Article
“Putin’sWarofChoice”:U.S.Propagandaandthe Russia–UkraineInvasion
AaronHyzen*andHildeVandenBulck*
DepartmentofCommunication,CollegeofArtsandSciences,DrexelUniversity,Philadelphia,PA19104,USA * Correspondence:ah3739@drexel.edu(A.H.);hdv26@drexel.edu(H.V.d.B.)
Abstract: TheRussianinvasionofUkraineon24February2022ignitedpropagandaeffortsfrom theU.S.executivebranchofgovernmentandtheU.S.media,asthecountrytriedtopositionitself towardsthewarnotjustintheeyesofitscitizensbutoftheentireworldaspartofitsgeopolitical powerposition.AcomparativequantitativeandqualitativeanalysisofofficialU.S.communications andU.S.partisanmediacoverageinthefirstweekoftheinvasionaimstouncoverhowtheU.S. governmentsettheagendaandframedtheevents,andtowhatextentthemediacopiedordiverged fromthisagenda-settingandframing.Theresultssuggestanarrowfocusanddistinctframingonthe partoftheU.S.government,partlytakenoverbypartisanmedia.Thelatteralsotouchedonother topicsthatfitmedialogicandprovidedsomecounter-framesinlinewiththeirideologicalpositions, yetoverallconfirmedthedominantframingofthewarasunjust,unprovokedandpremeditated,as Putin’schoice,andthepositionoftheU.S.astheleaderofthefreeworldanddefenderofdemocracy.
Keywords: propaganda;warpropaganda;governmentpropaganda;agenda-setting;framing; Ukraine;Russia;U.S.A.
1.Introduction
Citation: Hyzen,Aaron,andHilde VandenBulck.2024.“Putin’sWarof Choice”:U.S.Propagandaandthe Russia–UkraineInvasion. Journalism andMedia 5:233–254. https:// doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia5010016
AcademicEditor:AndreuCaseroRipollés
Received:10November2023
Revised:17January2024
Accepted:12February2024
Published:21February2024
Copyright: © 2024bytheauthors. LicenseeMDPI,Basel,Switzerland. Thisarticleisanopenaccessarticle distributedunderthetermsand conditionsoftheCreativeCommons Attribution(CCBY)license(https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).
“AmericanpeoplearestandingwiththepeopleofUkraineastheysufferanunjustified, unprovoked,andpremeditatedattackbyRussia’smilitaryforces”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.2). WhenRussiainvadedUkraineon24February2022,itignitedreactionsaroundtheglobe. TheU.S.hadtopositionitselftowardsthewarnotjustintheeyesofitscitizensbutofthe entireworldaspartofitsgeopoliticalpowerposition.Thisstudyprovidesacomparative quantitativeandqualitativeanalysisofofficialcommunicationfromtheexecutivebranch oftheU.S.governmentandU.S.partisanmediacoverageinthefirstweekofthewarasa propagandacampaign,aimedatsettingtheagendaandframingthepositionoftheU.S. towardstheeventswithaneyetoaffectpublicopinion.
Apowerfulmeanstotailorandcontrolpublicopinion,propagandaisrarelymore urgentandimportantthanintimesofwar,forthecountrieshavinganarmedconflictand fortheiralliesandenemies.Propagandahaslongbeenrecognizedasaforcefulwarweapon. Forexample,intheearly1930s,PolandproposedtotheLeagueofNationstoenact“moral disarmament”,specificallypropaganda,seentoincitepublicopiniontoaggression.The SovietUnionsimilarlyproposedtoban“ideologicalaggression”(Murty 1968,pp.233–34). Currently,theU.N.’sInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,akeyhuman rightstreaty,statesinArticle20,“Anypropagandaforwarshallbeprohibitedbylaw”.
Regardless,wartimesarerifewithpropagandaasgovernmentsandmediaengage intheirownandarewaryoftheirenemies’propagandacampaigns.Attheoutsetof theRussian–Ukrainewar,inearly2022March,RussianmediaoutletRTNewswasdeplatformedinmanypartsoftheworldtoavoidRussianpropaganda“polluting”mindsor contradictinghomepropaganda(Roettgers 2022).Followingsuit,Russiabannedandcut accesstoWesternnewsmedia,includingCNN,CBS,DWandBBCNews(Sherwoodand Milmo 2022).
Warexacerbatesthecomplexrelationshipsbetweengovernmentsandnewsmediathat allexpressideologicalgoalsandcommitments.Governmentsrecognizetheimportance ofpropaganda,investvastresourcesincommunicationandneedthemediatogettheir messagesout.Thenewsmedia,inturn,relyheavilyonthegovernmentforinformation, sourcesandaccesstowarzonesbuthavetheirownpoliticalagendaandinformationgoals, potentiallycreatingtensionbetweentruthandloyalties.OneyearintotheRussian–Ukraine conflict,TheGuardian(Koshiw 2023,par.1)reportedthefollowing:
Afteravoidingcriticismoftheauthoritiesatthestartofthewar,Ukrainian journalistshavebegunreportingallegationsofcorruptionbyofficialsagain.But wartimecensorshipandthearmy’sroleinprotectingtheircountryfroman existentialthreathasmadereportingonthemilitaryachallenge.
