentdirection.Theydedicatedtheirworktothepropositionthatthekindof classantinomiescharacteristicofEuropeansocietywerestillbornin theNewWorld.Theirargumentfortheone-dimensionalnatureof Americanpoliticalliferestedonwhattheyconcludedwasanindigenousuniversalpreferenceforprivatepropertythattendedtosuffocatealloutbreaksofmoreradicalsocialandpoliticalexperimentation. Outbreakstherewere,however,andsoHofstadter,forexample,was compelledtocometogrips,atleastwithintheAmericanmind,of whathechastisedasthe“paranoidimagination.”Hofstadter’streatmentofpopulism,andwhatheconsidereditspost–WorldWarII McCarthyiteanalogues,acknowledgedthesalience,ifnotthepalpable reality,ofpopularbeliefs,whetherparanoidornot,intheexistenceof rulingclassesandtheirmachinations.4 DavidPotter,acontemporary ofHofstadter,wroteaprizewinninganalysisofthecomingofthe CivilWarthatworkedouttheintricateinterconnectionsbetweenideology,politicaldisunion,andeconomicinterests.Hisclassicmeditation PeopleofPlenty wrestled,likeHofstadter’swork,withwhetherornot

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theamazingcornucopiaofAmericaneconomicresourcesandoutput couldcontinuetofunctionthewayithadforgenerations,asthelubricantforincipientclassabrasions.5 TheAfricanAmericanscholarand radicalactivistW.E.B.DuBoisauthoredaremarkablestudyofReconstructionthatcapturedtheorganicconnectionbetweenracialand classexploitationandsubordinationandhowthesedevelopmentsimprintedthemselvesonpost–CivilWarAmerica.6

Morehistoriansofgreataccomplishmentcouldbeaddedtothisgallery.Butponderingtherelationshipbetweenpowerandwealthinthe UnitedStateshasbynomeansbeenconﬁnedtoscholarstrainedashistorians.Tobesure,manyAmericanintellectualshavenotexpended mucheffortondecipheringtheinternalsocialandculturalcohesion andexternalmechanismsofdominationcharacteristicofrulingelites. Nodoubttheyconsideredsuchexplorationsanaridexerciseinasocietyfamousforitssocialﬂuidity.Butsomeofthecountry’smostoriginalsocialthinkersthoughtotherwise.

JohnAdamswasambivalent.Hecandidlyvoicedhisdoubtsthatthe voxpopulicouldbetrustedtoidentifyatrulyhonorableandmeritoriouselitededicatedtopublicservice,soeasilywasitledastrayby quacks,hypocrites,ﬂatterers,andbald-facedknaves.Fearingthe“tyrannyofthemajority,”Adamsnonethelessacceptedtherevolutionary principlethatthe“people”weresovereign.Buttoabolish,asthe Frenchrevolutionariestalkedofdoing,alldistinctionsofrankandorderbasedonwealth,tradition,andfamilylineagestruckhimasaroad tocertaindisaster.Howtoforgeaworkablebalance?Allowingwealth alonetodeterminewhoreignedwouldencouragethemostselﬁshinstinctsandweakentheimpulsetowinsocialdistinctionthroughdisinterestedpublicservice.YettherewasnoquestioninAdams’smindthat socialstabilitywouldalwaysrequire“thateverymanshouldknowhis placeandbemadetokeepit.”Atbottomhebelievedthat“thegreat questionwillforeverremain,whoshallwork?”Theanswerwasobvious:mostwould,andtheywouldenvythattinyprivilegedpercentage oftheir“betters”whoremainedatleisuretothinkorgovern.Forthis

FoundingFatherandfuturepresidenttherewasnoescapingthehistoricallyinevitable:“Thecontroversybetweentherichandthepoor,the laboriousandtheidle,thelearnedandtheignorant...willcontinue andrivalrieswillspringoutofthem.”7 Theartofgoodgovernment consistedofstrikingtherightbalanceofpowerbetweenthem,notin misguidedattemptstodoawaywiththeseintractablesocialdivisions altogether.

Jefferson,Madison,Hamilton,andotherpoliticalthinkersofthe revolutionarygenerationallunderstood,likeAdams,thatrepublican governmentwasnofoolproofprophylacticagainstconflictbetween popularforcesandvariouselites—landed,commercial,andfinancial. Madisonfearedthateconomicpowerwouldonedaytrytoseizepoliticalpower,andhewasconvincedthattheanti-republicanparty“was morepartialtotheopulentthantotheotherclassesofsociety.”8 Much ofthe SturmUndDrang thatraisedpoliticaltemperaturesduring the1790spittedJacobinlevelersagainstmoneyedaristocrats—orat leastthatishowtheHamiltoniansandJeffersoniansmalignedeach other.TheAdamsfamilyitselfcarriedthisintellectualtraditioninto thenineteenthcentury,albeitadjustedforthechangeinhistoricalcontext.CharlesFrancisAdams,andthebrothersHenryandBrooks,respondedtotheadventofindustrialismandtheriseofthecorporation andfinancialcapitalwithapitilesscritiqueoftheneworder.Dyspeptic,harboringaninbredpatriciandisdainforthemoneygame(andin Brooks’scaseanintellectualgrandiosityand Götterdämmerung pessimism),theAdamsesneverthelesswerediscerningobserversofwhat theyviewedasanewrulingelite.Itspoweroverthecountry’sbasal economy,theywarned,madethesenewcorporatebehemothsmuscular enoughtooverwhelmthericketyinstitutionsofdemocraticgovernment.9

PlutocracywasapreoccupationoftheGildedAge.Someintellectuals,YaleprofessorWilliamGrahamSumnermostprominently,were fullypreparedtodeployDarwinianthinkingtonaturalizeandjustify theemergenceofthisbandofbusinesstycoons.ThusSumnertreated

thetitans’stupendouswealth,socialprestige,andpoliticalauthorityas proofoftheirfitnesstosurviveandthriveinasocialworldsubjectto thesameprincipleofnaturalselectionthatgovernedalllifeonearth.10 ThorsteinVeblen,bycontrast,foundthisnewrulingcasteunfit.Ina seriesofsurgicaldissectionsoftheera’splutocrats—mostmemorably inhis1899 TheoryoftheLeisureClass andaquarter-centurylaterin AbsenteeOwnership—Veblenviewedthemasanalarmedanthropologistmight.Hedepictedthemasanexoticatavism,apingthecustoms andmoresofoutmodedwarriorcultures,consumedbyinsatiablecravingsforinvidioussocialandculturaldistinctions.Theywereutterly outoftouchwiththeforcesofmodernscienceandindustrythatmade themodernworldrun.The“leisureclass”possessedatoxicpower. Ruletheydid,butatenormoussocialcosttotherationalprocessesof technologicalprogressandgeneraleconomicwell-being.Moreover, theirculturalinfluencewaspernicious,sincetheirpracticesof“pecuniaryemulation,”inVeblen’sphrase,andstatus-seekingseepeddownward,demoralizingthosewholookeduptothemasexemplars.11

Irascible,contrarian,andfullofirrepressibledisdainforconventionalthinking,Veblenwasahighlyoriginalandidiosyncraticthinker. Butawidearrayofwritersandintellectualssharedhisunderlyingconviction:thatthecountrywasmoreorlessatthemercyofatinybody ofenormouslywealthymenendowedwithasuperveningpoliticalinﬂuenceearnedwithoutthebeneﬁtofpublic,democraticdecisionmaking.Thissameconvictionanimatedthemagazineexposés,political treatises,andutopiananddystopiannovelswrittenbyHenryGeorge, WilliamDemarestLloyd,EdwardBellamy,andIgnatiusDonnelley duringtheGildedAge.ThesewritersweregenerallynotpractitionersofhightheorylikeVeblen,buttheycapturedtheattentionof broadaudiences,forwhomtheyarticulatedacreepingsuspicionthat somethingotherthandemocracyhadarisenandwasthreateningthe land.12 Duringthetwentiethcentury,throughtheeraoftheGreatDepression,juristssuchasLouisBrandeis(themostprominentandinde-

fatigablefoeof“themoneytrust”),popularmuckrakerslikeCharles EdwardRussellandUptonSinclair,andsuchnovelistsoftheleftas JackLondon,TheodoreDreiser,andJohnDosPassoscontinuedto fireawayatthehubris,appetite,andtyrannicalinstinctsofMorgan, Harriman,Rockefeller,andotherrulingdynasts.13 Whentheoldorder finallyfellapartintheCrashof’29,intellectualssurveyedthedamage andlookedtothefuture.ReferencestoFerdinandLundberg’svoluminous America’sSixtyFamilies, whichattemptedtomapthegenerationalinterconnectionsofthecountry’srulingelite,foundtheirway intoFDR’spresidentialaddresses.14 MatthewJosephsonpublished The RobberBarons atthistime,coiningananalyticrubricthatseemedmade toordertosumupthemoralcharacterofthoseoligarchsmostblamed forthedisasteroftheGreatDepression,eventhoughJosephson’s bookwasahistoryoftheirnineteenth-centurypredecessors.15 And NewDealbrain-trusterAdolfBerleandColumbiaUniversityeconomistGardinerMeansproducedaclassicanalysisoftheusurpationof theeconomybyacliqueofcorporateinsiders,recommendinginits steadamoredemocraticmanagementofindustryandfinance.16

OnlyafterWorldWarIIdidthislongculturaltraditionbecomeless robustandbegintopeterout,thoughnotallatonce.C.WrightMills, likeVeblenananti-academicinsidetheacademy,published ThePower Elite inthemid-1950s,inwhichhetracedtheinterlockingandcrossfertilizationofmilitary,industrial,andpoliticalhierarchs.Thenotion ofa“rulingclass”wasalreadyinbadodorinColdWarAmerica,and Millsdidnotusethatterm.Notthathewasafraidto,buthedrewback frommorerigidMarxistconceptionsthatseemedtohimtoimply greatercoherence,moresingle-mindedness,andlesscontingencythan hisownmorelooselyconﬁgured“powerelite.”Nonetheless,Millsarguedpassionatelythataclosedcommunityofpower-meisterseither formulatedorinﬂuencedallthekeydecisionsaffectingthenation’sfate inwarandpeaceaswellasitscriticaleconomicchoices.Mostoccupied non-electivepoliticalorcivilpositionsandtendedtohavegraduated

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fromthesameselectcircleofpreparatoryschoolsandIvyLeagueuniversities,tofrequentthesamesocialgatheringplaces,andtoswapofﬁceswithcasualregularity.17

ByMills’sday,however,notionsofa“powerelite”or“rulingclass” hadfallenoutoffashion.Someintellectuals,likeSchlesinger,didalludeto“theEstablishment.”Thiswasamorebenignversionofthe “powerelite,”allegedlycomposedofaself-effacinggroupofinternationalﬁnancierswhohadcreatedtheMarshallPlan,theInternational MonetaryFund,theWorldBank,NATO,andthedemocratic,anticommunistreconstructionofwar-tornEurope.Eventhosewillingtotake theideaofanEstablishmentseriously,however,weremoreimpressed withitswisdom,itsprudence,anditsapparentlackofself-interested motivationthanwithitsaloofnessandimmunityfrompublicaccountability.

Moreover,thedominantintellectualsofthepostwarera—including DanielBell,DavidRiesman,RobertDahl,andothers—didnotrecognizeeventhisdegreeofhierarchy.Theycelebratedinsteadtheclasslessness,orhomogeneousmiddle-classness,ofAmericansociety.In thispluralistidyllnosocialinterestlordeditoverallothers,butrather eachcontendedforinﬂuencewithadozenotherwell-organizedpower blocs,arrivingatrollingcompromisesthatleftauthorityinapermanentstateofﬂux.Belldeclaredthishistoricalmomentthe“endofideology,”meaningthattheoldcategoriesofasuppressedproletariatand adomineeringbourgeoisienolongerhadanytractioninthepostwar world,atleastintheUnitedStates.Americawassimplytoodecentralizedasocietytosupportanythingascentripetalandenduringasa“rulingclass.”Awholenewacademiccross-discipline,AmericanStudies, wasinventedtoexploreanationalexperiencethathadmanagedto eludetherigidhierarchiesandmaldistributionsofpowertypicalof otherindustrialsocieties.18

ThedownfalloftheEstablishmentduringthetragicdebacleinVietnamreignitedpassionateinquiriesintotheusesandabusesofpower,

pastandpresent.Newhistoriesappeared,treatingthesocialandeconomicﬁssuresincolonialAmerica,theinternalclassdynamicsofthe AmericanRevolution,thepoliticaleconomyandculturalcoherenceof the“slavepower,”the“non-paranoid”resistancetotheadventofcorporatecapitalism.Thus,notwithstandingthetriumphofthepostwar consensus,aoncehonoredcountertraditionlivedoninthewritings ofEugeneGenovese,EricFoner,WilliamDomhoff,MichaelHarrington,NoamChomsky,BarbaraEhrenreich,KevinPhillips,andothers. Genovese,forexample,producedarevolutioninsouthernhistoriographywithhismeticulousre-creationofthepoliticaleconomyandculturalidentityoftheslave-owning“masterclass.”Foner,anotherhistorianofthegenerationfollowingPotterandHofstadter,arguedthata mainenginedrivingthenewRepublicanParty’sdeterminationtokeep slaveryoutofthewesternterritories,evenifthatmeantcivilwar,was thedeepanxietythatopportunitiesforlandedindependencewerevanishing.Withoutfreeland,Republicansasserted,classdivisionswould hardenandmakeAmericaliketheOldWorld.Foner’ssubsequent monumentalworkonReconstructiontracedtheconversionofthatRepublicanPartyintoavehicleofnationalrulefortherisingindustrial bourgeoisie.19

InthewakeoftheconservativeintellectualascendancythataccompaniedtheriseofRonaldReagan,however,whathadoncebeenamain currentofthecountry’shistoriographybecamelittlemorethanatributary.Itistruethatplentyofbookshaveappearedoverthelastdecade orsorevisitingthelivesoflegendarybusinesstitanssuchasMorgan, Rockefeller,Gould,andHarriman.20 Butnearlywithoutexceptionthey steerclearoftreatingtheseﬁguresasemblematicofsomerulingelite. Nowadays,itmayseemold-fashioned,againsttheAmericangrain,or evensubversive(pace PresidentGeorgeW.Bush’swarningthattocriticizehistaxcutsforthewealthywastoindulgein“classwarfare”)to talkaboutclasses,aboutthestrugglesbetweenthem,aboutsomething asexoticandalienasarulingelite.Butitisnot.Thecorpusofthink-

ingabouthierarchyanddemocracythatextendsallthewaybacktothe daysofJohnAdamshasleftbehindaseriesofquestionsstillworth pondering.Thatiswhatweaimtodointhisbook.

Fromthemomentwebeganconceptualizing RulingAmerica, we weredeterminedtoproduceavolumethatsurveyedrulingelitesin AmericafromtheRevolutiontothepresent.Withtheexceptionof KevinPhillips’s2002book WealthandDemocracy:APoliticalHistory oftheAmericanRich, noefforthasbeenmadetoproducesuchacomprehensiveworkinhalfacentury.Ourbook,whilecomplementaryto Phillips’swork,hasadifferentemphasis.Itstressesthevarietyofeconomicelitesthathaveruled,orattemptedtorule,thenation.Itdemonstratesthedifferentwaysinwhicheliteshaveconstitutedtheirpolitical,ideological,andsocialworlds;itexaminestheinternalﬁssuresand externalchallengesthathavethreatenedandsometimesundermined thoseworlds;anditexploresthespecialproblemsfacingelitepretensionstopoliticalpowerinademocracy.Itsfocusisoninstabilityand changeasintegralfeaturesofeliteruleinAmerica.

Onefundamentaltransformationinvolvestheetiologyofpower.In theeraofAdamsandJefferson,governmentseemedtheprincipalincubatorofeliteaspirationstooverweeningauthority.Bythetimeof theindustrialrevolution,however,civilsociety,inparticularthecentersofgreatesteconomicpower,hadsupplantedgovernmentasthe breedinggroundofaristocratichubris.Governmenthadbecomeeither theservitorofpowersgreaterthanitselfortheinspirationalhopeof thosewhosawitastheonlymechanismcapableofwrestlingthecountry’sillicitrulingcliquestotheground.Thisgreatseachangeinwhere powerwasrootedandonwhosebehalfitmightbedeployedarosein mostsocietiesundergoingthetransitionfromprecapitalisttocapitalist mechanismsofwealthcreation.Moreover,itwasitselforganically connectedtoanequallyprofoundchangeinthewayelitesorganized andconceivedofthemselves.

Inthelateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies,elitesconﬁguredthemselvesasanaristocraticcastewhosepositionrestedonlin-

eage,inbreeding,andvariousformsofsocialexclusivity.Evenapart fromtheirrealandpersonalproperty,theirinheritedculturalcapital commandeddeferencefromthosenotsoblessed.Overtime,those boundariesblurredalongwiththeexplosiveexpansionanddifferentiationoftheeconomy.Thoseoccupyingthecommandingheightsofthe economyandthepoliticalsystembegantolookmorelikeaclass,open to—evenforcedopenby—newcomersofmoreplebeianorigin.This newsocialﬂuidityfurthercomplicatedattemptstodiscernjustwho ruledandhow.Thiswasemphaticallythecase,moreover,asrising corporateindustrialandﬁnancecapitalovercameormergedwithmore settledanddynasticformsoflandedandmercantilewealth.

Thisproliferationofpowercenters,inturn,generatedinternaldivisionsthatcouldtakeonculturalandpoliticalaswellaseconomic shape.Mostsignificantly,itproducedafissurewithinthe“leisureclass” betweenthoseabsorbedbytheirownself-interestandself-regard,psychologicallyandpoliticallydeafandblindtotheeconomicmayhem andsocialantagonismsaccumulatingaroundthem,andafractionof thatsameuniverse—peoplesuchastheRoosevelts,forexample,or thoseto-the-manner-bornEstablishmentfiguresofthenextgeneration—whoself-consciouslytookupthechallengeofrulingonbehalf ofthewholecommonwealth,evenifthatmeantnowandthenrisking theenmityoftheirsocialpeers.Withinthesecircles,asenseofsocial trusteeshipsubduedtheinstinctforself-indulgence.Herethepossibilityofcollaboratingwithsubordinatesegmentsofthebodypolitic— thelabormovement,forexample—wasactivelyexplored,leavingthe makeup,nottomentiontheverifiableexistence,ofarulinggroupeven moreintriguingtoascertain.Fissuresthisprofoundtookonmeasurable,visibleformonlyduringmortalcrises.Onethinksoftheconstitutionalperiod,theCivilWar,thepoliticalfirestormignitedbypopulist andantitrustpassionsattheturnofthecentury,theGreatDepression, andthedefeatinVietnamandtheendofU.S.worldeconomicsupremacyinthe1970s.

Whatisfascinatingabouttheseoccurrencesisthattheyshowhow Introduction 15

dominantgroupsfaceduptothechallengeandeithersuccumbedin warorpublicignominyorelsesurmountedit,whetherthroughpure self-assertionorshrewdpoliticalcompromise.Theroadfromomnipotencetosuperannuationoromni-incompetencehasbynomeansbeena straightone.Whatevertheoutcome,thelifeanddeathofrulingelites isoneoftheenduringthemesthatrunthroughthelongliteratureof wealthandpoliticalpowerinAmerica.Itremainssotodayasthecountrywitnessesthetribulationsofitslatestrulinggroup,bornatthe dawnofReagan’s“morninginAmerica”andnowstrugglingtomaster whatmaybeeitherthehighnoonorthetwilightofthenewAmerican Century.Thecontributorstothisvolumeexaminetheseandotherdimensionsofthewaysinwhichdistinctsocialgroupsgraspedandthen losttheirholdonpoweroverthecourseofthecountry’shistory.

WeareawarethatAmericanhistoryispopulatedwithnumerous kindsofelites—someregional,othersnational;somethatstakedtheir prestigesolelyonwealth,othersthatderivedtheirpreeminencefrom politics;somegroundedinprofessional,religious,oreducationalexpertise,othersintheinﬂuencetheyexercisedinparticularethnicorracialcommunities.Hereweareconcernedprincipallyaboutthoseelites whosoughttousetheireconomicwealthtoachievenationalpolitical power.

Whatdoesitmeantoaspiretorulethenation?Sometimesithas meantliterallybecomingoneofAmerica’spoliticalrulers:onethinks oftheFederalistelitewhowrotetheConstitutionanddominatedpoliticallifethroughthe1790s,orofthesouthernplantationownerswho controlledtheSenateinthe1830s,1840s,and1850sand,byperpetuatingslavery,drovenationaleconomicpolicy.But,morecommonly,economiceliteshavenotbeenabletoruleinsuchadirectmanner.They hadtoﬁghttoestablishtheirdominanceinapoliticalsystemthatwas formallydemocraticandfrequentlyhostiletotheirwealthandtheir pretensions.Oftentheycouldachievetheirendsonlythroughpolitical representativeswhodidnotsharetheirclassoriginandwhomightor mightnotbeopentopersuasionorbribery.Thus,feweliteshavebeen

abletoassumethatpoliticalrulenaturallygravitatestothembyvirtue oftheirwealthorsocialstation.Onthecontrary,theyhavehadtoﬁght toestablishtheirlegitimacyandtoholdoffchallengers,bothfrombelowandfromascendanteliteswhosoughttodisplacethem.Forthis reason,thehistoryofrulingelitesisanexceptionallydynamicand complexstory.Allofthecontributorswrestlewiththreesalientfeaturesofthatdynamism:thevulnerabilityandevenmortalityofelites, thedramaofelitesuccessionandadaptation,andﬁnallytheinstinctfor counterrevolution.

ThereisnodenyingthatAmericahasalwaysbeenahighlyﬂuidsociety.Nothinghaseverbeenabletoassumeitsownpermanence,not evenensconcedcentersofwealthandpower.Intermsofpoliticalinﬂuence,hierarchshaveledaprecariousexistence.Thetensionbetween presumptionstodominationandtheunderminingofthosepresumptionsinformseverychapterofthisbook.In“TheDilemmasofRuling ElitesinRevolutionaryAmerica,”GaryJ.KornblithandJohnM. Murrinexplorehowquicklythe“naturalaristocracy”oftheFounding FatherswholedtheRevolutionanddevisedtheConstitutionfellto piecesandgaveway,intheNorth,toamoreplebeianpolitics.Sven Beckert,in“MerchantsandManufacturersintheAntebellumNorth,” arguesthatby1830thegreatmerchantswerealreadylosingtheirgrip tomiddlingandlowerorderswhomtheJeffersonians,thirtyyearsearlier,hadinvitedontothepoliticalstage.Ofcourse,the“slavepower” heldonthelongestandremainedessentiallyunchallengedinitsregionaldomainuntilitsdefeatintheCivilWar.Forsheerlongevity,no otherrulinggroupinAmericanhistorymatchesit.But,asAdam Rothmanmakesclearin“The‘SlavePower’intheUnitedStates,1783–1865,”asearlyas1820theslaveocracy,innationalpolitics,feltitselfto beundersiege.

Whilethepoliticallandscapechangeddramaticallyasaresultofthe CivilWar,theunderlyingsenseofelitevulnerabilitydidnot.AsDavid Nasawarguesin“GildedAgeGospels,”thenouveauricheindustrialistsoftheGildedAgeatﬁrsthadnointerestingovernment(aslongas

publicinstitutionskepttheirhandsoffcorporateaffairsandopened theircofferstocapitalistenterprises).Soonenough,however,theyfelt compelledtoexerttheirwillinthepoliticalrealminordertofendoff attemptsbyfarmersandlaborersandsmallerbusinessmentolimittheir prerogatives.Theysucceeded,butitwasahotlycontestedstruggle whoseoutcomewashardlyforeordained.Themorepoliticallyengaged circleofWallStreetfinanciersandcorporateexecutiveswhosupplantedthe“robberbarons”seemedtoputmattersonafirmerfooting. In“TheAbortiveRuleofBigMoney”and“TheManagerialRevitalizationoftheRich,”AlanDawleyandJacksonLears,respectively,analyzetheconsolidationofthisindustrial-financialeliteanditssearch forculturalauthorityandpoliticalinfluenceinwhatmightbecalledthe AgeofMorgan.Thiswasaformidableeliteindeedthatheldswayfora longgeneration.ButasDawleyemphasizes,itsmemberswerecompelledtolimittheirpowerinresponsetodemocraticchallenge.The ProgressiveErabubbledoverwithproposalstoreachsomepolitical compromisebetweenelitedesireandpopulardemands:acapitalismsupervisedbythestatethatwouldensureprofitabilityfortheownersof capitalbutalsoimposedemocraticchecksontheabilityofthewealthy toinfluencepoliticsanddominatetheeconomy.Yetthesubstanceof thecompromisenevermaterialized,aspost–WorldWarIeliteschose torollbackdemocracy’sencroachmentsontheircustomaryprerogatives.

EventssincetheSecondWorldWarofferadditionalevidenceabout thevulnerabilityofrulinggroups.In“TheForeignPolicyEstablishment,”GodfreyHodgsondissectstheanatomyofamandarinatethat presidedoverthepostwarreorganizationofEuropeanddirectedthe ColdWar.Menofimpeccablesocialcredentials,socializedatthetoniestprepschoolsandeducatedatIvyLeaguecolleges,managersofdistinguishedWallStreetbanksandlawﬁrms,apparentlyimpregnableto democraticdissent,theynonethelesscrashedandburnedinadisaster oftheirownmakinginVietnam.

Dominantrulinggroupshavefelttheheatnotonlyfrombelowbut

alsofromtheenergiesradiatedbythedynamicU.S.economyasitrepeatedlygeneratesopportunitiesforindividualstolaunchcapitalistenterprisesandassemblenewfortunes.Indeed,thechallengetotherule ofparticulareliteshascomeasmuchfromotherelitesasfromdemocraticpressures.Thus,inthe1830s,themerchantgrandeesofthe Northfoundthemselvesconfrontedbyrisingartisan-manufacturers, menwhoproudlycalledthemselves“mechanics”andconstituted,in embryonicform,anindustrialbourgeoisie.Bythe1850sand1860s,this bourgeoisiesoughttodisplacenotonlythenorthernmerchantelitebut theslaveocracyaswell,agroupwhomindustrialistsregardedasdessicatedand,evenworse,asadragontheexpansionofcapitalistmarkets, trade,andaccumulation.Acenturylater,asMichaelLinddemonstrates in“ConservativeElitesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNew Deal,”thedescendantsofthisindustrialbourgeoisie,whosepowerwas concentratedinindustryandﬁnanceintheNortheastandMidwest, foundthemselvesunderpoliticalsiegebyaneweliterootedintheraw material/energy/military-industrialcomplexoftheSouthwest.

Lookingback,then,weﬁndthatthepoliticalpowerofruling groupshasprovedperishable.Thedifferentelitessharethatincommon.Thevulnerabilityofindividualelites,however,shouldnotblind ustotheresilienceandadaptabilityofelitepoweringeneral.New eliteshavealwaysseemedreadytotaketheplaceofthoseindecline andtoadaptthemselvestochangingeconomicandpoliticalrealities.

Theﬁrstmomentofcrisisandsuccessionoccurredinthedecade followingratiﬁcationoftheConstitution.America’sRevolutionof 1776didnotsettletheissueofwhetherthenewnationwouldbeademocracy.Aslateasthe1790s,apowerfulgroupofAnglophiles,calling themselvesFederalistsandledbyAlexanderHamilton,wantedtoestablishaBritish-stylearistocraticrepublicintheUnitedStates.And theymighthavesucceededhadtheynotoverreachedthemselvesand, panickedbytheFrenchRevolution,imposedrepressivemeasuresthat, ironically,causedademocraticoppositiontocoalesce.Thatstrategic erroropenedthewayforThomasJefferson’selectionin1800and

madewhatKornblithandMurrincalla“decentralizedand... democraticstructureofpower”anenduringfeatureofAmericanpolitics. By1820,theFederalistshadallbutdisappearedasapoliticalforce. SubsequenteliteshadtoaccommodatethemselvestoademocraticpoliticsthathadbecomeadeﬁningfeatureoftheAmericanrepublic.

Thisdidnotmeanthatthesenewhierarchshadfullyembraceddemocraticbehavior,however.Onthecontrary,thesuccessorstotheFederalists,theJeffersonianplantersintheSouthandthemercantileelites intheNorth,stillevincedaratherFederalistdegreeofcasteexclusivity andsuperiority.Theyexpressedasenseofentitlementandwithita readinesstoacceptsocialobligations.AsRothmanandBeckertboth demonstrate,theantebellumsouthernandnorthernmenofpower styledthemselvesrespectersofthetraditionstheywerebornto,and theysoughttopreservethemratherthaninventnewones.Moreover, theybelievedthattheireconomicindependenceandculturalbreeding madethemsociety’snaturaloverseers.Indeed,theproportionsof thesegroupswhoheldpublicofficeatalllevels,fromlocalofficialsand statelegislatorstopresidents,senators,andSupremeCourtjustices,exceededthoseofallsubsequentrulinggroups.Inshort,theythoughtof themselvesaspublicmenwhowereuniquelyfittorule.Theyexpected tobedeferredtobyothersand,inreturn,toshouldertheburdenof maintainingarightlyorderedsociety.ButtheCivilWarprecipitated theirdownfallandasecondmomentofelitecrisisandsuccession.

Thesheerscaleofupper-classupheavaltriggeredbythedestruction oftheplanterclassandtheeclipseofNewEngland’smercantileelite wasboundtogeneratealternateformsofeliteascendancy.Buttheeconomictransitionfromasocietyofslave-basedplantationagriculture andsmallholderfamilycapitalismtoasocietyofimpersonalcorporate industryandfinancemagnifiedtheimpactofthewar.Thebuccaneer industrialistsandfinancierswhoemergedduringandaftertheCivil Wardidnotthinkofthemselvesaspublicmen,andtheyweredeeply unsureofjustwhatconstitutedtheirsocialresponsibilities.Thischange inthecharacterofeliteshadsomethingtodowiththeshiftfroman

agrariansocietytoonebasedonthelessﬁxedinteractionsandperpetualarrhythmiasofindustrialandﬁnancecapitalism.Undertherule that“allthatissolidmeltsintoair,”eventhemostimposingbastions ofwealthandpowermaybedisorientedandliveanxiouslywitha loomingsenseoftheirownmortality

AsNasawdemonstrates,thenewGildedAgeelitewasbothignorantandcontemptuousofthepublicrealm.Asadeptasitsmembers wereatpurchasingpoliticalfavorsorsimplylootingthepublictreasury,theyhadnodesiretotakeontheresponsibilitiesofpublicadministration.TheideologyofsocialDarwinismtowhichtheysubscribed onlyaggravatedthatpredicamentbyraisingtheirinstinctualpolitical absenteeismtothelevelofmoralandnaturallaw.Nevertheless,these GildedAgetycoonswereincreasinglycompelledbytheanti-corporate measurespassedbystategovernmentsduringthe1870sand1880sto embroilthemselvesinstruggleswithworkers,farmers,andtheirsupportersoverthelegitimacyofcapitalistinstitutions.Nothingintheexperienceofthesenouveauricheindustrialistspreparedthemfornegotiatingtheincreasinglydangerousterrainofmasspolitics,andinthe 1890stheycameperilouslyclosetolosingtheircontrolaltogether,as thePeople’sParty,ananti-corporate,anti–WallStreetgrassrootsorganizationofpoorfarmersandtheirallies,convulsednationalpolitics.

ThePopulistchallengetriggeredathirdmomentofelitecrisisand succession,asnewleadersemergedfromtheupper-classrankstoregaineconomicandpoliticalcontrol.Thosewhodirectedthisconsolidation,inparticularthecirclegatheredaroundJ.P.Morgan,wereindubitablyreadiertorulethanthecommandersoftheGildedAgehad been.Learspaintsaportraitofarevitalizedrulingclass,ahybrid mixtureofthepatricianandtheparvenu,whosesocialélan,managerialself-conﬁdence,spiritualathleticism,andcarefulgroomingofthe youngforalifeofsocialprivilegeandpublicresponsibilitygavethis newelitearesiliencyandaninterestinthecommonwealthattherobberbaronshadneverpossessed.So,too,Dawleydemonstrateshowthis elitegainedanembracingsovereigntyoverthenation’spoliticalecon-

omy.Itsmemberswereunlikethoseearlier,moreprovincialcaptains ofindustrywholordeditovertheirparticularﬁefdomsandcared aboutnothingbeyondtheirborders.FromtheirredoubtsonWall Street,thenewmenofpowerattheturnofthetwentiethcenturytook amoreglobalviewoftheirhegemonicresponsibilityforensuringthe stabilityandorderlinessofthenewcorporateeconomy,andevenextendedtheirsuperintendencebeyondtheboundariesoftheUnited States.

Buttheycouldneverentirelyeliminatethedisorderlinessofthecapitalistorderorofthedemocraticpoliticalprocesstheywantedtocontrol.AndasLearsobserves,self-doubtandself-absorptionoccasionally peekedthroughtheself-assurancethiselitesoughttoproject.Still,upper-classAmericansofF.ScottFitzgerald’sJazzAgewerefarmore poisedthantheirpredecessorshadbeeninthe1890s.

ButthentheGreatDepressionunderminedtheconﬁdenceand poweroftheancienrégime.Thestockmarketcollapseshrankordestroyedeconomicfortunes.Themiserycausedbymassunemployment andtheinabilityofcapitalismtorightitselfstrippedeconomicelitesof theirlegitimacy.PopularprotesthelpedchasetheMorgan-centered groupofﬁnanciersandindustrialistsfromkeycabinetpositions,the FederalReserve,andothergovernmentpostsandbroughttothepresidencyamanofpatricianbreeding,FranklinD.Roosevelt,whorefused toruleinthesoleinterestoftheclassfromwhichhecame.Moreover, Roosevelt’sNewDealerssubjectedstrategiceconomicinstitutions— banks,utilities,andcapitalmarkets—tothekindofpublicregulation andsurveillancethattheyhadneverexperiencedbefore.RooseveltattractedtohisNewDealhard-pressedworkersandfarmersandstrugglinghomeowners,ofcourse,butalsonewelitesdrawnfrommassconsumptionsectorsoftheeconomy—massmerchandisers,urbanreal estatemoguls,menfromthenewerinvestmenthouses,clothingand appliancemanufacturers,andbankerscateringtosmalldepositors— thatstoodtogainfromRoosevelt’sregulatoryandredistributionist policies.Thisallianceofpopularsocialmovementsandreform-minded

elitestogethererectedaNewDealorderinwhichthestatemanaged capitalismtoensurecorporateproﬁtability,highwages,andsocialwelfareforthoseunabletoliveofftheirownlabor.21

Other,olderelitesalsoaccommodatedthemselvestotheNewDeal andfoundwaystoexercisepoliticalinﬂuenceinthisliberalage.The mostcelebratedwastheEstablishment,afragmentoftheProgressive EraplutocracythatkeptitswealthanditswitsduringtheGreatDepression.ThesecirclesdidnotfallintotherabidhostilitytotheNew Dealthatcharacterizedtheplutocracyingeneral.Instead,itsmembers foundawaytodemarcatethemselvesfromtheRoosevelthaters,to nurturelinkstotheNewDealers,and,whenwarcameinthe1940s,to exerciseextraordinaryinﬂuenceinforeignaffairs.

Wherethe“robberbarons”hadnotraditiontospeakof,andthe Morganmilieustillgaveprecedencetoprivateoverpublicconcerns, theEstablishmentcamecloserthananythingelsesincethefirstfifty yearsoftherepublictodefiningitselfintermsofpublicservice.As LearsandHodgsonmakeclear,itsmemberswerepatriciansinthe manneroftheantebellummerchantgrandeesandVirginiaplanters, convincedthattheirwealth,education,anddisinterestednesshadendowedthemwithaspecialcapacityforrule.Theydislikedthemessy worldofmasspoliticsbutfoundwaystotolerateorcircumventit.Ultimately,however,thearroganceoftheEstablishment,anditsdisdain forpopularpoliticsinanageinfusedwithdemocraticdesire,notjustin theUnitedStatesbutthroughoutthedisintegratingEuropeancolonial world,diditin.

WhilethisremnantoftheMorgan-erarulinggroupprosperedduringtheNewDeal,sotoodidaregionalsouthernelite.Itsrisenotonly exempliﬁesthecycleofelitesuccessionandadaptation,butalsobrings usfacetofacewiththelatestincarnationofthatpenchantforcounterrevolutionthatformssodistinctiveapartofthestoryofelites throughoutAmericanhistory.AsLinddemonstrates,Rooseveltneeded southernsupporttobringhisNewDealorderintobeing;inreturn, liberalNewDealersagreedtoallowprevailingclassandracialhierar-

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chiesintheSouthtostand.Moreover,theNewDealundertookavast programofstatecapitalismtoprovidewater,electricity,andatransportationinfrastructuretotheSouth,Southwest,andWest.ThisprogramtiedRooseveltandhisColdWarDemocraticsuccessorseven morecloselytosouthernlandlordsandrawmaterialsproducers.Meanwhile,theColdWarincubatedaneweliteofweaponsmanufacturers thatPresidentEisenhowersofamouslydescribedasthemilitary-industrialcomplex.Fewmembersofeitherofthesetwogroupseverdemonstratedthecommitmenttosocialwelfareandgovernmentregulation ofbusiness(nottomentionracialequality)oftheirnortheasternand midwesternpartnersintheNewDealalliance.Thosepoliticalcontradictionsexplodedinthe1960sand1970s.

DefeatinVietnam,theU.S.lossofglobaleconomicsupremacyin the1970s,theelectionofRonaldReaganin1980,andthedifﬁculttransitiontoapostindustrialcomputerandinformationeconomytogether constitutethenation’smostrecentmomentofelitecrisisandsuccession.Lindsurveysthechanginglandscapeofwealthandpowerduring thistimeandshowshowthepetroleum,agribusiness,rawmaterials, andmilitaryelitesintheSouthandSouthwestthathadbeennurtured bytheNewDealshookfreeofthisliberalpoliticalformationandcoalescedaroundaparty(theRepublicans)andanideology(conservatism)dedicatedtofreeingcapitalismfromstateregulation.Lindalerts ustothepossibilityofideologicalandculturalreversionamongrising centersofpowerforwhomthenakedpursuitofself-interestissynonymouswiththegeneralwelfare.Compoundthatself-regardwithfundamentalistreligiouszealotry,andthestoryofthisrulingelite’sformationtakesastrange,unexpectedturnindeed.Lindexplainshowa counterrevolutionaryimpulse,alreadydetectableinthe1940s,eventuallysucceededinunderminingtheethosofsocialresponsibilitythat onceanimatedtheNewDealcoalition.Thisimpulsealsodamagedthe labormovement,widenedthegapbetweenrichandpoor,andweakenedthewelfarestate.

Eliteruleinanominallydemocraticpoliticalsystemseemstogener-

atecounterrevolutioninrecurringwaves.Bycounterrevolutionwe meanelitecampaignstorollbackorcontaindemocraticadvances. AmericancounterrevolutionisnottobeunderstoodintheclassicalEuropeansense,inwhichdominantsocialgroupsareassumedtoexistalready,togovernformoreorlesslongstretchesoftime,tobechallengedfrombelow,andthentoﬁghtback.Here,bycontrast,asoften asnot,rulinggroupsseemtocohereintheﬁrstplaceinordertostave offdemocraticadvances.WeseethislogicatworkasKornblithand Murrinexplainthecomingtogetherofthenewcountry’sregionalrulinggroupsintheirjointcreationoftheAmericanrepublic.TheConstitution,inparticular,wasmeanttoarrestthedevolutionofpower downwardandoutwardintothemiddlingranksofthepostcolonial world.GildedAgeindustrialtitanswerelikewisedrivenintothepoliticalarenaonlybysocialupheavalsonthelandandpopulareruptionsin thegreatcities.Itwas,moreover,thechallengeofpopulismin1896, morethanthegiantcorporateamalgamationsattheturnofthecentury,whichimplantedanationwideclassconsciousnessamongthepeopleDawleyandLearswriteabout.Theideologicalconvictionandculturalself-consciousnessoftoday’sconservativeelitesderive,Lindtells us,fromtheirdeterminationtoreversewhattheyregardastherevolutionarymomentumoftheNewDeal.

Counterrevolutionisfarfromthewholestory.Jefferson’saccommodationwithpopularrulewasreal,notsimulated,asMurrinand Kornblithnote.TheconservativetemperamentoftheMorganelite doesnotcanceloutthereorganizationandmodernizingoftheeconomythattookplaceonitswatch,asDawleymakesclear.“Oldmoney” patricianssuchasthetwoRooseveltsattemptedtopoliceandhumanizethemarketplaceand,intheprocess,earnedtheundyinghatredof theirpeersas“traitorstotheirclass.”WhiletheEstablishment,in GodfreyHodgson’sview,workedtoconstrainordefeatrevolutionary movementsfornationalindependenceallovertheworld,italsoerected aframeworkofmultilateralrelationswhoserecentdismantlingislamentedbymillionsinAmericaandabroad.U.S.elites,then,have

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shownacapacityforreformaswellasforanenduringreactionagainst reform.

BeginningwithJefferson’selectionin1800,thosewhoseektogovern,whatevertheireliteprovenance,howeverdevotedtothedistinct interestsoftheirownmilieu,havefeltitincreasinglynecessarytodefendwhattheyaredoingasaformofgeneralliberation.FurthercomplicatingourabilitytounderstandAmericanpatternsofdemocratic containmentisthetendencyofthoserulinggroupstorelyonalanguageofdemocracyandfreedom.Thisﬁllsthepoliticalairwiththe soundsofculturaldissonance.Atnotime,perhaps,hasthisbeen clearerthanatpresent,wheneveryoverturetodismantletheapparatus ofpublicsurveillanceoverthebusinesssystemispresentedasaform ofemancipationfromthetyrannicalhandofbureaucracy.InAmerica, evenrulingeliteshavelearnedtolive,ifreluctantly,bythedemocratic imperative.Nomatterhowextravagantlypopulisttheirlanguagemay become,however,thefootprintofwealthandpowerisclearlyvisible acrossthewholespanofAmericanhistory.

1 TheDilemmasofRulingElites inRevolutionaryAmerica 4

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TheAmericanRevolutionbecameabattlegroundbetweentwopowerful,risingforces:thegrowingexclusivityandsenseofentitlementof colonialelites,andtheemergingegalitarianism,especiallyofthe“middlingsort”whowerejustbeginningtomasterthenewlanguageof naturalrights.Boththeaspirationsoftheelitesandthehopesofthose whoresistedthemderivedinlargepartfromGreatBritain.Much ofwhatthesesettlersfromverydifferentcolonieshadincommon stemmedfromtheirwillingnesstoanglicizetheircultureandsociety throughouttheeighteenthcentury.1

In1760therewasno“America,”no“South,”andno“North.”The riceplantersofSouthCarolinaandGeorgiaseldominteractedwiththe tobaccoplantersofVirginiaandMaryland.InNorthCarolina,theone colonyinwhichthoseculturescoexisted,theresultwasbitterconﬂict betweenthem,notarecognitionofacommonidentityamongslaveholdingplanters.Becauseslaveryexistedinallthecolonies,contemporariesdidnotyetseeasharpcontrastbetweenslaveandfreesocieties. TheRevolutionwouldcreatenotjustanewnationbutdistinctive

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regionswithinthatnation.Theelitefamilieswhosurvivedthatstrugglewouldalsohavetodiscoverwhethertheycouldbecomearuling class.Didtheyshareenoughincommontocohereasanationalgoverningelitedespitethesectionaldifferencesthatwerebecomingever moreobvious?Inthe1790samostlynortherneliteseemedcloseto achievingthisgoal,onlytoloseitspowerin1800,butnotitseconomic resources,toacoalitionofsouthernplantersandnorthernmiddling people.ThatcoalitionlargelydeﬁnedwhatAmericawouldbeuntilthe CivilWar.IntheNorth,whichbegantogeneratemuchgreaterextremesofwealththanhadexistedinthecolonialperiod,economicand politicalpowerwereincreasinglyexercisedbydifferentelites.Inthe South,greatplantersretainedpowerinbothspheres,especiallyonthe stageofnationalpolitics.

Butin1760,followingtheBritishEmpire’sconquestofNew France,thecolonistslookedforwardtoafutureofpeaceandprosperity,andmanysettlersrejoicedintheaccessionofanew,youthfulking, GeorgeIII,whosepronouncementsinfavorofvirtueandpietyelicited awarmresponse.Virtuallynoneofthemanticipatedthat,withinﬁfteenyears,theywouldbeengagedinadesperatestruggleagainstthe sameBritisharmyandnavythathadledthemtovictoryagainst France.2

Anglicization

SinceEngland’sGloriousRevolutionof1688–89,theBritishstatehad achievedalevelofmilitarymightunparalleledintheprevioushistory ofitsislandpeoples.TheRoyalNavywasthestrongestintheworld, andwhilethearmywasmuchsmallerthanthoseofFrance,theHapsburgEmpire,Russia,orevenPrussia,itmorethanhelditsowninthe overseasstrugglethatbeganinNorthAmericain1754andengulfed evendistantIndiabeforeitwasover.TheBritishﬁscalsystem,anchoredintheBankofEngland,madethesetriumphspossible.Ata morebasiclevel,whatheldeverythingtogetherwastheBritishruling

class,firmlyrootedinthemonarchy,withitsabilitytoelicitdeference, distributepatronageandhonors,andcommandthearmedforces;inthe titledaristocracy,organizedpoliticallyintheHouseofLords;andin thegentry,wealthylandownerswholivedontheirrentsanddominated theHouseofCommonswhilesharingsomeseatswithaffluentmerchants,lawyers,armyandnavyofficers,andevenafewcolonials, mostlyabsenteeWestIndianplanters.By1760theBritishrulingclass wasoneofthemostdominatingforcesintheentireworld.3

OverthesamesevendecadestheNorthAmericancolonieshad grownfromperhaps210,000peopletonearly1.6million.In1690colonialofficeholderslackedtheresourcesandprestigetosetthemselves apartasarulingclass,evenonalocallevel.Almostnoneofthemlived inanythingmorethanamodesthouse,andmanyofthemstillworked withtheirhands.Thecoloniespossessedalmostnothingthatalater generationwouldrecognizeasrefinement,althoughforthatmatter Englandtoolaggedfarbehinditscontinentalrivalsinnearlyallforms ofartisticexpressionexceptliterature.Butbythe1760s,GeorgianarchitectureandEnglishpaintingandmusichadsoaredahead,whilein NorthAmericaeverycolonycouldboastthatitpossessedsomeelegant houses,thatpolitelettersweredefinitelytakinghold,andthatafew Americanpaintershadbecomesotalentedthattheycouldthrivein London,asdidBenjaminWestand,afewyearslater,JohnSingleton Copley.Becausethesizeofthelegislaturesinmostcoloniesgrew muchmoreslowlythanthepopulationatlarge,manyofthepeople whooccupiedthoseseatsweremuchmoreaffluentandrefinedthan theirpredecessorshadbeenin1690,buttheywerestillfarshortoflevelsofwealthconcentrationinBritain.Therethetop1percentcontrolledalmost45percentofthewealth,andthetop10percentcontrolled82percent.Inthecolonies,thecomparablefigureswere13 percentcontrolledbytherichest1percent,and51percentbythe wealthiest10percent.Despitethiscontrast,inthemiddledecadesof theeighteenthcentury,family,socialprominence,wealth,education, officeholding,andpretensionstogentilitywerebeginningtoconverge TheDilemmasofRulingElitesinRevolutionaryAmerica

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morecloselyuponafairlysmallnumberoffamiliesineachcolony thanatanyothertimeinthehistoryoftheAmericanpeople,andby 1760,freecolonistsweremoreovertlyloyaltoBritainthantheyhad everbeenbefore.4

Asof1760thecolonieswerestillquitediverse.Theirmodesofproductionsetthemapartfromoneanother.Thericeandindigoplanters ofthelowerSouthdominatedapopulationmostofwhomwereenslavedAfricans.InVirginiaandMaryland,wheretobaccohadallbut definedbothcolonieswellintotheeighteenthcentury,slaveswerea majorityinsometidewatercountiesbutnotineithercolonyasawhole, andtheriseofwheatasasecondcropandthegrowthofshipbuilding werebringinggreatereconomicdiversitytotheregion.Pennsylvania, NewYork,andNewJerseythrivedontheexportofwheatandflour. NewEngland,bysomemeasuresthepoorestregionofBritishNorth America,builtmoreshipsthantherestofthecoloniescombined,sustainedaveryactivefishery,andturnedtheregion’sdependenceon WestIndiantradeintoanopportunitytocreateasizablerumdistilling industry,butcouldnotraiseenoughcerealcropstofeedtheregion’s population.5

Ifmodesofproductionhighlightedhowthecoloniesdifferedfrom oneanother,patternsofconsumptionrevealedwaysinwhichthey werebecomingmorealike.BetweentheGloriousRevolutionandthe 1730s,populationgrewmorerapidlythantheabilityofindividualsettlerstoconsumeBritishgoods.After1730or1740,whilepopulation continuedtoexpandatanexplosiverate,thepercapitaconsumption ofBritishgoodsalsobegantorise.Astheirwealthincreased,elites throughoutthecoloniesactivelyemulatedthestandardsofGreatBritain’spolitesociety.NewspaperskepttheminformedofeventsinEurope,andnewspaperadsremindedthemwhatenticinggoodswere availabletothosewhocouldaffordthem.Muchofthissortofconspicuousdisplayalsobegantoaffectthemiddlingclasses.Apassionfor Georgianarchitecturemeantthatreﬁnedcolonialsby1760wereliving inhousesthatwerefarmorealikethananythingavailabletotheiran-

cestors,whohaddevelopedquitedistinctvernacularstyles.Theeighteenthcenturyalsowitnessedadramaticriseinthenumberofprofessionalmen—educatedlawyers,physicians,andministersofthegospel. Forthemostpart,untilmid-century,southerncoloniesimportedtheir professionalsfromBritainorsenttheiryoungmenacrosstheAtlantic toacquireaprofessionaleducation.NewEngland,withtwocolleges after1701andfourbythe1770s,overwhelminglytraineditsown.The MiddleColonies,wherethreecollegeswerefoundedinthedecadeafter 1746andafourthshortlybeforeindependence,wereshiftingfromthe southernpatterntowardNewEngland’s.6

Inshort,eventhoughthepopulationofthecolonieswasbecoming ethnicallyandraciallymuchmorediversethroughouttheeighteenth century,theseprovincesanglicizedinstrikingways.TheirelectedassembliesemulatedtheBritishHouseofCommons.Eventhelanguage ofpoliticswasmostlyborrowedfromGreatBritain.Twostrainsof thoughtcriticaltotheRevolutionarygenerationcameratherlateto NorthAmerica.Countryideology,orwhatalatergenerationwould call“republicanism,”wasborrowedmostlyfromBritishopposition spokesmenwhothrivedbetween1700and1740,whowarned,oftenin shrilllanguage,thatlibertycannotsurviveforlonginasocietythatallowsitsgovernmenttobecomehopelesslycorrupt.Thelanguageof naturalrightsarrivedevenlater,inthemiddledecadesoftheeighteenthcentury.Seventeenth-centurycolonistshadspokenoftheir“liberties,”andonlyoccasionallyoftheirrights.After1760thecolonistswouldbecomealmostobsessedwithdeﬁningandprotectingtheir rights.JohnLocke’s SecondTreatiseofGovernment hadattractedlittle attentioninthecolonieswhenitwaspublishedaftertheGloriousRevolution,butitsdaywascoming.Inmanyimportantways,thecolonies hadtobecomemoreself-consciouslyBritishbeforetheywouldbeable torecognizeoneanotheras“American.”7

Thesharpincreaseinconsumergoods,theimprovementofcommunicationsandeducation,andthedeterminationofthe“bettersort”to setthemselvesofffromthe“meanersort”didcreateanincipientclass

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systeminthecolonies.NoprovincehadahereditarypeeragecomparabletoEngland’s,Scotland’s,orIreland’s,butinVirginiatheofficeof councilloroftendidpassfromfathertosonintheeighteenthcentury, providedtheCrownapproved.InmanyNewEnglandtownsthemost importantofficeswerecontrolledmostofthetimebyasmallnumberoffamilies,andbythethirdquarterofthecenturythosewhosatin colonialassemblieswereusuallywealthyoratleastwell-to-doand thoughtofthemselvesasgentlemen.Theclasssystemremainedfluid enoughtoadmitsomenewcomerstotheemergingeliteclasses,suchas JohnAdamsinMassachusettsandBenjaminFranklininPennsylvania.8

Societiesacquireaclassstructurewhentheydevelopasignificantly asymmetricaldistributionofwealthandpower,andespeciallywhen thewealthiestpeoplealsocontrolthemostimportantpoliticaloffices. Inallofthecoloniessomemenhadbeenwealthierormorepowerful thanothers,butquiteoftenotherasymmetrieshadbeenequallyimportantorevenmoresignificant.Inseventeenth-centuryMassachusetts, whetheramanwasamemberoftheCongregationalChurchmattered morethanhiswealth.Bythe1650sagrowingnumberofaffluent Bostonmerchantswereineligibleforcolony-wideofficebecausethey hadneverhadaconversionexperiencethatwouldqualifythemasfull churchmembers.AftertheGloriousRevolution,wealthymerchants exercisedfarmorepoliticalpower.InNewYork,ethnicandreligious loyaltiesoftencountedformorethanwealthalone.Pennsylvaniaby themiddleoftheeighteenthcenturyhadtwoelites.OnewasQuaker, anditsmembersdominatedthecolony’sassembly.Theotherwas mostlyAnglican,withsomePresbyterians,anditsmembersincreasinglydominatedexecutiveandjudicialoffices.Thetwoelitesseldom socializedanddidnotintermarry.9

SlaveholderspresidedoverthemostasymmetricalpowerrelationshipsinNorthAmerica.Virginia’sgreatplanterscameascloseasBritishAmericacouldgettoatruerulingclass,butbecauseVirginiaremainedacolony,manyimportantdecisionswerestillmadeinLondon orbygovernorssentfromLondon.Relationsbetweengreatplanters

andlessersettlersgrewmorecordialfromabout1720to1740,partly becausegreatplanterstooktheirmagisterialresponsibilitiesquiteseriouslybutseldommadeanyseveredemandsonsmallplanters.Virginia hadbecome,ineffect,aparticipatoryoligarchyinwhich,everyseven years,thegentlemencandidatesproclaimedthemselvestheservantsof thepeople,andthepeoplethenelected(orreelected)themtothe HouseofBurgesses.Smallplantershadalmostnochanceofwinning highofﬁce,butmanywhovotedwererewardedwithlesserpositions.10

SouthCarolina’sLowCountryplanterswerewealthierthantheir Virginiacounterpartsbutexercisedlittlecontroloverthegrowing backcountrysettlementswheremostwhitepeoplelivedbythe1760s. Theplanters’relationshipwiththeirﬁeldslaveswasmoredistantthan similarrelationsbetweenplantersandslavesinVirginia,whichwere activelyandoftenoppressivelypaternalistic.Plantersandoverseers closelysupervisedthegangsthattoiledtoraisetobacco,butwhitemen whospentmuchtimeinthericemarsheswerelikelytocatchmalaria. BytheRevolution,ricewasgrownthroughthetasksystem,inwhich eachlaborerhadadailyquotatofulﬁll,afterwhichhistimewashis(or her)own.11

Aroundmid-century,signsofclasstensionsbegantomultiplyinthe mainlandcolonies.Extensivelandriotsbrokeoutinbothnorthern NewJerseyandNewYork’sHudsonValley.InBoston,NewYork City,andPhiladelphia,povertyincreasedmarkedlyduringandafter themid-centurywarswithFrance,andthetoneofpoliticaldebatebecamemuchsharperandmorecontentiousinBritishAmerica’sthree largestcities.12

Revolution

NorthAmerica’selitefamiliesbelievedthattheyservedthepeoplebut derivedmuchoftheirlegitimacyfromtheCrown.Inroyalcolonies, publicofﬁcesconferredtitlesonthegentlemenwhoheldthem.“His Excellency,”“Honorable,”and“Esquire”allderivedfromtheCrown,

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theultimatesourceofpublichonorsthroughouttheempire.OpenresistancetoBritishpolicycouldcostacolonialleaderanyfurtherchance ofroyalfavor.Completeacceptanceofroyaldemands,however,could arousethewrathofthepopulace.Between1763and1776,nearlyevery publicofﬁcialwascompelledtochoosebetweentheseunpleasantalternatives.Thosewhobecameloyalistswerenearlyalwaysforcedtoresigntheirofﬁcesandwereoftendrivenintoexile.Thosewhobecame patriotshadtoappealtothepeopleforthekindoflegitimacythe Crownhadonceprovidedandhopethattheirownwealthandsocial positionwouldallowthemtocontinuetoenjoypublicrespect.13

TheStampActCrisisof1764–1766demonstratedthatgentlemen, the“middlingsort,”andeventhe“lowersort”couldcooperateeffectivelytoachieveapoliticalgoaltheyallshared,butitalsorevealed howperiloustheseattemptscouldbecome.Colonialgentlemenwrote closelyreasonedpamphletsandresolutionsofprotestagainstthe StampAct.By1765theyagreedthatParliamenthadnoconstitutional powertotaxthecolonistswithouttheirconsent.Nearlyallofthem alsoagreedthat,onceParliamenthadspoken,thecolonistsmustobey. Theycouldpetitionforaredressofgrievancesbutnotresistopenly.

Boston’s“middlingsort”(especiallythe“LoyalNine,”whowould soontakethename“SonsofLiberty”)andthe“meanersort,”inparticularamobledbyEbenezerMcIntosh,ashoemakerfromtheSouth End,showedthemotherwise.OnAugust14,1765,McIntoshandhis followersleveledanewbuilding(rumoredtobethestampoffice)belongingtoAndrewOliver,whohadbeenappointedstampdistributor fortheprovince,thenmarchedonOliver’shome,wheretheydid enoughdamagetoconvincehimthattheywereserious.Heresigned hisposition,andthisexamplesoonspreadtotheothercolonies.Bythe timetheStampActwassupposedtotakeeffectonNovember1,noone wasavailabletodistributethestampsinanyofthethirteencoloniesexceptGeorgia,andthatcolonysoonjoinedtheothertwelveafteritsdistributoralsofled.Mobviolence,orthethreatofviolence,nullifiedthe StampActandforcedtheBritishgovernmenttochoosebetweenrepeal

andcivilwarinNorthAmerica.Usingmostlyeconomicjustiﬁcations, Parliamentrepealedtheact.14

Violencecouldachievespectacularresults,butitcouldalsogetout ofcontrol.OnAugust26McIntosh’smobvirtuallydemolishedthe BostonmansionofLieutenantGovernorandChiefJusticeThomas Hutchinson,atalosstohimofseveralthousandpounds.MostBostoniansbelieved,mistakenly,thatHutchinsonwasoneoftheauthorsof theStampAct,wheninfacthehadarguedagainstitspassageinletters toBritishofficials.TheflagrantdestructionofHutchinson’sproperty shockedrespectableopinion,andthemilitiafinallytooktothestreets torestoreorder.Nevertheless,thetownalsomadeitclearthatitwould toleratenojudicialretributionfortheAugust14riot,whichmeant,in effect,thatMcIntoshwouldneverbeprosecuted.15

TheBostonriotthatdestroyedHutchinson’shousetriggeredan equallyviolentoutburstinNewport,RhodeIsland,whereamobdestroyedthehomesoftwodefendersoftheStampAct,whosoonﬂed thecolony;butafterforcingthestampdistributortoresign,themob threatenedtoturnagainstthecity’selite,whohadbeenorganizingresistancetotheStampAct.Forseveraldaysclasswarseemedarealpossibility,untilthemobleaderwasarrested.16

InNewYork,aftertheStampActwasrepealed,angrytenantfarmersadoptedtherhetoricofthecity’sSonsofLiberty,manyofwhom wereartisans,whentheylaunchedamassiveprotestagainstthegreat landlordsoftheHudsonValley,eventhreateningtokillthelordof LivingstonManorandtomarchonNewYorkCitytoattackothers. SomeoftheSonsofLibertywereconnectedpoliticallytothegreat landlords,andtheydemandedtheuseofredcoatstosuppresstherioters.OneoftheSons,JohnMorinScott,evenservedonthejurythat condemnedWilliamPrendergasttodeathastheleadingrioter,althoughGeorgeIIIlaterpardonedtheman.Urbanartisansandtenantfarmersoftenhadreasontoresenttheirsocialsuperiors,butpersuadingthemtoworktogetherinacommonpoliticalcausewasno easymatter.Manytenantshadlearnedtoexpectmoresympathyfrom

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GeorgeIIIthanfromsuchpatriotleadersasthewealthyLivingston clan.17

Charleston,SouthCarolina,alsodiscoveredthatpopulardemonstrationscouldbedangerouslycontagious.Afterwhitesmarched throughthestreetschanting“Liberty!”theywerelatershockedtowitnessslavesalsoparadingthroughthestreetsshouting“Liberty!”More thanahundredslavesthentriedtoescape.ResistancetoBritishmeasuresdidindeedcreatestrongcriticismsofslavery.Betweenindependenceand1804,everynorthernstatewouldtakestepstoabolishslavery,eitherimmediatelyorgradually.18

Inthelate1760sbothCarolinaswererockedbywhatcontemporariescalled“regulator”movements.(Acenturylatersuchmenwouldbe called“vigilantes.”)InSouthCarolina,ruralturbulencealmostledto anarmedclashbetweentwogroupsofseveralhundredmen,eachwith itsownformulaforrestoringorder,beforetheprovincialgovernment intervenedbypromisingtocreateacircuitcourtsystemfortheentire colony.NorthCarolina’sdiscontentrevolvedaroundthecorruptionof magistratesandsheriffsinseveralinteriorcounties,andviolentprotestsagainstthemﬁnallyledtoapitchedbattleatAlamanceCreekin 1771,whenamusteringofabouttwothousandpoorlyarmedregulatorswasoverwhelmedbyasmallerbutbetter-armedforcefromthe easterncounties,commandedbytheroyalgovernor.

FromNewYorkthroughtheCarolinas,ruraldiscontentseethed dangerouslyasthecolonieslurchedtowardtheﬁnalimperialcrisiswith GreatBritain.Asthatcrisisunfolded,mostcolonistsdecided,manyafterprolongedhesitation,thatthedangerfromCrownandParliament outweighedwhatthecolonistshadtofearfromoneanother.Yet roughlyone-sixthofthesettlerschosetoremainloyaltoGeorgeIII, andsouthofNewEngland,moreenslavedAfricans—whengivena politicalchoice—sawBritishsoldiers,nottheAmericanrevolutionaries,astheirpotentialliberators.19

Royalauthoritybrokedownin1774–75aftermostgovernorsdissolvedtheirassembliesandrefusedtosummonnewones.Thesettlers

respondedbyelectingwhattheycalled“provincialcongresses”or “conventions,”whichwereusuallymuchlargerbodiesthatcontained sizablecontingentsofthe“middlingsort.”PotentialsectionaldifferencesfailedtopredominatebecauseVirginiansjoinedwithNewEnglandersinleadingthetransitionfromresistancetoindependence,while theﬁvecoloniesfromNewYorkthroughMarylanddisplayedthemost reluctancetoleavetheempire.Therestillwasno“South”andno “North,”but“America”wasinthemaking.

Classantagonismswerealsomuted,exceptwhenaimedatwealthy loyalists.TheFirstContinentalCongress,whichmetinPhiladelphiain thefallof1774,createdthe“Association”—electivecommitteesatthe locallevelthatwerechargedwithenforcingtradesanctionsagainst Britainandpurgingordiscipliningthosewhorefusedtosupportthe emergingRevolutionarycause.DuringthesemonthstheAmerican countrysidemobilizedpoliticallywithanintensityneverseenbefore. Asintheseventeenthcentury,the“middlingsort”oncemorebeganto holdsignificantpublicoffices,thistimewithanewsenseofentitlement providedbythelanguageofnaturalrights,buttheywerealsowilling toaccepttheleadershipofmenfromprominentfamilieswhosuccessfullyarticulatedtheirgrievancesandtheirgoals.Patriotelitesapproachedindependenceconfidentoftheirabilitytoleadandinspirea societyoffreemencommittedtoassertingtheirnaturalrights.Gentlemenpatriotsweredelightedandpleasedwiththewaypublicorderheld togetherintheircoloniesbetweenthecollapseofroyalpowerandthe assertionofindependence.ButoncetheBritishwareffortbecame grimlyseriousafterAugust1776,someofthisconfidenceevaporated. Asthecoloniesbecamestateswithformallyorganizedgovernments, andastheimperativesofwarimpingeduponthem,tensionsagain emergedbetweengentlemenandlessercitizens.InbothNewYorkand Maryland,forexample,thewealthydiscoveredthattheycouldnotlead politicallyunlesstheyacceptednewtaxesthatsoakedtherich.20

AfamousincidentduringtheRevolutionaryWarrevealedthedifferentassumptionsaboutclassthatseparatedtheemergingelite,inthis

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casemostlyofficersoftheContinentalArmy,fromlessprivileged Americans,suchasContinentalenlistedmenandordinarycivilians.In 1781GeneralBenedictArnoldalmostmanagedtobetraytheAmerican fortificationsatWestPointtotheBritish,butinsteadafewAmerican militiamencapturedMajorJohnAndré,theBritishofficerwhohad beennegotiatingwithArnoldandwastryingtoreturntoBritishlines. ArnoldlearnedofAndré’scapturejustintimetoescapetoaBritish warshipontheHudsonRiver,thusleavingAndrétofacealoneamilitarytribunalthatcondemnedhimtodeathasaspywhohadclearly beenbehindAmericanlineswhileoutofuniform.OntheAmerican side,everyonejoinedintheferociouscondemnationofArnoldasa traitorwhodeservedtohang,butassessmentsofAndré’splightfollowedclasslines.AmericanofficersgreatlyadmiredAndré’sfamily credentials,hisgraciousmanners,hisartistictalents(hesketchedan impressiveself-portraitwhileawaitingexecution),andhiscalmacceptanceofhisfate.SomeofthemweptwhenAndréwashanged.Ordinarysoldiers,bycontrast,believedthatAndrégotexactlywhathedeserved.“Ihaveseenseveralmenhung,”notedeighteen-year-oldJohn Shreve,withnosenseofcompassionforthecondemnedvictim,“but heflouncedaboutmorethananyoneIeversaw.”Anothersoldier,informinghiswifethatAndréwouldbehangedat5 p.m.,added,“Thisis thewaywekeepthesabbath,Iwishwecouldemployeverydaytoas goodadvantage.”21

BetweenthecollapseofBritishauthorityin1774andtheratification ofthefederalConstitutionin1788,thesensibilitiesofordinarycitizens seemedtobecarryingthedayinmoststatesmostofthetime.State politicsbecameanarenaofconflictbetweentwoloosecoalitionsof “cosmopolitans”and“localists.”FormerContinentalArmyofficers, mostgreatplanters,mostmerchantsengagedinAtlanticcommerce, mostlawyers,physicians,ministers,printers,andurbanartisansmade upthecosmopolitanbloc.Theywerericherthantheiropponents,and theyyearnedforrecognitionasarespectablerulingelite.Theyfavored

soundmoney,debtcollection,anddecentsalariesforexecutiveofficials andjudges,butlowcompensationforlegislators,presumablysothat onlymenofmeanscouldserveinthatcapacityforlong.Localistsincludedmostordinaryfarmers,formerContinentalsoldiers,manymilitiaveterans(bothofficersandmen)whohadservedinthewar,and small-townorruralartisans.Theyoftenfavoredpapermoney,“stay” lawstopostponethecollectionofdebts,andlowsalariesforgovernors andjudges(positionsthatfewofthemyetaspiredtohold),butsufficientcompensationforlegislatorstopermitmiddlingpeopletoserve. Theywerehighlysuspiciousoftheclassaspirationsofmenintherival coalition.22

Duringthe1780sthelocalistswonsooftenatthestatelevelthatcosmopolitansbegantodespairoftheirownsuccessunlesstheycould somehowcreateamorepowerfulcentralgovernmentandplacethemselvesinapositiontodominateit.Evenwhencosmopolitanswereable tocrushDanielShays’sarmedrebellioninwesternMassachusettsin 1786–87,Shays’ssympathizerselectedenoughrepresentativestothe Massachusettslegislatureafewmonthslatertopassmanyofthereformshehadadvocated.23

Cosmopolitanelitesalsodiscoveredthatsectionalquarrelscoulddestroytheirunityandunderminetheirclassaspirations.Duringthe samemonths,JohnJaytriedtonegotiateatreatywithSpainthatwould havegrantedcommercialconcessionstonorthernstatesinexchange forclosureoftheMississippitoAmericansfortwenty-fiveyears.This proposalsplitCongressalongstrictlysectionallines.Northernstates votedtoapprove,butallfivesouthernstatesopposedthetreatyand thusblockedratificationundertheArticlesofConfederation.The strugglewasfierceenoughtoprovokecallsforbreakinguptheUnion intotwoormoresmallerconfederacies.Whileconfrontingbothclass andsectionalconflict,elitemeninseveralstatesgotCongresstoendorsetheircallforaConstitutionalConvention,whichfinallymetin PhiladelphiabetweenMayandSeptember1787.24

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TheConstitution:FromCounterrevolutiontoRevolution

AtPhiladelphia,America’saspiringelitesﬂirtedwithseveralreactionaryideasbeforedraftingaformofgovernmentthattheybelieved couldlegitimizetheirdesiretorulebysuccessfullyappealingtothe sharedvaluesoftheRevolution.

Two-thirdsofthefifty-fivedelegateswhogatheredinPhiladelphia wererich;three-fifthseithercamefromgenteelfamiliesor,likeNew York’sAlexanderHamilton,hadmarriedintoone.Mosthadservedin Congress,andthreehadbeengeneralsintheContinentalArmy,includingGeorgeWashington,whopresidedovertheconvention’sdeliberations.Thedelegatesagreedtomeetinsecretsessionswithnooutsiderspresent,whichallowedthemtobefarmorecandidaboutthe dangersofpopularrulethantheywouldhavedaredtobeinanopen forum.25

OnMay31,thethirddayofactualdebate,Connecticut’sRoger Sherman,whohadhelpedtodrafttheDeclarationofIndependence, opposedtheelectionofanypartofanationallegislature“bythepeople,insistingthatitoughttobebythe[state]Legislatures.Thepeople hesaid,”accordingtoJamesMadison’snotes,“[immediately]should haveaslittletodoasmaybeabouttheGovernment.Theywantinformationandareconstantlyliabletobemisled.”ElbridgeGerryofMassachusetts,afutureJeffersonianRepublican,agreed.“Theevilsweexperienceﬂowfromtheexcessofdemocracy,”heinsisted.“Hehad... beentoorepublicanbefore:hewasstillhoweverrepublican,buthad beentaughtbyexperiencethedangerofthelevillingspirit.”Bycontrast,Pennsylvania’sJamesWilson,consideredbymanyhistoriansto bequiteconservative,championedpopularelections.“Hewasforraisingthefederalpyramidtoaconsiderablealtitude,and... wishedto giveitasbroadabasisaspossible,”heexplained.“Nogovernment couldlongsubsistwithouttheconﬁdenceofthepeople.”26

Profounddoubtsaboutthecapacityofordinarypeopletoparticipateingovernmentexceptasvotersandjurorshelptoexplaintheearly

proposalsforanewcentralgovernment.Allofthemﬂirtedwithwhat theFrench,inthe1790s,wouldbegintocall“counterrevolution.”

JamesMadison’sVirginiaPlancontainedalmostnoeffectiveseparation ofpowerssuchashadbecomehallmarksoftheNewYorkandMassachusettsconstitutions.AfteraviciouswarinwhichAmericanshaddefeatedparliamentarysovereignty,Madisonwasproposingsomething closetoasovereignparliamentfortheUnitedStates,abicamerallegislaturewithbroad,looselydeﬁnedpowers,includingavetooverstate laws.Inbothhousesthestateswouldberepresentedaccordingtopopulation.SmallstatesrespondedwithWilliamPaterson’sNewJersey Plan.ItproposedtoamendtheexistingArticlesofConfederationby givingtheunicameralcongress,inwhicheachstatehadasinglevote, thepowertolevyimportdutiesandastamptax,thereformsthatParliamenthadtriedtoimposeonthecolonieswiththeSugarandStamp Actsof1764and1765.Ifanystateresistedanactoratreatyadopted byCongress,Patersonproposedthat“thefederalExecutive...beauthorizedtocallforthyepoweroftheConfederatedStates ...toenforceandcompelanobediencetosuchActs,oranobservanceofsuch Treaties,”aprovisionuncomfortablyclosetoLordNorth’sConciliatoryProposition,adoptedbyParliamentin1775andrejectedoutof handbytheSecondContinentalCongress.27

EvenmoreexplicitwasAlexanderHamilton,wholaidoutadetailed planofhisownbutneveroffereditasaformalmotion,probablybecausenootherNewYorkdelegatewouldhavesupportedhim.Hewas almostready“todespairthataRepublicanGovt.couldbeestablished oversogreatanextent”ofterritoryastheUnitedStates.Headded that“theBritishGovt.wasthebestintheworld:andthathedoubted muchwhetheranythingshortofitwoulddoinAmerica.”Heproposedabicamerallegislatureinwhichsenatorswouldbechosenby electoralcollegesandserveforlife;theexecutive,similarlychosen, wouldalsoserveforlifebutwouldbesubjecttoimpeachmentand wouldappointallstategovernors,whointurnwouldhaveanabsolute vetooveralllegislation.Inshort,hismodelforAmericawasroyalgov-

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ernmentprettymuchasithadexistedinNorthAmericabeforethe Revolution.28

BeginninginJuly,severalmajorcompromisesreshapedtheexisting plansofunion,resolvedtheriftbetweenlargeandsmallstates,and persuadedmostdelegatesthatelitesfromdifferentstatesandregions couldsettletheirdifferencesandworktogether.UndertheConnecticut Compromise,theHouseofRepresentativeswouldbeapportionedaccordingtopopulation,butallstateswouldbeequallyrepresentedin theSenate.Freeandslavestatesresolvedtheirprincipaldifferenceby agreeingthat,forpurposesofapportioningbothrepresentativesand directtaxes,aslavewouldcountasthree-ﬁfthsofaperson.Atabout thesametime,theConfederationCongress,sittinginNewYork, passedtheNorthwestOrdinanceof1787,whichprohibitedslavery northoftheOhioRiver.Everysoutherncongressmanpresentforthe votesupportedtheban,whichmayindicatethatNorthandSouthhad reachedacompromisenegotiatedbyboththedelegatesinPhiladelphia andthecongressmeninNewYork,whowereintouchwitheach other.29

ManydelegatestothePhiladelphiaConventionrecognizedthat,in Madison’swords,“theStatesweredividedintodifferentinterestsnot bytheirdifferenceofsize,butbyothercircumstances;themostmaterialofwhichresulted...principallyfrom... theirhavingornothavingslaves.”Thebiggestdifference“didnotliebetweenthelarge& smallStates:itlaybetweentheNorthern&Southern.”Thesedifferencesofinterest,moreover,hadtakenonmoralimplicationsinthe wakeoftheRevolution’scelebrationoflibertyandtheequalityofnaturalrights.AlthoughslaveryremainedlegalacrossmostoftheUnited StateswhenthedelegatesgatheredinPhiladelphia,overtheprevious decadethelegislaturesofthreenorthernstates(Pennsylvania,Rhode Island,andConnecticut)hadinitiatedgradualemancipationschemes, courtsinMassachusettshadfoundslaveryincompatiblewiththestate’s newconstitution,andasimilarprocesswasapparentlytakingholdin

NewHampshire.Basinghisenumerationonsocialratherthanlegal conditions,Madisoncountedﬁvesouthernandeightnorthernstatesin 1787.WhenGouverneurMorris,RufusKing,andothernortherndelegatesboldlyquestionedwhetherrepublicanprinciplescouldbereconciledwiththeperpetuationofslavery,delegatesfromSouthCarolina madeclearthattheprotectionofchattelbondageinthelowerSouth wasanonnegotiableprerequisiteforcontinentalunion.ProminentVirginiansmayhavefeltuneasyabouttheethicalbasisoftheinstitution, butSouthCarolinadelegatesacknowledgednoqualms.“Ifslaverybe wrong,”CharlesPinckneydeclared,“itisjustiﬁedbytheexampleof theworld...Inallagesone halfofmankindhavebeenslaves.”30

Thesizeofcongressionaldistrictsprovidedanotherpotentiallycontentiousissue.AtatimewhentheMassachusettsHouseofRepresentativeshadovertwohundredmembersandVirginia’sHouseofDelegateshadmorethanonehundred,theconventionagreedthattheFirst FederalCongress,representingtheentirenation,wouldhaveonly sixty-ﬁvemenintheHouseandthat,afterafederalcensushadbeen taken,theHousewouldbeapportionedwithonecongressmanforeverythirtythousandpeople.Thedelegatesbelievedthatthisrequirementwouldalmostguaranteeafederallegislaturecomposedofgentlemen.In1787,whenBostonandBaltimorecombinedhadscarcelythirty thousandpeople,thenamesofveryfew“middlingmen”wouldeven berecognizablebypeoplelivinginanareathatlarge.Gentlemen wouldbeabletoviewithothergentlemenforthehonorofserving theirdistricts.31

Intheratiﬁcationstruggle,bothsidesunderstoodwhatthatclause meant.Madisonwastryingtoshiftpowerfromthemiddletowardthe topofthesocialpyramid,butasMelanctonSmith,anarticulateNew YorkAntifederalist,insisted,“Thoseinmiddlingcircumstances,”not theelite,“havelesstemptation;theyareinclinedbyhabit,andthe companywithwhomtheyassociate,tosetboundstotheirpassionsand appetites.”So“whentheinterestofthispartofthecommunityispur-

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sued,thepublicgoodispursued,”heexplained,“becausethebodyof everynationconsistsofthisclass,andbecausetheinterestsofboththe richandthepoorareinvolvedinthatofthemiddlingclass.”32

Intheirlasttwomonthsofdeliberation,thedelegatespaidfarmore attentiontowhatthevoterswouldacceptthantotheirownformulas foraperfectplanofgovernment.Madison’snearlysovereignparliamentforAmericagavewaytoagovernmentwithaclearseparationof powers,alegislaturewithcarefullyspeciﬁedpowers,andamuchgentler“SupremeLawoftheLand”clausetoreplacehisproposedveto overstatelaws.TheConstitution,mostdelegatesnowinsisted,grew outofthecentralvaluesoftheRevolution.

Thedelegatesalsoincorporatedatrulyrevolutionaryproposalinto thenewConstitution,theratificationclause.TheArticlesofConfederationcouldbeamendedonlywiththeunanimousapprovalofall thirteenstatelegislatures.Inthetwomostseriousattemptstoamend theArticles—theproposedimpostsof1781and1783—RhodeIsland haddefeatedthefirstone,andtheNewYorkSenatebyamarginof elevenvotestosevenhadscuttledthesecond.Elevenstateshadbicamerallegislatures;onlyPennsylvaniaandGeorgiawereunicameral.This meantthat,asmandatedbytheArticles,theConstitution,whichwas farmorecontroversialthantheimpostproposals,wouldhavetobeapprovedbytwenty-fourdistinctlegislativehouses.Undertheexisting rules,ithadnochanceofratification.33

Accordingly,thefirstdraftoftheVirginiaPlancalledforratification bypopularconventionsspecificallychosenforthatpurposealone. WithinaweekJamesWilsonwentmuchfurther.AccordingtoMadison,hehopedtheratificationclausewould“admitof ...apartialunion,withadooropenfortheaccession[oftheotherstates].” CharlesPinckneythensuggestedthatratificationbyninestatesbesufficienttolaunchthenewgovernment.34

IncorporatedintoArticleVIIoftheConstitution,thisratiﬁcation procedurewasindeedrevolutionary.Itamountedtoanillegaloverthrowoftheexistinglegalorder.IntheNortheastbetweenSeptember

1787,whentheconventionfinisheditswork,andthesummerof1788, popularmajoritiesagainstratificationexistedin,amongothers,New Hampshire,Massachusetts,RhodeIsland(wherehardlyanybodyfavoredit),andNewYork.TheWilson-Pinckneystrategymighthave producedaverydifferentAmericanunion,onethatleftoutNewYork andnearlyallofNewEngland.Or,toputthequestionmoreprovocatively,supportersofratificationwerewillingtoriskdestroyingthe Unioninordertosaveandstrengthenit.Theydidnotthinkthatthe bankruptConfederationcouldsurvivemuchlonger.Theybelieved thatthecollapseoftheUnionwouldbeacatastrophe,onethatwould “Balkanize”Americanpolitics,touseaphrasenotthencurrent.Their revolutionarystepseemedworththegamble.Asriskyasthestrategy undoubtedlywas,nothingelseheldanequalpromiseofsuccess.35

AsthedelegatesleftPhiladelphia,theybegantocallthemselves Federalists,awordthatuntilthenhadreferredtoadvocatesofdecentralizedgovernmentandthattheyhopedwoulddisguisethedegreeof centralizationtheywereproposing.Theirratificationstrategyworked becausetheypossessedatremendousasset:theycouldappealtothe highestvaluesoftheRevolutionandproclaimthemastheirown.They invokedthesovereignty,notofgovernmentatanylevel,butofthe peoplethemselves,whohadalreadybestowedspecificpowersoneach oftheirstategovernmentsandnowwouldbesimilarlyendowingthe newfederalgovernment.Ratificationbyspecialconventions,which hadastrongprecedentinthepopularacceptanceoftheMassachusetts Constitutionof1780,madethisprincipleconcreteandeffective,andit gavethefederalConstitutionalegitimacythattheArticlesofConfederationhadneverachieved.Butifratificationwasatrulyrevolutionary process,itwasalsononviolent.TheFederalistsknewthattheyhadto persuade thebroadAmericanpublictogivetheirnewsystemafair chance.Theseeffortssucceeded.Indeed,Wilson’sstrategyofestablishingthenewgovernmentbeforeallthestateshadratifiedworkedas hehadhoped.Thefederalgovernmentwasorganizedaftereleven statesratified,andthenNorthCarolinaandRhodeIslandalsosigned

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on.By1790thefederalConstitutionhadﬁnallyachievedtheunanimousratiﬁcationbythestatesthattheArticlesofConfederationrequired.36

Intheratiﬁcationstruggle,mosturbanartisansandprinterssupportedtheConstitution,whilemostordinaryfarmersremainedsuspiciousorhostile.TheseparateelitesofAmericawereunitingbehind theConstitutioninamannerthattheyhopedwouldpullthemtogether whilekeepingthemiddlingandlowerordersdividedamongthemselves.Butthemenabouttotakechargeofthenewgovernmentnever didcohereintoatruerulingclass,eventhough,afteradoptionofthe BillofRights,theycouldclaimadegreeofpopularsupporttheyhad notenjoyedsince1774–1776.

FederalistVisionandEliteDivision

Tothesurpriseanddisappointmentoftheframers,soonaftertheConstitutiontookeffect,thecompromisingspiritofthePhiladelphiaconventiongavewaytoafiercepartisanstrugglewithinthenewcentral government.Eachside—FederalistandRepublican—viewedtheother notonlyaswrongonmattersofpolicybutasunpatrioticandsubversiveoftheentirerepublicanenterpriseaswell.Atissue,aboveall,was Hamilton’ssystemofnationalfinancebasedonBritishprecedent.For Hamilton,thepromiseoftheAmericanRevolutionwasthecreationof astrongandwealthyUnitedStatesabletocompetesuccessfullyonthe worldstageagainstothergreatpowers.Bymeansofhisfiscalandeconomicprogram,hesoughttospeedtheanglicizationofAmericansocietyandtherebytoacceleratethenation’srisetoglobalprominence. AgainstHamilton’svision,Madison,Jefferson,andotherself-styled Republicancriticsofferedacounter-paradigmofagriculturalexpansioninthecontextoffreetrade,westwardmigration,anddecentralizedfederalism.TheybelievedthattheBritishmodelofpoliticaleconomywasfundamentallyincompatiblewitharepublicansociety.During the1790s,partisanandsectionalinterestsbecameincreasinglyinter-

twineduntilthecontestoverwhoshouldruleathomethreatenedto breakthenationapartattheoutsetofthenineteenthcentury.

Althoughhehadbeenaferventpatriotfromthebeginningofhis politicalcareerandaleadingAmericannationalistduringthe1780s, HamiltonmadenosecretofhiscontinuingadmirationforGreatBritainanditstime-testedinstitutions.Forhim,thegreatestdangersconfrontingtheUnitedStatesintheaftermathoftheRevolutionwerethe destabilizingforcesoffragmentationanddemocracy,bothreﬂectedin thegrowingpowerandirresponsiblepoliciesofpopularlyelectedstate governments.HeturnedtothehistoryoftheBritishnation-statefor strategiesthatwouldachievetheimmediategoalofpoliticalstability andadvancethelong-termaimofAmericangreatness.Totheextent possiblewithinthefederalsystemofgovernmentestablishedbythe Constitution,heenvisionedanationalrulingclasslikeGreatBritain’s combinationoflandedgrandeesandmerchant-ﬁnanciersthatwould promoteelitehegemonyandthepublicgoodatthesametime.37

AtthecoreofHamilton’sfiscalprogramwashisbeliefthatthepublicdebtoftheUnitedStates—asincurredbothcollectivelybythe Congressandseparatelybythevariousstategovernments—couldbe convertedintocirculatingcapitalbyanationalpromisetofundthe debtatparandtoissueinterest-bearinggovernmentsecuritiesthat wouldenjoytheconfidenceandattractthefundsofbothforeignand domesticinvestors.“Itisawellknownfact,”Hamiltonobservedinhis “ReportonPublicCredit,”“thatincountriesinwhichthenational debtisproperlyfunded,andanobjectofestablishedconfidence,itanswersmostofthepurposesofmoney.”Furthermore,“tradeisextendedbyit;becausethereisalargercapitaltocarryiton,andthe merchantcanatthesametime,affordtotradeforsmallerprofits,”he explained.“Agricultureandmanufacturesarealsopromotedbyit:For thelikereason,thatmorecapitalcanbecommandedtobeemployedin both.”38

Hamiltonarguedfurtherthat,byassumingresponsibilityforfundingstatedebtsaswellasthedebtsoftheConfederationCongress,the

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newnationalgovernmentwouldunitemenofcapitalbehinditand gainpoliticalpowerandeconomicleverageatthestates’expense.“If allthepubliccreditorsreceivetheirduesfromonesource,distributed withanequalhand,”hewrote,“theirinterestwillbethesame.And havingthesameinterests,theywilluniteinthesupportoftheﬁscalarrangementsofthegovernment.”Afullyfundedconsolidateddebt wouldenergizetheeconomy,strengthenthenationalgovernment,and promotemutualcooperationbetweenprominentprivateinvestorsand publicofﬁcials.39

Madison,however,hadhisdoubts,whichheraisedopenlyonthe flooroftheHouseofRepresentativesinthespringof1790.Appalled bytherageofspeculationinpublicsecuritiessinceratificationofthe Constitution,hecalledfordiscriminationinthetreatmentoforiginal purchasersandcurrentholdersofsuchcertificates.Originalpurchasers deservedfullpaymentinrewardfortheirpatrioticcommitmentata timeofnationalcrisis,heargued,butwilyinvestorswhohadbought governmentsecuritiesathugediscounts—andperhapswiththeadvantageofinsideinformation—shouldnotbenefitundulyfromtheirdeviousbehavior.OfparamountconcerntoMadisonwasthemorallegitimacyofthenewgovernment,notthestabilityofthefiscalsystem. TheresimplywasnoplaceforfinancialspeculatorsinMadison’sconceptofanenlightenedrepublicanelite,inhisvisionofgovernanceby anatural—asopposedtoanartificial—aristocracy.40

Forsimilarreasons,MadisonfoughtHamilton’splanforthefederalassumptionofstatedebts.Statesthathadstruggledtopayoff theirdebtsshouldnotberequiredtosubsidizethosethathadshirked theirpatrioticresponsibility.Tosomeextent,hispositiononassumptionmayhavebeeninﬂuencedbylocalconcerns—Virginiastoodto gainmuchlessfromassumptionthaneitherMassachusettsorSouth Carolina—butthedeepersourceofMadison’soppositiontoHamilton’sprogramonfundingthedebtwashisdifferentviewofhowthe politicaleconomyoftheAmericanrepublicshouldoperate.41

Thefullextentofideologicaldivisionwithinelitecirclesbecameev-

identinthewakeofHamilton’sothermajorreportstoCongress.In December1790Hamiltonproposedtheestablishmentofanational banktohousefederaldepositsthatwouldbegovernedbyaboard electedmainlybyprivateshareholders.Bymakingloansandissuing banknotesinamountsgreaterthantheiractualholdingsofspecie, bankscouldcreatenewworkingcapitaloutofthinairsolongasinvestorsmaintainedconfidenceinthebank’slong-termfinancialcommitments.Thisadditionalcapitalwouldspureconomicgrowthforthe benefitofallAmericans,Hamiltonbelieved,thoughheknewthatthose benefitswouldnotbespreadevenlythroughoutsociety.Thegenerationofnationalwealth,notitsinternaldistribution,washisprimary concern.42

InDecember1791Hamiltonissuedhis“ReportonManufactures,” whichrecommendedaseriesoffederalmeasurestoencouragethedevelopmentofthenation’sindustrialsector.CitingAdamSmithasan authority,Hamiltonarguedthatmanufacturingwasnoless—andprobablymore—productivethanagriculture.Hecontendedfurtherthata diversiﬁedeconomywouldexpandmorerapidlyandmoresteadily thanoneheavilyweightedtowardagricultureandagriculturalexports. Manufacturinglentitselftotechnologicalimprovementandcouldconvertotherwiseunderemployedcapitalandlaborintonationalwealth. Equallyimportant,growthofthemanufacturingsectorwouldhelp stabilizedemandforagriculturalcommodities.“Foreigndemandfor theproductsofAgriculturalCountries,”Hamiltonobserved,“is,ina greatdegree,rathercasualandoccasional,thancertainorconstant.” Theremedywastocreateareliablehomemarketforthenation’sagriculturalsurplusby“detach[ing]aportionofthehands,whichwould otherwisebeengagedinTillage,”andemployingtheminsteadinmanufacturing.ByHamilton’slogic,diversiﬁcationwouldenhanceproductivityacrossallsectorsoftheeconomy.43

ThemoreHamiltonelaboratedhisvision,themorealarmedgrew MadisonandJefferson.Tothem,Hamilton’sprogramheraldedareturntothemonarchicalsocialorderthatthepatriotshadrebelled

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against.Bytheiranalysis,debtwasthewellspringofBritishcorruption,andﬁnancialspeculationwastheenemyofrepublicanvirtue. MadisonandJeffersonhadnoobjectiontothepursuitofnational greatness,buttheyconceivedofthatgoalintermsprofoundlydifferentfromHamilton’svision.TheydidnotwanttheUnitedStatestobecomeanewGreatBritain.Theysoughtinsteadtocreateadifferent kindofsocialorderandadifferentkindofnation,onebasedonmodernrepublicanprinciplesanduncontaminated—asfaraspractical—by thecorruptivepracticesoftheformermothercountry.Theywerenot utopians,buttheybelievedthattheAmericanRevolutionhadopened upNewWorldoptionsthatwerefarmorepromisingthanHamilton’s OldWorldaspirations.44

ForMadisonandJefferson,theproperbasisofAmericanpolitical economywaslibertyandland,notpublicdebt,papersecurities,and banks.AsmembersoftheVirginiagentry,theyviewedagricultureasa wayoflifeintrinsically—morally—superiortoanyother.Inhis Notes ontheStateofVirginia, pennedin1781–82,Jeffersonfamouslyproclaimed,“ThosewholabourintheeartharethechosenpeopleofGod ...whosebreastshehasmadehispeculiardepositforsubstantialand genuinevirtue.”AdozenyearslaterMadisonechoed,“Theclassof citizenswhoprovideatoncetheirownfoodandtheirownraiment... arethebestbasisofpublicliberty,andthestrongestbulwarkofpublic safety.”TheagriculturalistsJeffersonandMadisonhadinmindwere clearlynotplantationslaves,thoughbystrictlogictheycouldhave been.IntheVirginians’worldview,theidealrepublicancitizenwasa yeomanfarmerpossessedofhisownfreeholdofarableland.45

AlthoughonoccasionMadisonandJeffersoncelebratedtheyeoman farmerasifhereliedonnobodybuthimselfandhisownlabor(understoodtoincludethatoffamilymembers),theyhadakeenappreciation fortheroleofmarketsandcommercialexchangeintheoperationof Americanagriculture.ThatwaswhyMadisonstoodﬁrmagainstany renunciationofAmericanrightstotheMississippiRiverinthe1780s andadvocatedanationalpolicyofcommercialdiscriminationagainst

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GreatBritainintheearly1790s.Thegoalinbothcaseswastoopenup newmarketsforAmericanagriculturalexports.Farmerswithnoplace toselltheirsurplusproductioncouldachieveonlyaprimitiveformof independenceandautonomy.MadisonandJefferson,liketheirnemesis Hamilton,appreciatedthehumandesireformaterialbetterment,and theywerepreparedtoadjustcommercialpolicytopromoterepublican prosperityinamarketenvironment.Theirultimateaimwasaworldof freetradewithoutmercantilisttariffbarriers—aglobalmarketwhere Americanswouldsupplyfoodstuffsinreturnformanufacturesproducedbyother,lessfreeandlessfortunatepeoples.46

Althoughliberalinitscelebrationofpropertyrights,privateenterprise,andfreetrade,JeffersonandMadison’sconceptionofaproper republicaneconomywasstructurallydifferentfromcapitalisminits modernform.Theyenvisionedarepublicansocialorderdevoidof “stockjobbers,”large-scaleinvestorsinpublicorprivatesecurities,and otheragentsofhighﬁnance—ineffect,aformofcapitalismwithout capitalists.Theircodeofrepublicanconductcouldaccommodatespeculationinland,eveninslaves,butnotspeculationinintangiblepaper instruments.“Allthecapitalemployedinpaperspeculation,”Jefferson wroteGeorgeWashingtoninMay1792,“isbarren&useless,producing,likethatonagamingtable,noaccessiontoitself,andiswithdrawn fromcommerce&agriculturewhereitcouldhaveproducedaddition tothecommonmass.”AccordingtoJefferson,“theultimateobjectof allthisistopreparethewayforachange,fromthepresentrepublican formofgovernment,tothatofamonarchyofwhichtheEnglishconstitutionistobethemodel.”47

Hamiltonwonmostoftheearlycongressionalbattlesovereconomicpolicy,gainingfullfundingofthenationaldebtwithoutdiscriminationbetweenprimaryandsecondaryholders,achievingfederal assumptionofstatedebts(inreturnforthedesignationoftheDistrict ofColumbiaasthenation’sfuturecapital),andestablishinganational bankwithcontinentalreach.Asaresult,theUnitedStatesembarkedon aﬁnancialrevolutionsimilarinhistoricalsigniﬁcancetothoseofthe

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NetherlandsandGreatBritain.Theadventofregularizedsecurities marketsandareliablebankingsystemgreatlyreducedthe“information asymmetry”thathadplaguedthecolonialeconomyfortheprevious century.Notwithstandingthepersonalbankruptciesofsuchmajor speculatorsasWilliamDuerandRobertMorris,thenation’sﬂedgling ﬁnancialinstitutionsachievedmonetarystabilityandglobalcredibility inthe1790s.OneneednotembraceHamilton’svisioninitsentiretyto acknowledgethathisprogramwasamajorfactorinAmerica’sescape fromthekindofeconomicdependencythathasplaguedmostother postcolonialsocietiesoverthepasttwohundredyears.48

Whatevertheirlong-termbeneﬁts,Hamilton’spoliciesintheshort termdeeplydividedthenation’spoliticalleaders.HavingcometogetherinsupportofratiﬁcationofthefederalConstitutionin1787–88, representativesofthevariousstateelitesseparatedintotwodistinct partieswithinthefederalCongressby1792.Thesectionalcastofthis divisionwasobviousforalltosee.MostrepresentativesfromNew Englandandthemid-AtlanticstatesstoodbehindHamilton’sFederalistagenda,whilethosefromthesouthernstates—withtheimportant exceptionofSouthCarolina—tendedtojointheRepublicanopposition.By1794therewasonceagaintalkofsunderingtheUnitedStates alonggeographicallines.Inaprivateconversationthatmayhavebeen stagedforpoliticaleffect,RufusKingtoldVirginia’sJohnTaylorof CarolineinMay1794“thatitwasutterlyimpossiblefortheunionto continue.Thatthesouthernandeasternpeoplethoughtquitedifferently ThatwhenI[zard]andS[mith]ofS.C.wereout,thesoutherninterestwouldprevail.Thattheeasternwouldneversubmitto theirpoliticks,andthatunderthesecircumstances,adissolutionofthe unionbymutualconsent,waspreferabletocertaintyofthesamething, inalessdesirablemode.”49

Asanalternativetodisunion,Madison,Jefferson,andtheirRepublicanalliesdevelopedathree-prongedstrategytopreventtheconsolidationofanationalrulingclassalongHamiltonianlines.Firstwasthe argumentfor“strictconstruction”ofthefederalConstitution,particu-

larlyinregardtothepowersofthenationalgovernment.Inresponse toHamilton’sproposalforanationalbank,Madisonarguedthat“the powerofestablishingan incorporatedbank”wassimplynotincluded “amongthepowersvestedbytheconstitutioninthelegislatureofthe UnitedStates.”Rejectingtheviewthatsuchapowerwas implied by clausesauthorizingCongresstoraisetaxesandborrowmoney,he warnedthatthe“doctrineofimplication”lentitselftoabuseandtothe potentiallossofallmeaningfulrestraintsongovernment.Hefailedin 1791toconvinceeitherhisfellowcongressmenorPresidentWashingtonthatthenationalbankwasinfactunconstitutional,buthisargumentforstrictconstructionwouldbecomeaneffectiveweaponinfuturestrugglesagainsttheconcertedexerciseofpoweratthenational level.

