The Marriage of Thought and Action: A Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer
by
Madeline Jeanne Levy
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Religion.
Whitman College 2015
Certificate of Approval
This is to certify that the accompanying thesis by Madeline Jeanne Levy has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Religion.
Whitman College May 13, 2015
Dr. Walter E. Wyman, Jr.
Chapter I: Introduction
One of the most influential Christian thinkers to emerge from Germany in the early 1900’s, Dietrich Bonhoeffer has captured the attention of many both for his thought and his actions. Bonhoeffer, a twentieth century German Protestant theologian and pastor, was an active preacher throughout Europe, a leader in the ecumenical movement, and eventually a conspirator in a resistance movement which made several attempts to assassinate Hitler. Although he produced compelling works and enduring theology, it is arguable whether or not Bonhoeffer would be so famous and so beloved if he had not been killed for his active resistance against the Third Reich. Indeed, it is this biographical detail that leads me to my study. I ask: How does a theologian like Dietrich Bonhoeffer become active in political resistance even to the point of tyrannicide? Is such a political decision a departure from his early theology? I argue that his choice to become active in resistance is not a departure from his early theology, rather that his early theology obligates his political involvement.
The majority of Bonhoeffer scholarship revolves around either his later life only or the continuity, or lack thereof, between his early and late thought, in particular whether the concept of “religionless Christianity” has any grounding in his earlier theology. Although his decision to take part in the plot to assassinate Hitler always elicits a degree of fascination, few thinkers seriously treat the topic of whether it is supported in his early theology. Those that do categorize it as a shift from peaceoriented thought to violent action. Two of the most recent, prominent people
ruminating on this subject are David M. Gides 1 and Clifford J. Green, 2 with Larry L. Rasmussen 3 contributing greatly to the discussion, albeit removed from the peace angle. 4
For all three thinkers, the first question that inevitably emerges is whether one can identify Bonhoeffer as a pacifist. There is no question that he valued peace at varying levels and points in his life. As Gides and Green point out, however, pacifism connotes a total commitment to peace and non-violence regardless of circumstance. Both argue that it is therefore unfair to categorize Bonhoeffer as a pacifist. Gides goes into depth, explaining that attempting to use the “Definition of Pacifism Approach” 5 results in incorrect assumptions about the course of Bonhoeffer’s thought and in inappropriate uses of the word “pacifism.” It is in his rejection of this approach that Gides formulates his solution to the problem through his method, to be discussed later. In essence, Gides skirts these issues with the term “pacifism” by using different categories of measurement while still including pacifism in a triad with just war and tyrannicide. Green, on the other hand, rejects the term “pacifism” altogether, arguing
1 David M. Gides, Pacifism, Just War, and Tyrannicide: Bonhoeffer’s Church-World Theology and his Changing Forms of Political Thinking and Involvement, (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011).
2 Clifford J. Green, “Pacifism and Tyrannicide: Bonhoeffer’s Christian Peace Ethic,” Studies in Christian Ethics 18, no. 3 (December 2005): 31-47, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed November 20, 2014.
Of Green’s work, I cite only the article above in this work, however, he discusses similar ideas in his book Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, pages 304-321.
3 Larry L. Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality and Resistance, (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
4 Rasmussen discusses in depth Bonhoeffer’s decision to attempt tyrannicide and its consistency with his earlier thought. He does not identify this with regards to any earlier commitment to peace, thus differing from Gides and Green. Rather, he frames the journey in terms of an ethic of resistance. I choose to include him in this discussion because his method, his conclusions, and the essence of his question inform and engage with the other two thinkers. In fact, it is for these reasons that I focus on all three thinkers (Gides, Green, and Rasmussen) over the many other scholars of Bonhoeffer.
5 Gides, 16.
for an understanding of Bonhoeffer’s “theological peace ethic.” 6 A large part of Green’s distinction lies in the fact that he sees Bonhoeffer as rejecting a system of principles that pacifism necessarily implies. 7 Rasmussen completely discards the term “pacifism,” instead framing the journey in terms of an ethic of resistance, while focusing on similar issues as Gides and Green.
The next issue that arises in all three works is how to categorize the predominant mode of thought that motivated Bonhoeffer to become politically involved. The predominant approach is through Christology and ethics, as evidenced primarily by Rasmussen. He states that, “Bonhoeffer’s resistance was the existential playing out of christological themes. . . . The priority must be given to Christology as the point of departure.” 8 Here, he clearly states that, in his approach, it is Christology that guides his understanding of Bonhoeffer’s theological base for action. For Rasmussen, crucial to Bonhoeffer’s resistance was a centrality of Christ to reality and thought as well as the notion of Christ as a “Man for Others.” 9 In this way, Rasmussen connects Christ to ethics of resistance. Similarly, Green places a great deal of importance on Christology, but he also links it to ecclesiology, or as he puts it, “[Bonhoeffer’s peace ethic] is inseparable from his way of reading the New Testament . . . his Christology and his understanding of discipleship, and for him it belongs to the essence of the gospel and the church.” 10 Here, we see that Green links several pieces of Bonhoeffer’s thought together, perhaps leaning toward a more varied approach to his influences. Gides picks up on the notion of church as crucial to this discussion and
6 Green, 33.
7 Ibid. 44.
8 Rasmussen, 15.
9 Ibid.
10 Green, 33.
focuses his work there. A key part of Gides’ argument is framed in opposing a purely Christological and/or ethical understanding of Bonhoeffer’s shift(s). He argues that there is an appropriate category by which to view Bonhoeffer’s life but that those are not it. This is what Gides calls the weakness of the “Theological Categories in Context Approach.” 11 One has to discern what category is significant. He claims that while Christology and ethics are important for understanding Bonhoeffer, they are not the best categories in which to understand the shift to tyrannicide. For Gides, Christology and ethics do not directly connect to political action. It is for this reason that he takes up the Church-world relationship as the theme and indicator of Bonhoeffer’s thought throughout his life. Gides splits Bonhoeffer’s thought into four phases, each with its own specific understanding of the correct role and intersection of Church and world, or ecclesiology. Through this theme, Gides identifies four distinct understandings of peace and violent resistance. 12 Gides formulates these phases in terms of political involvement, not just violent action. From each of these three thinkers, it is clear that there are several different yet related approaches available here.
All three more or less agree that Bonhoeffer’s thought cannot be explained as an unchanging entity. Instead, it is a fluid body of work. I use the descriptor fluid to intentionally evoke the idea of a moving, living entity that is able to respond to historical and biographical circumstances. Although it is changing, it is important for Gides, Green, Rasmussen, and me that one also recognizes the continuity of Bonhoeffer’s thought in certain ways. He is the same person with some of the same fundamental ideals, although everything is subject to subtle change throughout time.
11 Gides, 19.
12 Ibid. 35-40.
Rasmussen shows this in his indication that there were “changes and shifts in the character of his Christology [that] were at the same time changes and shifts in the character of his resistance.” 13 In this way, we see that Rasmussen understands Bonhoeffer’s notions of Christology and resistance as fluid, while they maintain a relationship to each other throughout. Similarly, Gides shows a fluidity of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the Church-world association and a constant correlation between this and Bonhoeffer’s political involvement. This is evident as he divides Bonhoeffer’s thought into four distinct phases with a common theme. Green supports this notion of fluidity in a more subtle way. This manifests itself in Green’s notion of Bonhoeffer’s distaste for principles. For Green, principles indicate a universal, eternal demand for obedience, which he sees as contrary to Bonhoeffer’s project. He perceives an aversion to such unchanging ideas in Bonhoeffer’s work. 14 For all three, having this understanding of Bonhoeffer’s thought allows them to argue against seeing a break in Bonhoeffer’s theology.
Throughout their works, Gides, Green, and Rasmussen use a few primary sources often while others are virtually ignored. All three thinkers examine Letters and Papers from Prison and Ethics. The Cost of Discipleship appears in various forms. Sanctorum Communio emerges in all, especially in Green’s work on sociality. Although Gides, in his chronological approach, does touch on most everything Bonhoeffer wrote, even he speeds over Creation and Fall. Rasmussen does not cite it at all in his book. This work seems to receive little to no attention in these discussions,
13 Rasmussen, 15.
14 Green, 44.
although it develops ideas of freedom and living for others that Green, for one, explicitly mentions as key concepts for Bonhoeffer’s actions. 15
Another important, but categorically different, secondary source in recent Bonhoeffer scholarship is Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking. 16 In it, co-authors Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel claim that Bonhoeffer did not actually participate in the attempted tyrannicide. Nation in particular argues from a Mennonite or Anabaptist point of view, providing him with a strongly pacifist agenda. He clearly wants to claim Bonhoeffer as a pacifist, although even for him, the definition of pacifism is unclear. The authors of Bonhoeffer the Assassin? argue their point by examining Bonhoeffer’s biography as well as his ethical theology, based on lectures from Barcelona, Ethics, and The Cost of Discipleship. According to them, Bonhoeffer had an ethic throughout his life that supported peace, and, for that reason, he could not have been involved in assassination attempts.
Although I join the existing Bonhoeffer scholarship by investigating the continuity of Bonhoeffer’s theology and its influence on his political actions, with my work, I contribute something new to this discussion in several ways. The first of these is in the categorization of Bonhoeffer’s predominant motivating mode of thought. I approach the consistency of Bonhoeffer’s theology and actions primarily from the angle of Bonhoeffer’s theology of creation. Although Christology plays a crucial role in his thought, I argue that the key reasons Christology is important stem from his
15 Ibid. 43.
16 Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel, Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013).
exegesis of creation. Bonhoeffer’s Christology does influence his decision, but the aspects of it that are influential are taken from creation. Likewise, I do not believe that ecclesiology is the predominant mode of thought inspiring Bonhoeffer to resist. Instead, I see the part of his ecclesiology that relates to political theory as remaining constant, while his understanding of his own place within that changes. For this reason, I see Bonhoeffer’s political thought as at first precluding his political involvement and then allowing it but never causing it. In this way, I propose a new way of looking at Bonhoeffer’s motivation: theology of creation. 17
I also contribute something new to Bonhoeffer scholarship by doing a close study of Bonhoeffer’s exegesis of Genesis chapters one through three: Creation and Fall. I think that this adds to existing Bonhoeffer literature, as no work has seriously undertaken it or based their primary argument on it. I, however, find crucial theological concepts rooted in Creation and Fall that continue to Bonhoeffer’s later works. For this reason, I think it is appropriate to fill this noticeable gap in the scholarship. I will discuss my justification for using this work more in depth later.
Finally, I differ from and add to the existing discussion by examining Bonhoeffer’s political actions separate from his concept of peace. Instead, I formulate my argument in terms of theological cause and political effect. By focusing on the category of political action instead of peace versus violence, I can track a theological consistency and a personal shift without falling into the pit of defining pacifism. Based
17 To an extent, my tactic is comparable with what Gides calls the Theological Categories in Context Approach, which he uses in his study. He explains that, “The Theological Categories in Context Approach involves connecting a theological category in Bonhoeffer’s thinking with his activity and then gauging overall continuity or discontinuity,” in addition to examining his overall situation in the world. In this sense, I too am using this approach. I choose, however, a different category to trace: freedom instead of Church-world relationship. See Gides, 371-372.
7
on the theological foundation found in Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer takes part in resistance. The secondary material makes it clear that Bonhoeffer’s relationship with peace is complicated and his understanding of principles is even more so. Based on that, I defend the position that Bonhoeffer’s attitude toward peace is not of central importance when deciding to be a political resistor. What is most important is his theology of creation, specifically the notion of freedom.
I argue that although the focus of Bonhoeffer’s theology shifts from theoretical to realistic, the underlying foundation of freedom remains the same, which is significant because it is this concept that supports and even obligates his political involvement in resistance. Despite having a consistent theology, Bonhoeffer does not become immediately involved in the 1930’s because of his self-identification within the church, which changes by the 1940’s. Thus, as a result of changing selfidentification, shifting theological focus, and consistent theological foundation, Bonhoeffer becomes involved in attempted tyrannicide.