TheU.S.isrelatedtotheconflictastheself-proclaimed“leaderofthefreeworld”and withmanypoliticalandeconomicinterestsatstake.Sincethe2014Russianannexationof Crimea,someidentifytheRussia–Ukraineconflictasaproxywarbetween“Russiaand theWest(theUnitedStates,NATO,andmemberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion)”(Hughes 2014,p.106; Foster 2022).Therefore,theU.S.requiredpropagandacampaignstodeclareits positiontowards,evaluationofandactionsrelatingtothewarasamessagetoitscitizens, tothewarringpartiesandtoitsallies.Assuch,itprovidesaninterestingcasetounderstand howpropagandaoperatesinthe21st Century.
Scholarshaveidentifiedpropagandadisseminationasfarbackas300B.C.(Murty 1968)anduptotheupsurgeofmediaandcommunicationnetworksinthe20thand21st centuries(JowettandO’Donnell 2019).Recentpropagandastudies(Bakiretal. 2019; HowardandKollanyi 2016; WardleandDerakhshan 2018; WoolleyandHoward 2016, 2017) focusondevelopmentsinbigdata,algorithmsandwiderAIwithindigitalnetworks.The affordancesofdigitaltechnologieshaveincreasedthecapabilitiesofinformationwarfare (DiPietroetal. 2021),politicalcommunication,computationalpropaganda(Woolleyand Howard 2016; WoolleyandHoward 2017)andpropagandathroughsocialmedia(Wanless andBerk 2017).Theyallowrapid,cheapandendlessrepetitionofpropagandaacross mediaplatforms(Hyzen 2023a).Nevertheless,legacymedia,includingtelevision,remain consequentialinpropagandadisseminationandparticularlyinwarpropaganda,thecase weanalyzehere.
Knightley’s(2004)seminal TheFirstCasualty arguesthattheU.S.governmenthas becomeincreasinglysuccessfulinwarpropagandaandinmanagingthemedia,especially sincethe1993GulfWar,asawealthofliteratureillustrates(Hiebert 2003; Boyd-Barrett 2004; DeFranco 2012; MacArthur 2004). HermanandChomsky’s(1988)propaganda modelpredictscollusionbetweengovernmentandmassmediatofilteroutinformation unfavorabletoeliteinterests.Recentscholarshiphasupdatedthemodeltoaccountforthe contemporarymediaecologyandforadditionalfilters(Boyd-Barrett 2017; Pedro-Caranana etal. 2018; Klaehnetal. 2018; Hyzen 2023b).Specifically,wearguethat“LegalStanding”, i.e.,legalityvs.illegality,actsasanideologicalframeforpropagandapurposes,especially intimesofwar(Hyzen 2023b).
Combiningpropagandastudieswithinsightsintorelationshipsbetweenjournalists/mediaandelite(government)sources,wearguethatcontemporaryexamplesof wartimepropagandarepresentaformofimmediatepropagandathatoriginatesfromthe governmentandmediathatrelyontheindexingpower(Bennett 1990)oftheirinteractionstosettheagendaofwhataspectsofthewararetalkedaboutandtoinfluencehow theyaretalkedabout.Weshowhowthecasefitsaconceptualizationofpropagandaasa tangibleexpressionofideologyaimedatenforcingideologicalgoals,managingopinion andconsolidatingloyalties.Specifically,howpropagandaisnotnecessarilylimitedto mis/disinformationbutincludesfactualinformationandcanemphasizethetruthifthat bestservestheoverallstrategy(Hyzen 2021).Theopeningquoteholdsanumberoftruths: manyAmericansstandwithUkraine,thewararguablydoesnotfollowtherulesofa justwar,andtheinvasionmusthavebeenplanned.Yet,themessageishighlycharged,
ideologicalpropaganda,forinstanceinstatingthewarwasentirelyunprovoked,aswe willdiscuss.
Afterthisintroduction,weprovideatheoreticalexplorationoftheseissues,resulting inthreebroadresearchquestions.Next,weexplorethequestionsempiricallyforthefirst weekofthewar(2/24-3/3/2022),whenpropagandaisexpectedtoreflecttheinformational andideologicalprioritiesofinterestedparties,i.e.,theU.S.governmentandnewsmedia, toestablishpremises,narrativesandperceptions,i.e.,frametheconflictmovingforward. Wecombineaquantitativeanalysisofthewar-relatedtopicscovered(agenda-setting)and aqualitativeanalysisoftheframingofthesetopicsinofficialpressbriefingsoftheWhite HouseandStateDepartmentandinasampleofwarcoverageinpartisanU.S.cablenews programs, CNNnewsroom and FoxNewsSpecialReport.Thepaperconcludeswithreflections onhowthiscasefitscurrentunderstandingsofpropagandaandstate–mediarelationships.