ThesecondandmostimportantprongofMadison’sandJefferson’s oppositionstrategywasthecoordinatedmobilizationofvoterstosupportRepublicancandidatesinstateandfederalelections.InFederalist no.10,Madisonhadwarnedagainstthedangersposedbyfactiousmajorities,andhehadchampionedafar-flungpolitywithlargeelectoral districtsas“arepublicanremedyforthediseasesmostincidenttorepublicangovernment.”ButnowheandJeffersonsoughttorousea virtuous majoritybymeansofdirectappealstopublicopinioninthe NationalGazette andotherpartisannewspapers.Buildingonastrong regionalbaseintheupperSouth,theycultivatedpoliticalalliances withformerAntifederalists,includingNewYork’sMelanctonSmith, andwithavarietyofambitiousmenexcludedfromlocalestablishmentsacrossthecountry.Moststrikingly,Madisonwaspreparedto stokefeelingsofclassresentmenttopromotehiscause.Inanessay publishedinSeptember1792,hedenouncedFederalistsas“morepartialtotheopulentthantotheotherclassesofsociety.”Membersofthe “antirepublicanparty,”hewrote,believed“thatgovernmentcanbe carriedononlybythepageantryofrank,theinfluenceofmoneyand emoluments,andtheterrorofmilitaryforce.”AgainstthiswickedfactionstoodthepatrioticRepublicans,firmlycommittedto“thedoctrine

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thatmankindarecapableofgoverningthemselves,andhatinghereditarypowerasaninsulttothereasonandanoutragetotherightsof man.”Betweenthesetwopartiestherecouldbelittlecooperationor compromisebecausefundamentalvaluesandtheverysurvivalofthe UnitedStateswereatstake.51

AlthoughMadisonexpressedconfidencethat“themassofpeoplein everypartoftheunion,ineverystate,andofeveryoccupationmustat bottombewith”theRepublicans,rallyingthepopulaceatlargeproved difficult—especiallyaftertheFrenchRevolutionandthewarinEurope increasinglyimpingedonAmericanpolitics.Intherapidlygrowing mid-Atlanticcities,Republicanssuccessfullyexploitedtheangerfeltby mechanicsandmiddlingmerchantstowardthegrandeeswhodominatedAnglo-Americantradeandmajorfinancialinstitutions.ElsewhereRepublicansappealedtofarmersbothasthemoralpillarsofthe nationandasfellowmembersofthelandedinterest.ButPresident Washington’sangrydenunciationofDemocratic-Republicansocieties forsupposedlyfuelingataxrevoltbyfarmersinwesternPennsylvania (theso-calledWhiskeyRebellion)didnothelptheRepublicancause, nordidhisendorsementin1795oftheJayTreatywithGreatBritain, whichMadison,Jefferson,andtheiralliesfiercelyopposed.Still,in 1796,RepublicanscamewithinthreeelectoralvotesofmakingJeffersonpresident.IntheearlymonthsofJohnAdams’sadministration,partisanacrimonysubsided,butthencameamajordiplomaticcrisiswithFrance(thenotoriousXYZAffair)andtheoutbreakofan undeclared“quasi-war”betweenFrenchandAmericanvesselsinthe Caribbean.PopularopinionturnedsharplyagainsttheFrancophileRepublicans,andinthesummerof1798,congressionalFederalists,with Hamilton’sencouragement,pushedthroughtheAlienandSedition Actsaimedatsilencingthegovernment’scriticsintheRepublican press.52

Outofdesperation,JeffersonandMadisoninthefallof1798formulatedthethirdprongoftheiroppositionstrategy:theassertionof residualsovereigntyinthestatesandoftherightsofstatestodefyfed-

erallawstheydeemedunconstitutional.InhisdraftoftheKentucky Resolutions,Jeffersondeclared“thatwhensoevertheGeneralGovernmentassumesundelegatedpowers,itsactsareunauthoritative,void, andofnoforce.”Heelaborated,“EveryStatehasanaturalrightin casesnotwithinthecompact,(casusnonfœderis,)tonullifyontheir ownauthorityallassumptionsofpowerbyotherswithintheirlimits.”

Likewise,intheVirginiaResolutions,Madisonafﬁrmed“thatincase ofadeliberate,palpableanddangerousexerciseofotherpowersnot grantedbythesaidcompact,thestateswhoarepartiesthereto,havethe right,andareindutybound,tointerposeforarrestingtheprogressof theevil,andformaintainingwithintheirrespectivelimits,theauthorities,rightsandlibertiesappertainingtothem.”53

ForMadison,theassertionofstates’rightsin1798representeda dramaticreversalofhispositionadecadebefore.Inthe1780shehad repeatedlydecriedtheviciousbehaviorofstategovernments,andat theConstitutionalConventionhehadsoughttoendowthenational governmentwiththepowertovetostatelaws.Nowhedecriedtheviciousbehaviorofthenationalgovernmentand,ineffect,soughttoendowstategovernmentswiththepowertovetonationallegislation.But nootherstatesendorsedtheKentuckyandVirginiaResolutions,andin 1798–99theyprobablydamagedtheRepublicancausemorethanthey strengthenedit.WhatreallyunderminedtheFederalistswastheSeditionActitself.Itangeredprinterssogreatlythattheyestablishednew RepublicannewspapersfasterthanFederalistcourtscouldshutdown theolderones.Between1798and1800,thenumberofRepublicanpapersrosebyover50percentnationwide.TheFederalists’attempttosilencetheiropponentsdidjusttheopposite:itenergizedthemandpreparedthewayforaRepublicanvictoryin1800.54

Democratization,Decentralization,Disintegration

Jefferson’saccessiontothepresidencyservesasa“Rorschachtest”for Americanhistorians.Forsomescholarsitsigniﬁestheﬁrstpeaceful

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transferofexecutivepowerfromonepartytoanotherinAmericanhistoryandprovidesproofthat,notwithstandingtheinﬂammatoryrhetoricofthe1790s,thereexistedanunderlyingideologicalconsensusin post-RevolutionaryAmericaregardingfundamentalprinciples.Other scholarstakemoreseriouslyJefferson’sownassessmentthat“therevolutionof1800...wasasrealarevolutionintheprinciplesofourgovernmentasthatof1776wasinitsform.”Webelongtothelattercamp. Inourview,Jefferson’selectionmarkedtheendofanglicizationin Americanpoliticsandusheredinanew,moredecentralizedandmore democraticstructureofpower—onemuchclosertothatenvisionedby theAntifederaliststhanbytheFederalistsduringthedebatesoverratiﬁcationoftheConstitution.55

Underthisnewstructure,membersofthemiddlingsortexercised fargreaterpoliticalinfluenceintheUnitedStatesthananywhereelsein theWesternworld.Intheearlydecadesofthenineteenthcentury,the righttovoteinmoststateswasextendedtonearlyalladultwhitemen. Equallyimportant,thecultureofpoliticsshifted.Ordinarycitizensincreasinglyexpectedtheirelectedrepresentativestoreflect,ratherthan refine,theirviewswhenmakinggovernmentdecisions.Candidatesfor publicofficepresentedthemselvesasthepeople’s“friends”ratherthan astheir“fathers.”Yetdemocratizationinthepoliticalrealmdidnot produceanegalitariansocialorder.Evenastheylostpoliticalhegemony,theelitesgrewricher,andclasshierarchyremainedanimportant featureofAmericanlife.IntheNorth,enterprisingmerchants—most famouslythecoterieofBostonianswhoerectedthenation’sfirstintegratedtextilemillsatWalthamandLowell—pioneerednewformsof businessincorporationtoprotectpropertyrightsandtopromotecapitalistdevelopmentinlieuofdirectfederalassistance.IntheSouth, largeplantersrespondedwithalacrityandimpressiveeconomicefficiencytoskyrocketingglobal(particularlyBritish)demandforcotton.InwaysnotanticipatedbytheframersofthefederalConstitution, politicaldemocracyprovedhighlycompatiblewiththepreservation

andaccumulationofprivatewealthandwiththepersistenceofeconomicinequality.56

IftheimplicationsofJefferson’saccessiontothepresidencywere large,hismarginofelectoralvictoryin1800wasnot.Despiteafierce splitwithinFederalistranksbetweenfollowersofHamiltonandPresidentAdams,Adamsreceivedatotalof65electoralvotescomparedto Jefferson’s(andAaronBurr’s)73.Asin1796,thegeographicalpattern ofpartisanbehaviorwasstriking,withRepublicansupportconcentratedintheSouthandFederalistsupportinNewEngland.ThemidAtlanticstateswereagainthe“swing”region,buttheirroleshouldnot obscuretheessentialpartplayedbythethree-fifthsclauseinshaping thefinaloutcome.Hadnotthesouthernstatespossessed14additional votesasaresultoftheinclusionofslaves(albeitatadiscount)inthe calculationoftheirpopulationsforelectoralpurposes,Adamswould havewonreelection.Fromthebeginning,asubtextofthe“Revolution of1800”wasthepreservationofchattelslaveryintheSouth.57

SlaverywentunmentionedinJefferson’sfamousinauguraladdress ofMarch4,1801.Thatspeechisrightlycelebratedforitsinspiringand conciliatorypresentationofthedemocraticsideofJefferson’spolitical vision.Whileheafﬁrmedthat“thewillofthemajorityisinallcasesto prevail”—apreceptprofoundlyatoddswithMadison’sapproachto majorityfactionsinFederalistno.10—Jeffersonproclaimedasa“sacredprinciple”thatthewillofthemajority,“toberightful,mustbe reasonable;thattheminoritypossesstheirequalrights,whichequal lawsmustprotect.”Heenvisioneda“wiseandfrugalgovernment” thatwouldbarelyactonsociety,servingmainlyto“restrainmenfrom injuringoneanother,whichshallleavethemotherwisetoregulatetheir ownpursuitsofindustryandimprovement,andshallnottakefromthe mouthoflaborthebreadithasearned.”Withinthiscontext,hecharacterized“thegeneralgovernment ...asthe sheetanchorofourpeace athomeandsafetyabroad,”yethecalledfor“thesupportofthestate governmentsinalltheirrights,asthemostcompetentadministrations

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forourdomesticconcernsandthesurestbulwarksagainstanti-republicantendencies.”Inshort,Jeffersonlimnedinhisowngracefulwords theAntifederalistalternativetotheFederalistsynthesisof1787–88:a continentalconfederationofsovereignstateswhosecentralauthority wouldpossessenoughpowertorepelforeignintrusion,sellpublic landstoeagerfarmers,anddeliverthemail,butplaynoothermajor roleinthelivesofordinaryAmericancitizens.58

JeffersonandhisRepublicansupportersrepudiatedtheBritish modelofgovernmentinbothstyleandsubstance.Aspresident,Jeffersonwentoutofhiswaynottoappearmonarchical—tothepointof personallyansweringthefrontdooroftheWhiteHouseinslippers andothercasualattire.Heconsideredhimselfanaturalaristocratbut alsoatrueembodimentofthepeople’swill.Becausehepossessed abidingfaithinthevirtueofthenation’sagriculturalmajority,hewas surethat,oncefreedfromFederalistdeceptions,thecitizenrywould recognizeasself-evidentthesamepoliticalprinciplesandgovernmental policiesthathe,astheirpresident,knewtoberight.59

UnderJefferson’sleadership,theRepublicansabolishedinternal taxes,shrankthemilitary,andslashedannualexpendituresofthefederalgovernment.Althoughtheydidnotdismantlethenationalbankor quashﬁnancialmarkets,byreducingthesizeandscopeofthefederal government,theytransferredmuchoftheresponsibilityforrulingthe countrytotheseparatestatelegislatures,wheremenofmodestfortunesandmiddlingstatusheldmoreswaythantheydidinCongress. Asaresult,thelocusofpoliticalpowershifteddownwardinthesocial order,thoughnotbelowtheranksofpropertiedwhitemen.60

Thedevolutionofpoliticalpowerfromnaturalaristocratstomenof themiddlingsorthadbegunduringthe1780s,whenlocalistswrested controlfromcosmopolitansinmanystatelegislatures.Theprocesswas interrupted,evenreversed,inthe1790s,whenFederalistsdominated thenationalgovernmentandpromotedaprogramofnationalintegration,ifnotfull-ﬂedgedconsolidation.WiththeJeffersonianvictoryin 1800,stategovernmentsonceagainbecamekeybattlegroundsinpoliti-

caldisputesoverﬁscalpolicyandeconomicdevelopment.IntheNorth, upwardlymobileRepublicansopenlychallengedtheirsocialbetters, andvoterturnoutinstateelectionsrosedramaticallyduringtheﬁrst decadeofthenineteenthcentury.Politicalupheavalwasmorelimited intheSouth,whereRepublicansusuallyrepresentedthelocalestablishmentandcontinuedtoenjoythesupportofyeomanfarmersnotonly asfellowmembersofthelandedinterestbutalsoasfellowmembersof thewhiteracewithamutualconcerntokeepblacksinsubjugation. Amongwhitesoutherners,racialsolidarityfueleddemocraticrhetoric andviceversa.AugustusJohnFoster,theEnglishministertothe UnitedStatesin1811–12,observedthattheJeffersoniangentrycould “professanunboundedloveoflibertyandofdemocracyinconsequenceofthemassofthepeople,whoinothercountriesmightbecomemobs,beingtherenearlyaltogethercomposedoftheirownNegroslaves...whoformno socialcheckupontheirmasters’political conduct.”61

InJefferson’smind,theRevolutionof1800wasmorethanavictory formajoritarianprinciples.Italsowasatriumphofagrarianvirtue overtheanti-republicanforcesofspeculationandcorruption.Withthe purchaseofLouisianain1803,Jeffersonbelievedhehadensuredthe agrariancharacterandhencethecivichealthofhis“EmpireforLiberty”forgenerationstocome.Yethisvisionofanexpansiveagriculturalrepublicremainedtetheredtotheinstitutionofracialslaveryin wayshehatedtoacknowledge.NotuntilthecontroversyoverMissouri’sapplicationforadmissiontostatehoodbrokeoutin1819didhe andothermembersoftheSouth’sRepublicaneliteconfrontthefull implicationsoftheFaustianbargaintheyhadmadeinjoiningwithplebeiannorthernerstodefeattheirFederalistfoes.62

AcomparisonofhownationalleadershandledtheMissouriCrisis withtheframers’approachtosectionaldifferencesattheConstitutionalConventionthreedecadesearlierdemonstratestheerosionof elitecontroloverAmericanpolitics.AtPhiladelphiainthesummerof 1787,genteeldelegatesspokefranklyandstruckhardbargainsbehind

GaryJ.KornblithandJohnM.Murrin

closeddoorswithremarkableefficiency.Theythenpresentedaunited frontinpubliconbehalfofthecompromisestheyhadreached,deliberatelydownplayingthecompetingsectionalinterestsatstake.Bycontrast,duringtheMissouriCrisistheprocessofintersectionalnegotiationextendedwellbeyondthenaturalaristocracytoincludethepress andtheelectorateatlarge.Thedramatookplacelargelyinpublic view,andtheopennessofthedecision-makingprocessmadeacompromiseoverMissourimuchmoredifficulttoachieve.Notcoincidentally,theMissouriCrisislastedmorethantwoyears—longerthanit tookforthefederalConstitutiontobedrafted,ratified,andputinto operation.

ThepersonsmostresponsibleforconvertingMissouri’sapplicationforstatehoodintoalarge-scalepoliticalcrisiswerenorthernRepublicans,notFederalists.Theyturnedtherhetoricofdemocratic rightsandmajorityruleagainstthesouthernRepublicanelitethathad wieldedthatsamerhetoricsoeffectivelyagainsttheFederalistsforthe previousquarter-century.Take,forexample,JamesTallmadge,Jr.,the representativefromNewYorkwhoproposedtheamendmenttomake gradualabolitionaconditionforMissouri’sadmissiontostatehood. ExplainingtoCongressthereasonforhisprovocativeaction,heportrayedhimselfnotasanenlightenedreﬁnerofpublicopinionbutinsteadasthereﬂexive,democraticagentofhisconstituents’antislavery views.“Whatevermightbemyownprivatesentimentsonthissubject, standinghereastherepresentativeofothers,nochoiceisleftme,” hedeclared.“Iknowthewillofmyconstituents,andregardlessof consequences,Iwill avow it.”InkeepingwithJeffersonianprinciples, TallmadgefurtherinsistedthathisamendmentabidedbyastrictconstructionoftheConstitution,andheinvokedtheDeclarationofIndependence’sassertion“thatallmenarecreatedequal”forultimateideologicalsupport.63

SouthernleadersreactedwithhorrortothecampaignagainstMissouri’sadmissionasaslavestate.InhisfamouslettertoJohnHolmes, datedApril22,1820,Jeffersonclaimedtodetestslaveryasmuchas

ever,but,inareversalofhispreviouspronouncementsonthesubject, herejectedanyefforttorestrictthepeculiarinstitution’sexpansion. ProhibitingslaveryinMissouriorinfederalterritorywouldonlyaggravatesectionaltensionsandcausemoretrouble,henowinsisted.“A geographicalline,coincidingwithamarkedprinciple,moralandpolitical,onceconceivedandhelduptotheangrypassionsofmen,”he warned,“willneverbeobliterated;andeverynewirritationwillmark itdeeperanddeeper.”64

Jeffersonviewedtherestrictionistcampaignof1819–20asastratagemengineeredbydesperateFederalistsandhencenotalegitimateexpressionofthepeople’swill.SodidMadisonandJamesMonroe.But thewaveofpublicmeetingsovertheMissouriquestionandthedefeat of“dough-face”congressmenin1820indicatethatpoliticallymobilizednorthernersdidcaredeeplyaboutcurbingthespreadofslavery. Inthiscontext,theprincipleofmajorityrule—acentraltenetofthe Revolutionof1800—threatenedthelong-termviabilityoftheSouth’s peculiarinstitution,theeconomicbasisoftheplanterelite.65

TheMissouriCompromise—whichcoupledtheadmissionofMissouriasaslavestatewiththatofMaineasafreestatewhileprohibiting slaveryintheremainderoftheLouisianaPurchasenorthof36° 30 ′ latitude—endedtheimmediatecrisisbutleftunresolvedcriticalquestionsaboutthefutureofrepublicangovernmentintheUnitedStates. Ontheonehand,by1820ithadbecomeevidentthat,contrarytothe Federalistvisionof1787–88,thenaturalaristocracycouldnotrulethe nationeffectivelyfromthetopdown—inlargepartbecausenorthern andsouthernelitescouldnotagreeonfundamentalissuesofpolitical economy.Ontheotherhand,itappearedthattheAntifederalistalternativeofalooseconfederationofstatescoordinatedbyaweakcentral administrationcouldneitherdefendAmericansagainstforeigndepredations—themainlessonoftheWarof1812—norsatisfytheexpansiveambitionsofeithernorthernorsouthernleaders.

OverthenextgenerationthedemocraticimplicationsoftheRevolutionof1800wouldcontinuetounfold.Toanextentthatwouldhave

GaryJ.KornblithandJohnM.Murrin

shockedtheframers,ordinarycitizensabandonedtheirfaithinruleby anaturalaristocracyandembracedinsteadaconceptofgovernmentby representativesmuchlikethemselvesintalentsandtraining.TheforemostsymbolofthisprocesswasAndrewJackson,who—thougha wealthyslaveholder—presentedhimselfasacandidateforpresidentin 1824andagainin1828and1832asthecommonmanwritlarge,emphaticallynotasanaturalaristocrat.AtJackson’ssideby1828stood MartinVanBuren,the“LittleMagician,”whopromotedpartycompetitionasameansbothtoenhancepopularparticipationinpolitics andtocurbsectionalantagonism.TheJacksoniandenunciationofthe “moneypower”inthe1830sechoedtheattacksbyMadisonandJeffersononHamilton’sfiscalplaninthe1790s,and,toasignificantextent, theDemocratsreunitedthenation’sagriculturalmajorityinopposition toelitefinancialinterestscenteredintheNortheast.YetJacksonians couldnoterasetheissueofchattelslaveryfromnationalpoliticsany morethanJeffersonianshadbeenabletobeforethem.Bymid-century whathadoncebeenasubtextoftheRevolutionof1800surfacedasthe mainsubjectofdebateatbothstateandfederallevelsofgovernment. Duringthe1850s,fearofthe“moneypower”gavewaytofearofthe “slavepower”intheNorth,andin1860AbrahamLincolnwaselected presidentonaplatformfirmlycommittedtothecontainmentofslavery.Beforeheeventookoffice,leadersofthelowerSouth—citingthe Jeffersoniandoctrinesof1776and1798butdefyingtheprincipleof majorityrule—fulfilledthethreatmadebySouthCarolina’sdelegates attheConstitutionalConventionof1787:theytooktheirstatesoutof theUnion.66

TheoutbreakoftheCivilWarconﬁrmedHamilton’sdarkestforebodingsaboutthedangersoffragmentationanddemocracy.Intheabsenceofanationalrulingclass,theAmericanrepublicimploded.Duringthesecessioncrisis,manyoftherichestandmostprestigiousmen ofboththeNorthandSouthsoughtalternativestoopenwarfare,but theylackedtheinﬂuenceandpowertoimposeasolutionfromabove uponthewidercitizenry.IntheNorth,politicalcontrolrestedwiththe

upstartRepublicanParty,whichrepresentedtheinterestsofthesection’sgrowingmiddleclass,notthoseofthelargestmerchantsand mostillustriousgentlemenofNewEnglandandNewYork.Likewise, intheSouth,thestateconventionsthatvotedforsecessionweremade upmainlyofmiddlingmen,not—outsideofSouthCarolina—the greatplanters.Attheoutset,atleast,theCivilWarwasnota“rich man’swarandapoorman’sﬁght.”Itwasinstead,asLincolnobserved, “aPeople’scontest”ofhugeandunprecedentedproportions—thegloriousyethorriﬁcculminationoftheJeffersonians’remarkableRevolutionof1800.67

ADAMROTHMAN

Howisitpossibleforaminorityofcitizenstogettheirwaytimeaftertimeinanostensiblydemocraticpolity?Thatquestionbecamecentraltonortherners’discoveryofa“slavepower”intheUnitedStates beginninginthemid-1830s.Theslavepowersignifiednotthepowerof slavesbutthepowerthataccruedtoslaveownersbyvirtueoftheir owningslaves.Antislaverycriticschargedthatslaveownersexerted powerfaroutofproportiontotheirnumbers,andthattheyusedtheir powertoenlargetherealmofslaveryinviolationofthecountry’s foundingtenetsoflibertyandequality.Theenlargementofslavery, criticsargued,threatenedtherightsoffreepeopleandcorruptedthe republic.1 AsJohnGorhamPalfreyofMassachusettswrotein1846,the foundersoftheUnitedStateswouldhavebeenappalledtolearn“that avastmajorityofthehighofficesinalldepartments[ofgovernment], includingnearlythree-fourthsoftheofficesinthearmyandnavy,had beenheldbyslave-owners,thatslaveryhadbeenthegreatdictatorof itspolicy,foreignanddomestic,andthatatthismomentnonebut slaveholderswereministersofthenationatanyforeigncourt,though

therearemorethanthreemillionsofvotersinthecountry,andonly onehundredthousandofthemholdslaves.”2

TherewasmorethanparanoiainPalfrey’slament.Slaveowners wieldedpowerintheUnitedStatesfromtheAmericanRevolution totheCivilWar.Theslavepoweroriginatedinthecombinationof terrorandsuccorthatslaveownersusedtoruleoverenslavedpeople andcompelthemtolabor.Thewealth,standing,andreputationthat slaveowninggavetoslaveownersenabledthemtoassertpoliticalleadershipamongthebroaderfreepopulationthroughoutthesouthern UnitedStates.Thenconstitutional,partisan,andideologicalmechanismstranslatedslaveowners’regionalpowerintonationalpower, resulting,asPalfreyobserved,intheconspicuouspresenceofslave ownersinthehighestechelonsofAmericanpolitics.Slaveownersdisagreedamongthemselvesonmanyimportantpoliticalissues,yetthey formedadominantelementintheconstellationofpoliticalforcesthat governedthecountryandprotectedslaverythroughtheﬁrsthalfof thenineteenthcentury.

Slaveowners’poweracrossdifferentlevelsofpoliticallifeallowed themtoexpandremarkablyinthedecadesthatfollowedtheAmericanRevolution.Attachingthemselvestoeconomicdevelopmenttaking placeintheemergingindustrialcentersofthecapitalistworld,the slave-owningpopulationspreadfromthesoutheasternseaboardtothe lowerMississippiValleyandbeyond.Theircommercialbasisshifted fromtobaccoandricetosugarand,especially,cotton,whichseemed capableofnearlylimitlessincreaseowingtothetransatlanticrevolutionincottontextileproduction.Asslaveowners’numbersgrew,their aggregatewealthalsoincreasedinspectacularfashion.Theybecame conﬁdentthat,ifletalone,slaverywouldallowthemtoproﬁtfrom theirconnectionstotheAtlanticeconomywithoutsufferingthesocial degradationthatseemedtoplagueindustrialsocietyinthenorthern UnitedStatesandEurope.Theythoughttheyhaditmade,exceptfor oneproblem.

Southernslaveowners’socioeconomicexpansioncoincidedwith

theirrelativepoliticaldeclineinthecountryasawhole.Fromtheearly 1820stothelate1850s,agrowingantislaverymovement,andmorerobustfreepopulationgrowthinthenorthernUnitedStates,sharpened sectionaltensions.Oneconsequencewastoforcesouthernslaveownersintoovertconﬂictwiththebasicprincipleofmajorityruleinthe countryasawhole.Whilecouchingtheirpositionintheuniqueidiom ofU.S.constitutionalism,theyincreasinglyreliedonthemostundemocraticaspectsofAmericanpoliticstopreservetheirinterestswithin theUnion.TheSouthCarolinianJohnCalhounofferedthemostsophisticatedexpressionoftheslaveowners’politicaldilemmainhisformulationofthe“concurringmajority,”aninnovativetheorythatused thefederatedstructureoftheAmericanrepublictoguaranteetheinterestsofinﬂuentialpropertiedgroups.Asthenorthernantislaverythreat grewinthe1840sand1850s,proslaverypoliticiansstruggledtopreserveadefactoconcurringmajorityinnationalpoliticsandevento formalizeitintheU.S.Constitution.

AbrahamLincoln’selectiontothepresidencyin1860ﬁnallyconvincedsouthernslaveownersthattheonlywaytoprotectslavery,and withittheirwholewayoflife,wastohavetheirowncountry.The self-defenseofslaveryculminatedinthesecessionofelevensouthern statesandtheformationoftheConfederateStatesofAmerica;butsecessionturnedouttobethedownfalloftheslavepower.Itprecipitated awarthatultimatelylinkedthefateofslaverytothesurvivalofthe Confederacy,andastheConfederacyfell,sotoodidtheslavesystemit wasformedtoprotect.Thisoutcomewasnotpartofsomegranddesignbutwasaccomplishedpiecemealduringthewarandinitswakeas aconsequenceofcomplexmilitaryandpoliticalpressures.Intheend, defeatandemancipationdestroyedslaveownersasarulingclassand forcedthevestigeofthatclasstoreconstituteitselfinanewworldof “freelabor”andblackcitizenship.

3 Theslave-owningclassintheUnitedStateswasforgedthrough itsevolvingrelationswithotherpeopleinAmericansocietyandthe broaderAtlanticworld.Itwasnotfrozenintimebutwasaﬂuidand

dynamicentity.TherewereapproximatelyeightythousandhouseholdswithslavesintheUnitedStatesin1790,makinguparound 15percentofallAmericanhouseholds.Althoughslaveownerslost tensofthousandsofslavesduringtheRevolution,theyretainedalmost700,000slaves,orroughly18percentofthetotalpopulationof theUnitedStates,undertheirdominion.Slaverywaslegalinevery stateexceptMassachusetts,butslaveownerswerelargelyconcentrated inthesouthernstatesofMaryland,Virginia,NorthCarolina,South Carolina,andGeorgia.Innoneofthesestateswereslaveownersamajority.EveninSouthCarolina,thestatemostthoroughlyidentiﬁed withslavery,slave-owninghouseholdsconstitutedonlyone-thirdofall households.3 Tobacco,rice,andindigo—thethreemajorcommodities grownbyslavelabor—accountedforalmostone-thirdofthevalueof thenewcountry’sexports,butforeignmarketswereuncertaininthe neweraofindependence.4

Slave-owningplantersthroughouttheBritishmainlandcolonies providedcrucialleadershipforthecauseofindependenceduringthe Revolution,andtheywereavitalelementofthenationalistcoalition thatpushedforanewfederalConstitutionattheendofthe1780s. GeorgeWashington’selectiontothepresidencyin1789symbolized slaveowners’politicalandculturalauthorityinthenewUnitedStates. InadditiontobeingtheherooftheAmericanRevolution,Washington wasoneofthelargesttobaccoplantersinVirginia,themostpopulous stateintheUnionandtheonewithmoreenslavedpeoplethanany other.Despitehisstatusasabigplanter,Washingtonwasambivalent aboutowningotherhumanbeings,andhesignaledthatambivalenceto hiscountrymenbyprovidinginhiswillfortheeventualmanumission ofhishumanproperty.5 ThequalmsexhibitedbysomeofVirginia’s leadingtobaccoplanterssuggestedthatEnlightenmentideasofnatural rightsandtheAmericanRevolutionhadunsettledslaveryinthevery centerofitspower.MostfamouswerethewordsofThomasJefferson, whoconfessedin NotesontheStateofVirginia, “Itrembleformy countrywhenIreﬂectthatGodisjust.”6

Political,economic,anddemographicforcescombinedoverthenext

half-centurytoreconﬁguretheslave-owningclassintheUnitedStates. TheoldimageofAmericanslaveownersasbackwardandstatic—an imagefosteredbycriticsanddefendersalike—contrastssharplywith theiractualhistoryasavatarsofchange.Geographicexpansionwas theﬁrstimportanttransformation.Planter-politiciansengineeredthe keyphasesofthecountry’swesternpushfromthe1790stothe1840s: theLouisianaPurchase,Indianremoval,theannexationofTexas,and theMexicanWar.7 Expansionwasneversolelyasoutherndream,butit istellingthatmostofthevocalopponentsofexpansionwereNew Englanderswhorecognizedthattheadditionofnewterritoryinthe SouthandWestwouldaugmenttheslavepower.8 Theywerenot wrong.NineslavestateswereaddedtotheUnionbetween1789and 1860(inorderofadmission:Kentucky,Tennessee,Louisiana,Mississippi,Alabama,Missouri,Florida,Arkansas,andTexas),andby1860, morethanhalfofthe395,000slaveownersintheUnitedStates, includingamajorityofthosewithtwentyormoreslaves,livedin thesenewslavestates.Diplomacy,conquest,andmigrationshiftedthe weightoftheslave-owningclasstotheSouthandWest.Atthesame time,gradualemancipationintheoriginalnorthernstatesandtheprohibitionofslaveryinthenewernorthwesternstatesmadeslaveowners anincreasinglysectional,asopposedtonational,class.9

Westernexpansiondovetailedwithatremendousexpansionofthe transatlanticcottoneconomy.CottonwasaminorcropintheUnited Statesuntilthe1790s,whentechnologicalandmanagerialinnovations inGreatBritain’stextileindustrybegantogenerateenormousdemand forrawcotton.Slaveownerstookadvantageofthenewmarketby turningtheirattention—andtheirslaves’labor—tothecultivationof short-staplecotton.CottonproductionintheUnitedStatesincreased fromabout50millionpoundsin1800to180millionpoundsin1820 and650millionpoundsin1840.In1860theU.S.cottoncropexceeded 1.6billionpounds—abouttwo-thirdsoftheworld’scotton.OnetravelertouringtheSouthin1827sawcottoneverywhere,eveninhissleep. “Idreamedofcotton,”hewrotetoafriend.TheDeepSoutheventu-

allycametodominatethecountry’scottonproduction.Morethanhalf ofU.S.cottonin1860wasgrowninLouisiana,Mississippi,andAlabama,mostofitonlandthathadbeenpurchasedorsimplytakenfrom indigenouspeople,thensurveyedandsoldbythegovernmentofthe UnitedStatesatpublicauctions.10

Cottonplantersproducedmostlyforthetransatlanticmarket.More thanthree-quartersoftheU.S.cottoncropwasexported,accounting formorethanhalfthevalueofallU.S.exports.Two-thirdsofU.S. cottonexportswenttoGreatBritain,theworld’sleadingmanufacturer ofcottontextiles.Britishtextilemanufacturersboughtalmostallof theirrawcottonfromtheUnitedStates,thusrelyingonslavelaborfor decadesafterslaveryhadbeenabolishedinBritain’sownplantation colonies.11 Cottonplanterswereferventadvocatesoffreetradeand consistentlyopposedprotectionistpoliciesformanufacturinginterests. (OnthispointtheyclashedwithLouisiana’ssugarplanters,whowere unabletocompeteintheworldsugarmarketandrequiredaprotective tarifftoshieldthemfromforeigncompetitioninthedomesticmarket.) Despiteepisodicdownturnsincommodityprices,thecottonplanters’successintheinternationalmarketgavethemconfidencethat theywereindispensabletotheAmericanandAtlanticeconomy.“No, youdarenotmakewaroncotton,”SouthCarolina’sJamesHenry HammondfamouslydeclaredintheSenatein1858.“Cottonisking.”12 Ifcottonwasking,othersectorsofthesoutherneconomyformeda respectablecourt.Tobacco,rice,andsugarmarketssustainedthelivelihoodsofperhapsoneineveryfiveAmericanslaveowners,includingsomeofthemostprominentandprosperousplantersfromthe Carolina-GeorgiaLowCountryandthelowerMississippiValley.13 Another10percentofslaveownerslivedincities.14 Thousandsofslaves workedinmills,mines,workshops,factories,andrefineriesandonrailroads.15 Althoughthepaceofurbanandindustrialdevelopmentinthe slavestatestrailedthatofthefreestates,itmatcheddevelopmentin several“advanced”EuropeannationsandfarexceededthatofBrazil.16 Notevenaprolongeddeclineincottonpricesfrom1818to1845damp-

enedsouthernslaveowners’faithinslavery.Duringtheseyearsmany southernreformersurgedeconomicdiversiﬁcationtolessentheregion’srelianceontheworldcottonmarket,butfewadvocatedaturnto freelabor.Therangeofactivitiesamenabletoslavelaborgavemany southernboostersconﬁdencethatslaverywascompatiblewithadiverse,moderneconomy.17

Alongwiththewestwardpushandtheriseofthecottoneconomy,a quintuplingofthenumberofslavesincreasedslaveowners’wealth andboostedtheirmoralconﬁdence.By1860therewerealmost4millionslavesintheUnitedStates,outofatotalpopulationof30million people.Theslavepopulationgrewbytheaccretionofnewslaveterritories;thelegalimportationofforeignslavesuntil1808andillegal smugglingthereafter;and,mostimportant,naturalreproduction.UnliketheslavepopulationsofCubaandBrazil(thetwoothermajor slavesocietiesintheAmericasthatendureduntilthesecondhalfofthe nineteenthcentury),theslavepopulationoftheUnitedStatesincreasedfrom1810onwardwithoutcontinualmassivereplenishment fromAfrica.Theprohibitiononslaveimportationmeantthatslave ownersintheUnitedStateshadtoprovideenslavedpeoplewithfood, clothing,andshelteradequateforbiologicalandsocialreproduction. Slaveownerselevatedthateconomicnecessityintoamoralprinciple. Forinstance,AndrewFlynn,acottonplanterintheYazoo-Mississippi Delta,instructedhisoverseerin1840topayspecialattentiontothe slavechildren,“forrearingthemisnotonlyaDuty,butalsothemost proﬁtablepartofplantationbusiness.”18

Crucialtoslaveowners’transformationintheﬁrsthalfofthenineteenthcenturywastheemergenceofamassiveforcedmigrationof slaveswithintheUnitedStates.ThehistorianMichaelTadmanestimatesthatroughly1.1millionslavesweretransportedfromslave-exportingtoslave-importingregionsofthecountrybetween1790and 1860.Someweretransportedbymigratingowners,othersbyprofessionalslavetraders.Theytrekkedoverland,ﬂoateddowntheMississippianditstributaries,andsailedoncoastingshipsfromBaltimore,

Norfolk,andCharlestontoSavannah,Mobile,andNewOrleans.19 Forcedslavemigrationhadmanybenefitsforslaveowners.Although smugglingofforeignslavesintothelowerSouthdidoccurafter1808, thevigorousinternalcommercereduceditsscopeandallowedslave ownerstoadheretoanationalpoliticalconsensusagainstforeignslave importation—atleastuntilthe1850s.Itpermittedthemtoshiftslave laborfromlessprofitabletomoreprofitablesectorsofthesouthern economy,boostingthepriceofslavesthroughoutthesouthernstates andlinkingtheslave-exportingandslave-importingregionsofthe Southinamutuallyadvantageoustrade.Moreover,forcedmigration terrorizedenslavedpeopleandextendedthetransatlanticprocessof deracinationthatrenderedthemvulnerableandpowerless.Onecan senseHarrietNewby’sdesperationasshepennedalettertoherhusbandinAugust1859.“Thelasttwoyearshasbeenlikeatroubledream tome,”shelamented.“ItissaidMasterisinwantofmoney.Ifso,I knownotwhattimehemaysellme,anthenallmybrighthopeofthe futerareblasted...forifI thoughtIshoulneverseeyouthisearth wouldhavenocharmsforme.”20 Newby’sletterpoignantlyreveals thatAmericanslaveownersparticipatedinacommercialsystemwith devastatingconsequencesforenslavedpeople.

Theexpansionofslaverymeantmorelaborersandgreatercapital forslaveowners,whohadthelegalrighttousephysicalpunishmentto compelslavesofallagesandbothsexestoworkunderconditionsthat freepeoplewouldnottolerateforthemselves.Slavery’sadvocatesarguedthatonlycoercedlaborcouldtransformthesouthernwildernessintocivilizedsociety.UniversityofVirginiaprofessorThomas RoderickDewrecognizedslavery’slabor-generatingandwealthproducingeffectsinhis1832essay“AbolitionofNegroSlavery.” Abolishslavery,wroteDew,“andVirginiawillbeadesert.”21 Moreover,slavesembodiedcapitalthatincreasedovertimeasslaveprices rose.In1860theaveragevalueofanAmericanslavewas$900,anincreasethatboostedslaveowners’wealthandgainedthemaccessto preciouscredit.22 Thecapitalembodiedbytheirslavepropertyelevated

bigplanterstothetopofthewealthpyramidinantebellumAmerica.A fewstatisticsillustratethepoint.In1860,7,000Americansowned wealthvaluedat$110,000ormore,and4,500ofthemlivedinthe South.Therichest0.1percentofsouthernersweremorethantwiceas wealthyonaverageastherichest0.1percentofnortherners.Moreover, thetwelverichestcountiesintheUnitedStatesin1860intermsoftotal wealthperfreemanwereallintheSouth,andnineofthemwerelocatedinLouisianaandMississippi.Finally,theoverallinequalityof wealthamongfreemenwassomewhatgreaterintheSouththaninthe Northin1860,andifoneincludesslavesinthecalculation,thenwealth inequalitywassubstantiallygreaterintheSouththanintheNorth.23 Itisthewealthiestslaveownerswhogenerallydominatetheimage ofAmericanslavery.Manyoftheirmansionsstillstandfortourists toview.Theirvoluminouspersonalpapersoccupylibrariesandarchives,wherescholarsnowstudythem.Theirstorieshavebeenfamouslyrepresentedandmisrepresentedinfilm.ThehistorianWilliam Scarboroughhaswrittenacollectivebiographyof339slaveowners, eachofwhomownedatleast250slavesin1850or1860.Hisbook, MastersoftheBigHouse, isarichtroveofinformationaboutthiselite group.Altogethertheyownedmorethan100,000enslavedpeoplein 1860.AlmosthalflivedinAlabama,Mississippi,andLouisiana,while morethanone-quartercalledSouthCarolinahome.Thebiggestof themallwasNathanielHeyward,whoowned1,834slavesin1850, mostofwhomworkedonhisriceplantationinSouthCarolina’s Colleton–St.BartholomewParish.Heyward’stotalestatewasvalued atmorethan$2millionwhenhediedin1851.Fromthissuper-elite camefiveU.S.senators,seventeenU.S.representatives,fifteengovernorsandlieutenantgovernors,andseventy-threestatelegislators.Most oftheseplanter-politicianslivedinSouthCarolina,wherepoliticswas especiallybeholdentothegrandees.24 Ofcourse,mostAmericanslave ownersdidnotlivequitesohighandmighty.Only3percentofall slaveownersin1860ownedfiftyormoreslaves.One-quarterowned fromtentoforty-nineslaves.Around70percentownedfewerthanten

slaves.25 Yetthedifferencesbetweenthemiddlingmajorityofslave ownersandthesuper-eliteshouldnotbeexaggerated.Slaveowners wereadiverselot,butfundamentalcommonalitiesunitedthem.Most weresouthern-born,Protestantwhitemenwhoabsorbedslaveryinto theotherelementalaspectsoftheirpersonality.Theyunderstoodthe northernassaultonslaverynotmerelyasanattackontheirproperty butalsoasanattackontheirregion,theirmanhood,theirrace,and theirGod.Allslaveownerssharedafundamentalclassinterestinprotectingslavery,whichwasabasisoftheirwayoflife.

Preciselyhowtocharacterizethatwayoflifehasinvolvedhistorians inalong-standingdebate.Someinsistthatslaveownerswerecapitalistsbecausetheywerefullyinvolvedintransatlanticnetworksof commodityproductionandexchange.Theyarguethatmakingmoney wasthesouthernslaveowners’overridingconcern,andthattheywere relativelyindifferenttononpecuniaryvalues.Othersinsistthatcapitalismisahistoricallyspecificsocialsystemthatrequireswagelaboras itsprevailingformoflabor,so,bydefinition,slaveownerscannotbe capitalists.Thesehistorianstendtoemphasizetheaspectsofslave owners’behaviorandvaluesthatemergeddirectlyfromthemasterslaverelationship,especiallytheirallegiancetoacultureofhonorand obligationcommonlyknownas“paternalism.”26 Myownview,closer tothelatter,isthatAmericanslaveownersconstitutedaprofiteering classthataroseandevolvedwithinthetransatlanticdivisionoflabor, andwhosebehaviorandvalueswerenotidenticalwiththoseofother profiteeringclasses,suchastheindustrialbourgeoisie,butwerefirmly rootedintheirownlocalattemptstosecureandjustifytheirpower overenslavedpeople.Thusthecrucialquestionsaboutsouthernslave owners’classcharactercanbeansweredonlybyacloseexaminationof theirvariousstrugglesforpower.

Likecharity,powerbeganathome.Orinotherwords,thehouseholdformedthebasicunitofslaveowners’rule.27 Manyoftheaspects ofsovereigntythataregenerallyassociatedwithstateadministration weredelegatedtoslaveownerswhogovernedthehumanpropertycol-

lectedintheirhouseholds.Theslaveownersweretheultimateauthoritieswithintheirhouseholds,punishingslavesforviolatingwrittenand unwrittenlaws.AsJamesHenryHammondarguedinhis1845 Letterto anEnglishAbolitionist, “Wetry,decide,andexecutethesentences, inthousandsofcases,whichinothercountrieswouldgointothe courts.”28 Assistedbymembersoftheirownfamilies,overseers,and drivers,plantersregulatedthedailylivesoftheirslaves.AndrewFlynn instructedhisoverseerto“visitthenegrohouseseverymorningby daylight”andatleastonenightperweek“afterhornblow.”29 Thepurposeofsuchvisitswastokeepenslavedpeoplewithintheplantation’s boundariesandsubjecttoitsmanyformsofdiscipline.Whipping,extrawork,reducedrations,andsellingwerejustsomeofthelawful methodsthatplantersusedtopunishinsubordinateslaves.30

Slaveownersusedthecarrotaswellasthestick.Theymetminimumstandardsinprovidingfood,clothing,andshelter.Theyoffered bonusesforgoodconductandhardwork,orsimplytodemonstrate largesse.Theypaidforoverwork,forSundaylabor,andforcropsthat theslavesgrewontheirowntime.Someslavesevenmanagedtoamass propertyoftheirown—recognizedassuchbycustomifnotinlaw.It wasnotthatslavesweretreatedwell,orthattheywereconvincedthat slaverywasrightandjust.Rather,intheseandmanyotherways,slave ownersgaveenslavedpeoplesomethingtolose.Suchallowanceswere centraltoAmericanslaveowners’managerialtechniqueandmoraldefenseofslavery.Proslaverytheoristsarguedthatmastersandslaves wereboundtogetherinasystemofreciprocalobligation.Masterswere obligedtoprotectanduplifttheirslaves,andinexchange,slaveswere obligedtosubmittoandlaborfortheirmasters.Lawenforcedthe slaves’partofthebargain,whilemasterswere,forthemostpart,regulatedsolelybytheirownpersonalregardforhonoranddesirefor proﬁt.31

Anarrayofneighborhoodpoliceinstitutionsbuttressedslaveowners’authority.Slaveswhovisitednearbyplantations,orwhowentto townforworkorpleasure,orwhodaredtorunawayenteredintopub-

licspacesregulatedbyslavepatrols—aubiquitouspresenceinslavesocieties.Thesespreadthetaskofprotectingslaverythroughoutthe adultwhitemalepopulationandeventofreepeopleofcolor.Thepatrolsﬁgureprominentlyinautobiographieswrittenbyfugitiveslavesin theantebellumperiodaswellasinthememoriesofformerslavesrecordedinthe1930sbytheWorksProgressAdministration.“Ifyou wasn’tinyourproperplacewhenthepaddyrollerscome,”oneNorth Carolinianrecalled,“theylashyoutil’youwasblackandblue.”32 Whenslaveswereformallyaccusedofcrimes,specialpubliccourtsadjudicatedtheircaseswithaneyetowardprotectingslaveowners’propertyrights.Slaveownerspresidedoverthesecourts,andseveralsouthernstateslimitedthenumberofnon-slave-ownerswhocouldserveas jurorsincriminalcasesinvolvingslaves.33

Enslavedpeopletestedtheauthorityoftheirownersinmanyways, rangingfromrunningawaytosabotagetohomicide,buttheseforms ofeverydayresistanceonlyrarelycongealedintocollective,armedresistanceonascalethatactuallythreatenedtheplantationsystem.Many realandallegedconspiraciesweresquelchedbeforetheyripenedinto outrightrebellion—usuallywiththehelpofslaveswhobetrayedtheir fellows’plots.(“Serviledeceit”waswhatthefreeblackabolitionist DavidWalkercalledthepatternofcollaboration.)34 Therapid,effectivesuppressionofthetwomajorslaverevoltsthatdidoccurinthe UnitedStatesintheﬁrsthalfofthenineteenthcentury—oneinthe sugarparishesaboveNewOrleansin1811andtheotherinVirginia’s SouthamptonCountyin1831—demonstratedtheoverwhelmingmilitarystrengthavailabletosouthernplantersinmomentsofcrisis.The little-knownslaverevoltof1811,thelargestinthecountry’shistory,is particularlynotablebecausefederaltroopscontributedtoitssuppression.Theircommander,GeneralWadeHamptonofSouthCarolina, happenedtobeoneofthelargestslaveownersintheUnitedStatesat thetimeoftherebellion,andhewouldshortlybecomeLouisiana’s richestsugarplanter.35

Slaveowners’poweroverslavesultimatelydependedonmustering

supportfromthemajorityofwhitesouthernerswhodidnotthemselvesownslaves.Abouttwo-thirdsofallsouthernhouseholdsheaded bywhitepeoplein1860didnotincludeslaves,aproportionthatappearstohaveheldmoreorlessconstantthroughouttheﬁrsthalfofthe century.36 Hadthesenon-slave-owningwhitesouthernersleaguedwith theslaves,theslave-owningminoritywouldnothavebeenableto maintainitsrule.Butthatisnotwhathappened.AstheacuteFrederick LawOlmstedobservedin TheCottonKingdom, “Thesecurityofthe whitesisinamuchlessdegreecontingentontheactionofthe‘patrols’ thanupontheconstant,habitual,andinstinctivesurveillanceandauthorityofallwhitepeopleoverallblack.”37 Itiseasybutinadequateto assumethatthesouthernwhiteyeomanrysupportedslaverybecause theywereracist,orbecausetheyearnedsomevaguepsychicbeneﬁt fromlordingitoverblackpeople.MostwhiteAmericansoftheera wereracist,butnotallendorsedslavery.Olmstedhimselfsuggested thattheyeomanry’sapparentlyspontaneoussupportforslaveryderivedfromanimplicitlawofself-defenseagainstslaveinsurrection. Thatisareasonablestarttowardanexplanation,butitmustbeallowed thatthenon-slave-owningmajorityofwhitesouthernerssupported slaveryforothersolidreasonsaswell.Mutualinterests,sharedvalues, andthesuppressionofdissentledmostwhitesouthernerstoaccept slaveryandtheleadershipoftheplanterclass.38

Manywhitesouthernmenwhodidnotownslavesneverthelessmateriallybeneﬁtedfromtheplantationsystem.Somehiredorborrowed slaves.Sometooktheircottontowealthierneighbors,whoginnedit andsolditforthem.Thousandsworkedasoverseersandcraftsmen onplantations.Young,slavelesswhitemenoftenlookedforwardto owningslavesastheymadetheirwayintheworld,andindeed,the likelihoodofwhitesouthernmenowningslavesincreasedwithage.39 Equallyimportantweretheindirecteffectsofslaveryinpreservingthe whiteyeomanry’sindependentandrelativelyself-sufﬁcientcommunities.TheplantationsystembypassedlargeregionsoftheSouthbecausethelandwasnotfertileenoughortransportationcostsweretoo

highforproﬁtablecommercialagriculture.Thesouthernyeomanry occupiedtheseinterstitialplaces,wherecommercialsocietyremained relativelyundeveloped,andyeomanhouseholdssustainedtraditional agrarianandpatriarchalmores.Thecircumstancesoftheirlivesgave non-slave-owningwhitepeoplelittlereasontoopposeslaveryorslave owners’leadership,andgoodreasontobesuspiciousofabolitionists’ moreprogress-oriented,bourgeoisvalues.40

Thosefewfreewhitemenandwomenwhodared(orappeared)to challengeslaveryfacedsocialpressure,intimidation,andevenviolence.Antebellumsouthernslavecodesallowedfortheprosecutionof freepeoplewhoengagedinunauthorizedcontactwithslaves.Eight SouthCarolinians,forinstance,wereconvictedofabolitionismbetween1847and1852.41 Extralegalcoercionalsosuppressedantislavery dissent.VigilancecommitteesthroughouttheSouthblockedthedisseminationofabolitionistpropagandathroughthemailin1835.42 A committeeinLexington,Kentucky,closeddownCassiusClay’santislavery TrueAmerican in1845andshippedhisprintingpressto Cincinnati.43 Nobodyknowsexactlyhowmanypeoplewererunoutof southerntownsandcommunities,aswastheConnecticut-bornNathan BirdWatsonin1851,for“promulgatingabolitionistsentiments ...at warwithourinstitutionsandintolerableinaslavecommunity.”44 The extentofsuchrepressionamongsouthernwhitepeoplecannotbemeasuredprecisely,butitsurelymutedantislaveryorganizationintheslave states.Perhapsoppositiontoslaveryisonereasonwhythousandsof native-bornsouthernersemigratedtofreestatesandterritories.Forinstance,approximately390,000freepeopleborninVirginiawereliving outsidethestatein1860,andmorethanhalfofthesewerelivingin freestatesorterritories.Seventy-ﬁvethousandhademigratedtoOhio. MigrationmayhaveeasedantislaverypressureswithintheSouthwhile strengtheningthemelsewhere.45

Southernpoliticalinstitutionsdidrequireslaveownerstotakethe interestsandvaluesofnon-slave-owningwhitepeopleintoaccount. Theformalsphereofsouthernpoliticswidenedintheﬁrsthalfofthe

nineteenthcentury.Constitutionalreformintheslavestatesgenerally rantowardeliminatingpropertyqualificationsonsuffrageandofficeholding,equalizingrepresentation,andsubjectingmoreofficesto popularelection.46 CompetitionbetweentheDemocraticandWhig partiesinthe1830sand1840sbroughtmorewhitemenintothepoliticalprocessandincreasedturnoutatelections.47 Thesechangesenhancedtheinfluenceoftheyeomanry,whogenerallyopposedstate banks,costlysubsidiesforcanalsandrailroads,andthetaxestheseentailed.Theyeomanry’soppositiontoanactivistgovernmentderived fromafearofpoliticalcorruptionandanindifferencetothebenefits ofmarketexpansion.Thesesamepreferencesreinforcedtheirhostilitytoschemesforemancipationandabolition,whichalsoseemedto usethepowerofgovernmenttodisruptartificiallythenaturaleconomicandsocialordercontainedwithintheirhouseholds.Intheeraof two-partycompetitionbeginninginthe1830s,non-slave-owningwhite farmers’anti-statistoutlooktendedtodirectthemtotheDemocratic Party,whilemorecommerciallyorientedsouthernerstendedtoidentifywiththeWhigParty,butbothpartiesintheSouthwereledby slaveowners.48

Thereislittledoubtthatpoliticalleadershipinthemid-nineteenthcenturySouthremainedsafelyinthehandsofslaveownersdespitethe marchof“democracy.”Slaveownershadmoreeducationthanother men,andtheymovedmoreeasilyintopubliclife.Theywereableto mobilizesprawlingconnectionsofkinship,friendship,andpatronage towinappointmentorelectiontoofﬁce.49 Onestudyofantebellum Texasdeterminedthat68.3percentofthestate’spoliticalleadersin 1860wereslaveowners,asopposedtojustoveraquarterofallhouseholdheads.50 Two-thirdsofallsouthernstatelegislatorsin1860were slaveowners,andtheonlytwoslavestateswheretheydidnotholda majorityofseatsin1860wereArkansasandMissouri.51 Slaveowners wereevenmoreoverrepresentedamongsoutherncongressmen,but therearefewavailablestatisticsonslaveowningamongnationalpoliticians.OnestudyofMississippifoundthatatleastforty-eightofthe

state’sﬁfty-tworepresentativesandsenatorsbefore1861ownedslaves, andtwo-thirdsofthemwereownersofmorethantenslaves.52 Similar studiesofothersouthernstatesareunlikelytoshowthatslaveowners weremuchlessdominantelsewhere.

Animportantaspectofsouthernslaveowners’struggleforpower wastheirincreasinglysophisticatedefforttojustifyslavery.Theemergenceofatransatlanticantislaverymovementinthelateeighteenth centurystirredtheformidableintellectualresourcesofAmericanslave ownersintoanevermorerigorousandthoroughanalysisanddefense oftheirwayoflife.TheywerefascinatedandappalledbytheslaverevoltinSt.Domingue,compensatedemancipationintheBritishWest Indies,andtheslowdeclineofslaveryinthenorthernUnitedStates. Proslaveryintellectualsinterpretedtheseprocessestoshowthatemancipationretardedeconomicprogressandharmedfreedpeople.Therise oftheorganizedabolitionistmovementintheNorthduringtheJacksonianeraintensiﬁedthenationaldebateoverslavery.Southernintellectualsofferedspeeches,sermons,reviews,pamphlets,treatises,and novelsdemonstratingthemoralityofslavery.Oneneedonlyread LouisaMcCord’sreviewofHarrietBeecherStowe’s UncleTom’s Cabin tograspthesouthernintellectuals’unrelentingefforttodefend slavery.“Againandagainhavewe,withallthepowerandtalentofour clearestheadsandstrongestintellects,forcedasidethefoulloadof slanderandvillainousaspersionsooftenhurledagainstus,”McCord protestedinthepagesofthe SouthernQuarterlyReview.53 Thiscirculationofproslaveryideasstrengthenedthesolidarityofsouthernslave ownersinthe1840sand1850s.Itarmedthemintellectuallywithaformidablecritiqueofbourgeoissocialrelations.

Theproslaveryargumentcametorestinthe1850sonacharacteristiccontrastbetweenslaveandfreesociety.Whereasslavesocietywas cooperative,peaceful,andGod-fearing(sotheargumentwent),free societywascompetitive,anarchic,andsecular.54 Theproslaverycontrastbetweenslaveandfreesocietyreconciledtwocherishedvalues,freedomandobligation,intensionwitheachother.Freedom

largelyprevailedintherelationsamongwhitesouthernmen,obligationintherelationsbetweenwhitesouthernmenandothersinsociety, includingwomen,children,andslaves.55 Iffreedomandobligation wereslaveowners’majorvalues,thendependency(thenegationof freedom)andalienation(thenegationofobligation)weretheirantitheses,theslaveowners’nightmare.Theproslaverycontrastbetween slaveandfreesocietydrewitslogicfromthecombinationofthesefour values:freedom,obligation,dependency,andalienation.Theindustrial bourgeoisieembodiedfreedomwithoutobligation—acorrosivesocial forceassociatedwithduty-dissolvingideasincludingtranscendentalism,feminism,andabolitionism.Themonstrousoffspringofthebourgeoisie,wageworkers,occupiedthemostdegradedpositioninthe proslaverystructureofvalues.Wageworkers,especiallyfreeblack people,appearedtobebothalienatedanddependent.Oppressedby poverty,theythreatenedtotiltthesocialordertowardanarchismorsocialism.Ifenfranchised,theyreduceddemocracytomobrule.Like wageworkers,slavesweredependentratherthanfree,butfromthe proslaveryperspectivetheywererescuedfromthedespairoffreesocietybyimmersioninthemutualobligationsofslavery.Onlyslaveownersandtheirallies,thesouthernyeomanry,embodiedanidealsynthesis offreedomandobligation.56

Thelogicoftheproslaveryargumentresonatedinan1857speech byJeffersonDavis,thewealthyMississippiplanterwhoeventuallybecamethepresidentoftheConfederateStatesofAmerica.Hedeclared thatslaveryprovided“themosthumanerelationsoflabortocapital whichcanpermanentlysubsistbetweenthem,andthemostbeneﬁcent formofgovernmentthathasbeenappliedtothosewhoaremorally andintellectuallyunabletotakecareofthemselves.”Likeotheradvocatesofslavery,Davisarguedthatblackpeoplewereincapableofselfgovernment.Theyhadtobeprotectedfromthecompetitivepressures offreesociety,andtheyneededmoralguidancetopreventthemfrom regressingintobarbarism.Moreover,hedeclaredthatthepresenceof blackslaves“elevatedthewhiteman,andgaveoursocialcondition

thatfreedomfromhumiliatingdiscriminationanddependenceamong individualsofourownrace,which,wheretheyexisted,wouldleave butthenameofpoliticalequality.”57 Slaveryalleviatedrelationsofexploitationamongsouthernwhitemenandallowedthemtofaceoneanotherasequals.InafarcryfromtheambivalentantislaveryofWashingtonandJefferson,JeffersonDavisnowarguedthatblackslavery madewhitefreedompossible.

Theproslaveryargumenthelpedtosolidifytheinternalcohesionof theslave-owningclass,butmostnorthernerswerenotconvincedofits logic.WhileslaverydisappearedasamodeoflaborintheNorth,itreappearedthereasakeysymbolofsavagecruelty,economicstagnation, andpoliticalcorruption.58 Theslaveowners’majorpoliticaldilemma wasthatnorthernerslaybeyondthereachoftheintensivenetworksof powerthatsmotheredoppositiontoslaveryintheSouth.Inthecountryasawhole,therefore,slaveownershadtorelyonmoreextensive networkstoprotecttheirinterests.Theseincludedconstitutionalrules, partisanalignments,andideologicalafﬁnities,whichallneededtheacquiescenceofsufﬁcientnumbersoffreenorthernerstobeeffective.59 Untilthelate1850s,slaveownerswereanindispensablepartofevery nationaladministrativeandlegislativecoalition,andtheyusedtheirleveragetoprotecttheslave-owninginterestindirectandindirectways.

ThefederalConstitutionprotectedslaveownerswithoutevermentioningslaverybyname.Article4,Section2(thefugitiveslaveclause), preventedslavesfrombecomingfreebyescapingtofreestates.Article 1,Section9(theslavetradeclause),prohibitedthenationalgovernmentfrombanningtheimportationofslavesuntil1808.Article1,Section2(thethree-fifthsclause),basedapportionmentofseatsinthe HouseofRepresentativesonfreepopulationplusthree-fifthsof“all otherpersons,”meaningslaves.Thethree-fifthsclausewasparticularly significantforslaveowners’nationalpower.Itboostedtheslavestates’ representationintheHouse,thoughnotasmuchasthesoutherndelegatestotheConstitutionalConventionwouldhaveliked.Thesouthernerswantedapportionmentbasedonthetotalpopulation,while

northernerswanteditbasedonfreepopulationalone.Thethree-fifths ratioemergedasacompromisederivedfromtheratiothattheContinentalCongresshadusedtoapportiondirecttaxesamongthestates.60 Theirrepresentationaugmentedbythethree-fifthsclause,theslave statesenjoyednear-parityintheHouseofRepresentativesinthe1790s andthefirstdecadeofthenineteenthcentury,when47percentofcongressionalrepresentativescamefromtheSouth.AlthoughthethreefifthsclausenevergavesouthernersanoutrightmajorityintheHouse, itlessenedthenumberofnorthernrepresentativesthatsoutherncongressmenhadtowinovertotheirsideonanyquestionrespectingslavery—forinstance,whenantislaverycongressmentriedtoblocktheadmissionofMissouriasaslavestatein1819–20.Italsoaugmentedthe influenceoftheslavestatesintheelectoralcollegeandnationalparty caucuses.ThomasJeffersonowedhisnarrowmarginofvictoryinthe 1800presidentialelectiontotheadditionalelectoralvotesawardedto theSouthbythethree-fifthsclause.Thisclauseeasedthetaskofprotectingslaveowners’interests.61

Butaspopulationgrowthinthefreestatesoutranthatoftheslave states,thethree-fifthsclauselostitspotency.Theproportionofsouthernrepresentativesdeclinedineverydecadeuntilitreached35percent in1860.Theshiftingbalancesubstantiallyreducedtheoriginalsouthernstates’influenceintheHouse.By1860,Maryland,Virginia,North Carolina,SouthCarolina,andGeorgiaaccountedforonly17percent ofrepresentativesintheHouse.Thethreemid-AtlanticstatesofNew York,NewJersey,andPennsylvaniaaloneaccountedfor26percent.62 TheirdeclininginfluenceintheHouseforcedsouthernpoliticiansto focusonpreservingslavestateparityintheSenate,abastionofthe slavepowerinthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury.Theequalrights ofstatesbecameacounterweightagainsttheequalrightsofcitizens. Timeandagain,antislaverylegislationthatpassedintheHousediedin theSenate.TheWilmotProviso,whichwouldhaveprohibitedslavery interritorywonduringtheMexicanWar,isagoodexample.Though

endorsedbytheHouseofRepresentativesseveralyearsinarow,it neversurvivedtheSenate’sproslaverygauntlet.63

Southernslaveownersfoundinﬂuentialalliesamongconservative northernbusinessmenwhoseeconomicendeavorslinkedthemtothe plantationsystem.NewEngland’scottontextilemanufacturershada clearinterestinpreservingasteadysupplyofcheapcottonfromthe slavestates.AsadominantelementintheleadershipofMassachusetts’s WhigPartyinthe1830sand1840s,theytriedtoholdbacktherising antislaverytidewhilereassuringthesouthernwingoftheirpartythat therewasnothingtofear.“Cottonthreadholdstheuniontogether,” wroteadisapprovingRalphWaldoEmerson.64 NewYork’smercantileelitealsosupportedslavery.TheywerethemiddlemenoftheAtlanticcottontrade.Asubstantialproportionofsoutherncottonpassed throughNewYorkonitswaytoLiverpoolandLeHavre,whilemany oftheconsumergoodspurchasedandconsumedintheSouthwere manufacturedinNewYorkandshippedbythecity’smerchants.These linkagesmadeNewYorkfertilegroundforproslaveryapologistssuch asthenewspapereditorThomasPrenticeKettell,whopublishedan anti-abolitionisttreatisein1860titled SouthernWealthandNorthern Proﬁts.65 TheantislaverymovementthusconfrontedentrenchedconservativeelitesintheNorthaswellasintheSouth.

Competitionbetweennationalpoliticalpartiesfurtherprotected slaveowners’interestsfromtheMissouriCompromiseuntiltheMexicanWar.Thepolarizingissuesofpartisanconﬂictintheeraofthesecond-partysystem—Indianremoval,internalimprovements,tariffs,and banking—relegatedquestionsaboutslaverytothemarginsofnational debate.NeithertheDemocratsnortheWhigscouldwinnationalelectionswithoutsupportfromtheSouth,andthepriceofthatsupportwas asolicitousregardforslaveowners’specialpropertyinterests.Each partyviedtooutshinetheother’sproslaverycredentialswithinthe Southwithoutalienatingnorthernvoters.66 Bothmajorpartiesattracted slaveowners,buttheDemocraticPartyultimatelyprovedtobemore

ﬁrmlyattachedtoslaverythantheWhigs.Fromitsinceptionasthe Jacksonianparty,theDemocracyregularlycountedonasolidsouthern electoralbase.Furthermore,Democraticcandidatesfornationalofﬁce generallyhadtowintwo-thirdsofthevoteattheDemocraticnominatingconvention,arulethatgavesouthernersleveragetheyneverenjoyedintheWhigParty.67 Finally,northernDemocratsweregenerally morehostiletoantislaveryonprinciplethanwerethenorthernWhigs. NotonlydidnorthernDemocratsrejectabolitionismasaspeciesof overbearingmoralreformakintotemperanceandSabbatarianism,but alsotheywereespeciallyhostiletothelurkingprospectofAfro-Americancitizenship.ItwasDemocratsprimarilywhocarriedoutthedisenfranchisementofblackvotersintheNorthwhilechampioningwhite malesuffrage.68

Slaveownerstookadvantageofthesenetworksofpowertosecurea prominentplaceforthemselvesinthenationalgovernment.Sevenof thefirstelevenpresidentswereslaveowners.Fifty-sevenpercentofall SupremeCourtjusticesweresoutherners,aswerehalfofallmajor cabinetanddiplomaticofficials.Itcanbeassumedthatmostofthese menwerealsoslaveowners.69 Thispresencehadrealpoliticalconsequences.Slaveownerssuccessfullypreventedthenationalgovernment frominterferingwithslaverywhenitendangeredtheirinterestsandinvolvedthenationalgovernmentinslaverywhenitadvancedtheirinterests.Therosterofaccomplishmentsisimpressive.Slave-owning politiciansgotthenation’scapitallocatedintheSouthandfirmlyprotectedslaverythere.Theyallowedthenationalgovernmenttoprohibit theimportationofslavesintotheUnitedStatesin1808butafterwards blockedanyfederalprohibitionorevenmeaningfulregulationofthe interstateslavetrade.Theyusedthecountry’sdiplomaticofficestowin compensationforslaveownerswhosehumanchattelfledtotheBritish duringtheAmericanRevolutionandtheWarof1812.Theydispatched thearmytosuppresscommunitiesoffugitiveslavesinFloridabutkept thenavyfromsupportingBritisheffortstoquashtheAtlanticslave tradeuntiltheearly1840s.Proslaveryforcesalsoattachedslaveryto

U.S.territorialexpansion.Theydefusedeffortstoabolishslaveryin theOrleansTerritoryin1804andMissouriin1819–20,whichenabled theexpansionofslaverywestoftheMississippi.They“removed”the southernIndians,expandingtheplantationsysteminthelandstheIndianswereforcedtoleavebehind.TheybroughtTexasintotheUnion asagiantslavestateandthenmadewaronMexicowiththeevident hopeofwinningyetmoreterritoryforslavery.Manyslave-owning politicianswereforthrightabouttheneedtoprotectslavery,butoften theycouchedtheiragendainthemoreabstractandtranscendentvocabularyofindividualandstaterights,whichhadabroaderappealto non–slaveownersthanthedefenseofslaveryinitself.70

Yetthejerry-builtedificeofslaveowners’hegemonybeganto crumbleinthelate1830s.Tacticsusedbyslaveownersalienatedmany northernerswhohadpreviouslycollaboratedwiththem.Theantislaveryconversionoftwoimportantnorthernpoliticianswhohad previouslychampionedslaveowners’interestsindicatedthechanging weather.JohnQuincyAdamsbecameanavowedenemyofsouthern slaveownersduringthefightoverthe“gagrule”institutedinthe HouseofRepresentativesfrom1836to1844tostifledebateonthousandsofpetitionscallingfortheabolitionofslaveryandtheslave tradeintheDistrictofColumbia.MartinVanBuren,anoriginalarchitectoftheDemocracy,turnedagainstslaveryafterlosingalongand bitterbattlewithproslaveryforcesinhispartyduringthemid-1840s. Thenortherndiagnosisofa“slavepower”tookholdasantislaveryactivistsbegantoidentifymaddeningconstraintsthatslaveownersimposedonthedemocraticlibertiesoffreenortherners.71 Themirrorimageofthatdiagnosisoccurredtosouthernpoliticianswhobeganto comprehendthatneithertheexistingConstitutionnorthetwo-party systemwouldsufficetoprotectslaveryinthefaceofarapidlygrowingnorthernfreepopulationandanincreasinglypotentantislavery movement.ConfrontingwhatTocquevillecalledthetyrannyofthe majority,theybegantoarticulateanexplicitlyantidemocraticpolitical theory. The“SlavePower”intheUnitedStates,1783–1865

Oneoftheﬁrsttothinkseriouslyabouttheslaveowners’deterioratingminoritypositioninAmericanpoliticswastheSouthCarolina planterandstatesmanJohnC.Calhoun.Beginninginthebattlesover thefederaltariffinthelate1820s,Calhounworkedoutatheoretically sophisticatedcritiqueofthetyrannyofthemajority.Hedistinguished betweenthe“absolutemajority,”whichwasameremajorityofallthe people,andthe“concurringmajority,”whichwastheunanimousassentofeachandeverymajorinterestinsociety.Hearguedthattheabsolutemajoritysubordinatedtheweakerinteresttothestronger,while theconcurringmajorityallowedforaharmonyofinterests.Giventhe constitutionalstructureoftheUnitedStates,Calhounclaimed,the country’sdistinctpoliticalinterestswereorganizedintostates,soeach stateshouldhaveavetothatcouldbeoverriddenonlybyasupermajorityoftheotherstatesintheformofaconstitutionalamendment. Theconcurringmajoritywasarecipeforagovernmentinapermanent conditionofparalysis,whichwouldhavesuitedthoseconservatives who,likeCalhoun,hadcometobelievethatanoveractivenational governmentwouldsomedaythreatenslavery.Theideaoftheconcurringmajoritycontinuestoresonateironicallyincontemporarythinkingabouttherightsofminoritygroupsinpoliticaldemocracies,but Calhoun’sownformulationaimedtoprotectpropertiedminoritiesin theUnitedStatesfromdemocraticregulation.Histheoryexpressed slaveowners’considerableanxietyoverenfranchisementofthelower classes,whatevertheircolor.72

BetweentheMexicanWarandsecession,slaveownerstriedwithincreasingurgencytosecureaconcurringmajorityindefenseofslavery. Theydeniedthatthenationalgovernmenthadtherighttoprohibit slaveryinitsterritories,andtheytriedtoextendslaveryintowestern territorieswhereitdidnotalreadyexist.(Slaveownersweresupported inthesegoalsbytheSupremeCourt’s1857 DredScott decision,which deniedthatCongresshadthepowertoprohibitslaveryintheterritories.AllﬁvesouthernDemocratsontheCourtvotedinthe7–2majority.)Theychampionedtheadmissionofnewslavestatesinorderto

The“SlavePower”intheUnitedStates,1783–1865

preserveparityintheSenate.Theypressedforanewfugitiveslavelaw toenforcenortherners’compliancewiththeconstitutionaldutytoreturnrunaways.Alloftheseeffortsmerelyexacerbatednorthernoppositiontothe“slavepower,”whichinturnreinforcedsouthernslave owners’feltneedtoprotectslavery.AbrahamLincoln’svictoryinthe presidentialelectionin1860withoutanyelectoralvotesfromtheslave statessignaledanendtothedefactoconcurrentmajorityinAmerican politicsandprovokedtherapidsecessionofsevenstatesfromthe lowerSouth,beginningwithSouthCarolina.AftertheclashatFort Sumter,thesewerejoinedbyfourmoreslavestates,includingVirginia. TheonlyslavestatesnottojointheConfederacywereMissouri,Kentucky,Maryland,andDelaware,whichhappenedtobethefourslave stateswiththesmallestproportionofenslavedpeopleintheirpopulations.73

The“Crittendencompromise”proposedinDecember1860toavert secessionrevealsthetermsofslaveowners’continuedparticipationin theUnioninthewakeofLincoln’selection.Theproposalencompassedsixconstitutionalamendmentsexplicitlyprotectingslaveryin variouswaysand,itmightbenoted,introducingtheword“slavery” intotheConstitutionforthefirsttime.Theamendmentswouldhave establishedfederalrecognitionofandprotectionforslaveryinallterritoriessouthof36° 30 ′ extendingtothePacific,andaprohibition oninterferencewithslaveryinthestateswhereitexisted.Thesixth Crittendenamendmentwouldhavepreventedtheotherfiveamendments,thethree-fifthsclause,andthefugitiveslaveclausefromever beingrepealed.Inshort,theCrittendencompromisewouldhaveenactedapermanentconstitutionalguaranteeofslaveowners’property rightsinotherhumanbeings.Onlysuchironcladassurancescould havemadeAmericandemocracysafeforslavery,anditisnotsurprisingthatLincolnandhisfellowRepublicansrejectedit.TheRepublicans’commondenominatorwasoppositiontotheextensionofslavery intonewterritoriesandstates,whichimpliedattheveryleastagradual fadingoutofslaveryovertime.74

Bothfearandhopeinfusedsouthernslaveowners’fatefuldecision tosundertheUnion.Lincoln’srepeatedassurancesthattheRepublican Partywouldnotemancipatetheslavesinthesouthernstateswerenota sufficientsubstituteforthelossofpoliticalpowerthathiselectionsignified.SecessionistspredictedthattheRepublicanPartywouldoverwhelmtheSouthbytheadditionofnewfreestatesandterritories,use itspowersofpatronagetobuildupantislaverypartiesintheslave states,orinciteslaveinsurrectionasJohnBrownhadattemptedat HarpersFerryin1859.Tomakemattersworseforslaveowners,some oftheirslavesappearedtotakeLincoln’selectionasaharbingerof theirimminentemancipation.AsoneslavewasallegedtohavedeclaredinMay1861,“Lincolnisgoingtosetthemallfree,andtheyare everywheremakingpreparationstoaidhimwhenhemakeshisappearance.”75 ThesecessionistsarguedthattheRepublicanascendancy threatenedtoexposeandenlargelatentsocialfissureswithinsouthern society,andultimatelytooverthrowslaverybyhookorbycrook.The onlysolutionwastoplacesouthernsocietybeyondthereachoftheabolitionists’politicalmachine.Alongsidethesefearswasafaiththatthe Southcouldflourishasanindependentcountry.TheCharlestonpoet HenryTimrodcapturedthatspiritinhis1861poem“Ethnogenesis”:

...At last,weare

Anationamongnations;andtheworld

Shallsoonbeholdinmanyadistantport

Anotherﬂagunfurled!76

Championedmosteffectivelybythesouthernclergy,Confederatenationalismreﬂectedslaveowners’conﬁdenceintheeconomic,political, intellectual,andespeciallyreligiousfoundationsoftheirsociety.Theirs wouldbeablessednation.77

Secessionwasamovementledbyslaveownerstoprotectandvindicateslavery.ThedebatesoversecessionwithintheSouth,thevarious statedeclarationsofthecausesofsecession,andthespeechesandcom-

municationsdeliveredbysouthernsecessioncommissionersrevealbeyondanydoubttheproslaverybasesofsecession.78 Buttwocaveats mustbeofferedtothistruism.First,agoodnumberofinfluentialslave ownersopposedimmediatesecessionforprudentialreasons.Itharboredtheprincipleofanarchyandinvitedterrorsfarmoredangerous thantheRepublicanParty.“Secessionisnoholidaywork,”warned BenjaminHillofGeorgia.79 Asecondcaveatisthatmanysouthern non–slaveownersalsosupportedsecessionfortheirownreasons,althoughvotingreturnsindicatethatdistrictswithfewerslaveowners tendedtosupportsecessionlessstronglythanthosewithmoreslave owners.Southernnon–slaveowners’tepidsupportreinforcedmany slaveowners’convictionthatindependencewasnecessarytoprevent theRepublicanPartyfromusingitspatronagetosowanantislavery partyinsouthernsoil.80 Nevertheless,theConfederateStatesofAmericawasatrueslaveowners’republic.InMarch1861theConfederate vicepresident,AlexanderStephens,declaredthatthecornerstoneof thenewgovernment“rests,uponthegreattruth,thatthenegroisnot equaltothewhiteman;thatslavery—subordinationtothesuperior race—ishisnaturalandnormalcondition.”81 Fulfillingslaveowners’ long-standingdreamofexplicitconstitutionalsanctionforslavery,the ConfederateConstitutionincludedspecificprotectionfortheslave propertyofcitizens,includingaguaranteethatslaveownerscouldtake theirslavesintoanynewterritoryaddedtotheConfederacyinthefuture.

WhilespinningnewprotectionsforslaveryintheConfederacy,secessionsweptawaythewebsofpowerprotectingslaverywithinthe Union.TheRepublicanPartyseizedtheopportunitytoenactanantislaveryprogramovertheobjectionsoftheracistnorthernrumpofthe DemocraticPartyandtheremainingslaveownersintheborderstates. NowdominatedbytheRepublicans,thenationalgovernmentadmitted Kansasasafreestatein1861.SlavesintheDistrictofColumbiawere emancipatedin1862andtheirownerscompensated.ThenationalgovernmentﬁnallyrecognizedHaitiandsignedanewtreatywithGreat

BritainstrengtheningtheU.S.commitmenttosuppressingtheAtlantic slavetrade.Slaverydeterioratedunderthepressureofwarintheslave statesthatremainedintheUnion,andabolitionadvancedintothe ConfederacywiththeUnionarmies,disguisedasa“militarynecessity.”WherevertheUnionarmieswent,slaveownerslostpowerover theirhumanproperty.“Thereisnobariertopreventtheescapeofour Slavswhochoosetogototheenemy,”complainedagroupofVirginia slaveownersin1864.“Theyaregoingconstantly.”82 Slavesﬂedtothe Unionlinesinlargenumbersandforcedthefederalgovernmentto confronttheproblemofslaverydirectly.AftertheEmancipationProclamationofJanuary1,1863,Unionsoldiers—includingblacksoldiers—carriedthebanneroffreedomdeeperintoConfederateterritory.Slaveownershadgambledthatsecessionwouldprotectslavery, buttheylost.83

TheCivilWarandemancipationshatteredAmericanslaveowners asaclass.Contrarytotheimageofthewarasa“poorman’sfight,” manyslaveownersandtheirsonsfoughtanddied.“Demassahad threeboystogotowar,butderewuzn’tonetocomehome,”aformer slaverecalled.“Allthechillumhehaswuzkilled.”84 Survivingslave ownersweredefeatedandexpropriatedoftheirhumanproperty.Becauseofemancipation(andwartimedamagetononhumanproperty), theaveragepercapitawealthofsouthernwhitesdeclinedfromalmost $4,000in1860tojustover$2,000in1870.85 Thestaggeringlossof wealthwasonlypartoftheirtrauma.Formerslaveownersgenerally retainedtheirownershipoflandbuthadtofindnewwaystogetformerslavestoworkforthem.Wages,sharecropping,tenancy,debt peonage,andconvictleasingweresomeofthemisnamed“freelabor”systemsthatreplacedslaveryintheSouth.TheReconstruction Amendmentsfinallyeradicatedtheconstitutionalbasisofslaveryand, inanevenmoreradicalstep,transformedfreedpeopleintocitizens. Notonlydidblackcitizenshipcomplicateformerslaveowners’attempt toreassertclasspowerinthenewcontextofemancipation,butithumiliatedthemaswellwiththeprospectofracialequalitysponsoredby

The“SlavePower”intheUnitedStates,1783–1865 91

theRepublicanParty.Southerneliteseventuallyrebuilttheirpower, butnotonthebasisofslaveowning.Theyreliedinsteadonnewcombinationsofcoercionandconsentthattookanotherhalf-centuryto master.86

Thedestructionoftheslavepowercontributedtotheriseofanew economicandpoliticalorderinthenationasawhole.As Hunt’s Merchant’sMagazine observedin1870,“Thelategreatcivilwarbroke downcertainsectionsandclassesinthiscountry,andtransferred wealthandpowertonewhands.”87 Conﬂictsbetweencapitalandlabor supplantedtheolderstrugglebetweenfreedomandslavery,yetechoes ofthatpaststrugglereverberatedinthenewera.Bourgeoisideologues arguedthatindividualfreedomofcontractrepresentedthecontinuationoftheantislaverytradition,whilespokesmenforthewhiteworkingclasscriticizedinequalitiesofpowerinthelabormarketthatturned freelaborinto“wageslavery.”88 Allsidesafﬁrmedthemoralsupremacyoffreeoverslavelaboryetdisagreedastowhatfreelabormeantin thewakeofslaveemancipation.Overtime,anationwideindeterminacyinthemeaningoffreedomprovidedcrucialspacewithinwhicha rebornsoutherneliteeventuallydisenfranchised,segregated,andimpoverishedblackAmericansintheeraofJimCrow.Andthatachievement,whichW.E.B.DuBoiscalled“anewdictatorshipofproperty intheSouththroughthecolorline,”wouldshapethehistoryofthe UnitedStatesforanothercentury.89

3 MerchantsandManufacturers intheAntebellumNorth

SVENBECKERT

Duringtheﬁrsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,theclose-knitand powerfulcommunitythathadconstitutedAmerica’snortherneconomicelitesunraveleddramatically.Newdivisionsappearedwithin theirranksthatmadeconcertedpoliticalactionincreasinglydifﬁcult. Andnewchallengerstotheireconomic,socialandpoliticalpower arose,underminingtheironceexaltedposition.Especiallyafter1830,in thewakeoftheindustrialrevolution,everyonefromwesternfarmers tonorthernartisans-turned-manufacturersandurbanwageworkers confrontedthepowerofmerchantsandbankers,theoldestsegmentof theNorth’seconomicelite.Atthesametime,theeconomiceliteinthe Northbecamelesscohesiveandbegantofragmentintodiversegroups withdifferingpoliticalaimsandcontrastingviewsofAmerica’seconomicfuture.TheresultingdivisionswithintheirrankseventuallyunderminedtheircollectiveabilitytosteerthenationandultimatelycontributedtotheoutbreakoftheCivilWar.

Themostimportantchallengefacedbythenation’seconomicelites

wasthedivergenceoftheirownsentimentsandinterests.Colonialeconomicelites,ofcourse,hadexperienceddisagreementsandupheavals fromtimetotime,butthesewereminorcomparedtotheemergingdiversitythathadsurfacedbythe1830s.Southernplanters,bolsteredby thecottonboom,becameevermoreforcefulinassertingtheirdistinct setofinterests,goingsofarastofindintheSouthacivilizationfundamentallyatoddswiththatoftheNorth.Tosecurethatcivilization,as wellastheirprofits,theyworkedtoforgeapoliticalenvironmentconducivetoslaveryandAtlantictrade.Manynorthernmerchants,deeply investedintheplantationeconomy,sympathizedwithsuchanagenda. Asmallbutgrowingnumberofthem,however,drawingprofitsfrom theirmanufacturinginterestsandtheirtradewiththeWest,beganto embraceapoliticaleconomyofdomesticindustrializationsharplyat oddswiththeinterestsofthesouthernplanters.Theirallies,inturn, weretherapidlygrowinggroupofartisans-turned-manufacturerswho championedadifferentvisionofeconomicdevelopment,onethatfocusedondomesticindustrializationandtheexpansionoffreelaboragriculture.

Atthesametime,economicelitesfacedchallengesfromnon-elites, particularlytheﬂedglingworkingclass.Thoughfewinnumbers,these workersincreasinglycametodominatecertainurbanneighborhoods. Somebegantoorganizeintradeunionsandengagedinstrikes.Ina numberofcities,urbanworkerswerebecominganimportantforcein localandstatepolitics,threateningtheonceunassailablepowerof northernmerchantsandbankers.Howtodealwiththeeconomic,social,andpoliticaleffectsofproletarianizationthusbecameanever moreurgentquestionforthenortherneconomicelites,whowereinno wayunitedintheirviewabouthowtorespondtothesesocialchanges.

JustastheindustrialrevolutionturnedupsidedownthewayAmericansworkedandlived,therefore,italsotransformedthenation’seconomicelite.Takentogether,thetwinchallengesofinternaldifferentiationandproletarianizationcontestedthepowerofeconomicelitesand

gavefarmers,workers,andslavesnewopeningstodeterminethenation’sdestiny.

MerchantswerebyfarthemostimportantsegmentoftheeconomiceliteintheNorthbeforetheCivilWar.EversinceEuropeansbegansettlingNorthAmerica,merchantshadplayedanimportantroleintheNewWorld.Asmercantilistdoctrinesheldthatthe proﬁtsofcolonialtradeaccumulatedinthemothercountry,European powersinNorthAmericahadfocusedmuchoftheircolonialinterestontheextractionofrawmaterialsandagriculturalcommodities. Alongsideexplorers,land-hungryfarmers,andreligiouslymotivated settlers,merchantswereamongtheﬁrsttosetfootontheNorthAmericancontinent.1

IntheyearsaftertheRevolution,merchantswhohadaccumulated theirwealthincolonialtimes,alongwithtraderswhohadtakenadvantageoftheopportunitiespresentedbytheupheavalsofwar,formed thecoreofthenortherneconomicelite.2 Theyorganizedthesaleand distributionofwareslargelymanufacturedinEuropeandtheﬁnancing,collection,andshippingofNorthAmericanagriculturalcommodities,especiallycotton,butalsotobacco,sugar,andrice.Intheprocess, theybecamedeeplyinvolvedintheslaveeconomyoftheSouth.Their successrestedlargelyontheiraccesstocapital,muchofwhichthey drewfromwealthierandmorepowerfultradersandbankersinLondon,Liverpool,LeHavre,Hamburg,andothercitiesintheAtlantic world.

BecauseoftheircentralpositionintheAmericanandAtlanticeconomy,itwasnotsurprisingthatwithintheUnitedStatesthesemerchantsandmerchantbankersstoodoutinwealthandsocialstatus. Whileourknowledgeaboutthedistributionofwealthisimperfect,we knowthatin1830,69percentofthemostafﬂuentBostonians(thosein thetop1percentofassetholders)weremerchants.3 Thistop1percent owned16percentofthecity’staxableassetsin1820,33percentin1833, and37percentin1848.4 By1860,Philadelphia’swealthiest1percentof

thepopulationowned50percentofthecity’sassets.5 InNewYork,the concentrationofwealthwasevengreater:aboutninethousandindividuals—1.4percentofNewYork’sinhabitants,mostofthemmerchants—ownedroughly71percentofthecity’srealandpersonal wealthinthemid-1850s.6 Incontrast,84percentofNewYork’seconomicallyactivecitizensownednopersonalorrealwealthofconsequence.7

Giventheimportanceofaccesstotransportation,markets,andinformation,itishardlysurprisingthatmostprosperousmerchantslived intheeasternseaboard’slargestcities:Boston,Providence,NewYork, andPhiladelphia.Inthesecities,merchantsbroughttogethertheresourcesoftheirrespectivehinterlands,providedplentifulshippingand bankingfacilities,andcreatedvibrantmarketsforthesaleofgoodsto beconsumedelsewhere.Merchantsalsoresidedinsmallerports,such asPortland,Portsmouth,Newburyport,Salem,Marblehead,NewBedford,Newport,NewLondon,NewHaven,andNewark.Asthecenturywenton,however,thesetownswoulddeclineinimportanceasthe mercantileeliteincreasinglyconcentratedinlargertownsandcities— especiallyinNewYork,whichhadthenation’sbestport,thebestconnectionstoalargehinterland,andthemostforward-lookingmerchants.Relatedtotheconcentrationoftradeinafewseaboardcities wastheriseofmerchantcommunitiesininlandtownssuchasAlbany, Buffalo,andCincinnati,citiesinwhichtraderscollectedregionalagriculturalresourcesandshippedthemtotheEastCoastinreturnfor manufacturedwares.8 Inadeparturefromthecolonialera,connections totherichagriculturalhinterlandmatteredasamorefullynational economybegantoemerge.

Wellintothe1820s,however,theworldofmerchantswasstillstrikinglysimilartowhatithadbeenincolonialtimes.Nomattertheir homeport,merchantsaccumulatedtheircapitalthroughsimultaneous involvementinawideassortmentofactivities.Theyboughtandsolda staggeringvarietyofgoods.TheyorganizedtheshippingofagriculturalcommoditiestotheWestIndiesandEurope.Theyﬁnancedagri-

culturebyadvancingcredittocapital-hungryfarmers.Theyinsured goodsinpassage.Andasmallbutgrowingnumberofmerchantseven begantoinvestinmanufacturing.SalemtraderJosephPeabody,forexample,hadstartedhisbusinesscareerduringtheearlyyearsofthe nineteenthcenturyinprivateering,beforehemovedtoacquireinterestsinalargenumberofshipsprincipallyengagedintheAsiatrade. ShippingpepperfromSumatra,teafromChina,andsugarfromthe WestIndies,heeventuallycontrolledaﬂeetofeighty-threeships,and investedsomeofhisproﬁtsintheSalemMarineInsuranceCompany, whichhedirected.9 CottonmanufacturingalsoattractedmassiveinvestmentsfromagroupofwealthyBostontraders.10 Itwas,moreover, commonamongmerchants,suchastheAstorsofNewYorkandthe PeppersofPhiladelphia,todiversifytheircapitalintotheownership ofland,especiallyurbanland,amovethatturnedouttobeabrilliant investmentinarapidlygrowingandurbanizingnation.11 Insurance companies,whichdevouredhugeamountsofcapital,alsoprovedto beamongthefavoriteinvestmentvehiclesofEastCoastmercantile elites.12

Itwasaboutthattime,however,thatthecharacterofmerchantbusinesseschangedsigniﬁcantlyfromwhatithadbeenduringtheprior twohundredyears.TherapidlyincreasingtradeduringtheEuropeanwars,thecottonboom,andthegrowthofAmerica’sdomestic marketsenabledandencouragedmerchantstospecialize.Bythe1810s, somehousestradedexclusivelyincertaincommodities,suchascotton,whereasothersprovidedservicessuchasshippingorﬁnancing. Wholesaleandretailsaleswereincreasinglyhandledbyseparatespecialists,andsowastheimportandexportbusiness,whilejobbersand auctioneersalsocontributedtothedistributionofgoods.13 Whilesome merchantsfocusedonparticulargoods,othersspecializedbyfunction: insurance,shipping,orbanking.Bankersinparticularnowcameinto theirown;someofthem,suchastheGirardsofPhiladelphia,the MorgansofBoston,andtheBelmontsofNewYork,assumedpowerful positionswithintheirclassandtheeconomymoregenerally.Oneof

theresultsofsuchspecializationwasthatmerchantinterestsbecame morediverse,contributingtosomeofthepoliticaldivisionsthatwould emergeprominentlyduringthe1850s.

Evenasthecharacterofmerchantbusinessesbegantoshift,however,theirorganizationremainedasithadbeenthroughouthistory.Usuallytheywereenterprisesemployingsmallnumbersofpeople,typicallyonlyafewtrustedpartners—oftenrelatives—andsome clerks,whofrequentlywerethesonsoffriendsandbusinesspartners. Theydidnotemploymanywageworkers.Toexpandthereachand scopeoftheiroperations,thesemerchanthouseswouldcreateawebof interlockingpartnerships,especiallywithtradersindistantports,which allowedtransactionstoremaininthehandsofthosetheyknewand trusted.14 Thegoalsofmostpartnershipswerelimited—forinstance,to investinasingle voyageofone ship.15 Whilesuchsmallandclose-knit businessesallowedforenormousflexibilityandrapidadjustmentsto changingconditions,theyalsomadefirmsunstable.Atanytimeapartnermightdie,moveaway,orlookfornewbusinessopportunitieselsewhere,bringingthepartnershiparrangementstoanend.Ifafirmwas topersist,ownershadtoallowyoungermemberstojoin,andthe choiceofthesepartnerswasofcrucialimportancetothefirm’scontinuedprosperity,notleastbecausetherewasnolimittotheactivepartners’liability.Unlimitedliability,inturn,helpedtoensurethatallpartnersvigilantlyguardedtheirbusinesses’operations.16

Thesesmallandnimbleﬁrmsbegannotonlytocarveoutmercantile specialtiesbutalsotodiversifyintomanufacturingandtosolidifytheir powerfulglobalpositioninshipping.Theycapturedthedynamictrade withthenewlyemergingwesternstates,andtheyincreasinglyproﬁted fromsupplyingarapidlydevelopingdomesticmarketintheNorth. Thisabilitytoaccumulatecapitalrapidlyandsteadilyandtodiversify theirinvestmentsdifferentiatedAmericanmerchantsfrommercantile elitesinportcitiessuchasIzmir,Alexandria,andBombay,whoseindigenousmerchantswereincreasinglylosingcontroloverdomesticand internationalcommercetoBritishandotherEuropeantraders.17 Amer-

icanmerchantsinsteadwereontheirwaytofreeingthemselvesfrom Europeantutelage.

Thepositionwithinthesocialstructureoftheyoungnationthat allAmericanmerchantsshared—characterized,forexample,bytheir ownershipofcapitalandtheiremploymentofothersforwages—was notenoughtomakethemacommunityandevenlesssoarulingclass. Afterall,theycompetedagainstoneanotherinthemarketplace,had politicalintereststhatoftenputthematoddswithoneanother,and originatedfrommanydifferentplacesthroughouttheAtlanticworld. Circumstances,however,includingwars,politicalinstability,therisky natureofmuchoftheirbusiness,andanincreasinglydiversepopulationoffreefarmersandwageworkers,forcednorthernmerchants andbankerstoforgedensenetworkswithoneanother.Theydidsoby shoringuptheirtraditionalkinshipandsocialconnections,bybuilding institutions,andbyarticulatingsharedhabits,manners,andvalues. Andthoughtheycontinuedtobedeeplyrootedinparticularplaces— Boston’smercantileelite,forexample,wasdifferentfromthatofPhiladelphia—thenineteenthcenturysawthemincreasinglywidentheir networksandidentities.Theymarriedoneanotheracrossgrowing distances,investedinevermoreremotebusinessventures,andengaged incollectivepoliticalmobilizationwiththeircounterpartsinothercities.18 Indeed,Americanmerchantswerepartofanational,Atlantic, andglobalcommunityoftradersthatstretchedfromBostontoBuenosAires,fromPhiladelphiatoLiverpool,andfromNewYorkto Bombay.