My methodology for this study is historical theology, in the sense that my main approach is analyzing Bonhoeffer’s theological works. I do hermeneutical work on Bonhoeffer’s theology, simultaneously examining his biographical and historical situation. This allows me to look primarily at his theology, while contextualizing it within his life. I believe that this is the most appropriate method, because it combines his biography and theology. Bonhoeffer had his roots in theology and, I argue, maintained that identity his entire life. Thought and reflection were always important to him, as evidenced by his continued theological works and his comments in his letters
from prison. In this respect, understanding his theology is essential to understanding Bonhoeffer. 18
The main works that I discuss are Bonhoeffer’s “The Church and the Jewish Question,” Creation and Fall, Ethics, and Letters and Papers from Prison. I will provide a more detailed biography of Bonhoeffer’s whole life in the next chapter, but here I will introduce the works I will use. Bonhoeffer finished his essay, “The Church and the Jewish Question” on April 15, 1933. He wrote it as a response to Hitler’s issuing of the Aryan Paragraph, one in a series of laws persecuting Jews and other minorities. The Aryan Paragraph, which took effect in its initial form on April 7, 1933, mandated that only those of the Aryan race could hold certain professions and be part of certain organizations. Among those jobs were clergy members and leaders of the church, and among those organizations was the church. This raised the question of the membership and leadership of baptized Jews, as well as general qualms about the state dictating the church’s membership. Although Bonhoeffer opposed Hitler’s previous attempts to control German life, the Aryan Paragraph necessitated an immediate response, as it affected Bonhoeffer’s own institution: the church. Bonhoeffer had colleagues who were both pastors and Jewish converts to Christianity. According to the Aryan Paragraph, they could neither hold their jobs nor be laymen in the church. This struck a nerve with Bonhoeffer, as he believed that only their faith in Christ should determine their participation in the church. Not only did Bonhoeffer have a social stake in the matter, he also objected on principle to the state’s intervention in the church’s
18 I am not alone in this assessment. In his conclusion, Gides writes, “For Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the consistency between his actions and his thought lends validity to both and thus defines him as an exemplary thinker and person.” As Gides shows, it is not uncommon to seek and find a connection between Bonhoeffer’s thought and action. In fact, it is precisely this connection that makes Bonhoeffer noteworthy. See Gides, 375.
business. It is the latter objection that he raises in “The Church and the Jewish Question.” I use this essay to examine Bonhoeffer’s understanding of political action early in his life: who can act when and how.
Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3 began as a series of lectures in the winter of 1932 to 1933, given at the University of Berlin. After pressure from his students, Bonhoeffer had the lectures published by the end of the year. In Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer interprets each verse of Genesis chapters one through three as he sees it being relevant to his contemporaries. It is essential to note that he reads Genesis as it applies to the present. Bonhoeffer rejects the notion of a single meaning, defined by the biblical author, rather he sees a meaning that changes generation to generation, a text that provides a meaning based on the situation. As such, when he explores the obvious topics of evil, sin, human nature, and nothingness and uses them to show his own focuses on freedom, creatureliness, and living for others, he does so with the contemporary world in mind. With Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer writes a constructive theological interpretation of Genesis. By virtue of its methodology, the theological conclusions Bonhoeffer draws become applicable to and useful for approaching his life and works. Although Creation and Fall receives little attention from Bonhoeffer scholars, it is a thorough, thoughtful exegesis of Creation that reflects on those fundamentals in light of the present.
As I discussed earlier, I think it is relevant to study because of Bonhoeffer’s identity as a theologian. Moreover, I think that it is relevant precisely because of Bonhoeffer’s methodology, his understanding of the text speaking to contemporary audiences. He takes a biblical text and shows what is important for the present world.
Bonhoeffer’s exegesis is not a superfluous, disconnected analysis of Genesis; it is an interpretation for the times. This approach to biblical text perhaps stems from Karl Barth’s influence, whose relationship with Bonhoeffer I will discuss later. Barth writes The Epistle to the Romans using a similar methodology. In his preface to the first edition, he states, “If we rightly understand ourselves, our problems are the problems of Paul; and if we be enlightened by the brightness of his answers, those answers must be ours.” 19 For Barth, the biblical text, when interpreted correctly, is directly relevant for one’s life in the present. It is this sentiment with which Bonhoeffer agrees, as evidenced by his writing Creation and Fall following that methodology. 20 For that reason, Creation and Fall is applicable in an analysis of Bonhoeffer’s theological foundation. Additionally, as an analysis of the religious understanding of the beginning of the world, Creation and Fall presents Bonhoeffer’s perspective on some fundamental questions regarding the nature of humanity, God, and the divine-human relationship. 21
The next work I examine is Ethics. Ethics is, as the title would suggest, an ethic. Unfinished at the time of his death, Bonhoeffer worked on it in pieces during his time in Tegel prison between 1943 and 1945. He wrote to Bethge about his ideas and sent him sections, and it is in this way that the book came to be. Although Bonhoeffer never completed Ethics, it stands as a significant work of his, as it deals with serious
19 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, (Oxford University Press: London, 1968), 1.
20 Gides supports this comparison, writing that Creation and Fall “the work marks Bonhoeffer’s developing sense of commitment to the Bible as the source of God’s authoritative Word. In the general spirit of Barth’s Epistle to the Romans, Bonhoeffer was not much concerned with theories about the derivation of scriptural texts. Rather, he was interested in what the texts say to the church in its situation today.” See Gides, 179.
21 Gides also adds that Creation and Fall is worth noting for “Bonhoeffer’s explicit choice of an Old Testament text for exegesis, implying that the Word of God spoke equally in both testaments, stood in direct opposition to the anti-Judaic trends in his church at the time.” See Gides, 179.
issues that he had explored throughout his life. I pull passages from Ethics that specifically speak to freedom and responsibility and that, thus, show theological continuity between it and Creation and Fall. I find that my use of Ethics is justified, because, as a work he undertook at the end of his life, it explores ideas that are important and pressing to him while in prison. It remains a central piece of his works. Ethics is significant as his last serious theological work. At heart, an ethical theology, it essentially attempts to suggest what living in the future after Nazism should look like. Ethics is also important, as Bonhoeffer wrote its fragments after he had become involved in active resistance to the Hitler regime, and, for that reason, it gives us a glimpse into his mind after his decision to partake in political actions.
Lastly, I explore his, arguably, most famous work: Letters and Papers from Prison. Letters and Papers from Prison is a compilation of various documents written by Bonhoeffer in prison and sent to Bethge and family members. The first letter is dated April 11, 1943, and the last February 28, 1945. Because of its gripping circumstances and evocative ideas, Letters and Papers from Prison has reached and fascinated people in a variety of situations and places. It is problematic due to the fact that the ideas are not necessarily completely fleshed out or defined. This work has several purposes in my project. First, it acts as the culminating piece in my argument that the theological foundation of freedom continues throughout Bonhoeffer’s life, influencing his actions based on his concepts of being for others and responsibility. As such, it shows a connection between Bonhoeffer’s early theology and his later thoughts and actions. Second, the work, along with Ethics, serves to bookend the political theory found in “The Church and the Jewish Question.” The justification for using Letters and
Papers from Prison is simple: it addresses Bonhoeffer’s theology while simultaneously giving the reader a glimpse into what occupied his mind during his time in prison. As with Ethics, this work is written after he has decided to participate in resistance, and, as such, it allows us to see what concepts are most immediately on Bonhoeffer’s mind after the failed attempt on Hitler’s life. In this study, I connect ideas that run through these works and investigating how they effect Bonhoeffer’s decision to become politically active in a resistance movement involved in attempted tyrannicide.
I begin in Chapter two by giving a short biography of Bonhoeffer’s life, essentially attempting to answer the question: how does a theologian like Bonhoeffer end up in active political resistance? Then, in Chapter three, I move to my analysis of “The Church and the Jewish Question,” in order to show that Bonhoeffer defends the necessity of the separation of church and state and his self-identification as a member of the institution of the church. Next, with Chapter four, I begin the heart of my argument: the theological foundation that obligates Bonhoeffer’s involvement. In Creation and Fall, I identify the notion of freedom as key, and subsequently the ideas of being for others and responsibility. I show that these ideas continue to be present and significant in Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison, in Chapters five and six respectively, while each work adds something of its own. In Ethics ’ case this is the value of reality, and in Letters and Papers from Prison the importance of action in reality. This concludes my main discussion of the theological continuities of freedom, and I next move to Chapter seven to bookend the political discussion from Chapter three. There, I use both of the later works mentioned to show that his notion of separation of church and state remains, while his self-identification shifts to that of an
individual actor. Following that argument, I conclude my argument in Chapter eight, arguing for my interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s life and works based on my previous analyses.
Chapter II: Biography: The Historical Path of a Theologian
Accounts of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s life are inevitably shaped by how it ended. His involvement in Nazi resistance and his subsequent martyrdom cause scholars and laity alike to look back on his early years as either indicative or contrary to his later decisions. What often emerges is the question: how does a theologian become involved in active political resistance? I agree that his biography asks this question, because it constantly reaffirms his identity as a theologian, while undeniably, I argue, showing his political activity in resistance. I will show that Bonhoeffer’s biography begs this question and that the content of his theology, which I will discuss in the following chapters, answers this question.
On February 4, 1906, Karl and Paula welcomed Dietrich and his twin sister, Sabine, to the Bonhoeffer family. Born in Breslau, Germany, Dietrich was to be the sixth of eight children. His father, a psychologist, worked as both a university professor and a practicing doctor. His mother ran the home, assisted Karl in his practice, and homeschooled her children in their formative years. 22 Between Karl and Paula, Dietrich and his siblings grew up in a highly intellectual and thoughtful household. The Bonhoeffer’s valued academics and encouraged their children in whatever scholarly field they pursued. For Dietrich, the discipline of choice was theology, even when he was a teenager. The Bonhoeffer household was decidedly Christian, albeit in a more private, family- and home-centric way than might be expected. The family did not
22 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography, Revised and Edited by Victoria J. Barnett (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 3-16.
attend church regularly, instead they prayed and taught religion at home in a less institutionalized way than the Church would have provided. Although definitely an identifying Christian, it seems that Karl Bonhoeffer valued intellectualism over what he saw as pure religiosity. 23 Young Dietrich sought to combine the two, and, for that, had the support of his parents. Thus, already, at a young age, Bonhoeffer identified as a theologian.