2.TheoreticalFramework
2.1.PropagandaandWar
Propagandaisameansofcommunicationtospreadideasandachieveideological goals.Assuch,itisanexpressionofpower(Hyzen 2021,p.3483).Here,ideologyis conceivedofintwoparts: Martin’s(2015)conciseprogramofvalues+beliefs=opinion and Williams (1975)definitionasacoherent,assumedornaturalizedsetofinterlocking beliefs,ideasandconcepts.Thus,propagandaisamethodtospreadideas,aswellas enforceandcoherentlystabilizeideologicalviewsandattitudestostrategicallymanage opinionandtosecure“loyalties”(Price 1994).Forexample,establishingthatthewar was“unprovoked”restsuponsecuringthepremiseofwhenthewarbegan,whetherin February2022orwhetherearliereventswarrantinclusionintheconflict.U.S.officialsand mediacarefullyselectoreliminateprioreventstosupportideologicalviewscogenttotheir propagandagoal.Somescholarssubscribetopropaganda’snegativeconnotations(Benkler etal. 2018,p.28),whilewetakeaneutralpositiontowardspropagandaasanobjectof studyandcommunicationstrategy(Hyzen 2021; Bernays 1928/2005).
Contemporaryliteratureconsiderspropagandaasubsetofstrategiccommunication (Hallahanetal. 2007; Zerfassetal. 2018).Ontheinternational(geo-)politicalstage, Murty (1968)characterizespropagandacampaignsbetweenstatesas“ideologicalaggression”,an aspectofwarfare.Similarly,propagandahasbeenidentifiedasamodeofpsychological warfareorinformationwarfare,toestablish“informationdominance”(Libicki 1995,p.88), asoftpowertactictoachievepoliticalgoalsalongsidehardpowermilitaryoperations (Nye 2004).Assuch,itisanimportanttoolinproxywars,i.e.,asinthecaseoftheU.S. involvementintheRussia–Ukraineconflict(Boyd-Barrett 2021).
Governmentorstatepropagandaisnevermore“urgent”andacknowledgedthan intimesofwar.Lasswell’s PropagandaTechniqueintheWorld War(1927/2013)provides aroadmapforwarpropagandaoperationstoservebroadstrategicaims,whichremain astuteandrelevanttoourcase.Lasswellarguedthethreechiefcomponentsofwarare militarypressure,economicpressureandpropaganda(p.9).Heidentifiesfourmain strategicobjectivesofpropagandaintimesofwar:tomobilizehatredagainsttheenemy; preservethefriendshipoftheallies;preservethefriendshipand,ifpossible,procurethe co-operationofneutrals;anddemoralizetheenemy(p.195).Totheseaims,propaganda hasdualuse,messagesaimedatdemoralizationanddestabilizationofpublicsupportofan enemyalsoservethepurposeofdomesticmobilizationandsupportforwarfare(Bolinetal. 2016).Theseprinciples,likewise,applytocountriesinvolvedinproxywars(Boyd-Barrett 2021).Weargue,furthermore,thatsuchpropagandareachesbothintendedandunintended audienceswithvariableconsequences(Hyzen 2023a).
BernayssharpenedLasswell’sprogramtoestablishsixprinciplesofstrategyforwar propaganda:
1. Fastenthewarguiltontheenemy.
2. Claimunityandvictory,inthenameofhistoryanddeity.
3. Statewaraims[...]Security,peace,abettersocialorder,internationallaws[...].
4. Strengthenthebeliefofthepeoplethattheenemyisresponsibleforthewar,with examplesoftheenemy’sdepravity.
5. Makethepublicbelievethatunfavorablenewsisreallyenemylies.Thiswillprevent disunityanddefeatism.
6. Followthiswithhorrorstories[which]shouldbemadetosoundauthoritative. (Bernays 1942,p.236)
Crucially,thesestrategicgoalscannotbeachievedonlythroughmis/disinformation, partofthebroadcategoryof“fakenews”thatpropagandatendstogetlumpedinwith (e.g., Wardle 2018; WardleandDerakhshan 2018).Thoughmis/disinformationwilllikely bedeployedintheprocessofapropagandacampaign,factsandtruthsplayanequalifnot moreimportantrole(Hyzen 2023a).Officialspokespersonsdonotsimplyproduceoutright liesastheyareprecarious—ifrevealedtheycandamagethepropagandist’sgoals—but carefullycraftinformationintostrategicnarratives(Schmitt 2018).Theimportantworkof propagandaistoplacetruthswithindistortedandmanipulatedcontexts,torepetitively emphasizefavorablefacts,whiledownplayingunfavorableinformationtoachievethe desiredideologicalgoal.Assuch,itisimportanttoanalyzetheveracityofpropaganda claimsandpremises.Thispositionsapropagandamessagevis à vismisinformation,i.e., mistakenlyconvenedinaccurateinformation,anddisinformation,i.e.,purposelyconvened inaccurateinformation.Importantly,propagandaservestobringthetargettowardsthe truthorawayfromthetruthinmorenuancedways(Hyzen 2023a).Ofcourse,“thetruth” isalarger,morecomplexconstructionthanfactsortrueinformation,asitcaninvolveboth omissionsandinterpretationsr.