Itwasinthefamilyparlorthatthemercantileelitetriedhardest toforgeacommunity.Theparlorwas,indeed,thecockpitofearlynineteenth-centurybusinesses.Becauseﬁrmswerebasedtoasigniﬁcantdegreeonfamilies,merchants,togetherwiththeirwives,devoted extraordinaryefforttomaintainingandstrengtheningrelationships amongrelativesandamonglargersocialnetworks.Kinandfriends,afterall,helpedtomobilizecapital,skills,andinformationandtopass

themontothenextgeneration.19 Moreover,inaworldofunderdevelopedcommunicationfacilitiesandweakimpersonalinstitutions,trust wasessentialtotheconductofbusiness.Merchantsandbankershadto allowtheirdistantrepresentativessigniﬁcantleewayinmakingdecisions.AsBostonmerchantPatrickTracyJacksonputittohisfactor, whorepresentedhiminIndia,“Idepend...moreuponyourjudgment whentherethanuponanydirectionsIcannowgiveforthedisposalof anyofmyconcerns.”20 Theadvanceofcredit,whichwaspartofmost businesstransactions,similarlywasbasedonthereputationofindividuals,atleastuntilthe1850s,whentheﬁrstcredit-reportingagency cameintobeing.Consequently,trustworthyconveyorsofinformation wereessentialformakinginvestmentdecisions,andfamilymembers werethebestandsometimestheonlypartnersinbusiness.21

Centraltothesenetworksweremarriages.22 Becausemarriagescreatednewalliancesthatoftenbroughtwiththemadditionalcapital,information,andexpertise,merchantsritualizedtheminformsstrikingly similartothoseofmarketexchanges.23 Theyconsideredgoodmarriage dealssoimportantthateventheDuncredit-reportingagencymentionedtheminitsassessmentsofthecreditworthinessofenterprises.24

AsaBostonlawyerremarkedin1818:“Itisanobviousadvantageto theyoungfolkstogrowupinthemidstofarespectablefamilyconnection.Weightofcharacterandsuccessarefrequentlypromotedbythe espritdecorps or defamille.”25

Becausebusinessandmarriagestrategiesweresocloselylinked, merchantswerefrequentlyrelatedtooneanother.InNewYork,for example,37percentofthe163wealthiestcitizensinthe1850swere related,adensityofkinshipnetworksthatledhistorianRobert GreenhalghAlbiontospeculatethatitis“difﬁculttotellwhetherthe businessormarriagetiesweretheﬁrstcauseofsuccess.”26 InSalem,in 1810,42percentofmerchantsranabusinessalongsidearelative.Most impressively,inBoston,astaggering71percentofthe79wealthiest Bostonianshadrelativesamongthissmallandselectgroupin1835.27 Itfelltowomentosolidifythesenetworksfurtherbywritingtorela-

tives,invitingthemtofamilyaffairs,andvisitingthem.Women,in effect,spunthethreadsthatheldthesefamiliestogether,bothemotionallyandeconomically.28 Evenasthepublicfaceofthispowerful groupofcapital-owningAmericansremainedoverwhelminglymale, itspowerwasdrawninsubstantialwaysfromamuchbroaderintergenerationalnetworkofkinandsocialcontactsforgedbywomen.

Familynetworkswerealsoaprominentsourceofcapital.Inheritancenormallyfollowedkinshiplinesandprovidedfortheaccumulationofcapitaloverlongperiods.Indeed,bythemid-1850s,overtwothirdsofallNewYorkhouseholdsassessedatmorethan$100,000had inheritedtheirwealthfromtheprecedinggeneration.Similarly,76percentofwealthyBostoniansfellintothiscategoryin1860.29

Theinstitutionoffamilythuscounteredpowerfulcentrifugaleconomicforcesandthelackofacommonhistoryamongmercantile families.Kinshipnetworkshelpednortherngentlemencapitalists—the Belmonts,Peabodys,Astors,Lowells,Whartons,andSteinways—to knittogetheracohesiveworld,andindeed,theimperativesofcapital accumulation,thestructureofenterprises,andtheweakdevelopment ofbanksandcapitalmarketscontinuallymovedthemtostrengthen thesenominallydomesticnetworks.30

Buildingonfamilyandkinrelationships,merchantsandbankersincreasinglyalsocreatedsociallyexclusiveneighborhoods.Afamily’s addressimpartedstatusasamemberofthe“betterclasses.”While,in theearlynineteenthcentury,merchantsstilllivedclosetotheirplaceof businessnearthewharvesandwarehouses,andindeedusuallyinthe verysamebuilding,bythe1830stheybegantomoveawayfromthese increasinglycrowdedandunrulyareasintonewsegregatedresidential neighborhoods.31 Boston’smercantileelitehadmasseditselfinthe streetsinandaroundBeaconHill.32 InNewYorkbymid-century,the city’smercantileelitecongregatedinandaroundUnionSquareand thelowerreachesofFifthAvenue,whileinPhiladelphiatheantebellummercantileelitesmadetheirhomesaroundWashingtonand Rittenhousesquares.33 EveninremoteRochester,ahistorianfoundthat

thecity’s“socialgeography...wasc lassspeciﬁc”asearlyas1834.34 In theirneighborhoods,mercantilefamiliescultivatedwaysoflivingthat markedthemasdistinguishedandrespectable.

Asaresult,theroleof“family”wasmorethaneconomic.Itwasthe bedrockonwhichindividuals’claimstorespectabilityrested.And centraltothemaintenanceofproperappearancewasasystemofdistinctgenderroles.35 Whilemenboughtandsoldcotton,negotiated loans,andacquiredrailroadsecurities,womenfashionedthemselves intoguardiansofthehome,aspacetheyandtheirhusbandsincreasinglydeﬁnedasbeinginsomefundamentalwaysdifferentfromthe publicrealm.Inaworldinwhichmostwomendidmanualwork,merchantwomenfocusedtheiractivitiesonthereproductionofthefamily byorganizingthehousehold,bymaintainingemotionaltiesbetween familymembers,byraisingchildren,andbypresentingthefamilyto thepublic.36 Merchantwomen’sspherewasonlyrhetoricallyprivate,as itwasdominatedbyanddevotedtoahigh-stakes,ritualizedpublicdisplayofreﬁnement.

Inaworldoffamily-centeredbusinessbasedontrustandpersonal contacts,“character”provedcritical.“Integrityofcharacterandtruth intheinnermanaretheprerequisitesforsuccess,”counseled Hunt’s Merchants’Magazine.37 Sincetherewerenoformalsystemsforranking worth,itwasnogreatsurprisethattheﬁrstsystematiceffortsatreportingthecreditworthinessofindividualsfocusedtoalargedegreeon character.Dun’scredit-reportingagencydescribedsometradersas “worthy,”“honorable,”“ofgoodmoralcharacter,”“amanoffamily.” Itreferredtoothersinlessfavorableterms,as,forexample,whenit concludedaboutonebusinessmanthat“hishabitsarefree—heisnot whatmightbecalledstrictlytemperate.”38 Indeed,“character,”accordingto Hunt’sMerchants’Magazine, “toamanofbusiness...isas dear aslifeitself.”39

Furthercontributingtothesenseof“moralcollectivity”among gentlemencapitalistswastheirrelationshiptoworkitself.Although mostantebellummerchantswerenotself-madeinthesenseofhaving

risenfrompoverty,theirmoneyremainedlargelyworkingcapitaland providedonlyaprecariousfoundationforsocialstatus.Riskswereoftengreat,andmostbusinessesexhibitedapronounceddependenceon theirowners’efforts,whichmade“theAmericanmerchant ...a type ofarestless,adventurous,onward-goingraceofpeople.”40 Supported byreligiousbeliefsthatpromisedredemptionforworldlyengagements,andnotunlikeBenjaminFranklin’sandMaxWeber’sprescriptivetheoriesofcapitalism,NewYorkbankerMosesTaylorconsidered “hardworkandprudence[tobe]governingprinciples.”41 Unlikesouthernplanters,whoforgedanidentityfocusedonleisure,Taylorattributedhissuccessto“work[ing]late.”42 AsJohnLowellofBostonput it,“punctuality ...isthelifeand soulofcredit.”43 Moneydemanded constantvigilance,alessoninstilledearlyon,whenmanyyounggentlemenbegankeepingpersonalaccountbooksthattrackedtheirexpenses.

Particularpatternsofconsumptioncomplementedthisintensecommitmenttowork.Womenespeciallyparticipatedinpublicformsof consumption.45 WhenAlexanderT.Stewartopenedhis“marblepalace”—adepartmentstore—in1846,the NewYorkHerald praisedhim forhaving“paidtheladiesofthiscityahighcomplimentingiving themsuchabeautifulresortinwhichtowhileawaytheirleisurehours ofthemorning.”46 Althoughnotionsofmodestyand“digniﬁedsimplicity”stillresonated,theyincreasinglytookabackseattomoreelaboratedisplaysoftasteandfashion.47 Travel,anotherformofconsumption,furtherdelineatedtheboundariesofthissociety:summers dictatedamovetothecountry;youngadulthoodmeanttripstothe AmericanWestandtoEurope;andsicknessrequiredavisittothespas ofEurope.Knowinghowtoconsumeandperform,knowinghowto deployone’ssocialcapital,becameacoreelementinassertingstatus anddrawingboundariesaroundtherespectableclasses.48

Merchantsalsodeﬁnedtheirdistinctworldbythedesignofthefamilydwelling.Itslayoutservedtocreatetheillusionofasphereremovedfromtheharshrealitiesofthemarket—aplacewhere“gentle-

men”couldrecoverfromtheworldofexchange.Thickcarpets,heavy curtains,andornatewallpaperinsulatedtheabodefromtheoutside world,offeringaphysicalretreatfromthenoises,odors,andvisual blurofthemetropolis.49 Althoughthehomewasostensiblyprivate,its relentlessconformitywasmeanttomakepublicstatements.Portraitsof livingordeceasedfamilymemberslineditswalls,denotingcontinuity, tradition,andstability.Artfullycarvedfurniture,neo-Greciansculptures,crystallights,andmemorabiliafromtripstoexoticplacesserved astestimonytomaterialwealth.50 Bythesecondquarterofthenineteenthcentury,publicandprivatespaceswithinthehomewerestrictly separated;bedroomsandthekitchenremainedinvisibletovisitors.51 Thefunctionofroomswasincreasinglyspecialized.Thoughmodest bylaterstandards,theantebellummerchanthomeservedasaneffectivestagetodisplaythematerialwealthandgoodtasteofitsinhabitants.Itsetthemapartfromfellownorthernerswhohadneithertheresourcesnortheinclinationtocreatesuchanabode,notleastbecauseit wasimpossibletosustainsuchahomewithoutthesupportofservants.

Asmerchantsworkedtosetthemselvesapartfromtherestoftheurbanpopulation,theyalsocreatedandstrengthenedinstitutionstosustaintheirnetworks.InNewYork,themostimportantofthesewasthe ChamberofCommerce,arapidlygrowingbodyofmerchantsand bankersfoundedin1768.52 Itpledgedtocreateaphysicalandpolitical environmentconducivetotrade,tosafeguardshipping,toconstruct canals,andtominimizetariffs.Inshort,itwascommittedtoshoringup thepoliticaleconomyofAtlantictrade.“Itschieffunction,”writesone historian,“seemstohavebeenthefacilitywithwhichitgaveforcoordinatedexpressionoftheviewsofthemerchants.”53 InBoston,merchantswithaverysimilaragendahadorganizedaChamberofCommercein1793,whilePhiladelphiamerchantshadcreatedthatcity’s ChamberofCommercein1801.By1858,tenChambersofCommerce wereoperatingintheUnitedStates,strengtheningsolidaritiesamong themercantileelite.

Augmentingthesetraditionaleconomicassociationswasarelatively

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newphenomenon:thesocialclub.InPhiladelphia,thenation’sﬁrstsocialclub,thePhiladelphiaClub,wasfoundedin1834.Twoyearslater, NewYork“gentlemenofsocialdistinction”formedtheUnionClub.54 Bythe1850s,threemoresocialclubshademergedinNewYork:the NewYorkClub,theNewYorkYachtClub,andtheCenturyClub.55 Bostonmercantileelitesfollowedsuitin1851withthefoundingofthe SomersetClub,anorganizationofmenofsocialdistinctionwhohad inearlieryearscongregatedattheTempleClubanditssuccessor, theTremontClub.56 FurtherorganizationsrangingfromtheNewYorkHistoricalSocietytoHarvardUniversity,andfromMassachusetts GeneralHospitaltotheNewYorkBibleSociety,createdpowerful, butlargelylocal,networks.57 Balls,parties,dinners,NewYear’svisits, promenades,andothermoreinformalactivitiescementedthissolidarityamongthemercantileelite.

Theseinstitutional,family,andkinnetworksalsoextendedintothe worldofpolitics.Merchantsonsaspiredtopoliticalcareersandtofill officesinlocal,state,andthenationalgovernments.Thesmallscaleof theAmericanstate,theabsenceofelitecompetitors,and,untilthe 1820s,thestill-restrictedfranchiseallowedtheexistingassociationbetweeneconomicandpoliticalpowertoflourish.Merchantsnotonly filledpositionsofpoliticalinfluencethemselvesbutalsodevelopedpersonalrelationshipswithpeopleinelectiveoffice.58 Theinfluenceof northernmerchantsonpoliticaldecisionsconsequentlywassometimes subtlebutalwayspowerful,securinginfrastructureimprovements,corporatecharters,andfavorablemunicipaldecisions.Thedominationof theMassachusettsFederalistPartybyBostonmerchants,forexample, allowedthemtoexertconsiderableinfluenceoverlocalandstatepoliticsduringthefirsttwodecadesofthenineteenthcentury,whiletheir importancetotheMassachusettsWhigPartyguaranteedmerchants powerintothe1830sand1840s.U.S.senators,congressmen,judges, mayors,andstaterepresentativesalloriginatedintheBostonmercantileelite.59 Indeed,asoneobserverreported,until1848“wealthyBostoniansachievedaremarkabledegreeofpoliticalhegemony”inthecity

andthestate.60 InNewYork,largenumbersofmayors,governors,and U.S.senators,amongothers,tracedtheirrootstothecity’smercantile elite.Philadelphiamerchantsandbankers,amongthemmembersof theWharton,Morris,Biddle,andHopkinsonfamilies,werecentralactorsinrevolutionaryandearlynationalpolitics.61 RobertWharton,for example,beganhiscareerasmayorofPhiladelphiain1798andwasreelectedafullﬁfteentimes.62 Thisexerciseofpoliticalpowerstrengthened,inturn,economic,familial,social,andculturalnetworks.

3 Inthewakeoftheindustrialrevolutionduringthe1830sandbeyond,thisseeminglystablemercantilecommunityincreasinglycame underpressure,especiallyfromanewlyemerginggroupofpowerful artisans-turned-manufacturersandanevermoremobilizedandenfranchisedpopulace.Mostsigniﬁcantly,themercantileelitefacedachallengefrom“arisingindustrialistclass.”63 Thesemenhadaccumulated capitalinnovelways,andlargelyoutsidetheolderkinshipandsocial networksofthenorthernmercantileelite.Bythe1840stheywere showingupinthehigherranksofthetaxrollsataremarkablerate. Themajorityofmanufacturerswereartisanswhohadexpandedtheir shopsandtransformedthemselvesintoentrepreneurs.64 Asonehistorianobserved,bymid-century“theywereknockingatthedoorsofpoliticalpowerandsocialprestigesolongguardedbytheircommercial brethren.”65

TheindustrialrevolutioncamelatetotheUnitedStates,compared toEngland.Butonceitcame,itarrivedvigorously.Aselsewhere,cottonspinningexpandedﬁrstasmerchantsinvestedsomeoftheircapital inspinningmillsbuiltalongthefast-ﬂowingriversofNewEngland andthemid-Atlanticstates.After1830,railroadsbegancrisscrossing theUnitedStates,devouringfabulousamountsofcapitalandeventuallyspurringthegrowthofcoalmining,alongwithironandsteelproduction.Simultaneously,incitiessuchasNewYorkandPhiladelphia, ProvidenceandCincinnati,artisansexpandedandreorganizedtheir workshopsasdomesticmarketsconsumedevermoremanufactured

goods.Theirinnovationsfocusedatﬁrstnotsomuchonnewtechnologiesbutonthereorganizationofwork,asmastershiredincreasing numbersofunskilledworkerstotakeoverevermoresubdividedtasks. NewYork’santebellumgarmentindustry,forexample,mayhavebeen basedonage-oldtechnologies,butitradicallyreinventedhowgarmentscameintobeing. 66

Manymerchantsrecognizedearlyonthenewindustrialopportunitiesandinvestedsomeoftheircapitalintheseﬂedgingenterprises.In Providence,forexample,earlyinvestmentsinthecountry’sinfantcottonandwoolenindustriescamefromthetown’swealthyoverseasmerchants,suchasMosesBrown,whoemployedtheservicesofSamuel SlatertoerectNorthAmerica’sﬁrstcottonspinningmill.67 InBoston,a groupofwealthymerchants,the“BostonAssociates,”builtthecountry’slargestspinningandweavingfactories.68 By1834,sevenoutof eightBostonmerchantshadaninterestintheregionaltextileindustry.69 Invariousways,observedhistoriansGlennPorterandHaroldC. Livesay,“capitalpouredfromthemercantilesectoroftheeconomy intothemanufacturingsector.”70

Whilemanymerchantsgraspedthenewopportunitiesoftheage,a growinggroupofmanufacturersemergedfromartisanaltradesthat didnotcrossintotheworldoftrade.Thesemanufacturersgenerally enjoyedfewlinkstomerchants,andtheywerenotpartofanyof thewell-establishedandclose-knitmerchantcommunities.PhiladelphiatextilemanufacturerThomasDolan,forexample,wasof“obscureancestry.”71 RobertEdwinDietz,amakeroflamps,hadﬁrst learnedcarpentryandthenexperimentedinhis“leisurehours,striving toburnvarioushydro-carbonswhichwereatthattimeintroducedfor artiﬁciallighting.”Oncesuccessful,he“purchasedwith[his]smallsavings,alampandoilbusiness”in1840.By1855heownedalargelamp factoryinNewYorkCity.72 AndsewingmachinemanufacturerIsaac SingerhadlearnedthemachinisttradeinAuburn,NewYork,and spentmorethanadecadeasatravelingmechanicandinventorbefore producingthemachinethatbroughthisnametohouseholdsthrough-

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outtheworld.73 Immigrantmanufacturersinparticular,accordingto historianRobertErnst,oftenstartedout“asjourneymenormaster craftsmenandgraduallyaccumulatedenoughmoneytoacquireplants andbecomebigemployers.”74 Suchartisans-turned-manufacturers wereconcentratedespeciallyinNewYorkandPhiladelphia,butarapidlygrowingnumberofthemalsomadetheirhomesinwesterncities suchasPittsburgh,Cincinnati,andChicago.75

Theworking-classbackgroundsofthesemanufacturers,theiroften roughmannersandlackofgenteeleducation,theirdearthofkinship linkstothemercantileelite,andthenatureoftheirworkitselfmarked themasupstarts.Asoneindustrialistobservedin1845,“Thereismuch complaintthatmechanics[asmanymanufacturerscalledthemselves] arenotreceivedevenlywithmerchantsandprofessionalmen.”76 This dividewasespeciallyrelevantbecausethemanufacturersbegantoarticulatesetsofbeliefsandembracepoliciesfrequentlyatoddswith thoseofthemerchants.

Thefaultlineseparatingthetwosocialworldsisembodiedinthe lifeofPeterCooper.Cooper,oneofthemajorindustrialistsinmidcenturyNewYork,madehisfortuneinthegluebusinessandlater diversiﬁedintoironmanufacturing.77 Hisenormouswealtheasily matchedthatofallbuttheveryrichestbankersandmerchants.Yetin manywaysCooperandhisfamilylivedinaworldverydifferentfrom thatofthetypicalmerchantfamily.Cooperdisdainedtheostentatious displayofrichesthatwealthymercantilefamilieshadembraced.78 He dressedsimplyandallegedlyhadtobepersuadedtopurchaseadress suitwhenhejoinedthereceptioncommitteewelcomingthePrinceof WalestoNewYork.79 Thebedinwhichheslepthehadbuiltwithhis ownhands.AlthoughCoopermovedintoarespectableNewYork neighborhoodin1850,hehadlonglivednearhisgluefactoryandright nexttothetracksoftheNewYork&HarlemRailroad.Cooper’sextraordinarypositionnotonlyforeshadowedthematerialpossibilitiesof manufacturingbutalsoshowedhowtheattendantsocialindependence allowedfortheemergenceofanewkindofworldview.

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Despitehisextraordinarywealth,Cooperappearstohavebeentypicalofmostmanufacturersoftheantebellumyears.Manufacturersgenerallylivedinmoremixedneighborhoodsthanthemerchants.InNew York,forexample,insteadofcongregatingaroundUnionSquare,they preferredthesixteenthandtwentiethwards,whichencompassedan areawestofFifthAvenuebetweenFourteenthandFortiethstreets, wheremanyoftheirworkshopsandfactoriesweresituated.80 Characteristically,sugarreﬁnerAlexanderStuartlivednextdoortohis“enormousreﬁnery,”justasallthreeSteinwaysbuiltbrownstonesadjacent totheirpianofactory.HeinrichSteinway’sbackdoorevenopeneddirectlyontothefactory’scourtyard.81

Mercantileandﬁnancialeliteslookedwarilyonthesemanufacturers. GeorgeT.Strong,apowerfulandwealthylawyer,deridedCooperas a“self-mademillionaireglueboiler.”82 WhenCooperreceivedthe PrinceofWales,hewaschidedfor“playingthepatriarchalBeauNash [aneighteenth-centuryBritishdandy]withanassiduityatleastasagonizingtoitsunaccustomedobjectasitwasamusingtoalltheworldbesides.”83 Tellingly,theDuncredit-reportingagencyremainedquite skepticalaboutmanufacturerslongaftertheirfortuneshadsolidiﬁed.In1860DundescribedmachinemanufacturerJohnRoachasa “roughilliteratekindofman,”pointingoutthathe“hasmadeallheis worth.”84 EvenRichardHoe,anextremelysuccessfulmakerofprinting presses,wasstilljusta“machinist”intheeyesofDun.85 ItwasnotunusualtoseeindustrialistssuchasRoachdescribedas“poorlyeducated, rugged,brusque,andbold.”86 EveninBoston,wheretiesbetweenmerchantsandmanufacturerswereclosest,merchantsdidnotalwayssee themanufacturersassocialequals.87

Contemptranbothways.Industrialistsoftenscornedthe“Wall StreetGentry.”88 Excludedfromthesocialuniverseofthenation’s mercantileandﬁnancialelite,industrialistscreatedtheirowninstitutions.InProvidence,artisans-turned-manufacturerscreatedtheMechanics’Association.InNewYork,“mechanicsandmanufacturer s... foundrallyingpointsintheAmericanandMechanics’Institute.”89 The

NewYorkMechanics’Institute,forexample,offeredlectureson“naturalandmechanicalphilosophy,”classesinmechanicaldrawing,and mathematics,and“Meetings,Debates,andDiscussionsforthebeneﬁt ofitsmembers.”90 Itboastedalibrarywithholdingsthatincludedvolumesonthenaturalsciences,engineering,philosophy,andhistoryand rangingfromNewtontoVoltaireandAdamSmith.91 Intypicalfashion, theinstituteprovidedaforumforexchangingtechnicalexpertiseand foropportunitiestotrainapprentices—twocentralconcernsofindustrialists.92 Theseinstitutionswerethenurseriesofadifferentelitesensibilityfromthatofthemerchants,asensibilitythatoftentranslatedinto adistinctsetofpolitics.

Prominentamongthesesensibilitieswastemperance.Indeed,temperancemovementsbecamevehiclesofmanufacturers’politics.In Providenceduringthe1830s,manufacturersspearheadedamovement tolimittheconsumptionofalcohol.Throughit,theyhopedbothtoincreasetheproductivityoftheirgrowingwagelaborforceandtoimprovetheirownclaimstorespectability.93 InRochester,NewYork,the city’ssmallmanufacturingelitemobilizedtoassertitsauthoritybyembracingevangelicalrevivalsandtemperance.94 Merchantsthereand elsewhereremainedminorparticipantsinthesemovements.95

Livinginaworldofproduction,factories,proletarianization,and acceleratingtechnologicalchangealsosuggestedtomanufacturerssuch asPeterCoopertheneedtodistancethemselvesfromthepolitical economyoftheirmercantilecounterparts.Theirrelationshiptolabor wasmoreintimateandmorecentraltotheirbusinessesthanithadever beentothenation’smerchants.Theyimpatientlyaskedforthefederal government’ssupportindefusingsocialtensionsinAmerica’scitiesby makinglandavailabletofreelaboragriculture.Theyalsodemanded protectionforAmerica’sﬂedgingindustrialenterprisesfromforeign competition.Andtheyhadavirulentdistasteforslaveryandslaveholders,whotheyfearedwouldunderminethefreelaborrepublicon whichtheirvisionofarapidlyindustrializingnationrested.Embracing suchapoliticaleconomyofdomesticindustrialization(which,bythe

1850s,wouldalsobecomecentraltotheprogramoftheRepublican Party)dividedmanufacturersnotonlyfromthesouthernrulingclass butalso,increasingly,frommanyofthemerchantsandbankersofthe North.96 Suchriftswithinthenortherneconomicelite,inturn,opened thedoorforothersocialgroups,includingworkers,toinﬂuencethe politicsofnortherncitiesandstates.

3 Astheartisans-turned-manufacturersbegantoassertthemselves, sotoodidarapidlygrowinggroupoflower-middle-classcitizensand wageworkers,manyofwhomhadrecentlyarrivedfromEurope.Boisterousdemonstrations,unions,strikes,andnon-elitepoliticalmobilizationsbecameacommonfeatureofurbanlife.Consequently,mercantile elitesbegantolosecontroloverpublicspaceandpolitics,especiallyin citiesandlargertowns,wheretheynowfacedwhattheyperceived asincomprehensiblechaos.Asthe NewYorkHerald complained,the “swearing,drinking,sillyboors”oftheBoweryhad“destroyedallenjoyment”ofcarriagedrivesalongcitystreets.97 Thecitywasnoisy,it stank,anditpermanentlythreatenedencounterswithitsmostundesirableinhabitants.

InEurope,thebourgeoisie,togetherwiththearistocracy,clearly dominatedthepublicsphereandpublicspace.IntheUnitedStates, however,therichwereslowtocontrolpublicspaceorimposeonit theirownculturalinstitutions.98 Whereas,inthelatenineteenthcentury,economicelitesuseddominationofculturalinstitutionstoconstructaclassidentityandtosetthemselvesapart,intheearlynineteenthcenturytheirpredecessorsdisplayedonlymodestaspirationsfor suchpublicculturalinfluence.Museums,forexample,thatwouldlater inthecenturybecomeleadingpillarsofbourgeoisself-definitionremainedinthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturycross-classamusementsdrivenbyprofit.TheBostonMuseum,foundedin1841,exhibitedstuffedanimalsanddwarvesalongsidetheworksofpainterssuch asSullyandPeale.99 InNewYork,Scudder’sandBarnum’sexhibited beardedladies,leglesswonders,livemudturtles,andbedcurtainsbe-

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longingtoMary,QueenofScots.100 Theseartifacts,alongwiththemed exhibitsontopicssuchasthe“missinglink”betweenmenandapes, featuring“MademoiselleFanny”(anorangutan),attractedanaudience rangingfrommanualworkerstothemillionairemanufacturerPeter Cooper.101 “Tasteful”artcollectionsweretobefound,ifatall,onlyin privatehomes.NeitherBostonnorNewYorkwouldseeamajorpublic fineartsinstitutionuntilthelate1870s,norwouldtheupperclass,as PaulDiMaggiohasobserved,succeedinthe“sacralizationofart,the definitionofhighculture...andtheinstitutionalizationofthisclassification.”102

Itwasatthistime,too,thatworkers,especiallyskilledworkers,beganorganizingintradeunionsandwerebecomingincreasinglyexperiencedintheuseofstrikes.103 Throughoutthe1830s,1840s,and1850s,a varietyofworkers—coachmen,pianofortemakers,cartmen,ﬁremen andcoalpassers,housepainters,carvers,marblepolishers,journeymen ironmolders,boxmakers,cigarmakers,tailors,printers,carpenters, andcoopers—demandedhigherwagesandbetterworkingconditions, withmixedbutnotablesuccess.104

Notonlyattheworkplace,onthestreets,oratthemuseumsbut also—andperhapsmoreimportant—inpoliticsdidmerchantsand bankersfaceanassertivecitizenrywhomadetheirvoicesheard.Indeed,itwasthedominanceoftheeconomiceliteinthisspherethat drovemanyworking-classpeopleintopoliticsinthefirstplace.In Rochester,whosepoliticsuntilthemid-1820shadbeenoverwhelminglydominatedbyitsrichestresidents,lower-middle-classcitizens nowcapturedpoliticaloffices,andthetoneoflocaldeliberationsbecamesignificantlymorereceptivetotheconcernsofworking-class voters.105 InNewYork,bythe1840sand1850s,theselower-classcitizensenjoyedsomesuccessaswell.Theybegantohaveinfluenceonthe city’sDemocraticParty,findingbythe1850sthatthepartywasresponsivetotheirdemandsforhousingreformandtheabolitionofthecontractsystem,whichhadputadditionalpressureonwages.106 Trade unionsandworking-classpoliticalorganizationsalsobegantohave

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successinpositioningtheircandidatesonDemocraticPartytickets.107 Andbythe1850sthereemergedtheﬁgureoftheparty“boss,”who wouldbereceptivetosomeofthepoliticaldemandsofworkersand lower-middle-classcitizens.108 Ineffect,“theboss,andlocalparties... allboretheimprintoftheworkingclasses.”109 EveninBoston,where thecity’seconomicelitewasperhapsmostsuccessfulinsecuringpoliticalofﬁces,theirpresenceinCityHallandinlegislaturesdeclined.110

Theshiftingsocialoriginsofpoliticalofficeholdersdemonstratethis slowbutsteadyerosionoftheoncetoweringpositionoftheantebellummercantileelite.Notthatthemercantileeliteabandonedallpoliticaloffices.Indeed,thevenerableNewYorkUnionClub,testifyingto itsmembers’politicalinvolvement,countedinthe1850samongits ranksaformersecretaryofthenavy,aU.S.senator,twogovernorsof NewYorkState,fourmayorsofNewYorkCity,andagovernorof RhodeIsland.Still,thenumberofupper-classNewYorkersholding politicalofficediddecline.Among103politicallyactivewealthyNew Yorkers,only12ranforofficeintheyearsbetween1850and1863, comparedto32whohadbeencandidatesbetween1828and1840.111 Of 1,052DemocraticPartyactivistsin1844,38percentwereprofessionals orbusinessmen,while33percentwereskilledworkers,asubstantial numberthatwasprobablywithoutcomparisonintheWesternworldat large.112 Increasingly,professionalpoliticiansoflower-middle-classor evenworking-classbackgroundmovedintopositionsofpoliticalinfluence.113

3 Propertiednorthernersfounditdifﬁculttorespondtothechallengesposedbyanevermoreassertivecitizenry,notleastbecause merchantsandartisans-turned-manufacturersdevelopeddistinctunderstandingsoftheupheavalsgeneratedbyindustrializationanddemocratization.Ofcourse,mostwell-to-donorthernersthroughoutthe antebellumyearssharedanumberofcommonassumptions;theyremainedcommittedtoprogress,markets,andrepublicangovernment. Emphasizingtheﬂuidityofsocialdivisionsandtheprevalenceofso-

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cialmobility,theymadethedenialofanykindofmeaningfulclassdivisionsthecornerstoneoftheirworldview.Inaworlddominated bymonarchsandfeudaltraditions,thiswasapowerfulemancipatory vision.

Butincreasingly,thesecommonviewswerenotenoughtoenable concertedpoliticalaction.Merchants,emphasizingtheimportanceof stabilityandpredictabilitytotheirbusinessenterprises,shunneddisruptionsofanykind,anddesiredasocietyorderlyinitsdomesticrelationsandpeacefulinitsrelationstothelargerworld.Tothem,order stilldependedtosomeextentonsocialhierarchies,andthustheystruggledtomaintaintheirpositionasstewardsofthecommunity.They alsoembracedaninternationalistoutlook,seeingthemselvesasthe bearersofafundamentallycosmopolitanspirit,anoutlookundoubtedlystrengthenedbythememoryofthedevastatingimpactthatthe Warof1812hadhadontheirbusinessundertakings.“Mercantilepursuits,”arguedthe AmericanMerchant, “discourag[e]physicalconﬂicts betweennations.”114 Withoutdespoticrulers,enlightenedfreetrade betweenfreenationswouldcreateacommoninterestinpreventing war.115 Thisdesireforpeaceextended,ofcourse,totheirownnation, whichwouldeventuallybringmerchantsintosharpconﬂictwithmanufacturersandwesternfarmers.

Themerchants’worldview,meanwhile,contrastedsharplywiththat ofmanufacturers,whichemphasizedtheingenuityandinventiveness ofAmerica’smechanicsasthebasisfortheUnitedStates’rapideconomicdevelopment.Furthermore,manufacturerswereoftenhostile towardthemercantileelite,whomtheysawasnon-producersliving offthelaborofothers,agitatingforfreetrade,importingcheapgoods fromEurope,andprovidingcreditonharshterms.Americanindustry, theybelieved,wasa“wide-spreadelm,withscoresofparasitesclingingtoitstrunk,”namely,merchantsandbankers.116 Manufacturersassertedthat,“unlikecommerce,”industryconsistsnotmerelyintheexchangeofgoodsbutin“givingthemanewformandgreatlyincreased value.”Therefore,“asanagentofcivilization,allotherpursuitsfade

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beforeit.”117 Manufacturersoftensawthemselvesaspartofthe“producingclasses,”orjustas“labor,”drawingadividinglinebetween themselvesandthecommercialorﬁnancialbourgeoisie.Indeed,while historianSeanWilentzcorrectlynotedthat“thedefenseofthe‘producingclasses’[included]anamalgamof‘honorable’anticapitalist smallmastersandwageearners,”italsoallowedmoresubstantialmanufacturerstorallyunderthebannerofanill-deﬁnedbutdeeplyrooted producerism.118 Thissetmanufacturersclearlyapartfromthemercantileeliteand,evenmoreso,itsslaveholders.

Centraltothemanufacturers’worldviewwasapositiveattitudetowardlabor,whichwasperhapsnotsurprising,consideringthatmany ofthemhadrisenoutoftheranksoftheworkingclassthemselves. Glorifyingthe“mechanicarts,”theysaw“thedignityoflabor...in itsresults,andnotintheformofemployment.”119 Forthesemanufacturers,freelaborwasthebasisoftherepublic,andinordertosecure opportunitiesforall,theprospectsforindustryandagriculturehadto bepromising.Expandingopportunitiesforfarmers,ineffect,wereto defusetherisingtensionsbetweenindustrializationanddemocratization.HoraceGreeley,thepublisherofthe NewYorkTribune anda leadingspokesmanforthisposition,wantedfor“eachman...anassuredchancetoearn,andthenanassuranceofthejustfruitsofhislabors.”120 Tosecurethepromisesoffreelabor,America’sﬂedgingindustriesneededprotectionandfarmersundisturbedaccesstotherich landsoftheWest—apoliticalprogramthatbroughtmanufacturers intosharplydrawnconﬂictwiththenation’smercantileelite.

3 Theseideologicaldivisionsplayedthemselvesoutinnationalpolitics,resultinginanincreasinginabilityofnortherneconomicelitesto defusethedangerouspoliticaltensionsthatemergedbetweensouthern plantersandthegrowingpopulationoffreefarmersintheexpanding West.Asearlyasthe1830s,amountingdebateaboutslaveryandthe futureshapeoftheUnionhaddrivenawedgedeepbetweendifferent upper-classgroups.Thevastmajorityofnorthernmerchantswanted

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toaccommodatetheSouth,whichmeantaccedingtoitspoliticalinterests.TheysoughttopreservetheUnionandwerewillingtocompromisepoliticallyaswellasideologicallywithsouthernslaveholderson nearlyeveryissue—fromthecrisisofthemid-1830sandtheCompromiseof1850totheFugitiveSlaveActandStephenDouglas’sKansasNebraskaAct.121 Theirultimateinterestinpeaceanduniontranscended allotherpoliticalloyalties,andtheyexertedtheirpowerinsideand outsidethepartysystemtopromotecompromise.“Thepeace... ofthecountry,”editorializedthe NewYorkJournalofCommerce, securedmerchants’prosperity,anddespitemanymerchants’abhorrence ofslavery,calledforpoliticalcompromisewiththesouthernruling class.122 Theywereessentiallyhopingforthecontinuationofapolitical economyfocusedonfacilitatingtheexportofslave-grownagricultural commoditiestoEuropeandtheimportofmanufacturedwaresinreturn.

Deedsfollowedwords.In1851,forexample,JamesBeekman,aNew Yorkstatesenatorandrealestatespeculator,desertedhisparty,the Whigs,andvotedagainstthenominationofWhigantislaveryadvocate HamiltonFishfortheU.S.Senate,totheapplauseofmanyofNew York’smerchants.123 ThatsameyearthebipartisanUnionSafetyCommitteenominateda“UnionTicket”forstatewideelections,withthousandsofmerchantssigningapledgethattheywouldvoteonlyforcandidatesfavoringaccommodationbetweenNorthandSouth.124 “Itis time,”theyproclaimed,that“thetrammelsofpartysubjugationwere thrownoff,andourintelligentbusinessmen... standupfortheprotectionoftheirtrueinterests.”125 Duringthe1852presidentialelections, alargenumberofupper-classNewYorkersagaindesertedtheWhig Partyanditscandidate,WinﬁeldScott,andhelpedelectaspresidentpro-compromiseDemocratFranklinPierce.126 Bipartisaneffortsat compromisewiththeSouthremainedstrongthroughoutthedecade; in1859,forexample,onehundredleadingNewYorkmerchantsorganizedthe“UnionSafetyCommittee”topropagandizepro-Union politicsinupstateNewYork.Duringthe1860presidentialelections,

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merchantsurgedavoteforthecandidatesendorsedbytheUnion CommitteeofFifteen,which,again,supportednorthernaccommodationtosouthernpoliticaldemands.127

MostmerchantsrootedtheireconomicactivitiesintheexistingarrangementsoftheAtlanticeconomy,especiallytheexportofagriculturalcommoditiesandtheimportofmanufacturedgoods.Tradein cottonwasoneoftheirmostimportantbusinesses,anditssaleenabled southernersinturntopurchasemanufacturedgoodsfromnorthern merchants.Theexportofcottonalsosecuredthenation’screditonthe Europeanmoneymarketsandthuskeptthenation’sbanksaﬂoat.128 “ThewholeCommerceoftheworldturnsupontheproductofslave labor,”argued Hunt’sMerchants’Magazine quiteaccuratelyin1855.129 Cottonproducedbyslavelabor,accordingtothepoliticaleconomist andeditorofthe DryGoodsReporter, ThomasP.Kettell,“sustain[s]the ratesoflaborandcapital,andsecure[s]theprosperityofourcountry.”130 Inan1860pamphlet, OnSouthernWealthandNorthernProﬁts, Kettellsuccinctlyarguedthatmerchants,bankers,andmanufacturers,aswellasartisansandnorthernfarmers,enjoyedtheirprosperity onlythankstothesouth’s“peculiarinstitution.”131 Indeed,theSouth’s riches,heobserved,accumulateintheNorth.132 “IftheSouthproduces thisvastwealth,shedoeslittleofherowntransportation,banking,insuring,brokering,butpaysliberallyonthoseaccountstotheNorthern capitalemployedinthoseoccupations.”133 Thus,heconcluded,“the historyofthewealthandpowerofnationsisbutarecordofslave products.”134

Suchinsightsandinterestsmotivatedmanymerchantsandbankers tostrugglehardtomaintaintheexistingstructuresoftheAtlantic economy.TheinternationalbankerAugustBelmont,forexample,believedthattherewasnoproblemjustifyingthecoexistenceofslavery intheSouthandcapitalismintheNorth.Havingslavelaborharvest theenormousagriculturalpotentialoftheUnitedStateswasarouteto prosperitythatultimatelywouldalsobeneﬁttheworkingclass,heargued.135 Freetrade,territorialexpansionthroughtheconstructionof

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railroadsandtheannexationofCuba,governmentrestraintinreligious matters,andapaternalisticattitudetowardthewhitepoor,hesaid, wouldcreatearapidlyexpandingbutsociallystablesociety.136 StabilizingtheinstitutionofslaverywouldineffectalsosoothetheincreasinglypolarizedsocietyoftheNorth.Belmontandhispoliticalallies strovefortheclassiccoalitionbetweentheNorth’supperclassandthe landedgentryoftheSouth,withthepeculiartwistofintegratingsome urbanworkersintothefold.137

Thosewho,likeBelmont,wereinvestedinthisorderwenttogreat lengthstoaccommodatetheinterestsofslaveholders.Duringthe 1830s,membersofProvidence’smercantileelite,forexample,mobilizedpassionatelyagainstthegrowingranksofabolitionistsamongthe localmanufacturers.138 Boston’stextileentrepreneurs,amongthemthe Websters,Winthrops,andEveretts,consistentlyfavoredsouthernappeasement,notleasttosecurebothacontinuedsupplyofinexpensive cottonfortheirfactoriesandaccesstotheircrucialsouthernmarkets.139 Indeed,in1848theywouldeffectivelysplittheWhigPartyinMassachusettsintoa“cotton”anda“conscience”faction.140 Demonstratinga strikinginabilitytoimagineadifferentpoliticaleconomy,the Journal ofCommerce editorializedin1850,“WeclingtotheCompromise[of 1850]aslongasthereishope.”141 TheSouthhadtobeaccommodated because“theUnion[is]thegreatsourceofourdignity,thegreatspring ofourprosperity,andthestreet-anchorofoursafety.”142

Itwasnotjustadefenseofsouthernslaveholdersforthesakeof maintainingtheUnionthatmotivatedmanynorthernmerchantsand bankers.Bythe1850s,thepoliticalunderpinningsoftheAtlanticeconomyitselfalsoseemedthreatenedbythenewlyemergingRepublican Party’sprogramoftariffs,homesteads,andcontainmentofslavery, endangeringthemodusvivendiunderwhichthemercantileelitehad thrived.143 Merchantssawverylittleneedfortheactivistgovernment manyRepublicansenvisioned;theyrightlyfearedthattheresultwould beapoliticaleconomyfundamentallydifferentfromtheexistingone— apoliticaleconomythatwouldunderminetheircentralrole.144 What

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wasatstakeforthemwasnothinglessthanthefuturepositionofthe UnitedStatesintheworldeconomy.Whocontrolledthefederalgovernmentmatteredagreatdealinshapingthisfuture.

Ofcourse,thisvisionwasnotsharedbyallnorthernmerchants.145 Whilemosttookanessentiallyconservativeviewofsectionalconflict, animportantminoritywereconfidentthatnewandprofitablearrangementscouldbeforgedinoppositiontosouthernplanters.Atfirst,they werefewinnumber,composedlargelyofreligiouslymotivatedabolitionistssuchastheNewYorkmerchantbrothersLewisandArthur TappanandtheBostonmerchantsJamesRussellLowellandThomas WentworthHigginson.146 Yettheincreasinglyaggressivestanceofthe southerners,especiallyinthewakeoftheintroductionoftheKansasNebraskaBillintheU.S.Senate,convincedgrowingnumbersthatthe statusquowasimpossibletomaintain.147 Forthemitbecamenecessary totake“united,deliberate,persistentandperseveringaction”tomake surethat“suchmennolongerpossesstheGovernment,”asthepresidentoftheNewYorkBankofCommerce,JohnA.Stevens,proclaimedinMay1856.148 Suchastepwastheeasiertotakebecause,by the1850s,anincreasingnumberofmerchantsdrewprofitsfromdomesticindustrialization,importsubstitution,andtheexportofagriculturalcommoditiesgrownbyfreefarmers,thusrootingtheminadifferentpoliticaleconomyfromthatofAtlantictrade.

ThemostimportantAmericansinthisgroupwerenotthemerchants,however,butthemanufacturers.149 Forexample,amongthe102 ProvidenceactivistswhosupportedthecreationoftheRhodeIsland Anti-SlaverySocietyin1836,thevastmajoritywereartisansandmanufacturers,peoplesuchasThomasDavis,whoproducedjewelry,and wentontobecomeoneofthemostoutspokenanti-slaveryDemocrats.150 InNewYorkaswell,manufacturerswereattheforefrontof thosecallingforamoreaggressivepositiontowardtheSouth.Horace Greeley,publisherofthe NewYorkDailyTribune, whohimselfwassociallyandeconomicallyclosetomanufacturersandwasamongtheﬁrst tomoveintotheRepublicanParty,spokeformanyofthemwhenhe

demandedno“concessiontoslavery.”151 Greeley,likeothers,wasattractedtotheprogramoftheRepublicanPartynotonlyforitsoppositiontoslaverybutalsoforitsbroadervisionofpoliticaleconomy.The promotionoffreeandcapital-intensiveagricultureintheWestpromisedtocreategrowingmarketsformanufacturedgoods.Moreover,the expansionoffreefarmingintheWestassuredurbanworkersaccessto propertyandanescapefrompermanentproletarianstatus.

Accordingtothesemanufacturers,thepoliticalpowerofsouthern slaveholdersoverthefederalgovernmentwasathreattothecontinued developmentoftheUnitedStatesandtotheirowneconomicwell-being.Itwasnotonlythespreadofslaveryassuchbutalsotheperceptionthattheexpansionofslaverywouldunderminetherepublican project,andespeciallythreatensocialstabilityintheNorth,thatmade themwaryabouttheaggressivestanceofsouthernslaveholders.152 The expansionistprojectsoftheSouthendangeredfreelaboragriculturein theWest,andwithoutthe“safetyvalve”oftheWest,theyfearedthat apermanentworkingclasswouldemergeinnortherncities,further menacingthefutureoftherepublic.NewYorkerPeterCooper,iron manufacturerandlifelongDemocratwhoby1856foundhimselfmovingclosertotheRepublicanParty,believedpassionatelythat“two orthreehundredthousandmen”withamaterialinterestinslavery shouldnotbeallowedto“continuetocontrol”thegovernment.153 Theirpoliticsweredrivenbyaﬁrmbeliefinthesuperiorityofthe North’seconomyandsystemoflabor.TheNewYorkclothingmanufacturerGeorgeOpdyke,whoventuredintoeconomicandpolitical theorizingwithhis1851 TreatiseonPoliticalEconomy, sawslaveryas “clearlyinconsistentwiththeprinciplesofjusticeandpoliticalequality”andtherootcauseofsoutherneconomicbackwardness.Capital boundinhumans,heargued,couldnotbeproﬁtablyemployedotherwise,andthedrivingforceofeconomicdevelopment—themotivation toworkhard—waslackinginslaves,forwhom“thehopeofgainand thefearofwantarebothextinguishedbythedeprivationoffreedom.” Thissystem,inOpdyke’smind,wasinstarkcontrasttothatofthe

strivingandeconomicallysuccessfulfreemenoftheNorth,including itswageworkers.154 SlavetraderandrailroadinvestorIsaacSherman tookasimilarstand.AsoneoftheearlymembersofNewYork’sRepublicanPartyandastrongsupporterofJohnC.Fremont’s1856presidentialcampaign,hewascommittedtofreelabor.“Soonerorlater,”he wroteinApril1856,“themassesofthiscountrywillseethatthereal issueistherightsofmen,therightsoflabor...Democracyconsistsin thepeoplerulingthroughjustice,andinharmonywiththegreatprinciplesofequity,andthatanattackupontheinalienablerightofevena minority,isanaggressionontheindividualrightsofthewhole.”While ShermandidnotadvocateinterferencewithslaveryintheSouth,he stronglyopposeditsextension.155

Inadditiontotheiroppositiontoanyexpansionofslaverywestward,manufacturersalsodifferedfrommostmerchantsintheirview ofwhatpoliciesthegovernmentshouldadopttopromoteandprotect America’sindustries.Theyfavoreda“fosteringhandofgovernment” tosheltermanufacturersfromoverseascompetitionandtodevelopthe nation’sinfrastructure.Indeed,industrialistssawthestate’ssupportof manufacturingasthekeyvariableinthedevelopmentofdomesticindustries.156 Inthisalternativevisionofapoliticaleconomy,quitedistinctfromtheinterestsandinclinationsofmostmerchants,“theproductsofthemanufacturer,mechanic,andartisan,mustbeexchangedfor theproductsofthecultivator,andtheseexchangesshouldformwithin ourUnionaninternalcommercesuchasnonationhasbeforeexhibited.”157 Highertariffsinparticularwould“promotetheincreasedprosperityofAmericanmanufacturers.”Tofulﬁllthisvisionandtounlock thepotentialexpansionoftheirownparticularformofcapital,industrialistsincreasinglycollidedwiththepoliticaleconomyofthemercantileelite.ItwasinthiscontextthattheRepublicanPartyprovidedapoliticalbasisforbuildingaverydifferentAmericansociety.Andindeed, manufacturerswerevastlyoverrepresentedamongtheelitesupporters oftheyoungparty.158

Tentatively,andtovaryingdegrees,agrowingnumberofupper-

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classAmericanssawafuturenationwithoutslaveholders.Theyacknowledgedthesharpeningcontradictionbetweentheforcesunleashed byrapidcapitalistdevelopmentandtheblossomingofslavery,and theysawthepersistenceofpre-bourgeoisformsoflaboraswellasthe attendantpoliticalpowerofslaveholdersoverthefederalgovernment asdamagingtheirowninterests,whichtheyhadbeguntoidentifywith thenationalinterest.Theyproposed,ineffect,tofurtherthepromises ofbourgeoisrevolution.Incontrasttothemajorityofthenorthern economicelite,theywereabletoseebeyondthesectionalandclassarrangementsoftheantebellumyears.Theyweretheideologicalandpoliticalinnovatorsoftheirclass,and,ineffectifnotinintention,itsrevolutionarywing.

3 Bythelate1850s,Americaneconomicelitesweresharplydivided—socially,culturally,andespeciallypolitically.ThemostsignificantdividewasbetweentheupperclassesoftheNorthandthe South.WithintheNorth,however,theriseofnewmanufacturing eliteshadspotlightedanimportantrift,onewhichcouldbesummedup asoriginatinginsharplydivergentviewsonthefutureofAmerica’s politicaleconomy.Whilemanynorthernmerchants,inordertocontinueenjoyingprivilegedaccesstotheleversofnationalpolitical power,soughtthepoliticalsupportofsouthernplanters,mostmanufacturers,incontrast,foundthemselvespoliticallyalignedwithadynamicandrapidlygrowinggroupoffreefarmers.Theconflictbetweenthesetwogroups—merchantsandmanufacturers—expressed indramaticpoliticalrealignments,eventuallycouldnotbecontained withinthenationitself,leadingtoitsdisintegrationinthewinterof 1860–61.Intheshortterm,andespeciallysharplyinthetwodecades precedingtheCivilWar,thisdeepsplitalsohinderedtheabilityof northerneconomicelitestoembraceconcertedpoliticalactionatthe localandstatelevels.Thisdissensionallowedgroupsofnon-elitecitizens,whoearlierinthecenturyhadbeenlargelyexcludedfrompoliticalpower,torisetopositionsofpoliticalinfluence.159

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Secessionandthewarthatfollowedstruckthegreatestpolitical blowtothenation’smercantileelites,sinceiteffectivelydestroyedthe worldthathadallowedthemtothriveeconomicallyandpolitically. Ironically,however,thewarresolvedmanyoftheirconﬂictsbycrushingthepoliticaleconomyofAtlantictrade.Thedefeatofthosewho hadsoughtproﬁtfromanessentiallysubordinateroleoftheUnited Statesvis-à-visEuropeaneconomiesallowedtheUnitedStatesandits economicelite,bothmerchantsandmanufacturers,toturnthemselves intoapotentpresenceontheworldscene,unitedunderthebannerof continentalindustrialization.Andstate-supportedindustrialization,in turn,allowedtheseeconomicelitestogaindecisivecontroloverlabor. TheCivilWar,ineffect,markedthegreatestdefeatofnorthernmercantileelites,butitwasalsothepreconditionfortheriseoftheworld’s mostpowerfulbourgeoisieduringtheGildedAge.160

GildedAgeGospels

DAVIDNASAW

Mrs.LightfootLee,thewealthywidowwhoistheheroineof HenryAdams’s1882novel Democracy, movedtoWashingtonbecause shewas“torturedby ennui. Sinceherhusband’sdeath,ﬁveyearsbefore,shehadlosthertasteforNewYorksociety;shehadfeltnointerestinthepriceofstocks,andverylittleinthemenwhodealtinthem; shehadbecomeserious.”ShewassingularlydistressedbyNewYork’s millionaires,who,havingamassedgreatwealth,didnotknowwhatto dowithit.“Toletitaccumulatewastoownone’sfailure;Mrs.Lee’s greatgrievancewasthatitdidaccumulate,withoutchangingorimprovingthequalityofitsowners.”ShedecidedtorelocatetoWashington,D.C.,sothatshemight“seewithherowneyestheactionofprimaryforces;totouchwithherownhandthemassivemachineryof society;tomeasurewithherownmindthecapacityofthemotive power.ShewasbentupongettingtotheheartofthegreatAmerican mysteryofdemocracyandgovernment.”Likeapassengeronanocean liner,shewantedtovisit“theengine-roomand[talk]withtheengineer.”Mrs.Lee,inshort,wasabandoningNewYorkCityforWash-

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ingtonbecause“whatshewanted,wasPOWER,”andWashingtonwas itsseat.1

Intheclosingyearsofthenineteenthcentury,theGildedAgemillionaireswouldmakethesamejourney,atalmostthesametime,and forthesamereason.Whereastheyhadearlierrefused—andrightly— totakeWashingtonandthestatecapitalsseriouslyascentersofeconomicdecisionorpolicymaking,theyhad,bythelate1880s,begunto understandthatdemocraticallyelectedlegislatorshadthepotentialto wieldenormouspowerovertheeconomy,and,unlessdeterred,might begintodoso.

Thebusinessmendidnotwillinglyenterthepoliticalrealm.2 Herbert Spencer,theirguideinmatterssocial,economic,andpolitical,had,as weshallsee,reinforcedtheirself-interestedconvictionthatthestate hadneitherrightnorreasontointerfereintheworkingsoftheeconomy.Governmentmightsubsidizenewrailroadconstruction,support manufacturingwithprotectivetariffs,andpayhandsomecommissions toﬁnancierswhomarketeditsdebt,butbeyondthat,thepolitical spherehadtobepermanentlyandresolutelywalledofffromtheeconomic.

TheﬁrstoftheGildedAgemillionairestobethrustintothepoliticalarenaweretherailroadbarons.Theyenteredpoliticsatthestate levelinthe1870stodefendtherailroads’prerogativetosettheirown ratesagainstagrarianpoliticianswhobelievedthatelectedofﬁcialshad notonlytherightbutalsotheobligationtointerveneintheworkings oftheeconomy.Bythelate1880s,aspoliticiansatthefederalaswellas thestatelevelsignaledtheirintentiontoplayanactiveroleineconomicmatters,otherbusinesselitesfocusedtheirattention—andresources—onWashington,ifonlytomakesurethattheirparticularinterestswouldnotsufferfromnewlegislation.Inthecongressional debatesovertariffs,railroadregulation,andantitrustbills,themillionairesdividedalongsectoralandregionallines.Onlytowardtheendof thecenturyinresponsetothethreatposedbytheadvocatesof“free silver,”themonetizationofwhichwouldhaveadverselyaffectedallel-

ements,sectors,andregionsoftherulingelites,3 didthebusinessmen unite—asarulingclass—tosafeguardtherightsofcapitalbylimiting thepowerofthepeople’selectedrepresentativestodeterminethenation’seconomicandmonetarypolicies.

Ifwearetojudgefromthenewspapers,HenryAdamsandhis ﬁctionalheroine,Mrs.LightfootLee,werenottheonlyAmericansfascinated—andappalled—bythearrivalofthemillionairebusinessmen. Fromthemid-1870sonward,thepapersweregluttedwithstoriesof theircomingsandgoings,theirmansionsandfêtes,theirEuropeanexcursionsandNewportholidays.“Thisisanageofgreatfortunes,”the NewYorkTimes exclaimedinoneofitsmanyarticlesonthephenomenon.“NeverbeforeinthehistoryoftheRepublichavetherebeenso manymenwhoareveryrich.”And“veryrich”in1882,asthe Times instructeditsreaders,wasquantitativelydifferentfrom“veryrich”in anyothereraofthenation’shistory:“Onewhomighthavebeen‘very rich’in1842wouldnotbeaccountedrichatall,withthesamefortune, in1882.”4 The LondonSpectator inaNovember1882articlemarveledat “theevidenceforthcomingfromAmericathatfortunesmaybeaccumulatedonascaleofwhichEnglishmenhavelittleconception.”While theEnglishwerepleasedtoearn4percentontheirinvestments,Americansweresatisﬁedwithnothinglessthan“threetimestotentimesthat rate.”5

ThemillionaireswhodrewMrs.LightfootLee’sspecialirewere thosewhohadaccumulatedtheircapitalelsewhere—inmanufacturing, mining,orrailroading—thenrelocatedtoNewYorkCityandretired fromactivework.Thesatanicmajestyoflate-nineteenth-centurycapitalism,onlyhintedatbyMrs.Lee,wasitsself-propagatingnature. Fortunes,oncemade,continuedtogrow—andatanalarmingrate. Whilethenouveauricheandtheirproﬂigatechildrenreclinedinthe lapofluxury,theirmoneymultipliedfasterthantheycouldspendit.

Mrs.Lee,likesomanyotherAmericans,scornedthemillionaires notbecausetheywererichbutbecausetheyweresooften—and,toher mind,sotediously—idle.Onthisshewasinfullagreementwithle-

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gionsofpoliticalradicals—greenbackers,grangers,agrarians,Alliance-men,free-silveradvocates,populists,single-taxers,Marxianand Debsiansocialists,anarchists,theKnightsofLabor,tradeunionists,andtheorganizersoftheworkingmen’sparties—whostoodtogetherincondemnationofunearnedfortunes.Laborwas,forthem,the sourceofallwealth;capital,aplunderingwhirlwindwhichsweptaway thatwealth.6

Themillionaires,wisely,didnotattempttojustifytheirfortunesby claimingthattheyhadearnedthembythesweatoftheirbrow.7 Althoughtheywouldnotpubliclydismisstheworkethic,theypaiditlittleheed.Inthenewindustrialage,theyinsisted,noindividualcould createwealthbyhimself.When,inSeptember1883,railroadtycoon JayGouldwasaskedbyaSenateinvestigatingcommitteehowmanyof the“menwhoconductbusinessenterprisesandwieldthepowerof capital”were“self-made,”herespondedthathewouldnotcallanyof them“self-madeexactly,forthecountryhasgrownandtheyhave grownupwithit.”8

AndrewCarnegiemadethesamepointinanarticlepublishedin 1906.Wealth,heclaimed,was“notchieﬂytheproductoftheindividualunderpresentconditions,butlargelythejointproductofthecommunity.”Toillustratehispoint,Carnegieconjuredupthestoriesof fourrepresentativeGildedAgemillionaireswhohadmadetheirfortunes,respectively,inrailroadsinNewYork,ironandsteelinPittsburgh,meatpackinginChicago,andmininginMontana.9

Notoneofthesemillionaires,Carnegieasserted,hadbeenresponsibleforcreatingthewealthofwhichheandhisfamilypartookso disproportionately.Therailroadstocksoftheﬁrstmillionairewould haveremainedworthlesshadthecommunitieshisrailroadsservednot soaredinpopulation.Similarlywiththeironandsteelmanufacturer, themeatpacker,andtheminer:“Theirventurewasmadeproﬁtableby thedemandfortheirproducts...fromthe expandingpopulationengagedinsettlinganewcontinent.Withoutnewpopulouscommunities farandnear,nomillionairedomwaspossibleforthem.”10

Gould’sandCarnegie’sadmissionthattheindividualwasnotthe primaryagentinthecreationofnewwealthposedideologicalandpoliticalproblemsforthem—andfortheirgenerationofGildedAgemillionaires.Ifthecommunity,forCarnegie,orthecountry,inGould’s formulation,wasthesourceofallwealth,thenwhyhadsomuchofit accumulatedinsofewhands?Andwhyshoulditremainthereinstead ofbeingdistributedmorewidely—andmoreequitably—amongthose whohadhadahandincreatingit?Thesewereamongthemanyquestionsposedbythepoliticalradicals,questionsforwhichthemillionaireshadnoeasyanswers.

Carnegiewasuniqueamonghiscontemporariesinthathetoowas troubledbytheseeminglyarbitraryandstrikingly“unequaldistributionofwealth,”which,heconceded,“liesattherootofthepresent Socialisticactivity...Multi-millionaires,anewgenus,haveappeared, ladenwithfortunesofsuchmagnitudeasthepastknewnothingof. Theextremesinthedistributionofwealthhaveneverbeenasgreatas theyareto-day... Thishasnaturallyattractedtheattentionofthe wageearnersandothersnotdelugedbythegoldshowers.”Theseinequalitieshadtobeaddressed,Carnegiewarned;theyweremorallyoffensiveandpoliticallydangerous.11

Whilesomeofhisfellowmillionaires,JohnDavisonRockefeller mostconspicuously,wouldattributetheirﬁnancialsuccesstoGod, who,theyclaimed,hadblessedthemwithrichesbecausetheyhad followedhisteachings,12 Carnegierequiredasecularversionofthe Protestantethictoexplainandjustifyhisownoversizedfortune.He founditintheworksoftheBritishphilosopherHerbertSpencer. SpencerbecamehisspiritualandpoliticalmentorbecauseSpencerrevealedtoCarnegieandhisgenerationofmillionairestheexistenceof aprovidentialplanneatlyencompassedwithintheterm“evolution,” whichexplained—and,inexplaining,justiﬁed—theaccumulationofso muchwealthinsofewhands.

Thebusinessmenhadaccumulatedtheirfortunes,Spencertaught, notbecausetheyweremorerighteous,morepious,moreindustrious,

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ormorediligentthantheiremployees,butbecausetheypossessedwhat Carnegiecalledthespecial“talentfororganizationandmanagement” requiredinthenewindustrialage.“Itisalaw... thatmenpossessed ofthispeculiartalentforaffairs,underthefreeplayofeconomic forcesmust,ofnecessity,soonbeinreceiptofmorerevenuethatcan bejudiciouslyexpendeduponthemselves;andthislawis... beneﬁcial fortherace.”13

Thesuccessfulbusinessmanhadbeenentrustedwithsurpluscapital becausehewas,inthelargerevolutionaryschema,bestsuitedtospend itwiselyonbehalfofthecommunity.Inthequestforriches,onlythe fittesthadsurvived—becausetheywerethefittest.Thosewhohad provedtheirtalentsinthebattleofaccumulation,Carnegieargued, wereobligedtoapplythosesametalentsinspendingdowntheirfortunes.Itwasthedutyofthe“manofwealth...to considerallsurplus revenueswhichcometohimsimplyastrustfunds,whichheiscalled upontoadminister ...inthe mannerwhich,inhisjudgment,isbest calculatedtoproducethemostbeneficialresultsforthecommunity.”

ByfashioningSpencer’sevolutionaryphilosophyintoahigh-minded apologiaforcapitalaccumulation,Carnegiehadrationalizedandjustiﬁedthemaldistributionofwealththatsodramaticallymarkedthenew GildedAge.His“GospelofWealth”laidoutadefenseofunrestricted capitalaccumulationasa“beneﬁcentnecessity”fortheentirecommunity,richandpoor.Thepeople,heargued,werebestservedbyallowingcapitaliststoaccumulateasmuchmoneyastheycould,becausethe morewealththatwasaccumulatedinwisehands,themorethatcould begivenaway—wisely—bythecapitalist-philanthropistacting“as trusteeandagentforhispoorerbrethren,bringingtotheirservicehis superiorwisdom,experience,andabilitytoadminister,doingforthem betterthantheywouldorcoulddoforthemselves.”14

Carnegie’ssolutiontothepoliticalandsocialproblemsgeneratedby thegrowingmaldistributionofwealth—thattherichgiveawaytheir moneybeforetheydied—wastooradicaltobeadoptedbyhisfellow

millionaires.Nonetheless,inhisrelianceonSpencer’sphilosophyto explaintheroleofthemillionairesinthenewindustrialage,hewas wellwithinthemainstreamofelitethought.Carnegie’sgenerationof GildedAgemillionaires—andintellectuals—wasdrawntoSpencer’s evolutionarytheorybecauseitmadesenseofhistoricalchangebydeﬁningitasprogress.15 AsHenryAdams,borninFebruary1838,alittle morethantwoyearsafterCarnegie,recalledinhisautobiography, “Fortheyoungmenwhoseliveswerecastinthegenerationbetween 1867and1900,LawShouldbeEvolutionfromlowertohigher.”16

Carnegie’sowndiscoveryofSpencerwasalife-alteringmoment,or atleastthiswashowhedescribeditinhis Autobiography. “Iremember thatlightcameasinafloodandallwasclear.NotonlyhadIgotridof theologyandthesupernatural,butIhadfoundthetruthofevolution.”17 CarnegiewasnotaloneinthisjoyousreceptionofSpencer’s evolutionaryphilosophy.“InthethreedecadesaftertheCivilWar,” RichardHofstadterhaswritten,“itwasimpossibletobeactiveinany fieldofintellectualworkwithoutmasteringSpencer.”18 EventhefictionalMrs.LightfootLeetalksofhim“foranentireeveningwitha veryliterarytranscendentalcommission-merchant.”19

In1882,theyearAdams’snovel Democracy waspublished,Herbert SpencerembarkedonatouroftheUnitedStates,thoughoneinwhich hedeclinedtogiveanypubliclectures.Thetourculminatedinafulldressbanquetwithaveritablewho’swhoofAmericanelitesinattendance.Carnegiewasthere,aswerejournalistsE.L.Godkin,Horace White,andCharlesDana;GeorgeRoberts,presidentofthePennsylvaniaRailroad;futureU.S.senatorsCarlSchurz,ChaunceyDepew, andElihuRoot;congressmenAbramHewittandPerryBelmont;AndrewGreen,whohadbeenthemajorforcebehindthebuildingof CentralPark,andCalvertVaux,oneofthepark’slandscapearchitects; AlbertBierstadt,theartist;formersecretaryofstateWilliamB.Evarts; businessmanCyrusField;CharlesFrancisAdams,Henry’sfatherand formerambassadortoGreatBritain;WilliamGrahamSumnerand

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LesterWard,whowouldfoundtheAmericanschoolsofsociologyand economics;andtwoofthecountry’smostinﬂuentialpreachers,Henry WardBeecherandLymanAbbott.20

SpencercaptivatedCarnegie’sgenerationnotsimplybecausehe coinedthephrase“survivalofthefittest,”whichbecamepartoftheir language,butbecauseheconstructedasyntheticphilosophythatexplainedeverythingunderthesunandthesolarsystembeyondit.There was,forSpencer,adiscernableordertothecourseofhumanevents andthestructureofhumansocieties,studyofwhichwouldrevealthe existenceofmorallawsthatwere“liketheotherlawsoftheuniverse—sure,inflexible,everactive,andhavingnoexceptions.”21 Societiesthatobeyedtheselawswouldprosper;thosethatdisregarded themwouldnot.Thesocialedificewhichlacks“rectitude initscomponentparts[and]isnotbuilton upright principles...willassuredly tumbletopieces.Aswellmightweseektolightafirewithice,feed cattleonstones,hangourhatsoncobwebs,orotherwisedisregardthe physicallawsoftheworld,asgocontrarytoitsequallyimperativeethicallaws.”22

“Theenslavementofthenegroes,”henoted,“servesforagoodexample.”Actingfromthepreceptsofapoliticaleconomythatdidnot coincidewithmorallaw,theslavemastershadsoughtforthemselves “amineofwealth”byreplacingfreewithslavelabor.“Theirgolden visionshavebeenfarfromrealizedhowever.Slavecountriesarecomparativelypoverty-strickenallovertheworld...West-Indianhistory hasbeenahistoryofdistressandcomplainings...The southernstates ofAmericaarefarbehindtheirnorthernneighborsinprosperity.”23

ForSpencer,“beneﬁcentnecessity”governedthenaturalworldand humansociety.“Progress,therefore,isnotanaccident,butanecessity,”aslongasthelawsofevolutionwereunderstoodandobeyed,as theyhadnotbeenbytheslaveholders.Spencerbanishedchance,luck, superstition,andhappenstancefromtheuniverse,certiﬁedthatindustrialsocietywasgovernedby“theverylawsoflife,”andassertedthat thoselawsweremorallaws.IndustrializationhadtriumphedinEng-

land,westernEurope,andtheUnitedStatesbecauseitrepresenteda forwardstepinevolutionaryprogress.Thefactthatindustrialization alsoledtotheimpoverishmentofsomewasregrettable,butitwould havebeenmoreunfortunatestillhadthoseleftbehindbeenpermitted toderailtheforwardmovementofanewindustrialsociety.“Pervading allnaturewemayseeatworkasterndiscipline,whichisalittlecruel thatitmaybeverykind,”Spencerhadwrittenin SocialStatics. “It seemshardthatanunskilfulnesswhichwithallhiseffortshecannot overcome,shouldentailhungerupontheartizan.Itseemshardthata labourerincapacitatedbysicknessfromcompetingwithhisstronger fellows,shouldhavetobeartheresultingprivations.Itseemshardthat widowsandorphansshouldbelefttostruggleforlifeordeath.Nevertheless,whenregardednotseparately,butinconnectionwiththeinterestsofuniversalhumanity,theseharshfatalitiesareseentobefullof thehighestbeneﬁcence.”24

Spenceropposedpoorlaws,state-fundedordirectedcharity,and governmentinterferencewiththeeconomynotbecausehewishedthe poortolivemiserablyordiefaster,butbecausehebelievedthatsuch interventionsmeddledwiththenaturallawsoftheeconomy.“The process must beundergone,andthesufferings must beendured... Thereisboundupwiththechangea normal amountofsuffering, whichcannotbelessenedwithoutalteringtheverylawsoflife.”25

ThepoliticalimplicationsofSpencer’sargumentwereclear-cutand easilyunderstoodbytheAmericanbusinesselites.Nothingandnoone, certainlynotthestateoritspoliticians,heargued,shouldbepermitted tointerferewiththe“natural”workingsoftheindustrialeconomyand theprogressof“beneﬁcentnecessity.”Thelawsthatgovernedtheforwardmovementofthenewindustrialagehadtobetreatedassacrosanct.

Itisstriking,indeed,howoftenthemultimillionairesjustiﬁedtheir businesspracticesbyreferencetooneoranother“law”ofindustrial society,lawswhich,theyasserted,couldnotberepealedoramended inthepoliticalarena.JohnD.Rockefeller,respondinginhis Ran-

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domReminiscences tocriticswhohadsuggestedthattherewassomethingunnatural,evencriminal,abouttheextraordinary“increaseinthe valueof[StandardOil’s]possessions,”claimedthat“itwasalldone throughthenaturallawoftradedevelopment.”26 JayGould,askedby theSenateinvestigatingcommitteeifhebelieveda“generalnational law”wasneededtoregulaterailroadrates,respondedthattheywere alreadyregulatedby“thelawsofsupplyanddemand,production,and consumption.”27 Carnegiecontinuallyinvokedunwrittenlawsofcompetition,consolidation,aggregation,supplyanddemand,andwages andproﬁtstoexplainwhyheandhiscompanyhadsucceeded.28

Withsuchovertappealstolaw,theGildedAgebusinessmenwere refutingthepopularnotionthatthattherewassomethingsinisterabout theirmaterialsuccess.JayGouldhad,afterall,beenreferredtointhe newspapersastheMephistophelesofWallStreet,abackhandedtribute tohisotherworldlyﬁnancialsuccesses.InthewakeoftheCrédit Mobilier,the“WhiskyRing,”andtheEriescandals,Carnegieand Rockefellertookcaretodistinguishbetweenlegitimatebusinessmen likethemselvesandthosetheyreferredtocontemptuouslyasthe“speculators.”“Thespeculatorandthebusinessmantreaddiverginglines,” CarnegieexplainedinaspeechtothestudentsofCurryCommercial Collegein1885.Speculatorswerenever“citizensofﬁrstrepute”and wouldthereforeneversucceedinthelongrun.“Ihavelivedtoseeall ofthesespeculatorsirreparablyruinedmen,bankruptinmoneyand bankruptincharacter.Gamestersdiepoor.”29

Carnegiewas,ofcourse,deadwrong.NomatterwhatSpencer’s philosophymighthavepredicted,theVanderbiltsandGouldsandthe politicianswhoprotectedthem—forahandsomeprice—didnotend upinthepoorhouse.Onthecontrary,theydidremarkablywell.But that,thebusinesseliteswouldargue,wasnotthefaultofindustrial capitalism.AsRockefellerhimselfacknowledged,“acorporationmay bemoralorimmoral,justasamanmaybemoralorthereverse;butit isfollytocondemnallcorporationsbecausesomearebad,orevento beundulysuspiciousofall,becausesomearebad.”30

Spencer’sformulationsallowedallthismalfeasancetobewashed awayasinconsequentialinthelongterm.Thesuccessfulbusinessman, hetaught,wassuccessfulbecauseherecognizedandobeyedtheeconomiclawsoftheindustrialage.Thedangertofutureprogressand prosperitycamenotfromthosewhofollowedthedictatesofevolutionaryprogress,likethecapitalists,butfromthosewhointerfered withthem.

JayGould,whenaskedbytheSenateinvestigatingcommitteeabout thedangerposedtothepeoplebythenewlydeveloping“aristocracyof wealth,”respondedthattherewasno“needtobeafraidofcapital... Whatyouhavegottofearislarge,ignorantmassesofpopulation.I don’tthinkthelibertiesofthepeoplehaveanythingtofearfromcapital.Capitalisconservativeandscary[i.e.,frightened];butwhatyou havetofearinarepublicangovernmentlikeours...islargemassesof uneducated,ignorantpeople.”31

AlthoughGoulddidnotspecificallymentiontheeventsofJuly1877 inhistestimony,therecouldbenodoubtthatthiswaswhathewasreferringto.OnJuly16,1877,firemenandbrakemanworkingforthe Baltimore&OhioRailroadinMartinsburg,WestVirginia,onbeing informedthattheirwageswerebeingreducedby10percent,walked offtheirjobs.TheWestVirginiamilitia,deployedtokeeptrafficmoving,joinedthestrikers.ThestrikequicklyspreadtoBaltimoreandon toeverymajoranddozensofminorrailroadhubsacrossthecountry.

Thiswasthebeginningphaseinlabor’sprotestagainstthelawsof industrialcapitalismthatindicatedwagecutsastheantidotetodepressedproﬁts.In1883,theyearthatGouldtestiﬁedbeforetheSenate committeeinvestigatingtherelationsbetweenlaborandcapital,the BrotherhoodofTelegraphersstruckhisWesternUnionTelegraph Company.In1885and1886,KnightsofLaborlocalsledstrikesagainst hisrailroadlinesintheSouthwest.Alsoin1886,therewerewalkoutsin thePennsylvaniacoalmines,attheMcCormickreaperworksinChicago,andonNewYork’sstreetcars.OnMay1,1886,advocatesforthe eight-hourdayledstrikesandprotestsinseveraldifferentcities.In

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Chicagothedemonstrationsexplodedintoviolencewhenabombwent offinHaymarketSquare.

Thebusinesseliteswereuniversallyfrightenedandappalledatthe determination—andthetactics—ofstrikingworkersandtheirunions. Therewas,however,littleagreementonwhatshouldbedone.Whilea fewofthemultimillionairebusinessmen,notablyJohnD.Rockefeller andHenryFrick,wereopposedtorecognizinganylabororganizations, mostwereunsurewhetherornottonegotiatewiththem.Wereorganizedtradesunionsgoingtomakeiteasierormoredifﬁculttomanage largeanddiverselaborforces?Wouldtherebemoreorfewerwork stoppagesifunionleadersnegotiatedwrittencontractswhichthey mightthenbeobligatedtoenforce?Thesequestionsremainedasyet unanswered.WhenaskedbytheSenateinvestigatingcommitteein 1883whetherhethought“thelaborunionsofthecountryareaninjury orabeneﬁttothelaborersandthecountrygenerally,”Gouldweakly responded,“Well,Icannotsayaboutthat.”Hesupportedtheattempt ofworkerstoorganizethemselvesintomutualaidsocieties,butopposedthenotionthattheywereentitledtoberepresentedbyunionsin negotiatingwagerates,because,asheremindedthesenators,theprice of“labor,likeeverythingelse,isregulatedbythelawofsupplyand demand.”32

AndrewCarnegietookadifferentposition.In1886,ayearinwhich over1,400workstoppagesoccurredinvolvingover400,000workers, Carnegiedeliveredtworatherstrikinglypro-unionarticlesto Forum. Inthefirst,publishedinApriljustbeforetheeight-hour-daystrikes andtheHaymarketbombing,hedeclaredhimselfresolutelyinfavor ofthe“rightoftheworking-mentocombineandformtrades-unions,” arightheconsidered“nolesssacredthantherightofthemanufacturer toenterintoassociationsandconferenceswithhisfellows.”33 Four monthslater,aftertheeventsinChicago,Carnegiepublishedafollowuppieceinwhichhenotonlyreaffirmedhispositionontradesunions butalsospecificallydefendedtherighttostrikeoftherailwayworkers

onGould’sWabashsystemandthestreetcaroperatorsontheThird AvenueRailwayinNewYorkCity.34

Responsibleunionsandtheirleaders,Carnegiebelieved,notonly providedacheckonunscrupulousemployerswhocontravenedeconomiclawsbysettingwageratestoolow,butalso,andmoreimportant,providedacheckontheirownmembers.“Trades-unionsmust,in theirverynature,becomemoreconservativethanthemassofthemen theyrepresent,”heobserved.“Iftheyfailtobeconservative,theygo topieces.”Carnegiehadnothingbutpraiseforunionleaderswho,like TerencePowderly,MasterWorkmanoftheKnightsofLabor,intervenedtoavertstrikes“againstthewishesofthelessintelligentmembersof[the]organization.”35

NowhereinCarnegie’s1886articlewastherementionofanyrole thestateorfederalgovernmentmightplayinresolvinglabordisputes. ForCarnegie,Gould,andtheirfellowGildedAgemillionaires,disputesbetweenlaborandcapitalwereeconomicissues,pureandsimple. Thelawsofsupplyanddemandwhichdeterminedwagerateswereinviolate.Onlywhenworkersattemptedtointerferewiththeselawsby striking,andthenviolentlypreventing“scabs”fromtakingtheirjobs andthreateningprivateproperty,didthestatehavetheright—andthe obligation—tointervene.Onthispointtherewasuniversalagreement amongthenation’selites.

Inthewakeofthe1877generalstrikeandthenagain,thoughtoa lesserdegree,in1886,oldwealthandnew,manufacturers,merchants, andbankers,allcalledontheirelectedofﬁcialstoconstructnewarmories,equipandtrainmilitiasand“nationalguards,”andrebuildthe armythathadbeendecommissionedattheendoftheCivilWar. ThomasScott,whosePennsylvaniaRailroadhadsufferedperhapsthe greatestpropertylossin1877,suggestedthattroopsbegarrisonedin thosecitieswhichmightinthefuturebethesitesofstrikeactivity.36 In NewYorkCity,wheretherehadbeennomajorstrikesduring1877, businessmenresponded,nonetheless,towhattheyperceivedtobea

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threatofviolencebycallingforpreemptivemilitaryaction.When fundsweresolicitedtobuildanewarmorytohouseanexpandedmilitia,evenJuniusS.Morgan,Pierpont’sfather,safelyensconcedinhis Londonofﬁce,feltobligedtocontribute$500.37

Thebusinessmenwhoarguedforenhancedpolicepowerstobreak strikesdidnot,indoingso,believethattheyhadtrampledonwhat theystillregardedastheinviolableseparationbetweenthepoliticaland economicrealms.Theyhadcalledonthestatetoprotectprivateproperty,nottointerfereintheworkingsoftheeconomy.

Havingrefortifiedthestateand,thoughtheywouldhavedeniedit, extendedthedefinitionofitsrightfulpolicepowers,thebusinesselites hadeffectivelydefusedamajorsourceofopposition.Withtheassistanceofthepolice,thestatemilitia,andthearmy,theyhadmaintained orderattheirworkplaces.Theywouldsimilarlysucceedinturning backathreatenedworkingman’sinsurgencyatthenation’spolling placesthatemergedintheaftermathofthe1886strikes.Inthatyear alone,workingmen’spartiescameclosetoelectingmayorsinNew YorkCityandChicagoandsucceededindoingsoinMilwaukeeand severalsmallercities,fromRutland,Vermont,toRendville,Ohio.38 Eveninthosecitiesandstateswheretherewerethegreatestconcentrationsoforganizedworkers,theworkingmen’spartiesquicklycameup againsttheirrefutabledemographicfactthatthereweresimplynot enoughworkerswhoidentifiedpoliticallyasworkingmentocontrol thestatehousesorexerciseanygreatinfluenceinnationalpolitics.In coalitionwithotherpoliticalradicals,labormighthaveplayedalarger roleinGildedAgepolitics,butthecultural,political,ethnic,religious, regional,andsocialdifferencesthatseparatedtheorganizedworkingmenfromoneanother—andfromtheirpotentialmiddle-classand agrarianallies—weretoogreattoovercome,especiallygiventhestructureoftheAmericanpoliticalsystemandthedominanceofthetwo majorpartieswithinit.

TheelitebusinessmenoftheGildedAgehadfarmoretofear,as theysoondiscovered,fromtheagrarians,who,ifinitiallyneitherasvi-

olentnorasvocalintheiroppositiontocapitalasthestrikingworkers, wereeverybitasdedicatedtocircumscribingitspower.Mostofthe nation’smanufacturingwas,inthe1880sand1890s,containedwithina narrowbeltthatextendedfromNewEnglandsouththroughPennsylvaniaandwestthroughOhioandpartsoftheupperMidwest.Outside thismanufacturingbeltalargeandincreasinglyvocalsegmentofthe populationintheprairieandsouthernstateswasconvincedthatitwas beingrobbedofitsrightfulshareofthenation’snewfoundwealthby easterncapitalistswhocontrolledthenation’srailroadsandsetits monetarypolicy.

Itwasthese“agrarians,”organizedintowhatbecameknownasthe Grangeorthegrangermovementinthe1870sand1880s,andthereafter theNationalAlliancesandthePeople’sParty,whoposedthegreatest challengetothebusinesselites.Unliketheindustrialworkers,the agrarianshadsufﬁcientvotesinthestatehousesandinCongressto translatetheirsuspicionsofcapitalintolegislationdesignedtoreinin itsmanifestpowers.

Theagrarians’chiefconcernswerewiththerailroadofﬁcials,who, theybelieved,wereoverchargingthem,andtheupholdersofthegold standard,whoweretakingmoneyfromtheirpocketsbydeﬂatingcommodityprices.Whilethequestionofthegoldstandardwould,aswe shallsee,beeffectivelyremovedfromthepoliticalagendainthelate 1870s,thequestionofrailroadrateswoulddominatetheprairiestate legislaturesthroughoutthe1870sandintothe1880s.

Theissueofrailroadregulationwas,infact,theTrojanhorsewith whichthepoliticianswouldbreachthewallsprotectingtheeconomy fromtheirinterference.Ascorporationscharteredbythestates,funded bythemandbyCongress,andchargedwithmovingthemailsinpeacetimeandthetroopsinwartime,therailroadsweretiedtogovernmentinamannerquitedifferentfromotherbigbusinesses.JayGould acknowledgedasmuchinhis1883testimonybeforetheSenateinvestigatingcommittee.Therewasa“greatdifference,”headmitted,betweenbusinesses,liketherailroads,whichhadsoughtstateincor-

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porationandthosethathadremainedpurely“private.”“Corporate property,”Gouldinsisted,had“dutiestothepublic”whichprivate propertydidnot.39

Thegrangerstatelegislators,insteadofregulatingtherailroadsdirectly,organizedstatecommissionstooverseethem,followingtheearlierexampleoftheNewEnglandlegislatures.Unlikethe“weak”New Englandcommissions,however,whichdidlittlemorethancollectdata andpublicizeabuses,the“strong”prairiestatecommissionswereexplicitlyauthorizedtosetmaximumratesforpassengersandfreight.

Therailroaddirectorsfoughtbackbyunilaterallydeclaringthenew railroadcommissionsunconstitutionalandrefusingtoobeythemuntil thecourtshadexplicitlydirectedthemtodoso.Whenthestatecourts ruledinfavorofthecommissions,thedirectorstooktheircasestothe SupremeCourt,which,in Munnv.Illinois, alsofoundinfavorofthe legislatures’righttoorganizeregulatorycommissions.

Thecourtshavingfailedthem,therailroaddirectorsrecognizedthat theyhadnochoicenowbuttoenterthepoliticalarenatoprotecttheir investmentsfromwhattheybelievedwasimproperinterference.They usedeveryweaponintheirconsiderablearsenalstopressurethestate legislaturestoceasetheirattemptstoregulaterailroadrates.Theyreducedserviceonroadstheyclaimedwerenolongerproﬁtable;they hiredwritersandbribednewspapereditorstopublishanti-commission articlesandeditorials;theyrecruitedandfundedcandidatesfavorable totheircausetoreplacethosewhoopposedthem;andtheythreatened topunishstateswithstrongregulatorycommissionsbywithdrawing investmentcapitalandceasinganynewconstruction.

Intheend,itwastheirthreattoceaseinvestingcapitalandbuilding newlines,therebyleavingun-servedcities,towns,andruralcitiesforeverisolated,thatproveddecisive.Althoughtherailroadsfailedtoget theprairiestatecommissionlawsrepealedorthecommissionsabolished,by1880theyhadsucceededinpressuringthelegislatorsinthe fourstateswith“strong”commissionstostripthecommissionersof theirauthoritytosetrates.“Onlyhollowoversightcommissionswere

left,”observesGeraldBerk,“empowered,like[theNewEnglandcommissions,todonomorethan]collectanddisseminatedataandpublicizethemostegregiousofrailabuses.”40

Therailroaddirectorshad,inthecourseoftheircampaignagainst theregulatorycommissions,learnedavaluablelesson.Whileitmight nolongerbepossibletopreventstatelegislatorsfrominterveningin economicmatters,itwaspossibletominimizethedamagetheymight do.Popularanimusagainsttherailroadswastoogreatforthepoliticianstoignore,butthatanimuscouldbecontained.“Weak”regulatory commissionswereamosteffectiveantidotetodemocraticruleby electedstateofﬁcials.ChaunceyDepew,whowascounseltoWilliam VanderbiltandtheNewYorkCentralRailroadfrom1875to1883,recalledinhismemoirsthat,whileoriginallyanopponentofthecommissions,hehadbecome“convincedoftheirnecessity ...It seemedto methatitwaseitheracommissionorgovernmentownership,andthat thecommission,ifstrengthenedasajudicialbody,wouldbeasmuch ofaprotectiontothebondandstockholdersandtheinvestingpublic astothegeneralpublicandtheemployees.”Thekeywordherewas “judicial.”Aslongasthecommissionswereisolatedfromthepressures heapedonlegislatorsbyarailroad-hatingpublic,theymightfunction aseffectivebarrierstopoliticalinterference.41

Bythelate1870s,thefocusofthepoliticalcampaignforrailroad regulationhadbeguntomovefromthestatelegislaturestoCongress.Billsmandatingfederalrailroadregulationwereintroduced— withconsiderablesupportfromprairiestatecongressmen—onseveral occasionsfrom1874to1886,onlytobekilledintheSenateorbottled upinconferencecommittees.Theﬁnalimpetustowardpassagecamein October1886,whentheSupremeCourteffectivelyoverturned Munnv. Illinois anddeclaredthatstatecommissionscouldnolongerregulate ratesontripsthatbeganorendedbeyondtheirborders.Withstate regulationnowrenderedunconstitutional,thedemandforfederalregulationintensiﬁed,andthepoliticalbattlegroundshiftedpermanently fromthestatelegislaturestoCongress.

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Intheprairiestatelegislatures,therailroads’principalopponents hadbeenfarmersandlocalmerchantswhosupportedtheregulatory commissions.InCongress,thegreatestthreatwouldcomefromother businessinterests,particularlythoseinthemanufacturingsector.Once thewallbetweenthepoliticalandeconomicsphereshadbeenbreached bytheestablishmentofstateregulatorycommissions—and,bythe mid-1880s,theacceptanceoftheinevitabilityofsomesortoffederal regulation—eachregionalandsectoralbusinessgroupwascompelled toenterthepoliticalarenatoprotectitsparticularinterests.

Bythelate1880s,theSenatewasalreadyknownasthe“Millionaires’Club”inrecognitionofthemanybusinessmenwhoservedthere, inlargeparttoprotecttheinterestsoftheirregionsand/orsectors.

SenatorHenryPayneofOhio,thefatheroftheStandardOiltreasurer, lookedafterStandardOil;SenatorLelandStanford,adirectorofthe UnionPaciﬁc,protectedhisrailroad’sinvestmentsontheWestCoast; andSenatorsJamesFairandJohnJonesofNevadaprotectedthemininginterestsoftheirstate.

Thealmostblatantdisregardoflargerclassinterestswasinsharp contrasttothesituationinEurope,where,asThomasMcCrawhas written,“politicalbattlesduringthelatenineteenthcenturypitteda fairlyunitedbusinesscommunityagainstapowerfullabormovement. InAmerica,bycontrast,themostconspicuouspoliticalwarfareofthat timematched onegroupofbusinessmenagainstanother: carriersversus shippers,commodityfarmersversusmortgagebankers,smallwholesalersandshopkeepersagainstlargeﬁrms.”42

Whentheglovescameoff,theseintra-classbattlescouldturnas vitriolicandpotentiallyviolentasthedisputesbetweencapitalandlabor.In1889,inanaddresstothePennsylvaniastatelegislatureinHarrisburg,withthegovernorpresiding,AndrewCarnegieattackedthe PennsylvaniaRailroadforextortingmoneyfromthepeopleofthe state,especiallythoseinthewest,bychargingPittsburghmanufacturerstwicetheratesthatChicagoandmidwesternindustrialistshadto pay.Inlanguageasprovocativeasthatusedbyanylabormilitants,

Carnegie,claimingthathewasspeakingfor“thegreatarmyoflabor” whoselivelihoodwasimperiledbythePennsylvaniaRailroad,recalled thatduringtheCivilWartheworkingpeopleofPittsburghhadtaken tothestreetstopreventgunsbeingshippedsouth.“Theydidthisin theinterestofthenation.Aretheytobeforcedintoasimilarprotest againstthePennsylvaniaRailroadCompanycarryingsuppliespast Pittsburghfurnacestofurnacesinotherstatesupontermstheyrefuse us?”Thethreatwasclear.Unlesstherailroadreducedtheratesit chargedtoshipcokefromsouthwesternPennsylvaniaintoPittsburgh, Carnegiewouldcallonhisworkerstoblockshipmentsthroughthe citytomanufactoriesfartherwest.“Isittobeexpectedthat,ifweare compelledtocloseourworksinconsequenceoftherailwaydiscriminationsIhavecited,ourmenwillstandcalmlylookingonandsee OhioandChicagofurnacesfedwhileoursareidle?”43 Toeliminatethe threatofviolence,whichhehadcalledintobeing,Carnegieaskedthe statelegislaturetoestablisha“strong”commissiontoregulaterailroad rates.

Noteverymanufacturer,ofcourse,agreedwithCarnegiethatthe railroadsneededregulating.JohnD.Rockefeller,forexample,whose StandardOilCompanyprofitedenormouslyfromrebates,opposed givinganInterstateCommerceCommissiontheauthoritytoeliminate them.HisrepresentativeintheSenate,HenryPayne,votedagainstthe finalbillbecauseitoutlawedrebates.44 BythetimeCongress,afterextensivedebateandlobbyingbyawidevarietyofbusinessgroups, passedanInterstateCommerceActin1887,thatactwassocompromisedbyinconsistenciesandambiguitiesthatitwouldtakethenew commissionersseveralyearstofigureoutpreciselywhattheyhadbeen authorizedtodo.

Thebusinesselites,havingestablishedtheirfootholdinCongress, foughtwithoneanothernotonlyaboutregulatorypoliciesbutalso abouttariffs.Asonrailroadregulation,eachsectorandregionpursued itsown,veryparticularinterests.Merchantsfavoredlowtariffs,the manufacturershighones,andthefarmerstariffsonwheatbutfree

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tradeformanufacturedgoods.“Theconflictovertariffs,”SvenBeckert haswritten,“pointed ...tothe enormousaccessofveryspecific‘interests’tothepoliticaldecision-makingprocess.”Thefinaltariffbills wereendlesslycomplicatedwith“hundredsofamendments,favoring thisorthatspecificindustryorcompany.”The1894billcontained morethansixhundredamendments.45

Therewas,itappeared,onlyoneissueonwhichallthebusinessinterestscouldagree,andthatwasonthenecessityofmaintainingthe goldstandardagainstthosewhowantedtoinﬂatethecurrencybycoiningsilver.Thosewhoheldlargeamountsofcapital,nomatterhowor whereithadbeenaccumulated,didnotwantthevalueofthatcapital dilutedbyinﬂation;thosewhoboughtandsoldsecuritiesinEurope (andthatincludedmostmajorbankers,merchants,manufacturers,and railroaddirectors)fearedthatanunstabledollar,notbackedbyand convertibletogold,wouldbedisastrousforbusiness.

ThegoldstandardproponentsevokedSpencerianevolutionarylaws byassertingthatgoldwastheonly“natural”currency.Allothercurrencieswereartificialbecausetheyweremanmadeandtheirvaluespoliticallyassigned.“Government-mademoneystoodinconflictwith nature’screationoftruemonetaryvalue,”notesGretchenRitter,summarizingthecasemadebythe“goldbugs.”Thevalueofagolddollar, oradollarbackedbygold,remainedsteadybecauseitsworthwasdeterminedbythe“bullionwithinitandnotthegovernmentstamp affixedtoit.”46

Thecurrencyquestionwassovolatile,soregionallyinﬂected,and sodestructivetopartyunitythatamajorityofDemocraticandRepublicanmembersoftheHousevotedtoafﬁrm,overPresidentHayes’s veto,the1878Bland-AllisonAct,which,bymakingsilverlegaltender butlimitingtheamountthegovernmentcouldpurchase,boughtpoliticalpeaceforalmostadecade.Removingthecurrencyquestionfrom thepoliticalarenawasintheinterestofbusinessmenofbothparties whowereagreedthatneitherthepeoplenortheirelectedrepresentativesshouldhaveanyroleinsettingmonetarypolicy.AsJames 142

Garﬁeldhadexplainedinaspeechdeliveredin1878andlaterpublished inpamphletform,therewas“ahigherlawabovelegislation—thelaw ofsupplyanddemand—pervadingandcoveringall,”anditalone shoulddeterminetheshapeandvalueofthenation’scurrency.“No menarewiseenoughtodoit[regulatecurrency],andiftheywere, dareyoutrustsodelicateathingasthattothepartisanvotesinSenate andHouse?IfyouhavesomuchfaithasthatinCongress,yourfaith exceedsmine.”47

Thefactthatthemajorpartieswereabletotakecurrencyquestions temporarilyoffthepoliticalagendawiththepassageofBland-Allison in1878didnotmeanthatthosequestionswerenotdiscussedelsewhere—inarticles,pamphlets,andbytheseveralminorpartiesthat advocatedgovernmentissuanceofgreenbacksorfreesilveraslegal currency.Whiletheagitationfortheissuanceofgreenbacksorgovernment-issued“ﬁat”moneyhadbeeneffectivelysilencedbythe1880s, thequestionofsilverremainedofvitalimportance,especiallyinthe agrarianWestandSouth,whichhadsufferedfromthefallincommoditypricesthatfollowedthepostwarshrinkageofthemoneysupplyand thereturntothegoldstandard.

In1889–90,asRichardHofstadterremindsusin TheAgeofReform, “sixnewWesternstateswithstrongsilvermovements—Idaho, Montana,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Washington,andWyoming— wereadmittedtotheUnion,expandingconsiderablythesilverblocin theSenate.”48 TheresultwasthepassageofaSilverPurchaseActin 1890whicheffectivelyoverturnedBland-Allisonandmandatedthatthe Treasurybuy4.5millionouncesofsilveramonth.