Bonhoeffer began studying at the University of Tübingen at the age of seventeen. He spent one year there before taking a semester to study in Rome. 24 Rome fascinated the young Bonhoeffer, and it would continue to hold a special place in his heart. After Tübingen, Bonhoeffer transferred to Berlin University in 1924, where he stayed until 1927. There, he finished his dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, in 1927, a work that focused on the communal nature of the Church in Christ. 25 His time at University of Berlin brought him into contact with many important contemporary thinkers. Bethge names Adolf von Harnack, Karl Holl, and Reinhold Seeberg as the professors with whom Bonhoeffer was especially close. 26 The most enduring and often examined professorial relationship for Bonhoeffer, however, was between him and Karl Barth. First becoming acquainted with Barth’s Epistle to the Romans, as mentioned previously, Bonhoeffer proceeded to read much of Barth’s other work, including his arguments with Harnack. Bonhoeffer did not whole-heartedly agree with either person, which allowed him to begin formulating his own theological stance in
23 Ibid. 15-18, 34-37.
24 Ibid. 45-47, 56.
25 Ibid. 81.
26 Ibid. 65-72.
contrast to that of his role models. 27 In 1931, through Erwin Sutz, a friend of Bonhoeffer’s, the two finally met and began their correspondence. 28 Although their life paths diverged at the onset of World War II, Bonhoeffer remained in touch with Barth, who acted both as an advisor and as an intellectual companion. Equally as influential as his time actually at university were Bonhoeffer’s extensive travels early in his career. He spent time in Barcelona, Berlin, and the United States before leaving the collegiate period of his life. Each place had a unique impact on him. In Barcelona in 1928, Bonhoeffer acted as an assistant pastor, spending a year ministering to a community of ex-patriot, middle-class Germans. 29 It is from this period that his lectures from Barcelona originate, which play such a key role in Nation et al.’s work, Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Barcelona was his second step towards being a pastor rather than a strictly academic theologian. The first step came when he taught Sunday School in Grunewald in 1925, as part of his university requirements. During that time, Bonhoeffer found that pastoral work excited him and gave him a second role for his Christianity. 30 Barcelona continued this journey of putting scholarly ideas into practice. Despite this shift of focus, Bonhoeffer continued to identify as a theologian and to speak theologically. In 1929, he returned to Berlin to complete his Habilitation and to work as an assistant lecturer. Returning from Spain, Bonhoeffer was particularly aware of the growing repercussions of nationalist sentiments, which pushed him toward a more concrete ethic of peace. Also during this period, Bonhoeffer became friends with the Jewish theologian Franz Hildebrandt, one of his first close
27 Ibid. 75.
28 Ibid. 153.
29 Ibid. 97.
30 Ibid. 91.
32
relationships. 31 By the end of the year, Bonhoeffer completed his Habilitation, Act and Being, which built on his dissertation topic.
Next, Bonhoeffer traveled to the United States to study at Union Theological Seminary in New York City for a year in 1930. His stay there prompted three important developments in his life. The first was his involvement in the African American Methodist community through his colleague Albert F. Fisher. Bonhoeffer found that the African American worship spoke to him in a special way, in addition to reaffirming and redefining for him the necessity of social justice. Second, he came into contact with Reinhold Niebuhr, American Christian ethicist and realist. Niebuhr’s influence on Bonhoeffer has been widely debated, due to its implications for Bonhoeffer’s attitude toward pacifism. The third moment, a particularly contested one in Bonhoeffer scholarship, was his acquaintance with Frenchman Jean Lasserre. Lasserre is often cited as forcing Bonhoeffer to examine seriously the concept of pacifism in the Bible. 33 Although Bonhoeffer’s parents promoted nationalism in their children’s youth, they were careful to temper it with the notion that war was not a universal good. Previously, during his time at Tübingen, Bonhoeffer joined the Hedgehogs, a highly patriotic fraternit y with which his family had a legacy, and, as such, participated in a brief military-like training. 34 The military, however, had always been a sensitive topic in his family, as his brother Walter died in combat in the year 1918, and it seemed that Bonhoeffer was not particularly enthusiastic about the military activities of the Hedgehogs. In fact, never again did Bonhoeffer participate in any
31 Ibid. 127.
32 Ibid. 131.
33 Ibid. 150-153.
34 Ibid. 48-52.
martial activities, at least none that have been documented. Neither, however, did Bonhoeffer proclaim himself to be a pacifist. Regardless, Lasserre had a lasting effect on Bonhoeffer. Bethge recounts that, “Lasserre confronted [Bonhoeffer] with an acceptance of Jesus’ peace commandment that he had never encountered before. Not that Bonhoeffer immediately became a convinced pacifist–in fact he never did so.” 35 Although Lasserre may have influenced Bonhoeffer’s thought, Bonhoeffer did not, as a result, identify as a pacifist, according to Bethge. This is, of course, much contested, most notably by Nation et al.
Bonhoeffer returned to Germany in the summer of 1931. The country to which he came home was on the cusp of Hitler’s seizure of total control. Upon his arrival, Bonhoeffer found that “the majority of theology students tended toward Hitler’s party.”
36 In 1931, Hitler was the leader of the Nazi party but not yet directly in a position of power within the government. His party, however, was gaining more and more popularity and this was being expressed in increasingly public ways, at prominent weddings for instance. In the November 1932 voting for church council seats in Berlin, the German Christians, a group associated with the Nazi party, won 2,282, a sum almost equal to their rival groups. 37 Previous to that, in March of 1932, Hitler had lost a presidential election to Hindenburg, lagging, however, a mere 19 percent behind the president. 38 Regardless, because of political pressure put on Hindenburg, on January 30, 1933, Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor of Germany. In March, Hitler began enacting various decrees that allowed him to take more power later, most notably the
35 Ibid. 153.
36 Ibid. 207.
37 Ibid. 233.
38 Ibid. 228.
Enabling Act. The Enabling Act gave Hitler the ability to ignore certain aspects of the German constitution and of legal proceedings or rulings, laying the foundation for his dictatorship. The rise of the German Christian issue culminated in April, when Hitler introduced Ludwig Müller onto the scene. Müller would soon become the Reich Bishop, making the German Christians the officially endorsed church of Germany. April also saw the publication of the Aryan Paragraph, and subsequently more and more anti-Semitic legislation appeared. 39 With Hindenburg’s death in early August, Hitler appointed himself Führer on August 19, 1934, now holding the most powerful political position in Germany. 40 Thus, within three years of Bonhoeffer’s homecoming from America, Hitler was issuing laws and statements in his power as Führer that made it clear that serious change was in store.
Bonhoeffer first spoke out against the impending religious monopoly of the German Christians. The German Christians, as explained above, were the religious group aligned with Hitler, which, essentially, answered to his needs as a politician. As part of his leadership, Hitler worked to make a “unified Reich church.” 41 In doing so, he raised the hackles of Christians like Bonhoeffer, who objected first to the imposition of a state religion and second to the German Christian message. Bonhoeffer believed that the German Christians were radically distorting the meaning and message of Christianity for political aims, and, as a reaction to this perceived blasphemous religiopolitical trend, he and likeminded preachers eventually founded the Confessing Church. Later in 1933, when Hitler published the Aryan Clause, Bonhoeffer showed
39 Ibid. 257-323.
40 Ibid. 373.
41 Ibid. 270.
his issues with the Third Reich again, openly writing about his ecclesiastical and moral qualms in his essay “The Church and the Jewish Question.”
In the midst of all this, Bonhoeffer continued to shift his focus from academics to preaching. Bethge categorizes this moment as Bonhoeffer’s shift from theologian to Christian. At that point, Bonhoeffer made the choice to be a pastor first and an academic second. He preached in Berlin and became involved in the youth leadership of the ecumenical movement. In the fall of 1933, Bonhoeffer went to London, which also proved to be significant for his future. There, he worked with children, preparing them for confirmation. It was in London that he truly encountered first hand the poverty and wealth gap in Europe. His time in England was also notable because it allowed him to establish international contacts that he used later for ecumenical work. Chief among them was Bishop George Bell of Chichester, president of the Ecumenical Council. The two men saw eye-to-eye on the issues that Germany faced, and they would continue to work together to the extent possible until Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment. 42
After leaving London in 1935, Bonhoeffer helped to establish several seminaries in Germany, the most famous being Finkenwalde. Seminaries as a form of education and as a space for preaching were important to Bonhoeffer because of the independence it gave in matters of substance. As I mentioned before, Bonhoeffer rejected the idea of the German Christians representing the official church of Germany. Many like-minded thinkers gathered on May 29, 1934 in Barmen for the first Confessing synod. During that and subsequent meetings, they drafted the Barmen Declaration, a document that identified the German Christian beliefs as heretical.
42 Ibid. 192, 325, 360-361.
Specifically, it rejected the notion that the state would have power over the church or that any worldly desire or need would dictate the decisions of the church. In essence, it rebuked the German Christians, and Hitler, for attempting to subordinate the gospel to political matters, calling their doctrines “false.” 43 Because of the Barmen Declaration, Bethge explains, “the opposition was no longer an ‘opposition’ that still acknowledged the authority of the Reich church, but understood itself as the one ‘Confessing church’ in Germany.” 44 Although Bonhoeffer did not help draft the Declaration, he, for the most part, agreed with what it espoused, especially the idea that the church was teaching incorrect doctrines. As time went on, the Confessing Church grew as an alternative to the German Christians, although the government always regarded it as a threat and later took steps to dissolve it. Because the Reich church had a monopoly on religious education, members of the Confessing Church, including Bonhoeffer, were forced to rely on seminary education to teach and cultivate what they saw as correct belief. It was in this spirit that Bonhoeffer founded Finkenwalde. The Finkenwalde seminary held a special place in Bonhoeffer’s heart, and it was there that he grew close to many church colleagues and students, including Bethge. Under Bonhoeffer’s direction, Finkenwalde became a place of serious reflection and prayer, almost its own brand of monasticism. Several of Bonhoeffer’s works came out of his time at Finkenwalde, most notably The Cost of Discipleship. Hitler’s government eventually closed Finkenwalde, because it operated independent of the control of the government, outside the scope of prescribed religious expression. The closing of Finkenwalde signaled, to an extent, the beginning of a personal struggle between Bonhoeffer and
43 Ibid. 366-371.
44 Ibid. 371.
Hitler. This personal battle accelerated as Bonhoeffer continued to speak out against the Third Reich, mainly now at ecumenical conferences. It resulted in the restriction on Bonhoeffer’s public speaking and printing.
In an effort to continue living in Germany, in 1940, Bonhoeffer got work at the Abwehr, a German military counter-intelligence office and secretly a thriving source of resistance. Hans von Dohnanyi, Bonhoeffer’s sister Christel’s husband, helped him get a position in which he ostensibly was to use his ecumenical contacts to gain information for Hitler’s war effort. In this way, Bonhoeffer avoided military conscription while remaining in the country. As an undocumented conscientious objector, Bonhoeffer could have been sentenced to death were he to resist being drafted, but his job at the Abwehr satisfied the government that he was doing his duty to his nation. During his time with the Abwehr, Bonhoeffer worked with Dohnanyi, Hans Oster, and Wilhelm Canaris, among others, on resistance activities. It is through this that Bonhoeffer’s name is tied to plots to assassinate Hitler, specifically the March 13 and 21 attempts of 1943. Although we do not know exactly what Bonhoeffer’s role was in these assassination attempts, we do know that he really was gathering intelligence abroad for the resistance movement. He did use his ecumenical contacts to feel out the possibilities for support and alliances abroad. One of his duties centered on making sure that Germany would have a sovereign, acceptable future in the event of a coup. Over all, Bonhoeffer did not play a large role in the resistance movement as a whole. The size of his role is, while worth noting in order to present a factual biography, irrelevant for this study. The fact that he was involved in the resistance
movement at all raises the questions broached above. In addition, he was a member of the inner circle, at least socially, regardless of the magnitude of his role.
Bonhoeffer was imprisoned on April 5, 1943, officially because of his connection to the Abwehr’s illegal Operation 7. 45 Bonhoeffer spent the majority of his incarcerated time in Tegel prison, in Berlin. During this period, Bonhoeffer wrote letters to his family, his new fiancé Maria von Wedemeyer, and his friends, notably Bethge. Bethge later brought together the majority of these documents into the famous Letters and Papers from Prison. They give us a unique insight into Bonhoeffer’s thoughts in prison. It is here that he breaches the subject of religionless Christianity, which became such a buzzword in the late 20th century. On October 8, 1944, Bonhoeffer was moved from Tegel to Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, from imprisonment for interrogation to imprisonment for imprisonment’s sake. From there, he and a group of other prisoners were transported to Buchenwald and then to Flossenbürg, in a chaotic attempt to keep them away from the front line. On April 9, 1945, he was hanged at Flossenbürg, thus giving him the status of a martyr in many people’s eyes.