Thesereflectionsresultinthebroadresearchquestion(RQ1):howdoestheU.S.governmentpropagatetheRussia–Ukrainewaranditsinvolvementinit?(Whatpropaganda strategiescanbeidentified?)
2.2.StatePropagandaandtheMedia
Newsmediaremaininvaluableforgovernmentstodisseminateanddistributetheir propaganda,especiallyintimesofwar,withboththestateandmediaaimingto“setthe agenda”.Agenda-setting(McCombsandShaw 1972)referstohowthemediachoosenews items:particularissuesareemphasizedwhereasothersaremarginalized,choicesthat influencepublicopinion(DeFranco 2012,p.10).However,governments,too,attemptto affectnewsprevalence,drawingattentiontoordeflectingfromcertainaspectsofawar and/oracountry’sinvolvement. Lippmann (1957)reflectsthattruepropagandarequired “someformofcensorship[ ]accesstotherealenvironmentmustbelimited,beforeanyone cancreateapseudo-environment”(p.43).Likewise, HermanandChomsky (1988)argued thatinformationisomittedfrommainstreammediathroughpressurefrompowerinterests tosupportpropagandacampaigns.Assuch,wartimeagenda-settingbygovernmentsand mediaisasmuchdeflectingattentionasmanipulatingtheprevalenceofinformation.
Understandingtherelationshipbetweentheexecutivebranchandthefourthestateof themedia,meanttoholddemocraticgovernmentaccountable,hasbeenthesubjectofmuch research. Bennett (2004)identifiesfourfactorsthataffecttheserelationships:ajournalist’s personalandprofessionalvalues,organizationalroutines,economic(businessmodel) constraints,andinformationandcommunicationtechnologycharacteristics.Sourcing routinesespeciallyhavereceivedconsiderablescholarlyattention(e.g., Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Broersmaetal. 2013; Berkowitz 2019),showinghowtheneedforcredibility resultsinastrongrelianceonelitesources,includingpoliticalelitesandotherstateand governmentofficials(Schudson 2002).Journalists’andthemedia’sideologicalpositions, businessconsiderationsandtime–spacerestraintsaffectthisrelianceonelitesources,next totheparticularnewstopic.Whetherthesemedia–elitesourcerelationshipsareamatter of“dueling,dancingordominating”(Carlson 2009,p.526)remainsatopicofdebate. However,empiricalresearchconfirms Bennett’s(1990)notionofindexing,i.e.,U.S.news media’stendencytofollowelitesources’takeonanissue,especiallywhenthereisrelative consensusamongstpoliticalelites.Theserelationshipsareofparticularrelevanceintimesof
crisis,suchaswar(Mermin 1999; McChesney 2002; Kennis 2009),whenmediacanbecome lesscritical,particularlyintheearlydaysofamilitaryconflict,thefocusofourstudy.
Officialpressbriefingsfromexecutivegovernmentbranchesconstitutecrucialspaces forjournaliststoobtainviewsonanissuefromelitepoliticalsourcesand,thus,powerful momentsforgovernmentstoobtainthedesirableideologicalpositioningsinthemedia, whosecoveragethenhelpssettheagenda.Thisspaceisthemedia’sdomainandisa capacitythegovernmentseekstoutilizetodisseminateitspropaganda.ThoughtheU.S.is notadirectmilitaryparticipantintheRussia–Ukrainewar,previousstudieshaveshown theU.S.hastreatedthelonger-standingRussia–Ukraineconflictsasaproxywarinwhich ithasvestedinterest,fundingpro-UkrainianpropagandacampaignsfollowingtheRussian annexationofCrimea(Bolinetal. 2016).Sincethe2014invasion,theU.S.hasclosely coordinatedpropagandanarrativesandcommunicationswiththeUkrainiangovernment andwithrespectivenewsmedia(Boyd-Barrett 2017).Thecurrentconflictisexpectedto showacontinuationofsuchoperations.
Theseconsiderationsleadtotheresearchquestion(RQ2):towhatextentdotheU.S. mediapickupU.S.governmentpropagandaattemptstosettheagenda?
2.3.WarPropaganda:StrategiesandTactics
Propagandafunctionsthroughthe“repetitionofsuchideologicalredescriptions, values+beliefscanbecodifiedintoopinionfavorabletotheideologicalgoalsofalarger strategy”(Hyzen 2023a,p.7).Thebroaderideologicalstrategyofmanagingopinionis largerthanasinglepropagandamessageorspecificcampaignandcontainsimmediate andlong-termgoals,butallrelyonrepetitionanddissemination.Propagandaisahighly flexibleendeavorofmanipulating“significantsymbols”(Lasswell 1927,p.627).Oneway tounderstandhowthecombinationofmanipulationofsignificantsymbolsandrepetition playsacrucialroleinthesuccessfuldisseminationofwarpropagandaisthroughthelens offraming.