Businessmeneverywherewereoutragedatwhattheyregardedas blatantpoliticalinterferenceineconomicaffairs.ThefactthatRepublicanshadvotedforthebillwasparticularlymaddening.“Theideaof reintroducingsilvercurrency”was,forJ.P.Morgan,JeanStrousehas written,“aboutaswelcomeasabiblicalplague.”49 AndrewCarnegie, theself-appointedvoiceofthenewbusinesselites,tookpeninhandto educatethepeopleandtheirelectedrepresentativeson“TheABCof

Money”andtheparamountimportanceofmaintainingthegoldstandard:“Inthenextpresidentialcampaign,ifIhavetovoteforamanin favourofsilverandprotection,orforamaninfavourofthegoldstandardandfreetrade,Ishallvoteandworkforthelatter,becausemy judgmenttellsmethateventhetariffisnothalfsoimportantforthe goodofthecountryasthemaintenanceofthehigheststandardforthe moneyofthepeople.”50

Carnegieandhisfellowmillionairebusinessmenhad,bytheearly 1890s,becomemoreandmoredisturbedatthefederalgovernment’s headlongrushintoeconomicmatterstheybelievedithadneitherthe rightnorthewisdomtointerferewith.TheSilverPurchaseActwasa giantstepinthisdirection;sotoowasthepassagethatsameyear,1890, ofanAntitrustActwhichwasdesigned,thecapitalistsfeared,toturn backtheevolutionaryclockandimpedeprogressbyinterferingwith whatCarnegiecalledthe“lawofaggregation.”Thecombinationof smallerfirmsintolargerones,Carnegieargued,followingHerbert Spencer,benefitedsocietybygeneratingefficienciesofproductionthat resultedincheapergoods:“Iftherebeinhumanhistory,onetruth clearerandmoreindisputablethananother,itisthatthecheapeningof articles... insurestheirmoregeneraldistribution,andisoneofthe mostpotentfactorsinrefiningandliftingapeople,andinaddingtoits happiness.”Hecontinued:“Everyenlargement[ofthescaleofproduction]isanimprovement,stepbystep,uponwhathaspreceded.It makesforhighercivilization,fortheenrichmentofhumanlife,notfor one,butforallclassesofmen.”Therewasnothingwrongwithbusinessesgrowingbiggerandbigger.Onthecontrary,“thelawofaggregation”dictatedthatsuchgrowthwasnotjustinevitablebutapositive good.51

TheGildedAgemillionaires’rhetoricaladherencetothedoctrine ofthe“survivaloftheﬁttest,”ﬁrstarticulatedbySpencerandseized uponbyagenerationofbusinessmen,wasnot,ashasbeensooften andsomistakenlyimplied,acommitmenttocompetition.Itwasrather acelebrationofthefruitsofsuchcompetition:bigness,monopoly,

andtrusts.Theﬁttestﬁrmsandbusinessmenhadsurvivedbecausethey hadbested,theneliminated,theircompetition.Thiswasevolutionary progressinitspurestform.Whenthepoliticians,blindedbyanideologicalabhorrenceofmonopolyandbigness,interferedwiththelawof aggregationtoprotectthevanquishedfromdefeatandextinction,they interferedwithevolutionaryprogress.

In1893,lessthanthreeyearsafterthepassageoftheSilverPurchase ActandtheAntitrustAct,thenationwasplungedintoaneconomic depressionwhichthebusinesseliteswerequicktoblameonlegislative meddling.Leftalone,withoutanymonetaryorantitrustlegislation,the economywouldhavefollowedthe“lawofaggregation.”Smaller, weakerfirmswouldhavebeenforcedoutofbusinessor“consolidated” intolargerones.Theendproductwouldhavebeengreaterefficiencies andeconomiesofproduction,lowerprices,andgeneralizedprosperity. Thepoliticianshad,ininterferingwiththenaturalworkingsofthe economy,checkedthemovementtowardconsolidation(throughthe AntitrustAct),inflatedthecurrency(withtheSilverPurchaseAct), andcreatedanenvironmentinwhichunfitbusinessesandbusinessmen wereencouragedtocompeteinthemarketplace.This,thecapitalists wereconvinced,hadledtooverproductionanditsinevitablebyproduct,depression.52

Togettheeconomybackontrack,thebusinessmenhadtofind somewayofreversingwhatappearedtobeagrowingsentimentthat Congressshoulddeterminemonetaryandeconomicpolicy.Although boththeSilverPurchaseandAntitrustbillshadbeensponsoredbya Republicansenator,JohnShermanofOhio,andpassedbybipartisan coalitions,theyembodied—albeitincompromisedform—agrariandemandsthatthefederalgovernmentplayanactiveroleintheeconomy. Worseyet,therehadappearedonthehorizonanewpoliticalparty,the People’sPartyorPopulists,whichhadasitsraisond’êtrebringinginto thepoliticalarenaagrariandemandsforadecentralized(andtherefore inflationary)bankingsystem,tighterantitrustlegislation,andthefree coinageofsilver.ThePopulists,intheirfirstelection,in1892,had

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polledoveramillionvotesfortheirpresidentialcandidateandelected thirteencongressmen,twosenators,andthreegovernors.“Business leadersfromthroughoutthenationandfromeverysphereofenterprise,”JamesLivingstonhaswritten,“realizedthatunlesstheyentered andalteredthemainstreamofpoliticaldiscourseoneconomicquestions,”monetaryinﬂationandfreecompetition“wouldbecomegovernmentpolicy.”53

WhentheagrarianactivistswhohadalreadyformedtheirownPopulistPartytookovertheDemocraticPartyandnominatedWilliam JenningsBryanofNebraskaonafreesilverplatform,thediewascast. Bryan—andtheDemocraticplatform—madeitclearthat,ifelected, heintendedtoextendthepoliticalrealmtoencompasseconomicpolicy makingthathadoncebeenexcludedfromit:“Wesayinourplatform webelievethattherighttocoinandissuemoneyisafunctionofgovernment.”54 TheplatformalsomadeexplicittheBryanDemocrats’intentiontoenlarge“thepowersoftheInterstateCommerceCommission”andprovideforregulationofthe“railroadsaswillprotectthe peoplefromrobberyandoppression.”TherewerealsoplanksdenouncingRepublicantariffpolicyforenriching“thefewattheexpense ofthemany”andpledgingreform.55

ThenominationofBryanonsuchaplatformforcedthebusiness elitestolookpasttheirsectoralandregionaldifferencesandunitebehindtheRepublicancandidate,WilliamMcKinley,whostoodforthe goldstandardandwhosecampaignwasorganizedbytheOhioindustrialistMarkHanna.Theeconomiceliteshad,inthepast,beenmore likelytosupportRepublicansthanDemocrats,buttheyhadmanaged togetalongquitewellwithGroverCleveland,whohadbeeninstrumentalinrepealingtheSilverPurchaseActin1893.Regrettablyforthe businessmen,theDemocraticPartyofGroverClevelandwasnomore.

Themobilizationofthebusinesselites—andtheiravailableresources—todefeatBryanandtheDemocratsin1896wasunlikeanythingthathadprecededitinAmericanpolitics.MarkHannawasable toraiseanastonishingamountofmoneyfromthebusinesscommunity.

J.P.Morganwasanearlycontributortothecampaign.StandardOil gave$250,000andRockefelleranother$2,500ofhisownmoney.CarnegienotonlycontributedmorethaneverbeforetoapresidentialcampaignbutalsograntedHannapermissiontoreprinthisprimeronhard moneyasacampaignpamphlet.“Itrequiredbutamomentforus,” Hannawrote,“toseethattheleaﬂetwasadmirablycalculatedtomake themoneyissueofthiscampaigncleartothesimplestmind.Wethereforeprintedandhavecirculatedmorethan5,000,000copiesofthe leaﬂet.”56

Theclasscoalitionthatformedtoprotecttheeconomy—andfuture prosperity—fromtheravagesofsilvercontinuedinplaceevenafter thedefeatofBryanin1896.Withtheexceptionofthewesternsilver interests,businessmenfromeveryregionandeverysectorremained unitednotonlyagainstfreesilverbutinoppositionaswelltoadecentralizedbankingsystemwhich,theybelieved,wouldbestructurallybiasedtowardtheoverextensionofcredit.

Thisisnottheplacetodiscussthemovementforbankingreformin anydetail.Sufﬁceittosaythatnomobilizationofbusinesseliteshad everbeenasbroadorasdeeporaspersistentastheoneassembledin theNewYorkReformClub’scurrencycommittee,theSoundMoney CommitteesattachedtocityandstateChambersofCommerce,the businessmen’sclubsandassociationsformedtosupportandfundthe McKinleycampaign,andtheNationalSoundMoneyLeague,which wascharteredin1896tocarryonthecampaign“fornationalhonor andsoundmoney”afterMcKinley’svictory.57

3 Theclassmobilizationthatoccurredaroundthedefenseofthe goldstandardwascriticallyimportantbecauseitcementedthepolitical strategythatwouldcarrythebusinesselitesintotheProgressiveEra andthetwentiethcentury.Thebusinesseliteshaddiscoveredthatthe bestwaytoprotecttheeconomicrealmfrompoliticalinterferencewas tocircumscribedemocracy.Whiletheyhadcometorecognizethat therewasnowaytowallofftheeconomicrealmcompletelyfromthe

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political,theyhadlearnedthatitwaspossibletoinsulateitfromelectoralpolitics.Thedefangedstateregulatorycommissionshadbeena ﬁrststepinthisdirection—andacriticalone.Theremovalofthesilver questionfromthepoliticalagenda,withthedefeatofBryanandthe Democratsin1896andthenagainin1900,wasevenmoreimportant.

ThebusinesseliteshadbeenabletoturnbackthePopulistthreatby outsizedfundingoftheircandidatesandtheirmessagesand,asimportant,bylaunchingapreemptiveideologicalattackonthenotion,so centraltothePopulists,thatinademocracy,thepeople,throughtheir electedrepresentatives,hadnotonlytherightbuttheobligationtodetermineeconomicandmonetarypolicies.Theeconomicrealm,asHerbertSpencer,andbeforehimAdamSmith,hadtaughtthebusinessmen, andthebusinessmennowattemptedtoteachthenation,wasself-regulatingandself-correcting.Ithadtobeleftalonetoobeyitsownevolutionarylaws,notthoseofthepoliticians.Democracyhaditslimits,beyondwhichvotersandtheirelectedrepresentativesdarednottrespass lesteconomiccalamitybefallthenation.

TheAbortiveRuleofBigMoney

ALANDAWLEY

Inanoft-quotedexchange,F.ScottFitzgeraldandErnestHemingwayarguedovertheplaceofbigmoneyinAmericansociety.“Letme tellyousomethingabouttheveryrich,”Fitzgeraldwrote.“Theyare differentfromyouandme.”“Yes,”repliedHemingway,“theyhave moremoney.”1 ThislittledebatespeaksvolumesaboutclassinAmerica.Inaproudlydemocraticsociety,theveryrichhavenochanceof everacquiringalordlymystique.Andyettheyenjoypowersandprivilegesthataretheenvyofkings.

Thedebateaboutclasswasplayedoutinthepageantofeventsfrom 1896to1932,aperiodwhichdeservestobecalledtheEraofBig Money.2 AsiftoshakeoffHemingway’scurse,GildedAgecaptainsof industrysetouttotransformthemselvesfrommeremoney-grubbers intoparagonsofsocietyenjoyingallthedignityandperquisitesofan upperclass.Notcontenttorestthere,thegoldendynastiesofthe Rockefellers,Morgans,andAldrichesalsosoughttoacquireamonopolyonpoliticalpower.Althoughdemocraticsensibilitieswouldnot permituseoftheterm“rulingclass,”thenewgenerationofwealthy

familieslinkedtoindustrialandﬁnancialcorporationssoughttobend thedestinyoftheircountrytothewilloftheirclass.3

Needlesstosay,thisprojectrancountertoestablisheddemocratic traditions.Strugglesagainstaristocraticprivilegeatthetimeofthe AmericanRevolutionandagainstslavemastersduringtheCivilWar hadcombinedwithegalitarianhabitsineverydaylifetoproducedeep hostilitytoruleby“therich,thewell-born,andtheable,”inAlexander Hamilton’sfamousphrase.Bytheendofthenineteenthcentury,there wastoomuchdemocraticballastintheAmericanshipofstate—democraticideology,culturalpluralism,popularparticipation—toallow captainsofindustrytosteertheshipwherevertheywanted.Moreover, thefactthatbothmajorparties,RepublicanandDemocratic,were loosecollectionsofinterestsandbeliefsthatcutacrossclasslines(unlikethetypicalclass-basedpartiesofEurope)meantthatpoliticalleadershadtohobnobwiththehoipolloi.

Partlybecauseofthesedemocraticchecks,theattemptatclassrule turnedouttobeafailure.Butforanyoneseekinganexplanationin termsoftheimpossibilityofarulingclassevertakingcommandin supposedlyclasslessAmerica,therearesomesurprisesinstore.4 Onthe eveoftheCrashof’29,itappearedthatdemocratictraditionswereinsufficientbythemselvestoblockrulebytherich.Intheend,whatmay havekeptbigmoneyincheckwastheworkingsofAmericancapitalismitself:economicinstability,innerconflictsamongelites,andan obsessionwithprofitattheexpenseofsocialresponsibility.

Plutocracy

Changesunderwayattheendofthenineteenthcenturypointedtowardtheconsolidationofanationalupperclasswithonefootplanted inWallStreetandtheotherinWashington.Inanydescriptionofthis newclassformation,theﬁrstthingtonoteisthecentralplaceofbig business.BeginningintheGildedAgewithgiantcombinessuchas 150 AlanDawley

JohnD.Rockefeller’sStandardOilandAndrewCarnegie’ssteelempire,thetrendtowardconcentrationofownershipreceivedabigboost duringawaveofbusinessmergersaroundtheturnofthecentury, cappedbytheformationoftheUnitedStatesSteelCorporationin 1901,theworld’sfirstbillion-dollarenterprise.Thenewstructureof economicpowerthatcontemporariescalled“monopoly”andeconomistslatercalled“oligopoly”5 offeredunprecedentedopportunitiesfor theaccumulationofwealthintheeverydayprofitsthatpouredoutof blastfurnaces,oilwells,andmachineshopslikelavafromavolcano. Ontopofthatweretheprofitsfromthestockdeals,commissions,insurancecharges,andotherpurelyfinancialtransactionsthataccompaniedcorporateconsolidation.Henceforth,thefateofAmerica’supper classwastied,forgoodandforill,tothefortunesofthecorporate rich.

Theriseofcorporateandotherbureaucraticorganizationscreated hierarchiesofcommandwhoseupperlayerswereoccupiedbynew managerialandprofessionalelites.Oneexampleofthenewtypewas RaymondFosdick,apace-settingsocialengineerwhoswaminthe crèmedelacrème ofgovernmentandprivatefoundations.Thevery modelofthecosmopolitanprofessional,FosdickﬁrstgainedprominenceastheheadoftheCommissiononTrainingCampActivities duringWorldWarI,whereheappliedscientiﬁcmethodstothesuppressionofviceamongAmericantroops;helaterbecamedirectorof theRockefellerFoundation.6

Insettingouttotamethewildhorsesofthecompetitivemarketplace,managerslikeFosdickbroughtsomemeasureofdisciplinetothe workplaceandsometop-downcontroltoanunrulysociety.This,in turn,ledtoclaimsofa“managerialrevolution,”inwhichthecorporationwassaidtohavebroughtaboutthe“separationofownershipand control,”atransferofpowerfromshareholderstomanagers,andan all-importantshiftfromproﬁttoproductivityastheaimofbusiness enterprise.7 Underthebannerof“efﬁciency,”thenewbreedof“scien-

tiﬁcmanagers”werealsosupposedtohavecalledahalttotheviolent laborwarsthathaddisgracedAmericanindustrialrelationsinthe GildedAge.8

Thefacts,however,donotsupportthemanagerialclaim,andcertainlynotfora“revolution.”Theideathatcapitalistswereoverthrown bymanagersﬂiesinthefaceoftheevidencethatintheearlytwentieth centurythetopmostlayerofthecorporatehierarchyconsistedofownerswhotookthelion’sshareoftheircompensationinproﬁtsanddividends,notsalaries.Farfromoverthrowingtheownersofcorporate property,thebureaucratizationofbusinessopenednewchannelsfor theaccumulationofwealth.Andsincetheyservedatthepleasureof theowners,thenewcadresofcorporatemanagers,foralltheiraccomplishments,weretheservantsofpower,notthemasters.

Thispointstoadistinctionbetweenthe upperclass andthe elite that isimportanttoouranalysis.9 Eliteswerethosewhohadmovedtothe toprungsoftheladderofsuccessinlaw,education,politics,business, oranyotherﬁeld.Theywerethemoversandshakerswhosenamesappearedin Who’sWho. Theupperclass,bycontrast,wasthegroupof interconnectedfamiliesthatenjoyedsocialleadershipandculturalprestigeinsocietyatlarge.Theywerethefox-and-houndssetwithnames in TheSocialRegister. Itistruethatatthetopmostechelonsthetwo overlapped.10 Buttherequirementsforentryweredifferent.Forthe elites,thekeywaseducationalcredentialsandpersonalconnections, whileentrytotheupperclassrequiredblood,breeding,andmoney— themorethebetter.

Theturnto“financecapitalism”confirmstheimpactofbigmoney onupper-classformation.Thefactthattheworld’sfirstbillion-dollar corporationwasthehandiworkofJ.P.Morgan,thegreatestinvestmentbankerofhisday,pointstotheimportanceoffinanceinfurtheringindustrialconsolidation.Althoughtheextentoffinancialinfluence isindispute,11 contemporarieshadnodoubtaboutitsimpact.Fromone endofthepoliticalspectrum,DwightMoody,aWallStreetconservative,hailedtheroleoffinancein TheTruthabouttheTrusts, while,

fromtheother,LouisBrandeisadvocatedtrust-bustingin OtherPeople’sMoneyandHowtheBankersUseIt.12

ByallaccountsthepremierfinancierwasJ.PierpontMorgan.The oversized,cigar-chomping,autocraticMorganwastheperfecttarget forcartooncaricature,abloatedcapitalistabletomakeorbreakthousandsoflivelihoodsatthestrokeofapen.Inthe“RichMan’sPanic” of1907,forexample,newspapershadafielddayreportingonMorgan’sroleasakindofone-mancentralbankinrestoringorderto financialmarketsafterweeksofmountinglossesamongWallStreet firms.Inanefforttostopthehemorrhage,Morganputtogetheramultimillion-dollarrescuepackagefortwoinvestmenttruststeeteringon thebrinkofcollapse.Thepackageimposedassessmentsontheleading trustcompaniesinproportiontotheirassets.Theclimaxofthedrama camewhenMorgansummonedtheprincipalstohiselegantManhattan mansionforamidnightmeetinglongrememberedbythosewhowere there.Havinglockedthedoor,thegiantoffinancelaidawrittenversionofthepackageonthetableanddemandedthateveryonesignfor hisshare.“There’stheplace,”hesaidfirmly,“andhere’sthepen.” LegendhasitthatMorgan’sboldinterventionsingle-handedlyended thepanic,althoughthetimelyarrivalofalargeshipmentofgold aboardthe Lusitania alsogaveabigboosttobusinessconfidence.AnotherkeyelementofthepackageinvolvedanoffertohavetheUnited StatesSteelCorporationpurchasetheTennesseeCoalandIronCompanyfromasyndicateofinvestorstopreventthesyndicatefromgoingbelly-up.Itwasanotherdemonstrationoftheclosetiesbetween financeandindustry.13

ThecentralizationofﬁnanceinWallStreethadimportantconsequencesfortheupperclass.Itreducedonceproudcentersofmoneylending,suchasBostonandPhiladelphia,tomereprovinciallocales, anditdemotedtheirnotablestosecondrank.Ontheirwaydown,local worthiessuchastheHigginsons,Peabodys,andotherBostonBrahminscontributedtheirsharetothebloodlinesofthenewclass,asdid otherﬁrstfamilies—theWhartonsandBiddlesofPhiladelphiaandthe

nabobsofBaltimoreandCharleston.EventheoldKnickerbockerpatricians,whosedeclinewaslovinglychronicledinthenovelsofEdith Wharton,couldnotmaintaintheirstatusagainstthenewcorporate richnomatterhowbluetheirblood.Asaresultofthesethickening networksofpropertyandfamily,whathadformerlybeenacollection ofregionalfamilygroupingswasincreasinglyknittogetherinanationalupperclass.

Inthewondrousalchemyofinheritedwealth,thebasemetalof GildedAgegainswasbeingtransformedintogoldenpatrimonies. Shelteredfromthestormsofthecompetitivemarket,thegreatbaronialfamilies—theRockefellers,Harrimans,andMorgans—consolidatedtheirfortunesinmarriagealliancesthatwerethesocialcounterpartofinterlockingcorporatedirectorates.Fromtheperspectiveof HighSociety,ﬁndingtherightmateandgettingintotherightclubwas exactlywhatclasswasallabout.AccordingtoDixonWecter,aleading chroniclerofhigh-endAmericans,“agroupoffamilieswithacommonbackgroundandracialoriginbecomescohesive,andfortiﬁesitself bythejointsharingofsportsandsocialactivities,byfriendshipsand intermarriage.”14

SoitwaswiththemarriageofJohnD.Rockefeller,Jr.,andAbby Aldrich.TheweddinglinkedthedestiniesoftheRockefellers,formerlyofClevelandbutnowsettledinasumptuousﬁefdomnorthof NewYorkCity,tothoseoftheNelsonAldrichesofRhodeIsland, whosepatriarchsatintheSenaterepresentingNewEnglandBrahmins. InwhatbecameAmerica’spremierdynasty,thechildrenofthisprivilegedcouple,includingNelsonandDavid,wouldcarrythefamily traditionintonewarenasofpoliticsandphilanthropy.Meanwhile,anothermaritalliaisontiedtheRockefellerstotheMcCormicksofChicagoinamergerofoilmoneyandagriculturalmachinerythatlinked thewealthofthenation’sﬁrstandsecondcities.

Marriagealliancesrecruitednewtalenttotheupperclass.Takethe caseofBenjaminStrong,themostpowerfulbankerintheFederalReservesystem.Strongwasdescendedonhismother’ssidefromsuccess-

fulPresbyterianministersandphysicians,andonhisfather’ssidefrom NewEnglandPuritanswho,asthesayinggoes,“cametodogoodand stayedtodowell.”Blessedwiththesefavorableethnicandreligious networks,Stronggothismainchanceaftersettlingwithhisyoungwife andchildinEnglewood,NewJersey,wherefellowmembersofthe tennisclubincludedThomasLamontandotherpartnersintheHouse ofMorgan.SoonStrongwasbroughtintosucceedLamontassecretaryofBankersTrust,a“bankers’bank”establishedin1903with EdmundConverseaspresident.Afterhisﬁrstwifecommittedsuicide, Strongfoundthewaycleartomarrytheboss’sdaughter,Katherine Converse,thuscementinghispositionintheworldofhighﬁnanceand HighSocietyatthesametime.15

Aftertwoorthreegenerationsofheavylifting,bigmoneycould ﬁnallybegintorelax.AccordingtoWecter,“roughandpiratical grandfathershadseized[upper-class]realestate,laidoutitsrailroads, andprovidedforitstrust-funds.”16 Toensurethattheprogenyofthe corporaterichmadethebestcontacts,therewerehandsomeendowmentsforexclusivesocialclubs,poshﬁnishingschools,andIvyLeague universities.Meanwhile,thesesamemenandwomenofgrandestate werecreatingnewinstitutionsofsocialcontrol,layingoutmillionsto establishtheRussellSage,Rockefeller,andotherphilanthropicfoundations,justassocietydamesredirectedtheircharitableeffortsawayfrom old-stylecharityballstowardmoreprofessionalsettlementhousesand socialworkschools.17

Theycouldevenhaveagoodtime.Inthenever-endingroundof tribaldisplay,HighSocietysaileditsyachts,rodetohounds,attended theatricalgalas,andcameoutatdebutanteballs.Again,Wecterdetails thegoings-on:“Thesecondandthirdgenerations,relievedfromthe counting-houseandshop,nowbegintotravel,buybooksandpictures,learnabouthorsesandwine,andcultivatetheartofcharm.”AlthoughnooneeveraccusedJ.P.Morganofbeingcharming,hewasa gluttonforarttreasuresandﬁlledhisManhattanmansionwiththe trappingsofEuropeanhighculture.Thesettingwasdescribedbyan

awestruckMorganunderling:“Inoneroomwerelofty,magniﬁcent tapestrieshangingonthewalls,rareBiblesandilluminatedmanuscripts oftheMiddleAgesﬁllingthecases;inanother,thatcollectionofthe EarlyRenaissancemasters–Castagno,Ghirlandaio,Perugino,tomentiononlyafew.”18

Highculturehadtobedefendedagainstthebarbarians.Withmore thanawhiffofsnobbery,EmilyPostlaidoutprecisestandardsof etiquette,whileHenryDwightSedgwick,aPhiladelphiagentleman, wrote InPraiseofGentlemen tocelebrate“thelawofdecorum,the valueofform,theabidingpleasureinbeauty,theworthofmanners, style,dignity,andreticence.”19 Snobberyshadedoverintobigotry.To theold-linegatekeepersofpolitesociety,bigmoneywasnecessarybut notsufﬁcientforentry.Aproperpedigreewasrequired,too,preferably white,northernEuropean,andProtestant.Despitetheirwealth,the Guggenheims,Schiffs,andotherwealthyJewishfamilieswerenoteligible,norweretheKennedysandotherRomanCatholics.According tooneinsider,bigotrywasrampantinthebestclubs:“Britishracialism,BrahminBostoniananti-(Irish)Catholicism,anyoneofanumber ofpossibleanti-Semitisms,andthetraditionalAmericananti-blackracism.”Inblurringthedistinctionbetween“class”andthe“race”of white,northernEuropeanProtestants,bigotryactuallyundercutthe long-termvitalityoftheclassbykeepingouttalentedrecruitsfrom outsidethefold.20

Buildingonthickeningnetworksofpropertyandfamily,thecorporaterichmovedtoreconstructthestate.Fromtheturnofthecentury totheGreatDepression,leadingﬁguressetouttocreatenewpolitical institutionsandputthemunderupper-classsupervision.Althoughthe term“rulingclass”doesnotslideeasilyofftheAmericantongue,that isessentiallywhatsomeaspiredtobecome.Theyreceivedaheadstart withtheriseofthe“moneypower”intheGildedAge,culminatingin thesuccessfuleffortofMarkHannaandhiswealthycroniestomake WilliamMcKinleypresidentin1896.Havingassembledthelargest warchestinAmericanhistory,Hanna’sspare-no-expensecampaign

thwartedthe“freesilver”crusadeofrenegadeDemocratWilliam JenningsBryan,mortalenemyof“goldbugs,”andopenedaneraof Republicandominancelastinguntil1932.21 McKinley’selectiontiedthe fateofthecountrytothewillofthecorporaterichinwaysthatwould notcomeundoneuntiltheNewDeal.

Criticsclaimedthattheascendancyof“theinterests”inWashington representedtheadventof“plutocracy.”Indeed,theelectionofsenatorsbystatelegislaturesindebttobigcontributorsbroughtsomany millionairestotheSenate—asmanyasathirdofthemembersatthe dawnofthetwentiethcentury–thatitwasdubbedthe“Millionaires’ Club.”AlthoughtheRepublicanPartywasacross-classalliancethat includednortheasternurbanpoliticalmachinesandmidwesternfarmers,thefactwasthattheelectoratewasriggedtoreducetheinﬂuence ofurbanworkersandimmigrants,whilerepresentativesofbigbusinessgainedprivilegedaccesstothehighestcirclesofpower.

Theadventof“plutocracy”wasactuallyasolutiontoaproblem createdbytheseparationofmarketandstateinthenineteenthcentury. BeginningwiththedemocraticfermentoftheJacksonianeraandextendingthroughtheliquidationofthesouthernmasterclassattheend oftheCivilWar,laissez-faireliberalismdecreedthatpropertywould nolongerensureautomaticaccesstopositionsofpowerthewayithad intheearliereraofmercantilism,whenmenofpropertywereexpectedtogovern.Asaresult,moniedeliteswerenowforcedtooperatethroughnetworksofprofessionalpoliticiansinastateofcourts andparties.Underthenewarrangements,politicalfavorshadacost, whetheritwaspaidinlegalcampaigncontributionsorinbribes.Eventually,thoselikeHannawithatasteforpoliticalrough-and-tumbledispensedwithmiddlemenandboughttheirwayintoofﬁcethemselves.22

ItiscommontoregardTheodoreRooseveltastheﬁrstpresidentto challengethepowerofmoney.Itistruethatthisproudscionofanold Knickerbockerfamilyfulminatedagainstthe“malefactorsofgreat wealth,”soughtmodestregulationofmeatpackingandrailroads,and initiatedonetrophyprosecutionoftheNorthernSecuritiesrailroad

empirewhichwonhimthereputationofa“trust-buster.”Yetnoteven thisrhetoricalchampionofthepublicinterestcouldescapetheforceof privatewealth.PlayingsecondﬁddletoMorganinendingthe“Rich Man’sPanic”of1907,Rooseveltauthorizedadiscreetdepositoffunds fromtheU.S.TreasuryintoNewYorkbanksand,moreimportant, gavehispromisenottoinvoketheShermanAntitrustActagainstMorgan’sproposedmergerofU.S.SteelandTennesseeCoalandIron.The arm’s-lengthcollaborationbetweentheimperiousMorganandtheimpetuousRooseveltblessedwhatmanysaidwasamonopolistictakeover andepitomizedtheemergingconﬂuenceofwealthandpowerbetween WallStreetandWashington.

TheEraofBigMoneywasatimeofAmericanexpansionoverseas. Havingvaultedtothetopoftheworld’sindustrialpowersintheearly 1890s,thecountrylaunchedaseriesofcolonialannexationsandmilitaryinterventionsintheSpanish-AmericanWarof1898whichcontinuedunderRepublicanandDemocraticadministrationsalikeuntilthe 1930s.UnderPresidentsRooseveltandTaft,foreignpolicywashanded overtomenlikeElihuRoot,corporatelawyerturnedbusiness-minded reformerattheDepartmentsofWarandState(1899–1909),andPhilanderKnox,onetimesteelindustryhireling,whobecameanindefatigablepromoterofAmericanbusinessoverseasduringhistenureas secretaryofstate(1909–1913).Gazingoutfromtheirphotographsin highbrowmagazinessuchas World’sWork, thelikesofRootandKnox exudedprideinhavingbroughtaboutAmerica’sgrowthasaworld power.23

Itistruethattheimperialimpulsehadmanysources.Amongthe mostimportantwerestrategicinterests,socialDarwinism,masculine ambition,andthejingoismexempliﬁedinthebattlecry“Rememberthe Maine!”24 Thepursuitofempire,inturn,shapedtheideologyofthe day.Foronething,itbolsteredpatriarchalvalues,includingthekindof hairy-chestedmasculinityassociatedwiththepugnaciousTheodore Roosevelt,atatimewhenpatriarchywascomingunderfeministattack.25 Foranother,itreinforcedraceconsciousness,deepeningthe 158 AlanDawley

senseofapresumptiverighttoruleonthepartofwhiteAnglo-Saxon Protestants.Accordingto World’sWork, thecombinationofAmerican continentalreachandthe“earth-girdlingspread”oftheBritishEmpire hadcreatedanAnglo-Americanimperiumthatwas“thewidestdominationthathasbeenwonbymenofthesamestock.”America’s Anglophilicupperclassesembraced“thewhiteman’sburden,”an ideologicalbondwiththeirBritishbrethrenwhichauthorslike RudyardKiplingandW.T.Steadworkedhardtostrengthen.Tothese Anglo-Americanimperialists,thesuppressionofthePhilippineinsurrectionwasjustified,inWilliamHowardTaft’swords,bythe“indubitablefact”that“theFilipinosareatpresentsoconstitutedastobeutterlyunfitforselfgovernment.”Abroadersenseofwhitesupremacy wasinstilledattheseriesofworld’sfairsinChicago(1893),Buffalo (1901),St.Louis(1904),andothercities,wheretribalpeoplesfromcolonialregionswerepresentedindegradingsideshows.Fromthehard workofempirebuildingtotheleisure-timereflectionsofempire,diplomatsandfair-goersaliketookalessoninsocialDarwinism,under whichAnglo-Saxons,Nordics,orsomeothernorthEuropeangrouping weresupposedly“fit”torideherdoneverybodyelse.26

Atthesametime,Americanexpansionowedmuchtoclassinterests.EspeciallyintheLatinAmericanprovinggroundofU.S.hegemony,thegoldendynastiesestablishedanetworkoftradeandinvestmentthatmademuchoftheregionintoaneconomiccolonyof Yankeecapital.Whetherthiswascalled“dependency”27 or“informal empire,”28 thefactwasthatleadingU.S.ﬁrmshadlargeinterestsin Mexico(Rockefeller,Morgan,Stillman,Dodge),theCaribbean(Morgan,Stillman),andCentralAmerica(UnitedFruit).Cubaoffersacase inpoint.Havingbecomeadefactoprotectoratein1902underthePlatt Amendment,CubawasaninvitingopportunityforYankeecorporations,whichtookoverthelion’sshareoftheisland’ssugarindustry— 60percentbythemid-1920s.LeadingthechargewastheAmerican SugarReﬁningCompany,aprimeexampleofthemostadvancedcapitalistmethodsoftheday,includingverticalandhorizontalintegration

AlanDawley

andtheuseofmoderntechnology.Thecompanyalsocameunderthe influenceoffinancecapitalwhentheoriginalstakeoftheHavemeyer familyofNewYorkwasaugmentedbyinvestmentsfromtheBoston financiersKidder,Peabody,&Company.Especiallyduringtheboom yearsoftheFirstWorldWar,MorganandotherWallStreetersmuscledintoreapalucrativeharvestofprofitsfromCubansugar,aonetimeluxurywhichwasfastbecomingastapleintheincreasinglysweeteneddietoftheAmericanconsumer.29

Beyondthenarrowcalculusofprofitwastheupper-classwillto power.Believingthattheystoodatthepinnacleofcivilization,empire buildersregardedcivilizedruleover“inferior”peoplesasadutytohumanity.Asthemostprominentofthelot,TeddyRoosevelthadno doubtthathisseizureofwhatwouldbecomethePanamaCanalZone furtheredtheprogressofcivilizationwhilealsoadvancingtowardthe destinyofU.S.preeminenceintheWesternHemisphere.Despitehis disavowalofmercenarymotives,Roosevelt’sconceptofcivilization restedonafirmfoundationofbusinessprinciples,asdidhismoralistic condemnationof“chronicwrongdoing”intheRooseveltCorollaryto theMonroeDoctrine.BymakingtheCaribbeansafeforgringosugar refineries,railroadinvestors,andbankloans,Roosevelt’sactionsindisputablyservedU.S.businessinterests.

ThesamewastrueinthecaseofthePhilippines.U.S.investors lookedhungrilyonrailroadandminingopportunitiesinthenewcolony,whereRoosevelt’scivilgovernor,WilliamHowardTaft,wasbusy helpingtoputdownthePhilippineinsurrectionagainsttheU.S.occupation.Taftregardedmilitaryconquestasthenecessaryprecondition totheexpansionofbourgeoiscivilizationinthetropics.Ashewrote hometoRoot,“ThearmyhasbroughtthePhilippinestothepoint wheretheyofferareadyandattractiveﬁeldforinvestmentandenterprise,buttomakethispossibletheremustbemininglaws,homesteadandlandlaws,generaltransportationlaws,bankingandcurrency laws.”30 (Alatergenerationwouldrefertothisasnationbuilding.) Whenhebecamepresidentin1909,theformerimperialproconsulpre-

sidedover“dollardiplomacy”underwhichtheﬂagfollowedthedollar overseas.Allinall,itisnothardtoseewhycontemporariesbelieved thattheylivedinaplutocracy.

TheProblemsofPlutocracy

Despitetheirsuccess,thecrownedheadsofAmericancapitalismfelt insecure.WalterLippmann,oneofthemostperceptiveobserversof theAmericanscene,describedtheirpredicament:“Theyhavebeeneducatedtoachievesuccess;fewofthemhavebeeneducatedtoexercise power.Nordotheycountwithanyconﬁdenceuponretainingtheir power,norinhandingitontotheirsons.Theylive,therefore,from daytoday,andtheygovernbyear.Theirimpromptustatementsof policymaybeobeyed,butnobodyseriouslyregardsthemashaving authority.”Forthatreason,Lippmann,believed,“noneofthemis seatedonacertainthrone, andallofthemareforeverconcernedasto howtheykeepfrombeingtoppledoff.”31

Lippmann’sobservationpointstoabasicproblemofplutocracy.In ademocraticsociety,therichandpowerfulmaybeenvied,buttheyare notrevered.Theymaybeobeyed,buttheyarenotheldinawe.Having“moremoney,”asHemingwaysaid,doesnotmakethem“different fromyouandme”inthewayFitzgeraldmeant.Clearly,plutocraticassaultsonthecitadelsofpowerrubbeddemocraticnervesraw.Louis Brandeis,the“people’slawyer,”wonawidehearingforanattackon ﬁnancecapitalismwhichmarshaledevidencefromthecongressional PujoCommitteetowarnthatrichbankerswereusing“otherpeople’s money”togetevenricher.Inonebitingwitticism,Brandeissummed upthewholeofbankingas“theprivilegeoftakingthegoldeneggs laidbysomebodyelse’sgoose.”32 Politicalcorruptionalsocameunder attack.Castingajaundicedeyeonthesenatorial“Millionaires’Club,” MarkTwainquipped,“IthinkIcansaywithpridethatwehavelegislatorsthatbringhigherpricesthananywhereintheworld.”Populistcriticscomplainedaboutgovernmentof,by,andfor“theinterests,”not

“thepeople,”andin1904,muckrakingjournalistLincolnSteffens pennedtheclassicindictmentofurbancorruption, TheShameofthe Cities, whichdepictedgreedybusinessmencarryingoff“boodle”from thepublictreasury.33

Asthisoutcrysuggests,plutocracyactuallyunderminedthelegitimacyoftheexistingsystem.Inademocraticsociety,politicalrulers mustwinconsentofthegovernedbysomecombinationofpower sharing,deliveringthegoods,socialresponsibility,andculturalleadership,allofwhichadduptowhatwasfirstcalled“hegemony”byAntonioGramsci.Evensomeupper-classconservativeshadtoadmitthat corruptionsappedconfidenceinthesystem,especiallyafterbeinginstructedonthepointbyEnglishvisitorLordBryce,whoportrayed corruptionasthechiefflawintheotherwisesplendidAmericancommonwealth.Nonespokelouderindenouncingtheinfluencepeddling ofbigmoneythanTeddyRoosevelt.WithhistypicalvehemenceRooseveltproclaimed,“Ofalltheformsoftyrannytheleastattractiveand themostvulgaristhetyrannyofmerewealth,thetyrannyofaplutocracy.”34

Partlyforthesereasons,bigmoneydidnothaveeverythingitsown way.RegionalhostilitytowardWallStreetintheSouthandWest helpedputmanyBryanDemocratsinoffice,whilefarmersandskilled workerscombinedtosupportinsurgentRepublicanslikeRobertLa Follette.UrbanworkerssupportedmachineDemocratsandafairnumberofsocialistswhodemandedbenefitsfortheirconstituents,while middle-classreformerssoughttocurbthepowerofmoneyinpolitics. Inthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,theseforcesweregathering inamultifariousmovementofprogressivereformthatwouldsoon placenewchecksonplutocracy.

Anothersetofproblemsaroseinforeignaffairs.Althoughtherewas littletheycoulddotostopU.S.expansion,anti-imperialistswarned thatforeignconquestunderminedtheAmericanrepublic.Drawingthe connectionbetweenbigbusinessandabignavy,theyportrayedmilitarismasathreattodemocracyandlambasted“dollardiplomacy”asan 162 AlanDawley

oppressiveburdenonordinarytaxpayers.Manysawimperialismasan outgrowthofbigbusiness.PaulReinsch(laterWoodrowWilson’sambassadortoBeijing)assertedin1900,“Itiscertainthatsomeofthe greattrustsareinterestedinexpansion.”Inasocietyalreadyafﬂicted by“corruptioninpublicaffairs,”andwherelegislationwas“moreuniformlyfavorabletocapitalanditsconcentratedintereststhantothe poorerclasses,”Reinschwarnedthat“thecentralgovernmentshould notbeturnedintoaninstrumentalityforadvancingpowerfulcentralizedinterests.”35

Fromthatdayforward,progressivecriticswarnedthatimperialism wouldpromotetheundemocraticconcentrationofpowerathome. DuringtheFirstWorldWar,JaneAddamsandothersocialreformers intheAmericanUnionagainstMilitarismcampaignedagainstU.S.interventioninMexicoandelsewhereonthegroundsthatforeignmilitaryinterventionswouldleadtoanoppressivemilitaryestablishment,a costlyimperialadministration,andanoligarchyofindustrialists.The argumentwasechoedafterthewarbytheWomen’sInternational LeagueforPeaceandFreedom.36

Therewerealsoafewcriticsoftheracistconsequencesofempire. ToaprescientyoungW.E.B.DuBois,theproblemoftheinternationalcolorlinewasnothinglessthan“theproblemofthetwentieth century.”FewcontemporarieswereasastuteasDuBoisin1903in settingAmericansegregationandEuropeancolonialisminthesame globalcontextof“therelationofthedarkertothelighterracesofmen inAsiaandAfrica,inAmericaandtheislandsofthesea.”Nonetheless, theblackandwhiteprogressiveswhojoinedtogethertoformtheNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeoplein1909 wererespondingtoacentralfaultinthesystemthatsoonerorlater wouldhavetobeaddressed.37

Anotherproblemofplutocracywasthetreatmentoflabor.Making surethattheproceedsoflaborﬂowedintothepocketsoftheowners requiredconstantattentiontoworkdisciplines,wagerates,chainsof command,injuryclaims,andahostofotherareaswhereclassinterests

collided.Underanarrowcalculusofself-interest,employerspinched andsqueezedtheiremployees,oftentothepointofdamaginghealth andsafety,asinsuchindustrialatrocitiesasthelethal1911ﬁreatthe TriangleShirtwaistCompanyinNewYorkCity.IncontrasttoEurope’s hautebourgeoisie, steepedinaristocraticvaluesthatbondedupperandlowerranksinacommonsocialorder,America’snewlyrich seemedalltooeagertoplayEbenezerScroogetoworking-classBob Crachits.ThatwasthekindofimageprojectedbyAndrewMellon, Pittsburghindustrialmagnateandfuturesecretaryofthetreasury,to hisestrangedwife,theformerNoraMcMullen,granddaughterofthe founderofIreland’sGuinnessBrewery.Inherdivorceproceedings, sherailedagainstthetreatmentmetedouttothe“toilersinmyhusband’svineyard”andobjectedthatnoneofthemwere“giventhelaborer’srecognition,toilingandworkingontheestateandaddingtoits wealthbutnotrecognizedaspartofit.Thewholecommunityspirit wasascoldandhardasthesteelitmade,andchilledthehearttothe core.”38

Asiftoconfirmtheircold-heartedness,industrialistsresistedanyeffortsbytheiremployeestoorganizeunions,oftenbreakingstrikesby sendinginPinkertonsandtheNationalGuard.Forthisreason,theEra ofBigMoneywasatimeofoftenviolentlaborwars,exemplifiedby theLudlowMassacreintheColoradocoalfieldsin1914,wherestate militiacalledinatthebehestoftheColoradoFuelandIronCompany, aRockefellersubsidiary,shotdownstrikingminersandburnedtheir familiesoutoftheirmakeshifthomes.Suchatrocitiestarnishedthe reputationsofthegoldendynasties.

Thelaborquestionwasincreasinglyaglobalone.Oneofthekey aspectsoftheworldeconomyinthisperiodwasthegrowingshareof theworld’sworkerscomingunderthecontrolofAmericanmoney, whetherthroughlarge-scaleEuropeanimmigrationtotheUnited StatesorthroughtheexportofAmericancapital,especiallytoLatin AmericaandtheCaribbean.AsAmericancapitalcameintocontact withtropicallabor,classrelationswereinternationalized.Incasessuch

asthebuildingofthePanamaCanal,1906–1914,whereWestIndian laborersweresupervisedbyYankeeengineers,therelationsweredirect.39 Butinmostcases,localownershiredmostofthelabor,asin Cuba,wheresmallsugarplantershiredcaneworkers,andnational governments,notAmericangendarmes,tookchargeofpolicingthem. Thefactthattheseregimeswereoftenrepressive–notoriouslysointhe caseofthedictatorsPorﬁrioDíazinMexicoandJuanVicenteGómez inVenezuela–wasacauseoflabordiscontent.This,too,posedaproblemforAmerica’sleaders.UnstableconditionsintheformofCaribbeancoupsd’étatandsocialrevolutioninMexicoroiledthewatersof U.S.politicswheneverthecountryintervenedoverseas.Frombattles overPhilippineannexationtoWilson’sMexicaninterventionsin1914 and1916,imperialismwaspoliticallydivisive.40

Finally,plutocracywasdestabilizedbytheveryeconomicdynamism thatpushedthecorporaterichtothetop.WhatJosephSchumpeter called“creativedestruction”—thatis,rapidtechnologicalandorganizationalchange—wasalwayssweepingouttheoldandbringingin wholenewindustries.Ontopofthatcameinternalconﬂictsamongdiversesectorsofbusiness.Becausesuppliers,manufacturers,shippers, andwholesalershaddifferentinterests,theirlobbyistskeptbumping intooneanotherwhileseekingtheirown“specialinterest”legislation. Suchdivisionsunderminedupper-classcohesion.Alongwithnew industries,suchasautomobilesandelectronics,camenewretinuesof corporaterichknockingatthegatesofHighSociety.Accordingto HerbertPell,therewasaconstantbattlebetweennew-rich“getters” andold-rich“keepers.”Thefactthatmostofthe“keepers”hadthemselvesbeen“getters”onlyagenerationortwoearlierdidnotsilence therunningcomplaintagainstthenewcomers.In1913,forexample, HenryCabotLodge,aBrahmin“keeper,”objectedthat“verymodern plutocrats”hadruinedsociety“withtheirentertainments,theirexpenditures,theirmarriages,theirdivorces,andtheirscandals.”Fifteen yearslateritwastheturnofaBrooklynmatronwhohadmarriedinto Europe’stopechelonandhadthenametoproveit—Mrs.JeromeNa-

poleonBonaparte—tolamentthefactthat“wholesaleinvasionofthe bestcirclesbythe nouveauriche andthehordesofhangers-onismakingplaceslikePalmBeachnomoreexclusivethanConeyIsland.Newport,thelaststrongholdoftheelite,hasthemoneyedintruderatthe gates.”41

ArevealingtwistonOldMoney’scomplaintagainstNewMoney aroseinthebitter1910divorcethatwasthetalkofthePittsburghsocietypages.Inaneloquentdiatribe,NoraMcMullenMelloncomplained thatherestrangedhusband,AndrewMellon,wasobsessedwithmoney attheexpenseoffamily:“Alwaysnewplans,biggerplansfornewdollars,biggerdollars,dollarsthatrobbedhimandhisfamilyofthetime hecouldhavedevotedfarmoreproﬁtablytoamere,‘ThankGod,we areliving.’”Offendedatbeingtreated“likehisHunsandSlavs,”the Irishheiresslamentedthecashbasisofmarriageintheboomingsteel city,whereshewasweighed“coldly,dispassionately,onthescalesof demandandsupplyandasawiferankedmerelyasacommodityinthe greatplansofthismasterﬁnancier’slifework.Thebabieswerethere: eventhemaleheirwasthere.Wasthewifetobelaidofflikeother hiredhelpwhenthemillsshutdown[?]”42

Thetreatmentofwivesastrophyobjectslentitselftothesortof scathingcritiquefoundinCharlottePerkinsGilman’s WomenandEconomics (1898).GilmanindictedtheVictoriandoctrineof“separate spheres”formakingwomenoftheleisureclassinto“over-sexed”ornamentsofextravaganceinasocietywherepatriarchalrulewas,in fact,becominganachronistic.Inaparallelassaultonupper-classrituals ofostentatiousdisplay,ThorsteinVeblen’s TheoryoftheLeisureClass (1899)skeweredthesuper-richfortheir“pecuniaryemulation”ofone another’s“conspicuousconsumption.”Farfrombeingdefendersof highculture,theywerethemselvesbarbariansatthegates.43

Inasituationwheretheaffairsofstateweresubjecttosomuchplutocraticinﬂuence,therewaslittletobufferthefullfuryofthecapitalist storm—thewhirlwindof“creativedestruction,”theupsanddownsof thebusinesscycle,theexploitationoflabor,therelentlesspressurefor

outwardexpansion.Andyet,thereignofbigmoneywasbynomeans absolute.Inequalityfueleddemocraticopposition,whileeconomicdynamismconstantlythreatenedtoreplaceonebatchofoligarchswith another.Thecentralironyoftheperiodwasthatthesamesystemthat putthecorporaterichonthethronemadetheirreignunstable.New strategieswereinorder.

Reform,War,andRevolution,1912–1921

Inaddressingtheproblemsofplutocracy,theupperclasssoughtto broadenitsleadershipduringtheturbulentyearsofprogressivereform andtheGreatWar.Whilesomepursuedamanagerialstrategyofenlightenedself-interest,others–oftenwomen–joinedmovementsforsocialjustice.Concedingthatobsessivepursuitofwealthhadtornthesocialfabric,reformersofbothtypestriedtomendit.Nodoubtsincere, theyalsorecognizedthatsocialresponsibilitywouldberepaidinthe intangibledividendsofgreaterlegitimacy.

Letuslookﬁrstatthemanagerialreformers.Atatimeofmuckrakingattackson“specialinterests,”manyindustrialmagnatesabandoned theoldphilosophyof“thepublicbedamned”andembracedenlightenedself-interestinstead.Thatmeantstabilizingtheeconomy,improvingworkingconditions,andattackingsocialproblemssuchasprostitutionanddrunkenness.Bettertoaddresssuchproblemsthroughprivate organizationsthantoriskgovernmentintervention.ThroughorganizationssuchastheNationalCivicFederation,forexample,theyenlisted socialworkerstodraftblueprintsfor“welfarecapitalism”thatwould harmonizetheinterestsofbusiness,labor,andthepublic.Theyalso establishedgrandphilanthropicorganizations,includingtheRussell Sage,Rockefeller,andCommonwealthfoundations,toimprovethe healthandeducationofthepoor.Inaddition,afteroutragessuchasthe LudlowMassacre,theRockefellersbroughtinprofessionallabormediatorstoimproveindustrialrelations,and,moreimportant,theyturned toadvertisingmenlikeIvyLeeandEdwardBernaystoimprovepublic

168 AlanDawley

relations.Theseeffortswereagreatsuccessinco-optingeliteprofessionalswhomightotherwisehavebeencorporatecritics,andtheywere modestlysuccessfulinpersuadingthegeneralpublicthatbigbusiness couldbesociallyresponsible.Thereislessevidence,however,that theyactuallybetteredtheconditionsofworkingpeople.44

Withlabordiscontentandothersocialproblemscontinuingtofester,someintheuppercrustbrokerankstoparticipateinmovements forsocialreform.Enteringintoacross-classalliance,wealthysocialites becameﬁnancialangelstomiddle-classreformerswhoransettlement houses,milkstations,andhealthclinics.Unlikeold-fashionedcharity, whichwasmerelylocal,theneworganizations,suchastheNational ChildLaborCommitteeandtheNationalConsumersLeague,were nationwidenetworksofbenevolencethatfurtheredtherestructuring oftheupperclass.

Itwasoftenwomenwhomadethebreak.Forexample,afterthekillingofwomenandchildreninLudlow,AbbyAldrichRockefellerabandonedeverythingherfather,NelsonAldrich,hadstoodfortobecome aprincipalcontributortotheNationalWomen’sTradeUnionLeague. Whensuchwealthy“allies”joinedprotestparades,spectatorswere treatedtotheincongruoussightofsocialitesinminkstolesmarching withsocialistsinshirtwaists.Regardedaseccentricsbyhideboundconservatives,therebelrichknewthattheirnetworksofbenevolence wouldhavethedualbeneﬁtofimprovingsocietywhilewinninggood willfromthepublic.

Itdidnottakelongforthesenetworkstobecomeenmeshedinelectoralpolitics.Indeed,theywereamajorfoundationforthepoliticsof reformthatgavetheProgressiveEraitsname.Initially,bothmanagerialandreformcampswereattractedtoTheodoreRooseveltandhis ProgressiveParty.InaﬁtofpiqueoverTaft’sauthorizationofanantitrustsuitagainsttheU.S.Steeldealhehadpersonallyapprovedin 1907,RooseveltdecidedtobolttheRepublicanPartyin1912.Under thebannerofthe“NewNationalism,”heproposedmodestregulation ofthetruststhroughthekindofnationalbureaucracylaterembodied

intheFederalTradeCommission.Managerialtypessawthisasasensiblealternativetoradicalism,andhewonsupportfromthelikesof GeorgePerkins,aMorganpartner.Theymayhavefoundhimunpredictable,but,unlikehiscousinFranklin,Teddywasneveraccusedof beingatraitortohisclass.Inaddition,proponentsofthe“NewNationalism”supportedmoderatesocialreforms,suchasprohibitionson theabuseofwomenandchildlaborers.Nodoubttheupper-classcaptainsinRoosevelt’sarmyofChristiansoldiersweresincereinbacking thesereforms.Buttheyalsohopedthatmoderatereformwouldstave offmoreradicalsolutionsofthesortproposedbyneo-populistBryan Democratswhoseemedbentonbringingdownthemoneypower. Theyalsosawthatreformwouldhelplegitimatetheexistingorder.As Rooseveltrepeatedlyargued,“socialreformisnottheprecursorbut thepreventiveofSocialism.”45

WoodrowWilsonwasnolessafoeofplutocracy.Indeed,underthe bannerofthe“NewFreedom,”Wilsoncalledforabreakupofthe trustsandareturntocompetition.“Interestdoesnotbindmentogether,”Wilsonsaid,“interestseparatesmen.Thereisonlyonething thatcanbindmentogether,andthatiscommondevotiontoright.”

DespiteWilson’smoralisticcondemnationofthe“interests,”thetalk inbothWallStreetandWashingtonbythetimehetookofﬁcein1913 wasabouthow—notwhether—tomakethestateapartnerinthemanagementofcorporatecapitalism.Onceinpower,WilsonDemocrats forgottheircampaignrhetoricaboutbreakingupthetrustsandpursuedgovernmentregulationinstead.46

EvenWallStreethadlearnedalessonfromthePanicof1907about theobsolescenceofMorgan’strademarkresponsetomeddlesomegovernmentofﬁcials:“Sendyourmantomymanandtheycanﬁxitup.” Whatwasneededwasfederallegislationtostabilizemoneymarkets, andNewYorkbankerslinedupbehindtheAldrichPlanforafederally supervisedbankingsystemwithheadquartersinNewYork.Whatthey gotwassomewhatdifferent—aregionalnetworkofmemberbanks withachiefappointedbythepresident—although,inpractice,thenew

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FederalReservesystemof1913conferredWashington’sblessingon WallStreet’spreeminence.47

Ingeneralterms,thenewfederalbureaucracywasacompromise betweenplutocracyanddemocracy.Bigbusinesswouldnolongerbe abletoinvokelaissez-faireasalicensetorunwild,whiledemandsfor publiccontrolofprivateenterprisewouldbesetaside.Instead,there wouldbemodestpublicregulationthroughnewgovernmentagencies suchastheFederalReserve,theFederalTradeCommission,andthe FoodandDrugAdministration.Atatimewhenmoreradicaldemands wereintheair,thenewmachineryincorporatedlimitedpublicregulationinordertopreservetheunderlyingprincipleofprivatecontrol. Theeffectwastoreducetheroleof“plutocracy”inpolitics,bothasan actualforceandasagalvanizingissue.48 Insofarasitreducedthecontradictionbetweencapitalismanddemocracy,bureaucracymaintained thecontinuityofthecapitalistsystembychangingit.

Asecondconsequenceoffederalbureaucracywastoreinforcethe remakingoftheupperclassalongnationallines.Thatis,thenewfederalagencieswereincubatorsoftruly national eliteswhoseoutlook transcendedregionalandsectoralinterestsandwhobecame,aswe haveseen,primecandidatesforentryintotheupperclass.

TheGreatWarhastenedbothofthesedevelopments.Tobesure, therewaspopulistgrumblingandantiwarworryaboutthefactthat J.P.Morgan&Co.wastheofﬁcialU.S.purchasingagentfortheBritishgovernment.Morganskimmedoff$30millionincommissionson the$3billionworthofdirectpurchasesmadebytheAllies,andhetook additionalmillionsininterestona$500millionAnglo-Frenchloan,the biggestsingleforeignloaninU.S.history(onthewaytoagrandtotal of$1.5billioninwarloans).YetassoonastheUnitedStatesjoinedthe Allies,Morgan’smillionswereportrayedasthejustrewardsforpatriotism.ThesamepatrioticaurahungoverthescoresofcorporateexecutivesandWallStreetﬁnanciers,suchasBernardBaruch,whotrooped toWashingtontobecome“dollarayearmen.”

Meanwhile,JohnD.Rockefellerburnishedhisreputationasapublic

benefactorbydonatingsome$70milliontoBelgianreliefandother goodcauses.Inthesameway,thewarwasalsoagoldenopportunity forsocietydamestoshowtheirbenevolenceafterthefashionofAbby Rockefeller,whosupervisedRedCrossvolunteers,byperformingpublicserviceontheplethoraofwomen’scouncilssetuptoconservefood, improvepublichealth,andtakecareoftheinjured.Nodoubtthepatriotismwasgenuine,butitwasalsogoodpublicrelations.49 Allinall,by turningplutocratsintopatriots,thewartemporarilyfurtheredtheupper-classquestforlegitimacy.

Withrespecttothelaborquestion,however,thewartaughtcontradictorylessons.Ontheonehand,theurgentneedforlaborpeaceconvincedevenconservativesofthevirtueofpowersharingbetweencapitalandlabor.FormerPresidentTaft,forexample,signedonascochairoftheWarLaborBoard,whichstoodbrieﬂyasaprimeexample ofabureaucraticmediationbetweencapitalismanddemocracy.Onthe otherhand,fearenteredtheheartsofthepropertiedastheywitnessed themountingnumberofmajorstrikesintheUnitedStatessetagainst thebackdropoftheBolshevikRevolutioninRussiaanddisorderin Europe.Facingoffagainstamassofdisorderlyworkers,otherwise conﬂicting“interests”drewtogetherinsolidoppositiontosharing powerwithlaborandmountedalargelysuccessfulOpenShopdrivein industry.Inthesamevein,thepostwarRedScareallbuteliminatedthe callforsocialjusticefromthehighercirclesbypaintingevenmoderate reformssuchassettingminimumwagesandmaximumhoursasdangerousexperimentsincommunism.50

Thegulfbetweentheclasseswasdeepenedbypatricianswhotightenedtheirembraceofeugenicandracistargumentsagainstimmigrants fromsouthernandeasternEurope.Againstthewishesoflargeemployersofcheapimmigrantlabor,Congressacceptedracialarguments andshutthedoorsagainstSlavs,Italians,andJewsintherestrictive quotasof1921and1924.Thevictoryofrestrictionistshaspuzzledhistorians:ifbusinesswasinthesaddleandlaborwasweak,whydidthe AmericanFederationofLaborwinoutovertheNationalAssociation

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ofManufacturers?Approachingthispuzzlethroughabroaderclass perspectivebringsusclosertoasolution.Whateverthenarrowinterestsofemployers,thebroadergoalsoftheupperclassesincludedpreservingtheirculturalleadershipandsocialstatusagainsttheboatloads ofnewcomerscrowdingAmerica’sshores.PatricianfollowersofMadisonGrantandLothropStoddardsoughttokeepthenationalpatrimonyinthehandsofAnglo-Saxonbluebloodsbyenactingaracial formofnationalismintolaw.51

Inexpressingclassaimsinethnic(“racial”)form,theuppercrust wasverymuchintheAmericangrain.Working-classneighborhoods, afterall,weresteepedintheirownvarietiesofPolish,Italian,orother ethniccustoms.52 Theresultofcastingupper-classidentityin wasp terms,however,wastodeepenthedivisionseparatingtheclassesby drivinganethnicwedgebetweenthem.InadditiontoviolatingthehallowedAmericancreedofequality,racisminallitsformswasaformidableobstacletowinningconsentfromtheurbanmasses.Whereas PolishimmigrantsworkinginPittsburghmightseektofollowinthe footstepsoffellowimmigrantAndrewCarnegie,theycouldnotwalk withthenativistsnobsoftheImmigrationRestrictionLeague,any morethanAfricanAmericanscouldadmirethebigotsoftheEugenics RecordOfﬁce.Intheshortrun,thetribalismofthe1920smayhave giventemporarycomforttothedescendantsofthe Mayﬂower, butin thelongrun,inasocietyasdiverseanddynamicastheUnitedStates,a merely wasp establishmentcouldnotlast.53

CorporateFeudalism,1922–1932

Bigmoneyreachedfornewformsofpowerinthe1920s.Through public-spiritedcorporationsandinstitutionsofpublicbenevolence,a newgenerationofthecorporaterichattemptedtothrowofftheold “robberbaron”reputation,donthemantleofenlightenedself-interest, andtakecommandofforeignanddomesticpolicy.Whatcriticssawas corporatedomination,admirerssawasthefoundationofabenevo-

lentestablishment,whatthesociologistE.DigbyBaltzell(following Tocqueville)dubbeda“businessaristocracy.”Fromfawningadmirers likeFitzgeraldtosophisticatedobserverslikeBaltzell,observersasked America’scorporaterichtoturnthemselvesintosomethingmoresubstantialthanHemingway’smoney-grubbers.Althoughmanynevergot beyondJayGatsby,Fitzgerald’srecklessanddestructiveﬁctionalhero, asigniﬁcantsegmenttriedtomovefromtheoldplutocracytoward morepublic-spiritedleadership.

Intheirlandmarkstudy TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty (1932),AdolfBerleandGardinerMeansdescribedthe“corporatesystem”evolvinginthe1920sasthelatter-dayequivalentofthefeudal system,inwhichthecorporationseemedtobesupersedingthestateas “thedominantformofpoliticalorganization.”Forthistransitionto takeplace,public-spiritedexecutiveswouldhavetooverrideboththe narrowpecuniaryinterestsoftheirstockholdersandthetechnocratic powerofthemanagerialeliteand“setforthaprogramcomprisingfair wages,securitytoemployees,reasonableservicetotheirpublic,and stabilizationofbusiness.”Inotherwords,theywouldhavetobewillingtomakethesupremesacriﬁceand“divertaportionoftheproﬁts fromtheownersofpassiveproperty.”54

Infact,therewasmovementtowardsomeofthesegoals.Though hopelesslyinadequatefromtheperspectiveofthe1930s,theeffortto smoothouttheupsanddownsofthebusinesscyclewassignificantin comparisontotheolddog-eat-dogcompetition.Theeffortwasembodiedincorporateplanning,tradeassociations,andthekindoftoplevelcollaborationexemplifiedbythe1919formationoftheSpecial ConferenceCommittee,aconsortiumofgiantfirmsthatincluded StandardOil,DuPont,andGeneralElectric.55 Thesenewforaysinto economicplanningtookplacealongsidethecontinuingworkofthe NationalIndustrialConferenceBoardandtheNationalBureauof EconomicResearchinreportingonmarketconditions.Inasimilar vein,corporationsexpanded“welfarecapitalism”byofferingretirementplans,profitsharing,andpaidvacationstoasomewhatwidercir-

cleofemployees,andtheylaunchedpublicitycampaignsintendedto showthatbusinesshadsuchastrongsocialconsciencethatgovernment-sponsoredsocialwelfarewasunnecessary.Meanwhile,corporate apologistsinsistedthatcorporationswerepublicbenefactorsbecause thelikesofGeneralElectricandGeneralMotorsdeliveredaseemingly endlessﬂowofconsumergoods.

Tobesure,plutocraticself-interestdidnotdisappear.Specialinterestsfeastedonpublicresources,asrevealedintheTeapotDomescandalandinTreasurySecretaryAndrewMellon’snotorioustaxrebates totherich,includingmillionstoMellon’sowncompanies.Theseraids onthepublictreasuryshowthecontinuedpotencyofpecuniaryvalues inalltheircorrosiveinﬂuence.Infact,thedistributionofwealth reachedsomethingofaMountEverestofinequalityin1929,whenthe gapbetweenrichandpoorwaswiderthanatanyothertimeinthe twentiethcentury.TheresultingvulgarityandproﬂigacyoftheJazz AgeshowedhowmuchremainedofVeblen’s“conspicuousconsumption.”

Nonetheless,newattitudeswereintheair.Therewasanewsophisticationinupper-classtasteformodernartandarchitecture.Forexample,AbbyRockefellercontributedgreatsumstolaunchtheMuseumof ModernArt,andJohnJ.RaskobteamedupwithAlSmithtospend moneyfromDuPontandMetropolitanLifeInsuranceinbuildingthe gloriousartdecocathedralknownastheEmpireStateBuilding.

InWashington,thenewattitudewasevidentinHerbertHoover’s CommerceDepartment.Drawingonhiswartimeexperienceashead oftheFoodAdministration,Hooverarguedthecasefor“associationalism,”theideathattradeassociationsandcorporatemanagement shouldworkcooperativelywithgovernmenttoservethepublic.FollowingHoover’slead,theFederalTradeCommission,forexample, assistedbusinesswithresearchonmarketconditionsandsponsored conferencesaimedatpromotingbusinesscooperationratherthancompetition.Suchintertwiningnetworksofcorporateandstatebureaucracymovedbeyondnarrowself-interesttowardwhatwaspromoted

asanewkindofbenevolentpartnershipbetweenbusinessandgovernment.

Overseas,thecorporaterichtookU.S.foreignpolicybeyond“dollar diplomacy.”Although“specialinterests”continuedtoplayastrong hand,especiallyinCongress,theinternationalistwingofcorporate Americapursuedabroaderstrategyofworldpower.UnderoutwardlookingCharlesEvansHughes,theStateDepartmentbrokeredamajor internationalarmsagreementattheWashingtonNavalConferenceof 1921–22.Thesamebusinessleadersconductedwhatwascalled“bankers’diplomacy.”LedbyBenjaminStrong,thepreeminentﬁgureat theFederalReserve,keyAmericanbankerssuchasThomasLamont workedcloselywiththeirEuropeancounterpartsHjalmarSchachtand MontagueNorman,theheadsoftheGermanandBritishcentralbanks, respectively.TheFederalReserveunderStrongfunctionedastheU.S. counterparttotheEuropeancentralbanks,afactunderscoredbythe closepersonalrelationshipbetweenStrongandNorman,wholikedto vacationtogetherinthesouthofFrance.Strongwasnottimidabout criticizingthenarrownationalismof“AmericaFirst”Republicanssuch asHenryCabotLodge,whopushedthroughhistoricallyhightariffs afterthewar.“Ifweputaprohibitivetariffuponimports,”Strongobjected,“webysomuchrestrictourexports,andfurther,makeitimpossibleforthosewhooweusmoneytopayit.”56

Corporateinternationaliststooktheleadinstabilizingtheworld economyintheﬁnancialagreementsembodiedintheDawesPlan (1924)andtheYoungPlan(1929)forreschedulingGermanreparationspayments.Theinternationalistoutlookgainedgroundduringthe briefgoldenyearsbetween1924and1929wheninternationalbankers seemedtohavesucceededinrestoringameasureofstabilitytoworld affairs.Undertheseunusuallyfavorableconditions,therewasabrief preﬁguringofthekindof“Atlanticism”thatcameonstrongafterthe SecondWorldWar,inwhichnewprocessesofclassformationoperatedonatransatlanticscale.57

Highﬁnancewasnottheonlyinternationalistinﬂuenceontheupper

class.TherewerestrongsocialtiesacrosstheAtlanticaswell.Forover ageneration,AmericanmoneyhadbeenmarryingintoEuropeannobilityandappropriatingaristocraticstyles—witnessMorgan’smedievaltapestries—withtheaimofstakingoutaclaimtobetheyouthful successorofEurope’sfadedaristocracy.Thatclaimwasfortiﬁedby wealthytouristswhofollowedinBritishandFrenchfootstepsonthe pathsofempire.LikeEuropeanswhohadappropriatedknowledgeof theOrientalpeoplestheyconquered,Americancosmopolitanswere gettingtoknowthepeoplesofLatinAmerica,Asia,andAfricaandappropriatingknowledgeoftheirculturesasawayofincreasingtheir ownculturalcapital.Fordecades,world’sfairsandmuseumshad broughtexoticplacestoAmerica’sshores,butnow,astheUnited Statesacquiredanempireinthetropics,itwastheturnofthewealthy touristtoboardtrain,plane,andcruiseshipandgotovisitthem. Throughadsinhigh-endmagazineslike VanityFair, travelagencies beckonedtheleisureclass“toglideeasilyoverruinedMayatemples andpyramidsintotheheartofmysteriousHaitithroughtheIndies, Mexico,CentralandSouthAmerica.”ForthosewhopreferredAfrica, therewas“theimmenselypicturesquenativesideofSouthAfrica,” withits“wildwardances,weirdage-oldtribalcustoms,thedigniﬁed Zuluchiefandhisretinueofduskywives.”58

TheCrashof’29andtheensuingdepressionofthe1930sputa crimpinthesetravelplans.Nonetheless,likepassengersaboardthe Titanic intheﬁrstmomentsafterhittingtheiceberg,HighSocietycontinuedtobehaveintheﬁrstmonthsofthedepressionasifnothinghad happened.DuringtheweekinlateOctoberwhenthe NewYorkTimes headlined“WorstStockCrash,”thesocietypagecalmlyreportedon thetransatlanticmigrationofplumedsocialitesfromtheirsummer abodestotheirwinterquarters.Spottingafamilyonthemovewith theiraristocrat-by-marriagedaughterintow,thesocietypagereported, “Mr.andMrs.SamuelNorrisandthelatter’sdaughter,CountessAlexandrinevonBeroldingen,whohavebeenattheSt.Regis,aresailing tonightontheAugustaforRome.”59

InWashington,too,politicalleaderstriedtopretendthatdisaster couldbeavoided.Cooperationwithbigbusinessremainedtheorderof theday.WithinweeksofthegreatstockmarketcrashofOctober 1929,HooverinvitedcorporateleaderstoaseriesofWhiteHouse conferencestohelpcoordinatearesponse.Inreviewingtheresultsofa gatheringofsomefourhundred“keymen”inDecember,Hoover drewahistoricalcontrastwiththelostworldofruthlesscompetition: “Theveryfactthatyougentlemencometogetherforthesebroadpurposesrepresentsanadvanceinthewholeconceptionoftherelationship ofbusinesstopublicwelfare...Thisisafarcryfromthearbitrary anddog-eat-dogattitudeofthebusinessworldofsomethirtyorforty yearsago.”60

Inmanyrespects,Hooverwasright.NeitherPresidentGrantnor Clevelandwouldhavethoughttosummonthecreamofthebusiness worldtocoordinateajointpublic-privateresponsetothedepressions oftheirday.Indeed,itisdoubtfulthatatanytimepriortotheGreat Warbusinessmenwouldhavebeenwillingtodowhatleadingexecutivesdidin1929–30injoiningwiththeirrivalsinawell-publicized pledgetomaintainwageratesattheexpenseofproﬁts,ortoissuesolemnpromisesto“sharethework.”Whenbankscontinuedtofailinrecordnumbers,nopreviouspresident—notevenWilson—wouldhave thoughttocallbankerstoWashingtontoparticipateinarescueoperationtobackuptheFederalReserve’seasingofcredittomember banks.YetinearlyOctober1931,HoovergatheredleadingbankerstogetherattheornateWashingtonhomeofSecretaryMellonandwon theiragreementtocreatea$500millioncreditpooltoassistweakerinstitutions.61 Finally,whenthatprivateeffortﬁzzledout,noneofHoover’spredecessorswouldhaveconsideredcreatingsomethinglikethe ReconstructionFinanceCorporation(RFC)toprovidepublicloansto privateenterpriseinpeacetime.

CorporateleadersthemselveshadcomealongwaysincetheplutocraticdaysofthePanicof1907.Intheearlierepisode,PresidentRoosevelthadplayedsecondﬁddletotheleadingbankerintheland,and

themarkethadtakenprecedenceinamultimillion-dollarrescuepackage.Inthecrisisofthe1930s,however,theroleswerereversed,Hoovertookthelead,andthestateentereddirectlyintotheprocessofcapitalaccumulationtothetuneof$2billionintheﬁrstyearoftheRFC alone.TheshiftfromMorgan’sManhattanlibrarytoMellon’sWashingtonhomesymbolizedthegrowingimportanceofthefederalgovernment,whilethefactthattheloanswenttorailroads,banks,and otherlargeﬁrmspointstotheremainingpowerofthecorporateoligarchy.Itispossibletoimaginethisnewpowerstructureconsolidating apermanentrulingclass.

Asitwas,thatpossibilitywasruledoutbytheinstabilityandinsecuritybuiltintothecapitalistsystem.Astheeconomicdownturnof 1929–30becamethe“GreatDepression,”thepullofeconomicself-interestinthehighercirclesbecameglaringlyapparent.Internationalism hadattractedonlyaminoritywithinthenationalupperclasstobegin with,andnowthenationalismofthemajoritywasevidentineconomic policyasCongressraisedhightariffratesevenhigherinthe1931 Hawley-SmootTariff.Inasimilarvein,thecontinueddeclineinthe levelofeconomicactivityintheearly1930sexposedthesubmerged rockofself-interestbuiltinto“welfarecapitalism.”Neveramounting tomorethan2percentofpayrolls,corporate“welfare”wasmostextensiveinhealthandsafetymeasures,whereitrepaiddividendsinthe formofhigherproductivity.Forthesamereason,itwasleastextensive incashbeneﬁtsforaccidents,retirement,andunemployment,thevery areaswhereworkersneededitthemost.Withever-lengtheningbread linesmakingamockeryofwelfarecapitalism,upper-classcharitywas alsofallingshortasthecoffersofbenevolencewererapidlybeing draineddry.Allinall,thecorporaterichfailedmiserablytomeettheir responsibilitiestowardthepoor.62

Undertheseconditions,criticismofplutocracyreturnedinfull force.Sharpeningtheknivesforanattackontheoverweeningpower of“America’sSixtyFamilies,”onecriticechoedVebleninlambasting “thepoliticsofpecuniaryaggrandizement”and“thepressoftheplu-

tocracy.”Theworsethingsgot,themorevotersabandonedpro-businessRepublicanstosupportanincreasingnumberofDemocrats,notablyFranklinRooseveltin1932,alongwithagrowingnumberofthirdpartyprogressives.Lippmann’sswipeatthecorporaterich—“nobody seriouslyregardsthemashavingauthority”—wascomingtruewitha vengeance.Sothoroughwasthelossofthecorporatemystiquethat bigbanksandmunitionsmakerscameunderattackintheSenate’sNye CommitteeformanipulatingtheUnitedStatesintowhatwasnowseen asthedisasteroftheGreatWar.63

ProgressiveslikeCharlesBeardwonawidehearingfortheview thatreducingthepowerofbigbusinesswasanecessarysteptowarda non-interventionistforeignpolicy.ReviewingthehistoryoftheAmericanrepublicbetweentheSpanishAmericanWarandtheGreatDepression,Beardconcludedthat“foreignpolicyanddomesticpolicyare aspectsofthesamething.”Ateverycriticaljuncture,heargued,“controloverinternationalrelations”camedowntoastrugglefor“control overdomesticpoliciesandforces.”WorriedthatAmericanleaders mightbetemptedtorespondtothedepressionofthe1930swiththe samekindofimperialexpansionasin1898,Beardheldoutthevision ofamoreegalitarian“commonweal”athomeasthewaytokeepexpansionistsincheck.Eventsgavethisideasomesupportintheearly 1930swiththesimultaneousarrivaloftheNewDealandtheGood NeighborPolicy.FranklinRooseveltrepudiatedthe(Teddy)Roosevelt CorollarytotheMonroeDoctrine,abrogatedthePlattAmendment, andotherwiseturnedhisbackonthehabitofsendingthemarinesinto LatinAmericatocollectdebtsownedtoU.S.banks.Allinall,popular resistancetoconcentratedpowerwasﬁnallygainingtraction.64

Withthecorporaterichfallingoffthethrone,professionalelites wereheadingtoWashingtontotaketheirplace.Roosevelt’sNewDeal ﬂungopenthedoortomen(andahandfulofwomen)whohadbeen waitinginthewingsduringtheascendancyofcorporategrandees.As talentedlawyers,socialworkers,professors,andengineerssettowork, itsoonbecameclearthatRoosevelthadtappedarichsourceofcre-

180 AlanDawley

ativeenergy.WiththeNewDealpavingtheway,anewpoliticaleconomyemergedbythelate1940sinwhichmarketandstatewerereunited inaregulatoryregimethatbearscomparisontotheoldmercantilism oftheeighteenthcentury.InwhatbecameknownastheEstablishment, rejuvenatedcorporatecapitalistssharedpowerwiththebureaucratic andprofessionalprogenyoftheNewDealandwiththemilitary-industrialcomplexthatgrewoutoftheSecondWorldWar.

Inthemeantime,thesupremeironyoftheperiodfromthedepressionofthe1890stothedepressionofthe1930swasthatthecorporate richwereunabletomonopolizepoliticalpowerbecausetheyweretoo closelytiedtomoneymakingfortheirowngood.Tobesure,democratictraditionsandpopularprotestexercisedimportantchecksonupper-classpower.Butwhatﬁnallydidtheminwastheirinabilitytogo beyondthebottomlinewhenthesystemcouldnolongerdeliverthe goods.ItturnedoutHemingwaywasrightafterall.

ThelessonforthefutureofdemocracyinAmerica,however,isnot verycomforting.IfthecorporaterichintheEraofBigMoneyfailed tobecomearulingclass,itwasnotforlackoftrying.Whetherthe super-richofthetwenty-ﬁrstcentury,emboldenedbytheproﬁtsof globalization,deregulation,andprivatization,willsucceedinasimilar bidforuncheckedpowerremainstobeseen.Butthepossibilitycannot beruledout.

TheManagerialRevitalization oftheRich

JACKSONLEARS

Bythe1890s,theAmericanrulingclasshadgrowncorpulentand corrupt.Itsmemberswerethetargetofincreasingmoraloutragefrom reformersandthebuttofridiculefromsatiristslikeThorsteinVeblen, whoviewedtheirlavishwaysasmerelytheoutmodedexcrescenceofa plutocracyonthewayout.ButVeblen,itturnedout,wasegregiously mistaken.Duringtheﬁrstseveraldecadesofthetwentiethcentury,the Americanrulingclassremadeitself,notonlybycollaboratingwith publicpolicymakersbutalsobycreatingnewculturalvaluesandinstitutions.Thisrevitalizedcultureprovidedanunprecedentedsenseof élanandsolidaritythatﬂourisheduntiltheeconomiccollapseofthe early1930s,andsurvivedinvariousformswellintothepost–World WarIIera.

AccordingtoVeblen’sinfluentialscenario,flabbyplutocratshaddevolvedintoa“leisureclass”andwouldeventuallylacksufficientknowhowtorunthevastcorporationsthathadenrichedthem.A“new class”ofsalariedtechniciansandprofessionalswouldbecomethevanguardofamanagerialrevolution.Theseparationofownershipand

controlinthecorporationwouldopenthedoortoagenuinemeritocracy.SoVeblen,JamesBurnham,andothersinthistechnocratictraditionhoped,buteventsdevelopeddifferently.Somesortofmanagerial revolutionoccurred,butitneversubstitutedmanagersofcorporations fortheownersofcapitalasthenewmenofpower.Onthecontrary: theestablishedrulingclassusedthemanagerialethostorevitalizeand transformitsculturalhegemonyatacriticalhistoricalmoment.1

Attheturnofthelastcentury,therulingclasswasroiledbyinternal conﬂict—betweenlocalandcosmopolitan,patricianandparvenu,paternalistdutyandirresponsibleextravagance.Themanagerialidealof meritseemedtodissolvethesetensions,tocreateacommoncriterion forelitestatus.Tosustainlegitimacy,themeritocraticmodelhadto possessatleastsomeempiricalvalidity.Old-moniedleaderslikeTheodoreRooseveltandCharlesWilliamEliot(presidentofHarvardfor fourdecades)recognizedthis,andsoughttobroadentheWASPmainstreambyopeningeliteinstitutionstoambitiousoutsiders,evenifthey wereJewsorCatholics.Atthesametime,oldandnewuniversities alikebeganrevampingtheircurriculatoprovidethetechnicaltraining necessarytomanagetheemergingcorporateeconomy;thefounding ofHarvardBusinessSchoolin1907wasacaseinpoint.

Thestandardofmeritalsomeantthatestablishedeliteshadtodemonstratetheirleadershipinbusinessandpubliclife.Therewerevarious waystodothis.AsCharlesPoncedeLeonhasshown,corporateleadersusedthenew“profession”ofpublicrelationstotransformthemselvesfrom“robberbarons”into“industrialstatesmen”and“progressivephilanthropists.”Yettherhetoricofdutywasmorethanjust smokeandmirrors,atleastforsomeprominentmen.Roosevelt’s strenuousquestforpersonalrevitalization,forallitsmanicsilliness,led himfromprovincialsnobberyintoalifeoflastingpublicservice. EndicottPeabody’smissionwasequallysuccessful.UnderPeabody’s sternleadership,theGrotonSchoolaimedtoindoctrinatethesonsof therichinaseverecreedofpaternalisticresponsibilityforthelarger good.Morethanafewtookthiscreedseriously.2

Theremaderulingclassbecamemoremeritocratic(albeitlargely withinitsownranks)thantheoldrulingclasshadbeen,moreableto meetmanagerialdemandsforexpertiseandmoraldemandsforpublic service.MuchofthisrevitalizationinvolvedaretailoringofVictorian manlinesstomeetthedemandsofmodernity,butupper-classwomen alsoplayedacriticalrolethroughtheselectiveassimilationoffeminism,avant-gardeart,andothernovelformsofculturalexperiment. Judiciousattentiontomerit(inactualityaswellasappearance)providedfreshlegitimacyforexistingeconomicprivilege.

Yetalongsidethemeritocraticimpulsetowardopennesstherewasan equallypowerfultendencytowardethnocentrismandattachmenttoinventedAnglophiletraditions.Indeed,thisexclusivitywasacrucialpart ofthenewruling-classconsciousness.Despitetheemphasisonpublic serviceatGrotonandafewsimilarinstitutions,prepschoolsjoined countryclubsandmetropolitanmen’sclubsincreatingsitesofselfrecognitionforwealthyboysandmen.DoctrinesofAnglo-Saxonsupremacywerecodiﬁedinadmissionspoliciesatclubsandschools,culminatingintheJewishquotasestablishedatIvyLeagueuniversitiesin the1920s.Throughtheﬁrstthreedecadesofthetwentiethcentury, snobberyslowlygainedtheupperhandoverpublic-spiritedprinciple.3

Thiswaspartofasubtleshiftintherevitalizationoftheruling class,agradualtiltfrommoraltophysicalandpsychologicalstandards forsuccess.AlthoughRooseveltcameclosetocelebratingactionforits ownsake,tohimcharacterremainedcrucial.Butbythe1920s,moralityplayedanincreasinglymarginalroleinthemanagerialworldview. The“BigMen,”themenofmoment,wereexpectedtoradiateaconstantsupplyofenergy,or“vim.”Theywerealsoexpectedtoconform toyouthfulanduniformstandardsofphysicalattractivenessonthe Anglo-Saxonmodel.Thenewinstitutionsofnationaladvertisingand mass-marketedentertainmentcreatedasleeker,morestreamlinedsymbolicuniversefortherichtocavortin;intheadsandthemovies,establishedwealthwasexceptionallydeftataccommodatingitselftothe newworldofﬂappersandfastcars.The1920smarkedtheapogeeof

streamlinedruling-classstyle:richmen(atleastintheadvertisements) wereleaner,ﬁtter,andmoreenergeticbyfarthantheirGildedAge predecessors.Andrichwomenweremoreseductive.They(andtheir consorts)hadbecomeBeautifulPeople.4

Yetaleitmotifoflossremained.Fordecades,establishedeliteshad sustainedtheirpowerbydeclaringthatitwasindecline,orhadalready disappeared.Novelistscollaboratedinthisﬁction,throwingaveilof melancholyoverinheritedwealth:thegoldenageofprobitywasinthe past,thevulgarparvenurepeatedlydisplacedthediscriminatingbutineffectualpatrician.F.ScottFitzgeraldcomplicatedthosecategories, dissectingstatusrivalrieswithagimleteyebutintheendreinforcing theromanticnarrativeofthevulnerablerich,doneinbytheirown privilege.Fitzgeraldunderstoodhowquicklynewmoneycouldbelegitimatedthroughassociationwiththe“best”schoolsandclubs;he alsoknewhowimplacablythoseinstitutionscouldmaintaintheirexclusivity.Butmainlyheendowedtherichwithpsychologicaldepth.The BeautifulPeople,forFitzgerald,wereoftenBeautifulLosers,lonely andmisunderstoodandself-destructive.Theyinhabitedaglamorous, apoliticalrealm,lightyearsawayfromthemorallychargedarenaof theProgressiveEra.Andtheywerefarmoreinterestingthanbloated plutocrats.

In1929theBeautifulLosersbecamelosersinfactaswellasfiction. TheculturalapparatustheyhadcreatedwasshakenbytheGreat Depression,butitwasnotdestroyed.Advertisingiconstemporarily donnedoverallstoshowtheirsolidaritywiththeworkingclass;Hollywoodskeweredthepompofwealthandcelebratedtheplainfolk.But theleadinginvestmentbanksandWallStreetlawfirmsandadvertising agencies,theIvyLeagueuniversitiesandexclusiveprepschools,even thecountryclubsandrestrictedsummerresorts—alltheseinstitutions survivedandeventuallyevenflourishedagain.Norweretheydedicatedsolelytotheprotectionofnarrowclassinterests.Theethosof publicserviceresurfacedintheadministrationofFranklinRoosevelt, godsonofTheodoreandaGrotonalumnus.Recoveringasenseof

paternalisticresponsibilitywhilepreservingitsexclusivity,theruling classremainedavitalforce,despitethewidespreadassumptionthatit wasdyingoralreadydead.Westilllivewithitsheirs,manyofwhom continuetoexercisesigniﬁcanteconomicandpoliticalpower.Reports ofitsdeath,likethoseofMarkTwain’s,havebeengreatlyexaggerated.

TurnofaCentury:CrisisandRevitalization

Historianshavebecomewaryofinvoking“crisis”asanexplanation forAmericanculturalchange,andwithgoodreason.Fromearliest colonialtimes,AmericanpubliclifehasbeenpervadedbyProtestant aspirationsandanxieties—dreamsofcreatingarighteouscommunity, fearsthatthecommunityisfallingintomoraldegeneracy.Anemotionallychargedpoliticaldiscoursehasproducedextravagantexpectation andbitterdisappointment.Suchahyperventilatedatmosphereproducesconstanttalkofcrisis.SoitshouldcomeasnosurprisethathistorianshavefoundcrisesateveryturninAmericanhistory.

Nevertheless,onecanplausiblyclaimthatthelatenineteenthcenturywasamomentofgenuinecrisisinAmericanruling-classculture. Rarelyhaveelitesexpressedtheirinsecuritiessoopenly,forsucha widevarietyofreasons,astheydidinthedecadeorsoleadingupto 1900.Theplutocracythathadcommandeeredtheshipofstateseemed unabletokeepthecraftoncourse.SkillfulmonopolistslikeJohnD. Rockefeller,Sr.,hadrationalizedthechaosofentrepreneurialcapitalismtosuittheirinterests,buttheirenterpriseslackedlegitimacy. Theyfacedmountingchallengesfromanangryworkingclass,which feltdispossessedofskillsandsecurity,aswellasfrommiddle-andupper-classreformerswhowereappalledatthespectacleofsmallbusinessmensqueezedtobankruptcyandlegislaturespurchasedwholesale.5

Yetthesocialtensionswereonlythemostobviouspartofthecrisis. Whatreallysetelitespokesmentoworryingwasthesensethattheir own“leadershipclass”wasnotuptothechallengesitfaced.Menof

wealthseemedincreasinglyoblivioustoanysenseofpublicresponsibility.Oldrepublicanfearsaboutthecorruptingpowerofluxury seemedconﬁrmedbytheanticsoftherichatopulentresortslike SaratogaSprings,whereextravagantspendinganddisplaybecamethe norm.ConsiderthedubiousachievementofthedapperBerryWall, whokeptaroomattheUnitedStatesHotelinSaratogaSprings,and whobecameknownas“kingofthedudes”afterappearinginforty completechangesofcostumeoneAugustdayin1888.Thiswasthe sortofsillinessthatdroveVeblenandotherrepublicanmoralistscrazy. Forthem,escapadeslikeWall’sprovidedconclusiveevidencethatthe richwerebecomingeffeteandineffectual.6

Theproblemofelitedeclinewentbeyondmerefrivolity.Degenerationencompassedbody,mind,andspirit.Flabbybodieswereasignof decayingcharacter;revitalizationrequiredatougheningofmuscularas wellasmoralﬁber.Theagendaofrevitalizationwasinplacebythe 1890s,butithadbeeninthemakingforsometime.Duringthedecades aftertheCivilWar,afﬂuentandeducatedAmericans,especiallyincities,feltincreasinglycutofffromdirect,unmediatedexperienceand yearnedtoreconnectwith“reallife”throughpassionateaction.

Onesourceofthatyearning—especiallyamongmen—wasthewar itself.Memoriesandfantasiesofmilitaryheroismhelpedcreatemore secularandmoreinsistentlyphysicalmodelsofmaledevelopment. Theidealofmanlinessemergingafterthewar,asKimTownsend writes,was“stillanhonorableman,butnowastronger,atougher,a lessthoughtfulman”thanhismid-centurypredecessorshadbeen.The oldideal,observedaHarvardPhiBetaKappaspeakerin1894,wasan introspectivespiritualseekerwitha“toweringforehead,fromwhich thehairwascarefullybrushedbackwardsandupwardstogivethefull effecttohisremarkablephrenologicaldevelopment.”Thatwanﬁgure hadgivenwaytothenewathleticmanof“mass”and“power,”but therewasnoreasonwhythisfellowcouldnotbeagoodChristiantoo. Onthecontrary,thespreadof“MuscularChristianity”oncollege

campusesandotherplaygroundsofwell-to-doyouthgavemena chancetoreclaimreligionfrom“feminizing”inﬂuences.7

Theretoolingofthemaleidealwasnotsimplyanattempttorecoverwartimeheroism.Itwasalsoanefforttoencourageadjustment toamoreurban,moresedentary,andmorehighlyorganizedsociety. Tomanymoralists,thedepletionofruralpopulationwasatleast asdisturbingastheclosingofthefrontier.Urbanoccupations“doalmostnothingtomakeonesturdyandenduring,”observedthenovelist RobertHerrickin1895,strikingacommonchordofcomplaint.Nor wasthedangersimplyphysical:city-dwellingparentsdeprivedtheir offspringofthechancetodevelopthesuperior“farmbredmind,” warnedMyronScudder,anadvocateof“MuscularChristianity”anda leaderintheMenandReligionForwardmovement,in1910.Atthe sametime,theeconomywasbecomingmorebureaucratically“rational”aswellasmoreurbanandindustrial.Theemergingcorporatesystemposedfundamentalchallengestofamiliarideasofpersonalidentity.Salariedemployees(eveniftheywereattheexecutivelevel)no longerpossessed“theeconomicandmoralindependenceofformer days,”as TheIndependent observedin1903.Interdependenceloomed, andwithit(implicitly)weakness.8

Thespecterofdebilityhauntedwhite-collarmenatallsociallevels, fromtheexecutivetohisshippingclerk,butitwaspeculiarlydisturbingtothoseatthetop.Fortunatelyforthefateoftheirclass,though, elitemenhadbeenimplementinganagendaofrevitalizationinschools andcollegesforseveraldecades.By1900ithadbeguntobearfruit.

Thebest-knownembodimentofrevitalizationwasTheodoreRoosevelt,anearsighted,asthmaticboywhoturnedhisownstruggleto overcomeweaknessintoalessonforanentire“leadershipclass.”The strugglebeganearly.Whenhewastwelve,adoctortoldyoung “Teedie”thathemust“makehisbody”orhismindwouldlanguish. Theboyvowed,“I’llmakemybody.”Hebegantodevotehimselfto exercise,inauguratingaregimeoffreneticactivismthatheneveraban-

JacksonLears

doned.HisclassmatesatHarvardrememberedhimracingaboutthe Yard,allnoiseandbustle—acombinationofaggressivephysicality andunremarkableintellect.Devotedtobodilypurity,heneversmoked orswore,avoidedexcessivedrinking(ortriedto),andabstainedfrom premaritalsex.HewonadmissiontoalltherightHarvardclubs,includingthePorcellian,theholyofholies.Combiningclassprejudice, Victorianmorality,andphysicalvigor,Rooseveltwastheidealmanto rallyarulingclassbesetbyfearsofdecay.9

Roosevelt’spoliticalascentepitomizedtherestorationofcharacter andpublicresponsibilityinelitemen.Forhimatleast,theprojectinvolvedsheddingsomeofhisinheritedsnobberyandethnocentrism.As aNewYorkStateassemblymaninthe1880s,hediscoveredthatheenjoyedthecompanyoflowerManhattancharacterslikeJakeHess,a GermanJew,andJoeMurray,anIrishCatholic.Theyhelpedcorral ethnicvotesforRoosevelt,andhe,inturn,begantopaysomeattention toworking-classneeds—asinhissponsorshipofastatelawrestricting themanufactureofcigarsintenements.AsNewYorkCitypolicecommissionerduringthe1890s,hejoinedJacobRiis’sefforttodiscover “howtheotherhalflives.”Hissympathyfortheimpoverishedgrew alongsidehisdistasteforracialandreligiousbigotry.Hedefined“True Americanism”in1894asthecreationof“acommunityofinterest amongourpeople”thattranscendedethnicdivisionsandpromoted “fairtreatment”forall.Andinhispresidentialadministrationheincludednotonlymuscular(Protestant)ChristianslikeGiffordPinchot, WilliamPhillips,andHenryStimsonbutalsoCharlesBonaparte,apatricianCatholicfromMaryland,assecretaryofthenavyandOscar Straus,thefirstJewishmemberofapresidentialcabinet,assecretary ofcommerceandlabor.And—totheoutrageofsouthernsenators— hedinedwithBookerT.WashingtonintheWhiteHouse.Indeed,his commitmenttomeritocracyandnoblesseobligeintensifiedashiscareer advanced,leadinghimfromtheSquareDealpoliciesofhispresidency totheProgressivePartyplatformof1912,whichanticipatedmostof thewelfarestatecreatedbytheNewDeal.10

Rooseveltepitomizedthecomingofthemanagerialrevolutionto theWhiteHouse.Morethananypresidentbeforehim,heaimedtoput technicalexpertiseattheserviceofthecommonweal—professionalizing,ineffect,theoldrepublicantradition.Thiswasapparentinhis pioneeringadvocacyofwildernessconservationthroughefficientmanagement.Theconservationmovementsoughttoprofessionalizethe ForestServiceinthenameofprotectingcertainsacredspaces,manyof whichresonatedwithfrontiermythology(asrepresentedinRoosevelt’sown WinningoftheWest).Conservationwasbothamovetowardmoreefficientmanagementandaninstrumentofruling-class solidarity.Meritocraticidealsofefficiencymeldedwithethnocentric mythsofmasculinitytoratifyeliterule.Thisdoublenesstypifiedthe managerialrevolutionintheUnitedStates,asitdidRoosevelthimself.