What I have presented above are the commonly accepted details of Bonhoeffer’s life. It is important, however, to address Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel’s recent publication: Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking. The authors claim that it is a misunderstanding to say that Bonhoeffer condoned tyrannicide at any point in his life, especially during his time at the Abwehr. The authors wish to counter the interpretation that Bonhoeffer somehow
45 Operation 7 involved the moving of fourteen Jews out of Germany. Bonhoeffer and his co-workers at the Abwehr obtained false identities, monetary support, and means of travel for those fleeing. Initially undetected by the government, due to financial irregularities in Abwehr paperwork, the operation came to light. It was this that spurred the official investigations against Dohnanyi, Oster, Canaris, and Bonhoeffer.
changed his theology or ethic when he went to work for the resistance. On the contrary, Nation et al. argue that Bonhoeffer held fast to his pacifist notions throughout his life. Their argument rests on two points. The first is biographical and historical, and the second is theological and ethical. As to the first, the authors claim that, “Bonhoeffer’s life as an agent of the Abwehr was truly a cover: a way to avoid military induction while continuing his theological reflection and ministry.” 46 Nation et al. place the primary motivation for Bonhoeffer’s involvement in the Abwehr as a means of sidestepping fighting in the war, not as a result of any desire to be involved in resistance. They also argue that he was not involved in any way with the attempted tyrannicides. The main argument for that is one of uncertainty. We cannot know what Bonhoeffer heard or said in conversations, and the only records we have of his time at the Abwehr do not cover the assassination attempts. The reasons listed for Bonhoeffer’s arrest and execution were avoidance of draft, his involvement in the financial irregularity occasioned by Operation 7, and his assistance of other draft dodgers. From this point of ambiguity, the authors move to their second argument: that Bonhoeffer’s theological ethic did not support assassination or war. In arguing this, they show a progression from his lectures in Barcelona in 1928 to Discipleship to Ethics. They state that despite slight changes between Barcelona and Discipleship, the transition between Discipleship and Ethics is incredibly smooth. The authors claim that by, “following the trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thinking over a significant period of his life, we are in a better position to determine what themes are the most enduring and what may simply be the coincidental assertions of one discreet context.” 47 What
46 Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, 76.
47 Ibid. 162.
they intend to do with that determination is to show that pacifism is one of those enduring themes in Bonhoeffer’s life. They write that, when Bonhoeffer’s pacifism is isolated from the broader theological developments of which it is a part, it is easily treated as an extraneous idea as easily espoused as it is transcended and overcome. In other words, treating ‘pacifism’ as its own cause rather than the effect of a much larger shift in Bonhoeffer’s thought structure is an interpretive act that already presupposes that Bonhoeffer’s commitment to peace is short-lived because it was never truly his own. 48
This comes to the heart of Nation et al.’s work. They desperately wish to combat the notion that Bonhoeffer became a Christian realist, stemming from his association with Reinhold Niebuhr, and abandoned his earlier, naïve pacifism. By showing a decided commitment to peace in his Barcelona lectures and a continuation of those theological and ethical foundations into his later works, the authors argue that Bonhoeffer could not have been involved in or even condoned any form of assassination.
Despite the veracity of our inability to know all of what Bonhoeffer said and did during his tenure at the Abwehr, I disagree with the argument put forth by Nation et al. for several reasons. First, I interpret Bonhoeffer’s later works Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison as indicating a high degree of Christian realism and a sense of thoughtful obligation to political action such as tyrannicide, as I will argue in the body of this study. Second, it seems highly unlikely that Bonhoeffer would not have even known about the assassination attempts prior to their occurrence, and, as his biography shows, when he saw injustice and wrongs occurring, he spoke up. I find it extremely doubtful that Bonhoeffer would have sat by silently if he did not condone the assassinations. Finally, I find a fundamental flaw in Nation et al.’s argument centered on their understanding of his degree of moral relativity. Scholars, including Green,
48 Ibid. 127.
Nation, and his fellow co-authors, agree that Bonhoeffer denied that there was a system of eternally true ethical principles. 49 In fact, Bonhoeffer himself says in a 1932 lecture to an ecumenical Youth Peace Conference, “The church therefore can proclaim not principles that are always true but rather only commandments that are true today. For that which is ‘always’ true is precisely not true ‘today’: God is for us ‘always’ God precisely ‘today.’” 50 This indicates that God is the only constant but that God is free to change, and, as such, even God is temporal in human’s experience of the divine. Indeed, in his Barcelona lectures in 1929, Bonhoeffer blatantly states, “There are no acts that are bad in and of themselves, even murder can be sanctified.” 51 This clearly implies that it is impossible to say that Bonhoeffer held pacifism as an eternally true value.
For these reasons, I maintain that Bonhoeffer did knowingly participate in resistance associated with tyrannicide and that the biography presented above is accurate. I agree that Bonhoeffer’s biography seems to ask: how can a theologian become involved in political resistance? I argue, in opposition to Nation et al., however, that Bonhoeffer resisted the Hitler regime precisely because of his identity as a theologian and because of his theology founded in Creation and Fall.
49 Green, 44.
50 Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, 31.
51 Ibid. 69.
Chapter III: Political Thought and Identity: The Early Years
Despite his later involvement in political resistance, early in his adulthood, Bonhoeffer exhibited a strong desire to keep church and state separate. This is evidenced in his essay “The Church and the Jewish Question.” His unique understanding of what the Jewish question is provides the starting point for a discussion of the roles of the church and the state. Based on the functions of each, Bonhoeffer explains how the church should appropriately react to the state’s actions, in this case concerning the Aryan Paragraph. 52 Although the church’s reactions are limited by its role, Bonhoeffer leaves space for the individual to act independently against the state. In this way, it is clear that Bonhoeffer’s early political thought is very much bound by the notion of separation of church and state. It is crucial to note that at this point in his life, Bonhoeffer is committed to working as a member of the institution of the church, speaking for the church, in a sense.
It is important to first clarify what Bonhoeffer means by the Jewish question. For most of Bonhoeffer’s contemporary society, the term had deeply racist implications. 53 For Bonhoeffer, however, the Jewish question is the issue of the Jewish
52 As I explained in Chapter I, the Aryan Paragraph dictated, among other things, that Jews could no longer be clergymen or members of the church. Bonhoeffer reacted strongly and immediately; the edict took effect on April 7, 1933, and Bonhoeffer wrote this essay in response on April 13, 1933. The Aryan Paragraph was of such primary importance to Bonhoeffer, first because it barred converted Jews who believed in Christ from participating in the church, and second because it indicated a state intervention in the church’s realm.
53Initially, historically speaking, the term “Jewish question” pertained to issues of citizenship and emancipation of European Jewry. At that point, it did not yet carry with it the anti-Semitic connotation that it would accrue later. In Germany in the mid-1800’s, the term morphed to mean the issue of the Jews’ perceived political, economic, and cultural power grabbing. The Jewish question asked what should be done with these threats to the nation. Jews were also seen as a racial threat, by nature of their supposedly being an impure race. It was in the mid-1800’s way that the term “Jewish question” was used
religion, having nothing to do with the Jewish race. He states that, “Without doubt one of the historical problems that must be dealt with by our state is the Jewish question, and without doubt the state is entitled to strike new paths in doing so.” 54 Here, we see the first hint that, for Bonhoeffer, the state has a specific role it must fulfill. This quotation also makes it clear that Bonhoeffer does not deny the existence of a Jewish question. How he defines it, however, differs from how the Third Reich defines it, stemming from his understanding of what it is to be Jewish. His motive for this discrepancy can be seen when he writes, “The church cannot allow the state to prescribe for it the way it treats its members. A baptized Jew is a member of our church. For the church, the Jewish question is therefore different from what it is for the state.” 55 What Bonhoeffer takes explicit issue with in this essay is the state dictating who may belong to the church. According to him, baptized Jews are part of the church, based on their baptism. Bonhoeffer explains that the term “Jewish” can have two separate meanings: race or religion. This is evident when he writes, “the Jew is subjected to special laws by the state, solely on the basis of his race and regardless of the religion to which he adheres.” 56 By claiming that a Jew can be racially Jewish but not of the Jewish religion, Bonhoeffer introduces the idea that race and religion can be separate identities. He clearly sees the notion of the Jewish race as fairly selfexplanatory or irrelevant as he does not define it. In contrast, he dwells considerably on in Nazi Germany. The Final Solution, the extermination of the Third Reich’s Jews, was the Nazi answer to its understanding of the Jewish question. Bonhoeffer, however, provides his own definition of the term.
Information above from: “Judenfrage,” Wikipedia, accessed March 5, 2015, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judenfrage.
54 Clifford J. Green and Michael P. DeJonge, eds, The Bonhoeffer Reader, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 372.
55 Ibid. 376.
56 Ibid. 371.
what it means to be religiously Jewish. He writes, “From the point of view of Christ’s church, Judaism is never a racial concept but rather a religious one. . . . It is God’s law that constitutes the ‘people’ Israel; thus one can become a Jew by accepting the law. But in the racial sense one cannot become a Jew.” 57 Here, he introduces two key claims in the rest of his musings on the Jewish question: first, that to be religiously Jewish is to follow the law of God, and second, that a person not of the Jewish race can be described as Jewish in the religious sense by believing in the law.
Bonhoeffer’s definition of “Jewish Christians” 58 expands on these understandings of what it is to call someone or something “Jewish.” Bonhoeffer explains,
From the point of view of Christ’s church, therefore, Jewish Christians are not people of the Jewish race who have been baptized Christians, but rather Jewish Christians in the church’s sense are those who see their belonging to the people of God, to the church of Christ, as determined by their observance of a divine law. Gentile Christians, on the other hand, see no other prerequisite for their belonging to the people of God, to the church of Christ, than being called to it by God, through God’s Word in Christ. 59
The first thing to note from this passage is that being a Jewish Christian has nothing to do with being Jewish racially, nor does it refer to Jews who converted to Christianity. It is crucial to understand that here Bonhoeffer uses the term “Jewish” as an adjective that conveys a specific characteristic of faith: adherence to law. As such, one can be a Jewish Christian and have no ties to Judaism as an independent religion or to the Jewish race. The second key aspect of this passage is the distinction between Jewish
57 Ibid. 376.
58 As I will show, Bonhoeffer’s concept of who is a Jewish Christian differs significantly from the prevailing definition. The common understanding of the term indicates someone who is religiously and racially Jewish but believes that Jesus is the Messiah. Bonhoeffer defines it differently, turning “Jewish” into an adjective related to the prioritization of the law.
59 Ibid.
and Gentile Christians. Bonhoeffer writes that while Jewish Christians claim they are Christian because they follow divine law, Gentile Christians believe they are part of the church only through God’s Word, or gospel. Thus, Bonhoeffer uses the adjective “Jewish” to imply valuing the law over the gospel. The crux of the matter comes down to Word and law. He claims that, “To exclude persons who are racially Jewish from our ethnically German church would mean to make it into a church of the Jewish Christian type.”
60 Thus, by turning “Jewish” into an adjective unrelated to the Jewish race, Bonhoeffer argues against the exclusion of Jews from the Christian church. Bonhoeffer states that to exclude racial Jews makes the church Jewish Christian. Being Jewish Christian does not mean having Jewish members, as they would be excluded. Instead, “Jewish Christian” refers to the focus on a preexisting law that supersedes the gospel.
61 Bonhoeffer’s religious argument against law in favor of gospel carries over into a vehement admonition for the two realms of church and state being kept apart.