Bennet’sindexingmodel,likeHermanandChomsky’spropagandamodel,emphasizes thatthedominanceofelitesourcesnotonlydetermineswhatmediatalkaboutbuthow theytalkabout(i.e.,frame)it,bylimiting“therangeofvoicesandviewpointsinbothnews andeditorialsaccordingtotherangeofviewsexpressedinmainstreamgovernmentdebate” (Bennett 1990,p.106).Thisreflectshegemonicnotionsofhowthesesourcesmanageto settheframesinwhichnewsstoriesarediscussed(Gitlin 1980).Framingisdefinedby Entman (1993)as“aprocesswherebyaframesuggestswhichaspectsofrealityareselected, rejected,emphasized,ormodified[providing}theaudiencewithcontextandsuggested meaning”(p.52).WhileEntmanemphasizedtheframingprocesstakingplaceinthe media,governmentpropagandalikewiseconstitutesaframingprocessthatmayprecede ordevelopalongsidemediaframing.Bychoosingwhattoemphasizeandwhattoomit, framingingovernmentpropagandaandmediacoverageinfluencescitizensbysuggesting ameaningthatresultsfrompowerrelations.
Framinganalysisisanestablishedmethodinpoliticalcommunication(DeVreese 2005)andhasbeenappliedtopropaganda(Cozma 2015; Manzooretal. 2019; Andersen andSandberg 2020).Qualitativeframinganalysisemphasizesframesasexpressionsof ideologicalprocessesthatgeneralizeinnewsthemesandtopics(Reese 2010).Thisis coherentwithourconceptionofpropagandadissemination.Framinganalysisgivesinsight intotheessentialelementsofamessage,reasoningdevices,thataredirectlylinkedtothe functionsofframingbyidentifyingtheproblem,causes,moralevaluationandsolutionor treatment(Entman 1993).Furthermore,framingwellcapturesrepetition,anessentialtactic ofpropaganda.
Indexing,asanexplanatorymodelforhowthedisseminationofstatepropaganda throughmediaispossible,hasbeentestedespeciallyforU.S.mainstream/legacymedia coverageofinternationalaffairs,conflictsandwars(Hallin 1994; Bennett 1990, 2004, 2019; Bennettetal. 2007). Entman’s(2003)cascadingactivationmodelsuggeststhat,asevents suchasaconflictorwarprogress,journalistsarenotpassiverecipientsofgovernment
propaganda,incorporatingtheirandtheiraudiences’interpretationsintotheirframing. Yet,itconfirmsthehegemonicborderswithinwhichsuch“dissent”takesplace,similarto HermanandChomsky’smodel,andEntman’smodeldoesnotunderminetheideathat governmentsourcesarecentraltoframingaconflictorcrisisatitsoutset,thetopicof thisstudy.
Thisresultsinthefinalbroadresearchquestion(RQ3):howdotheU.S.governmentandU.S.mediaframetheRussia–Ukrainewarandhowaregovernmentandmedia framingrelated?
3.CaseSet-Up:MaterialsandMethods
ToapplythetheoreticalconsiderationstotheoriginalpositioningoftheU.S.towards theRussian–Ukrainianwarintheearlydaysoftheconflict,wefocusonthefirstweek ofthewar(2/24-3/3/2022)whentheU.S.executivebranchandmediabuiltadistinct campaigntopositiontheU.S.,toindicatewhattheprioritieswere(agenda-setting)and howtointerpretthem(framing).
3.1.Sampling
3.1.1.PressBriefings
ThepositioningbytheU.S.governmentisanalyzedthroughthepressbriefingsoftwo legsoftheU.S.executivepower:theWhiteHouse(hereafterWH),theofficialrepresentation ofthePresident,gearedatdomesticaudiencesandinternationalobservers,andtheState Department(hereafterSD),thediplomaticlegoftheU.S.government.Transcriptsofthe sixpressbriefingsduringthatfirstweekwerecollected:2/24,2/28and3/3forWH,and 2/25,2/28and3/3forSD.Thesebriefingstypicallystartwithofficialpositionstatements fromtherespectiveexecutivebranch,followedbyaQ&AwithjournalistsfromtheU.S. andsomeforeignmedia.
3.1.2.MediaCoverage
Legacynewsmedia,especiallytelevisionnews,remaincrucialinwarreportingand, thus,intheprocessofcreatinganddisseminatingpropaganda.Toanalyzethemedia agenda-settingandframingandif/howtheyreflectgovernmentagenda-settingandframing,wefocusoncoverageofthewarinpartisanU.S.cablenetworks,CableNewsNetwork (CNN),considered(atthetime)tobeleftofcenter,andTheFoxNewsChannelorFoxNews, considered(conservative)rightofcenter.CNNisaU.S.-based,multinationalcablechannel, createdbyTedTurnerandownedbyWarnerBrosDiscoverythroughCNNGlobal.Fox NewsisaU.S.-based,multinationalcablenewstelevisionchannel,createdbyAustralianbornRupertMurdochandownedbyFoxCorporationthroughFoxNewsMedia. Theprogramsselectedforanalysisarethetwocablechannels’closestapproximations of“regular”newsprogramsonbroadcastchannels(Kimetal. 2022): CNNNewsroom forCNNand SpecialReportwithBretBaier forFoxNews,eachdailyprogramswitha durationof50min(commercialbreaksandannouncementsexcluded). CNNNewsroom reached696,000householdsand821,000viewersolderthantwointhefirstquarterof2022, theperiodthatincludesoursampleddays(https://ustvdb.com/networks/cnn/shows/ newsroom/). SpecialReportwithBretBaier onaveragehad2.87millionviewersinMarch 2022,thenthefifth-most-watchedprogramonFoxNews(Johnson 2022).