Forallhisegalitarianismandtolerance,therewasanothersideto TheodoreRoosevelt—thesidethatcelebratedtheDarwinianstruggle betweennationsandbelievedinregenerationthroughempire.Afterhis ownstruggletoovercomeweakness,Rooseveltwassimplyunableto separatemoralcouragefromphysicalcourage.Forhimtheformation ofcharacterwouldalwaysbeﬁrmlyrootedinﬂeshandbone.Thisobsessionwithbodilymanlinessmadehimsusceptibletomilitaristandracialistfantasies.Warwastheultimatetestofmenandnations,and preparationforitbeganinthewomb.Theopponentofbigotrystill worriedthatold-stockAmericanswerecommitting“racesuicide,”and maderegenerationaprojectinrecoveringWASPmanhood.During hispresidency,Roosevelt’sspeakingengagementsbecameamagnetfor largefamilies,someholdingsignsthatread“NoRaceSuicideHere!” InRedlands,California,in1903,Rooseveltremarked:“Thesightof thesechildrenconvincesmeofthetruthofastatementmadebyGov. Pardee,whenhesaidthatinCaliforniathereisnodangerofracesuicide.Youhavedonewellinraisingoranges,andIbelieveyouhave donebetterraisingchildren.”11

TheconnectionbetweenCaliforniaandfecunditywasnotfortuitous.BytheearlytwentiethcenturytheWestwasawell-knownsiteof

regenerationforeasterndudes.Roosevelthimselfhadpopularized theideawithhisforayintotheBlackHillsinthe1880s,whichprovidedhimabundantopportunitiesforvirileself-assertion.Whena foulmouthedbullytauntedhimrepeatedlyas“four-eyes,”thewellbredeasternercouldtakeitnolonger:“AsIrose,Istruckquickand hardwithmyrightjusttoonesideofthepointofhisjaw,hittingwith myleftasIstraightenedout,andthenagainwithmyright ...When hewentdownhestruckthecornerofthebarwithhishead...hewas senseless.”Sometimesamanhadtodowhatamanhadtodo—even, perhapsespecially,ifhewasagentleman.ForRooseveltasformany ofhiscontemporaries,bodyandmindweretwinnedthroughunquestioningadherencetoafewunchanging,bedrockprinciples:fairplay, personalhonor,moralandphysicalcourage.12

Strongvirtueexistedapartfromprivilege.The“entirelyoriginal Americangentleman”couldbefoundontheDakotaprairiesaswellas theplayingfieldsofHarvard,accordingtoRoosevelt’sfriendandadmirerOwenWister,whoalsoplayedacrucialroleincreatingtheWest asavenueforupper-classrevitalization.TheprotagonistofWister’s novel TheVirginian (1902)embodiedtheemergingidealofthetoughened-upgentleman.Afigureoffewwords,slowtoangerbutimplacableinhisquietsenseofpersonalhonor,heisathomeontherangebut alsointhecompanyofbooks(providedtheyhaveplentyofaction) andrefinedwomen.Wistermadeitplain:atouchofwesternspontaneitycouldsavegildedyouthfromtheeasterndiseasesofmorbidselfconsciousness,perpetualindecision,andparalysisofthewill.13

WilliamJamesagreed.In1903hefrettedopenlythat“thePh.D.Octopus”wouldensnarethoughtfulgraduatestudents,transformingthem intodroneswholacked“individualityandbaremanhood.”Threeyears later,reﬂectingon“thesocialvalueofthecollegebred”toanaudience atStanfordUniversity,Jameswarnedagainstthe“sterilizedconceit” and“priggishness”ofupper-classsocialandintellectualcoteries.“If democracyistosurvive,itmustcatchthehigher,healthiertone,” Jameswarned,andnoonewasmorecrucialtosettingthattonethan

college-bredmen(and,lessexplicitly,women).Hereturnedtothe themeofrevitalizationin“TheMoralEquivalentofWar”(1910),envisioninganationwidecivilianbootcampforthe“luxuriousclasses”: “Tocoalandironmines,tofreighttrains,toﬁshingﬂeetsinDecember,todish-washing,clothes-washing,andwindow-washing,toroadbuildingandtunnel-making,tofoundriesandstoke-holes,andtothe framesofskyscrapers,wouldourgildedyouthsbedraftedoff,accordingtotheirchoice,togetthechildishnessknockedoutofthem,andto comebackintosocietywithhealthiersympathiesandsobererideas.”14

James,inshort,sharedalotofconcernswithTheodoreRoosevelt, andforacoupleofyearsJameseventhoughtthatRooseveltwouldbe agoodcandidatetosucceedCharlesWilliamEliotaspresidentofHarvard.ButultimatelyRooseveltwastoorelentlesslyanti-intellectual forJames.“Youcollegemen,”theformerRoughRiderbellowedout toanaudienceofHarvardstudentsin1907,“bedoersratherthancriticsofthedeedsthatothersdo.”Jameswasdisgustedbythismindlessactivism.Hisideaofrevitalizationwasthereconnectionofthe “luxuriousclasses”tothedifficultiesroutinelyexperiencedbytherest oftheworld’spopulation;thismightmakethembetterdemocrats, morehumaneandpublic-spiritedleaders,Jamesthought.Jameswas alsoanintellectual,ananti-imperialist,andapacifistinsearchofa “moralequivalentofwar.”ForRoosevelt,therewasnosuchequivalent.Nothingcouldmeasureuptothebracingchallengeofthebattlefield.15

Rooseveltandhiscircledevelopedacrucialcounterargument againstantimodernmilitaristslikeBrooksAdams,whoclaimedthatthe martialvirtueshadwitheredwiththeriseofbourgeoissociety.Onthe contrary,Rooseveltandotherimperialistsinsisted,awarintheservice ofAmericancommercialexpansioncouldbeasmorallyregenerativeas anyfoughtforreligiousorpatrioticends.Indeed,allthesemotives couldbecombinedwiththerestorationofmanliness:thiswasthecore oftheimperialists’civilizingmission.Thealternative,AlfredThayer Mahanwarnedin1897,wasaslideintodegeneracycomparabletoan-

cientRome’s.Therewasadisturbingparallel,Mahanthought,betweenthecontemporaryUnitedStatesandimperialRomeafterithad abandonedits“strongmasculineimpulse”and“degeneratedintothat worshipofcomfort,wealth,andgeneralsoftnesswhichistheidealof thepeaceprophetsofto-day.”Thereassertionofmasculinevigorled directlytowarforempire.16

Leadingeducatorsstressedtheconnectionbetweentheplayingfield andthebattlefield,between“manlysports”atcollegeandimperialadventuresabroad.“Thetimegiventoathleticcontests...andtheinjuriesincurredontheplayingfieldarepartofthepricetheEnglishspeakingworldhaspaidforbeingworld-conquerors,”saidSenator HenryCabotLodgein1896.Sixyearslater,afterthevanquishingof SpainandtheconquestofthePhilippines,PresidentEliotofHarvard announcedthatheandhisfacultywereengagedinthecreationofan Americanaristocracy:“Thearistocracywhichexcelsinmanysports, carriesoffthehonorsandprizesinthelearnedprofessionsandbears itselfwithdistinctioninallfieldsofintellectuallaborandcombat;the aristocracywhichinpeacestandsfirmestforthepublichonorandrenown,andinwarridesfirstintothemurderousthickets.”TheAmericanaristocrat’spathledfrom“manlysports”throughmeritorious achievementsthatendedin“murderousthickets.”Athleticprowessand imperialleadershipweretwinned,forEliot(despitehisdistrustof football)asforCecilRhodes.Inhiswill,whichcreatedtheRhodes scholarship,theBritishimperialistlisted“fondnessofandsuccessin manlyoutdoorsports”asoneofthechiefcriteriafortheaward.Sport wasensconcedinthescholarshipawardthatrevivifiedtheAngloAmericanelite.17

Stillthechallengeofempirecouldprovideonlysporadicregeneration;noteventhebellicoseRooseveltwasanadvocateofpermanent war.Creatingandsustainingavital“leadershipclass”—whatlaterbecameknownasan“Establishment”—wasaconstanttask,newwith eachnewgeneration.Thegoalwasnottrivial.Toleadinademocracy, eliteshadtotaketheideaofpublicdutyseriously,eveniftheydeﬁned 192 JacksonLears

itaccordingtotheirclass-blinkeredvisionofsociety.Thiswasasubtle paternalism,temperedbyidealsofsocialresponsibility,andsuperiorin manywaystothe“deviltakethehindmost”creedoflaissez-faire.Yet, likemostruling-classcreeds,itconﬂatedtheinterestsofanarrowelite withthoseofsocietyandindeedhumanityatlarge.Thisoutlook blendedsincerebeliefanddisingenuousstrategy.Tomaintainlegitimacyinademocraticculturethatdistrustedinheritedwealthandeven denieditsexistence,eliteshadtodisguisetheirinheritedprivilegeand embraceameritocraticstandard—oratleastappeartoembraceit. Theyhadtocometoterms,inshort,withthemanagerialethosofexpertise,evenastheypreservedconnectionstoanactualandimagined past.Andtheymanagedtopulloffthiscomplicatedtaskformuchof thetwentiethcentury.

ReclaimingAuthorityinaManagerialAge

Onekeytotheremakingoftherulingclasswasthesocializationof itsyoung.EvenwhileWilliamJameswasworryingabout“gilded youths,”educatorsyoungerthanhewererevampingprepschoolsand collegestoinculcateasenseofpublicresponsibility—class-boundbut genuine—intheirstudents.Afeweliteacademieshadexistedsincethe eighteenthcentury(AndoverandPhillipsExeter,fortwo),butitwas notuntilthe1880sand1890sthatthemodernprepschoolemergedas aninstrumentofruling-classsocialization.Likeothercustodiansofthe (allegedlystatic)genteeltraditioninthelatenineteenthcentury,educatorswerecaughtupina“strenuousmood.”In1884thefoundersof theGrotonSchoolchoseEndicottPeabodyastheschool’sﬁrsthead, withtheexpressmissionofrestoringphysicalandmoralﬁbertothe sonsoftherich.PeabodypursuedthatgoalbycreatingwhatthesociologistErvingGoffmannwouldcalla“totalinstitution”whereboys wereconstantlysupervisedandsubjecttoSpartandiscipline.Thisregimewasinplacefordecades;AverellHarrimanandDeanAcheson remembereditwithbitternessfromtheirtimethereinthetwenties. TheManagerialRevitalizationoftheRich

JacksonLears

YetHarrimanandAchesonwerejustthesortofpublicﬁguresthat Groton’ssystemwasdesignedtoproduce.18

Ofcourse,thesystemwasnotfoolproof.AGrotonalumnusnamed GeorgeMartinrememberedthatPeabodyconstantlyadvisedtheboys “togointotheprofessionsandkeepawayfromWallStreet,”butMartinthoughtthisadvicefellondeafears.AlthoughPeabody“urgedthe boystobetruetothemselvesanddropoutoftheirparents’income class,theydidnothearhim.Theyweregoingtomakeenoughmoney tosendtheirsonstoGroton.”Therhetoricofdutygrewtiresometo studentslikeEllerySedgwick,latereditorofthe AtlanticMonthly. “Inseasonandout,”Sedgwickrecalled,“publicservicewasheldupto everyboyasashininggoal.ItisGod’smercythatallofusdidn’tgo intoit!”19

Still,manyofthemdid.ThehistorianJamesMcLachlanreports:

In1933,shortlybeforeitsﬁftiethanniversary,thistinyschool withfewerthanathousandalumnioutofcollegecouldnumber amongitsgraduatesonemanservingaspresidentoftheUnited States;twomenwhohadservedasSecretaryofState;threesenators;acongressman;ministersorambassadorstoJapan,Turkey, Canada,Denmark,Greece,Switzerland,theDominicanRepublic,ElSalvador,andCuba;agovernor-general;twostategovernors;twoassistantsecretariesofthenavy;oneoftheTreasury; oneoftheArmy;twolieutenant-governors;apolicecommissionerofNewYorkCity;acivilservicecommissionerofNew York,andagovernoroftheFederalReserveBank.20

NorwasGrotonalone.Throughtheearlydecadesofthetwentieth century,Choate,PhillipsExeter,andotherprominentprepschools compiledcomparablerecordsofplacingalumniinpubliclife.They wereengagedinacommonenterprise—themeldingofpatricianand parvenuintoacoherentrulingclass.Theircurriculaemergedonly graduallyfromtherigidclassicismofthetraditionalacademy,with

mathematicsandsciencelaggingbehindliterature,butacademicexpertisewaslessimportantthaneducatingthewholeman.Intheaccentsof muscularChristianity,educatorspresentedavisionoflifeatthetopas adifficultmoralstruggle.Beingrichandinfluentialwasnopicnic; powerandpainweretwinned.Envelopedinasceticidealsofduty,the privilegedyoungwereexhortedto“besomebody”(notthecontemporary“beyourself.”)Thiswaspartlyold-fashionedProtestantmoralism,butthepedagogicalbrewwasflavoredwithotheringredientsas well.After1900,successincreasinglyrequiredconformitytonewly standardizedidealsofphysicalvitalityandattractiveness.Tobesomebody,youhadtolooklikesomebody—vigorous,young,andpreferablyAnglo-Saxon.IntheAnglophileatmosphereoftheprepschool, standardswereespeciallyrigidandethnocentric:theright“look”was essentialtostatusascent,andevenstatussurvival.21

Theprepschoolpreparedtheprivilegedyoungforrule.Adozenor soprivatesecondaryschoolsconstitutedthechiefsluicewayintoIvy Leaguecollegesandfromthereintokeyeconomic,political,andculturalinstitutions—the“best”lawﬁrmsandinvestmentbanksanduniversities,thebluechipcorporations.Whilethiswastheworldthatwas supposedlybeingtransformedintoameritocracy,admissiontoitremainedlargelygovernedbyclass,ethnic,andgenderrestrictions.Duringtheearlytwentiethcentury,eliteapologistsdidlittletodenythose restrictions,buttheydidbegintherefrainthatlaterbecameamantra: theseboysareherebecausethey’rethe“best.”22

Ahandfulofeducatorstriedtomakethatclaimreal.Peabodywas one;CharlesEliotwasanother.LikeRoosevelt,hesoughtaninfusion ofnewbloodfromnon-WASPsources.Thecontemporaryrhetoricof “diversity”hasmanyantecedents,butpartofitslineagecanbetraced toEliot’s“AmericanDemocracy,”aspeechhegavein1902.While “thedemocracypreservesandusessoundoldfamilies,”hesaid,“it alsoutilizesstrongbloodfromforeignsources.”AccordinglyHarvard admissionsbegantocastawidernet,seekingmorestudentsfromethnicminorities.BythetimeEliotretiredin1909,outofabout2,100stu-

dentstherewerefiveAfricanAmericans,eightItalianAmericans,fifty IrishAmericans,andfifty-sixJewishAmericans;amongtheforeign studentstherewerethirty-threeRussianJewsandnineteenChinese. Thisethnicdiversity,howeverlimited,providedaccessfortheoccasionalbrilliantoutsider(suchasWalterLippmann,classof1910);it alsoprovidedlegitimacyforthenewmeritocraticcreed.Sodidthe electivesystem,whichEliotsubstitutedforthecreakingclassicalcurriculum.Theyoungmenwhohadtheself-disciplinetochoosetheir owncourses,Eliotbelieved,wereAmerica’srightfulelect.23

YetbothEliotandhissuccessor,AbbottLawrenceLowell,assumed thatthemeritocracytheyweredesigningwouldcontinuetobestocked by“thedescendantsofold,well-to-doAmericanfamilies.”Indeed, LowelldidhisbesttoensurethisbyinstitutingtheinfamousquotasystemforJews.ClassdivisionspersistedatIvyLeagueschoolsevenas theyweremodernizingtheircurriculaandclaimingtoembraceanew meritocraticmodel.Similarpatternsdevelopedatpublicuniversities outsidetheNortheast.Fraternities,eatingclubs,sportsteams,secret societies,andotherstatus-markingorganizationsproliferatedoncollegecampusesfromHarvard,Yale,andPrincetontoBerkeleyandVirginia.Extracurricular“collegelife”enhancedelitesolidarityandselfawareness.Despitecollegepresidents’rhetoric,thiswasnotagolden ageofmerit.Itwasaroundtheturnofthecentury,afterall,thatthe “gentleman’sC”appeared.24

Womenremainedakeypartofthispicture,andnotmerelyasreplenishersofAnglo-Saxonstock.Theyalsooversawtherealmofleisure,whichwasgrowingmoreimportanttothemaintenanceofrulingclasshegemony.Moreculturalinstitutionsappearedtoprovidevenues forelitestomingle,celebratethemselves,andrecognizeoneanother— aswellasre-createtheirenergiesforthecompetitivefray.Somewere stagsettingslikethemetropolitanmen’sclubs,butmanywerepresided overbywomen.

Amongthemweretheritualsofelitesociety,thecomingoutpartiesandweddingsthatwereincreasinglystagedinpublicvenuesand

bathedintheglareofnewspaperpublicity.Barriersbetweenprivate andpublicbecamemoreporous,ineverythingfrominteriordesign (whichstressedtheneedforﬂowbetweeninsideandoutside)tosociety pagereporting.Therichwerejoiningthedramatispersonaeofthe emergingcelebrityculture.Ruling-classleisurewasbecomingmoreinformalandmorepublic,andwomenacquiredfamesimplyforthepartiestheythrew.Theonly“democratic”featureoftheseritualswas theiravailabilityintheemergingmassmedia,wheretheycouldprovidevicariousentertainmenttoanaudiencehungryfortitillation.25

Yetafter1900,ruling-classwomenhadmoreseriousambitionsas well.Theyplayedanincreasinglyvisibleandimportantroleincultural institutionsthathadpreviouslybeencontrolledbymen—museums, artgalleries,orchestras.Intheimposingnewinstitutionsfundedby womenlikeIsabellaStewartGardnerandGertrudeWhitney,artbecamesacredandprofessionalataboutthesametime.Onceagainthe allegedlyanemic“genteeltradition”provedadaptabletothechallenges ofmanagerialmodernity.Ifonlybyvirtueoftheirwealthandtaste, richwomenwereabletolegitimatetheavant-gardeformsofartthat hadscandalizedthepreviousgeneration—GertrudeWhitneyinthe MuseumofAmericanArt(opened1931)thatbearshername,and AbbyRockefeller,evenmoreemphatically,intheMuseumofModern Art(opened1929).Ruling-classwomenmadesurethattheirculture wasﬂexibleenoughtoaccommodateandeventuallycanonizemodernism.Liketheirmalecounterparts,theyrefusedtorestcontentwith Victoriangentility,recognizingthatopennesstomeritrequiredopennesstoartisticexperimentaswell.26

Wealthywomenalsospreadclasslegitimacythroughphilanthropic giving,notonlybyencouragingtheirhusbands’stewardship(asrich men’swivesfromAbbyRockefellertoMelindaGateshavedone)but alsobycontributingtheirown.TheAmericanversionoftheToryradical(oratleasttheToryprogressive)wasbornintheyearsafter1900, oftenenoughamongold-moneyWASPs.JaneAddams,fundraising forHullHouse,usedtosaythatshecouldraisealmostasmuchmoney

inasummeronMountDesertIsland(aMainecoastretreatforold Yankeemoney)asshecouldtherestofthewholeyear.Theleisurely paceofresortlifeprovedconducivetogenerosity.27

Richpeoplehadbeencongregatingatseasideandmountainretreats sincetheantebellumera,butduringtheearlytwentiethcenturythese settingsbecamemoresociallysigniﬁcant.Theywere,amongother things,statustestinggrounds,opportunitiesforoldmoneyandnew, easternandwesternelites,tocultivatetheﬁnerpointsofsnobbery.At NewportonesultrydayinAugust1906,EdwardWharton(Edith’s husband)thumbedhiswayhomefromtowninabutcher’scart.Accordingtolocallore,anouveauriche“westerner”(whichcouldhave meanthewasfromChicagoorPittsburgh)sawWhartonandsaid,“I wouldn’tdothatifIwereyou.”TowhichWhartonreplied,“No,ifI wereyou,Iwouldn’tdothateither.”ButtheWestcouldturnthetables,too.“Onesimplydoesn’tweardiamondsinthedaytime,”clucked anelderlyPalmBeachmatrontoayoungerwomanfromDenver.“I thoughtnottoo,”saidthelatter,“untilIhadthem!”28

Butultimatelytheresortsweremoreimportantforbringingtherich togetherthanfordemarcatingdifferencesamongthem.Dozensoflocalsettingsservedregionalelites,butthenationalrulingclasscametogetheratwateringplacesdominatedbytheAnglophilenortheastern set—Newport,BarHarbor,TuxedoPark(NewJersey),andPalm Beach,alongwithdozensoflesser-knownspotssuchasJekyllIsland, Georgia.Thenearlyuniversalpolicyofacceptingmembershipcards fromcomparable-statusclubsinotherregionsreinforcedthecohesion ofthemembers,remindingthemoftheircommonparticipationina nationalelite.AnothercentripetalforcewastheexclusionofJews (alongwithAfricanAmericansandotherpeopleofcolor).Thisprohibition,enforcedbymostprivateclubsthroughouttheearlytwentieth century,sometimescaughtuptheoccasionalJewishmeritocrat.Once thePalmBeachBathandTennisClubsentalettertoitsmembersrequestingthattheyrefrainfrombringingJewishgueststotheclub.This

TheManagerialRevitalizationoftheRich

provokedBernardBaruch,aprominentJewishmember,toresign.But asapillaroftheEstablishment,hedidsoquietly.29

Likeprepschoolsandcolleges,clubscreatedacollectiveidentityfor moversandshakers.InAugust1930,whenthejournalistJamesGerard identified“64MenWhoRunAmerica,”fiftyofthemwere“menabout clubs.”“Theythemselves,”Gerardwrote,“aretoobusytoholdpoliticaloffice,buttheydeterminewhoshallholdsuchoffices.”Thiswasa self-importantexaggeration(particularlyforthathistoricalmoment, whenthepowerofestablishedeliteswaswaveringintheaftermathof themarketcrash),butitaccuratelycapturedapersistentpointofview. Alongwithahealthydoseofarrogance,theoutlookofthe“men aboutclubs”containedastrongtraceofpaternalism,anassumption thatrichmenhadadutyaswellasarighttointerveneinpublicaffairs. ThiswastheattitudethatledtheagedandailingJ.P.Morgantoask hisfriendGeorgeHarvey,theeditorof Harper’s, toconveyamessage tothenewlyelectedPresidentWoodrowWilson.Morgan,noDemocrat,hadopposedWilson,butnowheaskedHarveytotellthepresidentthat“ifthereshouldevercomeatimewhenhethinksanyinfluenceorresourcesthatIhavecanbeusedforthecountry,theyare whollyathisdisposal.”Morganembodiedthecombinationofold money,managerialacumen,andpaternalistmagnanimitythatcharacterizedtheremaderulingclassofthepre–WorldWarIera.30

Withrespecttoleisure,Morganwasatransitionalﬁgure.Partaestheteandconnoisseur,heacquiredobjetsd’artforthesensuousenjoymenttheyprovidedhim—apleasurehardlyreducibleto“conspicuous consumption.”Buthiscollectingtripstookplaceinawhirlofmanic energy.Ontherareoccasionswhenhedidslowdown,hehadtherapeuticendsinview.ForhimasforotherdrivenVictorianmen,play wasre-creationofmindandbody;itsaimwastoreadythemforthe rigorsoftheworkplace.WheneverMorganorhiscontemporariesfelt adebilitatingboutofneurastheniacomingon,theydroppedeverythingandtookoffonalongsea voyage. Thiswasthecharacteristic

manic-depressivepatternoftheoldrulingclass:intenseworkpunctuatedbyperiodicandsometimesextendedbreakdowns.Theremaderulingclass,incontrast,embracedamanagerialethosofcontinuous “peakperformance.”Nervousbreakdownshadtoﬁtintoatighter schedule.Longsea voyages werenotontheagenda,andeventemporarystillnesswasasignofdefeat.

Thenewandmoredemandingperformanceethicwasepitomizedby FrederickWinslowTaylor,the“father”ofscientiﬁcmanagement.His careerrevealedhowtheappearanceoftechnicalexpertisecouldrevitalizetheculturalhegemonyofinheritedprivilege.Apamperedsonof MainLinePhiladelphia,Taylorgrewimpatientwiththeindolentways ofinheritedwealth.LikeTheodoreRoosevelt(hisnearcontemporary),Taylorsoughtpastimesmoredemandingthanorganizingpolo matchesorloungingatAlpinespas.AtPhillipsExeterAcademy,he drovehimselftolonghoursofstudyandeventuallyhadtowithdraw owingto“eyestrain”inthemiddleofhisjunioryear.Itwasthecharacteristicnervousbreakdownoftheupperbourgeoisie,thoughitoccurredalittleearlierthanmost.Taylor’sself-treatment,incontrast, wasstrikinglyatoddswithculturalconventionsandfamilyexpectations,thoughitanticipatedtheﬁn-de-sièclelongingstoconnectwith “reallife.”31

Aftereighteenmonthsofdepressionandindecision,Taylortooka jobasanapprenticepatternmakeratafamilyfriend’sfactory,the Ferrell&Jonespumpworks,makingwoodenpatternsforironmolds. Itwasadifﬁcultanddemandingtask,butforTaylortheworkwassatisfying.Whathelearnedofmaterialsandtechniquesseemedtohima secretknowledge,unavailabletohisfoppishfriendsbackontheMain Line.UnlikeTeddyRoosevelt,whoneverpretendedhewasanything butaneasterngentlemanoutWest,Taylorwantedtobeoneofthe boys.Hetookupcursing,thoughsoineptlythattheresultswereoften comic.32

Taylor’sawkwardswearingcapturedtheanomaliesofhissituation. Hisrebellionagainstgentilitywasconstrainedbyhisprivilege.Hewas

notlookingatalife’sworkasapatternmaker,andeveryoneknewit. Afterafewmonthshewasofftoanotherapprenticeshipasamachinist (alsoatFerrell&Jones).HetooksixmonthsofftoworkatthePhiladelphiaCentennial,whereherepresentedagroupofNewEngland machinetoolmanufacturerstopotentialforeignbuyers—anotherjob thatcamethroughafamilyconnection.Finallyin1878hecompleted hisapprenticeshipatFerrell&Jonesandtookamachinist’sjobatMidvaleSteelCompany.MembersoftheMidvalehierarchywerefrequent guestsattheTaylors’dinnertable.Anotherfriendofafriendwasthe presidentoftheStevensInstituteofTechnologyinHoboken,where Taylormanagedtoobtainadegreeinmechanicalengineeringwithouteverattendingaclass.Everywhereheturned,Fredfoundfamily friendsinkeypositions.Hiseffortsatsolidaritywiththeworkerswere alwayscompromisedbyhisclassconnections.33

ThisbecameplainwhenTaylorwaspromotedtoforemanofamachineshopatMidvale.Obsessedwithincreasingproductivityinaresistantworkforce,hedevisedadifferentialpiecerate,whichpaidmore toworkerswhoproducedmore.Toﬁxthehigherrate,Taylorbroke eachjobintosegments,timedtheswiftestpossibleperformanceof each,andreassembledthemtodemonstrate“theonebestway”tomachinealocomotivewheeloroverhaulaboiler.AsproductivityatMidvaleincreased,Taylor’sreputationspread,andin1890helefttheplant totakeupfreelanceworkastheﬁrst“managementconsultant.”34

Taylorspentmuchofhiscareer,untilhisdeathin1915,searchingforscientiﬁclawintheworkplace,butitisanopenquestionhow muchhefoundthereandhowmuchheputthere.Themoreclosely oneexamineshis“science,”themorespuriousitseems.Calculations werebasedonarbitrarilychosenﬁgures.Theappearanceofprecision countedformorethantheactuality.(OneofTaylor’sassistantsroutinelyrecordedthreesecondsas“.00083hours.”)Fromtheoutsetthe resultsweremixed.Fewworkerswerewillingtoenduretheoppressive toilrequiredtobecomea“high-pricedman.”Afterseveraldaysof Taylor’sexperimentsinincreasingproductivityatBethlehemSteel,for

example,onlythecloddish“Schmidt”(describedatlengthin Principles ofScientificManagement)wasleftfromtheoriginalgroupoften workersTaylorhadpickedfortheirspeed,strength,andcommitment. WhenTaylorrecalledhisstintatBethlehemin Principles, heputatriumphantfaçadeonwhatwasactuallyadisaster.Scientificmanagement didnotlastatBethlehem;its“science”wasbogus,itthrewtheplant intoturmoil,anditsfailuregotTaylorfired.YetTaylorturnedthe Bethlehemexperienceintoaparableofprogress,akeymomentinthe inexorablemovementtowardutopianharmonybetweenworkersand managers.Submissiontoscience,theimpartialarbiter,wouldrender oldclasshatredsobsolete.Meritocraticstandardswouldcanceltheconflictbetweenlaborandcapital.35

Inconflatinghisownnarrowclassinterestwiththeinterestsofthe entiresociety,Tayloradoptedauniversalizingrhetoricalstrategyfamiliartoapologistsforwealthandpower.Buthisscientificidiomresonatedwithparticularforceintheearlytwentiethcentury.Faithinthe neutralityoftechnicalexpertisewasthecoreofthemanagerialethos, andscientificmanagementappealedtoabroadswathoftheAmerican population.ButitdidnotappealtotheworkersattheWatertownArsenalinMassachusettsandtheRockIslandArsenalinIllinois.When theHouseLaborCommitteeheldhearingstoinvestigateworkers’ grievances,Taylorwascalledtotestify.Ashesquirmedonthestand, thecommitteechair,WilliamWilson,skeweredhissystem’sclaimsto science,pointingoutthatemployerscouldusetimeandmotionstudy toservetheirownends,tocreatetheirownself-interesteddefinitions ofunproductivework.“Itceasestobescientificmanagementthemomentitisusedforbad,”Taylorrespondedlamely.Afterthisweakperformance,Tayloraskedforatranscriptofhissworntestimony,which hewas(amazingly)allowedtorewritecompletely,puttinghisstatementsinastrongerlight.Privilegecontinuedtoconferpower.The finalcommitteereportrebukedTaylor,butonlymildly,anditdid nothingtostopthespreadofTaylorismthroughoutAmericanindustry.Duringthe1920s,unionsweakenedandgraduallycededcontrol

overthelaborprocessinexchangeforhigherwages.Intheliterature ofmanagementtheory,Taylor’sworkacquiredcanonicalstatus: Principles becamethe ur-textofanacademicdiscipline.Asbusinessschools multiplied,theneutrallanguageofsocialsciencewouldprovidelegitimacyforwhatremainedalargelyclass-boundintellectualproject.36

Butacademicprestigealonewasinsufﬁcienttounderwritethenew, managerialversionofruling-classculturalhegemony.Evenifoneaccepteditsclaimsto“science,”Taylorismwasstillabloodlessparody ofeconomicrationality,themoreegregiouslysoasmorecomplexvisionsofhumannaturebecamepopularizedamongtheprofessional elite.Asearlyasthe1920s,evenmanagementtheoristsbegantoformulatemorepsychologicallysophisticatedapproachestoworkers’motivation.Psychologybecameakeycomponentofthedevelopingmanagerialethos—notjustasatoolformanipulatingworkersbutasakey tounderstandingthehumanself.Avagueandlargelyunarticulated “depthpsychology”laybehindmanyofthestrategiesforruling-class revitalization,inparticulartheassumptionthatsavageneedssurvived beneaththeveneerofbourgeoiscivilization(especiallyamongboys andmen).ThisvitalistimpulsejoinedTheodoreRooseveltandWilliamJameswithpsychologistssuchasG.StanleyHall;itcrossedclass andethnicbarriers,energizingabroadquestforregenerationamong middle-aswellasupper-classmen;ithelpedaccountforthevogueof bodybuildingattheturnofthecenturyandthepopularityof Tarzan in the1910s.

Inthemakingofamanagerialself,vitalityplayedacrucialcounterpointtoproductivity.ItkeptthethrumofTaylorismfrombecoming adeathrattle.Amidobsessiveefficiency(orthesimulationofit), therehadtoberoomforspontaneity;indeed,thetwotendenciesreinforcedeachother.Ineverydaylife,menshackledtomanagerialroutine cravedinstinctualreleaseoffthejob;intheorganizedfantasypurveyed bytheemergingmassmedia,thesuccessfulmanorwomanwasfullof boundlessenergy,asavidinplayasinwork.Advertising,film,and fictionmadetheremaderichseemeffervescentandfulloffun.Bythe

1920s,vitalityandproductivitycombinedtodeﬁneanewmanagerial self,forbothmenandwomenalike.Publicdutymergedwithpersonal efﬁciency,moralitywithphysicality.Thenewmodelofsuccesswas slimmer,moreenergetic,andmoreglamorousthanitsstraitlacedpredecessorhadbeen.Whetheritwasanymorehumaneorsatisfyingdependedonone’spointofview.37

Energy,Meritocracy,Melancholy:TheRevitalizedRich

Themergerofmentalandphysicalexcellenceappearedtovalidatethe managerialﬁctionofmeritocracy.Onlythe“best”wouldrisetothe topofthedevelopingcorporatehierarchy.Tomaintainitssuperiority, thenewrulingclasswouldneedtoavoidanemicgentility;resiliencerequiredadashofprimitivevitality.Projectingsuperhumanvitalityonto dark-skinnedbodies,middle-andupper-classwhitemenstrainedto captureanddeploythatstrengthinmodernbusinesslife.AsAfrican AmericansandNativeAmericansreachedasocialnadir,theyachieved anewstatusasiconsofprimalforce.Thevitalistworshipofforceprovidedacommonpoolofaspirationforexecutivesandstockroomboys. Itsanctiﬁedthehegemonyoftopmanagersbyassumingtheyhad scaledthecorporateheightsthroughsuperiorpersonalpower.

Celebritybodybuildersembodiedthispointedlysanitizedprimitivism.TheimportantthingaboutthePrussian-bornEugeneSandow, whosemusclesdazzledAmericanaudiencesattheturnofthecentury, wasnotjustthathewas“theperfectman”(asthepromoterFlorenz Ziegfeldpresentedhim)butthathewastheperfect European man.The whitenessofhisskinofferedcrucialreassurancethatordinarydeskboundblokescouldreconnectwiththeirarborealorigins.Thiswasnot simplyanantimodernescape.AsJohnKassonperceptivelyobserves, Sandow“raisedanew,potentiallymorepunishing‘scientiﬁc’standard againstwhichtomeasureone’sinadequacy.Theconceptofaperfect body,ostensiblydevisedinoppositiontomodernindustrialsociety,in factcapitulatedtothepresumptionthatperfectionlayinmateriallyde-

ﬁned,standardized,andrepeatableprocessesandproduct.”National advertisingdrovethepointhome,inadcampaignsforeverythingfrom QuakerOatstoGilletteblades:theperfectbodywasascientiﬁcally managedbody,systematicallymaintaininglevelsofpeakperformance atalltimes.38

TheincreasingphysicalityofcriteriaforsuccessrevealedthediffusionofpopularizedDarwinisminmanagerialthought.Themagazine System, whosetitlesuccinctlydeﬁnedthemanagerialimpulse,devoted itselftopuzzlingouttheprocessofnaturalselectionamongbusinessmen.Herewasanothermeritocraticstandard,thisoneovertlyrooted inbiology. System increasinglyidentiﬁedtopexecutivesas“bigmen” whostoodoutfromtheirsmallercolleagues.Clean-cutappearanceand standardizedattractivenessmattered,butsodidqualitiessuchassize, strength,andquickness.39

Preoccupationwithbodilyenergyreinforcedprimitivistlongings. EdgarRiceBurroughs,theauthorof TarzanoftheApes (1914)and manysequels,wasalsoawriterfor System. Tarzandemonstratedthat thestrengthandagilityofagorillacouldﬂourishwithinthebodyof anEnglisharistocrat(hisrealnamewasLordGreystoke).Thepopularityofthe Tarzan booksrevealedthatprimitivistyearningsforrevitalizationreachedwellintothemiddleclass.Butitwasthe“bigmen” whomanagedtotransformthoseyearningsintoanagendaforclassrevitalization.40

Theriseofadvertisingandpublicrelationsensuredthatthenewvitalityoftherichwouldbeexpressedinstandardized,sanitizedform. Fromthe1910sthroughtheearly1930s,advertisinguniversalizedthe experienceoftheverywealthy.Razorblades,coldcream,andother mass-producedcommoditiesweretypicallyassociatedwithelegantladiesandgentsineveningclothes.Inadvertising,therichinhabiteda luxuriousutopiathatwas—implicitlyandpotentially—availabletoall ambitiousconsumers.Atthesametime,beginningwithRockefeller’s hiringofIvyLeein1914,corporatechieftainsincreasinglyemployed publicrelationscounselorstoreshapetheirrepresentationinthemass

media.Asmuckrakinglostitsvogue,businessmenjoinedtheirwivesin thestarsystemofcelebrityjournalism.Whethertheyownedtheir firms(GeorgeWestinghouse,HenryFord,P.D.Armour)ormanaged them(GeraldSwopeofGeneralElectric,WalterTeagleofStandard Oil),theirmagazineprofilesmadeclearthattheirauthorityderived fromtechnicalknowledgeaswellasunceasinglaborandcharismatic leadership.Eventheirphilanthropiesweremoreefficientlyadministeredthantheoldscattershotcharitieshadbeen.Theyepitomizedthe newmeritocraticstandardsofmanagerialcapitalism.41

Thesocietypagescollaboratedinproducingacomprehensive accountof“thewholesomerich,”asCharlesPoncedeLeonhas shown—menandwomenwhocombinedphysicalradiancewithcivic responsibility.Tobesure,aprivilegedfewcouldstillbescornedasidle ordissipated;WalterWinchellandothertabloidjournalistsmadea specialtyofthis.Butdrunkennessandmaritalinﬁdelitywerethefailuresofweakindividuals,“poorlittlerichgirls”likeBarbaraHutton andDorisDuke;theywerehardlycharacteristicoftherichasaclass, whoseleisurepursuitsweremostlydown-to-earthandfamilyoriented—andevenattheirmostextravagantmerelyasignofcharming eccentricity.Bythe1920s,inthediscourseofmass-circulationjournalism,thebloatedplutocracyhadbeengalvanizedintoanenergetic, magnanimous,andmagneticelite.42

Similarimagerysurfacedintheimaginativeliteratureofthetime. Duringthe1920s,theﬁctionofEdithWharton,TheodoreDreiser,and F.ScottFitzgeraldindirectlyreafﬁrmedtherehabilitationoftherich— thoughnoonewouldclaimthatthiswastheauthors’intention.Whartonsurveyedthetransformationofastaid,provincialNewYorkelite intoadynamic,cosmopolitanrulingclasswiththeknowingnessofa borninsider.Dreiserdescribedtheplaygroundsoftheprivilegedwith theplaintivewhineofanoutsidercravingadmission.AndFitzgerald deployedhisdoublestatusasoutsiderandinsidertoexplorethemyriad waysinwhichtherichwere“differentfromyouandme.”Fitzgerald createdacompellingsymbolicuniversethatparalleledtheonepro-

ducedbyadvertising.Hiswealthycharacterswereasbeautifulasthe peopleintheCadillacads,butcomplexandvulnerable,too—andeven, sometimes,suffusedwithtragicgrandeur.Coveringtherevitalizedrich withamantleofmelancholy,hereinforcedtheﬁctionofelitedecline.

Wharton’s AgeofInnocence (1920)dissectsthepowerofbourgeois conventionsintheNewYorkofthe1870s—especiallytheirpowerto thwartanyoutwardbreachofVictoriansexualpropriety.Theprotagonist,NewlandArcher,yieldsreluctantlytotheimplacableforceofthat code:heﬁnallygivesupthewomanheadores,theCountessOlenska, toreturntothepathofconjugalduty.Thenovelconcludeswitha scenesetintheearlytwentiethcentury;init,Whartonprovidesacapsulesummaryoftherevitalizationoftherulingclass.Thirtyyears havepassedsinceArcherrenouncedthecountess;heisnowawidower withthreegrownchildren.Heponders“thenewstateofthings”that hasdevelopedformenlikehimselfsincethe1870s.InspiredbyTheodoreRooseveltamongothers,theyhadexploredarangeofciviclife beyond“thenarrowgrooveofmoneymaking,sport,andsociety.”Archerhadservedinthestateassembly,contributedarticlestoreform journals,helpedtofoundtheGrolierClubandtheﬁrsthospitalfor crippledchildren—“hadbeen,inshort,whatpeoplewerebeginningto call‘agoodcitizen.’”43

Asgoodcitizenshipbecamemorefashionableamongtheelite,criteriaforadmissionloosened.Thescrutinizingofsocialoriginsbecame lessintense.Afterall,asArchermuses,“ofwhataccountwasanybody’spast,inthehugekaleidoscopewhereallthesocialatomsspun aroundonthesameplane?”Newmoneycouldbecomerespectablevirtuallyovernight,onceitacquiredassociationswiththerightcultural institutions.Archer’schildrentypifytheinsoucianceoftherisinggeneration.Theylackhisobsessivescruples—especiallyhissonDallas, whoisalmostaparodyofthebrashyoungprofessionalswhobegan revitalizingeliteculturealongmanageriallinesaftertheturnofthe century.Freshoutofarchitectureschoolandabouttojoinaﬁrmin Chicago,heisafountofmindlessenergy;“tumultuousenthusiasmand

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cocksurecriticismtrippedeachotheruponhislips.”Helackshisfather’ssenseofpublicresponsibility,buttheoldermanistolerant.“The boywasnotinsensitive,heknew,buthehadthefacilityandself-confidencethatcameoflookingatfatenotasamasterbutasanequal. ‘That’sit;theyfeelequaltothings—theyknowtheirwayabout,’he mused,thinkingofhissonasthespokesmanofthenewgeneration whichhadsweptawayalltheoldlandmarks,andwiththemthesignpostsandthedangersignal.”Thiswasthewayeach“newgeneration” likedtothinkofitself,especiallyafter1900—energetic,assertive,undaunted.Thisnewélanwasatthecoreoftheremaderulingclass. Whartonsensedit,evenasshemaintainedherdistance.44 Dreiser,incontrast,longedtoinhaletheatmosphereofvitalitythat heassociatedwiththeveryrich.Forhim,especiallybythe1920s,the wealthyinhabitarealmofintoxicatingsweetness.ThisistheperspectiveofClydeGriffiths,thefecklessbutambitiousprotagonistof An AmericanTragedy (1925),whostartsoutasabellmaninthehaunts ofthewell-to-do.Forhim(asforDreiser),glimpsingthefashionableyoungersetofKansasCitiansfromthecorridorsoftheGreenDavisonHotelislikelookingthrough“thegatesofparadise”;andthe UnionLeagueClubinChicago,Clyde’ssecondjob,seems“anEveless paradise”wheremenofaffairsquietlyconferandtaketheirease.One ofthemishisuncleSamuelGriffiths,aprosperouscollarmanufacturer inLycurgus,NewYork,whofirsttakesashinetoClydebecausehe lookssomuchlikehisownsonGilbert.Dreiserinsistentlylinksphysicalappearancewithsocialstatus,contrastingSamuelGriffithsand Clyde’sfather,Asa.ThesuccessfulSamuelisa“swell-lookingguy,” clean-cut,trim,“quick,alert,incisive”;thepatheticAsaisoverweight, “oleaginousandabitmurky.”InDreiser’supdatedversionofVictoriantaxonomy,physiognomyisdestiny.45

Therulingclassrulesthroughitscommandofappearances.To Clyde,theyouthfulrichinLycurgusareallatleastconventionallyattractive,andsomestunninglyso.Intheirdinnerjackets,cummerbunds,

andtaffetapartydresses,theyfloatthroughadreamlandscapeofmidnightballsandmoonlitboatrides.Clydeisallowedadmissionbecause heisaGriffithsandheis“good-looking.”Yetultimatelythepowerof personalattractivenessrevealsitslimits.Whenaplain-speakingdebutantenamedGertrudeTrumbullreferstohisgoodlooks,Clydebeams nervouslyanddeniesit.Sheinsistshe’sevenbetter-lookingthanhis cousinGilbert,butgoodlookswon’tdohimmuchgoodwithout money.“Peoplelikemoneyevenmorethantheydolooks,”sheobserves.Clydelacksmoney,andeventuallyhishandsomefaceproves inadequatetosavehimfromhisapparentcomplicityinthedrowning ofhispregnantworking-classgirlfriend.ThroughoutClyde’strial, Dreisercontinuestocharacterizeclassconflictintermsofphysicalappearance.Thedistrictattorneyisamanwithabrokennose,which makeshimunattractivetowomenandresentfulofmenwithmore eroticappeal.Heseethesat“thewretchedrich!Theidlerich!”Itisas muchtheirgoodlooksastheiridlenessthatappallshim.Populistresentment,Dreiserimplies,couldbereducedtopersonalenvy.Theauthor,likehisprotagonist,hasbeenseducedbytheglamorousrich.46 Fitzgerald,too,wasenraptured,buthealwaysheldpartofhimselfinreserve,nurturingananalyticdetachmentthatDreisercould nevermaster.Fitzgeraldcravedacceptanceintotheinnercirclesofthe wealthy,butheknewhewouldneverbeathomethere.Hisdistance bothsharpenedandsoftenedhisfocus.Heanatomizedthesocialrituals oftherich,butsituatedthemintherecentpastofhisownyouth,surroundingthemwithahazeofmelancholyandloss.Healwaysmadeit clearthathewaswritingfromtheperspectiveofayoungupper-middle-classman,strainingforsocialascentbutneverquitepullingitoff. “Letmetellyouabouttheveryrich,”hewrotein“TheRichBoy” (1926).“Theyaredifferentfromyouandme.Theypossessandenjoy early,anditmakesthemsoftwherewearehard,andcynicalwherewe aretrustful,inawaythat,unlessyouwerebornrich,itisverydifficult tounderstand.Theythink,deepintheirhearts,thattheyarebetter

thanweare...Evenwhen theyenterdeepintoourworldorsinkbelowus,theystillthinkthattheyarebetterthanweare.Theyaredifferent.”47

“TheRichBoy”inthatstoryisAnsonHunter.BorninNewYork in1893,theeldestofsixheirstoafortuneof$15million,hegrowsup acceptingthedeferencepaidhimaspartofthenaturalorderofthings. AfterYaleandastintasanavalaviatoratPensacola,heentersthesocialworldofpostwarNewYork—alsoSouthampton,TuxedoPark, andHotSprings.Butheisneveramereplayboy.Hedivideshislifebetween“intelligenthedonism”bynightandhardworkinaprominent brokerageﬁrmbyday.Thestatic,closedeliteofthe1890shadopened itsdoorstonewmoney,earnedthroughtechnicalexpertiseandshrewd investmentinairplanesorautomobiles.ToacertainextentAnsonresentsthelossoftheoldexclusivity,“yethehimselfwasapartofthis change,andhisstronginstinctforlifehadturnedhiminhistwenties fromthehollowobsequiesofthatabortiveleisureclass.”Anson’s wealthhasmadehimcynical,amanwithoutillusions.Inmattersofthe heart,thisprovesaproblem.SweptawaybyPaulaLegendre,adark andseriousbeautyfromCaliforniawhoseparentskeepawinterresidenceinPensacola,Ansoncanneverquitebringhimselftocommitto her.Heletshergetaway,andﬁndshimselfaloneattwenty-nine,with athickeningwaistandnothingtodoonSaturdayafternoonbuthave drinksattheYaleClubwithanewgenerationwhonolongerrecognizehim.48

Lonelinessandvainregretafﬂictthenewlyrichaswellasthosewith inheritedwealth—“allthesadyoungmen,”asFitzgeraldcalledthem, whosesoaringaspirationsforromancearefatedforfrustrationeven iftheyrealizetheirmaterialambitions.In“WinterDreams”(1922), youngDexterGreenofBlackBear,Minnesota,isbesetbyvaulting ambitionsthatleadhimtopassupabusinesscourseatthestateuniversity“fortheprecariousadvantageofattendinganolderandmorefamousuniversityintheEast,wherehewasbotheredbyhisscanty funds.”Hewasnot“merelysnobbish ...He wantednotassociation

withglitteringthingsandglitteringpeople—hewantedthethings themselves.Oftenhereachedoutforthebestwithoutreallyknowing whyhewantedit—andsometimesheranupagainstthemysteriousdenialsandprohibitionsinwhichlifeindulges.”Aftergraduatingfrom that“famousuniversity,”Dextermakesbigmoneyfast,establishinga chainoflaundriesthatcatertotherichwhogatheratBigBearLake andotherresortcommunitiesintheupperMidwest.Onesummereveningafewyearsaftergraduation,hemeetsJudyJones,motorboating ononeofthoselakes.Apianoisplayinginthedistance,theplaintive tuneemanatingfroma“darkpeninsula”acrosstheway.Itisasong popularfiveyearsbefore,whenDexterwasasophomore,standingoutsidethecollegegym,longingtobeinsideatapromhecouldn’tafford. AlthoughDextercannowaffordproms,canevenaffordthelikesof JudyJones,hestillfeelsuncomfortablewhenheentersherhousefor thefirsttime.Heimaginesit“peopledbythemenwhohadalready lovedJudyJones.Heknewthesortofmentheywere—themenwho whenhefirstwenttocollegehadenteredfromthegreatprepschools withgracefulclothesandthedeeptanofhealthysummers.”Butnow Dextercancompetewiththosegodsontheirownterms.Hehas money.49

LikeDreiser,Fitzgeraldunderstoodtheconnectionsbetweenmoney andsex.WhenDextertellsJudy,“I’mprobablymakingmoremoney thananymanmyageintheNorthwest,”heimmediatelycreatesan eroticchargebetweenthem:“Analmostimperceptibleswaybrought herclosetohim... [S]hecommunicatedherexcitementtohimlavishly,deeply,withkissesthatwerenotapromisebutafulfillment... kissesthatwerelikecharity,creatingwantbyholdingbacknothingat all.”YetintheendJudyJonesprovesunattainable,amercurialflirt whosedesireforDexterflaresupunpredictablybutthendiesaway,ignitingagainonachanceencounterattheUniversityClubinMinneapolis(afterDexterhasbecomeengagedtoanotherwoman),onlytocool withinamonth.Yearslater,afterthewar,Dexterhearsthatshe’smarriedacadandfadedfast.50

Whethertheirmoneyisoldornew,Fitzgerald’srichareBeautifulPeople,“withgracefulclothesandthedeeptanofhealthysummers”—buttheyareenvelopedinanauraoflostillusionsandmissed opportunities. TheGreatGatsby (1925)isthedeﬁnitiveformulationof thistype.GatsbyhimselfseemsjusttohavesteppedoutofanadvertisementforArrowCollarsorHart,Schaffner&Marx.“Ah,”says DaisyBuchananlanguorouslytohimonestiﬂinghotLongIslandafternoon,“youlooksocool.”

“Youalwayslooksocool,”sherepeated. Shehadtoldhimthatshelovedhim,and[herhusband]Tom Buchanansaw.Hewasastounded.Hismouthopenedalittle,and helookedatGatsby,andthenbackatDaisyasifhehadjustrecognizedherassomeoneheknewalongtimeago.

“Youresembletheadvertisementoftheman,”shewentoninnocently.“Youknowtheadvertisementoftheman—”

“Allright,”brokeinTomquickly.“I’mperfectlywillingtogo totown.Comeon—we’reallgoingtotown.”51

Bythe1920s,comparingsomeonetoanadvertisingiconwasawayof expressingadmiration,evenlove,forhim(orher).YetGatsby’sapparentperfectionisﬂawedbyhisdoomeddesirefortheunattainable—his determinationthatDaisytellthecrudebutpowerfulTomshenever lovedhim.LikeFitzgeraldhimself,Gatsbyyearnstorecapturethe freshbloomofyouthfulromance.Hiscripplingnostalgiacracksthe surfaceofhissmoothself-presentation.Therichcanbedeludedtoo.

Fitzgerald’sBeautifulLoserswereoftensympatheticcharacters. Theywerealsothesubtlestrepresentationofwhattherevitalizationof therulingclasshadaccomplishedasaculturalmovement.Bythe1920s therevitalizedrichweresecureintheirsenseofsuperiority;thenew massmediahadmadethemthestarsofcelebritycultureandcreateda shimmeringsurfaceofelegancetorepresenttheirwayoflife.Fitzgerald,byfocusingontheirprivatefrustrations,suppliedshadowand

depthtothisportrait.Attheacmeofelitepowerandprestige,hecreatedacomplexfictionofelitedecline—morepsychologicallydense thanthesimplenotionofpatricianyieldingtoparvenu.Evenifthe BeautifulLosersclungsuccessfullytotheirwealth,theirunfulfilled longingsmademoneyseemirrelevant,andtheirvulnerabilityreinforcedthevaguesensethatelitesweresomehowtoofragilefordemocracy—that,despiteallevidencetothecontrary,theyweresomehow beinghustledtowardtheexit.Thefictionsoflossobscuredthepersistenceofprivilege.

3 Theprotractedaftermathofthe1929stockmarketcrashleftthe revitalizedrulingclassshakenanddividedbutstillhangingontoa largemeasureoflegitimacy.Confrontedbythecrisisofcapitalismand thecomingoftheNewDeal,manyrichpeopleretreatedintotheir lairs,lamentingtheirexclusionfrompubliclife.Fordecades,thePot andKettleClubofBarHarborhadtoastedthepresidentoftheUnited StatesontheFourthofJuly;butafterFranklinRooseveltcameto power,thememberstoastedtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates— whichtheybelievedhadbeenabandoned.52 Thestanceofprincipled powerlessnessconcealedthesurvivalofpower(even,onesuspects, fromtheclubmembersthemselves).Declarationsofdeclineobscured theresilienceofoldmoney,itseventualaccommodationwithRoosevelt’sregulatoryregime,andthepossibilitiesforreassertingitsinﬂuenceas“Dr.NewDeal”gavewayto“Dr.Win-the-War.”

Meanwhile,theNewDealitselfoffereddifferentopportunitiesfor thedeploymentofprivilege—achancetoreassertthepaternalistideal ofpublicresponsibility.Evenold-stockRepublicanslikeEndicottPeabodyeventuallyrecognizedthis.HehadvotedforHooverin1932,rememberingFranklinRooseveltas“aquiet,satisfactoryboyofmore thanordinaryintelligence,takingagoodpositioninhisformbutnot brilliant.”Butby1936Peabodywasconvincedthatthepolicesofthis Grotonalumnusepitomizedtheschool’sideals.“Iaminheartyagreementwithyou,”hewroteRoosevelt,“inwhatseemstomethetwo

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greatpurposesofyourlife:first,makingitpossibleforallthepeople ofthenationwhoarewillingtoworkbeinggivenanopportunitytodo soandtocarryonworkunderworthyconditions;secondly,tojoin withotherswhoarelike-mindedinendeavoringtobringpeacetothe nations.”53 Itwouldbehardtofindmorefittingtestimonytotherevitalizationoftherich,whichatitsbestinvolvedboththemaintenance ofpowerandthemagnanimitytouseitwisely.

TheForeignPolicyEstablishment

GODFREYHODGSON

InJanuary1902asuccessfulNewYorklawyernamedHenryL. StimsonwentdowntoWashingtontoattendtheannualdinnerofthe BooneandCrockettClub,anassociationofwell-bredbiggamehunters.1 Heandhiswife,Mabel,wenttostaywiththeirfriendGifford Pinchot,chiefforesteroftheUnitedStatesandintimatefriendofPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt.Theafternoonbeforethedinner,Stimson andafriendborrowedtwoofPinchot’shorsesandwentforaridein RockCreekPark.Ithadbeenraining,andthecreekwashigh. SuddenlyStimsonwashailedbynamebyfourmenwalkingthrough thewoodsonthefarsideofthecreek.Atﬁrsthewasastonished,becausehedidnotknowmanypeopleinWashington.Thenherecognizedthehigh-pitchedvoiceofPresidentRoosevelt,jokinglyasking himtoswimthecreekandjointhem.Thenanothervoice,muchbetter knowntohim,thatofhisformerlawpartner,ElihuRoot,nowRoosevelt’ssecretaryofwar,2 calledout,“ThePresidentoftheUnitedStates directsSergeantStimsonofSquadronAtocrossthecreekandcometo hisassistancebyorderoftheSecretaryofWar.”

“That’sanorder,sureenough,”Stimsoncriedouttohiscompanion andshoutedback,“Verygood,sir!”andputGiffordPinchot’sold horseJimmieatthecreek.Thehorse,likeitsrider,obeyedorders,but itlostitsfootinginthespateand“begantorollandplungedownstream,”asStimsonrecalledlater,“agooddealofthetimebothofus beingcompletelyunderwater.”EventuallyStimson,uptohischestin theswift,icywater,wasabletoleadthehorsedownstreamtoabreak inthemasonrywallthatrevettedthebank,gethimupthebank,and ridehimdowntowherethepresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthesecretaryofwarstood,looking“liketwosmallboyswhohadbeencaught stealingapples.”

Rooseveltmutteredsomethingabouthowhehadnotthoughtthe orderwouldbeobeyedbecauseitwasimpossible.“Mr.President,”said Stimson,“whenasoldierhearsanorderlikethat,itisn’thisbusinessto seethatitisimpossible.”Rooseveltlaughedandsaid,“Wellitwasvery niceofyoutodoit;nowhurryhomeanddrinkallthewhiskyyou can.”AndthatnightatthedinnerhehailedStimsonas“youngLochinvar,”aftertheromanticherooftheoldScotsballad.

Sixtyyearslater,attheheightofthe1962Cubanmissilecrisis,PresidentKennedysecretlysummonedelderstatesmentoadvisehim.One ofthemwasDeanAcheson,PresidentTruman’ssecretaryofstatein themostdangeroushoursoftheColdWar.AnotherwasRobertAbercrombieLovett.ApioneerofaviationinWorldWarI,hehadbeenassistantsecretaryofwarinWorldWarII,hadservedasundersecretary ofstateandsecretaryofdefenseintheTrumanadministration,and hadbeenofferedhispickofthethreetopjobsinPresidentKennedy’s cabinet:State,Defense,orTreasury.LovettwasthesonofJudgeRobertScottLovett,legaladviserandclosefriendoftherailroadmagnate E.H.Harriman,fatherofthediplomatandDemocraticgovernorof NewYork,AverellHarriman,whointurnhadbeentheclosefriendof theyoungerLovettatGrotonandYale.3

WhenhearrivedattheWhiteHouse,Lovettwentstraighttothe nationalsecurityadviser’scrowdedofﬁceinthebasementoftheWest

Wing.TheofﬁcebelongedtoMcGeorgeBundy,whosefather,Harvey Bundy,hadbeenLovett’scolleagueasassistantsecretarytoHenry StimsonwhenStimsonwassecretaryofwarduringWorldWarII. ThereonasidetablehespottedasmallphotographofBundy’smentor,ColonelStimson.“Allduringtheconversation,”Lovettrecalled later,“theoldColonelseemedtobestaringmestraightintheface.”

FinallyLovettsaidtoBundy,“Mac,IthinkthebestservicewecanperformforthePresidentistotrytoapproachthisasColonelStimson would.”4

3 Itisnottrue,whateveryoumightbetemptedtothink,thatAmericanforeignpolicywasgovernedanddirectedforsixtyyearsexclusivelybythefriendsandrelationsofHenryLewisStimson.Still,that propositionisclosertobeingtruethanonewouldeverexpectinanationnotoriouslysuspiciousofaristocracyandelitism.

Thefactisthatforthree-quartersofthetwentiethcentury,fromthe Spanish-AmericanWartotheendoftheVietnamWar,theforeignpolicyoftheUnitedStateswasdecisivelyinﬂuencedbyacomparatively smallgroupofmenwhobelongedtowhathasbeenlooselybutusefullycalledtheAmericanforeignpolicyEstablishment.

Theconceptof“theEstablishment”wasinventedbytheBritish ToryjournalistHenryFairlietodescribetheinformalnetworkofmen whowieldedpowerandinfluenceattheapexofpoliticalandbusiness lifeinBritaininthe1950s.Fairlie’sEstablishmentwasnotdefinedby wealthorevenbyhereditaryconnections.Althoughheassumedthat manyofthemenhewastalkingabouthadbeenformedbyeliteinstitutionssuchasEtonandWinchester,OxfordandCambridge(approximateBritishequivalentsofAndoverandGroton,HarvardandYale), hewastalkingaboutmenwhowerepowerfulbyvirtueoftheircareers andoffice,notbecauseofhereditarywealth;hespecificallymentioned theheadoftheAnglicanChurch,forexample,theleaderoftheInstituteofCharteredAccountants,thedirector-generaloftheBBC,and topcivilservants.

Fairlie’sideawasimportedintotheUnitedStates,moreorlessasa joke,bythepoliticaleditorofthe NewYorker, RichardRovere,ina spoofinthe AmericanScholar in1961.Graduallytheidea,andthe word,cameintocommonparlance,andintheprocessbecamechanged. TheEstablishmentcametomeansomethingasvagueas“therich,”or “theprivileged.”ButtherewasanEstablishment.Itwasaspecific group,withdefinablecharacteristics.Itacquiredprestigeandinfluence bybeingseentoberightabouttheneedforAmericaninvolvementin thetwoworldwars.ItledopinionintheColdWar,butoverreached, firstwithmoreorlessdisreputablecovertactions,mostlyintheThird World,suchasthedisasterattheBayofPigs,andthen,withterminal effectforitsowninfluence,inVietnam.

TherewereinfactfivemajoractsinthehistoryoftheforeignpolicyEstablishment.ItsoriginsintheFirstWorldWarintroduceditscast ofcharacters,itsinstitutions,anditsethos.(Itsprehistory,indeed,lay intheTheodoreRooseveltcircle,andparticularlyinthecharacterand ideasofElihuRoot,whocombinedasuccessfulcorporatelawpractice inNewYorkwithdevotiontothehonorandgreatnessoftheUnited Statesaswellastotheidealsofarbitrationandcooperationininternationalaffairs.)Thesecondwasitssuccessintheso-calledGreatDebate overAmericaninvolvementinWorldWarII—successfulatleastinthe sensethatPearlHarbormadetheU.S.belligerencythattheEstablishmentadvocatedinevitable.Thethird,andperhapsmostidentifiedwith thecoreoftheEstablishment,wasleadershipintheorganizationofthe nationatwarwiththeAxis,andespeciallyinthedevelopmentofand thedecisiontousetheatomicbomb.FourthwastheEstablishment’s advocacyofamiddlecourseofcontainmentintheColdWar.Andthe fifthactwasthefatalextensionofColdWarcontainmentandcounterinsurgencyforcetothedevelopingworldandespeciallytoVietnam.

3 AttheendoftheGildedAge,anAmericanupperclasshad emerged,headquarteredintheNortheast,especiallyinNewYorkand Boston,butnationalininﬂuence.Itsbasewasinindustrialwealthand

intheﬁnancialsector,butitsmemberstookpainstodistinguishthemselvesfrommerebusinessspokesmen.Theywereusuallyproductsof eliteboardingschools,colleges,andprofessionalschools,especially lawschools,andinpracticeofaverysmallnumberofschools,colleges,andgraduateschools.Overandoveragaininthebiographiesof themen(andtheywerealmostallmen)whodirectedAmericanforeignpolicyfromthe1900stothe1960sthesamefewnamesrecur.

Amongtheboardingschools,itwasPhillipsAndover(Stimson’s school);Groton(Acheson’sandHarriman’s,andindeedFranklinRoosevelt’s);St.Paul’sinConcord,NewHampshire,wherethediplomat andSovietexpertCharlesE.BohlenwaseducatedandsowastheCIA ofﬁcialCordMeyer;andtheHillSchool,nearPhiladelphia,almamater ofRobertLovettand(muchlater)ofGeorgeH.W.Bush’ssecretary ofstate,JamesBaker.

AmonguniversitiesitwasnoteventhewholeoftheIvyLeaguebut preeminentlyHarvard,Yale,andPrinceton;5 amonggraduateschoolsit wasHarvardLaw,YaleLaw,sometimesColumbia,andonlyoccasionallygreatmiddlewesternuniversitieslikeMichiganandWisconsin. Indeed,itisstartlingtodiscoverhowmanyofthekeyﬁguresin managingAmerica’sforeignrelationswerenotjustundergraduatesat Yalebutmembersofasinglesecretseniorsocietythere,Skulland Bones.Thisbizarreinstitutionstillmaintainsagloomy“tomb”on theYalecampuswherethegreatandthegoodcometominglewith ambitiousundergraduatesinanatmosphereofmoralupliftandVictorianjocularityamidmementosofasinisternineteenth-centurycultof NativeAmericanskulls.Stimson,Lovett,Harriman,Acheson,Harvey Bundyandhistwosons,McGeorgeandWilliam,forexample,wereall “Bonesmen,”nottomentionGeorgeHerbertWalkerBushandhisfather,SenatorPrescottBush.6 Sowereseveralofthekeyﬁguresinthe earlyyearsoftheCIA.7

SuchevidencesoftheconcentrationofinﬂuenceoverAmericanforeignpolicyinthehandsofatinyelitehavenotsurprisinglyengenderedagooddealofconspiracytheory.8 Thetruthratherwasthat,ex-

ceptintimeofwar,notmanyAmericansbetween1917and1968were interestedinforeignaffairs,andfewerstillwereexpertinthathighly specializedﬁeld.TheUnitedStateshadsucceededinnegotiatingthe nineteenthcenturywithremarkablyfewoftheentanglementsinworld politicsagainstwhichGeorgeWashingtonhadwarnedinhisfarewell address.TherewereoccasionalscufﬂesintheCaribbean.Therewas thetriumphantaggressionoftheMexicanWar,inwhichaborderdisputewasusedasapretextfortheannexationofTexas,theSouthwest, andCalifornia.ButinthemaintheUnitedStatesreliedontheMonroe Doctrine,thebreadthoftwooceans,andBritain’sRoyalNavytokeep thequarrelsof“thePowers”atadistance.Intheearlytwentiethcentury,foreigntradewasatinyproportionoftheAmericaneconomy, lessthan5percentofthegrossnationalproductin1900.

Becausemanyofthemworkedasinternationalbankersandlawyers, theEstablishmentproductsofeliteeasterneducationwereanexception.Theysharedpoliticalassumptions,amongthemahistory,apolicy,anaspiration,aninstinct,atechnique,andadogma.9 Theywere alsodeﬁnedbyaclass,aculture,adynasty,andastyle.Butmoreimportantiswhattheydid.Forbetterorforworse,theircontributionto thecreationoftheAmericansuperpowerwasimmense.

Vietnamdividedthemandstrippedthemoftheirauraofinvincibility.Sincethen,othereliteswithdifferentagendas,especiallyneoconservativesmoreinterestedintheMiddleEastthaninwesternEurope, havereplacedthem.ButtheEstablishment’sinﬂuenceliveson.Its membersmadeitpossibleforAmericatowintwoworldwarsandthe ColdWar.IntheprocesstheytransformedtheUnitedStatesfroma largelypaciﬁststateintoanationalsecuritystate,fromabulkyherbivoretoaman-eatingtiger.

TheprevailingcultureintheforeignpolicyEstablishmentwasthat ofNewEnglandboardingschoolsandIvyLeagueuniversities,of theolderestablishedProtestantdenominations(especiallyEpiscopalian andPresbyterian),ofWallStreetandBoston’sStateStreetlawﬁrms, andoftheclubstheirpartnersfrequented.Itwascapitalistbutliberal,

patrioticbutinternationalist,AnglophilethoughcriticalofEngland, masculinebutnotmacho,cultivatedbutnotusuallyintellectual,loyal toschools,colleges,clubs,family,andnation,deeplycommittedtoan idealofpublicserviceandtoanethosofindividualstoicism.Thecultureofthetwentieth-centuryAmericangentleman,youmightsay,was whathadbecomeofthePuritanwhonolongerbelievedinthePuritan God.TheﬁercePuritancreed,themetaphysicalandmilitantpassion ofOliverCromwellandJonathanEdwards,ofJohnWinthropand RogerWilliams,mighthavegone.Thesternvoiceofduty,andthe convictionofrighteousness,remained.

ThedynastybeganwithHenryLewisStimsonandevenfurther backwithStimson’slawpartnerandmentor,ElihuRoot.Itsdirectline ranthroughStimson’saideandprotégé,HarveyBundy,tothelatter’s sons,WilliamPutnamBundy,son-in-lawofDeanAcheson,andhis youngerbrotherMcGeorge.ButtheAmericanforeignpolicyEstablishmentwasbroaderthanasinglefamily.Itwelcomedall,oralmost all,whoshareditsideals,itspurposes,anditsstyle.Theyhadincommonaparticularethos,powerfullyshaped,evenforthoseofthemwho wereCatholicsorJewsoragnostics,byaProtestantethic.TheNew EnglandboardingschoolshadborrowedfromBritish“publicschools” anexplicitvaluesystemtypiﬁedbytheReverendEndicottPeabody,the rectorofGroton,andbytheReverendSamuelDruryofSt.Paul’s,an ethicofservice,self-discipline,stoicism.ThestylewasanAmerican variantofthatoftheVictorianBritishempirebuilder:modestindemeanorbutunmistakablyconsciousofsuperiority.LiketheVictorians, theycouldsay,“Theydidn’twanttoﬁght,butbyJingo,ifthey did...!”

TheEstablishmentwasnotaculturalcircleoranothernameforthe oldrulingclass.ItwasaforeignpolicyEstablishment,anditsagenda wasfromﬁrsttolastconcernedwiththeplaceoftheUnitedStatesin theworld.ThehistorygoesbacktotheRepublicannationalistsElihu RootandColonelStimson,butalsotoWoodrowWilson’sDemocraticfriendColonelEdwardHouseandthebusinessmen,lawyers,and

scholarshegatheredroundhim,ﬁrstinNewYork,theninParisin 1919inthe“Inquiry”toadvisetheAmericanmissionatthepeaceconference.

TheEstablishment’spolicy,fromstarttofinish,wastoopposeisolationismandtowork,withinthelimitsofitsownsenseofmorality, tomaximizeAmericanpowerandinfluenceintheworld.Thatdidnot meansimplythattheUnitedStatesshouldbeinvolvedintheworld, shouldbe—asthephrasewent—“interventionist.”Italsomeantthat theUnitedStatesshouldremainprimarilyorientedtowardEurope,as opposedtoLatinAmericaorAsia,thenaturalfieldsofactionforthe elitesoftheSouthandtheWest.Foralltheoccasionalrecruitsfrom theMiddleWestandTexas(GeorgeKennan10 orWillClayton11)this wasessentiallyaneasternEstablishment;itsworldviewwasthatof NewYorkandWashington,BostonandNewHaven.

Itsaspirationwasnotmodest:itwastothemoralandpoliticalleadershipoftheworld,noless.Speciﬁcally,itaspiredtosupersedethe BritishEmpireinitsdoubleroleofprotectingacertainWesternliberal,capitalistworldorder,andatthesametimeofpreachingWestern valuestowhatRudyardKiplingcalled“lesserbreedswithoutthelaw.” ItwastrueofmanyﬁguresintheEstablishmentmold,aswassaidof theCIA’sDesmondFitzGerald,that“hisinspirationwastheBritish Empire.”12 Itwasnottrue,astheEstablishment’senemies,likeSenator JosephMcCarthy,alleged,thattheywantedtopreservetheBritishEmpire.Theywantedtoreplaceit.

Itsinstinctwasforthepoliticalandideologicalcenter.Itwasrepelledbyrawbusinessself-interest,anduninterestedinradicalagendas ofsocialchange.Totakeanobviousexample,thetypicalEstablishmentﬁgurefoundracismdistasteful,butplacedtheneedforactiontowardracialequalitylowonhislistofpriorities.TheEstablishment stoodforaliberalcapitalism.Establishmentmembershadnoobjection intheworldtocapitalism;manyofthem,afterall,hadinheritedmore orlesssubstantialcapital,andmostofthemworked,asbankersorlawyers,attheheartofthecapitalistsystem,oftenliterallyonWallStreet.

Atthesametime,capitalism,itsmembersbelieved,oughttoprotect “thewidowandthefatherless.”AsTheodoreRooseveltputitin1912, “Thiscountrywillnotbeapermanentlygoodplaceforanyofusto liveinunlesswemakeitareasonablygoodplaceforallofustolive in.”13 Notarevolutionaryoraradicalcreed,tobesure,butonethat separatedthetypicalEstablishmentmemberfrommoreruthlesscapitalistsintherobberbarontradition.

KeymembersoftheEstablishment—Root,Stimson,theelder Bundy,andlaterJohnJ.McCloy,JohnFosterandAllenDulles,and McGeorgeBundy,forexample—wereallRepublicans,andaninternationalistRepublicanwasnecessarilyamanofthecenter,deﬁnedinoppositiontotheisolationistrightaswellastoDemocraticliberals.Only aftertheNewDealdidsubstantialnumbersoftheEstablishmentbecomeDemocrats.Eventhen,thecenterwastheplacewhereconsensus couldbesoughtandmaintained.

TheEstablishment’stechniqueinvolvedworkingnotthroughelectoralpoliticsbutoutofthepubliceye,chieflythroughtheexecutivebranch.Therewereexceptions,likethetwoRoosevelts,Averell Harriman,andNelsonRockefeller.Butmorecharacteristicwerethose likeHenryStimson,whoranforgovernorofNewYorkbutlost.Inan ageofethnicmachines,allbutthemostambitiousofprivatelyeducatedWASPswerenotdrawntoelectoralpolitics,andiftheywere, theywerenotoftensuccessful.Theirgreatopportunityresultedfrom therelativeweaknessofthepermanentfederalcivilservice,andinparticularfromthehideboundstuffinessoftheoldforeignservice.When thescopeandsizeofgovernmentdidexpandduringtheNewDealand evenmoreinWorldWarII,PresidentRoosevelt“neededhelp.”14 He turnedtolookforitwhereveritcouldbefound.Twoofthemostvaluablesourcesofappropriatetalentwere“dollarayearmen”fromWall Street(theydidn’tneedgovernmentsalaries)andacademicsfromthe greatIvyLeaguegraduateschools.TheEstablishment’sfirstopportunitycameduringandimmediatelyafterWorldWarI,whenfewothers wereinterestedinforeignaffairs;thesecondcameduringandimmedi-

atelyafterWorldWarII,whennotenoughothershadtherelevantexpertise.

TheEstablishment’sdogma,finally,shapedbythethreatofSoviet communismandtheColdWar,wascontainment:notwar,butthe threatofwar.ItwasGeorgeKennan,certainlyanEstablishmentfigure,ifuntypicallyself-doubtingandunclubbable,wholaunchedthat strategy,firstinsidegovernmentwithhiscelebrated“longtelegram”of February22,1946,andthentotheworld,oratleasttoaworldof rarefiedpowerandexpertise,inhisJune1947article,signed“X,”in theEstablishment’shousejournal, ForeignAffairs.15

TherewasaconsensusthatAmericanpowershouldbeusedtocontainSovietpowerandtopreventitanditsideologyofcommunism fromspreading.Butconsensusdidnotequalconformity.Evenonthe speciﬁctheoryofcontainmentitselftherewereﬁercedisagreements. DidKennan,forexample,meanthattheSovietUnionshouldbecontainedmilitarily,ashiswritingsseemedtoimply,oronlypolitically,as heinsistedhehadintended?

Indeed,membersoftheforeignpolicyEstablishmentdifferedso profoundlyfromoneanotheronimportantquestionsthatsomehave doubtedwhetherthetermmeansanythingatall.Howcouldonespeak, forexample,asifbothDeanAchesonandJohnFosterDulleswere membersoftheEstablishmentwhentheyopposedeachothersobitterlyonsomanyissues?Howcanonetraceitsoriginsbacktoboth ElihuRoot,TheodoreRoosevelt’ssecretaryofstate,andColonel House,WoodrowWilson’strustedadviser,wheneveryoneknowsthat Roosevelt(andRoot)despisedWilsonandallhisworks,whileWilson couldnotstandRoosevelt?

TheseobjectionshaveoftenbeenmadebyleadersoftheEstablishmentitself.Whenin1973IwenttointerviewMcGeorgeBundy,heimpatientlybrushedasidetheveryideathattherewasanysuchthingasa foreignpolicyEstablishment.16 Itwasallexplained,heinsistedairily,by VilfredoParetoandhistheoryofthecirculationofelites.Certainly DeanAchesonandJohnFosterDulles,forexample,orGeorgeKennan

andPaulNitze,didprofoundlydisagree.Thedangersofoversimpliﬁcationaretobeavoided.Theydonot,however,demolishtheusefulnessoftheideathattherewasaforeignpolicyEstablishment,stillless thecasefortryingtounderstandit.

3 Inthespringof1917,theGermangovernmentgambledonunrestrictedsubmarinewarfaretoknockBritainoutofthewar.Atthe sametimetheheadoftheGermanforeignoffice,ArthurZimmerman, offeredtohelpMexicorecoverTexas,California,andtheotherterritorieslostintheMexicanWar.Intheensuingoutrage,WoodrowWilson couldnolongerkeeptheUnitedStatesoutofthewar.Heremained, however,profoundlysuspiciousofthemotivesoftheEntentepowers (Britain,France,Russia,andItaly)andofthesecrettreatiesbywhich theyhadboundthemselvestohelponeanothertotheterritoriesof Germany,Austria-HungaryandtheOttomanEmpireafterthewar. (EvenafteranAmericanarmyof2millionmenwasfightingalongside theFrenchandtheBritishonthewesternfront,Wilsonrefusedtorefer tothemasallies,insistinginsteadontheterm“associatedpowers.”) OnSeptember2,1917,WilsonthereforeaskedhisclosefriendandforeignpolicyadviserColonelHousetogettogetheragroupofmento findoutwhatthedifferentallieswouldinsistonatthepeaceconference and“prepareourcasewithafullknowledgeofthepositionofallthe litigants.”17 ThemotivewasasmuchtopreparetoresisttheAllies’ claimsastopromoteacommonstrategyforthepeace.

InLondonandParis,professionaldiplomatswerealreadyhardat workonpreparingforthepostwarsettlement.ButHousedidnotrecruitthemembersofwhatcametobecalled“theInquiry”fromthe StateDepartmentortheforeignservice.Foronething,theresimply wasnoadequatebodyofbrainsandknowledgetheretorecruit.For another,asaTexasDemocratandprogressive,hedidnottrusttheold schoolofAmericandiplomats,almostallRepublicans,tosharehisand Wilson’szealfora“newdiplomacy.”18 Instead,heturnedtoacademics atHarvard,Columbia,andothergreateasterngraduateschools,some

226 GodfreyHodgson

ofthemyoungpatricianswhoknewEuropefromprewartoursorfrom studyingthere;otherswereEuropeanemigrantsandexileswithspecial knowledgeoftheethnicpoliticsandirredentistclaimsofoneEuropeanpeopleoranother.

Ifthingshaddevelopedalittledifferently,Housemighthavebeen unequivocallyaco-founder,withStimson,oftheEstablishmenttradition.ButduringtheParispeaceconference,WilsonandHousefellout. ThenWilson’streatyandtheLeagueofNationsweredefeatedbythe Republicans,ledbyHenryCabotLodge.Housewasleftontheoutside ofpoliticallife.Buthisinstincts—nationalist,internationalist,interventionist,criticallyAnglophile,elitist—qualiﬁedhimtobeatleastan honoraryfoundingmemberoftheforeignpolicyEstablishment.

Theyoungprofessors,mostlyfromIvyLeaguecolleges,recruited totheInquiryincludedseveralofthemostbrilliantyoungscholarsof theirgeneration,manyofthemhistorians,amongthemSamuelEliot MorisonandCharlesHomerHaskinsfromHarvard;CharlesSeymour, laterpresidentofYale;andE.S.Corwin,thegreatconstitutional scholarfromPrinceton.Altogether65percentofthemoreimportant contributorshadtakentheirﬁnaldegreeatjustfouruniversities:Harvard,Yale,Columbia,andChicago.19

Arguably,theInquiry’smostimportantworkwasdonebeforeithad fullygottenofftheground,forPresidentWilson’sFourteenPoints, madepublicinaspeechonJanuary8,1918,followedcloselydraftsput togetherbyHouseandsomeofthefirstrecruitstotheInquiry,especiallyWalterLippmann.Thevoluminousstudiesproducedlaterbythe Inquiry,sometwothousandofthemaltogether,hadrelativelylittledirectimpactonthepeaceconference.Butaftertheconferencewasover, keymembersoftheInquiry,ledbythefirstprofessoratHarvardto teachanythingotherthanAmericanorBritishhistory,ArchibaldCary Coolidge,helpedtocreatetwooftheEstablishment’skeyinstitutions, theCouncilonForeignRelationsanditshugelyinfluentialjournal, ForeignAffairs.20

WhentheAmericanpeacemakersreachedhome,theyfoundtheat-

mospheredeeplyunsympathetictotheiraspirationsforaLeagueof Nationstoguaranteeworldpeace.TheSenate’srejectionoftheVersaillestreatyhadgivenanimpetustoisolationism.WarrenG.Harding waselectedpresident.Thegeneralclimatewashighlyunfavourableto idealisticcommitmenttointernationalism,letalonetoclosetieswith Britain.InJune1918,however,noneotherthanColonelStimson’srole model,ElihuRoot,hadconvenedagroupmostlydrawnfromthe ﬁnancialsectorandtheNewYorkbartoformwhatwassooncalledthe CouncilonForeignRelations.

TheoriginalideawasthatArchibaldCaryCoolidgeshouldeditthe council’sjournal, ForeignAffairs. ButCoolidgehadbeenappointedlibrarianoftheHarvardUniversitylibraryandwasreluctanttoleave Cambridge.Sotheeditorshipwassplitintwo.CoolidgestayedatHarvard,andHamiltonFishArmstrong,ayoungjournalistandPrinceton graduate,washiredtodotheworkthatcouldbedoneonlyinNew York.Duringthe1920sthecouncilanditsjournalestablishedtheir reputation.CoolidgeandArmstrongwentoutoftheirwaytocommissionarticlesfromisolationistssuchasSenatorWilliamE.Borahof Idaho,aswellasbymanyofthebest-knownstatesmenofEuropeat thetime.TheyevenpublishedarticlesbythegreatAfricanAmerican leaderW.E.B.DuBois,andalsobySovietwriters.

ForeignAffairs keptaliveinterestininternationalaffairs,especially intheNewYorkbusinesscommunity.Itgraduallyencouragedthedevelopmentofsisterorganizationsinmorethanadozenothercities,and pouredforthresearchonmanysubjects,especiallyChina.Itsevening meetingsinNewYorkattractedmanyofthosewhowouldbecome leadingscholarsininternationalrelationsaswellasmanywhowould holdhighofﬁceintheStateDepartment,theTreasuryDepartment, andlaterintheDepartmentofDefenseandtheCIA.

Thecouncilwasalwaysclearlyopposedtoisolationism.Untilthe late1930s,theisolationistshadthingsmostlytheirownway.InCongress,isolationistsentimentwasstrongenoughtopassfourrestrictive neutralityactsinthelate1930s.ItwasnotuntilafterHitler’sriseto

power,andspeciﬁcallyhisreintegrationoftheRhinelandintoGermanyin1936,Japan’sincreasinglyaggressiveconductinChina,and thesemi-covertinterventionofGermanyandItalyononesideandthe SovietUnionontheotherintheSpanishcivilwarthatthegreatdebate betweeninterventionistsandisolationistswasjoined.

Theissuewasbetween“interventionists,”whobelieveditwasmore important,intheinterestsoftheUnitedStates,toensureaBritishvictoryovertheAxisthanfortheUnitedStatestokeepoutofthewar, andisolationists,whobelievedthatitwasmoreimportanttokeepout ofthewarthantopreventaBritishdefeatbyGermanyanditsallies. Committeeswereformedtorallypublicopiniononeithersideofthe argument.ModerateinterventionistssupportedtheCommitteetoDefendAmericabyAidingtheAllies,chairedbyWilliamAllenWhite, thenewspaperpublisherfromEmporia,Kansas.21 Whiteandhisexecutivedirector,ClarkEichelberger,lobbiedforrepealoftheneutrality lawsandsupportedPresidentRoosevelt’spolicyofgivingallaidtothe democraciesshortofwar.Fromearly1941on,amorestronglyinterventionistgroup,theFightforFreedomCommittee,cameintoexistence,callingforAmerica’sparticipationinthewarasafullbelligerent.

Theisolationistswereanextraordinarilydiversecross-sectionof Americanlife.22 IntheSenate,forexample,theyincludedarch-conservativeRobertTaft;theprogressiveHiramJohnsonofCalifornia,who hadbeenTheodoreRoosevelt’srunningmatein1912;theprairieradicalGeraldNyeofNorthDakota;andtheprogressiveRobertLa Follette,Jr.,ofWisconsin.BothformerPresidentHerbertHooverand formerRepublicancandidateAlfLandonwerenon-interventionists, butsotooweretheNewDealerandcriticofcapitalismAdolfBerle, GeneralHughJohnson(theformerheadoftheNewDeal’sNational RecoveryAdministration),andthebest-knownlaborleaderinthe country,themineworkers’JohnL.Lewis.WilliamRandolphHearst, headofthenation’smostpowerfulnewspaperchain,wasstrongly anti-interventionist,aswerethescourgeofWallStreet,JohnT.Flynn, andtheanti-SemiticradiopriestFatherCharlesCoughlin.Afterthe

TheForeignPolicyEstablishment 229

signingoftheNazi-Sovietpactinthelatesummerof1939,theCommunistPartyreverseditspolicyandcameoutforisolation,asdid manyRomanCatholics,mostTrotskyists,theGerman-American Bund,manyIrishAmericans,andplentyofliberalswhothoughtthe UnitedStatesshouldconcentrateonsolvingitsownproblemsbefore gettinginvolvedinthoseofEurope.

Thesepoliticaloppositeshadnonationalcoordinatingbodyuntil theformation,inSeptember1940,oftheAmericaFirstCommittee.23 It wasstartedintheheartofEstablishmentterritory,attheYaleLaw School,byayounggraduatestudent,R.DouglasStuart,Jr.,whohad studiedinternationalrelationsatPrinceton.Hewashelpedbynone otherthanKingmanBrewster,Jr.,scionofoneoftheoldestYankee clansanddestinedtobepresidentofYale,ambassadortotheCourtof SaintJames,andapartnerintheStimsonlawﬁrm.

Astimewenton,however,AmericaFirstbecamemoreclearlyidentiﬁedwithvariouselementsoftheAmericanright.Stuartprevailedon GeneralRobertE.Wood,chairmanoftheboardofSearsRoebuck,to bethechairmanofAmericaFirst,thoughhelatersteppeddown.AnothercommitteememberwasWilliamRegneryofChicago,laterthe keypublisherofconservativebooks.24 MostcontroversialofAmerica First’ssupporterswasColonelCharlesLindbergh,whohadbeenlivinginGermanyforseveralyearsandinﬂictedseveredamageonthe anti-interventionistcausebyhisnotoriousanti-SemiticspeechatDes MoinesinSeptember1941.25

TheCouncilonForeignRelationscameoutclearlyontheinterventionistside.AllenW.DulleswastheyoungerbrotherofJohnFoster Dulles.(ThebrotherswerethegrandsonsofJohnWatsonFosterof Watertown,NewYork,aCivilWargeneralturnedinternationallawyerwhohadbeensecretaryofstateintheadministrationofPresident BenjaminHarrison,andtheir“UncleBert,”RobertLansing,wassecretaryofstateunderWoodrowWilson.)26 DuringWorldWarI,Allen DulleshadservedasasecretagentintheSwisscapital,Bern,alisteningpostwhereonecouldlearnwhatwashappeninginGermany.(He

wastoreturntothesamepostinWorldWarII.)Afterthewarhepracticedlawathisbrother’sﬁrm,SullivanandCromwell,inwhichcapacityheinterviewedHitlershortlyafterhebecamechancellorin1933. DullescamebackfromthatmeetingandtheineffectualGenevadisarmamentconferenceandplungedintotheactivityoftheCouncilon ForeignRelations.Hepersuadedthecounciltostartahigh-levelstudy group,ostensiblytodiscoverhowtheUnitedStatesmightkeepits neutralityintheeventofaEuropeanwar,butactuallytocombatisolationism.In1935heandtheeditorof ForeignAffairs, HamiltonFish Armstrong,workeduptherecordsofthisdiscussiongroupintoa book, CanWeBeNeutral? Itsconclusion—sharplydifferentfromthat takenatthetimebyhisbrother,thefuturesecretaryofstate—was trenchantlyinterventionist:“Nonationcanreachthepositionofa worldpoweraswehavedonewithoutbecomingentangledinalmost everyquarteroftheglobeinonewayoranother.Weareinextricably andinevitablytiedtoworldaffairs.”27

ThreemonthsaftertheMunichagreementof1938,inwhichBritish primeministerNevilleChamberlainsoughttoappeaseHitler,Armstrongwroteaninety-four-pagearticleremindingAmericansthatthey toomightsoonfaceasimilarchoicetotheoneChamberlainhadfailed toconfront.28 InOctober1938DullesandArmstrongco-authoredanotherchallengetonon-intervention.Neutralitylaws,theyargued,were entirelyinadequateasaguaranteethattheUnitedStatescouldkeepout ofwar.Internationaltroublemakers“believetheycancountonapassivitywhich...isquitealientotheAmericantemper.Thequestionis, howcanwemakethemawareofthisanddoiteffectivelyandin time?”29

3 WasFranklinDelanoRooseveltamemberoftheEstablishment? Hewascertainlyahereditarymemberofoneoftheoldestrootstocks oftheAmericanupperclass,descendedfromDutchpatroons,Hudson Valleysquires,andmillionaireNewYorkmerchants.Hewaseducated atGrotonandHarvard,evenifhewasturneddownbythemostso-

ciallyaugustoftheHarvardclubs,thePorcellian.(CousinTheodore, inannouncinghisdaughterAlice’smarriagetothefutureSpeakerof theHouse,NicholasLongworth,proudlytoldKaiserWilhelmIIof Germany,“NickandIarebothinthePorc,youknow.”)30 Roosevelt theHappyWarriordidnotsharetheEstablishment’sdistasteforelectoralpolitics.Buthedidhavecentristinstincts.Healsohadasteadily internationalistattitude,evenifhehadtoconcealhispreferenceforintervention.HeadmiredColonelHouse,whoseadvicehefrequently sought,31 andColonelStimson.

InMay1940StimsonhadlunchwithRooseveltattheWhiteHouse andwasalarmedbywhatheheardaboutthewarandtheisolationist Congress.Hedecidedtostatehiscaseclearly.Characteristically,hedid sointwospeeches,oneatAndoverandoneatYale.Hetoldtheboysat Andoverthattheywereluckytohavebeenofferedaclearchoicebetweengoodandevil.(Oneofthosewhoheardhim,GeorgeHerbert WalkerBush,wentstraightoutandvolunteeredfortheU.S.Navy.) FromAndover,StimsonwenttoNewHaven,wherehegavearadio talkonthethemethattheUnitedStatescouldnot,initsowninterest, allowBritaintobedefeatedbyNaziGermany.

ThenextdaythepresidentoftheUnitedStatesphoned,offering Stimsonthejobofsecretaryofwar.Roosevelthaddecidedtoreplace thetwomostisolationistmembersofhiscabinetwithtwoRepublican interventionists,FrankKnox,anewspaperpublisherfromChicago whohadbeenAlfLandon’svicepresidentialrunningmatein1936,and Stimsonhimself.Fromthatmomenton,ColonelStimsonfilledtheWar Departmentwiththoseheregardedasthefinestfloweroftheeastern foreignpolicyEstablishment.HebroughtinJohnJ.McCloyandRobertLovettasassistantsecretariesandHarveyBundyashispersonalassistant.

StimsonputGeorgeHarrison,headoftheFederalReserveunder Hoover,inchargeofS-1,thecodenamefortheManhattanProjectto buildanatomicbomb.InmanyrespectstheatomicbombwasthespecialachievementandthespecialresponsibilityoftheforeignpolicyEs-

tablishment,anditisworthaskingtowhatextentthebomb,andthe decisiontouseit,wereshapedbytheEstablishment’svaluesandattitudes.

Formally,thedecisionwastakenbytheInterimCommitteeata meetingonMay30and31,1945,andcommunicatedtoPresidentTrumanbyStimsonandAssistantSecretaryMcCloythefollowingday. TherewasdiscussionofthepossibilityofwarningJapan.Thatwasrejectedbecauseofthelossoffaceiftheweapondidnotwork.(Forall anybodyknew,sinceithadnotbeentestedasabombdroppedfroman airplane,itmightnot.)Therewasdiscussionofademonstration.That wasrejectedbecauseoffearsthattheJapanesemightmoveAmerican prisonersofwarintothedesignatedtargetarea.Manylaterhistorians havesuggestedthattheuseoftheweaponwasmotivatedinwholeor inpartbythewishtokeeptheSovietUnionoutofthewarinthe PacificsoastodepriveStalinofasayinthepostwarsettlementinEast Asia.32 Stimson’sfirstbiographerstatesthathefoundnoevidenceof this.33 KaiBird,inhisbiographyoftheBundybrothers,concludes fromamemorandumwrittenbytheirfather,HarveyBundy,andonly declassifiedin1973(wellafterMorison’sbookwaspublishedin1960), thatBundyandStimsonwereindeedawarethatthebombwouldbe droppedbeforetheSovietUniondeclaredwaronJapan.34 Moreover, HarveyBundywaswellawarethatStimsonbelievedasearlyasthe PotsdamconferenceinJulythatthewarcouldbeendedwithoutthe useoftheatomicbomb,iftheJapaneseweretoldthattheUnited Stateswouldallowthemonarchytocontinueinaconstitutionalform. Inanycase,itisclearthat,withinthesmallgroupofmenwhoknew ofthebomb’sappallingcapabilities,thedecisionhadlongbeentaken todropit.35

MostofthekeymembersoftheforeignpolicyEstablishment(as opposedtotheelectedpoliticiansandthescientists)involvedinthedecisiontodroptheatomicbombwerelawyers,andtheydisplayeda lawyerlikepropensitytomakethecasetheythoughttheirclients,two successivepresidentsoftheUnitedStates,wantedtohear.Itwasnot

thattheywereunawareoftheconsequencesoftheiractionsorofthe gravityoftheresponsibilitytheyweretakingonthemselves.“Warwas death,”wroteHarveyBundy,“andthequestionnowwastogetitover with.”36 McCloysaidthatbothheandStimsonhad“longandpainful thoughtsabouttheatomictriumph.”Stimsonappearstohavehadaminorheartattackwhenheheardthatthebombhadbeendropped.He retreatedtotheSt.Hubert’sClubatAusable,NewYork,anupperclassEpiscopaliansummerresortcampintheAdirondacks,wherehe gaveasolemntalkabouttheneedtocontroltheatomicweapon.Then hereturnedtoWashingtonandattemptedathislastcabinetmeetingto persuadetheTrumancabinetthattheUnitedStatesshouldoffertoban thebomb.37 Thesepromptingsofmorality,however,didnotprevail againstthecorevaluesoftheEstablishment:stoicism,patriotism,arespectforthemilitaryvirtues,andperhapsalsoadeterminationnotto besofterthanlessprivilegedmortals.Thesewerethevaluesthatwere neededtoconfronttheAxisbetweenEuropeanfascistsandJapanese militarists.Thewareffort,ledatthetopoftheciviliangovernmentby agroupofmenwhoweretheepitomeoftheEstablishment,wasspectacularlysuccessful.

3 Ifaftervictoryin1945,though,theEstablishmentevercherished thehopeofgoingbacktomakingmoneyonWallStreetduringthe weekandplayingtennisandsailingontheweekends,thathopewasto bedisappointed.ItwasnotlongbeforeAmericaseemedtofacean evengreaterdanger,fromtheSovietUnion.

Thiswas—toitsmembers’eyes,atleast—theEstablishment’sﬁnest hour.Itplayedaleadingpartincreatingtheinstitutionsandethosof thepostwarworldandofthenationalsecuritystatewithwhichAmericaconfrontedtheColdWar.TheUnitedNationsandtheBretton Woodsinstitutions,theInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorld Bank,wereconceivedbeforeFranklinRoosevelt’sdeath,andiftheEstablishmentwasstronglyrepresentedintheRooseveltadministration, itwasonlyoneofakaleidoscopeofcompetingtraditionsandinterests,

fromsouthernconservativesinCongresstoindustriallabor.During theTrumanadministration,Stimson’scontemporariesretired.Their placewastakenbytheAchesongeneration:AverellHarriman,Charles Bohlen,GeorgeKennan,RobertLovett,JohnJ.McCloy,theill-fated JamesForrestal,andAchesonhimself.

TheirmonumentsweretheMarshallPlantorevivetheeconomy andsopreservethedemocracyofwesternEurope,and nato,thedefensivealliancetosaveEuropefromStalinistaggressionandincidentallytoguaranteeAmericanhegemonyinEuropefortwogenerations. (TheEstablishmentwaslessinterestedinJapanandChina.)TheNationalSecurityActof1947,whichmergedtheWarandNavydepartmentsinanewDepartmentofDefense,andcreatedtheNational SecurityCouncilintheWhiteHouseandtheCentralIntelligence Agency,wereinstitutionsinfusedwiththeethosandstaffedwiththe personneloftheEstablishment.