The relationship between gospel and law can be seen as mirroring the relationship between church and state, for Bonhoeffer. He writes,
The church has neither to praise nor to censure the laws of the state. Instead, it has to affirm the state as God’s order of preservation in this godless world. It should recognize and understand the state’s creation of order–whether good or bad from a humanitarian perspective–as grounded in God’s desire for preservation in the midst of the world’s chaotic godlessness. This judgment by the church on what the state does stands quite apart from any moralizing and is to be distinguished from every sort of humanitarianism, because of the radical
60 Ibid. 377.
61 Because of the separation he draws between the Jewish race and religion, Bonhoeffer can argue in favor of those of Jewish race regardless of their religious beliefs, while simultaneously arguing against Judaism as a religion. Paradoxically, his case for Jews is a case against Judaism. It is in this conclusion, however, that this move’s true rhetorical power lies. By critiquing Judaism, Bonhoeffer can appear to agree with the government that the religion is not a favorable belief system. In this way, he seems less radical. At the same time, he implies that the church of the Third Reich is Jewish Christian, because it excludes Jews based on a Jewish notion of law. In this way, Bonhoeffer criticizes the Third Reich by calling it “Jewish,” an adjective that the Nazi party would heartily reject as a self-descriptor.
separation between the place of the gospel and the place of the law. The actions of the state remain free from interference by the church. 62
In this passage, Bonhoeffer explicitly defines the nature of the state as the creation of order, which serves to maintain the world as God created it. Because God is not in the world as an active agent in human’s everyday history, the state must fulfill the role of maintaining order through the making and enforcing of laws. This is the function of the state, and, as such, the church must allow the state to do its job. It is important to note that Bonhoeffer also acknowledges a separation from what he calls humanitarian ideals. According to him, the state’s responsibility is to create order, which is not always equivalent to upholding humanitarianism. The state, as the state, focuses primarily on preserving order, and the church must recognize and respect this focus. Bonhoeffer believes this is all to be the case, because the state’s role comes directly from God, as he explains, saying, that each institution must carry out “the function ordained to it by the One who sustains the world.”
63 The state has its established role with which the church must not interfere.
As we have seen above, however, the state is not limitless in power. Rather, it must reciprocally respect the role of the church. Bonhoeffer argues that, “At the other extreme from too little law and order, there can be too much law and order. This would mean the state developing its use of force to such a degree as to rob the Christian faith of its right to proclaim its message.” 64 He delineates two ways in which the state might stray from its function: enforcing too little law and order or too much law and order. I will discuss this distinction later in the chapter. For the moment, it is only necessary to
62 Ibid. 372.
63 Ibid. 373.
64 Ibid. 374.
understand that the state enforces too much law and order when it encroaches on the church’s role. The passage above indicates what function the church has: proclaiming the gospel. When the state interferes with the church’s ability to preach and spread the message of Christianity, it has overstepped its function. This is essentially what Bonhoeffer perceives as happening with the publication of the Aryan Paragraph. The Aryan Paragraph is a case of the state dictating to the church how and to whom it may proclaim its message. This is also a part of his objection to the establishment of the German Christians as the state approved church. Bonhoeffer argues that this is an illogical choice for the state to make because, “A state that threatens the proclamation of the Christian message negates itself,” 65 for the reason that, “it is from the Christian proclamation and faith that the state receives its own rights.” 66 Because God, through Christianity, defines and upholds the role of the state against that of the church, the state that impedes the spreading of the gospel effectively impedes the understanding of its own source of authority. For this reason, it is irrational for a state to attempt to legislate church matters.
Based on the respective roles of the church and state, it is pertinent to investigate how Bonhoeffer believes the church should respond to Jewish question as defined by the Aryan Paragraph. He writes, “the true church of Christ, which lives by the gospel alone and knows the nature of state actions, will never interfere in the functioning of the state in this way, by criticizing its history-making actions from the standpoint of any sort of, say, humanitarian ideal.” 67 By specifying that he comments on the actions of “the true church of Christ” (emphasis mine), Bonhoeffer makes it
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. 373.
clear that this is the appropriate and correct way for the church to behave. This behavior involves allowing the state to do its job: making laws and keeping order. The church’s concern should be with the gospel, and the state’s should be with the law. He again separates out humanitarianism from the church’s official response to the state. Bonhoeffer expands on this, putting it in concrete terms, saying, “The church cannot primarily take direct political action, since it does not presume to know how things should go historically. Even on the Jewish question today, the church cannot contradict the state directly and demand that it take any particular different course of action.” 68 Here, he explicitly states that the church is not to be involved politically in the state’s affairs. This is the basis of his early understanding of political action. This is not to say, however, that the church cannot take any action in the event of state faults. There are ways in which the church may become involved in state business. Bonhoeffer explains that although the church has an obligation to allow the state to fulfill its function, this does not mean that the church stands aside, indifferent to what political action is taken. Instead, it can and must, precisely because it does not moralize about individual cases, keep asking the government whether its actions can be justified as legitimate state actions, that is, actions that create law and order, not lack of rights and disorder. 69
The church, while it cannot object to specific situations based on humanitarian qualms, is obligated to ensure that the state appropriately fulfills its God-given function. If the church observes that the state fails to create order to a legitimate degree, it should become involved in a discussion of politics. Being involved in such a political discussion, however, is not equivalent to direct politically action, which the church
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
must not do. Bonhoeffer carefully lays out three ways in which the church may respond to potential state violations of function. He writes that the church can act by, first (as we have said), questioning the state as to the legitimate state character of its actions, that is, making the state responsible for what it does. Second is service to the victims of the state’s actions. The church has an unconditional obligation toward the victims of any societal order, even if they do not belong to the Christian community. 70
The former is a response in line with the separation of church and state and the church’s role as upholder of this God-given order. The latter is a reaction to an event, involving doing what the church can to ease the lives of the state’s victims outside of the political sphere. The third response is preventative and requires the church not just to bind up the wounds of the victims beneath the wheel but to seize the wheel itself. Such an action would be direct political action on the part of the church. This is only possible and called for if the church sees the state to be failing in its function of creating law and order, that is, if the church perceives that the state, without any scruples, has created either too much or too little law and order. It must see in either eventuality a threat to the existence of the state and thus to its own existence as well. 71
This involves a departure from the earlier admonition that the church must not be involved directly in political action. In this third option, the church may become directly politically active, but only if it appears that the state is creating an illegitimate amount of law and order. Bonhoeffer does specify what he characterizes as a legitimate amount of order. He claims, “Either too little law and order or too much law and order compels the church to speak.” 72 We saw earlier how he characterizes too much law and order, and as to the former, he writes, “There is too little law and order wherever a group of people is deprived of its rights.” 73 Either way, too much or too little law and
70 Ibid. 374.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. 373.
73 Ibid.
order obligates the church to become directly involved in politics. Regarding the Aryan Paragraph, however, Bonhoeffer writes that, “For the church today, the Jewish question poses the first two possibilities as challenges of the hour, which it has a duty to meet. The necessity for immediate political action by the church must, however, be decided by an ‘evangelical council’ as and when the occasion arises and hence cannot be casuistically construed beforehand.” 74 This shows that, at this point in history, Bonhoeffer does not support direct political action by the church. 75
Although he places several conditions on the church’s ability to act politically, Bonhoeffer takes a different stance regarding individual agents. He argues that, with respect to the Jewish question, “It remains for the humanitarian associations and individual Christian men who see themselves called to do so, to make the state aware of the moral aspect of the measures it takes in this regard, that is, should the occasion arise, to accuse the state of offenses against morality.” 76 While the church cannot judge the state based on humanitarian ideals, it is fully within the individual Christian’s rights to lodge moral complaints against the state. The distinction rests in the association with the institution of the church versus the status as an independent actor, albeit motivated by the Christian faith. Indeed, Bonhoeffer reiterates this, saying, “Of course it cannot prevent individual Christians, who know that they are called to do so in certain cases,
74 Ibid. 375.
75 Because Gides focuses on Bonhoeffer’s Church-world theology as the major category in guiding his life, his work overlaps with some of the discussion in this chapter. Gides identifies four phases in Bonhoeffer’s life, each with its own understanding of the Church-world relationship and its own degree of political involvement. For the most part, my study operates within Gides’ Phases two and four and, again, mostly agrees with his findings at a basic level. We both see the separation of the roles of church and state as coming from divine authority. We also both agree that Bonhoeffer did change his attitude toward his own political involvement. We have several significant differences in our approaches to this concept, however. First, we differ on how deeply we examine the Church-world relationship. Second, Gides extends the counterpart of the Church to include the world, as a physical, this-worldly reality, while I examine only the church and state understanding, not the world as a whole. Our third difference will become clear in my Chapter seven. See Gides, 341-344.
76 Green and DeJonge, 372.
from accusing the state of ‘inhumanity’; but as church it will only ask whether or not the state is creating law and order.” 77 Again, it is the position of being an individual that allows one to criticize the moral actions of the state. It is also important to note that the Christian individual is not prohibited from direct political action in any circumstance, in contrast to the church which may directly participate in political action only under certain conditions.
This brings us to Bonhoeffer’s position as to his personal political action or inaction. Clearly, he understands the church as being able to directly act politically only in certain circumstances, based on the separation of the roles of church and state, while the individual is not restricted in this manner. The question is whether Bonhoeffer, at this point in his life, sees himself as a member of the institution of the church or as an individual actor. I argue that he understands himself as the former, based on biographical details. Early in his career, Bonhoeffer was still highly involved in the church in an institutional sense. In Bethge’s description of Bonhoeffer’s decision to become a theologian, he writes, “When he was about fourteen, for instance, they tried to convince him that he was taking the path of least resistance, and that the church to which he proposed to devote himself was a poor, feeble, boring, petty, and bourgeois institution, but he confidently replied: ‘In that case I shall reform it!’” 78 Bonhoeffer’s proclamation of reform indicates that, early in his life, his goal was to work within the church institution, albeit changing it if need be. His focus was oriented primarily around operating as a member of the church, not an individual. Because of this selfidentification combined with his notion of separation of church and state, Bonhoeffer
77 Ibid. 373.
78 Bethge, 36.
did not get directly involved in political action in his early life, although this would change in the future.
Chapter IV: The Foundation: Creation and Fall
Bonhoeffer’s later political action can be traced back to theological roots, stemming from Creation and Fall, his 1932-33 lecture series. It is in his exegesis of Genesis 1-3 that Bonhoeffer develops his notion of freedom as a fundamental part of human nature and human relationship to God, the world, and others. I will begin by exploring the beginning as freedom and finding the definition of God’s freedom. Next, I will explain the origin of human’s freedom and its own definition. The majority of the chapter will focus on this task. By examining Bonhoeffer’s understanding of creatureliness, freedom for God, freedom from and also for the world, and freedom for others, I will show that his concept of freedom is the foundation of his decision to become involved in active resistance against Hitler.
Just as Genesis begins with the beginning, so too does Bonhoeffer. 79 His first task is to explore what it means to conceptualize the beginning. He writes, the beginning is not to be thought of in temporal terms. We can always go back behind a temporal beginning. But the beginning is distinguished by something utterly unique – unique not in the sense of a number that one can count back to, but in a qualitative sense, that is, in the sense that it simply cannot be repeated, that it is completely free. 80
According to Bonhoeffer, one should primarily understand the beginning as being free. The concept of freedom exists from the beginning, because of the beginning. This fairly abstract notion gains some tangibility when Bonhoeffer explains the role of the
79 Genesis 1:1-2
80 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 3: Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax, ed. John W. De Gruchy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 32.
Creator, saying, “In other words the Creator – in freedom! – creates the creature. The connection between them is conditioned by nothing except freedom, which means that it is unconditioned.” 81 This indicates several things. First, that God, here characterized as the Creator, is free. It is significant that God’s first action comes out of a place of freedom. Bonhoeffer stresses only two traits of God in this initial discussion: God’s role as Creator and God’s freedom. Second, this passage states that the relationship between Creator and creature is predicated on freedom alone. It is not necessity that leads to creation, nor is it that freedom leads to creation. Freedom is not a cause of creation; creation is “unconditioned.” Bonhoeffer explains later that the reader is not privy to the Creator’s motivations in creating, rather that all the reader can know is that creation comes out of God’s freedom. This brings us to the third important aspect of the quotation above: the unconditional nature of freedom. A free action is not caused nor conditioned. By nature of being free, a free action is beyond conditions. From this, the definition of God’s freedom becomes: that which is unconditioned.