Toallowforbothquantitativeandqualitativeanalysis,forbothprograms,thesample waslimitedtotheepisodesof2/24,2/28and3/3.Allbroadcastswereprovidedbythe InternetArchive.
3.2.QuantitativeCodingandAnalysis
QuantitativecodingandanalysisaimedtofindwhataspectsoftheRussia–Ukraine warwerecoveredbythepressbriefingsandmedia.Tothisend,allcontentwastreated withthesamecodingschedulethatwasdeveloped,basedontheliteratureonwarand peacejournalismregardingconflictreporting(e.g., LynchandGaltung 2010)andonthe
dimensionsofandindicatorsforpropagandaintexts(verbalandvisualmediacoverage, officialstatements,etc.Foroverviews,see Zollmann 2015, 2019),nexttocodesreflectingthe institutionalandnon-institutionalactorsandissuespotentiallyinvolvedinthisparticular conflict.Thecodingscheduleallowedustoindicatewhetheranitemwasaboutthe warornotand,ifso,whattopicwascovered:battlefield,security,peace,sanctions,war justification,U.S.policies,UNpolicies,NATOpolicies,EUpolicies,civilians,refugees, nuclearhazard,misinformationandother.Briefingswerefurthercodedforwhetheran itemwaspartoftheopeningstatement(i.e.,agenda-settingbythegovernment)ortheQ&A, wherejournalistscoulddrawattentiontotopicsnotmentionedbygovernmentofficials,and whetherquestionsreceivedoff-oron-topicresponses.Briefingswerecodedforthenumber ofitemsandmediacoverageforthenumberofitemsandtime,asthelatterisasparse resourcethataffectsnewsselection.Allmaterialswerecodedbyoneoftheauthorsand10% ofthecoverageandbriefingswerecodedbytheotherauthor,showingKrippendorff’salpha intercoderreliabilityof0.8ormoreforallnominalvariables,indicatinghighagreement (DeSwert 2012).Alldataweresubmittedtodescriptivestatisticalanalysis.
3.3.QualitativeFramingAnalysis
Thequalitative,inductiveframinganalysisaimedtouncoverideologicalmessages, analyzinghowwar-relatedtopicsweretalkedaboutinpressbriefingsandmedia.Every meaningfulsectionofthebriefingsandcoveragewassubmittedtothefollowingquestions: What/whoistheproblem?What/whocausedit?WhatmoralevaluationisprovidedWhat istherecommendedtreatment?Thesequestionshelptoilluminateifandhowthebriefings andmediacoveragefollowedBernays’sixcharacteristicsofwarpropaganda,especiallyin identifyingtheinstigatorandcastigatingblameontheenemywhilejustifyingthehome positionsandinterventions.
Inductiveframinganalysisapproachedtheprimarytextswithanopenmind,yet codingwasinformedbyanunderstandingofgeneralindicatorsof(war-related)propagandaintexts. Zollmann (2019)groupsthesealongthreedimensions:alignmentand legitimizingstate–corporateviewsandactionswhileomittingsubstantialcriticism;“technical”propagandabasedondistorted,manipulatedfactsandoncriticismlimitedtotacticsandproceduresratherthansubstance;anddemonizationofactorsandactionsof opposingpositions.
Answersforeachframingquestionwerebroughttogetherinamatrixtolookfor similarities,consistenciesandoverallpatterns.Thesewerecombinedintoframepackages (GamsonandModigliani 1989).Framesaliencewasdeterminedbyhowoftentheyoccurred andrelationshipsbetweenframes(dominant,secondary,counterandneglected)(Zhou andMoy 2007).Specialattentionwaspaidtoframingdevices,includingwordchoice, metaphors,symbolsandstereotypesaspartofpropaganda’srhetoricaltoolbox,including theidentificationoftheconflict(conflict,(un)justwar,occupationorliberation, ),of actorsinvolved(name-calling,glorification ),ofevents(warcrimes,aggression,defense) andofeventsandactors(PanandKosicki 1993).
4.Results:QuantitativeAnalysis
4.1.War-Related—NotWar-RelatedNews
Thesixbriefingshadatotalof461items,ofwhich60items(13.1%)werenotwarrelatedand401(86.9%)werewar-related. CNNNewsroom spenttheentiretyofitsthree analyzedprogramsonthewar,while FoxNewsSpecialReport wentfromdedicatingalmost theentirenewsprogramtothewar(97.19%)onthefirstday,85.5%ofthetimeon2/28and just57.1%on3/03.Theremainingdataanalysisfocusessolelyonwar-relatedreporting.