ThepaladinsoftheTrumanadministrationwerejoinedintheformingandexecutionofAmericanforeignpolicyinthelate1940sandthe 1950sbymenyoungenoughtohaveserved,oftenwithgreatdistinction,asjuniorofﬁcersorintelligenceoperativesinWorldWarII.DavidBruce(ascionoftheMellonfamilyfromPittsburgh),andawhole swarmofidealisticbutprivilegedyoungmenwhohadserved(as Brucedid)intheOfﬁceofStrategicServices(OSS)duringthewar, wouldnowserveunderAllenDullesinthenewCIAthatcameinto existenceinJuly1947:FrankWisner,RichardBissell,TracyBarnes, DesmondFitzGerald,RichardHelms,WilliamColby,JohnBross, CordMeyer.38

Theagencyinthoseyears,itwassaid,hadtheatmosphereofaYale classreunion.OSSwassofullofthewellconnectedthatitwasknown as“Oh-so-social.”TheCIAincludedrough-hewntypesaswell.But thepreponderanceofIvyLeaguegraduatesingeneral,andespecially graduatesofYale,Harvard,andPrinceton,andaboveallofYaleinthe earlyyearsoftheagency,isstillastonishing.RobinWinkscitessome compellingcalculations.AslateastheNixonadministration,26percent

ofCIAemployeeswithcollegedegreeshadreceivedthosedegrees fromIvyLeagueinstitutions,andofthose,86percentwerefromHarvard,Princeton,andYale.Whenadvancedstudyistakenintoconsideration,andwithColumbiaaddedtothelist,Winksnotes,thedominanceisevengreater.39

3 TheforeignpolicyEstablishmentandthepostwarintelligence communityhavesofarusuallybeenstudiedasentirelyseparatephenomena.Inreality,theywerethesamekindofpeople,andoften(in thepersons,forexample,ofAllenDullesorWilliamBundy)thesame people.BetweentheendofWorldWarIIandtheKennedyadministration,Americaninteractionswiththeoutsideworld,especiallythe higherechelonsofforeignpolicy,diplomacy,andintelligence,were dominatedbymenfromthreeorfoureasternuniversities.AsWinks saysofthatperiod,“TheIvyLeagueinstitutionswerehavensofthe wellconnected.”40

Thiswastheperiodofwhat,inanothercontext,Ihavecalled“the liberalconsensus.”41 Theessenceofthatconsensuswasavastdeal, wherebyconservativesmoreorlessgrudginglyacceptedtheoutlines ofasocialdemocraticNewDeal,whileallbutthemostradicalliberals embracedasternlyanticommunistforeignpolicy.Thiswastheposition oftheforeignpolicyEstablishment.TheGreatDebateaboutisolationismwasover.

InthebeliefthattheUnitedStateshadtosavetheworldfroma new,Soviettotalitariantyranny,DeanAchesonstoodatArmageddon andpersuadedSenatorArthurVandenbergandtheRepublicansherepresentedthattheUnitedStatesmustberesponsibleforcontainingcommunistexpansion.42 Inthatsamebelief,youngerYalegraduates(and others)organized,andsometimestookpartin,covertactionfromthe BaltictoIndonesiaandthePhilippines.43

TheEstablishment’striumphinrisingtothechallengeoftheCold WarwiththeSovietUnioninEuropewasinextricablyconnectedwith therootsofitscomingtragicfailureinSoutheastAsia.ForiftheEs-

tablishment’sinstinctwascentristandrestrained,itspolicydepended nonethelessonmobilizingAmericanresourcesforaconﬂictthatwas ultimatelymilitary.

JohnF.Kennedy’sinauguraladdress,concernedalmostexclusively withthe“longtwilightstruggle”againstcommunism,waswrittenby TheodoreSorensen,agraduateoftheUniversityofNebraska.Butit expressedwithperfectpitchthebeliefsoftheHarvard,Yale,and Princetongraduateswhohadbeenjuniorofﬁcersinthewaragainst Axisdomination,andstoodreadytoﬁghtasecondroundagainstthe tyrannousempiresofStalinandMao.

Itwasnotlong,however,beforethatconsensus,andtheforeignpolicyEstablishmentwhichhadreachedtheapogeeofitspowerunderit, begantodissolve.Multiplecauseswereatwork,withinandoutsidethe Americanupperclass.ThefirstunmistakablyvisiblecrackwastheBay ofPigs.ThefiascoutterlydiscreditedRichardBissell,Yalegraduate andeconomicsprofessor.44 HeandAllenDullestooktheblame.Butit alsoledtosoul-searchingandfinger-pointinginsidetheintelligence andforeignpolicycommunity.

InthenextfewyearsthecivilrightsmovementandtheKennedyassassinationshookthenationalmorale.Asthe1960swenton,therewas ageneralquestioningofauthorityofeverykind,fromthebosomof thefamilytotheWhiteHouse.Fathers,teachers,professors,priests, ofﬁcers,executives,andpoliticianswereallasked,oftenrudely,tojustifythemselvesandtheirauthority.ThatwasoneSixties,theLeft Sixties,sotospeak;atthesametimetheSixtiesoftheRight,takingoff fromthecampaigntochooseBarryGoldwaterfortheRepublicanpresidentialnominationin1964,nowbegantochallengetheliberalconsensusfromtheoppositedirection.BothinevitablyshookthedisproportionatepoweroftheEstablishmentoverforeignpolicy.Bothwere offeredanopportunitybythestrategicblunderandtacticalincompetenceofVietnam.

BythetimeRichardNixonwasinauguratedin1969,aliberalera wasendingandaconservativehegemonywasapproaching.Thewarin

VietnamraisedquestionsthattheforeignpolicyEstablishmentwasnot successfullyabletoanswer.WastheUnitedStatestobetheworld’s policeman?WhatwouldbethegeographicallimitstoAmericanresponsibility?Inwhatcircumstanceswouldtheuseofforcebejustiﬁed todefendstrategicinterests?IfthelessonofMunichhadbeenthatappeasementofdictatorshipsdidnotwork,whatwouldbethelessonsof Vietnam?

ThebackgroundtothetragedyofVietnamwasadecisiontakenas earlyasthepostwar1940sinMoscow.Onceitwasclearthatthe UnitedStateswasorganizinganalliancetodefendwesternEurope fromdirectmilitaryattack,analliancebackedbythethreatofnuclear weapons,theSovietleadershipdecided,insteadofbludgeoningthe West,tostrangleit.TheRedArmyremainedineasternEuropein massiveforce.ButSovietpolicyincreasinglyswitchedtoencouraging anti-colonialandothernationalmovementsinwhatwasnowcalledthe ThirdWorld:intheCaribbeanandLatinAmerica,inAfrica,inthe MiddleEast,Indonesia,andSoutheastAsia.Itwasagreatmistake(one oftenmadeinWashington)toseeallsuchmovementsasessentially broughtintobeingbyMoscow.Everywhereinthe1950s,authentic movementsforfreedom,oratleastfornationalself-determination, wereboilingup,theircausesspeciﬁctotheexperienceofeachcountry. YeteverywhereMoscow,andoftenBeijing,too,wereinvolved,encouraging,fomenting,arming,andfundingsuchrebellions.Sothe UnitedStatesfounditselfcommittedtomaintainingthestatusquo (sometimesrepresentedbyundemocraticandcolonialregimes)almost anywheresubversioncouldberepresentedaslikelytoleadtothelocal successofcommunism.

FromcombatingcommunisminEurope,theU.S.government,with theCIAaspointman,founditselfcommittedtotryingtounderstand andtoinﬂuencethepoliticsofliterallydozensoffarawaycountriesof whichitknewlittle,toparaphrasethehaplessNevilleChamberlain’s descriptionofCzechoslovakiain1938:Angola,Guatemala,Indonesia, Zaire.45

Intheprocess,Washington,andtheEstablishment,hadenoughsuccessestobelieveithadlearnedhowtocountersubversion.FromitsoriginsasthesuccessorofGeneralWilliam“WildBill”Donovan’sOSS, theCIAwasonlypartlyanintelligenceagency.Themoreglamorous partofitsworkwasthatoftheDeputyDirectorshipofPlans(DDP). Thatwasthecovernamefor“covertaction,”whichcouldmean “counter-insurgency”—ﬁghtingup-countryagainstrebellionsofthe kinddescribed—orpoliticalcoupsbackedbymoreorlessovertsmallscalewarfare.TheSovietUnionhaduppedtheantebyencouraging warsofnationalindependencetodenytheWestmarketsandrawmaterials.TheUnitedStates,byrespondingalmosteverywhere,globalizedtheColdWar.

BoththegrandNorthAtlanticallianceandthesmallwarsinAsian, African,andLatinAmericanjungleswerelargelyledbyEstablishment types.In1953theCIA,inthepersonofKermit“Kim”Roosevelt,anotherGrotonboy46 andagrandsonofPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt, withanassistfromtheBritishSecretIntelligenceService,overthrew theradicalgovernmentofMohammedMossadeqinIranandreinstalledtheShahonthePeacockThrone.ThenextyeartheCIA,led byTracyBarnes(Groton,Yale,andHarvardLaw),acousinofthe Whitneys,ledanoperationtoremoveJacoboArbenz,aleftistthough noncommunistpresident,fromofﬁceinGuatemala.Inthesameyears ColonelEdwardLansdale,legendaryasthemodelfortheantiheroof GrahamGreene’snovel TheQuietAmerican, andbackedbyanother quintessentiallyEstablishmentﬁgure,DesmondFitzGerald,47 brokethe HukbalahaprebellioninthePhilippines.Theconsequenceoftheseand otherundercoveroperations,whichlostnothinginthetellingbackin Washington,wasadeepeningfaithintheideathatcommunisminthe developingworldcouldbedefeatedbysmalloperationsinwhichpropagandaandpoliticalintriguewouldbebackedbyforceonasmallbut lethalscale.

Thisfaithin“littlewars”andcovertactionhadrubbedoffonthe

EstablishmentCIAmenfromtheircontacts,duringandafterWorld WarII,withtheBritish,whohadlearnedinimperialadventurestouse cunning,surprise,andsecrecytomakeupforashortageofresources. TheofficialBritishobsessionwithsecretwarfarewasnotonlyaggressivebutalsodefensive,inflamedbyanexaggeratedestimateofGerman“fifthcolumn”operations.Americanintelligenceofficersfrom “WildBill”DonovanonacquiredfromtheBritishanexaggeratedobsessionwithinfiltration.48 “Bytheendofthewar,”onehistorian writes,“sabotage,guerrillaattack,secretintelligence,andotherforms ofirregularwarfarespreadeverywhere... [Americanintelligenceofficers’]faithinshadowwarfarewasfurthernurturedbya...gross overestimateoftheeffectivenessofBritishcovertoperations.”49 Bythe Kennedyadministration,MaoZedong’sthoughtsonguerrillawarfare wererequiredreadingfortheambitiousnationalsecurityofficial,and enthusiastsforcounterinsurgencywarfare,liketheStateDepartment’s RogerHilsman,wereinfluential.50

Theproliferationof“shadowwarfare”inthe1950sculminatedin thedisastrousBayofPigsinvasionofCubain1961.Thisbrutallyexposedfalseassumptionsofeverykind.ItwasalsounmistakablyanEstablishmentoperation.BackedbyAllenDulles,whohadledtheEstablishment’schargeagainstisolationismintheGreatDebateof1939–1941,itwasrunbyRichardBissellandTracyBarnes.Theinvasionwas insomemeasureinspiredbythesuccessofBarnes’soperationinGuatemala.Itprovedadisastermainlybecauseitsplanners,incharacteristicEstablishmentfashion,ignoredthepoliticalimplications,domestic andinternational.JohnF.Kennedy,whoneverignoredthepolitical implicationsofanything,insistedthattheAmericaninvolvementmust bedeniable.DullesandBarnessimplyassumedthatKennedywould havetobailtheoperationout.51

Bythefallof1962,theperceivedthreatfromCubaseemedtohave beenneutralizedbyKennedy’sﬁrm,ifdevious,handlingofthemis-

silecrisis.52 Washington’sattentionswitchedtothefarmoreremote threatfromcommunistmovementsintheformerFrenchcoloniesof Indochina.

ThecommitmenttoVietnamgrewoutofthesecretwarinLaos, where—whileAverellHarrimanstrovetoachieveanegotiatedsettlement—theCIApaidninethousandMeotribesmeninthehopethat theycoulddefeatacommunistarmy.(This,likeotherCIAprojectsfor usingIndochineseethnicminoritiesagainsttheVietnamesemajority, cameundertheresponsibilityofDesmondFitzGerald,whowaschief oftheDDP’sFarEastdivisionunitin1963,thenheadofDDPfrom 1965tohisdeathin1967.)53

InVietnam,asinLaos,Washingtonwasinitiallyoftwominds whetherAmericaninvolvementwasnecessary.54 Thequestionthereat ﬁrstappearedinadifferentguise:ShouldtheUnitedStatessupportthe corruptandundemocraticregimeofPresidentNgoDinhDiem(not tomentionhisbrotherandhisfearsomesister-in-law,MadameNhu, whoseresponsetounrestamongtheBuddhistclergywastocallfora “monkbarbecue”)?LessthanthreeweeksbeforePresidentKennedy wasassassinated,theDiembrothersweremurderedinacoupopenly approvedofbyKennedy’sambassadorinSaigon,HenryCabotLodge. BythetimeLyndonJohnsonfocusedonVietnam,hewaslisteningto advisers—includingsuchcentralEstablishmentﬁguresasMcGeorge BundyandAverellHarriman—whowereforthemostparttellinghim thattheUnitedStatescouldnotallowacommunistrevolutiontooccur inSouthVietnam.

Neithertheknife-in-mouthcounter-insurgencywarriorsnortheir Establishmentmasterswerequicktorealizetheimplicationsoftheraw violencethatunderlayastrategyinSoutheastAsiathatpurportedtobe aboutexportingAmericanidealstothedevelopingworld.ThemuscularChristianityoftheReverendEndicottPeabodycouldnotsurvive exposuretoaworldinwhichAmericansfoughtcommunistsubversion withthesystematicmassacresofthePhoenixprogram,inwhichtens

ofthousandsofVietnameseweremurderedincoldbloodbyAsians workingunderAmericanorders.55

ItwastheprolongedagonyofVietnamthatdividedanddiscreditedtheforeignpolicyEstablishmentand,byrobbingitofitsreputationforwisdom,destroyeditsinﬂuence.Neitherthedivisionnorthe discrediting,however,happenedovernight.SeveralofPresidentJohnson’skeyadvisers—notablyhisnationalsecurityassistant,McGeorge Bundy,andBundy’selderbrother,theassistantsecretaryofstatefor theFarEast,WilliamBundy—wereclassicEstablishmentmembers. NeitheroftheBundyswaswithoutseveredoubtsoverthewisdomof thecommitmentinSoutheastAsia.In1964,however,bothbrothers wereresponsibleforthedecisiontoaskCongressforaTonkinGulf Resolution.Thistookadvantageofamurkynavalencounter,inwhich NorthVietnamesevesselsmayormaynothaveattackedU.S.ships,to getcongressionalauthorityforwar.Inthespringof1965,MacBundy, whohadjustvisitedSouthVietnam,playedaleadingroleinthedecisionstosendU.S.troopstoSouthVietnamandtobombNorthVietnam.BothBundybrothers,andothersfromanEstablishmentbackground,56 playedavocalpartinsellingtheVietnampolicy,notleastata seriesofmeetingsattheCouncilonForeignRelations.

OnereasonfortheEstablishment’sdisarrayoverVietnamwasthat itsmembershadalwaysthoughtwesternEuropeandtheMiddleEast weremuchmoreimportanttotheUnitedStatesthanAsia.JohnJ. McCloy,inparticular,whobythistimewasoftenhalfjocularlyreferredtoasthechairmanoftheEstablishment,wasaskedbyJohnson togotoSaigonasambassador,butrefused.57 Hewasnotinitially againstanAmericanpresenceinVietnam;hesimplythoughtitwasa diversionofresourcesandofWashington’spoliticalprioritiesfrom westernEurope,wherethesolidarityof nato wasbeingchallengedby GeneraldeGaulleandothersandbypressuresfortroopscutsbythe BritishandGermangovernments.Indeed,heresentedthewayViet-

namwasknockingwhatheregardedasmoreimportantissuesinEuropeoffthefrontpages.And,asthelawyerwhorepresentedseveral majoroilcompanies,healsothoughtthattheMiddleEastwasahigher prioritythanSoutheastAsia.

Throughouttheperiodfrom1960to1968,theCouncilonForeign Relations(CFR)organizednostudygrouponSoutheastAsia.Early in1965,however,itdidpollitsmembers.Aroughquarterofthem favoredexpansionoftheAmericanwareffort,anotherquarterfavoreddisengagement,andhalfwereformuddlingthrough.Again,at ﬁrstMcCloyagreedwithGeorgeKennan,GeorgeBall,andAverell HarrimanthattheUnitedStatesshouldnotbedrawnintoalandwarin Asia.InearlyJune1965,inacommencementaddressatHaverford CollegeinhisnativePhiladelphia,McCloysaid,“Idonotyetsee clearly...lightthroughthetunnel.”(AtaboutthattimePhilipHamburgerwroteinthe NewYorker thattheadvocatesofthewar,whooftensaidtheysawlightattheendofthetunnel,were“rightaboutthe tunnel,wrongaboutthelight.”)ThenhewastalkedintoamorefavorableviewbytheadministrationspokesmenwhovisitedtheCFR, whoincludedHenryCabotLodge,GeneralMaxwellTaylor,andBill Bundy.

ThenarrativethatmostclearlychartsthepartplayedbyVietnamin thegrowingdivisionandeventualdiscreditingoftheEstablishmentis thatofthe“WiseMen,”thegroupofelderstatesmenoutsidegovernmenttowhomLyndonJohnsonturnedforadvice.Asthesheersize anddifﬁcultyofthetaskthatwouldbeinvolvedindefeatingtheViet CongrebelsandtheirsupportersinNorthVietnambecameplain,the Establishmentmindgraduallychanged.PatriotstheEstablishmentmen certainlywere,anddisinclinedtoshrinkfromconﬂict.Certainlymost ofthemfeltinstinctively,asMcCloydid,thatoncethehonorofthe UnitedStateswasatstake,itmustbemaintained.Defeatwasunthinkable.Buttheywerealsopracticalmen,manyofthemlawyers.They wouldnotshrinkfromadayincourtiftherewereanychanceofwin-

ning.Butifthecasewashopeless,theyknewthattheymighthaveto settleoutofcourt.

LyndonJohnsonwasawareofhisrelativeinexperienceinforeign affairs.Hewasimpressed,perhapsoverimpressed,bytheEstablishment’sreputationforexpertiseandwisdom.Hewantedtorecruitits prestige.InJuly1965agroupofabouttwentydistinguishedelder statesmenthatincludedDeanAcheson,RobertLovett,andJohnJ. McCloywasinvitedforbrieﬁngsonVietnamattheStateDepartment. ThenextdayasmallergroupofthemmetthepresidentandenthusiasticallyendorsedplansforescalationinSoutheastAsia.Achesontold thepresidenthehad“nochoicebuttopresson.”58 Thiswasthepolicy AchesonhadcounseledintheearlydaysoftheColdWar:standupto thecommunists.Withapprovalherecordedthat“mycolleaguescame thunderinginlikethechargeoftheScotsGreysatWaterloo.”(Notfor nothinghadAcheson’sgrandfatherbeenanofﬁcerintheBritisharmy: heknewofitsglories.)ThenextdayMcGeorgeBundytoldhisstaff, “Themustachewasvoluble.”59

OnJuly22,1965,McCloyandArthurDean,theseniorpartnerin theleadingWallStreetlawﬁrmofSullivanandCromwell,whohad beentheheadofthedisarmamentagencyintheKennedyadministration,wereinvitedbackforasecondmeeting.McCloyaskedwhyHanoi couldn’tbebombed.And,laterintheyear,afterPresidentJohnsonorderedabombinghaltinthehopeofpersuadingHanoitonegotiate peace,bothMcCloyandLovetttoldBundythattheywereinfavorof startingbombingagain.Sofar,nobreakintheEstablishment’sCold Warstance.

OnJanuary27,1966,therewasasecondfullWiseMengroup meeting.McCloy,Harriman,theBundybrothers,GeorgeBall,Arthur Dean,andClarkCliffordwerepresent.Whateverprivatemisgivings theremighthavebeen,therewasstillnoopenbreachoverthepresident’swar.

Yetalreadythereweresignsofdivision.Whentheadministration

wantedtosetupacitizens’grouptolobbyforthewar,HamiltonFish Armstrong,theeditorof ForeignAffairs, thoughtitwouldbebadidea: itwouldlooklike“controlofgovernmentpolicybyreactionaries, WallStreet,theEast,theEstablishment.”60 IntheendMcCloy,David Rockefeller,andAchesondidjoina“CommitteeforanEffectiveand DurablePeaceinAsia.”Itslessthangung-homanifestoreﬂectedthe Establishment’sinstinctforthecenterground.

In1967thepresident’sfriendJimRoweandakeen-as-mustard WhiteHouseaide,JohnRoche,starteda“CitizensCommitteefor PeacewithFreedominVietnam,”withformerSenatorPaulDouglas asitshead.FormerPresidentEisenhowerandAchesonjoined.ButBob LovettandMacBundydraggedtheirfeet.McCloyrefusedtojoin, whileGeorgeBall,asa“Europeanist,”consistentinhisskepticism abouttheVietnamenterprise,comparedthem,savagely,to“buzzards, sendingtheyoungmenofftobekilled.”61

ThingsdidnotgowellinVietnam.InMay1967oneofDefense SecretaryRobertMcNamara’saides,formerHarvardlawprofessor JohnMcNaughton,toldhisbossthatthewarhadcaused“theworst splitinmorethanacentury.”62 Privately,McNaughtonsaid,“Thiswar isshit.”OnNovember1and2ofthatyeartheWiseMencametotown again,amongthemJohnson’sadviserClarkClifford,whohadworked intheWhiteHousewithPresidentTruman,aswellasthepresident’s friendAbeFortas,63 MacBundy,AverellHarriman,DouglasDillon, ArthurGoldberg,andArthurDean.TheywerebriefedinanoptimisticveinbythechairmanoftheJointChiefs,GeneralEarleWheeler. “Thisisamatter,”saidAcheson,“wecanandwillwin.”“Gettingout ofVietnam,”saidBundy,“isasimpossibleasitisundesirable.”64

TheEstablishmentleadershipwasstillonboard.Butitwastroubled. Manydistinguishedﬁgureswerebeingangrilyquestionedbytheirchildrenandwivesabouthowtheycouldsupportapolicythatseemed bothfutileandmorallybankrupt.

OnJanuary30,1968,cametheTetoffensive.65 TheVietCongrose alloverthecountry,evenpenetratingtheperimeteroftheAmerican

embassyinSaigon.Laterhistorians,especiallythoseofaconservative tendency,interpreteditasadefeatfortheVietCongandHanoi.Atthe time,itwascertainlyapoliticaldefeatfortheJohnsonadministration. OnFebruary27atameetingonVietnamattheStateDepartment, McNamara,oncethepartisanofperseverance,lostcontrol.“They’ve droppedmorebombsthaninallofEuropeinWorldWarIIandit hasn’tdoneafuckingthing,”heshouted,andthenbrokedownsobbing.66

ThesamedaytheusuallycoolDeanAchesonalsolosthistemper withthepresidentoftheUnitedStates.Hefelthewasbeinggiven therunaround.HestalkedoutoftheWhiteHouse,andwhenMac Bundy’ssuccessor,WaltRostow,calledtoaskhimtocomeback,the oldgentlemananswered,“TellthePresidenthecantakeVietnamand stickituphisass.”67

OnMarch25cametheclimacticmeetingwiththeWiseMen.Bundy summarizedtheirviewforthepresident:“Wecannolongerdothejob wesetouttodointhetimewehaveleft,andwemustbegintotake stepstodisengage.”GeneralWheelerexplainedthatthePentagonwas notintentona“classicmilitaryvictory.”“Thenwhatinthenameof Godareﬁvehundredthousandmenouttheredoing,”Achesonburst out,“chasinggirls?”68

Lessthanaweeklater,LyndonJohnsontackedontoatelevised speechinwhichheannouncedahalttothebombingofNorthVietnam astatementthathewouldnotseekreelection.

TheWiseMenoftheforeignpolicyEstablishmenthadchanged theirposition.Theyhadwonagain,butitwasaPyrrhicvictory.Walt Rostowdiedinthelastpoliticalditch.“Ithoughttomyself,”hereﬂected,“thatwhatbeganinthespringof1940whenHenryStimson cametoWashingtonendedtonight.TheAmericanEstablishmentis dead.”69

3 Thatfall,RichardNixoncapturedtheWhiteHouse.Forthenext decade,AmericanforeignpolicywasdominatedbyHenryKissinger.

He,too,camefromHarvard.Hehadbeenthedirectorofastudy groupattheCouncilonForeignRelationsandadvisedNelsonRockefeller.70 Hehadevenworkedbrieﬂyandunhappilyasaconsultantwith McGeorgeBundyintheearlyyearsoftheKennedyWhiteHouse.But amemberoftheforeignpolicyEstablishmenthewasnot.Inthe1970s, inforeignpolicyasinotherﬁelds,thereappearedwhatthejournalist andWhiteHouseaideunderBillClinton,SidneyBlumenthal,calleda “counter-establishment”oftheright.71 Inforeignpolicyterms,new groups,basedinnewinstitutions,suchastheAmericanEnterpriseInstituteinWashington,D.C.,andtheHooverInstitutionatStanford UniversityinPaloAlto,California,drawingtheirpersonnelandtheir economicsupportfromdifferentpartsofthecountryandsubscribing todifferentorthodoxiesandadifferentideologyfromthoseoftheold Establishment,werecomingtothefore.Acrucialmomentwastheformationin1975oftheCommitteeonthePresentDanger,andthecampaignofSenatorHenry“Scoop”Jacksonforpresidentin1976.These incidentssawthebeginningofanew,neoconservativeorthodoxyto replacethecentristinstinctsoftheEstablishment.

Inthe1980sand1990sanewgenerationtookoverfromthehighmindedamateursoftheEstablishment.Nolongerwasforeignpolicy necessarilythebusinessoftheonlyelitethatwasinterested.Foundations,thinktanks,andgraduateschoolstrainedanewclassofforeign policyprofessionals.Inmanyrespectstheywerefarbetterpreparedto handleAmerica’sgrowinginternationalresponsibilitiesthanthemen fromGrotonandYale,HarvardLawandWallStreet.Itremainstobe seenwhethertheywilldoabetterjob.Certainlytheirfocuswasdifferent.ManyweredisillusionedwithEurope.AfterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,therewaslessinterestinthereconditeargumentsofstrategicstudies,moreinwhatwascalleda“neo-Wilsonian”approach, dedicatedtospreadingwhatthenewneoconservativeelitesawasthe bestofAmericanvalues.

AsearlyastheKennedyadministration,therehadbeensignsthat

theAmericanrightwasreviving.Theliberalconsensuswasending. Theyear1962,forexample,broughtnofewerthanthreebook-length denunciationsoftheCouncilonForeignRelations.72 AftertheNixon victoryinthe1968election,attacksontheforeignpolicyEstablishment ingeneralandtheCouncilonForeignRelationsandtheTrilateral Commissioninparticularmultiplied.73 Butnowtheywerejoinedbyattacks,someequallyﬁerce,butmostofthemambivalent,fromtheliberalandradicalleft.Ingeneral,whiletheattacksfromtherightcame fromsmall,provincialpublishersintheSouthandWest,attacksfrom theleft(asright-wingconspiracytheoristsmightexpect)camefrom big,establishedNewYorkpublishers.74 Severalofthesewriters,moreover,werelessthansevereintheirjudgmentsoftheEstablishment: theycametomock,andstayed,ifnottocheer,atleasttobegrudginglyimpressed.Ontheright,incontrast,somethingakintoparanoia reigned.AstudybyJamesPerloffaccusedtheCouncilonForeignRelationsofbeingbehindalmosteveryeventinAmericanhistoryinthe previousseventy-ﬁveyearsthatcouldbeseen,fromaconservative pointofview,asdeleterious.75 Perloffmovedfromsayingthat“Wall StreetandtheCouncilonForeignRelationsenjoyedanearlyloveaffairwiththeBolsheviks”76 bywayofblamingthecounciloritsmembersforYalta,ColdWarspyscandals,andtheChineseRevolution,to Vietnam.PresidentCarter’sadministrationwasriddledwithcouncil members,Perloffpointedout,andevenRonaldReaganwasnotguiltlessofthiscontamination.77

3 ItisplainthatanyaccountoftheforeignpolicyEstablishment encountersseriousdifficultiesofdefinition.WasEdwardHousea member?WasFranklinRoosevelt?IfAllenDullesfallswithinthe definition,whatofhiselderbrother,Foster?TheforeignpolicyEstablishment,itseemstome,wasneitheraconspiracynorafantasy.If,as McGeorgeBundysaid,itwasmerelyanexampleof“thecirculationof elites,”78 itwasasignificantone.Itwascertainlyasustainedepisodein

thehistoryoftheAmericanupperclass.Itwasalsoacrucialphasein thehistoryofAmericanforeignpolicy.WhathadtheEstablishment achieved,andwherehaditfailed?

Acomparativelytinybutextremelyeffectiveandpublic-spirited fragmentofAmericansocietyplayedacrucialpartinhelpingthe UnitedStatestoconfronttherealityandthechallengesofworld power.Initsﬁrstgreattrial,duringtheWilsonadministration,many ofwhosepersonnelcouldbedescribedasproto-Establishment,AmericasucceededindestroyingthemilitarismofimperialGermanyandits allies,butfailedattheParispeaceconferencetobringaboutapeace thatconformedtoitsidealsoreventoitsinterests.Thatveryfailure calledtheforeignpolicyEstablishmentintobeing.

IntheGreatDebateofthelate1930sandearly1940s,theEstablishment’sinstinctswerehealthieranditsjudgmentwiserthanthatofthe isolationists,evenifitwastherecklessfollyofimperialJapanandNazi GermanyinattackingtheUnitedStates,ratherthantheargumentsof HenryStimsonandhisfriends,thatﬁnallyabolishedisolationism.TotalwarhardenedtheyoungergenerationoftheEstablishment.Victory validateditscredentials.ButwargavewaynottopeacebuttoCold War.ConfrontedbythethreattheSovietUnionseemedtoposetothe freedomofEuropeandtoAmericanhegemony,theEstablishmentpresidedoverthemilitarizationofAmericanpolicyandtosomedegreeof Americansocietyinthecreationofa“nationalsecuritystate.”

ItisnaturalnowtoquestiontheEstablishment’scommitmentto containmentinEuropeandcounter-insurgencyalmosteverywhere else.Yetinthe1950sitwouldhaverequiredsuperhumanpoliticalcouragetohavemadeseriousattemptstoreachaccommodationwiththe SovietUnion.ThechoiceofpolicyintheThirdWorld,however,was lessinevitable.ThestubbornfollyofVietnam,ofwhichitcanbesaid, aswassaidofNapoleon’sjudicialmurderofaBourbonprince,that itwas“worsethanacrime,itwasamistake,”79 resultedfromthehubrisofbelievingthattherewasnothingtheUnitedStatescouldnot achieve,nobattlethatcouldnotbewon.Thatmiscalculationre-

boundedontheEstablishmentthatwaslargelyresponsibleforthewar andintheendwasmarginalizedbyit.TheEstablishment’sgreatest failure,however,resultedfromitsindifferencetoanditslackofunderstandingofthespiritofalevelingage.InReagan’sAmerica,anew rulingclass,itspowerrootedinnewmoneyandjustiﬁedbynewideas, wasreadytopushasidetheReverendPeabody’spatricianPuritans.

MICHAELLIND

Betweenthe1960sand2000,NewDealliberalismintheUnited Stateswasoverthrownbytheconservativemovement.HavingcapturedtheRepublicanParty,conservativescreatedﬁrstaRepublican presidentialmajorityandthenaRepublicanmajorityinCongress.The topplingofRooseveltianliberalismbyReaganiteconservatismresulted frommorethanaclashofideasaboutsociety.Theprocessinvolved thedisplacementofonesetofelitesbyanother,withadifferentgroup ofeconomic,ethnic,andregionalconstituencies.

TheNewDealcoalitionincludedmanyindustrialstatemayorsand politicalmachinebosses,alongwithanumberofsouthernandwesternpoliticians.Notwithstandingthis,themid-centuryliberalestablishment,whichincludedliberalRepublicansaswellasDemocrats,overlappedtoalargedegreewiththepatriciannortheasternestablishment andthepublicservicemandarinateoftheIvyLeagueandthemajor nonproﬁtfoundations—thesameeliteswhichhadbeeninﬂuentialin theearlierProgressiveEra.Consequently,appealstowhiteworkingclassresentmentoftheEastCoastelite,pioneeredinnationalpolitics byGeorgeWallace,becamethestock-in-tradeofRepublicancon-

ConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal

servatives,whocombinedananti-intellectual“culturewar”withthe agendaofcorporationsandwealthyindividualswhowantedtoroll backtheregulatoryandsocialwelfareachievementsoftheNewDeal. AlthoughtheBushfamilywasanestrangednortheasternelitedynasty, mostoftheleadersoftheRepublicanrightwerefromtheSouthand theWest,someofthemformersegregationistDemocratswhobecame Republicansduringthecivilrightsera.Asthestatesoftheformer ConfederacybecamethebaseofRepublicanconservatism,southern conservativesusedtheirsuccessfulpoliticalsynthesisoffolksypopulism,laissez-faireeconomics,militarism,andreligiousfundamentalism toappealtoworking-classwhitesinotherpartsofthecountry,suchas Catholic“whiteethnics”intheMidwest,whoresentedtheoldnortheasternelite,intellectuals,andracialandsexualminorities.Attheelite level,thesouthernconservativesfoundalliesamongsomeWallStreet ﬁnanciersandcorporateCEOsaswellasamongthe“neoconservatives,”whowereex-liberalandex-radicalintellectualsandpolicyexperts.

Bythetwenty-ﬁrstcentury,acoalitionofsouthernwhitesand northernwhiteCatholicsdominatedbysouthernandwesternpoliticianscontrolledAmericanpolitics.Thepatternwasfamiliartostudents ofAmericanhistory;itrepresentedarepriseofthepatternofAmericanpoliticsfrom1800to1860,whenaJeffersonianeliteleadingacoalitionofsouthernersandCatholicimmigrantsintheNorthcontrolled Washington,D.C.,mostofthetime.Asthenewmillenniumbegan, thenortheasternestablishmentandtheIvyLeaguehadlostpowerin theUnitedStatestoaright-wingsouthernandwesterncounter-establishmentalliedatthegrass-rootslevelwithProtestantevangelicalsand fundamentalistsandattheelitelevelwithasmallbutinﬂuentialfaction ofneoconservativeintellectualsandpoliticaloperatives.

PoliticsMovesUpwardandSouthward

Inthelastthirdofthetwentiethcentury,Americansocietywastransformedbyanumberoflong-termtrends.Internalmigrationshifted

thegeographiccenterofgravityfromtheNortheastandMidwestto theSouthandWest,whileinternationalmigration,concentratedina smallnumberofstates,increasedthepercentageofforeign-bornand nonwhiteAmericans.TheRepublicanParty,basedincreasinglyinthe SouthandWest,beneﬁtedfromthegeographicshiftinAmerica’spopulation.TheDemocrats,increasinglyapartyoftheNortheast,Midwest,andWestCoast,lostasecurepresidentialmajorityin1968anda securecongressionalmajorityin1994.Asaresultofproductivityincreasesandtheexpatriationofindustry,manufacturingdeclinedtothe pointwherethree-quartersofAmericanswereemployedintheservice sectorbytheendofthecentury.Unionmembershipplummetedoutsideofthepublicsector,andpoliticalpartyinstitutionsdeclinedalong withtraditionalpartisanship.Inpolitics,thechurchesofwhiteand blackevangelicalProtestantseclipsedunionsandpartymachinesasthe mostimportantgrassrootspoliticalorganizationsintheRepublicanand Democraticparties,respectively.Attheelitelevel,politicswasincreasinglystructuredbylobbiesandsingle-issueadvocacygroupsrather thanbybroad-basedpoliticalpartieswithcoherentideologies.The electronicmassmediareplacedtheprintmediaasthechiefmeansof politicalcommunication.

Amongthesecomplexchanges,twoparticularlyimportanttrends standout:anupwardshiftandasouthwardshiftinAmericanpolitics.

Theperiodfromthe1960suntiltheearlytwenty-firstcenturyinthe UnitedStateswitnessedwhatChristopherLaschoncecalleda“revolt oftheelites.”ThepoliticalinfluenceoftheAmericanworkingclass declinedalongwithitsmajorinstitutionalexpressions,thelaborunion andthepartymachine.ThesocialcenterofgravityinAmericanpoliticsshiftedupward.Thiswasevidencedintherightwardshiftofthe governmentineconomicsandtheleftwardshiftwithrespecttosocial issues—shiftswhichreflectedtheinterestsandvaluesofthecollegeeducatedoverclassthatnowdominatesbothnationalparties.

WhilethesocialcenterofgravityinAmericanpoliticsmovedupward,thegeographiccenterofgravitymovedsouthward.Themajor

beneﬁciaryofthechangesinAmericanlifeafterthe1960swasthe southernright.“TheSouth,forgoodorill,hasbeenbiddingthenation tofollowitslead,”writesthehistorianBruceJ.Schulman.“TheSouth haspassedonmuchtootherregions—afondnessforhightechnology, acravingfordefenseindustry,asuspicionofunions,adividedeconomy,anantipathytowelfare,anuneasyaccommodationbetweenblack urbanleadersandwhitebusinessconservatives.”1

Theriseofthesouthernrightcameasasurprise.Duringthecivil rightsrevolutionofthe1950sand1960s,itappearedthattheSouth wouldbeintegratedintotheAmericanmainstream.Instead,inthe finalthirdofthetwentiethcentury,Americawasintegratedintothe southernmainstream.Therisetoprimacyinthefederalgovernmentof politiciansfromthestatesoftheformerConfederacywasonlyone manifestationofalong-termtrend:thesouthernizationoftheUnited States.ThesouthernizationofAmericansocietywasvisibleinmany realms,fromcivilrights,wherepoliticalpolarizationalongraciallines cametodefinenationalpolitics,toeconomics,wheretheage-oldsouthernformulaoftaxcuts,deregulation,freetrade,andcommodityexportscametodefinethenationalmainstream.

Betweenthemid-twentiethcenturyandtheearlytwenty-ﬁrst,the UnitedStatesexperiencedprogressinmanyareas,rangingfromthe eliminationofformalracialandgenderdiscriminationandthediffusionofliberalattitudestowardsexandcensorshiptopublicsupportfor environmentalconservation.ButthesouthernizationofAmericanlife warped,whenitdidnotretard,thegeneralprogresstowardhigherlivingstandardsandgreaterpersonallibertiesthattheUnitedStates sharedwiththeotheradvancedindustrialdemocracies.Ifthesouthern borderoftheUnitedStateshadrunalongtheMason-Dixonlinerather thantheRioGrande,thenAmericanhistoryinthelastdecadesofthe oldmillenniumwouldhavebeenquitedifferent.

Attheelitelevel,theresultofallofthesetrendswasashiftinpoliticalpowerfromtheremnantsofthenortheasternRepublicanEstablishmentaswellasfrompost–NewDealliberalelitesbasedinorganized ConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal 253

MichaelLind

labor,thecivilrightsmovement,andtheacademytoanascendant southern–SunBelteliteanditsalliesintheﬁnancialsectorandpartsof themedia.Withaneconomicoutlookshapedbythecommodity-exportingcapitalismandthelow-wage,small-governmenttraditionof theSouthandWest,andaviewoftheworldinﬂuencedbysouthern JacksonianmilitarismandProtestantfundamentalism,thelatestinaseriesofAmericanelitesbegantoremakethenation.

TheThirdRepublic:ConservativesTakeControl

ThepresentAmericanregime,itcanbeargued,representsaThirdRepublicoftheUnitedStates.2 TheFirstRepublicenduredfromthe FoundingandcollapsedintheCivilWar.TheLincolnadministration anditssuccessorslaidthegroundworkfortheSecondRepublic,which lasteduntiltheGreatDepression.TheThirdRepublic,theproductof theNewDealandthecivilrightsrevolution,wasassembledbythe presidentsfromFranklinD.RoosevelttoLyndonB.Johnson.

In1932anunlikelycoalitionofsouthernconservatives,western populists,urbanindustrialworkers,andreformistnorthernProtestants, unitedbyhostilitytothenorthernindustrialcapitalistelite,elected FranklinRooseveltandputanendtotheSecondRepublic.TheNew Dealhadtwoagendas—oneforthenortheastern-midwesterncoreand onefortheagrarianperiphery.IntheNortheastandMidwest,theNew Dealwasidentiﬁedwiththeredistributionofbargainingpowerandincometowardtheworkingclass.Inthesouthernandwesternperiphery, bymeansofstatecapitalistprojectslikethecivilianTennesseeValley Authorityandmilitarybases,theNewDealersinthefederalgovernmentbuiltamoderninfrastructureinthehopeofdecentralizingindustrythroughouttheUnitedStates.3

Thegeographicdecentralizationofindustryandwealthwasagoal sharedbothbytheprogressiveNewDealersinallregionsandbyelite southernconservatives,whosesupportinCongresswasindispensable fortheNewDealcoalition.ConservativesouthernDemocratsused

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theirpoliticalpowertoblockfederalprogramsthatthreatenedtodestabilizetheclassandracialhierarchiesofsouthernsociety.Menial andagriculturalworkers—categoriesincludingthemajorityofblack southerners—wereexemptedfrommostfederallaborandsocialinsurancereforms,andlargesouthernlandownersreapedthegreatestbeneﬁtfromNewDealfarmaidpolicies.Andsouthernconservativesinthe UnitedStatesSenatemanagedtodelaymajorcongressionalcivilrights reforms,whichwouldotherwisehavetakenplaceinthelate1940s,untilthemid-1960s.

DespitethesuccessofsouthernDemocratsinlimitingthescopeand radicalismoftheNewDeal,theUnitedStateswasdominatedbyNew Dealliberalismfromthe1930stothe1970s.Republicanpresidentslike EisenhowerandNixonhadtoaccommodatethemselvestotheprevailingliberalconsensus.UnderPresidentLyndonJohnson,NewDeal idealsreceivedtheirﬁnalexpressionwiththeenactmentofMedicare andMedicaid,thelastmajorsocialinsuranceprogramsestablishedin theUnitedStates.

TheNewDealeraended,however,inthe1960s,andaneweraof conservativepoliticaldominancebegan,producingaRepublicanmajorityinthepresidencyandCongressbytheturnofthetwenty-first century.Althoughsomeconservativerejectionistswantedtorepealthe NewDealandthecivilrightsrevolution,themajorityofconservatives soughttopromotetheiragendawithintheestablishedframeworkof theThirdRepublic.ThisstrategyledmainstreamconservativestopromotepartialprivatizationofSocialSecurityandMedicareratherthan theirabolition.Andmainstreamconservatives,ratherthaninvitingaccusationsofracismbycallingfortherepealofcivilrightslegislation, claimedthataffirmativeactiononthebasisofracebetrayedthecolorblindvisionoftheCivilRightsActof1964.Findingitdifficulttomustercongressionalsupportfortherepealofpopularfederalprograms, theadministrationsofbothRonaldReaganandGeorgeW.Bushinsteadpursuedastrategyof“starvingthebeast”bycuttingtaxesand preventingthegrowthofspendingorthecreationofnewgovernment

programs—attheexpense,inbothpresidencies,ofballooningfederal deﬁcits.

Theperiodfromthe1970suntiltheearlytwenty-firstcentury,then, canbestbeunderstoodnotintermsoftheestablishmentofanew American“republic”butintermsofthecaptureandmodificationof theThirdRepublicoftheUnitedStatesbyconservativeshostiletothe politicalvaluesofitsNewDealliberalfounders.Ratherthanabolish thefoundationsofFranklinRoosevelt’sAmerica,theresurgentrightin thelatetwentiethandearlytwenty-firstcenturiesadoptedastrategyof workingwithinthesystemthatmid-centuryliberalshadestablished whilegraduallyunderminingprogramsandinstitutionsofwhichthey disapproved.

RaceandtheRiseoftheRight

TheNewDealcoalitionofthe1930stothe1960shadunitedsegregationistsandcivilrightsreformersinasinglealliancebasedontheuse offederalpowertoredistributeincomeamongclassesandregions. Thecivilrightsrevolutionofthe1950sand1960sdestroyedtheNew Dealcoalitionandreplaceditwithanewpoliticalrealignmentbased onrace.

Almostassoonasithadcoalesced,theNewDealcoalitionbeganto fallapartoverissuesofrace.Thesouthern“Dixiecrats”splitaway fromtheDemocraticPartyin1948andvotedforthesegregationist StromThurmond,inprotestagainstPresidentHarryTruman’ssupportforcivilrightsreform.Betweenthe1940sandthe1970s,southernDemocratsandnorthernRepublicansfrequentlyvotedtogetherin Congressaspartofwhatwascalled“theconservativecoalition.”BeginningwithBarryGoldwaterandRichardNixon,architectofthe “southernstrategy,”Republicantacticianssoughttowinoverwhite southernDemocratsalienatedfromtheirpartybecauseofitsstandon blackcivilrightsanditsculturalliberalism.

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Conservativeswerealsoabletotakeadvantageofanti-blacksentimentsamongworking-classwhitesintheNorthbecauseofdemographicchange.Themechanizationofsouthernagriculture—aprocess acceleratedbyNewDealfarmsubsidies—haddisplacedmuchofthe South’sblackruralproletariattothecitiesoftheindustrialNorthand Westatatimewhenindustrywasbeingrelocatedtolow-wageareasin theAmericanSouthorWestortoThirdWorldcountries.In1900,nine outoftenblackAmericanslivedintheruralSouth.By1990,blacks madeupathirdofthecombinedpopulationofthetenlargestcitiesin theUnitedStatesand,combinedwithnonwhiteimmigrants,formed themajorityinNewYorkandLosAngeles.4

Thehighratesofpovertyandcrimeamongsouthernmigrantsin theNorthproduced“whiteﬂight”tothesuburbsanduniversalizeda kindofanti-blackpoliticsthatpreviouslyhadbeenconﬁnedtothe South.Followingthecivilrightsrevolution,Republicanconservatives avoidedendorsingracismdirectlyanddistancedthemselvesfromthose whodid.When,in2002,SenatorTrentLottofMississippipraisedthe 1948presidentialcampaignofthesegregationistStromThurmond,the publicoutcryforcedhimtoresignasSenatemajorityleader.Nevertheless,manyoftheissueschosenbyRepublicanpoliticians,suchaswelfarereforminthe1990s,weresurrogatesforappealstotheracialanxietiesofwhiteAmericans.Bythe1990s,the“southernstrategy”had succeededinmakingwhitesintheformerConfederacythemostimportantconstituencyofwhathadoncebeenthepartyofLincolnand theNorth.Inthemeantime,theDemocraticPartyhadabsorbedmany formerprogressiveandcentristRepublicans,anditsnewheartland wasfoundintheregionsthathadsupportedtheGOPbetweenLincoln andHoover:NewEngland,theupperMidwest,andtheWestCoast. Working-classCatholicsintheindustrialMidwest,waveringbetween themostlynorthernDemocratsandthepredominantlysouthernand westernRepublicans,becamethemostimportantswingvotersinpresidentialelectionsby2000.

MichaelLind

IdentityPoliticsandtheDemocrats

Racialdemagogywasnotlimitedtotheright.Insteadoftryingtowin backthewhiteworkingclass,theDemocraticPartyafterthe1970sput itshopesina“rainbowcoalition”strategythatsoughttobuildanew Democraticmajorityonthebasisofblacks,Latinos,andtheliberalminoritywithinthewhitepopulation.Mainstreamliberalsupportersof thecivilrightsrevolution,suchasPresidentLyndonJohnsonandVice PresidentHubertHumphrey,forreasonsofpoliticsaswellasprinciple,hadfavoredrace-neutrallawandopposed“benign”racialdiscriminationonbehalfofracialminorities.BayardRustin,aleadingblack liberal,arguedthatracialpreferencepolicieswoulddestroytheliberalcoalitionbetweenthewhiteworkingclassandblackAmericans. (Large-scaleLatinoandAsianimmigrationhadonlybeguninthe 1960s.)Thefearsofthecolor-blindliberalscametruewhentheDemocraticPartyasawhole,inpursuingthe“rainbowcoalition”strategy, rejectedrace-neutralreforminfavorofracialdiscriminationagainst whiteAmericans.

Bythemid-1970s,theDemocratsaddedLatinostoblacksasagroup eligibleforracialpreferences.The“compensatoryjustice”argument forafﬁrmativeactionforblackAmericanswouldnotworkforLatinos, mostofwhomcametotheUnitedStatesfollowingtheliberalizationof U.S.immigrationlawsinthe1960s.Therationaleforracialquotaswas changedfromcompensationforpastinjusticetothepromotionof“diversity.”Corporationsanduniversities,fearfulofprotestsbyblackand Latinoactivists,adoptedquotasintheprivateaswellasthepublicsector,andundertheirinﬂuencetheSupremeCourt,albeitbynarrowmajorities,hasupheldanumberofracialquotaschemes.5

Democraticpoliticiansandactiviststendedtorespondtocriticisms ofracialpreferencesbydenouncingcriticsasracists.AlthoughhechallengedtheleftwingoftheDemocratsoneconomicsandforeignpolicy aspresident,BillClintonavoidedchallengingtheracialpreferencepolicieswhichhadbecomeDemocraticorthodoxy.Duringthe1992presi-

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dentialcampaign,hehaddenouncedablackpopstarnamedSister Souljahforhercommentthatblacksoughttokillwhitepeoplerather thanoneanother.Aspresident,however,heavoidedanychallengeto left-wingorthodoxyaboutracialpreferencesandmulticulturalism.He saidthatracialpreferencesshouldbe“mended,notended,”andengagedinteleviseddebatesaboutraceinAmerica.

Racialpreferenceswerenottheonlyexampleofidentitypoliticson theleft.TheleftwingofAmericanliberalismalsofavoredmulticulturalism,bilingualism,andamnestiesforillegalaliens.Diatribesbyleftist scholarsandactivistsagainstwhiteAmericansandWesterncivilization playedintothehandsofdemagogicconservativeRepublicansseekingtoappealtodisaffectedwhiteDemocrats.Bilingualpoliciesalso alarmedwhitecitizens,particularlyinstateslikeCalifornia,Texas,and FloridainwhichtheSpanish-speakingpopulationwasgrowingrapidly. AndthesupportbyDemocraticpoliticiansofmassamnestiesforimmigrantswhohadbrokenU.S.immigrationlawswaswidelyinterpretedasadesperateattempttocompensatefortheparty’sunpopularitybyseekingtonaturalizeforeignerswhohadbrokenAmericanlaws inordertobringthemtothepolls.

RaceandRealignment

Theresultoftherace-basedrealignmentinthe1960swasapatternof raciallypolarizedpoliticsthatchangedlittleinthethreesubsequent decades.NoDemocraticpresidentialcandidatehaswonamajorityof thewhitevotesinceLyndonJohnsonin1964.Theonlywhiteethnic groupthatremainsconsistentlyDemocraticistheJewishAmerican minority,whovotedforAlGoreoverGeorgeW.Bushby80percent to17percent.TheRepublicanPartycapitalizedonthedisaffectionof manyformerwhiteDemocratstocreateapresidentialmajority,broken onlybytheonetermofJimmyCarterandthetwotermsofBill Clinton,and,beginningin1994,amajorityinbothhousesoftheU.S. Congress.

MichaelLind

In1996Clintonwasreelected,winningoverwhelmingmajoritiesof theblackandLatinovoteandlosingthewhitevotetoRepublicanrival BobDolebyonly3percentagepoints.In2000,however,substantial movementofwhitevoterstowardtheRepublicansgavetheRepublican PartycontrolofthepresidencyandofbothhousesofCongress,which theRepublicansheldinthemid-termelectionof2002.Inthe2000 presidentialrace,theDemocraticdeﬁcitinthewhitevotegrewfrom the3percentof1996to12percent.WhitemenalonepreferredBushto Gorebyaremarkable24percentagepoints.Only10percentofblack votersin2000votedforBush.

ApolltakenbytheJointCenterforPoliticalandEconomicStudiesinSeptemberandOctober2002,priortothemid-termcongressionalelections,revealedstarkideologicaldivisionsbetweenwhites andblacks.6 In2002theRepublicanPartywonthetwo-partyvoteby53 percentto47percent.AccordingtotheGallupPoll’sanalystsfollowing theelection,“ByfarthelargestdivideamongAmericanvoterscontinuestoberacial.”InthewordsofthenotedAmericanpoliticalanalyst RuyTexeira,“LastNovember[2002]wasallaboutthewhitevote.”7 In thatyear’sU.S.Senateelections,non-HispanicwhitespreferredRepublicanstoDemocratsbyafactorof55.1to44.9percent.LatinospreferredDemocratsbyafactorof67.1to32.9percent,whileblacksgave theDemocratsanoverwhelming93.8percentoftheirvote,compared toonly6.2forRepublicans.Inracesforstategovernor,thepreference ofwhitevotersforRepublicansoverDemocratswasevenhigher,62.8 percentto37.2percent.

ManyDemocratscontinuedtobelievethatthegrowthofnonwhite immigrantnumbers(chieﬂyLatinos)wouldinevitablygivetheirparty amajority.Thisseemedplausible,giventhatthepercentageofforeignbornAmericans,mostofthemLatinAmericans,hadrisento9.5percentby1999,fromalowof4.7percentin1970.8 Andbytheearly twenty-ﬁrstcentury,CaliforniaandTexashadnonwhitemajorities.

Thenonwhitepopulation,however,wasconcentratedinafewlarge states,whichwereunderrepresented,comparedtowhite-majority

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states,intheelectoralcollegeandtheU.S.Senate.Andimmigrantvoterswerefarlesslikelytoregisterandtovotethannative-bornAmericans.Forexample,ifcitizenshipandturnoutratesofLatinosand Asiansweretoremainattheirlevelsof2000,in2040whites—bythen roughlyone-thirdofthepopulationofCalifornia—wouldstillaccount for53percentofCalifornia’svoters.9 In2002,only17percentofthe votesinTexaswerecastbyLatinos.Therainbowcoalitionstrategy, evenifitweresuccessfulinCalifornia,Texas,orNewYork,wasunlikelytosucceedonthescaleofthenation,whichmighthaveawhite majoritywellintothetwenty-ﬁrstcentury,ifnotintothetwentysecond.10

TomakemattersworseforDemocraticstrategistsfavoringa“rainbowcoalition”strategyforwinninganationalmajoritywithoutwinningmorewhitevotes,internalmigrationwithintheUnitedStatesmay helptheRepublicans.AsnonwhiteimmigrantshavepouredintoCalifornia,NewYork,andotherentrystates,millionsofwhiteAmericans havemovedintothelesscrowdedandmoreculturallyhomogeneous Americanhinterland.Themalapportionmentoftheelectoralcollege andtheU.S.SenategivesvotersintheRockyMountainsandplains statesgrosslydisproportionatepowerinthefederalgovernment.This explainswhy,eventhoughamajorityofAmericanscasttheirballotsforAlGorein2000,GeorgeW.Bushwas“selected”bytheelectoralcollege,thankstowesternvotes.Andasnotedearlier,thesmallpopulationstatesoftheWest,inalliancewiththemorepopulous southernstates,arealsoresponsiblefortheRepublicanmajorityinthe U.S.Senate.

TheOverclassandtheTransformationofLiberalism

Theshiftfromtheclass-basedpoliticsoftheNewDealeratotheracebasedpoliticsofthepost–civilrightserawasaccompaniedbythediminutionofworking-classinﬂuence.Thedeclineoforganizedlabor, combinedwiththeexpansioninnumbersandafﬂuenceofthemanage-

rial-professionaloverclass,transformedthedefinitionsof“liberalism” and“progressivism”inthelastdecadesofthetwentiethcentury.DuringtheNewDeal,thebaseoftheleftwasorganizedlabor,andeconomicegalitarianismdefinedthepoliticsoftheleft.Beginningwiththe civilrightsera,thesocialbaseoftheleftinthewhitepopulation shiftedtoaffluentcollege-educatedprofessionalsmoreconcernedwith issuessuchasfeminism,environmentalism,andforeignpolicythan withthe“breadandbutter”issuesofold-fashioned“lunch-bucketliberalism.”

Asindustrialjobswereexpatriatedtolow-wagestatesorcountries,theAmericanworkforcebecamepolarizedbetweenlow-wage servicesectorworkersandawell-paidmanagerial-professionalelite— the“overclass.”11 Membersoftheoverclass,basedinpoliticallypowerfulprofessionslikethelawandmedicineandtheprofessoriat,were protectedbylicensinglawsfromcompetitionbyforeignersorimmigrants.Unlikefactoryworkersorjanitors,Americanlawyerscouldnot bereplacedbylawyersinIndiaorbyunlicensedimmigrantsfrom LatinAmerica.Itistheartificialmonopoliescreatedbyprofessionallicensing,ratherthanatransitiontoa“knowledgeeconomy,”thatexplainswhyAmericanprofessionalstendedtoflourishatatimewhen workersexposedtoforeignandimmigrantcompetitionsuffered.(In theearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury,asU.S.corporationsbegan tooutsourcejobstoforeignmanagers,professionals,scientists,andengineers,theeliteconsensusinfavoroffree-marketglobalismbegan tofray.)

Beginninginthe1960s,politicalliberalismwastransformedfroma movementconcernedchieﬂywithworking-classstandard-of-livingissuestoaquality-of-lifemovementreﬂectingthevaluesandinterests ofthecollege-educatedelite.ThepoliticalscientistJeffreyM.Berry pointsoutthatin1963,two-thirdsofbillsbeforeCongressdealtwith economicgrowthorredistribution,whileonlyone-thirdinvolvedquality-of-lifeissueslikeenvironmentalismorconsumerism.By1991,however,“seventy-onepercentofallcongressionalhearingsthatyeartook

uplegislationthathadquality-of-lifeconcernsatthecenterofthepolicesbeingdebated,whilejust29percentofthedomesticlegislationinvolvedexclusivelyeconomicissues.Analysisofeachbillrevealedthat groupssuchastheWildernessSociety,theSierraClub,theConsumerFederationofAmerica,andtheRalphNaderorganizationsoftenpushedthelegislationforward.”12 Liberalinterestgroups,because oftheelitenatureoftheirdonors,arefarbetterfundedthanmostconservativeinterestgroups,manyofwhichrelyonsmalldonationsraised bydirectmailcampaigns.13 AccordingtoBerry,“asliberalcitizens groupsmobilizedtheirfollowersinthe1960sand’70s,RalphNader liberalismbegantoeclipseHubertHumphreyliberalism...Atthe sametime,thesuccessofthosegroupshaspushedtraditionalliberal concernsforthepooranddisadvantagedfurthertothemarginsof Americansociety.”14

Thepoliticaldivisionswithinthenationaloverclasstendedtooccur oversocialissuesratherthaneconomicissues.Withintheoverclass, therewasaconsensusinfavorofinvestor-friendlyglobalizationand highlevelsofimmigration.Globalizationbeneﬁtedprofessionalsand executivesintheUnitedStateswhohopedtoachievehigherreturns frominvestmentsabroadthanfrominvestmentsinAmericancapital andlabor.Themembersofthemanagerial-professionaloverclassalso tendedtobeemployersofmeniallabor—nannies,gardeners,maids— whosewageswerekeptlowbythehighlevelsofunskilledimmigration thatbeganinthe1960s.Whiletheoverclassenjoyedabuyer’smarket inlaborandservices,themedianrealwageinbothmanufacturingand servicesdroppedbetween1979and1996.15

TheDeclineoftheParties

AnothermajortransformationinAmericanpoliticsinthelastpartof thetwentiethcenturywastheweakeningofthemajorpartiesasorganizations.

Untilthe1970s,partyleaderschosepartynomineesatstateandnaConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal 263

tionalconventions,andpartymachinesconnectedleadersandrankand-filemembersatthegrass-rootslevel.By1972,however,uppermiddle-classreformers,criticalofsecretivedecisionmakingbyparty leadersin“smoke-filledrooms,”prevailedonbothpartiestoturnover thenominationoftheircandidatestocaucusesorprimaries.Theprimary/caucussystemandcampaignfinancereform,whichwereintendedtodemocratizetheAmericanpoliticalsystem,backfired.The McCain-Feingoldcampaignfinancereforms,enactedbyCongressin 2002andupheldbytheSupremeCourtin2003,bylimitingthe amountsof“softmoney”thatcouldbespentoncandidatesbythepartiespromisedtoreducetheroleofthenationalpartiesevenfurther.

Byweakeningtheparties,thereformerscreatedapoliticalvacuum thatwasfilledbymillionairesandbillionaireswho“self-financed”their ownpoliticalcampaigns.Theincreaseinthenumberofrichpoliticians wasaresultofthe1976decisionin Buckleyv.Valeo, whichupheld campaignfinancelimitsoncontributionstocandidatesbutstruckdown limitsonhowmuchoftheirownresourcescandidatescouldspendon theircampaigns.Themostprominentself-financedpoliticalcandidate wasthebillionaireH.RossPerot,whoinhis1992campaignforthe presidencydrewmorevotesthananythird-partycandidatesinceTheodoreRoosevelthadrunastheProgressivePartynomineein1912.But Perotwasmerelythemostvisibleofanumberofpoliticianswhospent theirownfortunestoobtainoffice,oftenwithlittleornosupportfrom thepoliticalpartiestowhichtheynominallybelonged.In1984Senator DanielPatrickMoynihancomplained:“Atleasthalfofthemembersof theSenatetodayaremillionaires...We’ve becomeaplutocracy... TheSenatewasmeanttorepresentthestates;insteaditrepresentsthe interestsofaclass.”16

Thereplacementofconventionsbyprimariesandcaucusesledto thedominationofthenominatingprocessinbothpartiesbysingle-issuegroupslikethereligiousrightintheRepublicanPartyandmembersoftheenvironmentalistandfeministmovementsandblackand LatinoethnicactivistsintheDemocraticParty.Allofthesegroups

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representedsigniﬁcantconstituenciesinAmericansociety.Inatraditionalstrong-partysystem,theseconstituencieswouldhavecompromisedwithothersintheparty.Butintheeraofweakpartiesthatbeganinthe1970s,theprimaryloyaltyofmanypoliticalactivistswasto asingle-issuegroupratherthantothepartyasawhole.

Theincentivestocompromiseandtomoderateextremistrhetoric werefurtherweakenedbytheimperativesoffund-raisingbysingle-issuegroups.Activistsontheleftdependedheavilyonsubsidiesfroma fewmajorliberalfoundations.Theneedtorenewtheirgrantsgave themanincentivetoarguethatthesituationwasalwaysbadandperpetuallygettingworseintheareasoftheirconcern,rangingfromthe environmenttoracerelations.

Thesingle-issuegroupsoftheright,suchastheNationalRiﬂeAssociation(NRA),theMoralMajority,andtheChristianCoalition,by contrast,dependedheavilyonsmalldonationssolicitedbydirect-mail campaigns.Alarmistandapocalypticrhetorichelpedthemtoraise moneyanddominatepoliticalprimaries.Thesamerhetoric,however, tendedtoforcethemtodeﬁnepoliticalcompromiseasbetrayal.

Thedefinitionofpoliticsasmoralcrusadingwasmostpronounced amongthereligiousleaderswhoemergedaspoliticalkingmakersinthe lastthirdofthetwentiethcentury.Americansocietyasawholebecame moresecularandtolerantwitheachdecade.Theriseofpoliticalclerics wastheresultnotofa“greatawakening”inAmericansocietyingeneral,butratheroftheweakeningofthepoliticalparties.Asold-fashionedpartymachinesdissolved,thelargestorganizationswithgrassrootsmembershipthatcouldbemobilizedinpoliticalcampaignswere thechurches.TheCatholicChurchplayedonlyaminorroleinpolitics. ButevangelicalProtestantchurchesinthesoutherntradition—both blackandwhite—movedtofillthevoidleftbythedecliningparty organizations.BlackProtestantpreacherslikeJesseJacksonandAl SharptonbecamemoreinfluentialinDemocraticpolitics.ButtheirinfluencewasdwarfedbythatofwhitesouthernProtestantpreachers likeJerryFalwellandPatRobertson,whobecamekingmakersinthe

RepublicanParty.Preacherswhocoulddeliverbusloadsofthefaithful tothepollsonElectionDayreplacedold-fashionedpoliticalbosses. ThecaptureofthenominatingprocessinbothpartiesbyProtestant churchesexplainswhyferventChristianreligiosityseepedintoAmericanpoliticsduringtheriseofsouthernpoliticalhegemonyinthelatter partofthetwentiethcentury.NotonlyconservativeRepublicanslike GeorgeW.BushbutalsosouthernDemocratslikeJimmyCarterand BillClintonspokeoftheirpersonalrelationshipwithJesusinalanguagefamiliarintheSouth—andamongthedescendantsofsouthern blackimmigrantsinthecitiesoftheNorth.

Bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,Americanpoliticswasdominatedbyindividualisticbillionairesandtruebelieversbelongingto variousreligionsandsecularideologies.Peoplewhowereneitherrich norhighlyideologicalfoundthemselvesmarginalized.Theirdisaffectionexpresseditselfasgrowingalienationfrombothnationalparties anddeclininglevelsofvoterturnout.InDecember2000,followingthe bitterpartisandebateovertheinstallationofGeorgeW.Bushaspresidentbytheelectoralcollege,42percentofAmericansidentiﬁedthemselvestoGalluppollstersasindependents—agreaternumberthaneitherself-identiﬁedRepublicansorDemocrats.

ConservativeVictoriesintheWarofIdeas

Intheneweraofweakpartyloyalties,conservativesowedtheirsuccessinchangingthenationaldebateaboutdomesticandforeignpolicyinlargeparttotheirorganizationalsuperiorityovertheirpoliticalrivals.Theso-calledneoconservativeswereparticularlysuccessful indominatingnationaldebate.Ironically,neoconservativetacticsand strategyweremodeledonthoseofthecommunistleft.Duringthe 1930stheTrotskyistmovement,whichproducedanumberofleading neoconservativeﬁgures,setupitsownnetworkoflittlemagazinesand institutionstocombatthoseoftheStalinistleftintheUnitedStatesand Europe.FollowingWorldWarII,anti-Stalinistsocialistscollaborated

withanticommunistliberalsinfoundingtheCongressforCultural Freedom,whichopposedSoviet-sponsoredculturalfrontgroups.The inﬂuenceoftheculturalfrontmodelcanbeseenontheneoconservativemovement,which,beginninginthe1970s,createdapoliticalintellectualnetworklinkingelitejournalslike ThePublicInterest and TheNationalInterest, politicalmonthliesorweeklieslike Commentary and TheWeeklyStandard, thinktanksliketheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute(AEI),andprojectsagitatingforparticularpolicies,likethe CommitteeonthePresentDangerinthe1970sandtheProjectfora NewAmericanCenturyinthe1990sandearly2000s.IrvingKristol, whohadco-editedtheanticommunistliberalmagazine Encounter inthe 1950swhenitwassubsidizedbytheCIA,andhissonWilliamandtheir associateswereatthecenterofthisnetwork.

TheiralliesintheProtestantfundamentalistsubculturehadanetworkoftheirown.Betweenthe1920sandthe1960s,themostlysouthernfundamentalists,alienatedfrommodernsociety,hadbuilttheir owncountercultureofChristianbookstores,Christianradioandtelevisionstations,andevenpseudoscientiﬁc“creationscience”institutes thatsoughttorefutemodernbiologyandgeology.Inresponsetothe sexualrevolutionandculturalliberalismofthe1960s,fundamentalists undertheleadershipofthetelevisionpreachersJerryFalwell,founder oftheMoralMajority,andPatRobertson,founderoftheChristian Coalition,hadapreexistingbasefromwhichtheywereabletocapture theRepublicanPartyandinﬂuencestateandfederalgovernments.Like thesecularneoconservatives,theProtestantfundamentalistscombined sectarianismwithinnovativeuseofup-to-datemediastrategies.

TheAmericanlefthandicappeditselfinitsresponsetotheneoconservative-fundamentalistalliancebyitsmediaandpoliticalstrategies.Insteadoffightingthepopulistrighttoinfluencepublicopinion, theleftfocusedonpersuadingthecollege-educatedelite,throughmedialikeNationalPublicRadio(NPR),thePublicBroadcastingService (PBS),andprestigiousjournals.Afterthe1960s,theleftdominatedthe academicsubcultureatthepriceoflosingitsinfluencebeyondthecamConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal 267

pus.Meanwhile,fromthe1960stotheearlytwenty-ﬁrstcentury,the politicalenergyofidealistsontheleftwasdissipatedinthepromotion ofdivisiveethnicandgenderidentitypolitics,leavingtherealmofpoliticaleconomylargelyuncontested.

Bothconservativeandliberalintellectualsdependedtoalargedegreeonfoundationfunding.LiberalfoundationsliketheFordand Rockefellerfoundationshadfargreaterresourcesthanthoseofthe right,liketheBradleyandOlinandSmith-Richardsonfoundations. Neoconservatives,however,usedtheirlimitedresourcestobettereffect bysubsidizingcadresofyoungpublicintellectualsaccustomedtoprint andTVandradiodebate,andbysubsidizingbooksintendedtopromoteconservativeideas,suchastheracistanti-welfaretract TheBell Curve byCharlesMurrayandRichardHerrnstein.Bycontrast,the foundationsoftheleftsupportedprojectsratherthanthinkersandpublicists.Andmuchofthemoneyfromtheliberalfoundationswentto projectsinrelativelynoncontroversialareaslikechildren’swelfareand environmentalism.Thefrequentchoiceofnoncontroversialtopicsreﬂectedcompromisesbetweentheprogressiveprogramofﬁcersatleft foundationsandtheirmoreconservativeboardsofdirectors.Allof theseself-defeatingstrategiesbythecenter-leftproducedconservative victoriesbydefaultinthewarofideas.

TheDeclineoftheNortheastandMidwest

Inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,thesuccessofNewDeal programsofruralelectriﬁcationandindustrialdecentralizationinthe SouthandWestmadepossibleamassiveinternalmigrationtoair-conditionedhomesandprosperouscitiesinthoseformerbackwaters.Between1950and2000,theregionalpopulationasapercentageofthetotalU.S.populationdeclinedintheNortheast(29to23percent)and Midwest(26to19percent),whileitgrewintheSouth(31to36percent)andtheWest(14to22percent).18 Onthelistofthetenlargestcitiesbypopulationsizein1950and1990,Baltimore(number6)wasre268 MichaelLind

placedbySanDiego,St.Louis(number8)byDallas,andBoston (number10)bySanAntonio.19

Between1868and1950,inallofthepresidentialelectionsexceptfor one,atleastoneofthetwonationalpartypresidentialcandidatescame fromoneofﬁvestates:Ohio,NewYork,Illinois,Indiana,andNew Jersey.20 Thepost-1945shiftinpopulationcreatedtwonewpresidentialdynasties:aCaliforniadynasty(Nixon,Reagan)andaTexasdynasty(JohnsonandthetwoBushes—whoconstitutedaliteraldynasty).ThepoweroftheSouthinnationalpoliticswasexaggeratedby itsalliancewiththestatesoftheinteriorWest,whosesmallpopulations havealwaysbeenenormouslyoverrepresentedintheelectoralcollege andtheU.S.Senate.Inthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,thenorthernRepublicansgainedapoliticalbonusthankstothe rapidadmissionofthen-Republicanwesternstates,withsmallpopulationspredominantlyofNewEnglandersandmidwesternersofYankee Protestantancestry,reinforcedintheMidwestandGreatPlainsbyculturallysimilarGermansandScandinavians:Nebraska(1887),Colorado(1876),NorthDakota(1889),SouthDakota(1889),Montana (1889),Washington(1889),Idaho(1890),Wyoming(1890),Utah (1896),Oklahoma(1907),NewMexico(1912),andArizona(1912).As aresultofagrariandiscontent,FranklinRooseveltwasabletodetach thesestatesfromtheRepublicanPartyduringtheNewDeal.TheformerlyDemocraticsouthernconservativeswhocapturedtheRepublicanParty,inturn,usedtheculturalalienationofwhitehinterlanders fromthepost–civilrightseraDemocraticPartytobuildaRepublican majorityinallthreebranchesofthefederalgovernmentbytheearly twenty-ﬁrstcentury.

AccordingtotheU.S.CensusBureau’sdataondomesticnetmigrationfrom1995to2000,coreDemocraticstateslikeCalifornia,New York,andMassachusettslostpopulation,whilealmostallofthegains cameinstatesthathavecontributedtotheRepublicanpresidentialand Senatemajorities,includingArizona,Colorado,andNevada.21 SoutherndominanceofAmericanpoliticswassogreatafter1960thatthe

onlyDemocratselectedpresidentinthelastthirdofthetwentieth centuryweresoutherners—LyndonJohnson,JimmyCarter,andBill Clinton.

DixieDemagogyGoesNational

Theincreasedinﬂuenceofsouthernpoliticianswasnotsimplyaresult oftheshiftintheU.S.populationtotheSouthandWestandtheracial polarizationofAmericanpolitics.Southernpoliticianswerepreadapted bytheirtraditionofreactionarypopulismtoexploittheopportunities createdbythetransformationofAmericansocietyandpoliticsinthe latterpartofthetwentiethcentury.

TheSouth’straditionwasoneofsingle-partydominancebythe Democrats.But“no-partypolitics”maybeabetterdescription.The majorquestionsofsouthernsociallife—theracialorder,theclasssystem,theeconomy,andreligion—couldnotsafelybediscussedinpublicbetweentheendofReconstructionandthecivilrightsera.Theresultwasadivorcebetweengovernanceandpolitics.Governancewas themonopolyofthealliedelitesoftheprivateandpublicsector.Politicswastheater,dominatedbydemagogueslike“CottonEd”Smith, Huey“TheKingﬁsh”Long,andW.Lee“PasstheBiscuits,Pappy” O’Daniel.Onlyrarely,asinthecaseofLong,diddemagoguesincite classwar.Mostofthetimetheyspecializedinappealstoreligion,wavingtheﬂag(eithertheStarsandStripesortheStarsandBarswould do),andxenophobichostilitytowardthoseoutsidethesouthernwhite Protestantcommunity—blacks,Yankees,Jews,Catholics,liberals,and “communists”(acatchalltermofabuse).

Intheﬁrsttwo-thirdsofthetwentiethcentury,southerndemagogy seemedprimitiveandrepugnanttotherestofthecountry.Insteadof beingarelicoftheruralpast,however,southernpoliticaldemagogy provedtobethewaveofthefuture.Theweakeningofthepartiesby post-1960sreformsresultedinapoliticalculturebasedonfactionsand individualsofakindlongfamiliarinthesouthernstates.Inanerain 270 MichaelLind

which“attackads”ontelevisionandradiobecamethemajorformof communicationfromcandidatestocitizens,southern-styledemagogy provedtobehighlysuccessful.ItisnocoincidencethattheRepublican politicalstrategistLeeAtwaterandoneofhismostsuccessfulDemocraticcounterparts,JamesCarville,weresouthernersschooledinthe politicsoftheirregion.

Anti-intellectualpopulismwasacharacteristicofsouthernpoliticians—left,right,andcenter.Whatbecameknownas“culturewar politics”or“identitypolitics”inthelatetwentiethcenturyhadalways beenthestapleofsoutherndemagogues,whospecializedininﬂammatoryappealstoracialidentity,sexualmorality,religiousbelief,andjingoisticpatriotism.Ironically,liberalactivistsinthefederaljudiciaryaccidentallyunleashedthiskindofpoliticsbynationalizingissuesofsex andcensorshipaswellasracewhichhadpreviouslybeenfoughtoutin statelegislaturesandcitycouncils.Thenationalizationofissueslike abortion,homosexualrights,andcensorshipoccurredinthe1960sand the1970sattheverymomentwhenprintjournalism,withitsrestricted, eliteaudience,wasgivingwaytotelevisionandtalkradio,withtheir massaudiencesandlowstandards.Themajorbeneﬁciariesofthese trendswerethesouthernrightanditsnationalallies,whotookadvantageofthetraditionalvaluesoftheworking-classmajority.

Perhapsthepurestexampleofdemagogyinpoliticsinvolvedtheissueofpublicfundingforthearts.Duringthe1930s,NewDealliberals hadsoughtpublicfundinginordertowrestcontrolofartawayfrom Eurocentrictastemakersandtinycliquesofthefashionablerichin NewYork,Boston,andothereasterncities.TheWorksProgressAdministrationandotherfederalartsprogramswereguttedbyconservativesinCongressinthelate1930s,upsetbytheradicalismofsomeof theartists.AftertheNationalEndowmentfortheArtsandNational EndowmentfortheHumanitieswerecreatedduringtheJohnsonpresidency,theywerequicklycapturedbythe“artworld”ofthenortheasternseaboard.Insteadoftaxingtherichtosubsidizeaestheticpopulism,federalartsprogramstaxedworking-classAmericanstosubsidize

avant-gardeartistsandthewealthypatronswhoweretheirchiefaudience.Bythe1990s,beforeconservativepopulistsinCongressimposedregionalquotas,almosthalfoffederalartssubsidiesﬂowedto Manhattan.Targetedatworking-classaudiences,denunciationsoftaxpayerfundingforobsceneorincomprehensibleartbecameastapleof conservativerhetoric.Liberalsfoundthemselvesdefendingworksof artwhoseshockvalueoftenexceededtheiraestheticmerit.Allofthis wasveryfarfromtheoriginalNewDealideaofpostofﬁcemuralsand outdoorpageantsdepictinglocalhistory.

Controversiesliketheseprovidedconservativeswithhighlyemotional“wedgeissues”whichtheyusedtopryapartthenewalliance ofeliteprogressivesandworking-classpopulists.Thedefectionof GeorgeWallacefromtheDemocraticPartyin1968markedthebeginningofthedivorcebetweenwhiteworking-classpopulismandDemocraticliberalism.Thedisaffectionofthewhiteworkingclassfromelite progressivismgaveconservativesanopportunitytodestroytheNew DealcoalitionandreplaceitwithaRepublicanmajority.Inthetimetestedtraditionofsouthernconservative-populistalliances,thisnew Republicanalliancefocusesonappealstoreligion,patriotism,and“traditionalvalues,”alongwiththinlydisguisedrace-baiting,inorderto weldeliteeconomicconservatives,whoareoftensocialliberals,with working-classwhitesocialconservatives,whoarefrequentlyleftof centerintheirattitudestowardbigbusinessandtheeconomy.

TheCounterrevolutionofBusinessagainstLabor

Theallianceofconservatismwithpopulismmadepossibleasustained onslaughtbytherightagainstorganizedlaborintheUnitedStates. TheGoldenAgeofAmericanunionismbeganin1935,whentheNationalLaborRelationsActlegalizedcollectivebargaining.Untilthe 1970s,theAFL-CIO’spoliticalactioncommitteewasthelargestand mostimportantPACinnationalpolitics.

The1970smarkedacounterrevolutionagainstlaborbythebusiness

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community,aidedbyconservativepoliticians.Increasingly,business viewedlabornotaspartofathree-waycompactincludinggovernment butastheenemy.ThejournalistThomasB.Edsalldescribedtheshift: “Duringthe1970s,businessreﬁneditsabilitytoactasaclass,submergingcompetitiveinstinctsinfavorofjoint,cooperativeactionin thelegislativearena.Ratherthanindividualcompaniesseekingonly specialfavorintherewardofacontract,inthedroppingofanantitrustcase,orinStateDepartmentassistanceingainingexclusivefranchisingrightsinaforeigncountry,thedominantthemeinthepolitical strategyofbusinessbecameasharedinterestinthedefeatofbillssuch asconsumerprotectionandlaborlawreform.”22

BusinessPACsoutspentlaborPACsforthefirsttimeinthe1978 elections.23 Theshiftingbalanceofpowerwasevidentinthesameyear inthesuccessfulattemptbythebusinesscommunitytopersuadeCongresstorejecttheLaborReformBill,whichwouldhavemadetheorganizationoftheworkplaceeasier.Thiswasamajorvictoryforthe BusinessRoundtable,foundedbycorporateexecutivesin1972.When PresidentReaganfiredstrikingairtrafficcontrollersin1982,hisadministrationsignaledanewalliancebetweengovernmentandbusiness againstlabor.

ThehostilityofcorporateAmericaanditspoliticalallieswasnotthe onlyreasonforlabor’sdecline.Evenintheabsenceofcorporatedecisionstoexpatriatefactoryjobs,employmentintheindustrialsector wouldhavedeclinedasaresultofmechanizationandautomation.As themanufacturingsectorshrank,theunionsfailedtoorganizeexpandingsectors.Beginninginthe1970s,mostofthegrowthinemployment tookpartinthesectorsoftheworkforcehardesttoorganize,suchas serviceworkersandwhite-collarworkers.Theincreaseofimmigrants, bothlegalandillegal,intheworkforcealsomadeunionizationdifﬁcult. Untilthe1980s,organizedlaborfavoredimmigrationrestrictioninordertoraisewagesandmakeunionizationeasier.Thereversalofcourse bytheAFL-CIO,whichnowofﬁciallyfavorsattemptstounionizenot onlylegalbutillegalimmigrantsaswell,wasasignofdesperation

ratherthanofconﬁdence.Theonlygrowthinunionmembershipoccurredamongpublicsectoremployees,suchasschoolteachers.Asa proportionofthecivilianlaborforce,unionizedlaborplummetedto12 percentby2000.24 Andamajorityofunionmembersworkedforfederal,state,orlocalgovernments.

Inthedeclineoforganizedlabor,theconservativeSouthplayeda keyrole.Eveninthemid-twentiethcentury,attheheightoflabor’s growthandinﬂuenceintheindustrialstates,southernpoliticiansand employershadusedlawsandintimidationtothwartattemptsatunionizationofthesouthernworkforce.Theabilityofbusinessestomove jobstotheanti-unionSouthgaveanti-laborexecutivesenormousleverage,asdidtheiralliancewithanti-unionsouthernpoliticiansin Washington,D.C.

FromRaisingWagestoSubsidizingPoverty

OnefactionoftheDemocraticPartyadaptedtothenewconservativehegemonyinAmericanpoliticsbycompetingwiththeRepublicanPartyfortheloyaltyofthebusinesseliteandprofessionals.Bill Clinton,morethananyotherAmericanpolitician,representedthe “neoliberal”combinationoffree-marketconservatismandsocialliberalismcharacteristicoftheAmericanoverclass.Hesupportedfeminism andgayrights—andalsopoliciesfavoredbyeconomicconservatives andlibertarians,includingtheNAFTAfree-tradeagreementbetween theUnitedStatesandMexicoandlarge-scaleunskilledimmigration.

Clinton’smajorantipovertyinitiativewastheearnedincometax credit(EITC),awagesubsidyforpoorworkers.IncreasingtheEITC wassupportedbyClinton’salliesinthecentristDemocraticLeadership Councilasanalternativetoraisingtheminimumwage.Between1978 and1989Congresshadpermittedtherealvalueoftheminimumwage toerode.Asaresult,theminimumwagelost31percentofitsvalue. AccordingtotheEconomicPolicyInstitute,theshrinkingminimum wageaccountedfor22percentoftheincreaseininequalityamong

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men—and42percentofthegrowthininequalityamongwomen—betweenthetopandbottomtenthsoftheAmericanwagescale.Fourincreasesinthe1990s,culminatinginthe1997legislationthatestablished therateat$5.15anhour,failedtorestoretheminimumwagetothe standardofthe1960s,andanattempttoraiseitto$6.15wasrejected byCongressin2000.Topermitworkerstoescapethefederaldeﬁnitionofpoverty,theminimumwagewouldhavehadtoberaisedto morethan$8.00anhour.

NeoliberalspreferredtheEITCtotheminimumwageasastrategy forcombatingpovertyamongworkingAmericansbecauseitisasubsidyforbusinessandafﬂuentemployers.Enactedin1975,theEITC programwassponsoredbySenatorRussellLongofLouisiana,and itsgreatestchampionintheClintonadministrationwasTreasurySecretaryLloydBentsenofTexas.ItwasnoaccidentthattheEITC shouldappealtorelativelyconservativesouthernDemocratslikeLong, Bentsen,andClinton.TheweaknessoforganizedlaborintheSouth meansthatsouthernDemocraticpoliticianshaveoftenbeenasdependentasRepublicansonthesupportofbusinesslobbiesandinvestors. TheEITCpermittedcentristandconservativeDemocratstodosomethingforlow-wageworkerswithoutthreateningtheirfriendsanddonorsinindustriesthatrelyoncheaplabor.Insubsidizingtheworker whotoilsforlowwages,theEITCsimultaneouslysubsidizestheemployer,whocancontinuetopayworkerslessthantheyneedtosubsist atorabovethefederalpovertyline.

InadditiontobeingabeneﬁtpaidbyAmericantaxpayersasawhole tolow-wagebusinessesandtheconsumerswhobuytheirproductsand services,theEITCisprobablyaninterregionalcorporatewelfareprogramfortheSouth.TheSouth,whichhasthelowestwages,thelowest levelsofemploymentbeneﬁts,andthelowestrateofunionizationin theUnitedStates,inevitablyreceivesadisproportionateshareoffederalEITCmoney.First,intheearlyandmid-twentiethcentury,the southernelite,havingusedlegislationandviolencetosmashorganized labor,builtlow-wagetextilefactoriesandcarfactoriestoforcethosein

high-wageregionslikeNewEnglandandtheMidwestoutofbusiness. Then,inthelatetwentiethcentury,southernDemocraticpoliticiansin Washington,likeLong,Bentsen,andClinton,arrangedfortaxpayers intheformermilltownsofNewEngland,aswellasintheMidwest, theprairiestates,themountainstates,andtheWestCoast,tosupplementtheinadequatepaychecksofexploitedsouthernworkers.The EITCsucceededinliftingmanyAmericansoutofpoverty—butitdid soinawaythatdidnotthreatentheeconomicinterestsofsouthern businessandthenationaloverclass.

FromProgressivetoRegressiveTaxation

Intheareaoftaxation,too,theinﬂuenceofsouthern-styleconservatismonAmericanpoliticswasevident.Thesouthernstatestraditionallyhavecombinedlowpublicspendingwithlowandregressivetaxation.Fromthe1970stotheearlytwenty-ﬁrstcentury,during theperiodofRepublicanpresidentialhegemonyinterruptedonlyby Clinton’stwoterms,theamountoftaxationatthefederallevelwasreduced—anditsburdenwasshiftedfromtherichtotheworkingclass andthepoor.

UnderRonaldReaganandGeorgeW.Bush,Congressenactedmassivetaxcuts,whichintheabsenceofcommensuratespendingcuts createdenormousfederaldeﬁcits.By2001theUnitedStatesranked twenty-seventhamongthirtyOECD(OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)countriesinthepercentageoftotaltaxation(federal,state,andlocal)asapercentageofGDP.Whiletaxeson therichwereslashed,thehighlyregressiveSocialSecuritytaxrose from3.3percentofGDPin1965to6.9percent.25

Theregressivenatureofoverallnationaltaxationwasfurtherincreasedbythedevolutionoffederalresponsibilitiestothestatesinareaslikewelfare.Statetaxestendtobemoreregressivethanfederal taxesbecauseitiseasierforindividualsandcorporationstomove withinthecountrytoavoidtaxesthantoleavethecountry.States 276 MichaelLind

ConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal 277

thereforetendtorelyonsalesandexciseandpropertytaxes.Many statesdonothaveanincometax.

Thestatetaxsystemsofsouthernstatesaregenerallyamongthe mostregressiveinthenation.Withnostateincometax,Texas,thepoliticalbaseofbothPresidentsBushandRepublicanHouseMajority LeaderTomDeLay,hadoneofthetenmostregressivetaxsystemsin theUnitedStates.In1995thetop1percentofnon-elderlyTexanmarriedcouples,withincomesof$395,000ormore,paidonly4.4percent oftheirincomeinstatetaxes,comparedtothosemakinglessthan $19,000,whopaid13.8percentoftheirincomeinsalesandexcisetaxes andpropertytaxes.26 Bymeansoftaxcutsfortherichandtheshifting ofgovernmentfromWashingtontostatecapitals,conservativepoliticianssoughttonationalizethesouthernmodeloftaxation.

TheDeclineoftheNortheasternForeign PolicyEstablishment

Thecounterrevolutionofthesouthernrightwasnotlimitedtodomesticpolicy.AccompanyingthegeneraldeclineoftheNortheasthasbeen thedeclineofinﬂuenceofthenortheasternEstablishmentonU.S.foreignpolicy.Throughoutthetwentiethcentury,old-stocknortheasternProtestantslikeAverellHarriman,DeanAcheson,andMcGeorge Bundy,withbackgroundsinIvyLeagueuniversities,NewYorkinvestmentbanks,andleadingfoundations,hadbeenthedominantelitein foreignpolicyinbothRepublicanandDemocraticpresidentialadministrations.TheiroutlookwasusuallyAnglophile,Atlanticist,andinternationalist.

Someelitesoutherners,likeWoodrowWilson’sadviserColonelEdwardM.House,andJamesBaker,thesecretaryofstateunderPresidentGeorgeHerbertWalkerBush,wereassimilatedintotheethosof thenortheasternforeignpolicyEstablishment.Southerners,however, hadalwaysbeenunderrepresentedintheforeignserviceandtheU.S. intelligenceagenciesandoverrepresentedintheU.S.military.The

278 MichaelLind

martialethicsharedbyeliteandnon-elitesoutherners—drawingon thearistocratictraditionofthesouthernplanteroligarchyandthebellicosityoftheScots-IrishhillcountrySouth—wasoftencorrelated withcontemptfordiplomacyandferventsupportfortheuseofmilitaryforce.

Asthepowerofsouthernandwesternpoliticiansgrewinthelast thirdofthetwentiethcentury,theyfrequentlylookedforexpertiseoutsidethedistrustedandresentednortheasternelite.WASPpatriciansincreasinglyweredisplacedbymilitaryofﬁcers,oftenofsouthernorigin, andbycivilianforeignpolicyintellectualsfromnon-WASPbackgrounds,someofthemforeign-born,suchasHenryKissingerand ZbigniewBrzezinski.

ThedeclineininﬂuenceofnortheasternAtlanticistsaccompanied theendofthepost-1945foreignpolicyconsensusduringtheVietnam War.ColdWarinternationalismwasattackedbytheleftwingofthe DemocraticPartyandtherightwingoftheRepublicanParty.The 1970sand1980ssawaseriesofattemptsbyindividualpresidentstodeviseanalternateformulaforAmericangrandstrategy:European-style Realpolitik byRichardNixon,humanrightsuniversalismbyJimmy Carter,andtherevivalofcontainmentbyRonaldReagan.Theendof theColdWarproducednonewconsensus.TheClintonadministration,whichemphasizedglobalintegrationbymeansofcommerce,was succeededbytheGeorgeW.Bushadministration,whichsawtheworld inblackandwhitemilitarytermsevenbeforetheAlQaedaterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001.

Inthekaleidoscopicconfusionofpost–ColdWarAmericanforeign policy,themostpowerfulfactionwasthatoftheneoconservatives, manyofwhomwereformerColdWarliberalsoranticommunistsocialistswhohadbrokenwiththeleftwingoftheDemocraticParty duringtheVietnamera.LiketheoldnortheasternEstablishment,the neoconservativeswereasmall,well-educatedelite,mostlynortheasternandmetropolitanandlargelyJewish.Inthe1980sand1990sthe

ConservativesandtheCounterrevolutionagainsttheNewDeal 279

supportofneoconservativesforhard-linersinIsraelledthemtocementanalliancewiththeProtestantfundamentalistsofthereligious right,whoseardent“ChristianZionism”resultedfromtheirowninterpretationofChristiantheology.Neoconservativeideology—incubated inthinktanksliketheAmericanEnterpriseInstituteinWashington, D.C.—wasdisseminatedtotheright-wingpopulistsoftheSouthand WestviaRupertMurdoch’sFoxTVnetworkandhisAmericanpoliticalmagazine,the WeeklyStandard, aswellasbyconservativetalkradiohostslikethepopularRushLimbaugh.

IntheadministrationofGeorgeW.Bush,neoconservativeslike DeputySecretaryofDefensePaulWolfowitz,UndersecretaryofDefenseforPolicyDouglasJ.Feith,andVicePresidentDickCheneybattledwithSecretaryofStateColinPowell,aself-described“Rockefeller Republican”whorepresentedtheolderinternationalismofnortheasternRepublicans.IntheaftermathoftheterroristattacksonNewYork andWashington,D.C.,ofSeptember11,2001,PresidentBushtilted decisivelytowardtheneoconservatives.ThepolicyoftheU.S.governmentbecamethepolicyadvocatedbytheneoconservativesduringtheir yearsoutofpowerduringtheClintonadministration:amassivemilitarybuildup;rejectionoftreatiesandinternationalorganizationsand theadoptionofaggressiveAmericanunilateralism;almostuncriticalsupportforthepoliciesofArielSharon’sLikudregimetoward theoccupiedPalestinianpeople;andtheinvasionandoccupationof Iraq,whichhadbeenadvocatedbyCheneyandWolfowitzduring theﬁrstPersianGulfwarbutrejectedbythen-PresidentGeorgeHerbertWalkerBushandthen-ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff ColinPowell.Neoconservativeexpertsandjournalistslikethemilitary analystElliotCohen,NormanPodhoretz,theeditorof Commentary, andClinton’sformerdirectorofcentralintelligence,JamesWoolsey, blurredthedistinctionsbetweenIsrael’swarwiththeoccupiedPalestiniansandthestruggleagainsttheAlQaedaterroristnetworkby speakingofa“WorldWarIV”betweentheWestand“Islamism”—a

categorysoelasticthatitcouldincludenotonlySunniandShiaMuslimsbutalsosecularBa’athPartymembersinIraqandSyriaandsecularPalestiniannationalists.

UnderGeorgeW.Bush,asaresultofthealliancebetweenthe neoconservativesandsouthernandwesternpoliticians,U.S.foreign policywastransformed.TheUnitedStateswasalienatedfromallofits majorEuropeanalliesexceptforTonyBlair’sBritain.TheAmericans hadjoinedIsraelasoccupiersofanArabnation,and,likeIsrael,confrontedadeterminedinsurgency.UnlikethewarinAfghanistan,which wasarationalresponsetotheTalibanregime’ssupportfortheAl Qaedaterrornetwork,theBushadministration’sforeignpolicywas notalogicalreactiontoevents.Itsunilateralismandmilitarismreﬂectedthetraditionaldistrustofdiplomacyandpro-militaryattitudes ofsouthernersandtheiralliesintheinteriorWest.AndtheshiftinfocusfromEuropeandEurasiatotheMiddleEastreﬂectedinpartthe eclipseoftheEurocentricnortheasternProtestantEstablishmentbya newandaggressivecounter-establishmentofsouthernChristianZionistsandpredominantlyJewishneoconservativeswho,fordifferentreasons,consideredIsraelthemostimportantforeigncountry.

GlobalizationandtheAmericanEconomy

ThesoutherninfluenceontheThirdAmericanRepublicwasstrikingly evidentintherealmoftheeconomy.DuringtheSecondRepublic,betweentheCivilWarandtheNewDeal,theUnitedStateshadprotecteditsdomesticindustrieswithhightariffs.Thankstotheinfluence ofsouthernerslikeFDR’ssecretaryofstateCordellHull,afterWorld WarIItheUnitedStatessoughttouniversalizefreetrade—agoaltraditionallysupportedbythecommodity-exportingelitesoftheSouth andWest.From1945untilthe1970s,increasingaccesstoforeignmarketsbenefitedownersandworkersintheU.S.industrialsector,because thenationemergedfromWorldWarIIwithanear-monopolyinmanufacturing.Inthe1970s,however,asEuropeandJapanandthe“Little 280 MichaelLind

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Tigers”ofEastAsiacaughtup,industrialworkersbegantosupport protectionism.Unlikeinthepast,northernmanufacturingelitesdid notsupportareturntoprotectionism.Inordertocutlaborcosts,they movedtheirfactoriestothelow-wage,low-taxstatesoftheSouthand West,wherelocalpoliticaleliteshadsuccessfullypreventedtheunionizationoftheworkforce,ortolow-wageworkforcesinpoornations suchasMexicoandMalaysia.

Theriseofthesouthern–SunBeltelitehasbeenaccompaniedbythe disintegrationanddisappearanceoftheoldnortheasternelitebasedin manufacturing.ThehistoricstrugglebetweenthecommodityproducersoftheSouth,whofavoredfreetrade,andthemanufacturersofthe North,whofavoredprotectionofdomesticindustry,lostitsrelevance withthegrowthoftransnationalmanufacturinginthefinalthirdofthe twentiethcentury.InsteadofseekingtosellfinishedAmericanproductstoforeignconsumers,moreandmoreU.S.corporationssoughtto employinexpensiveforeignlabortomanufacturegoodstobesoldto theAmericanmarket.GlobalizationfinallyendedthelongcivilwarbetweenthetwowingsofAmericancapitalism.Northernmanufacturing elitesseekingforeignlaborfortransnationalproductionoperations abandonedtheirtraditionalprotectionismandunitedwiththecapitalistsofthesouthernandwesterncommoditysectortopromoteinvestor-drivenglobalization.Asaresult,bothmanufacturingcapitalists andcommoditycapitalists,underthemisleadingnameof“freetrade,” seekaliberalregimeinforeigninvestmentpermittingthemaccessto foreignlabor(themanufacturers)orforeignnaturalresources(the commoditycapitalists,suchasoilproducers).