It is necessary, however, to distinguish God’s freedom from human’s freedom. The two beings are free in different ways. In creating humans, 82 Bonhoeffer points out that the reader sees God’s process for the first time: God intends to create a being in God’s image. 83 A problem arises by nature of creation, as Bonhoeffer explains, “Only in that which is itself free could the free Creator behold the Creator. But how can what is created be free? What is created is determined, bound by law, conditioned, not free. If the Creator wishes to create the Creator’s own image, then the Creator must create it
81 Ibid.
82 Genesis 1:26-27.
83 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 61.
free.” 84 Bonhoeffer hits here on a major issue in human nature. The created is necessarily caused and subject to certain realities. The created is not free in the sense that God is free: unconditioned. God must, however, find a way to make this new being free if God wishes to create in God’s image. According to Bonhoeffer, the solution, or perhaps better phrased as result, is a new kind of freedom: created freedom. He expands, writing that,
To say that in humankind God creates the image of God on earth means that humankind is like the Creator in that it is free. To be sure, it is free only through God’s creation, through the word of God; it is free for the worship of the Creator. For in the language of the Bible freedom is not something that people have for themselves but something they have for others. 85 Thus, without a doubt, human beings are free. They must be free in order to fulfill God’s intention that they be in God’s image. Humans’ freedom is, however, conditioned. Humans have freedom due to God’s free action of creation. As such, it is freedom for something or someone. Human’s freedom is conditioned both in its origin and in its subsequent use. This passage indicates one of the objects of humans’ freedom: God, in the form of worship of God. I will expand on this concept later in the chapter. Bonhoeffer continues, clearly defining human freedom as “a relation between two persons. Being free means ‘being-free-for-the-other’, because I am bound to the other. Only by being in relation with the other am I free.” 86 Here, it is clear that human freedom stems from conditional circumstances, whether that be a relation to God, to the world, or to fellow human beings. Human freedom is interactive. This rhetoric of “being-free-for-the-other” is key in understanding how this idea develops in Bonhoeffer’s later works, as I will explore in future chapters. As to the origin of this
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid. 62.
86 Ibid. 63.
phrase, Bonhoeffer explains that, “Because God in Christ is free for humankind, because God does not keep God’s freedom to God’s self, we can think of freedom only as a ‘being free for. . . .’” 87 Although unique from God’s freedom, human freedom is modeled on God’s in that God has shown that freedom is meant to be for something. This also indicates the tie between freedom and Christ, for Bonhoeffer. Through Christ, God acts for human beings in history. This is necessary, because of humans’ freedom. Looking to the second creation of humans, 88 Bonhoeffer shows that, “God’s hand no longer holds the human being in its grasp; instead it has set the human being free.” 89 Here, God gives humans freedom in a more literal sense, which necessitates a new mode of God’s being free in the world. Again, however, we must not assume that God’s freedom is like humans’. Bonhoeffer explicitly defines created freedom, saying, “Created freedom then means . . . that God’s self enters into God’s creation.” 90 In humans, God sees God’s own self in freedom but in a created form. This is, as Bonhoeffer describes it, “the paradox of created freedom.” 91
This paradox of created freedom stems, as we have seen, from humans’ nature as created. Bonhoeffer has a name for this phenomenon: creatureliness. He writes,
Created freedom is freedom in the Holy Spirit, but as created freedom it is humankind’s own freedom. . . . The creature is free in that one creature exists in relation to another creature, in that one human being is free for another human being. And God created them man and woman. The human being is not alone. Human beings exist in duality, and it is in this dependence on the other that their creatureliness consists. The creatureliness of human beings is no more a quality or something at hand or an existing entity than human freedom is. It can be defined in simply no other way than in terms of the existence of human
87 Ibid.
88 Genesis 2:7
89 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 78.
90 Ibid. 63.
91 Ibid.
beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-uponone-another. 92
Thus, creatureliness is a necessary condition of human nature. It is also unbreakably linked with human freedom. Created freedom exists only because of God, but it is not God’s freedom; it is unique to humans. While the nature of freedom as being-for-others has already been explained in terms of God, what is added here is wh y being-for-others is so fundamental to human nature. Because man and woman are created together, in community, the life of a human being must necessarily be one of relationships to others. This is, in essence, creatureliness. Creatureliness is both the identification of one as a part of a group and of one as a separate entity from that group. In this way, creatureliness embodies the inclination of freedom for others in that, in human freedom, one recognizes the need to be for others, the necessity of acting in positive relation to the group, while at the same time identifying as an individual who can act on behalf of the group. Bonhoeffer revisits the idea of creatureliness in his exegesis of the verses pertaining to the tree of knowledge and the command to abstain from its fruit. 93 On the commandment to refrain from eating from the tree of knowledge, he writes,
The prohibition contained two complementary aspects. On the one hand it indicated that Adam was human, was free (free ‘for’ and ‘from’) – it is Adam, the human being, who is addressed concerning Adam’s own existence, and Adam understands this. On the other hand it indicates to this human being, who is addressed as a free person, this human being’s limit or boundedness, that is the human being’s creatureliness. The prohibition addresses Adam concerning Adam’s freedom and creatureliness and binds Adam to this existence, the existence that belongs to Adam’s own being. The prohibition means nothing other than this: Adam, you are who you are because of me, your Creator; so
92 Ibid. 64.
93 Genesis 2:8-17
now be what you are. You are a free creature, so now be that. You are free, so be free; you are a creature, so be a creature. 94
Here, Bonhoeffer finds that the commandment indicates the unique situation of Adam as human. Adam is able to make choices and, as such, is free. He is also, however, conditioned by that which is around him; Adam is limited. This is a development on the definition of creatureliness. As before, the human must relate to the other, in some way existing for and against the other, but now Bonhoeffer has added the idea of being bound to the other, being limited in one’s choices. This is so crucial to Bonhoeffer’s understanding of human nature that he remarks, “[The interrelatedness of freedom and creaturelieness] is expressed here in the picture language of the Bible in that the tree of knowledge, the forbidden tree that denotes the human being’s boundary, stands at the center. The human being’s limit is at the center of human existence.” 95 Humans’ freedom to live, freedom to be for others, is paradoxically focused on humans’ creaturely limitedness.
Precisely because they are bound to creatureliness, humans must express their freedom by being free for something or someone. Bonhoeffer describes several different objects of human freedom, beginning first with freedom for God. That humans are free for God stems from God’s both creating and preserving of the world. Bonhoeffer explains that when Genesis reads, “And God saw that the light was good,” 96 what is happening is the preserving of the world. Identifying creation as good is God’s way of affirming the world. By affirming the world, God indicates that it should continue on living. Bonhoeffer writes,
94 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 85.
95 Ibid. 86.
96 Ibid. 45. Genesis 1:4a
And because of God’s look, with which God embraces God’s work and does not let it go, we live. That God’s work is good in no way means that the world is the best of all conceivable worlds; what it means is that the world lives wholly before God, that it lives from God and toward God and that God is its Lord. What is meant here is a goodness that has not yet been distinguished as such over against evil, a goodness that consists in being under the dominion of God. 97
The first sentence implies the preserving nature of God’s calling the world good. Bonhoeffer clarifies, however, that good does not mean good in the sense that humans now know good: in relation to evil. Rather, it is a good, because it is God’s. The characteristic of being oriented toward God indicates that God is at the center of life. Bonhoeffer’s understanding of life as focused on God continues into the verses on the creation of animals. 98 He explains that, “More and more creation attains its own being, more and more sharply it stands out in distinction from the form of the Creator, and more and more jubilantly it proclaims the Creator’s nearness.” 99 This passage both hearkens back to the definition of creatureliness and hints at the coming understanding of being free for God. It does the former by emphasizing the separateness of creation from the Creator. Defining creatureliness, Bonhoeffer noted that it was the “existence of human beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-uponone-another.” 100 This sense of being a separate entity apart from a group surfaces in his notion of creation “[attaining] its own being” and “[standing] out in distinction.” In essence, the first clauses of the passage name creatureliness as the cause for the last clause: the worshiping of the Creator. This worshiping, or proclaiming, of God’s role is what freedom for God is. This is evident, when Bonhoeffer writes about humans that
97 Ibid. 45-46.
98 Genesis 1.11-13, 1:20-25
99 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 57.
100 Ibid. 64.
“only such an image [of God], in its freedom, would fully praise God, would fully proclaim God’s glory as Creator.” 101 This undeniably links freedom and praise of God together. Only by being free can humans truly worship God and preach God’s goodness. Thus, in being free, humans are free for praise of God. In addition to praise, obedience to God is a second aspect of freedom for God. In addressing the prohibition of the tree of knowledge, Bonhoeffer explains that, “Adam has life in the unity of unbroken obedience to the Creator . . . The distinctive characteristic of Adam’s life is utterly unbroken and unified obedience, that is, Adam’s innocence and ignorance of disobedience.” 102 Bonhoeffer argues that obedience is a key aspect of the first human’s life. Before the fall, Adam knows only obedience to God. In this way, part of being free for God is being obedient. This is supported in Bonhoeffer’s discussion of the Fall. 103 He claims that eating from the tree of knowledge, consists in its own attempt to be for God, to have access to a new way of ‘being-for-God’, that is, in a special way of being pious. Indeed this piety was supposed to consist in humankind’s going back behind the given word of God to procure its own knowledge of God. . . . This is disobedience in the semblance of obedience, the desire to rule in the semblance of service, the will to be creator in the semblance of being a creature, being dead in the semblance of life. 104
In a way, the reason wh y the Fall is so devastating is that it is improperly using humans’ freedom for God. The first line makes it explicit that this action has the goal of being for God, indicating that it is motivated by human freedom. The notion of the misdirected piety comes from Bonhoeffer’s idea that Adam and Eve attempted to obey God’s imperative to praise God by learning more about God and God’s world, doing
101 Ibid. 61.
102 Ibid. 85.
103 Genesis 3:6
104 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 116-117.
so, however, in a prohibited manner. This is, as he says, disobedience posing as obedience. In this misuse of human freedom for God, what Bonhoeffer sees as correct freedom for God becomes clear. It is obedience within the bounds of God’s commands. It is the choice to obey in spite of and because of human beings’ freedom. Another type of human freedom is freedom from the world. Bonhoeffer, however, is firm that this is really a subset of being free for God. Bonhoeffer perceives Genesis as establishing freedom from the world when humans are created. He explains, whereas the freedom of human beings over against one another consisted in being free for one another, humankind’s freedom over against the rest of the created world is to be from it. That means that humankind is its lord; humankind has command over it, rules it. And that constitutes the other side of humankind’s created likeness to God. 105
Here, Bonhoeffer adds the idea that human freedom can also be freedom from something, in this case: the world. He bases this on the notion that God gives humans the world to rule. As he notes above, this is another way in which God creates humanity in God’s image. The distinction between freedom from and freedom for appears to be one of release versus responsibility. Bonhoeffer quickly comments, however, that, “Being free from created things is not the same as, say, the ideal of the spirit’s being free from nature. On the contrary this freedom to rule includes being bound to the creatures who are ruled.” 106 This indicates that even freedom from something is responsibility, because it is still created freedom and, as such, must be bound and conditioned. He further explains that, “The reason why we fail to rule, however, is because we do not know the world as God’s creation and do not accept the dominion we have as God-given but seize hold of it for ourselves. There is no ‘being-
105 Ibid. 66.
106 Ibid.
free-from’ without a ‘being-free-for’. There is no dominion without serving God; in losing the one humankind necessarily loses the other.”
107 In this way, Bonhoeffer brings freedom from the world back to freedom for God. The reason humans are free from the world, free to rule the world, is because God created humans to be free to do so. If humans fail to recognize that this is from God, they are not acting out of freedom for God, and, for that, lose the inextricably tied freedom from the world. This indicates that ruling the world with the understanding that it is God’s gift is part of being free for God. It also implies that acknowledging God’s creation and God’s gifts are specific parts of being free for God.