4.2.Topics
Quantitativeanalysisoftheoccurrenceofwar-relatedtopicsinbriefingsandnews coveragesuggestshowtheU.S.governmentandmediatriedtosettheagendaregarding thewar.
4.2.1.TopicsinWhiteHouseandStateDepartmentBriefings
First,welookatwhichtopicswerementionedintheWHandSDbriefingsinthatfirst weekofthewar.
Table 1 showsthatmorethanhalf(54.1%)ofallitemsinWHandSDbriefingscombined concernedsanctionsand“other”.TheformerdealtwiththeU.S.’spositiontowardsand roleindecidingonthesanctionsagainstRussiainresponsetotheinvasion,whilealmost allitemsidentifiedas“other”concernedtheU.S.positioningitselftowardsthewar.Closely relatedistheextensiveattention(23.4%)giveninWHbriefingstoU.S.policiesotherthan sanctions.Everyothertopicreceivedmuchlessattention(<10%each).WhileSDbriefings paidsomeattentiontothepositionoftheUN,thiswasnexttoabsentfromWHbriefings,as wasthepositionoftheEU.Someattentionwasdevotedtoglobalsecurityandtopotential nuclearhazardseitherthroughRussianuseofnuclearweaponsordangerrelatedtothe RussianoccupationofChernobyl.Interestingly,theactualbattlefield,Ukrainiancivilians andrefugeesreceivedlimitedattention.TheWHmadenomentionofpeacetalks,and theSDsomewhat(6.5%).Notsurprisingly,anyjustificationfortheRussianaggression wasabsent.
Table1. War-relatedtopicsin%ofnumber(#)ofitemsforWhiteHouse(WH)briefings,State Department(SD)briefingsandallbriefingscombined.
Topics/Items%WHALL(#248)SDALL(#153)ALL(#401) Battlefield3.22.02.7 Civilians0.02.61.0 Sanctions34.719.628.9 Refugees4.82.64.0 Security7.78.58.0 UN0.87.23.2 EUpolicies0.80.00.5 US/NATOpolicies23.45.916.7 Justifications0.00.00.0 NuclearHazard6.09.27.2 Peace0.06.52.5 Disinformation0.00.00.0 Other18.535.925.2 Total100100100
Tobetterunderstandagenda-settingeffortsbythegovernment,wecomparetopics raisedinthebriefings’openingstatements,representingtheofficialpositionstatementof U.S.executivepowers,withthetopicsraisedintheQ&A,wherejournalistscouldinitiate othertopics,suggestingsimilarordifferentareasofinterest.
Table 2 showsthattheopeningstatementsfirmlyfocusedonjustthreetopics:U.S. policies(14.3%),sanctions(28.6%)and“other”(57.1%).Thelatterrefers,inthefirstWH briefingandthefirsttwoSDbriefings,toextensiveidentificationofthewaras“unjustified, unprovoked,premediatedattack”,“Putinhasmadehischoice”,and“flagrantviolationof internationallaw”,whichweelaborateonintheframinganalysis,and,inthesecondWH paper,tothepositionoftheU.S.asthelargestproviderofassistancetoUkraine.
Thequestionsfromjournalistsfollowedthisagenda-settingbyaskingfurtherquestionsaboutsanctions(26.9%ofallquestions)andU.S.policiesdirectly(16,8%ofallquestionsidentifiedasU.S.position)orindirectly(someofthequestionscodedas“other”could beinterpretedassuch).Yet,subsequentquestionscoverotherissues,notablysecurity (19%ofallquestions)andnuclearhazards(14%ofallquestions).Interestingly,19.4%ofall answersprovidedbyofficialswereoff-topic,withWHofficialsansweringoff-topic17.3% ofthetimeandSDofficials22.7%ofthetime.One-offtopics(gatheredinthecategory “other”)wereoverwhelminglyintroducedthroughquestionsfromcorrespondents,were typicallybriefandrangedfromembassiesmovingfromKyivtoLviv(SD),theKennedy CentercancelingaRussianBalletperformance(WH),Russia’scrackdownonindependent
media(SD),providingPutinanexitstrategy(WH),andreportsthatChinaaskedRussiato invadeaftertheOlympics(SD),amongothers.
Table2. War-relatedtopicsastheyoccurredinopeningstatements,journalists’questionsandofficials’ answersforallbriefingscombined.
4.2.2.TopicsintheMedia
Tocomparetheagenda-settingbytheU.S.executivepowerwiththeagenda-setting bytheU.S.media,weanalyzedtheoccurrenceofvariouswar-relatedtopicsinthemedia coverageduringthesameopeningweek.Assaid,whileforbriefings,topicsaremeasured bythenumberofitems,mediatopicsarepresentedintime,ascarceresourcefornews programsaffectingselectionandperceivedimportance(timespentonanitem).