UnitedinitscommitmenttoglobalizationonAmericanterms,the U.S.businesscommunityﬁnancedtherevivaloflaissez-fairecapitalist economicsbyendowinguniversitychairsofeconomicsandsubsidizing thebusinesspressandpro-businessthinktanks.By2000,onlyafew marginalorganizations,liketheU.S.BusinessandIndustrialCouncil, stilllobbiedforthepoliciespromotingdomesticmanufacturingthat hadbeenthecoreoftheeconomicagendaoftheFederalistandWhig

partiesandoftheRepublicansfromAbrahamLincolntoHerbert Hoover.27

Globalization:MarketversusEmpire

Thedeclineoftheoldermidwesternprotectionismandisolationism didnotmeanthetriumphofasingleversionofglobalisminAmerican foreignpolicy.Onthecontrary,boththeDemocraticPartyandtheRepublicanPartydeﬁnedglobalizationindifferentways,afactinﬂuenced bythechangingnatureoftheirdomesticindustrialconstituencies.

WhilecorporateinﬂuenceonAmericanpoliticshadgrownattheexpenseofthatoforganizedlaborafterthe1960s,theprivatesectorelite wasdividedinitsloyaltiesalongsectorallines.Inthe2000presidential campaign,venturecapitalfavoredtheDemocratsbyamarginof3to 2.TheentertainmentindustrywasalsoastrongsupporteroftheDemocraticParty.Atthesametime,theRepublicansreceivedtwo-thirdsof thecontributionsfromthedefenseindustryand80percentofthose fromtheoil,gas,andagribusinessindustries.28

TheClintonadministration’sapproachtoglobalization,underthe leadershipofTreasurySecretaryRobertRubin,reflectedtheinterests oftheDemocraticParty’sfinancialcontributors.Itssupportforinternationalenforcementofintellectualpropertyrightswasimportantto Hollywood,whichwasconcernedaboutthepiratingofAmerican movies,andalsotoSiliconValley,concernedaboutthepiratingof Americansoftware.Theemphasisonliberalizingglobalfinance—a policythatmadepossibletheAsianeconomiccrisisofthemid-1990s— servedtheinterestsoftheWallStreetinvestorswhomadebigcontributionstotheDemocraticParty.Initszealforthe“enlargement” of“marketdemocracies”asapanaceaforinternationalconflict,the Clintonadministrationsometimesseemedtopromoteaversionof Marxisteconomicdeterminism,inwhichcapitalismautomaticallyproduceddemocracyandworldpeaceasby-products.

WhiletheClintonDemocratssoughttomaketheworldsafefor

Hollywoodandinvestmentcapital,theRepublicanshaddifferentpriorities.Despitetheirreputationasthepartyofbigbusiness,Republicans weremorelikelythanDemocratstothinkofglobalizationinmilitary ratherthaneconomicterms.Buttherewasnocontradiction.Increasingly,theRepublicanPartyhadbecomethepartyofmilitary-linked statecapitalism.Bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,whatRepublican PresidentDwightEisenhowerhaddescribed(anddreaded)as“themilitary-industrialcomplex”hadbecomeanactiveconstituencyoftheRepublicanParty.ThemembersoftheU.S.militaryaredisproportionatelyconservativeandRepublican,andmanyretiredofficersgoto workforaerospacecompaniesandotherdefensecontractors,including LockheedMartin,Raytheon,GeneralDynamics,andMartinMarietta, whosemajorifnotsoleclientsaretheU.S.governmentanditsallies andclientstateslikeIsrael.Thefactthatthesecompaniesareprivatein form,eveniftheyfunctionasdefactoextensionsofthegovernment, permitsthesefirmstofinancepoliticianswithcampaigncontributions andtolobbypolicymakers.

CloselylinkedwiththedefensecontractorindustryistheU.S.oilindustry.BecauseoftheimportanceofMiddleEasternoilconcessionsto U.S.oilcompanies,theAmericanenergyindustryhasauniquestakein Americanmilitaryanddiplomaticpoliciesintheregion.ThelinkbetweentheU.S.military-industrialcomplexandtheoilindustryisprovidedbyﬁrmswhichspecializeinlarge-scalemilitaryandcivilianconstructionoverseas.ThemostimportanthaslongbeenBechtel,the world’slargestconstructioncompany,afamily-heldcorporationthat hasbeenaplayerinU.S.politicssincetheNewDealera.Amongthe AmericanofﬁcialswhohaveworkedforBechtelhavebeenRonald Reagan’ssecretaryofdefense,CasparWeinberger,andhissecretaryof state,GeorgeShultz.29

Theintertwiningofthedefense,energy,andoverseasconstruction industrieswasevidentinthesecondBushadministration.BothPresidentGeorgeW.BushandVicePresidentDickCheneyhadbeenexecutivesintheoilindustryinTexas.Bush’spoliticalcareerhadbeen

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financedinpartbyEnron,theenergygiantwhosebankruptcycreated apoliticalscandalaswellaseconomicshockwaves.Cheney’sfirm, Halliburton,includedamongitsenterprisesDresserIndustries,the firmforwhichGeorgeHerbertWalkerBushhadworkedwhenhe movedtoTexasafterWorldWarII.FollowingtheinvasionofIraq, HalliburtonwasawardedasubstantialcontractforIraq’sreconstruction,tobepaidforoutofAmericantaxrevenues.TheBushadministration’sfirstproconsulforoccupiedIraq,GeneralJayGarner,wasa retiredmilitaryofficerwhohadgonetoworkforadefensecontractor. ThePentagon,inchargeofacceptingbidsforthereconstructionof Iraq,announcedthatcompaniesfromcountriesthathadopposedthe war,includingGermany,France,andRussia,wouldnotbeeligiblefor contracts.

Thiskindofaggressivemercantilism,whileitmayhavecontradictedthelibertarianprinciplesoftraditionalfree-marketRepublicans, wastypicaloftheapproachofconservativesfromthestate-capitalist defense-energy-constructionsector,forwhomthemilitaryandmilitary-linkedﬁrmswerescarcelydistinguishable.ThetemporaryimpositionofprotectioniststeeltariffsbyBushexhibitedthesamekindof economicnationalistthinking.Likethemilitary-industrialcomplexand theenergysector,the“oldindustries”thatsupportedtheRepublican Party,likeagribusiness,wereheavilydependentongovernmentsubsidiesorprotection,andwereoftensympathetictoabelligerentunilateralnationalismintherealmoftradeaswellasinthemilitaryanddiplomaticarenas.

TheCounterrevolutionoftheRightinPerspective Atthebeginningofthetwenty-ﬁrstcentury,theUnitedStateswas ruledbyaneliteunlikethatofthemid-twentiethcentury.In1950the dominantliberalpoliticaleliteincludedcivic-mindednortheasternpatricians,nationalunionleaders,andleadingacademicsalongwithbigcitymayorsfromtheNortheastandMidwest.In2000themakeupof

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thenewlydominantconservativepoliticalelitewasquitedifferent: southernandwesternpoliticianshadreplacedtheformerlydominant northeasternersandmidwesterners,corporateexecutivesandﬁnanciers whocelebratedunfetteredcapitalismandrejectednotionsofnoblesse obligehadshoulderedasidetheoldEastCoastEstablishment,andtelevisionpreacherslikePatRobertsonhadreplacedurbanmayorsas kingmakersinelectoralpolitics.

ItisnowclearthatintheThirdRepublicoftheUnitedStatesthat tookshapebetweenthe1930sandthe1960s,therehavebeentwoeras: theNewDealerafromRoosevelttoJohnson,andtheconservativeera thatfollowed.30 Thecontinuitybetweenthetwohasbeenprovidedby theSouth.Followingthecivilrightsrevolution,southernconservatives,earlierthepartnersandsometimestheopponentsofNewDeal reforms,movedintotheRepublicanParty,whichtheytransformed intothevehicleofadistinctivelysouthernrightquitedifferentfrom theconservativetraditionsoftheNortheastandMidwest.

ThetragedyoftheNewDeal,inretrospect,wasthatFranklinRooseveltandhissuccessorsindustrializedtheSouthwithoutliberalizing it.TheissueatstakewaswhethertheNewDeal’sprogramsoffederal regionaldevelopmentintheSouthandWestwouldremodelthosesocietiesalongnortheastern-midwesternlinesormerelymodernizeand empowertraditionalregionalelites.Theanswerisnowclear.ByenrichingwithoutrevolutionizingtheSouth,theNewDealempowered themostreactionaryconservativesintheUnitedStates.Andinthelast thirdofthetwentiethcenturyandthebeginningofthetwenty-ﬁrst, southernconservativesandtheiralliesinotherregionswentfromtriumphtotriumphinanAmericawhichincreasinglyresembledthetraditionalSouth:alow-wagesocietywithweakparties,weakunions,and apoliticalculturebasedondemagogicappealstoracialandethnicanxieties,religiousconservatism,andmilitaristicpatriotism.Whetherand whendemographic,cultural,andeconomicchangeswouldundermine thisconservativeelite,andinaugurateanewerainAmericanpolitics underadifferentelite,onlythefuturewouldreveal.31

Coda:DemocracyinAmerica

STEVEFRASERANDGARYGERSTLE

RulingAmerica tellsastoryabouttherelationshipbetweenwealth andpoweroverthecourseofthenation’shistory.Itscontributorsexaminethewaydistinctiveeconomicandsocialeliteshaveexercised theirpredominanceandjustiﬁedtheirpreeminence(orhavefailedto doso).Butofcoursealltheseeliteshavehadtooperatewithinademocraticpoliticalsystemandaninformalbutnolessrichtraditionof democraticbeliefandcustom.Democracyisaninvisiblepresencein thisbook,likedarkmatter:wecansenseitsubiquity,itshoveringexistence,withoutmeasuringitdirectly.Everyeliteexaminedhere,even the“slavepower,”hashadtoreckonwithdemocracyasitslimiting case,itshorizonofpossibility.Democracyechoesineachchapter,but fromafar,remindingusofitsweightyabsence.

YetdemocracyisvitaltothishistoryofrulingelitesinAmerica.It hasagainandagainhauntedtheimaginationsandpoliticalcalculations ofthepropertiedandprivileged.Thelogicofdemocracyisinherently dangeroustotheirpresumptionsandsenseofsecurity.Intheory,peoplecanvoteagainstpropertybyelectingtoregulateit,levelit,redis-

tributeit,conﬁscateit,oreventoabolishit.Themoredrasticofthese optionsarerarelyifeverontheagenda(althoughinthecaseofslaverythethreatofabolitionwasreal).Buthowbettercanwedescribe thelandmarksofAmericanpoliticalhistory—theBillofRights,Jacksoniandemocracyanditswaronthe“MonsterBank,”theEmancipationProclamation,populism’srefusaltobecruciﬁedona“crossof gold,”thetrust-bustingfuroroftheProgressiveEra,theNewDeal’s purgingofthe“moneychangersfromthetemple”—thanasbarricades againsttheoverweeningpretensionsofthepropertied?

InAmerica,democraticresistancetothedominationofgreatwealth hasbeensalutary.Arousedfarmersandindustrialworkers,aspiringentrepreneursandvigilantmiddle-classconsumers,deservemostofthe creditforthoselawsandinstitutionsthatestablishedtheprerogatives ofthepublictorestraintheappetiteofproperty.Rarelyhaveelitespioneeredonthefrontiersofdemocraticreform.Andwhentheyhave, onecanalwayshearinthebackgroundtherumblingofpopulardiscontent.Wouldtherehavebeengrass-rootspoliticalpartiesandthe humblingofaristocraticpretensionwithouttheegalitarianpassions thatoverranJacksonianAmerica?Wouldtherehavebeenawaragainst slaverywithouttheplebeiandemandthattheslaveocracynotbeallowedtocloseoffthemainavenueofeconomicopportunity—landfor “freelabor”intheWest?Wouldtherailroadbarons,thegreatindustrialtycoons,thecorporatetrustmakers,andtheﬁnancialoverlordsof WallStreethavebeensubjectedtogovernmentregulationwithoutthe doggedresistanceoftheGrange,theGreenback-Laborparties,the Populists,theantitrustmovement,andtheSocialistPartyofEugene Debs?Withoutthe1877railroadstrike,bloodyHaymarketandHomestead,theKnightsofLaborandtheAFL,theWobbliesandtheCIO, wouldthereeverhavebeenlawstoguaranteetherightsofworkersto organize,toabolishchildlabor,toputalimitonthehoursonemight becoercedintoworking,toprotectthehealthandsafetyofcoalminers andoilriggersandgarmentcutters,topryopenthelockboxofthe workplaceandmakeitobeysomethingotherthantherelentlesslyim-

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personallawsofthefreemarket?Withouttheseandnumberlessother instancesofmassmobilization,thehistoryofAmericanelites—and indeedofallofAmerica—wouldlookquitedifferent,farlesscivilized.Democracyhasrestrainedtheaspirationsofthewealthytorule America.

Ithasalso,ironically,convincedmanyordinarypeoplethatin Americaeveryonecouldbecomewealthy.Alltheinstancesofcollectivedemocraticinsurgencywehavementioned,andmanyothersbesides,haveoccurredwithinaculturesimultaneouslycommittedtoindividualismandtotheprivatepursuitofhappiness.LongagoAlexisde Tocquevillewroteaboutthetensionbetweenlibertyandequalityinthe NewWorld’sﬁrstdemocracy.Amanofconservativeinstinctsand breeding,heworriedagreatdealaboutthedangersofthe“tyrannyof themajority”andhowitmightcrippletheachievementofindividual excellenceandliberty,leavinginitswakeasocietyofnumbingmediocrityandconformity.Asocietyseekingtoinvigorateitsdemocracy paidlittleheedtoTocqueville’sanxieties,andhewasallbutforgotten formorethanacentury.1 HowevermuchtheFrencharistocratmay haveshortchangedthecivilizinginﬂuenceoftheegalitarianinstinct,he perceivedsomethingindubitablytrue:namely,thatwhilethenewdemocracywascalledupontobraketheelevationofthefew,itcarried outthatmissionsothatthemanymightengageintheraceforindividualself-aggrandizement.Americandemocracythushaslimitedthe powerofthewealthywhileencouragingthemanytopursuethemain chance.TheconvictionthatAmericandemocracypromisedeveryman anopportunitytobecomerichinhibitedjusthowfarassaultsonentrenchedelites,inToqueville’sdayandsince,havebeenapttogo.But italsomadeordinaryAmericansfuriousatattemptsbythehighand themightytocloseoffaccesstowealthandpower.

Thereisathirdwayinwhichdemocracyﬁguresasaghostlypresenceinthisbook.Whileeliteshavenaturallyenoughresistedpopular incursionsthatwouldlimittheireconomicfreedomandtheirpolitical 288

supremacy,theyhavethemselvesgrownupinaculturesuffusedby democraticandegalitariantraditions.Increasinglytheyhaveadopteda democraticdemeanorandportrayedtheirmotivations,purposes,and policyasgroundedintheprincipleofpopularsovereignty.Thishas beentrue,thoughtovaryingdegrees,sincetheRevolution.Moreover, thishasbeenmorethanandsomethingotherthanmerecynicalcalculationonthepartofempoweredelites.EventhesocialDarwinismofthe GildedAge,afterall,groundeditsdefenseofhierarchyintheimplacableworkingoutofsupposedlynaturallawsthatpresumablyapplied toEveryman.PartofthepatriciansophisticationthatmarkedJeffersonandthetwoRooseveltswastheiropennesstoculturalcurrents andpoliticalopinionsoriginatingbeyondandbeneaththebordersof theirownsocialclass.TeddyRooseveltwasbynomeansacommitted democrat—hewouldbetheﬁrsttoboastofthat—buthewasboth savvyandsincereinhisbeliefthatthegovernmenthadtoprotect thegeneralwelfareagainstthepredationsoftheirresponsiblerich.To besure,politicalshrewdnessandmoralhypocrisymadetheirweight feltinthewayselitesmaneuveredtomaintaintheirprivilegedpositions.ThemannerinwhichthegreatrailroadsandWallStreetbanks capturedturn-of-the-centurypublicinstitutionssuchastheInterstate CommerceCommissionandtheFederalReserveandmadethemserve narrower,self-interestedpurposesaretwocasesamongmany.Butto reduceeverythingtothelevelofdisingenuouspoliticalperformanceis toundervaluethewaydemocracyhasfunctionedsilentlyasaformof self-discipline,subtlyinformingtheinternallifeofthepowerful,establishinglimitstotheirsenseofentitlement.Onrareroccasions,usually atmomentsofprofoundcrisis,eliteshavefracturedinternallyover theirattitudetowardsocialupheaval,withafragmentevenallyingitselfwithdemocraticforces.

TheNewDealisforgoodreasonthemostenduringcase.Theelite fragmentationofthattimeextendedfarbeyondFranklinDelanoRoosevelt’sbecominga“traitortohisclass”andbreakingwithhisgentri-

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fiedworldinordertoexposeitsselfishness,condemnitssocialcallousness,andsubjectittoachasteningpublicshamingandsupervision. TheNewDealwasmuchmorethanoneman’sapostasy.Itrepresented anactivecollaborationbetweendisaffectedcirclesofthebusinessand financialcommunitywithsocialinsurgentsfromthecountry’sindustrialworkshops,urbanbarrios,andzonesofruraldevastation,and fromtheranksofghettoizedethnicCatholicsandJewsandmarginalizedcosmopolitanintellectuals.ThatRooseveltandtheNewDealhe championedneverhadanyintentionofuprootingthecapitalistfoundationsofAmericansocietyishardlyasecret:FDRhimselfwentto greatlengthstomakethatplainatthetime.NorwouldtheNewDeal havemanagedtoachievewhatitdidwithouttheenergy,militance,and intelligenceofitspopularallies,especiallyinthelabormovement.Itis alsotruethattheNewDealregimeitselfwasinaperpetualstateofindecision,advancingandthenretreatingacrossthebroadfrontofreform,finallyabandoningfurtherinroadsintotheredoubtsofcorporate powerwiththereturnofrecessioninthelate1930s,andthenofcourse withtheoutbreakofwar.Nevertheless,theRooseveltyearsleftbehind asetoflawsandinstitutionsthatforahalf-centuryestablishedademocraticpresenceinsidetheheartofthecountry’spoliticaleconomy. Moreover,theNewDealstructuresandcommitmentscompelledthe wealthyandpowerfultooperatewithinconstraints,andtopayelementaryattentiontotheimperativesofsocialwelfareandsocialjustice.

TodayweliveamongtheruinsoftheNewDeal.Thecounterrevolutionagainstit,ﬁrstgainingpowerunderRonaldReagan,isstillhard atworktryingtodismantlewhatremains.Thecounterrevolution’s agendaexplicitlyandprominentlyfavorstheinterestsofgreatcorporationsandthewealthy.Thatishardlyasecret.Butthelatestironyof Americandemocracyisthatthisre-ascendancyofwealthandpower presentsitselfasapopularrising,afreedommovementoftheoddest, nottosaymostperverse,sort.Itschampionsrailagainstoverbearing government,enslavingregulation,andthedeadhandofbureaucratic hierarchy.Inthisincongruousliberationstruggle,themeaningoffree-

domisencompassedby,isvirtuallyexhaustedby,thelogicofthefree market.Libertyprevailswherepropertyisatlibertytodowhatitwill. TheNewDeal’sdemocraticreckoningwith“economicroyalists”and the“Toriesofindustry”isnowcastigatedasthelatestincarnationof Tocqueville’s“tyrannyofthemajority.”Talkofemancipationtakes placealongsidethemostmeticulouscareandfeedingofthenation’s chiefbusinessandﬁnancialinstitutions;yetthetalkissoﬁery,sofull ofzealousidealism,thatitreachesbeyondcynicismandcapturesthe imaginationofmillionsofordinarypeoplewhobelievethattheirfuture,too,willbepavedwithgold.

Ironicindeed!Butwhatdoesthisstrangeinversionimplyaboutthe presentandfuturerelationshipbetweenwealthandpowerontheone handanddemocracyontheother?Thecontributorstothisbookpresumeanantipathy,sometimeslatent,sometimesovert,betweenelite dominationandpopularresistancetothatdomination.Canwemake thatsamepresumptionnow?Itwouldseemnot.Nosocialopposition today,norforthelastquarter-century,approachesinorganizational scale,inemotionaldepth,orinprogrammaticcoherencethegreat counterweightsofthepast:noJacksonianleveling,noPopulistprairie ﬁre,noProgressivetrustbusting,nosocialistvisionaryalternative,no massedchorusesof“SolidarityForever.”Thedemocraticurgetorein inthedangerousambitionsofprivilegedeliteshasgrownfrail.

Yetitwouldbeprematuretopronouncethatdemocracyisdead.Its veryweaknessmayemboldenelitestooverreach,totransgresssome lineofegalitariananddemocraticfaithtooprecioustobeignored.And atthatpointademocraticmovementmaystir,grounded,perhaps,ina reinvigoratedlabormovement,orinananti-globalizationalliance,or inprotestsagainstthehigh-handedunilateralismofU.S.foreignpolicy.Andifthathappens,aportionoftheAmericanelite,worried abouteconomicdeclineathomeorAmerica’splummetingreputation abroad,maywellalignitselfwiththatmovement,therebystrengtheningitspoliticalandeconomicmuscle.Butthatstorybelongstofuture historians,who,withthehistoricalrecordbeforethem,willknow Coda

whetherdemocracymadeacomebackinearly-twenty-ﬁrst-century America.Herewecanonlystresshowimportantdemocracyhasbeen tothediscipliningofpastelitesandhowimportantitsrevivalwillbeto theregulationofthosewhotodayholdgreatwealthandexercisedisproportionatepowerinAmerica. 292

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Notes

Acknowledgments

Contributors

Index

Notes 4

Introduction

1.CharlesA.Beard, AnEconomicInterpretationoftheConstitutionofthe UnitedStates (1913;NewYork:Macmillan,1952).

2.See,byArthurM.Schlesinger,Jr., TheAgeofJackson (Boston:Little, BrownandCompany,1945); TheAgeofRoosevelt (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1957–1960): TheCrisisoftheOldOrder,1919–1933 (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1956); TheComingoftheNewDeal (Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1958);and The PoliticsofUpheaval (Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1960).

3.VernonLouisParrington, MainCurrentsinAmericanThought:AnInterpretationofAmericanLiteraturefromtheBeginningsto1920, 3vols.(NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandCompany,1927–1930).

4.LouisHartz, TheLiberalTraditioninAmerica (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace, 1955);RichardHofstadter, TheAgeofReform:FromBryantoFDR (NewYork: Knopf,1955);RichardHofstadter, TheParanoidStyleinAmericaPoliticsandOther Essays (NewYork:Knopf,1965).

5.DavidM.Potter, TheImpendingCrisis,1848–1861 (NewYork:Harperand Row,1976);DavidM.Potter, PeopleofPlenty:EconomicAbundanceandtheAmericanCharacter (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1954).

6.W.E.B.DuBois, BlackReconstructioninAmerica,1860–1880 (NewYork: Harcourt,BraceandCompany,1935).

7.JohnAdams, DiscoursesonDavila:ASeriesofPapersonPoliticalHistory (1790;Boston:RussellandCutler,1805),91–92.

8.JamesMadison, Writings, ed.JackN.Rakove(NewYork:Libraryof America,1999),531.

9.CharlesFrancisAdamsandHenryAdams, ChaptersofErieandOtherEs-

says (Boston:J.R.OsgoodandCompany,1871);BrooksAdams, LawofCivilizationandDecay (NewYork:Macmillan,1896).SeealsoDanielAaron, MenofGood Hope:AStoryofAmericanProgressives (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1951),254,260,276.

10.RichardHofstadter, SocialDarwinisminAmericanThought, withanintroductionbyEricFoner(Boston:BeaconPress,1992).

11.ThorsteinVeblen, TheTheoryoftheLeisureClass:AnEconomicStudyof Institutions (NewYork:Macmillan,1912);ThorsteinVeblen, AbsenteeOwnership andBusinessEnterpriseinRecentTimes:TheCaseofAmerica (NewYork:B.W. Huebsch,1938).

12.HenryGeorge, ProgressandPoverty (SanFrancisco:W.M.Hinton& Company,1879);HenryDemarestLloyd, WealthagainstCommonwealth (New York:Harper&Brothers,1894);EdwardBellamy, LookingBackward,2000–1887 (Boston:TicknorandCompany,1888);IgnatiusDonnelly, Caesar’sColumn:A StoryoftheTwentiethCentury (1894;Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvard UniversityPress,1960).

13.LouisD.Brandeis, OtherPeople’sMoneyandHowtheBankersUseIt (New York:F.A.Stokes,1914);CharlesEdwardRussell, LawlessWealth:TheOriginsof SomeGreatAmericanFortunes (NewYork:B.W.DodgeandCompany,1908); UptonSinclair, TheMoneychangers (NewYork:B.W.Dodge&Company,1908); TheodoreDreiser, TheFinancier (NewYork:A.L.Burt,1912);TheodoreDreiser, TheTitan (NewYork:JohnLaneCompany,1914);JackLondon, TheIronHeel (1907;Westport,Conn.:LawrenceHill,1980);JohnDosPassos, USA (atrilogy): The42ndParallel (1930;Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1946); 1919 (1932;Boston: HoughtonMifflin,1946); TheBigMoney (1936;Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1946).

14.FerdinandLundberg, America’sSixtyFamilies (NewYork:Vanguard Press,1937).

15.MatthewJosephson, TheRobberBarons (NewYork:Harcourt,Braceand Company,1934).

16.AdolfA.BerleandGardinerC.Means, TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty (1932;NewYork:Macmillan,1948).

17.C.WrightMills, ThePowerElite (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1956).

18.RichardRovere, TheAmericanEstablishmentandOtherReports,Opinions, andSpeculations (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace&World,1962);DanielBell, The EndofIdeology (Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1960);DanielBell,ed., TheRadical Right (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,1963);E.DigbyBaltzell, TheProtestantEstablishment:AristocracyandCasteinAmerica (NewYork:RandomHouse,1964);

DavidReisman(withNathanGlazerandReuelDenney), TheLonelyCrowd:A StudyoftheChangingAmericanCharacter (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1950);Mills, PowerElite, 243;RobertDahl, WhoGoverns?DemocracyandPowerin anAmericanCity (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1961).

19.EugeneD.Genovese, ThePoliticalEconomyofSlavery:Studiesinthe EconomyandSocietyoftheSlaveSouth (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1965);EugeneD.Genovese, TheWorldtheSlaveholdersMade:TwoEssaysinInterpretation (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1969);EugeneD.Genovese, Roll,Jordan,Roll:The WorldtheSlavesMade (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1974);EricFoner, FreeSoil, FreeLabor,FreeMen:TheIdeologyoftheRepublicanPartybeforetheCivilWar (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970);EricFoner, Reconstruction:America’s UnﬁnishedRevolution (NewYork:Harper&Row,1988).Otherauthorsandmore booksmighteasilybeaddedtothislist,whichisonlymeanttobesuggestive: KevinPhillips, WealthandDemocracy:APoliticalHistoryoftheAmericanRich (NewYork:BroadwayBooks,2002);G.WilliamDomhoff, WhoRulesAmerica? (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1967);EricFoner, TheStoryofAmerican Freedom (NewYork:W.W.Norton,1998);NoamChomsky, HegemonyorSurvival:America’sQuestforGlobalDomination (NewYork:MetropolitanBooks, 2003);BarbaraEhrenreich, NickelandDimed:On(Not)GettingByinAmerica (NewYork:MetropolitanBooks,2001);MichaelHarrington, TheOtherAmerica (NewYork:Macmillan,1962);HerbertG.Gutman, PowerandCulture:Essayson theAmericanWorkingClass (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1987);DavidMontgomery, TheFalloftheHouseofLabor:TheWorkplace,theState,andAmericanLabor Activism,1865–1925 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987).

20.ThemorenotablebooksincludeRonChernow, TheHouseofMorgan:An AmericanBankingDynastyandtheRiseofBigBusiness (NewYork:Atlantic MonthlyPress,1990);RonChernow, Titan:TheLifeofJohnD.Rockefeller,Sr. (NewYork:RandomHouse,1998);JeanStrouse, Morgan:AnAmericanFinancier (NewYork:RandomHouse,1999);MauryKlein, TheLifeandLegendofJay Gould (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1986);MauryKlein, TheLife andLegendofE.H.Harriman (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 2000).

21.Wehavewrittenelsewhereabouttheemergenceinthe1930softhispolitico-economicformationandtheshakeupinelitesthatitentailed.SeeSteveFraser andGaryGerstle,eds., TheRiseandFalloftheNewDealOrder,1930–1980 (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989);andStevenFraser, LaborWill Rule:SidneyHillmanandtheRiseofAmericanLabor (NewYork:FreePress, 1991).

1.TheDilemmaofRulingElitesinRevolutionaryAmerica

1.StillextremelyvaluableisRobertR.Palmer, TheAgeoftheDemocratic Revolution:APoliticalHistoryofEuropeandAmerica,1760–1800, 2vols.(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1959–1964).ForPalmer,boththearistocraticreactionandegalitarianismweregatheringmomentumbeforetheFrenchRevolution brokeoutin1789.

2.Foranearlierattempttoaddressmanyoftheissuesinthischapter,see GaryJ.KornblithandJohnM.Murrin,“TheMakingandUnmakingofanAmericanRulingClass,”in BeyondtheAmericanRevolution:ExplorationsintheHistory ofAmericanRadicalism, ed.AlfredF.Young(DeKalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1993),27–79.

3.JonathanI.Israel,ed., TheAnglo-DutchMoment:EssaysontheGlorious RevolutionandItsWorldImpact (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991); andJohnBrewer, TheSinewsofPower:War,Money,andtheEnglishState,1688–1783 (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1989).

4.Forthecolonialpopulation,seeU.S.BureauoftheCensus, HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates,ColonialTimesto1970, vol.2(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOfﬁce,1975),1168.SeealsoJohnBrewer, ThePleasuresofthe Imagination:EnglishCultureintheEighteenthCentury (NewYork:FarrarStrauss Giroux,1997);RichardL.Bushman, TheReﬁnementofAmerica:Persons,Houses, Cities (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1992);DavidS.Shields, CivilTonguesandPoliteLettersinBritishAmerica (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1997);NedLandsman, FromColonialstoProvincials:AmericanThoughtandCulture,1680–1760 (NewYork:TwaynePublishers,1997);andJackP.Greene,“LegislativeTurnoverinBritishAmerica,1696to1775:AQuantitativeAnalysis,” WilliamandMaryQuarterly, 3dser.,38(1981),442–463(hereaftercitedas WMQ and assumedtobe3dser.).Forlevelsofwealthconcentration,compareJohnA. James,“PersonalWealthDistributioninEighteenth-CenturyBritain,” Economic HistoryReview, 2dser.,41(1988),559,table6,withAliceHansonJones, Wealthof aNationtoBe:TheAmericanColoniesontheEveoftheRevolution (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1980),164,table6.2.

5.CompareJoyceE.Chaplin, AnAnxiousPursuit:AgriculturalInnovation andModernityintheLowerSouth,1730–1815 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorth CarolinaPress,1993),withAllanKulikoff, TobaccoandSlaves:TheDevelopment ofSouthernCulturesintheChesapeake,1680–1800 (ChapelHill:Universityof NorthCarolinaPress,1986);MaryM.Schweitzer, CustomandContract:House-

hold,Government,andtheEconomyinColonialPennsylvania (NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,1987);andDanielJ.Vickers, FarmersandFishermen:TwoCenturiesofWorkinEssexCounty,Massachusetts,1630–1850 (ChapelHill:University ofNorthCarolinaPress,1994).Forcomparativewealthlevelsinthecolonies,see Jones, WealthofaNationtoBe, 96,table4.2.

6.T.H.Breen,“‘BaublesofBritain’:TheAmericanandConsumerRevolutionsoftheEighteenthCentury,” Past&Present, 119(May1988),73–104;and JohnM.Murrin,“TheLegalTransformation:TheBenchandBarinEighteenthCenturyMassachusetts,”in ColonialAmerica:EssaysinPoliticsandSocialDevelopment, ed.StanleyN.KatzandJohnM.Murrin,3ded.(NewYork:AlfredA. Knopf,1983),540–572.

7.BernardBailyn, TheIdeologicalOriginsoftheAmericanRevolution (Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1967);BernardBailyn, TheOriginsofAmericanPolitics (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1969);JohnM.Murrin,“PoliticalDevelopment,”in ColonialBritishAmerica:EssaysintheNew History oftheEarlyModernEra, ed.JackP.GreeneandJ.R.Pole(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1984),408–456;JamesH.Hutson,“TheEmergenceofthe ModernConceptofaRightinAmerica:TheContributionofMichelVilley,” AmericanJournalofJurisprudence, 39(1994),185–224;DanielT.Rodgers, Contested Truths:KeywordsinAmericanPoliticssinceIndependence (NewYork:BasicBooks, 1987),45–79;andT.H.Breen, TheLockeanMoment:TheLanguageofRightson theEveoftheAmericanRevolution:AnInauguralLectureDeliveredbeforetheUniversityofOxfordon15May2001 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).

8.IncisivediscussionsofclassintheearlymodernAnglo-Americanworld includeKeithWrightson,“Class,”in TheBritishAtlanticWorld,1500–1800, ed. DavidArmitageandMichaelJ.Braddick(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2002), 133–153;RonaldSchultz,“AClassSociety?TheNatureofInequalityinEarly America,”in InequalityinEarlyAmerica, ed.CarlaGardinaPestanaandSharonV. Salinger(Hanover,NH:UniversityPressofNewEngland,1999),203–221;and GregNobles,“Class,”in ACompaniontoColonialAmerica, ed.DanielVickers (Malden,MA:BlackwellPublishers,2003),259–287.

9.BernardBailyn, TheNewEnglandMerchantsintheSeventeenthCentury (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1955);RobertE.Wall,“TheDecline oftheMassachusettsFranchise,1647–1666,” JournalofAmericanHistory, 59 (1972–73),303–310;JohnM.Murrin,“TheMenacingShadowofLouisXIVand theRageofJacobLeisler:TheConstitutionalOrdealofSeventeenth-Century NewYork,”in NewYorkandtheUnion:ContributionstotheAmericanConstitutional

Experience, ed.StephenL.SchechterandRichardB.Bernstein(Albany:New YorkStateCommissionontheBicentennialoftheUnitedStatesConstitution, 1990),29–71;FrederickM.Tolles, MeetingHouseandCountingHouse:TheQuaker MerchantsofColonialPhiladelphia,1682–1763 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorth CarolinaPress,1948);StephenBrobeck,“RevolutionaryChangeinColonialPhiladelphia:TheBriefLifeoftheProprietaryGentry,” WMQ, 33(1976),410–434.

10.DavidA.Williams, PoliticalAlignmentsinColonialVirginiaPolitics,1698–1750 (NewYork:GarlandPublishing,1989);DavidA.Williams,“TheSmall FarmerinEighteenth-CenturyVirginiaPolitics,” AgriculturalHistory, 43(1969), 410–421;CharlesS.Sydnor, GentlemenFreeholders:PoliticalPracticesinWashington’sVirginia (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1952);John GilmanKolp, GentlemenandFreeholders:ElectoralPoliticsinColonialVirginia (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1998);RhysIsaac, TheTransformationofVirginia,1740–1790 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1982).

11.PeterH.Wood, BlackMajority:NegroesinColonialSouthCarolinafrom 1670throughtheStonoRebellion (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1974);PhilipD. Morgan,“WorkandCulture:TheTaskSystemandtheWorldofLowcountry Blacks,1700to1880,” WMQ, 39(1982),563–599;PhilipD.Morgan, SlaveCounterpoint:BlackCultureintheEighteenth-CenturyChesapeakeandLowcountry (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1998);andfortheculturaltoneof SouthCarolinapoliticsbeginninginthe1730s,seeRobertM.Weir,“‘TheHarmonyWeWereFamousFor’:AnInterpretationofPre-RevolutionarySouth CarolinaPolitics,” WMQ, 26(1969),473–501.

12.BrendanMcConville, ThoseDaringDisturbersofthePublicPeace:The StruggleforPropertyandPowerinEarlyNewJersey (Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press,1999);ThomasL.Purvis,“OriginsandPatternsofAgrarianUnrestin NewJersey,1735to1754,” WMQ, 39(1982),600–627;IrvingMark, Agrarian ConﬂictsinColonialNewYork,1711–1775, 2ded.(PortWashington,N.Y.:IraJ. Friedman,1965);SungBokKim, LandlordandTenantinColonialNewYork:ManorialSociety,1664–1775 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1978); andGaryB.Nash, TheUrbanCrucible:SocialChange,PoliticalConsciousness,and theOriginsoftheAmericanRevolution (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press,1979).

13.WehavetakenthesehonoriﬁctitlesfromthelegislativeandjudicialrecordsofprovincialMassachusetts.Themajorexceptiontothepatternwasthe Pennsylvaniaassembly,whichwasdominatedbytheQuakerPartyformostofthe century.Quakersdidnotusetitles.Forthepatternofpatriotversusloyalist

amonghighofﬁceholders,seeJamesKirbyMartin, MeninRebellion:HigherGovernmentLeadersandtheComingoftheAmericanRevolution (NewBrunswick,N.J.: RutgersUniversityPress,1973).

14.ThestandardstudyremainsEdmundS.MorganandHelenM.Morgan, TheStampActCrisis:ProloguetoRevolution, 3ded.(ChapelHill:Universityof NorthCarolinaPress,1995).

15.Ontypesofmobsandhowthepublicreactedtothem,seePaulineMaier, FromResistancetoRevolution:ColonialRadicalsandtheDevelopmentofAmerican OppositiontoBritain,1765–1776 (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1972).

16.MorganandMorgan, StampActCrisis, 150–158,199–202.

17.Ibid.,202–204,206–207;Mark, AgrarianConﬂictsinColonialNewYork, chap.5.

18.SylviaR.Frey, WaterfromtheRock:BlackResistanceinaRevolutionaryAge (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991),51; ThePapersofHenryLaurens, ed.GeorgeC.Rogers,Jr.,etal.,vol.5(Columbia:UniversityofSouthCarolina Press,1976),53–54;ArthurZilversmit, TheFirstEmancipation:TheAbolitionof SlaveryintheNorth (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1967).

19.RachelN.Klein, UniﬁcationofaSlaveState:TheRiseofthePlanterClass intheSouthCarolinaBackCountry,1760–1808 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorth CarolinaPress,1990);RichardM.Brown, TheSouthCarolinaRegulators (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1963);A.RogerEkirch, “PoorCarolina”: PoliticsandSocietyinColonialNorthCarolina,1729–1776 (ChapelHill:University ofNorthCarolinaPress,1981);JamesP.Whittenburg,“Planters,Merchants,and Lawyers:SocialChangeandtheOriginsoftheNorthCarolinaRegulation,” WMQ, 34(1977),214–238;PaulH.Smith,“TheAmericanLoyalists:Notes onTheirOrganizationandNumericalStrength,” WMQ, 25(1968),259–277; BenjaminQuarles, TheNegrointheAmericanRevolution, withanewintroduction byGaryNashandanewforewordbyThadW.Tate(1961;ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1996).

20.ThemostcarefulstudyoftheAmericanresponsetothecollapseofBritish authorityisDavidAmmerman, IntheCommonCause:AmericanResponsetotheCoerciveActsof1774 (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,1974).Seealso JacksonTurnerMain,“GovernmentbythePeople:TheAmericanRevolutionand theDemocratizationoftheLegislatures,” WMQ, 23(1966),391–407;Edward Countryman, APeopleinRevolution:TheAmericanRevolutionandPoliticalSociety inNewYork,1760–1790 (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1981);and RonaldHoffman, ASpiritofDissension:Economics,Politics,andtheRevolutionin Maryland (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1973).

21.JudithL.VanBuskirk, GenerousEnemies:PatriotsandLoyalistsinRevolutionaryNewYork (Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2002),92–105, esp.102–103(quotationsandreproductionoftheself-portrait).

22.Forpoliticalalignmentsinthe1780s,seeJacksonTurnerMain, Political PartiesbeforetheConstitution (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1973).

23.DavidP.Szatmary, Shays’Rebellion:TheMakingofanAgrarianInsurrection (Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1980);JohnL.Brooke,“Tothe QuietofthePeople:RevolutionarySettlementsandCivilUnrestinWesternMassachusetts,1774–1789,” WMQ, 46(1989),425–462;LeonardL.Richards, Shays’s Rebellion:TheAmericanRevolution’sFinalBattle (Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,2002).

24.RichardB.Morris, TheForgingoftheUnion,1781–1789 (NewYork: Harper&Row,1987),232–244.

25.Onthebackgroundofthedelegates,seeForrestMcDonald, WethePeople: TheEconomicOriginsoftheConstitution (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, 1958);andMorris, ForgingoftheUnion, 268–275.

26.MaxFarrand,ed., TheRecordsoftheFederalConventionof1787, rev.ed.,4 vols.(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1937),1:48(ShermanandGerry),49 (Wilson).ThewordsinbracketswereinsertedbyMadisonmanyyearsafterthe convention,probablyafter1819.

27.Ibid.,1:18–23(VirginiaPlan),242–245(NewJerseyPlan,quotationat 245).ForNorth’sConciliatoryProposition,seeBernardDonoughue, BritishPoliticsandtheAmericanRevolution:ThePathtoWar,1773–75 (London:Macmillan andCompany,1964),223–224,248–251.

28.Farrand, RecordsoftheFederalConvention, 1:282–293,quotationsat288.

29.StaughtonLynd,“TheCompromiseof1787,” PoliticalScienceQuarterly, 81(1966),225–250.

30.Farrand, RecordsoftheFederalConvention, 1:486;2:371.

31.RecenthistoriesofthePhiladelphiaconventionincludeJackN.Rakove, OriginalMeanings:PoliticsandIdeasintheMakingoftheConstitution (NewYork: AlfredA.Knopf,1996);andCarolBerkin, ABrilliantSolution:InventingtheAmericanConstitution (NewYork:Harcourt,2002).ForMadison’sstatement,seeJacob E.Cooke,ed., TheFederalist (Middletown,Conn.:WesleyanUniversityPress, 1961),63.Inthecensusof1790,BaltimoreandBostonhadacombinedpopulation of31,541.DavidT.Gilchrist,ed., TheGrowthoftheSeaportCities,1790–1825 (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,1967),28,tableII.

32.JonathanElliot,ed., TheDebatesintheSeveralStateConventionsonthe

AdoptionoftheFederalConstitution,asRecommendedbytheGeneralConventionat Philadelphiain1787, 2ded.,5vols.(Philadelphia:J.B.Lippincott&Co.,1861), 2:247–248.

33.FortheArticlesofConfederation,seeMerrillJensenetal.,eds., TheDocumentaryHistoryoftheRatiﬁcationoftheConstitution, 27vols.(Madison:StateHistoricalSocietyofWisconsin,1976–),1:86–94,esp.93(Art.13).Fordefeatofthe impostamendmentsof1781and1783,seeibid.,19:xxviii–xxxi,xxxvii–xl.

34.Farrand, RecordsoftheFederalConvention, 1:123.

35.McDonald, WethePeople, providesastate-by-stateanalysisofsupportfor andoppositiontoratiﬁcation.

36.Fortheratiﬁcationstruggle,seeRobertAllenRutland, TheOrdealofthe Constitution:TheAntifederalistsandtheRatiﬁcationStruggleof1787–1788 (Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,1966).Asuccinctbutcompellingdiscussion oftheemergenceofpopularsovereigntyinthestruggleoverstateconstitutionsis inPalmer, AgeoftheDemocraticRevolution, 1:213–238.

37.GeraldStourzh, AlexanderHamiltonandtheIdeaofRepublicanGovernment (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1970);DrewR.McCoy, TheElusiveRepublic:PoliticalEconomyinJeffersonianAmerica (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co., 1980),146–152;StanleyElkinsandEricMcKitrick, TheAgeofFederalism:The EarlyAmericanRepublic,1788–1800 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993), 92–131.

38.AlexanderHamilton,“ReportonPublicCredit,”in Writings, ed.JoanneB. Freeman,LibraryofAmerica(NewYork:LiteraryClassicsoftheUnitedStates, 1999),535.

39.Ibid.,544.

40.McCoy, ElusiveRepublic, 136–145;ElkinsandMcKitrick, AgeofFederalism, 136–145;LanceBanning, TheSacredFireofLiberty:JamesMadisonandthe FoundingoftheFederalRepublic (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1995),298–316.

41.ElkinsandMcKitrick, AgeofFederalism, 146–153;Banning, SacredFireof Liberty, 316–321.

42.AlexanderHamilton,“ReportonaNationalBank,”in Writings, 575–612; ElkinsandMcKitrick, AgeofFederalism, 226–228,258–261.

43.AlexanderHamilton,“ReportontheSubjectofManufactures,”in Writings, 647–734,quotationsat665,666;JohnE.Crowley, ThePrivilegesofIndependence:NeomercantilismandtheAmericanRevolution (Baltimore:JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,1993),146–155.

44.LanceBanning, TheJeffersonianPersuasion:EvolutionofaPartyIdeology

(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1978);McCoy, ElusiveRepublic, esp.152–161; JoyceAppleby, CapitalismandaNewSocialOrder:TheRepublicanVisionofthe 1790s (NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1984);JohnR.Nelson,Jr., Liberty andProperty:PoliticalEconomyandPolicymakingintheNewNation,1789–1812 (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1987);ElkinsandMcKitrick, Ageof Federalism, 79–92,195–208;HerbertE.Sloan, PrincipleandInterest:Thomas JeffersonanandtheProblemofDebt (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995), esp.chap.3.

45.ThomasJefferson,“NotesontheStateofVirginia,”in Writings, ed. MerrillD.Peterson,LibraryofAmerica(NewYork:LiteraryClassicsofthe UnitedStates,1984),290;JamesMadison,“RepublicanDistributionofCitizens,” in Writings, ed.JackN.Rakove,LibraryofAmerica(NewYork:LiteraryClassics oftheUnitedStates,1999),512.

46.Banning, SacredFireofLiberty, 58–75;McCoy, ElusiveRepublic, 137–145; Nelson, LibertyandProperty, 66–79.

47.ThomasJeffersontothePresidentoftheUnitedStates[GeorgeWashington],May23,1792,in Writings, 986.OntheanticapitalistdimensionsofJeffersonianthought,seeRobertF.Shalhope, JohnTaylorofCaroline:PastoralRepublican (Columbia:UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress,1980);MichaelMerrill,“The AnticapitalistOriginsoftheUnitedStates,” Review, FernandBraudelCenterfor theStudyofEconomies,HistoricalSystems,andCivilizations,13(Fall1990), 465–497.

48.RobertE.Wright, HamiltonUnbound:FinanceandtheCreationofthe AmericanRepublic (Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,2002),chap.3;RobertE. Wright, TheWealthofNationsRediscovered:IntegrationandExpansioninAmerican FinancialMarkets,1780–1850 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002), chaps.1–4,8.

49.JamesRogerSharp, AmericanPoliticsintheEarlyRepublic:TheNewNation inCrisis (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1993),31–112;JohnTaylor, Disunion SentimentinCongressin1794:AConﬁdentialMemorandumHithertoUnpublished, ed.GaillardHunt(Washington,D.C.:W.H.LowdermilkandCo.,1905),quotationat21.

50.JamesMadison,“SpeechinCongressOpposingtheNationalBank,”February2,1791,in Writings, 482,486.

51.NobleE.Cunningham, TheJeffersonianRepublicans:TheFormationof PartyOrganization,1789–1801 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1957),chaps1–2;JamesMadison,“ACandidStateofParties,”in Writings, 531.

52.Madison,“ACandidStateofParties,”532;RolandM.Baumann,“Phila-

delphia’sManufacturersandtheExciseTaxesof1794:TheForgingoftheJeffersonianCoalition,” PennsylvaniaMagazineofHistoryandBiography, 106(1982),3–39;AlfredF.Young, TheDemocraticRepublicansofNewYork:TheOrigins,1763–1797 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1967),chaps.13–18;Elkins andMcKitrick, AgeofFederalism, 303–593;Sharp, AmericanPoliticsintheEarly Republic, 69–184.

53.ThomasJefferson,“DraftoftheKentuckyResolutions,”in Writings, 449, 453;JamesMadison,“VirginiaResolutionsagainsttheAlienandSeditionActs,”in Writings, 589.

54.JeffreyL.Pasley, “TheTyrannyofPrinters”:NewspaperPoliticsintheEarly AmericanRepublic (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,2001),105–131.

55.ThomasJeffersontoJudgeSpencerRoane,September6,1819,in Writings, 1425.Forcontrastinginterpretationsofthehistoricalsigniﬁcanceoftheelection of1800,see,forexample,RichardHofstadter, TheIdeaofaPartySystem:The RiseofLegitimateOppositionintheUnitedStates,1780–1840 (Berkeley:University ofCaliforniaPress,1972),128–150;andSharp, AmericanPoliticsintheEarlyRepublic, 226–227,267–275.

56.GordonS.Wood, TheRadicalismoftheAmericanRevolution (NewYork: AlfredA.Knopf,1992),chap.19;ChiltonWilliamson, AmericanSuffragefrom PropertytoDemocracy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1960),chaps.8–11; AlexanderKeyssar, TheRighttoVote:TheContestedHistoryofDemocracyinthe UnitedStates (NewYork:BasicBooks,2000),chap.2andappendix;AlanTaylor, “FromFatherstoFriendsofthePeople:PoliticalPersonasintheEarlyRepublic,” JournaloftheEarlyRepublic, 11(Winter1987),465–491;JeffreyL.Pasley,“1800 asaRevolutioninPoliticalCulture:Newspapers,Celebrations,Voting,andDemocratizationintheEarlyRepublic,”in TheRevolutionof1800:Democracy,Race, andtheNewRepublic, ed.JamesHorn,JanEllenLewis,andPeterS.Onuf(Charlottesville:UniversityofVirginiaPress,2002),121–152;PeterDobkinHall, The OrganizationofAmericanCulture,1700–1900:PrivateInstitutions,Elites,andthe OriginsofAmericanNationality (NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1984), esp.chaps.5–6;RobertF.Dalzell,Jr., EnterprisingElite:TheBostonAssociates andtheWorldTheyMade (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1987), chaps.2–3;RobertWilliamFogel, WithoutConsentorContract:TheRiseandFall ofAmericanSlavery (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,1989),esp.chap.3.

57.Sharp, AmericanPoliticsintheEarlyRepublic, 243–249;LeonardL.Richards, TheSlavePower:TheFreeNorthandSouthernDomination,1780–1860 (Baton Rouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,2000),42.

58.ThomasJefferson,“FirstInauguralAddress,”in Writings, 492–494.

59.CatherineAllgor, ParlorPolitics:InWhichtheLadiesofWashingtonHelp BuildaCityandaGovernment (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia, 2000),32–33.

60.MarshallSmelser, TheDemocraticRepublic,1801–1815 (NewYork:Harper &Row,1968),45–57.

61.AugustusJohnFoster, JeffersonianAmerica:NotesontheUnitedStatesCollectedintheYears1805–6–7and11–12bySirAugustusJohnFoster,Bart., ed.RichardB.Davis(1954;Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1980),163.Onthe democratizationofpoliticsintheNorth,seePaulGoodman, TheDemocraticRepublicansofMassachusetts:PoliticsinaYoungRepublic (1964;Westport,Conn.: GreenwoodPress,1986),73–85;DavidHackettFischer, TheRevolutionofAmericanConservatism:TheFederalistPartyintheEraofJeffersonianDemocracy (New York:Harper&Row,1965),187–192,203–211;Taylor,“FromFatherstoFriends ofthePeople”;Pasley,“1800asaRevolutioninPoliticalCulture.”Ontheconnectionbetweenracialslavery,democraticideology,andtheJeffersoniancoalition intheSouth,seeEdmundS.Morgan, AmericanSlavery,AmericanFreedom:The OrdealofColonialVirginia (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,1975),chap.18; JohnAshworth,“TheJeffersonians:ClassicalRepublicansorLiberalCapitalists?” JournalofAmericanStudies, 18(December1984),425–435.

62.RogerG.Kennedy, Mr.Jefferson’sLostCause:Land,Farmers,Slavery,and theLouisianaPurchase (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003).

63. AnnalsofCongress, 15thCong.,2dSess.(1818–1819),vol.1,quotationsat 1204–5,1211;Richards, SlavePower, 52–82;JoshuaMichaelZeitz,“TheMissouri CompromiseReconsidered:RhetoricandtheEmergenceoftheFreeLaborSynthesis,” JournaloftheEarlyRepublic, 20(Fall2000),447–485;SeanWilentz,“The MissouriCrisisRevisited:Slavery,Democracy,andtheConstitutionintheEarly Republic,”GasparG.BaconLectureontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates, May2,2002,BostonUniversity(unpublishedpaperinpossessionoftheauthors).

64.ThomasJeffersontoJohnHolmes,April22,1820,in Writings, 1434.

65.Shalhope, JohnTaylorofCaroline, 197–199;NobleE.Cunningham,Jr., ThePresidencyofJamesMonroe (Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1996), 93–104;Wilentz,“MissouriCrisisRevisited,”15;GloverMoore, TheMissouri Controversy,1819–1821 ([Lexington]:UniversityofKentuckyPress,1953),170–217.

66.DavidDonald,“AnExcessofDemocracy:TheAmericanCivilWarand theSocialProcess,”in LincolnReconsidered:EssaysontheCivilWarEra, 2ded. (NewYork:VintageBooks,[1960]),209–235;JohnWilliamWard, AndrewJack-

son:SymbolforanAge (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1955),46–78;RichardH.Brown,“TheMissouriCrisis,Slavery,andthePoliticsofJacksonianism,” SouthAtlanticQuarterly, 65(Winter1966),55–72;CharlesSellers, TheMarket Revolution:JacksonianAmerica,1815–1846 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1991),301–331;EricFoner, FreeSoil,FreeLabor,FreeMen:TheIdeologyofthe RepublicanPartybeforetheCivilWar (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970), 90–98.

67.RobertGrayGunderson, OldGentlemen’sConvention:TheWashington PeaceConferenceof1861 (Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1961),10–12, 28–32;SvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidation oftheAmericanBourgeoisie,1850–1896 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001),94–96;Foner, FreeSoil,FreeLabor,FreeMen, esp.chap.1;RalphA. Wooster, TheSecessionConventionsoftheSouth (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,1962),19–20,32–33,54–55,71–72,87–88,106–107,128–129,144–145,160–161,176–178,198–199;JamesM.McPherson, ForCauseandComrades:WhyMen FoughtintheCivilWar (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),esp.chap.1; AbrahamLincoln,“MessagetoCongressinSpecialSession,”in Speechesand Writings, ed.DonE.Fehrenbacher,2vols.,LibraryofAmerica(NewYork:LiteraryClassicsoftheUnitedStates,1989),2:259.

2.The“SlavePower”intheUnitedStates,1783–1865

1.Forthehistoryofthe“slavepower”concept,seeLeonardRichards, The SlavePower:TheFreeNorthandSouthernDomination,1780–1860 (BatonRouge: LouisianaStateUniversityPress,2000),chap.1;DavidBrionDavis, TheSlave PowerConspiracyandtheParanoidStyle (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversity Press,1969).

2.JohnGorhamPalfrey, PapersontheSlavePower (Boston:Merrill,Cobb& Co.,1846),12–13.

3.PopulationstatisticsdrawnfromInter-UniversityConsortiumforPolitical andSocialResearch, Historical,Demographic,Economic,andSocialData:The UnitedStates,1790–1970, computerﬁle(AnnArbor:Inter-UniversityConsortium forPoliticalandSocialResearch[produceranddistributor],197?).

4. AmericanStatePapers:CommerceandNavigation, 2vols.(Washington, D.C.:GalesandSeaton,1832),1:24–33,322.

5.KennethMorgan,“GeorgeWashingtonandtheProblemofSlavery,” JournalofAmericanStudies 34,no.2(2000):279–301.Washington’spropertyholdings

placedhimhighonthelistofVirginia’swealthiestonehundredplanters.SeeJacksonT.Main,“TheOneHundred,” WilliamandMaryQuarterly, 3dser.,11(July 1954):354–384.

6.ThomasJefferson, Writings, ed.MerrillPeterson(NewYork:Libraryof America,1984),289.OntheSouthinthe1780s,seeJohnRichardAlden, The SouthintheRevolution,1763–1789 (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversity Press,1957),chaps.20–21.

7.Forsouthernpoliticians’contributiontoterritorialexpansion,seeJoseph A.Fry, DixieLooksAbroad:TheSouthandU.S.ForeignRelations,1789–1973 (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,2002),chaps.1–2.

8.Richards, TheSlavePower, 43–45.

9.ForthedeclineofslaveryintheearlynationalNorth,seeIraBerlin, Many ThousandsGone:TheFirstTwoCenturiesofSlaveryinNorthAmerica (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),chap.9.

10.QuotationfromUlrichB.Phillips, PlantationandFrontierDocuments: 1649–1863, vol.1(Cleveland:ArthurH.ClarkCo.,1909),289.Statisticsfrom StuartBruchey, CottonandtheGrowthoftheAmericanEconomy,1790–1860: SourcesandReadings (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,&World,1967),tables1A,3C.

11.Bruchey, CottonandtheGrowthoftheAmericanEconomy, tables2B,3A,3J, 3L.

12. CongressionalGlobe, Senate,35thCong.,1stSess.,appendix(1858),70.

13.BasedonRobertFogel’sestimatethattobacco,rice,andsugaraccounted for21percentoftheslavepopulationin1850.RobertFogel, WithoutConsent orContract:TheRiseandFallofAmericanSlavery (NewYork:W.W.Norton, 1989),30

14.JamesOakes, TheRulingRace:AHistoryofAmericanSlaveholders (New York:VintageBooks,1982),50.

15.RobertStarobin, IndustrialSlaveryintheOldSouth (NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress,1970),chap.1.

16.Fogel, WithoutConsentorContract, 102–107;RichardGraham,“Economics orCulture?TheDevelopmentoftheU.S.SouthandBrazilintheDaysofSlavery,”in WhatMadetheSouthDifferent?, ed.KeesGispen(Jackson:University PressofMississippi,1990),97–124.

17.Starobin, IndustrialSlaveryintheOldSouth, chap.6.

18.WilliamKauffmanScarborough, TheOverseer:PlantationManagementin theOldSouth (1966;Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1984),69.Onslave owners’interestinslavereproduction,seeMarieJenkinsSchwartz, BorninBond-

age:GrowingUpEnslavedintheAntebellumSouth (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress,2000),chap.1.

19.MichaelTadman, SpeculatorsandSlaves:Masters,Traders,andSlavesinthe OldSouth (Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1996),12.

20.JohnW.Blassingame,ed., SlaveTestimony:TwoCenturiesofLetters, Speeches,Interviews,andAutobiographies (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversity Press,1977),118.Forslaves’experiencesintheslavetrade,seeWalterJohnson, SoulbySoul:LifeinsidetheAntebellumSlaveMarket (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress,1999).

21.DrewGilpinFaust,ed., TheIdeologyofSlavery:ProslaveryThoughtinthe AntebellumSouth,1830–1860 (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress, 1981),39.

22.Onslaveowners’capitalgainsfromrisingslaveprices,seeGavinWright, ThePoliticalEconomyoftheCottonSouth:Households,Markets,andWealthinthe NineteenthCentury (NewYork:W.W.Norton,1978),139–144.Ninehundred dollarsin1860wasroughlyequivalentto$18,350in2003.Thisestimateisderivedfrom HandbookofLaborStatistics, publishedbytheBureauofLaborStatistics,whichsuggestsamultiplierof20.39toconvert1860valuesinto2003values(www.minneapolisfed.org/research/data/us/calc/hist1800.cfm, accessedDecember14,2003).

23.LeeSoltow, MenandWealthintheUnitedStates,1850–1870 (NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress,1975),101,103,166–167,195n6.SoltowreportsaGini Coefﬁcientof.813forwealthamongfreemenintheNorthin1860,and.845for freemenintheSouth.

24.WilliamKauffmanScarborough, MastersoftheBigHouse:EliteSlaveholdersoftheMid-Nineteenth-CenturySouth (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversity Press,2003),13,241.Aggregatestatisticsonslaveowningandresidencecompiled fromAppendixD.

25.PeterKolchin, UnfreeLabor:AmericanSlaveryandRussianSerfdom (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1987),54.

26.ThedebateisexaminedinMarkM.Smith, DebatingSlavery:Economyand SocietyintheAntebellumAmericanSouth (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1998).

27.Onthesouthernhousehold,seeElizabethFox-Genovese, WithinthePlantationHousehold:BlackandWhiteWomenoftheOldSouth (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1988),chap.1.

28.JamesHenryHammond,“LettertoanEnglishAbolitionist,”in TheIdeol-

310 NotestoPages74–77

ogyofSlavery:ProslaveryThoughtintheAntebellumSouth,1830–1860, ed.Drew GilpinFaust(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1981),190.

29.Scarborough, TheOverseer, 68.

30.KennethM.Stampp, ThePeculiarInstitution:SlaveryintheAnte-Bellum South (NewYork:VintageBooks,1989),chap.4.

31.EugeneGenovese, Roll,Jordan,Roll:TheWorldtheSlavesMade (New York:PantheonBooks,1974).

32.SallyHadden, SlavePatrols:LawandViolenceinVirginiaandtheCarolinas (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),71.

33.ThomasMorris, SouthernSlaveryandtheLaw,1619–1860 (ChapelHill: UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1996),218.

34.PeterP.Hinks, ToAwakenMyAfﬂictedBrethren:DavidWalkerandthe ProblemofAntebellumSlaveResistance (UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1997),217–219.

35.RonaldEdwardBridwell,“TheSouth’sWealthiestPlanter:Wade HamptonIofSouthCarolina,1754–1835”(Ph.D.diss.,UniversityofSouth Carolina,1980).

36.Soltow, MenandWealth, 143–144.

37.FrederickLawOlmsted, TheCottonKingdom:ATraveller’sObservations onCottonandSlaveryintheAmericanSlaveStates,1853–1861, ed.ArthurM. Schlesinger(1953;NewYork:DaCapoPress,1996),574.

38.Ontherelationshipbetweenslaveownersandnon–slaveownersintheantebellumSouth,seeespeciallyEugeneD.Genovese,“YeomanFarmersinaSlaveholders’Democracy,” AgriculturalHistory 49,no.2(1975):331–342.

39.J.WilliamHarris, PlainFolkandGentryinaSlaveSociety:WhiteLiberty andBlackSlaveryinAugusta’sHinterlands (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1985),83–90.

40.StevenHahn, TheRootsofSouthernPopulism:YeomanFarmersandthe TransformationoftheGeorgiaUpcountry,1850–1890 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1983),chap.3.

41.ManishaSinha, TheCounterrvolutionofSlavery:PoliticsandIdeologyinAntebellumSouthCarolina (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2000), 80.

42.SusanWyly-Jones,“The1835Anti-abolitionMeetingsintheSouth:A NewLookattheControversyovertheAbolitionPostalCampaign,” CivilWar History 47,no.4(2001):289–309.

43.ClementEaton, TheFreedom-of-ThoughtStruggleintheOldSouth (New York:Harper&Row,1964),187.

44.Harris, PlainFolkandGentryinaSlaveSociety, 121.

45.StatisticsonemigrationfromVirginiacompiledfromDavidHackett FischerandJamesC.Kelly, BoundAway:VirginiaandtheWestwardMovement (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,2000),325.

46.DonE.Fehrenbacher, ConstitutionsandConstitutionalismintheSlaveholdingSouth (Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1989),chap.1.

47.WilliamJ.Cooper,Jr., TheSouthandthePoliticsofSlavery,1828–1856 (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1978),chap.2.

48.HarryL.Watson,“ConﬂictandCollaboration:Yeomen,Slaveholders,and PoliticsintheAntebellumSouth,” SocialHistory 10(1985):273–298;Hahn, Roots ofSouthernPopulism, chap.3.

49.EdwardE.Baptist,“TheMigrationofPlanterstoAntebellumFlorida: KinshipandPower,” JournalofSouthernHistory 57,no.3(August1996):527–554.

50.RichardLoweandRandolphCampbell,“WealthholdingandPolitical PowerinAntebellumTexas,” SouthwesternHistoricalQuarterly 79,no.1(1975):25.

51.DonaldWooster, Politicians,Planters,andPlainFolk (Knoxville:UniversityofTennesseePress,1975),41,andidem, ThePeopleinPower (Knoxville:UniversityofTennesseePress,1979),125,128,133,138,143,148,153.Wooster’sdata donotincludeDelaware.

52.DanielP.Jordan,“Mississippi’sAntebellumCongressmen:ACollective Biography,” JournalofMississippiHistory 38(May1976):170.

53.RichardC.Lounsbury,ed., LouisaS.McCord:PoliticalandSocialEssays (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,1995),245.Twohistoriesthattrace thedevelopmentanddisseminationofproslaveryideasovertimeareLarryE. Tise, Proslavery:AHistoryoftheDefenseofSlaveryinAmerica,1701–1840 (Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1987),andJeffreyRobertYoung, Domesticating Slavery:TheMasterClassinGeorgiaandSouthCarolina,1670–1837 (ChapelHill: UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1999).

54.Tise, Proslavery, esp.chap.5.AclassicexpressionoftheproslaverycontrastbetweenfreeandslavesocietyisGeorgeFitzhugh, CannibalsAll!or,Slaves withoutMasters (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress, 1960).Fitzhugh’sthoughtisanalyzedinEugeneD.Genovese, TheWorldthe SlaveholdersMade:TwoEssaysinInterpretation (NewYork:PantheonBooks, 1969),pt.2.

55.StephanieMcCurry,“TheTwoFacesofRepublicanism:GenderandProslaveryPoliticsinAntebellumSouthCarolina,” JournalofAmericanHistory 78 (March1992):1245–64.

56.Myanalysisoftheproslaveryargumentisindebtedtothe“elementary

structureofsigniﬁcation”explainedinAgirdasJulienGreimas, OnMeaning:SelectedWritinginSemioticTheory, trans.PaulJ.PerronandFrankH.Collins(London:FrancesPinter,1987),chap.3.Forotherapplicationsofthisapproach,see FredricJameson, ThePoliticalUnconscious:NarrativeasaSociallySymbolicAct (Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1981);andAndersStephanson, Kennan andtheArtofForeignPolicy (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1989), chap.8.

57.LyndaLasswellCristandMarySeatonDix,eds., ThePapersofJefferson Davis, vol.6,(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1989),147–148.

58.EricFoner, FreeSoil,FreeLabor,FreeMen:TheIdeologyoftheRepublican PartybeforetheCivilWar (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970),308–313.

59.Onthedifferencebetweenintensiveandextensivenetworksofpower,see MichaelMann, TheSourcesofSocialPower, vol.1, AHistoryofPowerfromtheBeginningto a.d. 1760 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986),7–10.

60.Forafascinatingdefenseofthethree-ﬁfthsclause,seeFederalistno.54, writtenbyJamesMadison,in TheDebateontheConstitution, ed.BernardBailyn, vol.2(NewYork:LibraryofAmerica,1993),196–201.

61.Richards, TheSlavePower, chap.2.

62.KennethC.MartisandGregoryA.Elmes, TheHistoricalAtlasofState PowerinCongress,1790–1990 (Washington,D.C.:CongressionalQuarterly,1993), 136,150.Thesouthernproportionofthecountry’sfreewhitepopulationdecreasedfrom40percentin1800to30percentin1860.

63.DonE.Fehrenbacher, TheSlaveholdingRepublic:AnAccountoftheUnited StatesGovernment’sRelationstoSlavery, ed.WardMcAfee(NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress,2003),268.

64.KinleyJ.Brauer, CottonVersusConscience:MassachusettsWhigPoliticsand SouthwesternExpansion,1843–1848 (Lexington:UniversityofKentuckyPress, 1967);ThomasH.O’Connor, LordsoftheLoom:TheCottonWhigsandtheComingoftheCivilWar (NewYork:CharlesScribner’sSons,1968),emersonquoted at67.

65.SvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidation oftheAmericanBourgeoisie,1850–1896 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001),20–23,85–89.

66.Cooper, TheSouthandthePoliticsofSlavery.

67.Richards, TheSlavePower, 113–116.

68.ForaprovocativeanalysisofthedifferentrelationshipofDemocratsand Whigstoslavery,seeJohnAshworth, Slavery,Capitalism,andPoliticsintheAntebellumRepublic, vol.1, CommerceandCompromise,1820–1860 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),chap.5.OnslaveryandtheDemocraticParty,see

Richards, TheSlavePower, chap.5;JoelH.Silbey,“‘Thereareotherquestionsbesidethatofslaverymerely’:TheDemocraticPartyandAntislaveryPolitics,”in CrusadersandCompromisers:EssaysontheRelationshipoftheAntislaveryStruggle totheAntebellumPartySystem, ed.AlanM.Kraut(Westport,Conn.:Greenwood Press,1983),143–175;SeanWilentz,“Slavery,Antislavery,andJacksonianDemocracy,”in TheMarketRevolutioninAmerica:Social,Political,andReligiousExpressions,1800–1880, ed.MelvynStokesandStephenConway(Charlottesville: UniversityPressofVirginia,1996),202–223.

69.PhilipH.Burch,Jr., ElitesinAmericanHistory (NewYork:Holmes& MeierPublishers,1981),236–237.Foracomparisonofsouthernslaveownerswith otherlandedelites,seeStevenHahn,“ClassandStateinPostemancipationSocieties:SouthernPlantersinComparativePerspective,” AmericanHistoricalReview 95(February1990):78–83.

70.Fehrenbacher, SlaveholdingRepublic. SeealsoWilliamDusinberre,“PresidentPolkandthePoliticsofSlavery,” AmericanNineteenth-CenturyHistory 3,no.1 (Spring2002):1–16.

71.WilliamLeeMiller, ArguingaboutSlavery:TheGreatBattleintheUnited StatesCongress (NewYork:Knopf,1996).

72. ThePapersofJohnC.Calhoun, ed.ClydeN.Wilson,vol.11(Columbia: UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress,1978),640.Anespeciallyforcefulargument concerningtheantidemocraticoutlookofSouthCarolina’splanter-politicianscan befoundinManishaSinha,“RevolutionorCounterrevolution?:ThePoliticalIdeologyofSecessioninAntebellumSouthCarolina,” CivilWarHistory 46(2000): 205–226.

73.TheoutstandingstudyoftheroadtosecessionremainsDavidM.Potter, TheImpendingCrisis,1848–1861, completedandeditedbyDonE.Fehrenbacher (NewYork:Harper&Row,1976).

74.Ibid.,chap.19.SecessionallowedslaveownerstocodifythesebasicconstitutionalprotectionsforslaveryintheConfederateConstitution.SeethecomparisonoftheU.S.andC.S.A.constitutionsinJamesM.McPherson, OrdealbyFire: TheCivilWarandReconstruction, 3ded.(Boston:McGrawHill,2001),Appendix A–3.

75.QuotedinArmsteadL.Robinson,“IntheShadowofOldJohnBrown:InsurrectionAnxietyandConfederateMobilization,1861–1863,” JournalofNegro History 65(Autumn1980):288.Enslavedpeople’sinterpretationofLincoln’selectionisalsoaddressedinStevenHahn, ANationunderOurFeet:BlackPolitical StrugglesintheRuralSouthfromSlaverytotheGreatMigration (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,2003),65–68.

76. ThePoemsofHenryTimrod (NewYork:E.J.Hale&Sons,1872),100.

314 NotestoPages88–91

77.ForthereligiousbasisofConfederatenationalism,seeDrewGilpinFaust, TheCreationofConfederateNationalism:IdeologyandIdentityintheCivilWar South (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1988);MitchellSnay, GospelofDisunion:ReligionandSeparatismintheAntebellumSouth (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1993),chaps.5–6.

78.ArecentstudyshowingtheproslaveryoriginsofsecessionisCharlesB. Dew, ApostlesofDisunion:SouthernSecessionCommissionersandtheCausesofthe CivilWar (Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia,2001).

79.WilliamW.FreehlingandCraigM.Simpson,eds., SecessionDebated: Georgia’sShowdownin1860 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),102.

80.Studiesofsecessionarenumerous.SomeofthebestareWilliamL.Barney, TheSecessionistImpulse:AlabamaandMississippiin1860 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1974);DanielW.Crofts, ReluctantConfederates:UpperSouth UnionistsintheSecessionCrisis (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1989);MichaelP.Johnson, TowardaPatriarchalRepublic:TheSecessionofGeorgia (BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1977);PeytonMcCrary,Clark Miller,andDaleBaum,“ClassandPartyintheSecessionCrisis:VotingBehavior intheDeepSouth,1856–1861,” JournalofInterdisciplinaryHistory 8(Winter 1978):429–457.

81.Johnson, TowardaPatriarchalRepublic, 135.

82.IraBerlin,BarbaraJ.Fields,StevenF.Miller,JosephP.Reidy,andLeslie S.Rowland, FreeatLast:ADocumentaryHistoryofSlavery,Freedom,andtheCivil War (NewYork:NewPress,1992),153.

83.IraBerlin,BarbaraJ.Fields,StevenF.Miller,JosephP.Reidy,andLeslie S.Rowland, SlavesNoMore:ThreeEssaysonEmancipationandtheCivilWar (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).

84.LeonF.Litwack, BeenintheStormSoLong:TheAftermathofSlavery (NewYork:VintageBooks,1980),165.Forstatisticsoncasualtiesfromthesupereliteslave-owningfamilies,seeScarborough, MastersoftheBigHouse, 329.

85.Soltow, MenandWealth, 181.

86.EricFoner, Reconstruction:America’sUnﬁnishedRevolution,1863–1877 (NewYork:Harper&Row,1988);Hahn,“ClassandStateinPostemancipation Societies.”TheclassicstudyoftheslowrestorationofsouthernpowerisC.Vann Woodward, OriginsoftheNewSouth,1877–1913 (BatonRouge:LouisianaState UniversityPress,1951).

87.QuotedinRichardBensel, YankeeLeviathan:TheOriginsofCentralState AuthorityinAmerica,1859–1877 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990), 349.

88.AmyDruStanley, FromBondagetoContract:WageLabor,Marriage,and theMarketintheAgeofSlaveEmancipation (NewYork:CambridgeUniversity Press,1998),chap.2.

89.W.E.B.DuBois, BlackReconstructioninAmerica,1860–1880 (NewYork: Atheneum,1962),707.

3.MerchantsandManufacturersintheAntebellumNorth IamgratefultoCharlesForcey,DeborahGesensway,ErinSprague,and theeditorsofthisvolumefortheirhelpinwritingthischapter.PartsofthischapterarebasedonearlierversionsofthematerialinSvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidationoftheAmericanBourgeoisie (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).

1.BernardBailyn, TheNewEnglandMerchantsintheSeventeenthCentury (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1955).

2.SeealsoFredericCopleJaher, TheUrbanEstablishment:UpperStratain Boston,NewYork,Charleston,Chicago,andLosAngeles (Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1982),21.

3.Ibid.,22.

4.EdwardPessen, Riches,Classes,andPowerbeforetheCivilWar (Lexington, Mass.:D.C.Heath,1973),39;seealsoRonaldStory, TheForgingofanAristocracy: HarvardandtheBostonUpperClass,1800–1870 (Middletown,Conn.:Wesleyan UniversityPress,1980),3.

5.Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 40.

6.SvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidation oftheAmericanBourgeoisie (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),19.

7.Ibid.,19.

8.SeealsoPaulE.Johnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium:SocietyandRevivals inRochester,NewYork,1815–1837 (NewYork:HillandWang,1978),16.

9.WalterMuirWhitehill, CaptainJosephPeabody:EastIndiaMerchantofSalem,1775–1844 (Salem:PeabodyMuseum,1962),15,23,24,55.

10.RobertF.Dalzell, EnterprisingElite:TheBostonAssociatesandtheWorld TheyMade (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1987),29.

11.E.DigbyBaltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen:TheMakingofaNationalUpperClass (Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1958),93;Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 66.

12.Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 67.

13.GlennPorterandHaroldC.Livesay, MerchantsandManufacturers:Stud-

iesintheChangingStructureofNineteenth-CenturyMarketing(Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversityPress,1971),7,20,30.

14.RobertGreenhalghAlbion, TheRiseofNewYorkPort,1815–1860 (New York:CharlesScribner’sSons,1939),264.

15.Ibid.,267.

16.Forrelatedinformation,seeBarryE.Supple,“ABusinessElite:GermanJewishFinanciersinNineteenth-CenturyNewYork,” BusinessHistoryReview 31 (Summer1957),esp.509.

17.MarikaVicziany,“BombayMerchantsandStructuralChangesintheExportCommunity,1850to1880,”in EconomyandSociety:EssaysinIndianEconomicandSocialHistory (Delhi:OxfordUniversityPress,1979),163–196;Marika Vicziany, TheCottonTradeandtheCommercialDevelopmentofBombay,1855–75 (London:UniversityofLondonPress,1975);ElenaFrangakis-Syrett,“Commerce intheEasternMediterraneanfromtheEighteenthtotheEarlyTwentiethCenturies:TheCity-PortofIzmirandItsHinterland,” InternationalJournalofMaritimeHistory 10,no.2(1998),125–154;E.R.J.Owen, CottonandtheEgyptian Economy (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969).

18.Forevidence,seeJaher, UrbanEstablishment, 42,andPessen, Riches, Classes,andPower, 216–218.

19.ThisisalsoemphasizedbyJohnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium, 22.

20.QuotedinJaher, UrbanEstablishment, 23.

21.JohnCrosbyBrown, AHundredYearsofMerchantBanking:AHistoryof BrownBrothersandCompany,BrownShipley&Company,andtheAlliedFirms (New York:privatelyprinted,1909),24.

22.SeealsoPessen, Riches,ClassesandPower, 213.

23.ElizabethBlackmar, ManhattanforRent,1785–1850 (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1989),141–142.

24.See,forexample,“AnsonG.PhelpsDodge,”entryofOctober15,1859, DunPapers,BakerLibrary,HarvardBusinessSchool,345:600(N);RobertS.Buchanan,entryofApril1,1851,ibid.,340:56.

25.QuotedinStory, TheForgingofanAristocracy, 5.SeealsoCharlesHaynes Haswell, ReminiscencesofanOctogenarianoftheCityofNewYork (NewYork: Harper&Brothers,1896),514.

26.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 206;Albion, TheRiseofNewYorkPort, 254.

27.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 73;Johnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium, 26.

28.SeePierreBourdieu, Distinction:ASocialCritiqueoftheJudgmentofTaste (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1984). 316

29.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 72,203.

30.TheimportanceofkinshipnetworksisalsoemphasizedbyBettyG. Farrell, EliteFamilies:ClassandPowerinNineteenth-CenturyBoston (Albany:State UniversityofNewYorkPress,1993),59.

31.Albion, TheRiseofNewYorkPort, 254;Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 169.

32.Farrell, EliteFamilies, 25.

33.Beckert, MoniedMetropolis, 56;Baltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen, 175.

34.Johnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium, 53.

35.SeeespeciallyNancyCott, TheBondsofWomanhood:“Woman’sSphere” inNewEngland,1780–1835 (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1977),64,72.

36.Farrell, EliteFamilies, 78.

37.See Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 35(1856),388;31 (1854),263;34(1856),60;31(1854),59;41(1859),644;34(1856),59.

38.See,forexample,DunPapers,374:35,41,61,63,71,75,117.

39. Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 33(1855),390.

40.Ibid.,41(1859),644;39(1859),140.

41.DanielHodas, TheBusinessCareerofMosesTaylor:Merchant,Finance Capitalist,andIndustrialist (NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1976),10.

42.Ibid.,37.Seealso Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 32 (1855),522.

43.QuotedinJaher, UrbanEstablishment, 38.

44.AnnaRobesonBurr, ThePortraitofaBanker:JamesStilman,1850–1918 (NewYork:Dufﬁeld,1927),42;JohnWard,Diary,April1–20,1864,New-York HistoricalSociety; TheAutobiographyofBenjaminFranklin, reprintedas Benjamin Franklin’sAutobiography, ed.J.A.LeoLemayandP.M.Zall(NewYork:Norton, 1986),54.

45.LisaTiersten,“RedeﬁningConsumerCulture:RecentLiteratureonConsumptionandtheBourgeoisieinWesternEurope,” RadicalHistoryReview 57(Fall 1993),116–159;WilliamLeach, TrueLoveandPerfectUnion:TheFeministReform ofSexandSociety (NewYork:BasicBooks,1980),222–226.

46. NewYorkHerald, September18,1846,2;seealsoChristineM.Boyer, ManhattanManners:ArchitectureandStyle,1850–1900 (NewYork:Rizzoli,1985), 90.

47. Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 31(1854),61;33(1855), 558;30(1854),649.Callsagainst“extravagances”canalsobefoundinthe United StatesEconomist 13(June18,1853),18.

318

48.Bourdieu, Distinction, 114.

NotestoPages102–105

49.JohnA.Kouwenhoven, PartnersinBanking:AnHistoricalPortraitofa GreatPrivateBank,BrownBrothersHarriman&Co.,1818–1968 (NewYork: Doubleday&Company,1968),85.

50.See,forexample,“AParlorViewinaNewYorkDwellingHouse,”1854, reprintedinAllenChurchill, TheUpperCrust:AnInformalHistoryofNewYork’s HighestSociety (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1970),46.Forillustrations oftypicalbourgeoisfurniture,seeEileenDubrowandRichardDubrow, American FurnitureoftheNineteenthCentury (Exton,Pa.:SchifferPublishing,1983);Elan Zingman-LeithandSusanZingman-Leith, TheSecretLifeofVictorianHouses (Washington,D.C.:Elliott&ClarkPublishing,1993).

51.SeeKatherineC.Grier,“TheDeclineoftheMemoryPalace:TheParlor after1880,”in AmericanHomeLife,1880–1930:ASocialHistoryofSpacesandServices, ed.JessicaH.FoyandThomasJ.Schlereth(Knoxville:UniversityofTennesseePress,1992),51.

52. AnnualReportoftheChamberofCommerceoftheStateofNewYork,for theYear1858 (NewYork:WheelerandWilliams,1859),340–350.

53.Albion, TheRiseofNewYorkPort, 265.

54.FrancisGerryFairﬁeld, TheClubsofNewYork (NewYork:H.L.Hinton, 1873),59.SeealsoReginaldTownsend, MotherofClubs:BeingtheHistoryofthe FirstHundredYearsoftheUnionCluboftheCityofNewYork,1836–1936 (New York:WilliamEdwinRudge,1936);DavidBlack, TheKingofFifthAvenue:The FortunesofAugustBelmont (NewYork:DialPress,1981),60.

55.Townsend, MotherofClubs, 2,84–87.SeealsoThomasBender, NewYork Intellect:AHistoryofIntellectualLifeinNewYorkCity,from1750totheBeginnings ofOurOwnTime (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1987),135.

56.Baltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen, 337;Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 224.

57.Farrell, EliteFamilies, 31.

58.OnBoston,seeJaher, UrbanEstablishment, 26;onNewYork,seeBeckert, MoniedMetropolis, 81–82.

59.Farrell, EliteFamilies, 32;Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 26,54.

60.Farrell, EliteFamilies, 32.

61.Baltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen, 81.

62.Ibid.,87.Formoreexamples,seeJohnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium, 71; Pessen, Riches,Classes,andPower, 284,285,287.

63.RobertErnst, ImmigrantLifeinNewYorkCity,1825–1863 (Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,1994),17.

64.SeeSeanWilentz, ChantsDemocratic:NewYorkCityandtheRiseofthe AmericanWorkingClass,1788–1850 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1984), 107–142;LisaB.Lubow,“FromCarpentertoCapitalist:TheBusinessofBuilding inPostrevolutionaryBoston,”in Entrepreneurs:TheBostonBusinessCommunity, 1700–1850, ed.ConradEdickWrightandKatherynP.Viens(Boston:NortheasternUniversityPress,1997),181–210.

65.Ernst, ImmigrantLifeinNewYorkCity, 17.

66.MichaelZakim, Ready-MadeDemocracy:AHistoryofMen’sDressinthe AmericanRepublic,1760–1860 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2003),37.

67.JohnS.Gilkeson, Middle-ClassProvidence (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),18.

68.UnitedStates,SecretaryoftheInterior, CensusoftheUnitedStatesin 1860, 379,380,382,384;CarlM.Degler,“LaborintheEconomyandPoliticsof NewYorkCity,1850–1860”(Ph.D.diss.,ColumbiaUniversity,1952),49.See, forexample,thereportsonCorneliusDelamaterinDunPapers,“Cornelius Delamater,”entryofSeptember14,1857,316a:185,entryofOctober9,1869, 411:100L,and“NoveltyIronWorks,”368:400,431,440,441;Dalzell, Enterprising Elite.

69.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 49.

70.GlennPorterandHaroldLivesay, MerchantsandManufacturers:Studiesin theChangingStructureofNineteenth-CenturyMarketing (Baltimore:JohnHopkins Press,1971),78.

71.QuotedinBaltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen, 96.

72.FredDietz, ALeaffromthePast:DietzThenandNow (NewYork:R.E. DietzCompany,1914),60,74,77,94.

73. TheNationalCyclopediaofAmericanBiography,BeingtheHistoryofthe UnitedStates, vol.30(NewYork:JamesT.White,1943),544.

74.Ernst, ImmigrantLifeinNewYorkCity, 93.

75.CatherineElizabethReiser, Pittsburgh’sCommercialDevelopment,1800–1850 (Harrisburg:PennsylvaniaHistoricalandMuseumCommission,1951); HenryA.Fordetal., HistoryofCincinnati,Ohio (Cleveland:W.W.Williams, 1881).

76.JamesJ.Mapes, InauguralAddressDeliveredTuesdayEvening,January7, 1845,beforetheMechanics’InstituteoftheCityofNewYork (NewYork:Institute Rooms,1845),11.

77.AllanNevins, AbramS.Hewitt,withsomeAccountofPeterCooper (New York:Harper,1935),55,59,61;EdwardC.Mack, PeterCooper:CitizenofNewYork (NewYork:Duell,SloanandPearce,1949),35,40,44,69,204,205. NotestoPages105–107

78. ScientiﬁcAmerican, March29,1879,193.

79.Nevins, Hewitt, 144.

80.Beckert, MoniedMetropolis, 62.

81. ScientiﬁcAmerican, January10,1880,17;RichardK.Lieberman, Steinway &Sons (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1995),21.

82.EntryforOctober22,1860,in TheDiaryofGeorgeTempletonStrong, ed.AllanNevinsandMiltonHalseyThomas,vol.3(NewYork:Macmillan,1952), 52.

83. NewYorkTimes, 17October1860,3.

84.“JohnRoach,”entryofJune4,1860,DunPapers,317:229.

85.“RichardHoe,”entryofMay1851,ibid.,360:51.

86.LeonardAlexanderSwann, JohnRoach,MaritimeEntrepreneur:TheYears asNavalContractor,1862–1886 (Annapolis:U.S.NavalInstitute,1965),23.

87.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 48.

88.PeterS.HoetoRobertHoe,NewYork,October20,1857,HoePapers,LibraryofCongress,Washington,D.C.

89.AlexanderD.Bache, AnniversaryAddressbeforetheAmericanInstitute,of theCityofNew-York,attheTabernacle,October28th,1856,duringtheTwentyeighthAnnualFair (NewYork:Pudney&Russell,1857),32.

90. CatalogueoftheLibraryoftheMechanics’InstituteoftheCityofNewYork (NewYork:A.Baptist,Jr.,1844),63.Forthecompositionoftheleadershipofthe Mechanics’Institute,seeMapes, InauguralAddress, 2.

91.See CatalogueoftheLibraryoftheMechanics’InstituteoftheCityofNew York; Mapes, InauguralAddress, 9.

92.Mapes, InauguralAddress, 9.

93.SeeGilkeson, Middle-ClassProvidence, esp.23–36.

94.SeeJohnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium.

95.Seeibid.,137.

96.Beckert, TheMoniedMetropolis, 78.

97. NewYorkHerald, July15,1850,quotedinRoyRosenzweigandElizabeth Blackmar, TheParkandthePeople:AHistoryofCentralPark (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1992),28.

98.AlexisdeTocqueville, DemocracyinAmerica, ed.PhillipsBradley,2vols. (NewYork:VintageBooks,1945),1:198;2:114.Foradiscussionthatfocuseson NewYorkCity,seeMaryP.Ryan, CivicWars:DemocracyandPublicLifeinthe AmericanCityduringtheNineteenthCentury (Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia Press,1997),37,74–75.

99.PaulDiMaggio,“CulturalEntrepreneurshipinNineteenth-Century Boston,”in NonproﬁtEnterpriseintheArts:StudiesinMissionandConstraint (New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1986),43.

100.AndrewStulmanDennett, Weird&Wonderful:TheDimeMuseuminAmerica (NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1997),18,26.

101.Ibid.,30;RossiterRaymond, PeterCooper (Boston:HoughtonMifﬂin, 1901),69.Forthegeneralpoint,seealsoRyan, CivicWars, 38.

102.DiMaggio,“CulturalEntrepreneurshipinNineteenth-CenturyBoston,” 43,50.

103.Wilentz, ChantsDemocratic, 373,377.

104.Degler,“LaborintheEconomy,”14,15,16,18.

105.Johnson, AShopkeeper’sMillennium, 74.

106.AmyBridges, ACityintheRepublic:AntebellumNewYorkandtheOrigins ofMachinePolitics (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),115.Seealso Ryan, CivicWars, 308.

107.Bridges, ACityintheRepublic, 116.

108.Ibid.,123.

109.Ibid.

110.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 54.

111.AmyBridges,“AnotherLookatPlutocracyinAntebellumNewYork City,” PoliticalScienceQuarterly 97(1982),62;GabrielA.Almond, Plutocracyand PoliticsinNewYorkCity (Boulder:WestviewPress,1998),59–70.

112.AnthonyBoleslawGronowicz,“RevisingtheConceptofJacksonianDemocracy”(Ph.D.diss.,UniversityofPennsylvania,1981),49.

113.Townsend, MotherofClubs, 136.

114. AmericanMerchant 2(November1858),35.

115.See,forexample,CharlesF.Hoffman, ThePioneersofNew-York:AnAnniversaryDiscourseDeliveredbeforetheSt.NicholasSocietyofManhattan,December 6,1847 (NewYork:StanfordandSwors,1848),14.

116.AbrahamOakeyHall, AnniversaryAddressbeforetheAmericanInstitute,at PalaceGarden,October29,1859 (NewYork,1859),24.

117. TransactionsoftheAmericanInstituteoftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear 1857 (Albany:C.VanBenthuysen,1858),44;Hall, AnniversaryAddressbeforethe AmericanInstitute, 24–27.

118.Wilentz, ChantsDemocratic, 17.

119. TransactionsoftheAmericanInstituteoftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear 1856 (Albany:C.VanBenthuysen,1857),29,37. NotestoPages110–114

120. NewYorkWeeklyTribune, May2,1846,3.

121.OntheCompromiseof1850,see NewYorkCommercialAdvertiser, June13, 1850,1f;October24,1850,2.

122. JournalofCommerce(JoC), November1,1860,2.

123.Amongmanyothers,seelettersbyA.A.Belknap,HiramKetchum,Robert Wetmore,andJ.DePeysterOgdentoBeekman,allFebruary1851,PoliticalCorrespondence,Misc.Mss.Beekman,Box25,JamesBeekmanPapers,New-York HistoricalSociety.

124.See JoC, October24,1850,2.

125.Ibid.

126.PhilipSheldonFoner, BusinessandSlavery:TheNewYorkMerchantsand theIrrepressibleConﬂict (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1941), 74–78,84–86.

127. JoC, November6,1860.

128.See,forexample,“AugustBelmont,”in EncyclopediaofAmericanBusiness HistoryandBiography:BankingandFinanceto1913, ed.LarrySchweikart(New York:FactsonFile,1990),40.

129. Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 32(1855),264,quoting the Richmond(Virginia)Dispatch. Seealso Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 28(1853),326–327;39(1858),523;41(1859),129–130.Seealso ThomasP.Kettell, EightyYears’ProgressoftheUnitedStates (NewYork:L. Stebbins,1864),119–121.

130.Kettell, EightyYears’ProgressoftheUnitedStates, 122.

131.ThomasP.Kettell, OnSouthernWealthandNorthernProﬁts,asExhibitedin StatisticalFactsandOfﬁcialsFigures:ShowingtheNecessityofUniontotheFuture ProsperityandWelfareoftheRepublic (NewYork:GeorgeW.&JohnA.Wood, 1860),3,19,34,60,172,173.

132.Ibid.,98.

133.Ibid.,30.

134.Ibid.,10.

135.IverBernstein, TheNewYorkCityDraftRiots:TheirSigniﬁcanceforAmericanSocietyandPoliticsintheAgeoftheCivilWar (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,1990),133–134.

136.Ibid.,133.

137. JoC, November5,1860.

138.Gilkeson, Middle-ClassProvidence, 39.

139.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 55.

140.Ibid.;Farrell, EliteFamilies, 32.

141. JoC, July2,1850,2.

142.ChamberofCommerce, ProceedingsoftheChamberofCommerceofthe StateofNewYorkattheOpeningofTheirNewRooms,June10,1858 (NewYork: JohnA.Douglas,1858),11.

143.See,forexample, JoC, June18,1860,3;July4,1850,2.

144. Hunt’sMerchants’MagazineandCommercialReview 40(1859),519;41 (1859),129–130.

145.ForBoston,seeRichardAbbott, Cotton&Capital:BostonBusinessmen andAntislaveryReform,1854–1868 (Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress, 1991),4.

146.Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 56.

147.See JoC, July4,1850,2;JohnAshworth, Slavery,Capitalism,andPoliticsin theAntebellumRepublic, vol.1, CommerceandCompromise, 1820–1860(NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),125–191.

148. New-YorkDailyTribune, May31,1856,8;June11,1850,4.

149.Gilkeson, Middle-ClassProvidence, 40.

150.Ibid.,44.

151.HoraceGreeley, RecollectionsofaBusyLife,IncludingReminiscencesof AmericanPoliticsandPoliticians,fromtheOpeningoftheMissouriContesttothe DownfallofSlavery (NewYork:J.FordandCompany,1868),31,354,397;James Livingston, PragmatismandthePoliticalEconomyofCulturalRevolution,1850–1940 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1994),25–35.

152. New-YorkDailyTribune, November7,1857,2.

153.CitedinEdwardMack, PeterCooper:CitizenofNewYork (NewYork: Duell,SloanandPearce,1949),191.

154.GeorgeOpdyke, TreatiseonPoliticalEconomy (NewYork:G.P.Putnam, 1851),327,330,331.

155. SchenectadyDemocrat, April29,1856;G.TuckertoIsaacSherman,Albany, February28,1859,IsaacShermanPapers,HuntingtonLibrary,Pasadena,Calif.; IsaacShermantoThurlowWeed,ChamplainArsenal,Vermont,March22,1861, copyinIsaacShermanPapers,originalinRochesterUniversityLibrary.

156. TransactionsoftheAmericanInstituteoftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear 1850 (Albany:L.VanBenthuysen,1851),7; TransactionsoftheAmericanInstitute oftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear1856, 7–8.

157. TransactionsoftheAmericanInstituteoftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear 1850, 9; TransactionsoftheAmericanInstituteoftheCityofNew-YorkfortheYear 1851 (Albany:C.VanBenthuysen,1852),11.

158.Beckert, MoniedMetropolis, 95.

159.Theimportanceofthissplittoweakeningelitepoliticalpowerisdiscussed inBeckert, MoniedMetropolis, 78;Jaher, UrbanEstablishment, 56.

160.Forthathistory,seeBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis, chaps.5–10.

4.GildedAgeGospels

1.HenryAdams, Democracy:AnAmericanNovel (NewYork:ModernLibrary,2003),1,6,8–9.

2.Onthispoint,myinterpretationisatoddswithhistorianswho,withLee BensonandGabrielKolko,arguethattheGildedAgebusinessmenactivelysought governmentregulationasasolutiontointernalstructuralproblems.Itismyargumentthatthebusinessmen’sentryintothepoliticalspherewasdefensiveandreactive,notoffensiveandvoluntary.Fordiscussionsofthisliterature,seeElizabeth Sanders, RootsofReform:Farmers,Workers,andtheAmericanState,1877–1917 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999),179–181,andStephenSkowronek, BuildingaNewAmericanState:TheExpansionofNationalAdministrativeCapacities,1877–1920 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),125–131.Forthe bestone-volumesurveyofGildedAgepoliticaleconomy,seeRichardFranklin Bensel, ThePoliticalEconomyofAmericanIndustrialization,1877–1900 (NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).