The above expressions of human freedom have been for God, either directly or by being free from the world. Being free for others is another possible expression of human freedom, according to Bonheoffer. As noted, this freedom for others rests upon the nature of humans as social, as relational creatures. It is freedom for another that is given by God. In this way, freedom for others is ultimately freedom for God. Although Bonhoeffer does not give a concrete picture of what freedom for others looks like in the world, in this work, he does hint at it and provide direction in the depiction of Jesus Christ. This is present most in Bonhoeffer’s discussion of the term sicut deus, which roughly translates to “being as god.” This appears when the serpent tells Eve that by eating the fruit, she will not die, rather she will become like God – sicut deus. 108 Bonhoeffer writes somewhat cryptidly, “Imago dei – humankind in the image of God in being for God and the neighbor, in its original creatureliness and limitedness; sicut deus – humankind similar to God in knowing-out-of-its-own-self about good and evil,
107 Ibid. 67.
108 Genesis 3:4-5
in having no limit and acting-out-of-its-own-resources.” 109 Here, he contrasts the two ways of humankind’s being godlike: imago dei and sicut deus. Imago dei, being created in the image of God, is what humans are, according to Bonhoeffer. Sicut deus is what humans unfortunately attempt to become. This quotation indicates that the ideal, intended state of humankind, imago dei, is firmly linked to being for God and, newly phrased, for the neighbor. It also implies that the state of fallen man, sicut deus, changes that. It morphs created freedom into limitless but also directionless freedom. Bonhoeffer does not claim that contemporary humans are stuck being sicut deus. He only implies that this is the worse alternative, the contrast to that for which one should be striving. Using the terminology of “neighbor” also gives a new sense to being for others. “Others” now has a concrete form. The idea of a relationship with a neighbor carries with it many connotations from both the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, chief among them in Bonhoeffer’s mind, Jesus Christ’s actions. Indeed, Bonhoeffer writes, “Imago dei, sicut deus, agnus dei – the human being who is God incarnate, who was sacrificed for humankind sicut deus, in true divinity slaying its false divinity and restoring the imago dei.” 110 Agnus dei, God’s lamb, and God incarnate in human form both clearly refer to Jesus Christ. From that, it is clear that Bonhoeffer believes that Jesus lived and died as he did in order to show humans that sicut deus is not truly how humans are. Instead, humans are imago dei: free for others and for God. Mentioned earlier, the quotation, “Because God in Christ is free for humankind, because God does not keep God’s freedom to God’s self, we can think of freedom only as a ‘being free
109 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 113.
110 Ibid.
for. . . .’” 111 has renewed importance. Jesus is free for others, namely humans. This is God’s intention for Jesus. It is because of Jesus’ example of freedom for others that humans can see freedom as relational, as being freedom for others. 112 If there were doubt about the significance of Jesus and freedom, Bonhoeffer writes near the end of the work, “The tree of life, the cross of Christ, the center of God’s world that is fallen but upheld and preserved – that is what the end of the story about paradise is for us.” 113
Each symbol mentioned here points to freedom, which points to the utter centrality of freedom in Genesis for Bonhoeffer. The tree of life is a symbol of humans’ freedom to disobey but also their obligation to obey due to their freedom for God. The cross of Christ stands for Jesus’ ultimate and necessary manifestation of human nature as imago dei, or being for others. Finally, the center of God’s world calls back to the notion that God is the center of the world, because it is God’s look that allows humans to live and freely praise their Creator. These symbols all indicate the importance of freedom for the world, in Bonhoeffer’s eyes. Because he writes that these representations are what Genesis is about, it is fair to infer that, for Bonhoeffer, Genesis is ultimately about freedom.
This brings us to the paradox of the post Fall world, according to Bonhoeffer. He claims that, “Humankind dies from knowing good and evil. . . . What does it mean
111 Ibid. 63.
112 Rasmussen also sees the connection between Jesus, being for others, and human beings, but he explicitly places the ultimate significance on Jesus. He writes that, “[Being-for-others] is the essence of being Christ,” and, further, that, “Bonhoeffer’s anthropology is based in his Christology.” This is one example of why Rasmussen believes Christology is the key to understanding Bonhoeffer’s actions. My approach, however, breaks Rasmussen’s idea down even further (being for others) and continues on to find freedom at the ultimate core. In a way, Rasmussen’s argument implicitly aligns with mine, as he explains that “[the unity of Bonhoeffer’s Christology, anthropology, and ecclesiology] is the being-therefor-others; this is grounded in reality itself.” This is, to a degree, what I argue. Rasmussen, however, chooses to focus on Christology instead of the ontological idea itself. See Rasmussen, 19 and 21.
113 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 146.
to be dead? It does not mean the abolition of one’s being a creature. Instead it means no longer being able to live before God, and yet having to live before God.” 114 He writes this when he explains what it means that humans will die by eating from the tree of knowledge. Crucial here is the notion that by knowing good and evil, after the Fall, humans cannot live with God, in such a relationship to God as they had before. They are not as connected to God as they were, having temporarily lost their selfidentification as imago dei. Now they have chosen to be sicut deus. This is not to say that the imago dei identity is forever gone. With Jesus, humankind again has a role model of being for others, being imago dei. It is this possibility of return that means that humans must live with and before God. Humans cannot escape the Creator to created relationship. Similarly, Bonhoeffer comments that, “The world is changed and destroyed in that human beings in their dividedness can no longer live with God, with one another, and with nature; yet, in this dividedness between tob and ra, they also cannot live without God, without one another, and without nature.” 115 Here, Bonhoeffer extends the paradox to living with and without others and the world. All the forms of created, human freedom hang in the balance. They are both impossible and utterly necessary. Creation and Fall stops here. The most concrete solution or step toward a solution that Bonhoeffer offers is following in Jesus Christ’s path. The question for Bonhoeffer’s life becomes, in a sense, how to be free for others, how to live for others in a fallen world.
Thus, Creation and Fall presents a theological interpretation of human freedom and creatureliness. Genesis, to Bonhoeffer, is about freedom. It is in God’s freedom
114 Ibid. 90.
115 Ibid. 135.
that the world begins. When humans are created, the way in which God creates them in God’s image is by giving them freedom. This freedom is conditioned and, as such, must be for others. These ideas of freedom and being for others make up the foundation on which Bonhoeffer’s theological obligation to politically resist the Nazi government is based. It is important to remember that Bonhoeffer’s exegesis is a constructive theological interpretation, as discussed in the Chapter 1, and, as such, is relevant when discussing Bonhoeffer’s decisions. Because of its methodological approach, it is appropriate to look to this theology when determining Bonhoeffer’s motivations for later action. For this reason, I argue that the concepts of freedom and being for others, as articulated in Creation and Fall, are the theological basis of Bonhoeffer’s political action.
Chapter V: Adding Responsibility and Reality: Ethics
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics builds on the foundation that Creation and Fall laid. In Ethics, Bonhoeffer begins to answer the question posed at the end of the last chapter: how to be free for others in a concrete sense. The connection between the works is evident by the continued importance of freedom in Ethics. In this later work, however, Bonhoeffer links freedom to a new concept: responsibility. He associates responsibility, in turn, with two more ideas: vicarious representative action and reality. By doing so, he pushes his theological foundation to a more tangible place. This chapter concerns itself with these ideas.
It is undeniable that freedom remains a crucial theological concept in Ethics This comes across in several instances, one of which being Bonhoeffer’s discussion of suicide. He writes,
The freedom in which humans have their bodily life allows them freely to affirm this life and at the same time points them beyond bodily life; this freedom allows them to understand bodily life both as a gift to preserve and as a sacrifice to offer. Only because human beings are free for death can they give up their bodily lives for the sake of a higher good. Without the freedom to sacrifice one’s life in death there would be no freedom for God, and there would be no human life. 116
Although this is a new iteration of Bonhoeffer’s concept of freedom, the fundamentals hold true. Beginning with the last clause, it is clear that freedom is something essential to being human. By emphasizing the word “human,” Bonhoeffer is clear that the notion of humanity is inextricably tied to freedom. Without freedom, there might be life, but it
116 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 6: Ethics, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Scott, ed. Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 197.
would not be human life, according to him. This echoes what he wrote in Creation and Fall about created freedom being something unique to the imago dei creature.
Returning to the beginning of the passage, the notion that bodily life is a gift and a sacrifice subtly harkens back to creation. Bonhoeffer claims that bodily life is a gift from God, as is the freedom to end that bodily life. In ending one’s life, one exercises one’s human freedom both by freely acting and by freely choosing something for which to end one’s life. In this, Bonhoeffer again highlights the idea that freedom is freedom for something. Humans can be free for death or for a moral value or social cause, although Bonhoeffer makes it clear that the best thing to be free for is God. Earlier in the work, Bonhoeffer explicitly states, “It is critical, however, that this relative freedom not be confused with an absolute freedom for God and for our neighbor, a freedom that is created and given only by God’s word itself.” 117 This shows that while the freedom to commit suicide is a freedom, it is not absolute freedom. It is still important to note that the characteristics of created freedom exist in it, but Bonhoeffer wants it noted that the ideal freedom is for God and for other people. In this quotation, Bonhoeffer again shows that his notion of freedom from Creation and Fall continues in Ethics. He builds on the notion of freedom with relation to the obedience noted in Creation and Fall when he writes,
The freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one among countless possibilities. Instead, it consists precisely in the complete simplicity of his action, for which there are never several possibilities, conflicts, or alternatives, but always only one. Jesus calls this one option the will of God. There is only one will of God. In it, the origin has been regained. It is the source of freedom and simplicity in everything that is done. 118
117 Ibid. 174.
118 Ibid. 313.
Here, Bonhoeffer distinguishes again between common freedom, or the freedom to choose, and absolute freedom which is the relation to God and others. Similarly to his exegesis of Genesis, Jesus acts as a role model with regard to the appropriate use of created freedom. In this passage, the notion of simplicity parallels the notion of obedience in Creation and Fall. Here, freedom is obedience to God. It is being for God and not for the world. In a way, because Jesus’ actions are simply obeying the will of God, he is free from the world of choice and struggle. This is one way in which one can understand what it means to be free from the world, as described in Creation and Fall. Looking ahead, we see hints of the moral relativism often associated with Bonhoeffer’s later works, which is deeply connected to his understandings of both obedience and reality. By claiming that there is truly only one path to follow, that of God’s will, Bonhoeffer argues for two seemingly opposing characteristics of life. By always following God’s will, one is always obedient to God, and correctly using one’s freedom for God. God’s will is related to reality, as we will see later, and this reality is constantly changing. As such, a correctly acting free human will constantly obey God and simultaneously constantly respond to reality, without regard for supposed moral truisms. This passage serves here as a hint of what lies ahead, as I will treat this topic in more detail later in the chapter. What is most important to understand is that freedom remains a foundational category for Bonhoeffer through to the period in which he writes Ethics
In addition to the individual aspects of freedom that stay constant between Creation and Fall and Ethics, Bonhoeffer firmly upholds the notion that freedom means being for others, and, in Ethics, this gets a new name: responsibility. He writes,
“Responsibility and freedom are mutually corresponding concepts. Responsibility presupposes freedom substantively–not chronologically–just as freedom can exist only in the exercise of responsibility. Responsibility is human freedom that exists only by being bound to God and neighbor.”