3.Theoneobviousexceptionbeing,ofcourse,thewesternsilverinterests.

4. NewYorkTimes, October29,1882,8.

5.Reprintedin NewYorkTimes, November19,1882,5.

6.SeeDanielT.Rodgers, TheWorkEthicinIndustrialAmerica,1850–1920 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978),210–220.

7.Thisisnottosaythatothersdidnotdothisjobforthem.Throughoutthe GildedAge,therewasaprofusionofhagiographicportraitsandsuccessmanuals whichproclaimedthatthewealthofthenewmillionaireswasfoundedentirelyon theirinnervirtues,mostspeciﬁcallytheirdiligence,perseverance,discipline,chastity,temperance,andhard,hardwork.See,forexample,JudyHilkey, CharacterIs Capital:SuccessManualsandManhoodinGildedAgeAmerica (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1997).

8.JayGouldtestimony,UnitedStatesCongress,Senate,CommitteeonEducationandLabor, ReportupontheRelationsbetweenLaborandCapital (Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOfﬁce,1885),1088.

9.Thoughhedidnotnamenames,itwasclearthattherailroadmillionaires weretheVanderbilts,thathehimselfwasthemodelfortheironandsteelmagnate,PhilipArmourorGustavusSwiftthemeatpackingking,andWilliamA. ClarktheMontanaminer.

10.AndrewCarnegie,“Wealth”(1906),in ProblemsofTo-day:Wealth,Labor, Socialism (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,Doran,1908),13,17–21.

11.Ibid.,2–3.

12.RonChernow, Titan:TheLifeofJohnD.Rockefeller,Sr. (NewYork:RandomHouse,1998),54–57.

13.AndrewCarnegie,“[Gospelof]Wealth,” NorthAmericanReview (June 1889),in TheAndrewCarnegieReader, ed.JosephFrazierWall(Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,1992),132–133.Thearticlewasoriginallytitled “Wealth”;itwasretitled“TheGospelofWealth”whenreprintedinanEnglish edition.Carnegieadoptedthelattertitle.

14.Ibid.,138.

15.AlthoughIrwinWyllie(TheSelf-MadeManinAmerica [NewYork:Free Press,1954],86–87)claimedthatfew,ifany,GildedAgebusinessmenhadreador learnedanythingfromDarwinorSpencer,andRobertC.Bannisterwentastep furthertoarguethattherewas,infact,“noschool(orschools)ofsocialDarwinists”inAmericaoranywhereelse,andthatthetermhadbeeninventedbyitsenemiesasanepithetorlabelto“caricaturethe‘let-alone-philosophy’(asitwas termed)”(SocialDarwinism [Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1970],xi), neithercriticmanagedtodislodgethesocialDarwinistideologicalediﬁcefromits scholarlypedestal.Ihavenointentionofenteringintothelargerdebateonsocial DarwinismotherthantocommendRichardHofstadter’sbrilliantexerciseinintellectualandculturalhistory(SocialDarwinisminAmericanThought [Boston:BeaconPress,1955]).EventhoughhewasunabletodrawdirectlinesbetweenindividualbusinessmanandsocialDarwinism,orindeedtomelditsmultipledoctrines intoacoherenttheory,hedemonstratedforciblyhowthesedoctrines“wereused tobuttresstheconservativeoutlook”(5–6).

16.HenryAdams, TheEducationofHenryAdams:AnAutobiography (Boston: HoughtonMifﬂin,1918),232.

17.AndrewCarnegie, AutobiographyofAndrewCarnegie (Boston:NortheasternUniversityPress,1986),327.

18.Hofstadter, SocialDarwinism, 33.

19.Adams, Democracy, 1.

20.See,onthisgathering, HerbertSpencerontheAmericansandtheAmericans onHerbertSpencer, comp.EdwardL.Youmans(NewYork:Appleton,1883).

21.J.D.Y.Peel, HerbertSpencer:TheEvolutionofaSociologist (NewYork: BasicBooks,1971),100.

22.HerbertSpencer, SocialStatics,orTheConditionsEssentialtoHumanHappiness (London:JohnChapman,1851),42.

23.Ibid.,45.

NotestoPages131–140

24.Ibid.,42,65,332–333.

25.Ibid.,324–325.

26.JohnD.Rockefeller, RandomReminiscencesofMenandEvents (NewYork: Doubleday,Page,1909),90–91.

27.Gouldtestimony,1081.

28.SeeEdwardKirkland, BusinessintheGildedAge (Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress,1951),45–48.

29.AndrewCarnegie,“TheRoadtoBusinessSuccess:ATalktoYoungMen” (1885),in TheEmpireofBusiness (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,Page,1913),7.

30.Rockefeller, RandomReminiscences, 65.

31.Gouldtestimony,1089.

32.Ibid.,1090.ItisstrikinghowsimilarGould’sformulationwastoSpencer’s. WhileSpencerwasunalterablyopposedtotradesunionswhoseonlyraisond’être wasraisingthewagesoftheirmembers—andtherebyupsettingtheeconomic lawsthatgovernedwagerates—herefusedtocondemnworkercombinationsout ofhand.Theywere,heconceded,quiteprimitiveformsofsocialorganization, buttheyoccasionallyperformedapositivesocialrole.Byencouraginglaborersto cooperatewithoneanother,theypreparedthem“forsuchhigherformsofsocial organizationaswillprobablyhereafterarise.”HerbertSpencer, ThePrinciplesof Sociology, vol.3(NewYork:D.Appleton,1896),551–552.

33.AndrewCarnegie,“AnEmployer’sViewoftheLaborQuestion,” Forum (April1886),in TheGospelofWealthandOtherTimelyEssays (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1965),98.

34.AndrewCarnegie,“ResultsoftheLaborStruggle,” Forum (August1886), ibid.,109,111.

35.Ibid.,119–120.

36.ThomasA.Scott,“TheRecentStrikes,” NorthAmericanReview 125(September1877),360–361.

37.SvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidation oftheAmericanBourgeoisie,1850–1896 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001),235.

38.LeonFink, Workingmen’sDemocracy:TheKnightsofLaborandAmerican Politics (Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1983),26–27.

39.Gouldtestimony,1075.

40.GeraldBerk, AlternativeTracks:TheConstitutionofAmericanIndustrialOrder,1865–1917 (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1994),85.

41.ChaunceyDepew, MyMemoriesofEightyYears (NewYork:Charles Scribner’sSons,1922),242–243.

42.ThomasK.McCraw, ProphetsofRegulation:CharlesFrancisAdams,Louis

D.Brandeis,JamesM.Landis,AlfredE.Kahn (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1984),67.

43.AndrewCarnegie,“Pennsylvania’sIndustrialandRailroadPolicy”(1889), in MiscellaneousWritings, ed.BurtonHendrick,vol.1(GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday,Doran,1933),297.

44.Chernow, Titan, 292.

45.Beckert, TheMoniedMetropolis, 305–307.

46.GretchenRitter, GoldbugsandGreenbacks:TheAntimonopolyTraditionand thePoliticsofFinanceinAmerica,1865–1896 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversity Press,1997),162.

47.Citedibid.,79.

48.RichardHofstadter, TheAgeofReform (NewYork:VintageBooks,1955), 104.

49.JeanStrouse, Morgan:AmericanFinancier (NewYork:RandomHouse, 1999),305.

50.AndrewCarnegie,“TheABCofMoney,” NorthAmericanReview (June 1891),in AndrewCarnegieReader, 256.

51.AndrewCarnegie,“PopularIllusionsaboutTrusts,” CenturyMagazine (May1900),in TheGospelofWealth, 81,83.

52.JamesLivingston, OriginsoftheFederalReserveSystem:Money,Class,and CorporateCapitalism,1890–1913 (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1986),55.

53.Ibid.,66.

54.WilliamJ.Bryan,“CrossofGold”speech,in DocumentsofAmericanHistory, ed.HenrySteeleCommager,6thed.,vol.2(NewYork:Appleton-CenturyCrofts,1958),176.

55.Ibid.,178–179.

56.Strouse, Morgan, 355;Chernow, Titan, 388;MarkHannatoAndrewCarnegie,October17,1896,vol.39,AndrewCarnegiePapers,ManuscriptDivision, LibraryofCongress,Washington,D.C.

57.Livingston, OriginsoftheFederalReserveSystem, 81–106.

5.TheAbortiveRuleofBigMoney

1.Thedebateappearstohaveoccurredatadistanceinaliteraryexchange thatbeganwithlinesfromaFitzgeraldshortstory,“TheRichBoy”(1926),and continuedwithHemingway’saccountofa1936conversationinwhich“someone” hadsaidtoFitzgerald,“Yes,theyhavemoremoney.”ItisreportedinMatthewJ. Bruccoli, ScottandErnest (NewYork:RandomHouse,1978),754n3.

2.Ifwefollowchangeovertimeinsocialrelations,thenclass“happens”in

differentwaysatdifferenttimesdependingonchanginghistoricalcircumstances. SeeEdwardThompson, TheMakingoftheEnglishWorkingClass (London:V. Gollancz,1963),9.Forthatreason,historianshavemuchtocontributetounderstandingtheroleoftheupperclassesinAmericanhistory.Unfortunately,untilveryrecentlytheyhaveshiedawayfromstudying“thefew,”lookinginstead attheworking-class“many,”thebroadmiddleclasses,orthemassmentalities ofgenderandrace.Amongtherelativelyfewhistoricalstudiesof“thefew,” seeSvenBeckert, TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidationof theAmericanBourgeoisie,1850–1896 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001);FredericCopleJaher, TheUrbanEstablishment:UpperStratainBoston,New York,Charleston,Chicago,andLosAngeles (Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress, 1982);RonaldStory, TheForgingofanAristocracy:HarvardandtheBostonUpper Class,1800–1870 (Middletown,Conn.:WesleyanUniversityPress,1980);John Ingham, TheIronBarons:ASocialAnalysisofanAmericanUrbanElite,1874–1965 (Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1978).Whilegroupportraitsoftheupper classarerelativelyrare,biographiesofprominentﬁguresandtheirgoldendynastiesareabundant.See,forexamples,RonChernow, TheHouseofMorgan:An AmericanBankingDynastyandtheRiseofModernFinance (NewYork:Atlantic MonthlyPress,1990),and Titan:TheLifeofJohnD.Rockefeller,Sr. (NewYork: RandomHouse,1998);ClariceStasz, TheRockefellerWomen:DynastyofPiety, Privacy,andService (NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,1995).

3.ThereissurprisinglylittleworkontheAmericanupperclassasagroup anditsrelationtopower.Inasocietythatisarguablymoreboundupwiththecapitalistmarketthananyother,thebeginningofwisdominanydefinitionofclass startswithmaterialconditions,asexpressedintermssuchas“capitalistclass”or “businessclass.”Thenineteenth-century“bourgeoisie,”forexample,isdefinedin Beckert, MoniedMetropolis, 6,asagroupwhosepowerisderived“fromtheownershipofcapitalratherthanbirthright,status,orkinship.”Onthe“business class,”seeRobertLyndandHelenLynd, Middletown:AStudyinModernAmerican Culture (NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandCo.,1929).Onereasonwhyclassisa usefulcategoryisthatitdrawsconnectionsbetweenmaterialconditionsandother spheresoflife.Foraworkingdefinition,wecansaythatclasspertainstobothverticalrelationsofdominanceandsubordinationandhorizontalsolidaritiesofinterestandaffinityasthesetakeshapearoundtheintertwiningrelationsofproperty, family,andthestate.InMarxistrenderings,theserelationsalwaysinvolvetheexploitationofthelaboringmanybythepropertiedfew,withanolderemphasison economicfactorsandamorerecentemphasisonculturalmodesofdomination. Compare,forexample,twoinfluentialworks,PaulBaranandPaulSweezy, Mo-

nopolyCapital:AnEssayontheAmericanEconomicandSocialOrder (NewYork: MonthlyReviewPress,1966),andPierreBourdieu, Distinction:ASocialCritique oftheJudgementofTaste, trans.RichardNice(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1984).Inliberalsociology,thestudyofstratiﬁcationbywealthor incomepreservestheeconomicconnectionwithouttheconnotationofexploitation.Afoundingtextfortheliberalideaofclassas“thedifferentandunequalfacultiesofacquiringproperty”isJamesMadison,“Number10”(1787),in TheFederalist (NewYork,1937),55.Inconservativeapproaches,bycomparison,class inequalitybecomesapositivegood.ConservativechampionsofthevirtuesofinequalityrangefromAlexisdeTocquevilleandWilliamGrahamSumnertoE. DigbyBaltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen:TheMakingofaNationalUpperClass (Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1958).

4.ForthoughtfulcommentsonthedebilitatingeffectsofAmericanexceptionalisminAmericanscholarship,seeIanTyrrell, TheAbsentMarx:ClassAnalysisandLiberalHistoryinTwentieth-CenturyAmerica (Westport,Conn.:Greenwood Press,1986);DorothyRoss, TheOriginsofAmericanSocialScience (NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).

5.DwightMoody, TheTruthabouttheTrusts (NewYork:MoodyPublishing Company,1904),defendedconcentratedwealthagainstpopulistandothercritics of“monopoly”;AlfredChandler, TheVisibleHand:TheManagerialRevolutionin AmericanBusiness (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress, 1977),offeredtheclassicaccountofoligopoly;MichaelPioreandCharlesSabel, TheSecondIndustrialDivide:PossibilitiesforProsperity (NewYork:BasicBooks, 1984),beganareconsiderationoftheinevitabilityofoligopoly,whichhasmore recentlybeenfurtheredbyNaomiLamoreaux,DanielRaff,andPeterTemin, “BeyondMarketsandHierarchies:TowardaNewSynthesisofAmericanBusiness History,” AmericanHistoricalReview, 108(April2003),404–433.

6.RaymondFosdick, ChronicleofaGeneration:AnAutobiography (New York:Harper&Bros.,1958).

7.Thepioneeringworkontheseparationofownershipandcontrolwas AdolfA.BerleandGardinerC.Means, TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty (1932;NewYork:Macmillan,1948).Theideaofamanagerialrevolutionwas ﬁrstbroachedbyJamesBurnham, TheManagerialRevolution:WhatIsHappening intheWorld (NewYork:JohnDayCompany,1941);itwasacceptedbyJohnKennethGalbraith, TheNewIndustrialState (Boston:HoughtonMifﬂin,1967).The subtitleofChandler, TheVisibleHand, is TheManagerialRevolutioninAmerican Business.

8.Investigationsfromthebottomuphaveproducedamorejaundicedview

of“scientiﬁcmanagement.”See,forexamples,IraKatznelsonandAristide Zolberg, Working-ClassFormation:Nineteenth-CenturyPatternsinWesternEurope andtheUnitedStates (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986);David Gordon,RichardEdwards,andMichaelReich, SegmentedWork,DividedWorkers: TheHistoricalTransformationofLaborintheUnitedStates (NewYork:Cambridge UniversityPress,1982);SusanPorterBenson, CounterCultures:Saleswomen,Managers,andCustomersinAmericanDepartmentStores,1890–1940 (Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1986);HarryBraverman, LaborandMonopolyCapital:The DegradationofWorkintheTwentiethCentury (NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress, 1974).

9.Thecomplexityofagivensocialformationrequiresotherwaysofapprehendinginequalityaswell,andsoweﬁndothertermsinthetoolkitoftwentiethcenturysocialscience.Theseinclude“race”and“caste”:OliverCromwellCox, Caste,Class,andRace:AStudyinSocialDynamics (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday &Company,1948);“establishment”:E.DigbyBaltzell, TheProtestantEstablishment:AristocracyandCasteinAmerica (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1964), 7–8,whichcontainsausefuldistinctionbetweenelite,upperclass,and“establishment”(orrulingclass);inaddition,Baltzell, PhiladelphiaGentlemen, introduced theterm“businessaristocracy”toconnoteaneconomicgroupthatalsoprovidessocialandpoliticalleadership;and“elite”:C.WrightMills, ThePowerElite (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1956),whichexaminestheirontriangleof corporate,military,andpresidentialpower.G.WilliamDomhoff, WhoRules America (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1967),1–11,attemptstosynthesize Baltzell’supperclassandMills’spowereliteinhisanalysisoftheAmerican“governingclass.”

10.ThedistinctionfollowsBaltzell, ProtestantEstablishment, 7–8;Baltzellalso identiﬁesmembersoftheupperclassbytheoverlapofnamesbetween Who’sWho and TheSocialRegister.

11.Worksthathaveemphasizedthe“ﬁnancialization”ofcapitalisminthisperiodincludeKevinPhillips, WealthandDemocracy:APoliticalHistoryofthe AmericanRich (NewYork:BroadwayBooks,2002);GiovanniArrighi, TheLong TwentiethCentury:Money,Power,andtheOriginsofOurTimes (London:Verso, 1994).Otherssubsumeﬁnanceunderthegeneraltrendtowardcorporateconcentration;seeMartinSklar, TheCorporateReconstructionofAmericanCapitalism (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988).

12.Moody, TruthabouttheTrusts; LouisBrandeis, OtherPeople’sMoneyand HowtheBankersUseIt (1914;NewYork:Harper&Row,1967).

13.QuotefromThomasLamont, AcrossWorldFrontiers (NewYork:Harcourt,

Brace,1951),39;JohnGarraty, RightHandMan:TheLifeofGeorgeW.Perkins (NewYork:Harper1960),211–215;Chernow, HouseofMorgan, 122–130;Lester Chandler, BenjaminStrong:CentralBanker (Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution,1958),29.Severalofthebiggestnamesinﬁnanceoverthenextgeneration werepresentforthelate-nightmeetingattheMorganlibrary,includingMorgan associatesGeorgePerkins,ThomasLamont,andBenjaminStrong,aswellas JamesStillmanofNationalCityBank(forerunnerofCityCorp)andGeorge BakerofFirstNationalBank.

14.DixonWecter, TheSagaofAmericanSociety:ARecordofSocialAspiration,1607–1937 (NewYork:C.Scribner’sSons,1937),6.SeealsoCleveland Amory, WhoKilledSociety? (NewYork:Harper,1960).

15.Chandler, BenjaminStrong, 24–30.

16.Wecter, Saga, 6.

17.JohnH.Glennetal., RussellSageFoundation,1907–1946 (NewYork:RussellSageFoundation,1947);RaymondFosdick, TheStoryoftheRockefellerFoundation (NewYork:Harper,1952);E.RichardBrown, RockefellerMedicineMen (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1979).

18.Wecter, Saga, 6;Lamont, AcrossWorldFrontiers, 37.SeealsoStasz, RockefellerWomen.

19.QuotedinAmory, WhoKilledSociety? 80.SeealsoNelsonAldrich, Old Money:TheMythologyofAmerica’sUpperClass (NewYork:Knopf,1988).

20.Aldrich, OldMoney, 275;Baltzell, ProtestantEstablishment, waswritten,in part,toalertmembersoftheupperclasstotheinevitabledisappearanceofany resolutelyProtestantEstablishmentinasocietywithsuccessfulCatholicsand Jews.

21.WalterDeanBurnham, CriticalElectionsandtheMainspringsofAmerican Politics (NewYork:Norton,1970).

22.Onthetransitionfromlaissez-faireliberalismtosomethingnew,seeStephenSkowronek, BuildingaNewAmericanState (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982);AlanDawley, StrugglesforJustice:SocialResponsibilityandthe LiberalState (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress, 1991).

23. World’sWork, 1,no.1(November1900),1,4.

24.SeeJosephSmith, TheSpanishAmericanWar:ConﬂictintheCaribbeanand thePaciﬁc,1895–1902 (NewYork:Longman,1994);DavidTraxel, 1898:TheBirth oftheAmericanCentury (NewYork:Knopf,1998);IvanMusicant, EmpirebyDefault:TheSpanish-AmericanWarandtheDawnoftheAmericanCentury (New York:HenryHolt,1998);MaxBoot, TheSavageWarsofPeace:SmallWarsand NotestoPages154–158

theRiseofAmericanPower (NewYork:BasicBooks,2002);KristinHoganson, FightingforAmericanManhood:HowGenderPoliticsProvokedtheSpanish-American andPhilippine-AmericanWars (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1998).

25.GailBederman, ManlinessandCivilization:ACulturalHistoryofGender andRaceintheUnitedState,1880–1917 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, 1995).

26. World’sWork, 1,no.1(November1900),1;WilliamHowardTafttoElihu Root,August18,1900,ser.21,2:131,WilliamHowardTaftPapers,Libraryof Congress,Washington,D.C.;RobertRydell, AlltheWorld’saFair:VisionsofEmpireatAmericanInternationalExpositions,1876–1916 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1984).

27.Inthe“worldsystems”approachofImmanuelWallerstein,thestressison theroleoftheUnitedStatesastheglobalhegemoninmaintainingtheunequalrelationbetweentheworld’sdevelopedcoreandunderdevelopedperiphery.By shiftingtheaxisofclassconflicttothetransnationalplaneofcoreandperiphery, the“worldsystems”concepttendstoreduceinternalconflictstosecondaryimportance.SeeImmanuelWallerstein,ed., WorldInequality:OriginsandPerspectiveson theWorldSystem (Montreal:BlackRoseBooks,1975),and TheCapitalistWorldEconomy:Essays (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979).Inthesame vein,seeThomasMcCormick, America’sHalfCentury:UnitedStatesForeignPolicyintheColdWar (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1989).Other Marxistanalysis,followingLenin,presentsimperialismastheoutgrowthofthe systemofmonopolycapitalismratherthantheresultofthespecificaimsandinterestsofthebourgeoisie.SeeHarryMagdoff, TheAgeofImperialism:TheEconomicsofU.S.ForeignPolicy (NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1969).

28.TheWisconsinschoolofhistoriansexplainsoverseasexpansioninterms ofanefforttoresolve(orescape)theinternalproblemsofAmericansociety bypushingthemouttothefrontier,withtragicconsequencesathomeand abroad.WilliamA.Williams, TheTragedyofAmericanDiplomacy (Cleveland: WorldPublishingCompany,1959);LloydGardner,WalterLaFeber,andThomas McCormick, CreationoftheAmericanEmpire (Chicago:RandMcNally,1973); WalterLaFeber, TheNewEmpire:AnInterpretationofAmericanExpansion,1860–1898 (Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1963).Insteadofemphasizingupper-classleadership,theWisconsinschooloftenstressessystemiccausationand popularconsensusaroundempire;seeespeciallyWilliamA.Williams, TheRoots oftheModernAmericanEmpire:AStudyoftheGrowthandShapingofSocialConsciousnessinaMarketplaceSociety (NewYork:RandomHouse,1969).Charles Berquist, LaborandtheCourseofAmericanDemocracy:U.S.HistoryinLatinAmer-

icanPerspective (NewYork:Verso,1996),offersasophisticatedviewoftheincorporationofAmericanlaborinimperialexpansion.

29.CesarAyala, TheAmericanSugarKingdom:ThePlantationEconomyofthe SpanishCaribbean,1898–1934 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1999),75,87,95.

30.TafttoRoot,August18,1900.

31.QuotedinAldrich, OldMoney, 36.

32.LouisBrandeis, OtherPeople’sMoneyandHowtheBankersUseIt (1914; NewYork:Harper&Row,1967),12.

33.TwainquotedinPhillips, WealthandDemocracy, 240.

34.QuotedinJohnMiltonCooper, TheWarriorandthePriest:WoodrowWilsonandTheodoreRoosevelt (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1983),116.

35.PaulReinsch, WorldPoliticsattheEndoftheNineteenthCentury (1900; NewYork:Macmillan,1972),354.

36.AlanDawley, ChangingtheWorld:AmericanProgressivesinWarandRevolution (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003).

37.W.E.B.DuBois, TheSoulsofBlackFolk (1903;NewYork:Knopf,1993), 16.

38.QuotedinHarveyO’Connor, Mellon’sMillions:TheBiographyofaFortune (NewYork:JohnDayCompany,1933),113.

39.MichaelConniff, BlackLaboronaWhiteCanal:Panama,1904–1981 (Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,1985).

40.SimilarconsequenceswereplayedoutinslowmotionintheChineseRevolution,1911–1949.AmericanssuchasPaulReinschsawlaborasakeytoChinese development.“Theyhavecheapandabundantlabor,—thebest,themostreliable, andthemostfrugalintheOrient,”observedReinsch.Given,inaddition,China’s hugepopulationandrichnaturalresources,“thereislittleroomfordoubtthat, whentheindustrialforcesofthisregionhaveoncebeensetinmotion,Chinawill intruthbecome‘therealmofthecenter.’”IfAmericawasnottobeleftbehind,it wasessentialthatthedoorfortradeandinvestmentbekeptaswideopenaspossible.SeeReinsch, WorldPolitics, 248.

41.PellquotedinAldrich, OldMoney, 272;LodgeandBonapartequotedin Amory, WhoKilledSociety? 23,21.

42.O’Connor, Mellon’sMillions, 113.

43.CharlottePerkinsGilman, WomenandEconomics (Boston:Small,Maynard &Company,1898);ThorsteinVeblen, TheTheoryoftheLeisureClass (NewYork: Macmillan,1899).

44.FernandoFasce, AnAmericanFamily:TheGreatWarandCorporateCulture inAmerica, trans.IanHarvey(Columbus:OhioStateUniversityPress,2002).

45.QuotedinCooper, TheWarriorandthePriest, 113;Garraty, RightHand Man, dealswithPerkins’scareer.

46.Quotefrom www.san.beck.org/WP20-LeagueofNations.html, September18, 2003.

47.SeeJamesLivingston, OriginsoftheFederalReserveSystem:Money,Class, andCorporateCapitalism,1890–1913 (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1986);ArthurLink, WoodrowWilsonandtheProgressiveEra (NewYork:Harper,1954),44–53.

48.Sklar, CorporateReconstructionofAmericanCapitalism, isindispensablefor understandingthechangingrelationshipbetweenbusinessandgovernment,althoughtheinterpretationtherediffersfromtheonepresentedhere.

49.Chernow, HouseofMorgan, 188,200,617,618,627.

50.SeeDavidMontgomery, TheFalloftheHouseofLabor:TheWorkplace, theState,andAmericanLaborActivism,1865–1925 (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987).

51.SeeGaryGerstle, AmericanCrucible:RaceandNationintheTwentiethCentury (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001).

52.Theoverlapofclassandethnicconsciousnesshaslongbeenastapleofsocialhistory;forafoundingtext,seeHerbertGutman, Work,Culture,andSocietyin IndustrializingAmerica (NewYork:Knopf,1976).

53.Aldrich, OldMoney, 275;andseeBaltzell, ProtestantEstablishment.

54.BerleandMeans, TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty, 1,356.

55.AbundantdocumentationontheSpecialConferenceCommitteecanbe foundintheDuPontCompanyRecords,PresidentialPapers,Acc.1662,Hagley Library,Wilmington,Del.

56.QuotedinChandler, BenjaminStrong, 265.Intheend,despiteworryabout AmericansbeingseenasShylocks,Strongdecidedthatdebtsweresacredobligationsandoutrightforgiveness“isnottobecontemplated”;StrongtoRussell Lefﬁngwell,U.S.UndersecretaryoftheTreasury,July25,1919,quotedinAndrew Boyle, MontagueNorman:ABiography (London:Cassell,1967),151.Thereisa largeliteratureontheU.S.roleinrecastingbourgeoisEuropeinthe1920s.Afresh insightisfoundinEmilyRosenberg, FinancialMissionariestotheWorld:ThePoliticsandCultureofDollarDiplomacy,1900–1930 (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1999).SeealsoCarlParrini, HeirtoEmpire:U.S.EconomicDiplomacy,1916–1923 (Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,1969);WilliamC.

McNeil, AmericanMoneyandtheWeimarRepublic:EconomicsandPoliticson theEveoftheGreatDepression (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986); CharlesMaier, RecastingBourgeoisEurope:StabilizationinFrance,Germany,and ItalyintheDecadeafterWorldWarI (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975);FrankCostiglia, AwkwardDominion:AmericanPolitical,Economic,andCulturalRelationswithEurope,1919–1933 (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1984); MichaelHogan, InformalEntente:ThePrivateStructureofCooperationinAngloAmericanEconomicDiplomacy,1918–1929 (Columbia:UniversityofMissouri Press,1977);MaryNolan, VisionsofModernity (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,1994).

57.KeesvanderPijl, TheMakingofanAtlanticRulingClass (London:Verso, 1984).

58. VanityFair, January1930,15;October1929,114.Anotherexamplefrom theOctober1929issue:“WhynotspendtheholidaysinNorthAfrica,thelatest playgroundoftheinternationalset?”(40).Fortheoreticaldiscussion,seeEdward Said, Orientalism (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1978);MaryHelms, Ulysses’Sail: AnEthnographicOdysseyofPower,Knowledge,andGeographicalDistance (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988);MaryHelms, CraftandtheKinglyIdeal: Art,Trade,andPower (Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1993).

59. NewYorkTimes, October25,1929,38.Fromthesamesource:“Mr.and Mrs.HarveyM.Hallandthemembersoftheirfamily,whoreturnedrecentlyfrom Europe,havelefttheircountryplaceinNewCanaan,Conn.,andareat885Park Avenueforthewinter.”

60.QuotedinDavidKennedy, FreedomfromFear:TheAmericanPeopleinDepressionandWar,1929–1945 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),53.

61.Ibid.,82.

62.StuartBrandes, AmericanWelfareCapitalism (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1976),84,141–142;SanfordJacoby, EmployingBureaucracy:Managers, Unions,andtheTransformationofWorkinAmericanIndustry,1900–1945 (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1985),196–199.

63.FerdinandLundberg, America’sSixtyFamilies (NewYork:Vanguard Press,1937),xv,xvii;LippmannquotedinAldrich, OldMoney, 36.

64.CharlesBeard, TheOpenDooratHome (NewYork:Macmillan,1934),302, 303.SeealsoCharlesBeard, AForeignPolicyforAmerica (NewYork:Knopf, 1940).Beardwasnottheonly“progressive”historiantodrawtheconnection betweendomesticandforeignaffairs;CarlBeckercharacterizedtheAmerican Revolutionasatwo-sidedstruggleover“homeruleandwhoshouldruleat

NotestoPages182–185

home.”AlthoughFrederickJacksonTurnerpaidlittleattentiontoforeignpolicy perse,hisvisionofthefrontiercenteredontheadaptationofEuropeantraditions toAmericanconditions.Forapro-empireuseofBeard’sideas,seeAndrew Bacevich, AmericanEmpire:TheRealitiesandConsequencesofU.S.Diplomacy (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).

6.TheManagerialRevitalizationoftheRich

1.ThorsteinVeblen, TheTheoryoftheLeisureClass (NewYork:Macmillan, 1899),and“TheDisciplineoftheMachine”(1904),reprintedin ThePortableVeblen, ed.MaxLerner(NewYork:VikingPress,1948),335–348;James Burnham, TheManagerialRevolution (NewYork:JohnDayCompany,1941). TheclassictextontheseparationofownershipandcontrolisAdolfA.Berleand GardinerC.Means, TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty (1932;New York:Macmillan,1948).Noonecouldreadmorethanafewparagraphsofthis chapterwithoutrecognizingmydebttoChristopherLasch’sseminalessay“The MoralandIntellectualRehabilitationoftheRulingClass,”in TheWorldofNations (NewYork:Knopf,1973),80–91.

2.CharlesPoncedeLeon, Self-Exposure:Human-InterestJournalismandthe EmergenceofCelebrityinAmerica,1890–1940 (ChapelHill:UniversityofNorth CarolinaPress,2002),159;PeterW.CooksonandCarolineHodgesPursell, PreparingforPower:America’sEliteBoardingSchools (NewYork:BasicBooks,1985), 13,14,17,114,125,130,204;JamesMcLachlan, AmericanBoardingSchools:AHistoricalStudy (NewYork:Scribner,1970),chap.9.

3.Ontherevitalizationofclasshegemony,seeT.J.JacksonLears, NoPlace ofGrace:AntimodernismandtheTransformationofAmericanCulture,1880–1920 (NewYork:PantheonBooks,1981),esp.chap.3.OnJewishquotasatHarvard, seeKimTownsend, ManhoodatHarvard:WilliamJamesandOthers (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),282;andonIvyadmissionsmoregenerally,seeMarciaGrahamSynnott, TheHalf-OpenedDoor:DiscriminationandAdmissionsatHarvard,Yale,andPrinceton (Westport:GreenwoodPress,1979).

4.Idiscussthisimageryatlengthin FablesofAbundance:ACulturalHistory ofAdvertisinginAmerica (NewYork:BasicBooks,1994),esp.chaps.6,7.

5.HenryDemarestLloyd, WealthagainstCommonwealth (NewYork:Harper &Brothers,1894);IdaTarbell, TheHistoryoftheStandardOilCompany (New York:McClure,Phillips&Co.,1904–5);RonChernow, Titan:TheLifeofJohnD. Rockefeller,Sr. (NewYork:RandomHouse,1998),112–165,438–439;DanielT.

Rodgers, AtlanticCrossings:SocialPoliticsinaProgressiveAge (Cambridge,Mass.: BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1998).SeealsotheclassicessayscollectedbyHerbertGutmanin Work,Culture,andSocietyinIndustrializingAmerica (NewYork:Knopf,1976).

6.Lears, NoPlace, 26–32;ClevelandAmory, TheLastResorts (NewYork: Harper,1952),432.

7.Townsend, Manhood, 17;FrancesA.Walker,“CollegeAthletics,” Harvard Graduates’Magazine 2(1894),11,quotedinCliffordPutney, MuscularChristianity: ManhoodandSportsinAmerica,1880–1920 (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),39.

8.RobertGrant, Fourscore:AnAutobiography (Boston:HoughtonMifﬂin Company,1934);MyronT.Scudder,“TheValueofRecreationinRuralCommunities,”in TheRuralChurch, vol.6of MessagesoftheMenandReligionForward Movement (NewYork:AssociationPress,theYMCA,1912),228–229,quotedin Putney, MuscularChristianity, 28–29;“TheFateoftheSalariedMan,” TheIndependent, August20,1903,2002–3.

9.Townsend, ManhoodatHarvard, 256–258;KathleenDalton, TheodoreRoosevelt:AStrenuousLife (NewYork:Knopf,2002),chap.2.

10.Dalton, Roosevelt, 82,126,158,208,265,279;WilliamHenryHarbaugh, TheLifeandTimesofTheodoreRoosevelt (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1975),212–214.

11.“PresidentinCalifornia,” NewYorkTimes, May8,1903,3,quotedinGail Bederman, ManlinessandCivilization:ACulturalHistoryofGenderandRaceinthe UnitedStates,1890–1917 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1994),204.On masculineregenerationthroughimperialadventure,seeKristinL.Hoganson, FightingforAmericanManhood:HowGenderPoliticsProvokedtheSpanish-American andPhilippine-AmericanWars (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1998),and RichardSlotkin, GunﬁghterNation:TheMythoftheFrontierinTwentieth-Century America (NewYork:Atheneum,1992),esp.29–62.

12.TheodoreRoosevelt, AnAutobiography (NewYork:Scribner’s,1920),122, and TheStrenuousLife (NewYork:CenturyCompany,1900),1–24.

13.OwenWister, TheVirginian (1902;NewYork:PenguinBooks,1988);G. EdwardWhite, TheEasternEstablishmentandtheWesternExperience:TheWestof FredericRemington,TheodoreRoosevelt,andOwenWister (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1968);Townsend, Manhood, 265–273.

14.WilliamJames,“ThePh.D.Octopus”(1903),in Writings, vol.2, 1902–1910, LibraryofAmericaed.(NewYork:Viking,1987),1111–18;WilliamJames,

“TheSocialValueoftheCollegeBred”(1906),ibid.,1242–49;WilliamJames, “TheMoralEquivalentofWar”(1910),in TheWritingsofWilliamJames, ed. JohnJ.McDermott(NewYork:RandomHouse,1967),660–670.

15.TheodoreRoosevelt,“CollegeLife”(1907),quotedinTownsend, Manhood, 277.

16.TheodoreRoosevelt,reviewofBrooksAdams, TheLawofCivilization andDecay,TheForum 22(December1896),575–579;AlfredThayerMahan, The InterestofAmericainSeaPower,PresentandFuture (Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1897),121,citedinPutney, MuscularChristianity, 32.SeealsoLears, No Place, 134–137,andHoganson, FightingforAmericanManhood, chaps.2–4.

17.HenryCabotLodge,“Football,” HarvardGraduatesMagazine 5(September1896),67;Eliot,quotedinTownsend, Manhood, 96;ThomasJ.Schaeperand KathleenSchaeper, CowboysintoGentlemen:RhodesScholars,Oxford,andtheCreationofanAmericanElite (NewYork:BerghahnBooks,1998),16–17.

18.Putney, MuscularChristianity, 107;McLachlan, AmericanBoardingSchool, chap.9.

19.GeorgeMartin,“PrefacetoaSchoolmaster’sBiography,” Harper’s 188 (January1944),161;EllerySedgwick,“ThreeMenofGroton,” AtlanticMonthly 178(1946),68.

20.McLachlan, AmericanBoardingSchools, 298.

21.Putney, MuscularChristianity, 107;CooksonandPursell, Preparingfor Power, 19,57,205.

22.CooksonandPursell, PreparingforPower, 199ff.

23.CharlesWilliamEliot,“AmericanDemocracy,” HarvardGraduatesMagazine 10(June1902),506–507;Townsend, Manhood, 92,121;HughHawkins, BetweenHarvardandAmerica:TheEducationalLeadershipofCharlesWilliamEliot (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1972).

24.HenryA.Yeomans, AbbottLawrenceLowell,1856–1943 (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1948),68;RichardAngelo,“TheSocialTransformationofAmericanHigherEducation,”in TheTransformationofHigher Learning,1860–1930, ed.KonradH.Jarausch(Chicago:UniversityofChicago Press,1983);DonaldMeyer,“EarlyFootball,”unpublishedpapercitedinChristopherLasch, TheCultureofNarcissism (NewYork:Norton,1979),113.

25.MaureenE.Montgomery, DisplayingWomen:SpectaclesofLeisureinEdith Wharton’sNewYork (NewYork:Routledge,1998),63–68.

26.KathleenMcCarthy, Women’sCulture:AmericanPhilanthropyandArt, 1830–1930 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1991),209,237–239.

27.Amory, LastResorts, 315.SeealsoKathleenMcCarthy, NoblesseOblige:

CharityandCulturalPhilanthropyinChicago,1849–1929 (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1982);BarryKarlandStanleyKatz,“FoundationsandRuling ClassElites,” Daedalus 116(Winter1987),1–40.

28.Amory, LastResorts, 6–7.

29.Ibid.,48.

30.Gerardquotedibid.,8;JeanStrouse, Morgan:AmericanFinancier (New York:RandomHouse,1999),672.

31.MyaccountofTaylorisbasedonSudhirKakar, FrederickWinslowTaylor: AStudyinPersonalityandInnovation (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1970),and RobertKanigel, TheOneBestWay:FrederickWinslowTaylorandtheEnigmaof Efﬁciency (NewYork:Viking,1997).

32.Kakar, Taylor, 36–38;Kanigel, OneBestWay, 116–147.

33.Kanigel, OneBestWay, 145–147,181–184.

34.Ibid.,162–180,240–346.

35.Ibid.,315–323,467–484;FrederickWinslowTaylor, ThePrinciplesofScientiﬁcManagement (1911;NewYork:Norton,1967),43–53.

36.HughC.J.Aitken, TaylorismatWatertownArsenal (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1960);Kanigel, OneBestWay, 467–484;SamuelHaber, EfﬁciencyandUplift:ScientiﬁcManagementintheProgressiveEra (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1964).

37.Idiscussthenewmanagerialselfin Fables, 162–234.

38.JohnKasson, Houdini,Tarzan,andthePerfectMan:TheWhiteMaleBody andtheChallengeofModernityinAmerica (NewYork:HillandWang,2001),30–76,quotationat75;Lears, Fables, 158,166–169.

39.Kasson, Houdini, 174–175.

40.Ibid.,179–182;Putney, MuscularChristianity, 180–200.

41.RolandMarchand, AdvertisingtheAmericanDream:MakingWayforModernity,1920–1940 (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985);Poncede Leon, Self-Exposure, 154–157.

42.PoncedeLeon, Self-Exposure, 141–145.

43.EdithWharton, TheAgeofInnocence (1920;NewYork:Scribner’s,1970), 346.

44.Ibid.,353–358.

45.TheodoreDreiser, AnAmericanTragedy (1925;NewYork:Signet,2000), 43,202,173–174.

46.Ibid.,331,543.

47.F.ScottFitzgerald,“TheRichBoy”(1926),in TheStoriesofF.ScottFitzgerald, ed.MalcolmCowley(NewYork:Scribner,1951),177.

48.Ibid.,200–201.

49.Fitzgerald,“WinterDreams”(1922),ibid.,130,134.

50.Ibid.,136ff.

51.F.ScottFitzgerald, TheGreatGatsby (NewYork:Scribner’s,1925),119.

52.Amory, LastResorts, 310.

53.PeabodyquotedinMcLachlan, AmericanBoardingSchools, 297.

7.TheForeignPolicyEstablishment

1.ThisaccountisfromGodfreyHodgson, TheColonel:TheLifeandWarsof HenryL.Stimson (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1990),7–8,basedonStimson’sdiaryforJanuary17,1909.

2.ElihuRoot(1845–1937)wasasuccessfulcorporationlawyerwhomadea fortunebeforehewasthirty.Hewentontobecomesecretaryofstate(1905–1908) andwasawardedtheNobelPrizein1912forhisworkinconnectionwiththe Hagueconferenceof1907.

3.InNovember1919GeorgeHerbertWalker,grandfatherofPresident GeorgeHerbertWalkerBushandgreat-grandfatherofPresidentGeorgeWalker Bush,foundedtheW.A.Harriman&Co.bank,whichinDecember1930merged withthelong-establishedAnglo-AmericanbankBrownBrothers.

4.WalterIsaacsonandEvanThomas, TheWiseMen:SixFriendsandthe WorldTheyMade:Acheson,Bohlen,Harriman,Kennan,Lovett,McCloy (New York:Simon&Schuster,1986),624.

5.“ForboysfromGrotonorSt.Paul’softhat[1920s]eracollegemeantHarvard,Yale,orPrinceton.”Ibid.,60.

6.GeorgeWilsonPierson, HistoryofYaleCollege (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1952);BrooksMatherKelley, Yale:AHistory (NewHaven:Yale UniversityPress,1974);AlexandraRobbins, SecretsoftheTomb:SkullandBones, theIvyLeague,andtheHiddenPathsofPower (Boston:Little,Brown,2002).

7.EvanThomas, TheVeryBestMen (NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1995), 92.

8.Forexample,JamesPerloff, TheShadowsofPower:TheCouncilonForeign RelationsandtheAmericanDecline (Appleton,Wisc.:WesternIsland,1988).

9.GodfreyHodgson,“TheEstablishment,” ForeignPolicy 10(Spring1973), 3–40.

10.KennanwasraisedinWisconsin,educatedatPrinceton.Hiscousin,also namedGeorgeKennan,wasafamoustravelerinnineteenth-centuryRussia.He

wastheauthorof SiberiaandtheExileSystem (1891;Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1958).

11.ClaytonwasborninTupelo,Mississippi,in1880.Hebecame“thegreatest cottonmerchantintheworld.”In1940hewenttowork,unsalaried,forNelson Rockefellerininter-Americanaffairsandin1943wasmadeundersecretaryofstate foreconomicaffairs.AfterthewarhewasoneofthecreatorsoftheMarshallPlan forEuropeanreconstruction.

12.Thomas, TheVeryBestMen, 55.

13.See www.theodoreroosevelt.org/life/quotes.htm.

14.“ThePresidentneedshelp,”wrotetheBrownlowCommitteein1940,recommendingthatthepresidentshouldbegivensixhigh-levelspecialassistantsto sharehisworkload.RichardP.Nathan, ThePlotThatFailed:NixonandtheAdministrativePresidency (NewYork:Wiley,1975),87.

15.Thebackgroundofbothtelegramandarticleareinterestinglyexplained byGeorgeKennan, Memoirs, vol.1(Boston:Atlantic–Little,Brown,1967),290–295,354–367.Thetextofthelongtelegramispublishedat547–559.

16.Thoughhehimself,ithasastutelybeenpointedout,usedthewordtodescribetoPresidentJohnsontheelderstatesmenheoughttorecruittohissupport. IsaacsonandThomas, TheWiseMen, 644.

17.RayStannardBaker, WoodrowWilson:LifeandLetters, vol.7(Garden City,N.Y.:Doubleday,1927–1939),254.

18.SeeArnoJ.Mayer, ThePoliticalOriginsoftheNewDiplomacy,1917–1918 (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1959),passim.

19.LawrenceE.Gelphand, TheInquiry:AmericanPreparationsforPeace,1917–1919 (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1963),47.

20.SeeWilliamP.Bundy,“About ForeignAffairs,” www.foreignaffairs.org/ about/history. SeealsoWhitneyH.Shepardson, EarlyHistoryoftheCouncilon ForeignRelations (Stamford,Conn.:OverbrookPress,1960);RobertF.Byrnes, AwakeningAmericanEducationtotheWorld:TheRoleofArchibaldCaryCoolidge, 1866–1928 (SouthBend:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1982);RobertD. Schulzinger, TheWiseMenofForeignAffairs:TheHistoryoftheCouncilonForeignRelations (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1984).

21.RonaldSteel, WalterLippmannandtheAmericanCentury (Boston:Little Brown,1980).

22.JustusD.Doenecke, StormontheHorizon:TheChallengetoAmericanInterventionism,1939–1941 (Lanham,Md.:Rowman&Littleﬁeld,2000).

23.OnAmericaFirst,seeWayneS.Cole, AmericaFirst:TheBattleagainstIn-

342

NotestoPages229–235

tervention,1940–1941 (Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1953);JustusD. Doenecke,ed., InDangerUndaunted:TheAnti-InterventionistMovementof1940–1941 (Stanford:HooverInstitutionPress,1990).

24.Cole, AmericaFirst, 13.

25.Ibid.,141.

26.PeterGrose, GentlemanSpy:TheLifeofAllenDulles (Boston:Houghton Mifﬂin,1994),5.

27.AllenW.DullesandHamiltonFishArmstrong, CanWeBeNeutral? (New York:Harper&Brothers,1936),117.

28.WilliamG.Hyland,“ForeignAffairs at70,” ForeignAffairs 71(Fall1992), 171–193;HamiltonFishArmstrong,“ArmisticeatMunich,” ForeignAffairs 17 (January1939),289.

29.HamiltonF.ArmstrongandAllenW.Dulles,“LegislatingPeace,” Foreign Affairs 17(October1938),1–13.

30.IsaacsonandThomas, WiseMen, 95.

31.SeeHouse-FDRcorrespondenceintheHousepapersinDepartmentof ManuscriptsandArchives,YaleUniversityLibrary.

32.GarAlperovitz, AtomicDiplomacy:HiroshimaandPotsdam:TheUseofthe AtomicBombandtheAmericanConfrontationwithSovietPower (NewYork:Simon &Schuster,1965); AtomicDiplomacy:TheCriticalIssues, ed.BartonJ.Bernstein (Boston:Little,Brown,1976).

33.EltingE.Morison, TurmoilandTradition:AStudyoftheLifeandTimesof HenryL.Stimson (Boston:HoughtonMifﬂin,1960).

34.KaiBird, TheColorofTruth:McGeorgeBundyandWilliamBundy,Brothers inArms (NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1998),84–85.

35.Twoofthescientistswhoweremembersofthepaneladvisingtheinterim committee,J.RobertOppenheimerandArthurCompton,statedlaterthattheybelievedthedecisionhadalreadybeentaken.Morison, TurmoilandTradition, 626–627.

36.Bird, ColorofTruth, 84.

37.Hodgson, TheColonel, 350–363.

38.TheagencyreplacedtheCentralIntelligenceGroupbytheauthorityof theNationalSecurityActof1947,whichalsocombinedtheWarandNavydepartmentsintotheDepartmentofDefense.

39.RobinW.Winks, CloakandGown:ScholarsintheSecretWar,1939–1961 (NewYork:Morrow,1987),35.

40.Ibid.,437.

41.GodfreyHodgson, AmericainOurTime (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday, 1976).

42.DeanAcheson, PresentattheCreation (NewYork:Norton,1987),219.

43.See,forexample,amongalargeliterature,Thomas, TheVeryBestMen, andWinks, CloakandGown.

44.AtYale,RichardBissellwasactuallytappedforSkullandBonesbutrefusedtoaccept.Robbins, SecretsoftheTomb, 187.

45.EvanThomaswritesthat“thetargetformostcovertactionenthusiasts... wasnolongerliberatingtheEastBloc,butratherstoppingthedominoesfromfallinginotherpartsoftheworld—theMiddleEast,Asia,Africa,LatinAmerica” (TheVeryBestMen, 107).Butthissuggeststhatthechangeinpolicyresultedfrom decisionsinWashington.InrealityWashingtonwasrespondingtoachangeinSovietstrategyandtothecommunistvictoryinChinain1949.

46.Thoughhewentoutofhiswaytodenythathewaspartof“theGroton clique.”Ibid.,108.

47.FitzGerald,St.Mark’sandHarvard,marriedMariettaPeabody,granddaughteroftheheadmasterofGroton.ForLansdale’saccount,seeEdwardGeary Lansdale, IntheMidstofWars:AnAmericanMissiontoSoutheastAsia (NewYork: Harper&Row,1972).

48.SeeBradleyF.Smith, TheShadowWarriors:OSSandtheOriginsofthe CIA (NewYork:BasicBooks,1983),xiii.SeealsoR.HarrisSmith, OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica’sFirstCentralIntelligenceAgency (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1972).

49.Smith, ShadowWarriors, xv.

50.RogerHilsman,agraduateofWestPoint,waswoundedwhileserving withMerrill’sMaraudersinBurmain1944.Afterrecoveringfromhiswounds,he stayedinBurma,servingwithOSS,andcommandedaguerrillagroupofthree hundredBurmesetroops.Afterthewarhereceivedbothamaster’sdegreeand Ph.D.fromYaleUniversity.HeheadedtheStateDepartment’sBureauofIntelligenceintheKennedyadministration.TomeettheguerrillathreatinSouthVietnam,hewrote,“weneedreformerstoreorganizemasspartiesandsocialandpoliticalprogramsthatcouldbecomethebasisofmodernization.”Hewasassistant secretaryofstateforFarEasternaffairs1963–64.Helaterservedonthefacultyof ColumbiaUniversity.SeeLt.Col.JamesB.Wilkinson,Ret.,“AGazetteRetrospective:CounterguerrillaWarfare,” MarineCorpsGazette (February2002).

51.LawrenceFreedman, Kennedy’sWars:Berlin,Cuba,Laos,andVietnam (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),138.

52.DeviousbecauseKennedywenttogreatlengthstoconcealthefactthathis policydependedonadeal,toremoveU.S.missilesfromTurkey,whichhedenied making.

53.ThomasPowers, TheManWhoKepttheSecrets:RichardHelmsandtheCIA (NewYork:Knopf,1979),180.

54.Freedman, Kennedy’sWars, 295–304;RudyAbramson, SpanningtheCentury:TheLifeofAverellHarriman (NewYork:Morrow,1992),582–591.

55.Powers, TheManWhoKepttheSecrets, 181–183.WilliamColby,whosucceededFitzGeraldasheadofDDP’sFarEastdivisionandlaterbecamedirector ofcentralintelligence,subsequentlyadmittedthat20,587Vietnamesecivilianshad beenkilledbyOperationPhoenix.SouthVietnameseestimateswentashighas 40,000dead.

56.Forexample,MichaelForrestal,sonofJamesForrestal,theinvestment bankerandﬁrstsecretaryofdefense.

57.KaiBird, TheChairman:JohnJ.McCloyandtheMakingoftheAmerican Establishment (NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1992),570.ThepresidentsentSecretaryofStateDeanRusktosoundMcCloyout.

58.JamesChace, Acheson:TheSecretaryofStateWhoCreatedtheAmerican World (NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1998),420.

59.Bird, ColorofTruth, 338.

60.Bird, TheChairman, 518,citingArmstrongtoArthurDean,August9, 1965.

61.Ibid.,598.

62.Bird, ColorofTruth, 360.

63.SubsequentlyChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtuntilheresignedaftera conﬂictofinterestcontroversy.

64.IsaacsonandThomas, WiseMen, 679–680.

65.DonOberdorfer, Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar (GardenCity, N.Y.:Doubleday,1971).

66.Bird, ColorofTruth, 366.

67.Chace, Acheson, 424.

68.Ibid.,427.

69.IsaacsonandThomas, WiseMen, 700.

70.WalterIsaacson, Kissinger:ABiography (NewYork:Simon&Schuster, 1992),83.

71.SidneyBlumenthal, TheRiseoftheCounter-Establishment:FromConservativeIdeologytoPoliticalPower (NewYork:TimesBooks,1986).

72.DanSmoot, TheInvisibleGovernment (Dallas:DanSmootReport,1962);

ColonelVictorJ.Fox[pseud.], TheWelfareStaters (NewYork:FreedomPress, 1962);KentCourtneyandPhoebeCourtney, America’sUnelectedRulers:The CouncilonForeignRelations (NewOrleans:ConservativeSocietyofAmerica, 1962).

73.Forexample,GaryAllen, NoneDareCallItConspiracy (Rossmoor,Calif.: ConcordPress,1972),soldover5millioncopies.

74.Forexample,DavidHalberstam, TheBestandtheBrightest (NewYork: RandomHouse,1972);WalterIsaacsonandEvanThomas, TheWiseMen; Bird, TheChairman.

75.Perloff, TheShadowsofPower.

76.Ibid.,42.

77.Ibid.,168–169.

78.GodfreyHodgson,“TheEstablishment.”

79.BoulaydelaMeurthe,ontheexecutionoftheducd’Enghienin1804.

8.ConservativeElitesandtheCounterrevolution againsttheNewDeal

1.BruceJ.Schulman, FromCottonBelttoSunbelt:FederalPolicy,Economic Development,andtheTransformationoftheSouth,1938–1980 (Durham:Duke UniversityPress,1994),218.SeealsoDeweyW.Grantham, TheSouthinModern America:ARegionatOdds (NewYork:HarperCollins,1994).

2.MichaelLind, TheNextAmericanNation (NewYork:FreePress,1995). Forasimilarbutnotidenticalargument,seeBruceAckerman, WethePeople: Foundations (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress, 1993).

3.JordanA.Schwarz, TheNewDealers:PowerPoliticsintheAgeofRoosevelt (NewYork:RandomHouse,1993).

4.TheodoreCaplow,LouisHicks,andBenJ.Wattenberg, TheFirstMeasuredCentury:AnIllustratedGuidetoTrendsinAmerica,1900–2000 (Washington, D.C.:AEIPress,2000),20.

5.ForananalysisofthestrategiesofdissimulationbywhichAmericanjudicialandpoliticaleliteshavesoughttocamouflageanti-whiteracialdiscrimination inthenameofaffirmativeaction,seeDanielSabbagh,“JudicialUsesofSubterfuge:AffirmativeActionReconsidered,” PoliticalScienceQuarterly 118(Fall2003), 411–436.

6.DeWayneWickham,“Racial,IdeologicalIssuesSplitBlack,White Voters,” USAToday, November4,2002. NotestoPages247–260

7.RuyTexeira,“DecipheringtheDemocrats’Debacle,” Washington Monthly, May1,2003.

8.Caplow,Hicks,andWattenberg, FirstMeasuredCentury, 17.

9.JackCitrinandBenjaminHighton,“Race,Ethnicity,andVoting:What AccountsforTurnoutDifferencesinCalifornia?”researchbrief,PublicPolicyInstituteofCalifornia,December2002,2.

10.SeeRuyTexeiraandJoelRogers, America’sForgottenMajority:Whythe WhiteWorkingClassStillMatters (NewYork:BasicBooks,2000).

11.In TheNextAmericanNation, Iusedtheterm“overclass”todistinguishthe college-educated,credentialedmanagerial-professionalelitefromthehereditary upperclass,withwhichitoverlapstoadegree.Like“underclass,”“overclass”isa phraseinSwedishthatGunnarMyrdaltranslatedintoEnglishandintroducedto Americanpublicdiscourse.

12.JeffreyM.Berry,“Revived,YetHardlyRecognizable,” WashingtonPost Outlook, July11,1999,B3.

13.Ibid.

14.Ibid.SeealsoJeffreyM.Berry, TheNewLiberalism:TheRisingPowerof CitizenGroups (Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitutionPress,1999).

15.StephenA.Herzenberg,JohnA.Alic,andHowardWial, NewRulesfora NewEconomy:EmploymentandOpportunityinPostindustrialAmerica (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1998),26,27,table4.

16. NewYorkTimes, November25,1984,citedinDennisGilbertandJoseph A.Kahl, TheAmericanClassStructure:ANewSynthesis, 4thed.(Belmont,Calif.: WadsworthPublishingCompany,1993),215.

17.TedHalsteadandMichaelLind, TheRadicalCenter:TheFutureofAmericanPolitics (NewYork:Doubleday,2001),1.

18.Caplow,Hicks,andWattenberg, FirstMeasuredCentury, 11.

19.Ibid.,21.

20.FredM.Shelley,J.ClarkArcher,FionaM.Davidson,andStanleyD. Brunn, PoliticalGeographyoftheUnitedStates (NewYork:GuilfordPress,1996), 79.

21.DanielHenninger,“Blue-StatePolsAreEmptyingTheirOwnStates,” WallStreetJournal, August29,2003,A8.

22.ThomasByrneEdsall, TheNewPoliticsofInequality (NewYork:W.W. Norton,1984),128–129.

23. NewYorkTimes, August4,1981,citedinGilbertandKahl, AmericanClass Structure, 262.

24.Caplow,Hicks,andWattenberg, FirstMeasuredCentury, 49.

25.“InternationalTaxComparisons,1965–2001(Federal,State,andLocal),” CitizensforTaxJustice,November5,2002.

26.“TexasStateandLocalTaxesin1995:SharesofFamilyIncomeforNonelderlyMarriedCouples,”Appendix1,44,CitizensforTaxJustice, http://ctj.org/ whop/whop_tx.pdf.

27.Forthehistoryofregionaldivisionsovertrade,seePeterTrubowitz, DeﬁningtheNationalInterest:ConﬂictandChangeinAmericanForeignPolicy (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998).

28.HermanM.SchwartzandAidaA.Hozic,“WhoNeedstheNewEconomy?” Salon, March16,2001.

29.ThomasR.Dye, Who’sRunningAmerica?TheBushEra, 5thed. (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1990),236.

30.SeeSteveFraserandGaryGerstle,eds., TheRiseandFalloftheNewDeal Order,1930–1980 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989).

31.MichaelLind, MadeinTexas:GeorgeW.BushandtheSouthernTakeoverof AmericanPolitics (NewYork:BasicBooks,2003).

Coda

1.AlexisdeTocqueville, DemocracyinAmerica, trans.ArthurGoldhammer (NewYork:LibraryofAmerica,2004).

Acknowledgments

Theeditorswanttoacknowledgeanumberofpeoplefortheirhelpin gettingthisbookfromideatoreality.Attheoutset,weconsultedwith afairnumberofourfellowhistoriansaboutthenatureandshapeof thisproject.Welearnedagreatdealfromwhattheyhadtosay.Special thanksareduetoIraBerlin,MichaelKazin,andNelsonLichtenstein fortheirtrenchantcommentsonthewholemanuscript.Ourcontributorstooksubstantialtimeawayfromotherprojectstowriteforusand thentoreworktheiressaysinlightoftherevisionswerequested. Theirdeepcommitmenttothisprojecthasbeenoneofourgreatest satisfactions.Ithasbeenapleasuretoworkwithoureditor,JoyceSeltzer,andwehavebenefitedfromherenergy,enthusiasm,andsavvyeditorialadvice.NancyClementeskillfullyguidedthisbookthrougheach productionstage.AmandaHellerdidanexcellentjobcopyeditingthe manuscript,savingitfromvariousliteraryinfelicities.Forthatmatter, allthepeopleinvolvedwiththeprojectatHarvardUniversityPress performedtheirtaskswithtalent,efficiency,andprofessionalcare,for whichwearegrateful.DanielGerstleexpertlycheckedfootnotesand KatarinaKeane’scriticalassistancewiththecopyeditor’squeriesgotus throughaparticularlytoughbottleneck.JamesO’Brien’sindex,as usual,isfirst-rate.Wethankyouall.

Contributors 4

SteveFraser isawriterandeditorwholivesinNewYorkCity.He istheauthorof EveryManaSpeculator:AHistoryofWallStreetin AmericanLife (2005)and LaborWillRule:SidneyHillmanandtheRise ofAmericanLabor (1991),winnerofthePhilipTaftPrize.Heiscoeditorof TheRiseandFalloftheNewDealOrder,1930–1980 (1989).

GaryGerstle isProfessorofHistoryattheUniversityofMaryland. Heistheauthorof Working-ClassAmericanism (1989)and American Crucible:RaceandNationintheTwentiethCentury (2001),winnerofthe TheodoreSaloutosPrize.Heisco-editorof TheRiseandFallofthe NewDealOrder,1930–1980 (1989).

SvenBeckert,ProfessorofHistoryatHarvardUniversity,isthe authorof TheMoniedMetropolis:NewYorkCityandtheConsolidation oftheAmericanBourgeoise (2001).Heiscurrentlywritingaglobalhistoryofcotton.

AlanDawley isProfessorofHistoryatTheCollegeofNewJersey. Heistheauthorof ClassandCommunity:TheIndustrialRevolutionin Lynn (1976),winneroftheBancroftPrize; StrugglesforJustice:Social ResponsibilityandtheLiberalState (1991);and ChangingtheWorld: AmericanProgressivesinWarandRevolution (2003).

352 Contributors

GodfreyHodgson isaBritishprint,radio,andTVjournalistand historianoftheUnitedStates.Hisbooksinclude AmericainOurTime (1976); TheColonel:TheLifeandWarsofHenryStimson,1867–1950 (1990); MoreEqualThanOthers:AmericafromNixontotheNewCentury (2004).HeiscurrentlyatworkonabiographyofWoodrowWilson’s keyadviser,ColonelHouse.

GaryJ.Kornblith,ProfessorofHistoryatOberlinCollege,isthe authorof TheIndustrialRevolutioninAmerica (1996)andmanyessays onentrepreneurs,artisans,andpoliticalelitesinantebellumAmerica.

JacksonLears isBoardofGovernorsProfessorofHistoryat RutgersUniversityandeditorof Raritan:AQuarterlyReview. Heisthe authorof NoPlaceofGrace:AntimodernismandtheTransformationof AmericanCulture,1880–1920 (1981),nominatedforaNationalBook CriticsCircleAward; FablesofAbundance:ACulturalHistoryofAdvertisinginAmerica (1994),winneroftheLosAngelesTimesBook AwardforHistory;and SomethingforNothing:LuckinAmerica (2003).

MichaelLind,WhiteheadSeniorFellowattheNewAmericaFoundationinWashington,D.C.,istheauthorofanumberofbooksabout Americanpoliticsandhistory,including TheNextAmericanNation (1995)and WhatLincolnBelieved (2004).

JohnM.Murrin isProfessorofHistory,emeritus,atPrinceton Universityandoneofthecountry’sleadingscholarsofcolonialand revolutionaryAmerica.Hehasco-authored Liberty,Equality,Power:A HistoryoftheAmericanPeople (2004),andeditedorco-editedﬁve books.HisownessaysonearlyAmericarangefrompoliticsandthe lawtoeconomicsandculture.

DavidNasaw isDistinguishedProfessorofHistoryandDirectorof theCenterfortheHumanitiesattheCUNYGraduateCenter.Author offourbooks,including TheChief:TheLifeofWilliamRandolph Hearst (2000),winneroftheBancroftPrize,theJ.AnthonyLukas

BookPrize,andthreeotherprizes,heiscurrentlyworkingonabiographyofAndrewCarnegie.

AdamRothman isAssistantProfessorofHistoryatGeorgetown University.Heistheauthorof SlaveCountry:AmericanExpansionand theOriginsoftheDeepSouth (2005).

Index

abolitionism(antislaverymovement),66, 77,79

Acheson,Dean,193–194,216,219;and ColdWar,216,234,235;andforeign policyEstablishment,221,224,277; andVietnamWar,243,244,245

Adams,Brooks,9,191

Adams,CharlesFrancis,9 Adams,Henry,9,123–124,125,129 Adams,John,8–9,32,54,57

Adams,JohnQuincy,85 Addams,Jane,163,197–198 advertising,183,184,205–206,207,212 AFL-CIO,272,273–274

AfricanAmericans,90–91,204,256–259; discriminationagainst,91,198. See also slavery;slaves AgeofInnocence,The (Wharton),207–208

Albion,RobertGreenhalgh,99

Aldrich,Abby. See Rockefeller,Abby Aldrich Aldrich,Nelson,154,168 AlienAct(1798),54 AmericaFirstCommittee,229 AmericanEnterpriseInstitute(AEI), 246,267,279

AmericanFederationofLabor,171–172 AmericanMerchant, 113 AmericanRevolution,36–38 AmericanStudies,12 AmericanSugarReﬁningCompany, 159–160 AmericanTragedy,An (Dreiser),208–209 AmericanUnionagainstMilitarism,163 Andover(PhillipsAndoverAcademy), 193,219,231 André,John,38 antislaverymovement(abolitionism),66, 77,79 antitrustpolicies,157–158,168. Seealso ShermanAntitrustAct Armour,P.D.,206 Armstrong,HamiltonFish,227,230,244 Arnold,Benedict,38 ArticlesofConfederation,44 artisans,46,105–106 arts,publicfundingfor,271–272 Astorfamily,96,100 atomicbomb,231–233

Baker,James,219,277 Ball,George,242,243,244 Baltimore,Md.,154,268–269

Baltzell,E.Digby,173

BankersTrust,155

banksandbankers,96,116–117,155, 169–170,175. Seealso Morgan,J. Pierpont

Barnes,Tracy,234,238,239

Baruch,Bernard,170,199

BayofPigsinvasion,218,236,239

Beard,Charles,6–7,179

Bell,Daniel,12

Bellamy,Edward,10

Belmont,August,116–117

Belmontfamily,96,100

Bentsen,Lloyd,275

Berle,Adolf,11,173,228

Bernays,Edward,167

Biddlefamily,105,153

Bissell,Richard,234,236,239

Bland-AllisonAct(1878),142,143

boardingschools. See prepschools bodybuilders,204–205

Bohlen,CharlesE.,219,234

BolshevikRevolution,171

Bonaparte,Charles,188

Bonaparte,Mrs.JeromeNapoleon,165–166

BooneandCrockettClub,215

Boston,Mass.,108,110,111,153;incolonialera,33,34–35;mercantileelite in,94,99,100,103,104–105,106, 108,112;politicalpowerin,104–105, 112

BradleyFoundation,268

Brandeis,Louis,10–11,153,161

Brewster,Kingman,Jr.,229 Britain,28–29,31,125

BritishEmpire,222

Bross,John,234

Brown,Moses,106 Bruce,David,234

Index

Bryan,WilliamJennings,146,157 Brzezinski,Zbigniew,278 Buckleyv.Valeo(1976),264 Bundy,Harvey:andforeignpolicyEstablishment,219,221,223;inWarDepartment,217,231,232,233 Bundy,McGeorge,217,219,246;and foreignpolicyEstablishment,221,223, 224,241,247,277;andVietnamWar, 240,241,243,244,245 Bundy,WilliamPutnam,219,221,241, 242,243

Burr,Aaron,57 Burroughs,EdgarRice,205 Bush,GeorgeH.W.,231,269,279,284 Bush,GeorgeW.,13,259,261,266,269, 283–284;domesticpoliciesof,13,255–256,276,278;foreignpoliciesof,278, 279–280 Bush,Prescott,219 BusinessRoundtable,273

Calhoun,JohnC.,66,86 Carnegie,Andrew,126–129,132,151; andintra-classdisagreements,134–135,140–141;andnationalpoliticsin 1890s,143–144,147 Carter,Jimmy,247,259,266,270,278 Catholics,156,182,188,251,257,265 celebrityculture,196–197 CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),234–235,237–239,240 ChambersofCommerce,103 Charleston,S.C.,36,154 Cheney,Dick,279,283–284 Chicago,Ill.,107,134,154 ChoateSchool,194 Chomsky,Noam,13 ChristianCoalition,265,267 Cincinnati,Ohio,95,105,107

CivilRightsActof1964,255 civilrightsrevolution,255,256 CivilWar,20–21,63,66,87–90,122, 186;slave-owningclassand,66,87, 88–91,313n74 “classwarfare”(term),13 Cleveland,Grover,146 Clifford,Clark,243,244 Clinton,Bill,258–259,260,266,270, 274,278,282 clubs,social,104,156,198–199 Cohen,Elliot,279 Colby,William,234 ColdWar,4,218,224,233–239,248 colleges,31. Seealso universities colonialera,27–28,29–33;emerging classsystemin,32–33 ColoradoFuelandIronCompany,164 ColumbiaUniversity,225–226,235 CommitteeonthePresentDanger,246, 267 CommonwealthFoundation,167 “concurringmajority,”66,86–87 Confederacy,66,87,89 Congress. See U.S.Congress CongressforCulturalFreedom,267 conservationmovement,189 “conspicuousconsumption,”174 Constitution. See ConstitutionalConvention;U.S.Constitution ConstitutionalConvention,39–45,59–60;elitecompositionof,40 ConsumerFederationofAmerica,263 consumption,30,102,174 Converse,Edmund,155 Converse,Katherine,155 Coolidge,ArchibaldCary,226,227 Cooper,Peter,107–108,109,111,119 corruption,132,161–162,174 cotton,68–70;expandedproductionof,

68–69;andslavelabor,65,68–70,83; andtextileindustry,68,69,83,105, 106,116 CouncilonForeignRelations,226,227–228,229,230,246;criticsof,247;and VietnamWar,241,242 counterrevolution,24–25;againstNew Deal,25,290–291 Crashof1929,11,176–177,213 “creativedestruction,”165 credit-reportingagencies,99,101,108 “Crittendencompromise,”87 “cronycapitalism”(term),2 Cuba,159–160,165,239–240. Seealso BayofPigsinvasion “culturewar,”251

Dahl,Robert,12 Davis,Jefferson,80–81 Davis,Thomas,118 DawesPlan(1924),175 Dean,Arthur,243,244 DeLay,Tom,277 democracy,relationof,torulebyelites, 1–2,18,25,56–57,78,286–292 Democracy (Adams),123–124,125,129 DemocraticLeadershipCouncil,274 DemocraticParty,62,111–112,146,150, 179;inthelatetwentiethcentury,252, 257,258–261,269–270,274,282;and slavery,62,78,83–84,89 departmentstores,102 Depew,Chauncey,139 depressionofthe1930s(GreatDepression),11,22,176–179,184 “depthpsychology,”203 Dew,ThomasRoderick,71 Dietz,RobertEdwin,106 Dillon,Douglas,244 “Dixiecrats,”256

Dolan,Thomas,106 Dole,Bob,260 “dollarayearmen,”170,223 “dollardiplomacy,”161,162–163 Domhoff,William,13 Donnelly,Ignatius,10 Donovan,William“WildBill,”238,239 DosPassos,John,11 DredScott decision,86 Dreiser,Theodore,11,206,208–209 Drury,Samuel,221

DuBois,W.E.B.,8,91,163,227 Dulles,AllenW.,223,229–230,247;as CIAdirector,234,236,239 Dulles,JohnFoster,223,224,229,230, 236,247

Duncredit-reportingagency,99,101, 108

earnedincometaxcredit(EITC),274–276

Edsall,ThomasB.,273 education. See colleges;prepschools; universities Ehrenreich,Barbara,13 Eichelberger,Clark,228 Eisenhower,Dwight,6,24,243,255,283 Eliot,CharlesWilliam,182,192,195–196 elites,152;incolonialera,32–33;in ConstitutionalConvention,40;new, inNewDeal,22–23,179–180. Seealso rulingelites

Emerson,RalphWaldo,83 EmpireStateBuilding,174 “endofideology,”12 Enroncorporation,284 Establishment,foreign-policy,18,23,25, 180,192,217–225;andColdWar,218, 224,233–240,248;declineof,23, 277–280;differenceswithin,224,241–

242,243–244,245–247;educational backgroundsof,219,220,221;and VietnamWar,18,218,220,236,240–245,248–249;andWorldWarI,218, 223,225–226,248;andWorldWarII, 218,223–224,229–230,231–233,248 “Establishment,the”(term),12,217–218 Europe,110,140,150,175. Seealso Britain Everettfamily,117

Fair,James,140 Fairlie,Henry,217–218 Falwell,Jerry,265,267 farmers,35–36,46,50–51,114,141–142. Seealso yeomanry,southernwhite FederalistParty,19–20,45,46–55,57, 104 FederalReservesystem,169–170 FederalTradeCommission,174 Feith,DouglasJ.,279 FightforFreedomCommittee,228 “ﬁnancecapitalism,”152–155. Seealso banksandbankers FirstWorldWar. See WorldWarI FitzGerald,Desmond,222,234,238,240 Fitzgerald,F.Scott,149,173,184,206–207,209–213 Flynn,Andrew,70,74 Foner,Eric,13 Ford,Henry,206 FordFoundation,268 ForeignAffairs, 224,226,227 foreignpolicy,175–176,191–192,219–220,236–238;inthelatetwentieth century,245–247,276–284. Seealso Establishment,foreignpolicy Forrestal,James,234 Fortas,Abe,244 Fosdick,Raymond,151

Foster,JohnWatson,229 foundations,155,167,265,268

Franklin,Benjamin,32 “freesilver,”124–125,157 freetrade,69,280–282 Frémont,JohnC.,120 Frick,Henry,134 fundamentalists,267,279

Gardner,IsabellaStewart,197 Garﬁeld,James,142–143 Garner,Jay,284 GeneralElectric,206 Genovese,Eugene,13 “gentleman’sC,”196 George,Henry,10 GeorgeIII,35–36 Germany,227–228 GildedAgeelite,9–10;agrarianchallengeto,136–141;conﬂictswithin, 124,140–141;andcurrencyissues, 124–125,140–147;entryof,intopoliticalarena,17–18,21,124–125,136, 138–144,145–148,324n2;ideologyof, 124,126–133,148;mobilizationof,in 1896election,146–147;andworkers, 133–136

Gilman,CharlottePerkins,166 Girardfamily,96 globalization,263,282–284 Goffmann,Erving,193 Goldberg,Arthur,244 goldstandard,137,142–144 Goldwater,Barry,256 GoodNeighborPolicy,179 Gore,Al,259,261 Gould,Jay,126,127,132,133,134,137–138

Gramsci,Antonio,162 Grant,Madison,172

GreatBritain. See Britain GreatDepression,11,22,176–179,184 GreatGatsby,The (Fitzgerald),212 GreatWar. See WorldWarI Greeley,Horace,114,118–119 GrotonSchool,182,193–194,216,219, 238. Seealso Peabody,Endicott Guatemala,238 Guggenheimfamily,156

Hall,G.Stanley,203 Halliburtoncorporation,284 Hamilton,Alexander,40,41–42,54,57, 150;economicprogramsof,46,47–50, 51;inﬂuenceof,51–52 Hammond,JamesHenry,69,74 Hampton,Wade,75 Hanna,Mark,146–147,156–157 Harding,WarrenG.,227 Harriman,E.H.,216 Harriman,W.Averell,193–194,216,219, 223,234,277;andIndochinawars, 240,242,243,244 Harrimanfamily,154 Harrington,Michael,13 Harrison,George,231 Hartz,Louis,7 HarvardUniversity,191,195–196,230–231,246;andforeignpolicyEstablishment,219,225–226,234–235,238 Havemeyerfamily,160 Hawley-SmootTariff,178 Hayes,RutherfordB.,142 Helms,Richard,234 Hemingway,Ernest,149 Heyward,Nathaniel,72 Higginson,ThomasWentworth,118 Higginsonfamily,153 HillSchool,219 Hilsman,Roger,239,343n50

Hitler,Adolf,227–228,230

Hofstadter,Richard,7,129,143

Hoover,Herbert,174,177,178,228

HooverInstitution,246 Hopkinsonfamily,105 House,Edward,221–222,224,231,247, 277

houses,30–31,102–103,155–156

Hughes,CharlesEvans,175

Hull,Cordell,280

Humphrey,Hubert,258

Hunt’sMerchant’sMagazine, 91,101, 116

identitypolitics,259,268 immigration,252,259,260–261,263, 273–274;restrictionof,171–172 imperialism,164–165,191–192 insurancecompanies,96 InternationalMonetaryFund,233 InterstateCommerceAct(1887),141 Iran,238 Iraq,279,284 isolationism,227–229 Israel,279,280

IvyLeagueuniversities,234–235. See alsospeciﬁcmemberinstitutions

Jackson,Andrew,5,62

Jackson,Henry“Scoop,”246 Jackson,Jesse,265

Jackson,PatrickTracy,99 James,William,190–191,203 Jay,John,39

JayTreaty(1795),54 Jefferson,Thomas,5,46,49–51,54–55; 1800electionof,55–57,82, seealso Revolutionof1800;aspresident,57–58,59;andslavery,60–61,67 JewishAmericans,182,188,196,259;

discriminationagainst,156,183,198–199

Johnson,Lyndon,255,258,269,270;and VietnamWar,240,243,245 Jones,John,140 Josephson,Matthew,11 JournalofCommerce, 117

Kasson,John,204–205 Kennan,George,222,224,234,242 Kennedy,JohnF.,216,236,239 Kennedyfamily,156 KentuckyResolutions,55 Kettell,ThomasPrentice,83,116 Kidder,Peabody,&Company,160 King,Rufus,43,52 Kipling,Rudyard,159,222 Kissinger,Henry,245–246,278 KnightsofLabor,133,135 Knox,Frank,231 Knox,Philander,158 Kristol,Irving,267 Kristol,William,267

laborrelations,163–165,171. Seealso strikes;unions;workers Lamont,Thomas,155,175 Lansdale,Edward,238 Lansing,Robert,229 Laos,240 Lasch,Christopher,252 LatinAmerica,159–160,164–165. See also Cuba;Mexico;Venezuela Latinos,258,260–261 “leadershipclass,”192–193 Lee,Ivy,167,205 “leisureclass,”10,181 liberalism,261–263 Lincoln,Abraham,5,62,66,87,88 Lindbergh,Charles,229

Lippmann,Walter,161,179,196,226

Livingston,James,146

Lloyd,WilliamDemarest,10

Locke,John,31

Lodge,HenryCabot,165,175,192,226 Lodge,HenryCabot(grandson),240, 242

London,Jack,11

Long,Huey,270

Long,Russell,275

Longworth,Nicholas,231

Lott,Trent,257

LouisianaPurchase,59

Lovett,RobertA.,216–217,219,231, 234,243,244

Lovett,RobertS.,216

Lowell,AbbottLawrence,196 Lowell,JamesRussell,118

Lowell,John,102

Lowellfamily,100 LudlowMassacre,164,167

Lundberg,Ferdinand,11

Madison,James,46,48,49–51,52–55,61; andtheConstitution,41,42–43,52–53,54–55

Mahan,AlfredThayer,191–192 “managerialrevolution,”151–152,189 ManhattanProject,231–232 manufacturers,antebellum,105–110,141; andmercantileelite,106–110,113–114, 120;andpolitics,109–110;andslavery, 118–120

MaoZedong,239 marriages,99,154–155 MarshallPlan,234 masculinity,158,191–192. Seealso “MuscularChristianity” McCarthy,Joseph,222 McCloy,JohnJ.,223,231,232,233,234,

241–242;andVietnamWar,241–242, 243,244

McCord,Louisa,79 McCormickfamily,154 McIntosh,Ebenezer,34,35 McKinley,William,146–147,156–157 McNamara,Robert,244,245 McNaughton,John,244 Means,Gardiner,11,173 Mellon,Andrew,164,166,174,177 Mellon,NoraMcMullen,164,166 MenandReligionForwardmovement, 187 mercantileelite,93,94–98;ascoreof antebellumnorthernelite,94–95;differencesof,fromartisans-turnedmanufacturers,106–110,112–114,121; investmentsby,inmanufacturing,56, 96,106;andlowerclasses,17,110, 121;networkswithin,98–105;political powerof,104–105,109–110,111–112; andslavery,114–118;womenin,99–100,101,102 Mexico,165 Meyer,Cord,219,234 MiddleEast,220,242,279–280,283 “middlingsort,”34,37,56,58–59,63 migration,internal,251–252,261,268–270

“military-industrialcomplex,”6,283 “Millionaires’Club”(U.S.Senate),161 Mills,C.Wright,11–12 minimumwage,274–275 MissouriCompromise,59–61 Monroe,James,61 Moody,Dwight,152–153 MoralMajority,265,267 Morgan,J.Pierpont,143,147,155–156, 160,199;powerwieldedby,21,152, 153,158,170

Morgan,JuniusS.,136 Morganfamily,96,154 Morris,Gouverneur,43 Morrisfamily,105 movies,183

Moynihan,DanielPatrick,264 Munichagreement(1938),230 Munnv.Illinois, 138,139 Murdoch,Rupert,279 “MuscularChristianity,”186–187,188, 195,240 MuseumofModernArt,174,197 museums,110–111,197. Seealso Museum ofModernArt

Nader,Ralph,263

NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople(NAACP), 163

NationalAssociationofManufacturers (NAM),171–172

NationalBureauofEconomicResearch, 173

NationalChildLaborCommittee,168 NationalCivicFederation,167 NationalConsumersLeague,168 NationalEndowmentfortheArts,271 NationalEndowmentfortheHumanities,271

NationalIndustrialConferenceBoard,173 NationalLaborRelationsAct,272 nationalupperclass,1896–1932,150–161, 169–170,174–175,218–219;changing imagesof,183–184,203–213;conﬂicts within,165–166;criticsof,161–163, 166,178–179,181–182,185–186;ethnic compositionof,156,172,198;ﬁctional portrayalsof,182,183,184,198–199, 206–213;institutionsfundedby,155, 167–168,174,197–198;andlabor, 163–165,171;in1920s,171–178;in

1930s,178–180,184–185,213–214;and overseasexpansion,158–161,162–163, 164–165,175,179,192;andpolitical power,149–150,156–158,174–175, 179–180,199;andreform,167–171; revitalizationof,21–22,182–193,203–214;womenin,166,168,171,183, 196–198 NationalWomen’sTradeUnionLeague, 168 NativeAmericans,204 NATO(NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization),234,241 Nazi-Sovietpact(1939),229 neighborhoods,100–101,108 “neoconservatives,”251,266–267,268, 278–279;andforeignpolicy,220,246, 279–280 “neoliberalism,”274–275 neutralitylaws,227,228,230 Newby,Harriet,71 “newclass,”181–182 NewDeal,188,213–214,254–255,289–290;andthearts,271,272;counterrevolutionagainst,25,290–291;new elitesand,22–23,179–180;inSouth andWest,254–255,257,268,285 NewDealcoalition,250,254–255,256, 259,269,272;destructionof,24,256, 272;southerneliteaspartof,23–24, 254–256,285 “NewFreedom,”169 “NewNationalism,”168–169 Newport,R.I.,35,95 NewYork,N.Y.,33,83,135–136;manufacturersin,106,107,108–109;mercantileelitein,95,96,100,103,104, 105;museumsin,110–111,197;politicalpowerin,105,111–112 NewYorkHerald, 102,110 NewYorkJournalofCommerce, 115

NewYorkMechanics’Institute,109 NewYorkTimes, 125,176

NewYorkTribune, 114

NewYorkUnionClub,104,112 Nitze,Paul,225 Nixon,Richard,245,255,256,269,278

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO),234,241 NorthCarolina,27,36,67,82 NorthernSecuritiescase,157–158 NorthwestOrdinance(1787),42 NyeCommittee,179

OfﬁceofStrategicServices(OSS),234, 238 oilindustry,283–284 OlinFoundation,268 Olmsted,FrederickLaw,76 Opdyke,George,119–120 “overclass,”262–263

PACs(politicalactioncommittees),272–273

Palfrey,JohnGorham,64–65 PanamaCanal,165

Panicof1907(“RichMan’sPanic”),153, 158,177–178

Pareto,Vilfredo,224 Parrington,Vernon,7 parties,political,78;originsof,in1790s, 52–56;weakeningof,inlatenineteenthcentury,263–266,270. Seealso DemocraticParty;FederalistParty; RepublicanParty;WhigParty “paternalism,”73 patriarchalvalues,158. Seealso masculinity

Payne,Henry,140,141 Peabody,Endicott,182,193,194,213–214,221,240

Peabody,Joseph,96

Peabodyfamily,100,153 Pell,Herbert,165 PennsylvaniaRailroadCompany,135, 140–141 People’sParty,21,145–146 Pepperfamily,96 Perkins,George,169 Perloff,James,247 Perot,H.Ross,264 Philadelphia,Pa.,33,153–154;manufacturersin,105,107;mercantileelitein, 10,94–95,103,104 PhiladelphiaClub,104 philanthropy,178,206 Philippines,159,160,238 Phillips,Kevin,13,14 Phillips,William,188 PhillipsAndoverAcademy,193,219,231 PhillipsExeterAcademy,193,194,200 Pinchot,Gifford,188,215 Pinckney,Charles,43,44 planters. See slave-owningclass Podhoretz,Norman,279 politicalactioncommittees(PACs),272–273 politicalparties. See parties,political populationshift,268–269;andpolitical power,251–252,261,268–270 Populists,21,25,145–146 Portsmouth,N.H.,95 Post,Emily,156 Potter,David,7–8 Powderly,Terence,135 Powell,Colin,279 PowerElite,The (Mills),12 prepschools,183,193–195,221. Seealso GrotonSchool;PhillipsAndover Academy;PhillipsExeterAcademy; St.Paul’sSchool PrincetonUniversity,219,234–235 privateschools. See prepschools

professionals,31,168,179–180,262 ProgressiveParty,168–169,188 protectionism,69,109. Seealso tariffs Protestants,73,265–266,267,279. See also “MuscularChristianity” Providence,R.I.,105,106,108,109,117, 118 psychology,203 publicdebt,47–48,51 publicrelationsindustry,182,205–206 PujoCommittee,161

QuietAmerican,The (Greene),238 racialpreferences,258–259 racism,91,171–172,198,222,268. See also slavery railroads,105;conﬂictsoverregulation of,124,137–141;strikeof1877 against,133 Raskob,JohnJ.,174

Reagan,Ronald,247,255–256,269,273, 276,278,290 realestate,96

ReconstructionFinanceCorporation (RFC),177 Reinsch,Paul,163

RepublicanParty,13,150,157;inthelate twentiethcentury,250–251,252,257, 283–284,285;originsof,13,63,88, 89–90,117–119

Republicans,Jeffersonian,52–55,58–59, 60. Seealso Revolutionof1800 resorts,197–198 RevolutionaryWar,36,37–38 Revolutionof1800,55–59,61–62,63 Rhodes,Cecil,192 rice,33,67,69

“RichMan’sPanic”(Panicof1907),153, 158,177–178

Riesman,David,12 righttovote(suffrage),56,78,84 Riis,Jacob,188

RobberBarons,The (Josephson),11 Robertson,Pat,265,267,285 Rochester,N.Y.,100–101,109,111 Rockefeller,AbbyAldrich,154,168,171, 174,197 Rockefeller,David,154,244 Rockefeller,JohnD.,127,132,134,151, 170–171,185;explanationsgivenby, forhissuccess,127,131–132;andnationalpoliticalissues,141,147 Rockefeller,JohnD.,Jr.,154 Rockefeller,Nelson,223,246 Rockefellerfamily,154,167 RockefellerFoundation,155,167,268 Roosevelt,FranklinD.,179,184,213–214;andforeign-policyEstablishment, 233,247;andnationalupperclass,6, 22,213–214,230–231,289–290;and NewDeal,254,269,289–290;and WorldWarII,223,228,231 Roosevelt,Kermit,238 Roosevelt,Theodore,183,200,207,215–216,231,289;andforeignpolicy,160, 224;andJ.P.MorganinPanicof 1907,158,177–178;meritocraticbeliefsof,182,188;asreformer,5,157–158,162,168–169,188–189,223,289; andupper-classrevitalization183, 187–190,191–192,203 Root,Elihu,158,215,227;andforeignpolicyEstablishment,218,221,223, 224 Rostow,Walt,245 Rovere,Richard,218 Rubin,Robert,282 “rulingclass”(term),1,11,12,149–150, 156

rulingelites:criticsof,9,10–12,21;and democracy,1–2,18,25,286–292;and economicchange,2,19,20–21;instabilityof,1–2,14–26;scholarsand,2–14. Seealso Establishment,foreignpolicy;GildedAgeelite;mercantile elite;nationalupperclass,1896–1932; slave-owningclass;southern–SunBelt elite

Russell,CharlesEdward,11 RussellSageFoundation,155,167

Rustin,Bayard,258

St.Paul’sSchool,219,221 Salem,Mass.,95,96,99

Sandow,Eugene,204

Scarborough,William,72 Schacht,Hjalmar,175 Schifffamily,156

Schlesinger,Arthur,Jr.,7 Schumpeter,Joseph,165 scientiﬁcmanagement,200 Scott,Thomas,135

Scudder,Myron,187 SecondWorldWar. See WorldWarII Sedgwick,Ellery,194 Sedgwick,HenryDwight,156 SeditionAct(1898),54,55 “separatespheres,”166 servants,103 Sharpton,Al,265

Shays’srebellion,39 Sherman,Isaac,120 Sherman,John,145 ShermanAntitrustAct(1890),144,145, 158

SilverPurchaseAct(1890),143,144,145, 146

Sinclair,Upton,11 Singer,Isaac,106–107

SkullandBones,219 Slater,Samuel,106 slave-owningclass,56,66–73,93;and CivilWar,66,87,88–91,313n74;in colonialera,32–33;diversitywithin, 72–73;expansionof,afterAmerican Revolution,65–66,68–70,85;and non–slave-owningwhites,75–78;politicalpowerof,64–65,66,67,72,78–79,81–88;powerof,overslaves,73–76;sizeof,67,68 slavery,36,73,130;declineof,inthe North,42–43;justiﬁcationsfor,79–81; andnorthernbusinessmen,83,93, 114–118;andU.S.Constitution,81–82. Seealso slave-owningclass;slaves slaves,69,73–75;forcedmigrationof, 70–71;numbersof,67,70;pricesfor, 71–72;revoltsby,75;slaveowners’ powerover,73–76 Smith,Adam,49,148 Smith,Al,174 Smith,Melancton,43–44,53 Smith-RichardsonFoundation,268 socialclubs,104,156,198–199 socialDarwinism,21,159,289,325n15. Seealso Spencer,Herbert “socialhistoryrevolution,”3–4 socialists,162,266–267 SocialRegister,The, 152 SocialSecuritytax,276 SomersetClub(Boston),104 SonsofLiberty,34,35 Sorensen,Theodore,236 South,the:inthecolonialera,27,30,31, 32–33;yeomanryin,beforeCivilWar, 76–78.Seealsoslave-owningclass; slavery;slaves;southern–SunBelt elite “southernstrategy,”257

southern–SunBeltelite,251,281;electoralsupportfor,256–257,259–261; andglobalization,280–281;andlabor,274,275–276;andNewDeallegacy,254–256,285;andpopulation shifts,251–252,268–270;riseof,to nationalpower,23–24,253–254,270–277

SovietUnion,224,228,233,237,238 Spanish-AmericanWar,158 SpecialConferenceCommittee,173 Spencer,Herbert,124,127–128,129–131, 133,148,326n32 sports,192 StampActCrisis,34–35 StandardOilCompany,132,140,141, 147,151,206 Stanford,Leland,140 states’rights,54–55 Steffens,Lincoln,162 Steinwayfamily,100 Stephens,Alexander,89 Stevens,JohnA.,118 Stewart,AlexanderT.,102 Stimson,HenryLewis,188,215–216;and foreign-policyEstablishment,217, 219,221,223;andWorldWarII,231, 232 stockmarketcrashof1929,11,176–177, 213

Stoddard,Lothrop,172 Stowe,HarrietBeecher,79 Straus,Oscar,188 strikes,111,133–136,164 Strong,Benjamin,154–155,175 Strong,GeorgeT.,108 Stuart,R.Douglas,Jr.,229 suffrage,56,78,84 sugar,69

Sumner,WilliamGraham,9–10 “survivaloftheﬁttest,”130,144–145

Swope,Gerald,206 System magazine,205

Taft,WilliamHoward,158,159,160–161, 168,171

Tallmadge,James,Jr.,60 Tappan,Arthur,118 Tappan,Lewis,118 tariffs,120,141–142,175,178,280 Tarzanbooks,205 taxation,13,274–277 Taylor,FrederickWinslow,200–203 Taylor,Maxwell,242 Taylor,Moses,102 Teagle,Walter,206 TeapotDomescandal,174 temperance,109 TennesseeCoalandIronCompany,153, 158 Tetoffensive,244–245 Texeira,Ruy,260 textileindustry,69,105,106,117;and slavery,68–69,83 Thurmond,Strom,256,257 Timrod,Henry,88 tobacco,33,67,69 Tocqueville,Alexisde,288 TonkinGulfResolution,241 travel,102,176 TriangleShirtwaistCompanyﬁre,164 TrilateralCommission,247 Truman,HarryS.,232,234,256 Twain,Mark,161

UncleTom’sCabin(Stowe),79 UnionClub(NewYork),104,112 unions,111–112,164,171–172,202–203; weakeningof,252,272–274 UnitedNations,233 UnitedStatesSteelCorporation,151, 153,158,168

universities,267–268;admissionspolicies of,182,183,195–196;andforeign-policyEstablishment,219,225–226,234–235. Seealsospeciﬁcuniversities UniversityofChicago,226

U.S.BusinessandIndustrialCouncil,281

U.S.Congress,82–83,139–140,161,227, 255;representationin,43,81–82

U.S.Constitution,6,25,213;ratiﬁcation of,44–46;andslavery,42–43,57,81–82,87;“strictconstruction”of,52–53. Seealso ConstitutionalConvention

U.S.SupremeCourt,138,139,258

VanBuren,Martin,62,85 Vandenberg,Arthur,235 VanityFair, 176 Veblen,Thorstein,10,166,181–182,186 Venezuela,165

VietnamWar,236–237,240–241,244–245,248–249;foreign-policyEstablishmentand,18,218,220,237,240–245,248–249

Virginian,The (Wister),190 VirginiaResolutions(1798),55

Walker,David,75 Wall,Berry,186 Wallace,George,250,272 Warof1812,113

Washington,BookerT.,188 Washington,George,5,40,54,67 WashingtonNavalConference(1921–1922),175 Websterfamily,117 Wecter,Dixton,154,155 “welfarecapitalism,”173–174,178 West,the,189–190,268–269. Seealso southern–SunBeltelite Westinghouse,George,206 Wharton,Edith,154,206,207–208

Wharton,Edward,198 Wharton,Robert,105 Whartonfamily,100,105,153,198 Wheeler,Earle,244,245 WhigParty,78,104,115;andslavery,78, 83,84,117 WhiskeyRebellion,54 White,WilliamAllen,228 “whiteman’sburden,”159 Whitney,Gertrude,197 Who’sWho, 152 Wilentz,Sean,114 WilmotProviso,82–83 Wilson,James,40,44 Wilson,Woodrow,199,224;asreformer, 5,169;andWorldWarI,225,226,248 Winchell,Walter,206 Winks,Robin,234–235 Winthropfamily,117 “WiseMen,”242–245 Wisner,Frank,234 Wister,Owen,190 Wolfowitz,Paul,279 women:inmercantileelite,99–100,101, 102;innationalupperclass,166,168, 171,183,196–198;andreformmovements,168;“separatespheres”for,166 Women’sInternationalLeagueforPeace andFreedom,163 Wood,RobertE.,229 Woolsey,James,279 workers,162,263,287–288;inantebellumNorth,93,106,111–112;and GildedAgeelite,133–136. Seealso strikes;unions workingclass,93,185,272. Seealso workers workingmen’sparties,136 WorksProgressAdministration(WPA), 271 WorldBank,233

world’sfairs,159

World’sWork, 158,159

WorldWarI,160,163,170–171,179;foreignpolicyEstablishmentand,218, 223,225–226,248

WorldWarII,218,223,228

YaleUniversity,219,231;andforeignpolicyEstablishment,216,219,226, 227,234–235,238 yeomanry,southernwhite,76–77;and slavery,75–76,77–78 YoungPlan(1929),175