119 In this passage, he firmly links responsibility and freedom together. Bonhoeffer acknowledges that one cannot be responsible without freedom, and, as such, freedom is a precursor to responsibility in a person. Acting with or because of freedom, however, he explains, cannot occur if the action is not responsible. For Bonhoeffer, responsibility is, by definition, relational freedom. The last sentence is crucial to linking responsibility to freedom to being for others. Here, Bonhoeffer uses his old terminology of “being bound to God and neighbor,” again echoing language in Creation and Fall. This being bound is the same as being for another, and, as such, Bonhoeffer connects the three concepts tightly together. The importance he places on relationships emerges again when he argues that “a human being necessarily lives in encounter with other human beings and that this encounter entails being charged, in ever so many ways, with responsibility [Verantwortung] for the other human being. History arises out of accepting this responsibility for other human beings or for entire communities or groups of communities.” 120 Bonhoeffer explicitly states that living in relation to others is an essential part of human existence. He also explains that one’s relationships require of one responsible action with regard to the other. Thus, for Bonhoeffer, being for others, seen through responsible action, is an inescapable part of being human. 121
119 Ibid. 283.
120 Ibid. 220.
121 Rasmussen too connects Bonhoeffer’s acts of resistance to his idea of responsibility. Although our understandings of Bonhoeffer’s notion of responsibility more or less agree, he interprets freedom in a 56
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer elaborates a great deal on responsibility, its definition and its consequences. He organizes responsible action in the following way, stating,
The structure of responsible life is determined in a twofold manner, namely, by life’s bond to human beings and to God, and by the freedom of one’s own life. It is this bond of life to human beings and to God that constitutes the freedom of our own life. Without this bond and without this freedom there can be no responsibility. Only the life that, within this bond, has become selfless has the freedom of my very own life and action. This bond has the form of vicarious representative action and accordance with reality [Wirklichkeitsgemäßheit] Freedom exhibits itself in my accountability [Selbstzurechnung] for my living and acting, and in the venture [Wagnis] of concrete decision. This, then, is the framework [Disposition] within which we have to consider the structure of responsible life. 122
He begins by arguing for the equation of freedom to responsibility through being for God and others, as seen above. He does add to his definition of responsibility the idea of selflessness. By being selfless, one can act freely and responsibly. In this passage, he terms the relation between humans and God a “bond,” which maintains the concept of freedom binding humans to God. Bonhoeffer goes on to note two essential building blocks of this bond: vicarious representative action, which includes accountability, and accordance with reality, which includes the venture of concrete decision. According to Bonhoeffer, in order to fulfill the bond between God and humans, one must take part in vicarious representative action and in reality. The next paragraph will focus on the former, while the latter will be dealt with later in the chapter.
very different manner. He draws the concept only from The Cost of Discipleship and Ethics, thus identifying it solely with the question of obedience and liberty. I find this interpretation to be lacking in its grasp of the theological importance and origin of Bonhoeffer’s concept. See Rasmussen, 37-50. Green, in contrast, articulates a notion of freedom that corresponds more closely to my interpretation of Bonhoeffer. He writes that freedom should be understood “not as arbitrary action but modeled on God’s freedom for humanity and embodied in freedom to love the neighbor and to serve the community.” See Green, 43.
122 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 257.
From this passage, all we can understand is that vicarious representative action and accountability are linked to each other and are essential to responsible action. Bonhoeffer expands on this notion, writing,
Responsibility is based on vicarious representative action [Stellvertretung]. This is most evident in those relationships in which a person is literally required to act on behalf of others, for example, as a father, as a statesman, or as the instructor of an apprentice. A father acts on behalf of his children by working, providing, intervening, struggling, and suffering for them. In so doing, he really stands in their place. He is not an isolated individual, but incorporates the selves of several people in his own self. Every attempt to live as if he were alone is a denial of the fact that he is actually responsible. 123
Bonhoeffer begins by clearly associating responsibility with vicarious representative action. 124 The definition of the latter emerges in his concrete examples of vicarious representative actors. He explains that to perform vicarious representative actions involves acting “on behalf of others.” In this way, vicarious representative action entails being for others and being selfless, to a degree. In the example of the father, Bonhoeffer uses the preposition “for” after the action words, indicating that the father is acting for his children. This is not a new concept for Bonhoeffer, but rather a new way of stating his notion of being for others. What follows in this passage, however, is a new angle. He writes that the father “stands in [the children’s] place.” The vicarious representative actor takes on the lives of the people for which he is acting. This incorporates the relationality of human life into vicarious representative action. When one acts responsibly, one is not alone, rather one is necessarily acting for others in a way that intimately connects the actor with the others’ life. Being responsible for others means, for Bonhoeffer, living with full regard as to their needs and attempting to
123 Ibid. 257-258.
124 Lending authority to my interpretation, Green understands Bonhoeffer’s vicarious representative action in a similar manner. He also explicitly links it to Bonhoeffer’s actions, stating that, “For Bonhoeffer, vicarious representative action meant opposing National Socialism.” See Green, 43.
satisfy those needs to the point of losing the self, to a degree. Part of this losing of the self may include guilt in the eyes of the world, as evidenced by Bonhoeffer’s comment that, “the structure of responsible action involves both willingness to become guilty [Bereitschaft zur Schuldübernahme] and freedom.” 125 According to Bonhoeffer, one may become labeled as guilty when acting responsibly. The biographical parallel is unmistakable: being guilty according to the state’s laws while acting responsibly towards those persecuted by the state’s laws. Likewise, the logical parallel is clear: losing, or rather giving up, the self in order to responsibly exist for others leads necessarily to a disregard for the label of guilt imposed by society. Being willing to be guilty goes hand in hand with being for others through vicarious representative action. Once again, the ever-applicable role model resurfaces: Jesus. Bonhoeffer writes, “[Jesus] is the responsible human par excellence.” 126 Jesus acts for others through vicarious representative action. Just as the father takes on his children’s lives, God, through Jesus, takes on human life in order to act responsibly toward humanity. Jesus, according to Bonhoeffer and many others, willingly becomes guilty in the eyes of the state, thereby absorbing and removing the collective guilt of humanity. Here, Bonhoeffer uses the classic images and tropes of Jesus to show that free, responsible action has its basis in the divine.
The second part of responsibility is acting in “accordance with reality,” as Bonhoeffer wrote in the passage above. This is a topic that is not discussed in Creation and Fall but that is crucial to understanding how the theological foundation of that work connects to his later political actions. Ethics serves as a stepping-stone between
125 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 275.
126 Ibid. 232.
the purely theological Creation and Fall and the resistance activity that is so often categorized as entirely removed from theological thought. In this work, he develops the importance of reality to responsible action and, thus, freedom. In the passages that follow, Bonhoeffer lays out the connection between reality and responsibility, as well as the issue of moral relativity. He writes,
The moment a person accepts responsibility for other people–and only in so doing does the person live in reality–the genuine ethical situation arises. This is really something different from the abstract way in which people usually seek to come to terms with the ethical problem. The subject of the action is no longer the isolated individual, but the one who is responsible for other people. The action’s norm is not a universal principle, but the concrete neighbor, as given to me by God. The choice is made no longer between a clearly recognized good and a clearly recognized evil; instead, it is risked in faith while being aware that good and evil are hidden in the concrete historical situation. 127
When one is responsible for another person, one can no longer exist in the theoretical place in which predetermined moral and ethical principles apply. Because the relationship between people is ever changing and ever unique, those principles are irrelevant. One’s action must then be based on the other, on the reality of the given situation. In this passage, Bonhoeffer rejects the notion that the abstract should govern the lives of human beings. He argues that what is real and concrete is what should guide one’s actions. One must react to reality according to what is there. He continues,
To act out of concrete responsibility means to act in freedom–to decide, to act, to answer for the consequences of this particular action myself without the support of other people or principles. Responsibility presupposes ultimate freedom in assessing a given situation, in choosing, and in acting. Responsible action is neither determined from the outset nor defined once and for all; instead, it is born in the given situation. The point is not to apply a principle that eventually will be shattered by reality anyway, but to discern what is necessary or ‘commanded’ in a given situation. One must observe, weight, and judge the matter, all in the dangerous freedom of one’s own self. One must
127 Ibid. 221.
indeed enter the sphere of relativity, in the twilight that the historical situation casts over good and evil. 128
Here, Bonhoeffer persists in emphasizing the importance of acting in relation to reality and not with respect to static moral or ethical principles. It is clear from this passage, that, for Bonhoeffer, each situation presents a unique obligation and a different way in which to act responsibly. By appropriately responding to the situation, one acts responsibly and in freedom. One acts in freedom, because one can choose to disregard principles or other people. It is important to note that this does not contradict the earlier point about freedom not meaning choices, but instead meaning God’s will. Bonhoeffer is careful in the passages above to leave room for God’s direction. He calls the situation with the neighbor something “given to me by God.” Furthermore, his use of the word “commanded” in the second passage indicates a connection to obedience to God’s will. Although one must act in reaction to reality without regard for principles, this reaction can be based on direction from God, because God responds to reality as well. Throughout these passages, Bonhoeffer has been dancing around moral relativism without naming it, that is, until the end. The ideas of responding to reality and disregarding moral principles indicate a certain degree of understanding that morals are dependent on the situation. Indeed, the last sentence of the passage explicitly states that history obligates the actor to exist in “the sphere of relativity.”
129 It is crucial to understand that this does not mean anarchy for Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer’s brand of moral relativity exists only because of the strict obedience due to God. This is supported by Bonhoeffer’s comment that, “Action in accord with reality is limited by
128 Ibid. 221-222.
129 Green explicitly argues for the importance of understanding Bonhoeffer’s rejection of absolute human principles. It is because of this that Green believes Bonhoeffer was not a pacifist but rather had a peace ethic. See Green, 44.
our creatureliness. We do not create the conditions for our action but find ourselves already placed within them.” 130 Reality should not be thought of as human made. Responsible action is dependent upon human relations, but ultimately humans do not control those situations. Humans’ creatureliness, their being bound to God and to others, precludes their controlling God and others. In these ways, acting in accordance with reality is the crucial second half to acting responsibly through vicarious representative action.
Thus, Ethics expands on the theological foundations laid in Creation and Fall by adding to the notion of freedom the concepts of vicarious representative action and reality. In doing so, Bonhoeffer begins to give freedom and responsibility concrete manifestations in life. There is a sense of immediacy and tangibility that was not present in Creation and Fall. This is evident simply through the fact that Bonhoeffer pulls his discussion towards reality. It is also clear when he writes that,
There are occasions when, the course of historical life, the strict observance of the explicit law of a state, a corporation, a family, but also of a scientific discovery, entails a clash with the basic necessities of human life [Lebensnotwendigkeiten]. In such cases, appropriate responsible action departs from the domain governed by laws and principles, from the normal and regular, and instead is confronted with the extraordinary situation of ultimate necessities that are beyond any possible regulation by law. 131
Here, Bonhoeffer openly argues that, in order to act responsibly, it may be necessary to break laws of the state. It indicates that there are situations in reality that require one to become guilty in the eyes of the state if one desires to act for others. In case there were any question of this, Bonhoeffer explains that, “There can be no doubt that such necessities actually exist. To deny them would mean ceasing to act in accord with
130 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 267.
131 Ibid. 272-273.
reality.”
132 Thus, not only is law-breaking sometimes necessary for responsibility in the form of vicarious representative action, it is also sometimes necessary to appropriately respond to the reality of the situation. What is particularly notable here is that Bonhoeffer is speaking concretely and tangibly not only about worldly institutions that exist but also about the present time in which “such necessities actually exist.” This is a wholly other step from Creation and Fall, yet it is built on the same foundational concepts. Although Bonhoeffer does not name himself as such a law-breaker, it is not a far jump to make that he sees himself as acting responsibly in accordance with reality when he defied the Nazi government through the resistance movement.
As such, Ethics represents a shift in focus from Creation and Fall, while simultaneously maintaining the continuity of theological thought between the two works, and, consequently, throughout Bonhoeffer’s life. Ethics upholds the importance of freedom, as established in Creation and Fall, and adds to it the notions of responsibility, vicarious representative action, and reality. In this latter concept, Bonhoeffer’s move toward realism and historical awareness become evident. On the theological foundation of Creation and Fall, Ethics begins to construct a response to the concrete and the situational, which is continued in Letters and Papers from Prison.
132 Ibid. 273.