CNNNewsroom
Table 3 showsthat CNNNewsroom hadthebattlefieldasthemostcoveredtopicon days1and3,alwaysopeningwithandreturningtoit,followedoriginallybysanctionsand laterbyciviliansthatdominatedthesecondbroadcast.Thedominanceofthebattlefield (mostlyabsentfrompressbriefings)followsthemedialogicthatimagesofbattlefieldsdrive hometheseriousnessandhorroroftheconflict,evokingstrongemotions(Chouliaraki 2013).Themedialogiclikewiseexplainstheconsiderableattentiontotheimpactofthe waroncivilians,especiallyinthesecond(38.96%)andthird(27.48%)selectedprograms, anitemabsentfromtheopeningstatementsandnearlyabsentfromtheoverallbriefings. CNNNewsroom followedthepressbriefingsintheirattentiontosanctions(andsomewhat tootherU.S.policies)inthefirsttwosampledprograms,tonuclearthreatinthesecond andthirdprogramsandintheirsilenceontheUNandEUpositions,onpeaceandon disinformation.Likethebriefings, CNNNewsroom providednojustificationforthewar. Finally,“other”topicsconstituteawiderangeofone-offtopicsincludingUkrainiancivilian safetyinstructions(2/24),protestmarchesinvariouspartsofEuropeandtheU.S.(2/28) andPutin’smentalhealthconcerns(3/3),amongstothers.
FoxNewsSpecialReport
InTable 4,weprovideamoredetailedoverviewofthedistributionofvarioustopics acrossthesampledperiodfor FoxNewsSpecialReport
Table3. Sampledaysbytopicsofwarnewsinpercentagesofdurationin CNNNewsroom. SampleDay/ Topic%
Table4. Sampledaysbytopicsofwar-relatednewsinpercentagesofdurationin FoxNewsSpecialReport.
24February17.374.840.000.000.000.004.760.0052.343.810.009.367.53100
Thebreakdownofwar-relatedtopicsacrossthesampleddaysshowsthat FoxNews SpecialReport,like CNNNewsroom,paidconsiderableattentiontothebattlefieldineach episodebutthatsanctionsdominatedthefirsttwoepisodes,inthatregardfollowingthe briefingsmorecloselyinthetopicsdiscussed(ifnotevaluation,seeframing),dedicating morethanhalf(52.34%)ofitsfirstprogramtoit.TheU.S.positionwasanotherimportant topic.Like CNNNewsroom,therewasattentiontonuclearhazards,bothreferencingpotentialdangerfromRussiansoldiersoccupyingChernobylandinterpretationsofthreatening commentsbyRussianpresidentPutin. FoxNewsSpecialReport alsofollowedthebriefings intheirsilenceontheUNandEU,onpeaceandondisinformation,andtherewasno justificationforthewar.Differentfromthebriefingsand CNNNewsroom, FoxNewsSpecial Report paidsomeattentiontothepossibilityofpeacetalksonthedaythewarstarted.Asin thecaseofCNN,the“other”categorycontainsawiderangeofone-offtopics,includingthe impactoftheinvasionontheU.S.stockmarket(2/24),internationalsporteventscanceling Russianparticipation(2/28)andAmericansgoingtoUkrainetohelp(3/3),amongstothers.
5.Results:QualitativeFramingAnalysis
Theanalysisofwhatthebriefingsandmediatalkedaboutiscomplementedbya framinganalysisofhowthesetopicsweretalkedabout,startingfromthebriefings.
5.1.DominantFrame1:”Unjustified,Unprovoked,andPremeditated”
AfirstframethatdominatedtheWHandSDbriefingsandwaspickedupbythe mediacoveragecontextualizedtheRussianmilitaryinvasionofUkraineas“unjustified, unprovoked,andpremeditated”andhadadominantinterpretationandtwosubframes.
5.1.1.DominantFrame1
TheU.S.governmentmessagewasclear:Putinandhisinnercirclewerefirmlypresentedastheproblem,thecauseofthewarandtheonestoblame.Thesolutionwas oppositionfromtheU.S.andtheworldcommunitywithsanctionsaimedatpunishing Russia,specificallyPutinandhisinnercircle.Themoralevaluationisthattheinvasionis unjustifiedoneverylevel,thereforewrong/badandthosewhoopposeitareright/good. Followingwarpropagandastrategies(cf. Bernays 1942),thisframeenforcesassigningwar guilt(1)onRussia,toclaimunityinoppositionaswellas“victory”withtheeffectiveness ofsanctions(2)andtocounterRussiannewsclaimingthewarwasprovoked,framing unfavorableinformationaslies(5).Forexample,theopeningstatementsoftheearliestWH andSDbriefingshavenearlyidenticalpassages:the“entireworldarewiththepeopleof Ukrainetodayastheysufferanunjustified,unprovoked,andpremeditatedattackbythe Russianmilitaryforces”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.1);andthe“Americanpeoplearestanding withthepeopleofUkraineastheysufferanunjustified,unprovoked,andpremeditated attackbyRussia’smilitaryforces”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.1).Onthefinalsampleday,theSD openingstatementcontinuedthethemeas“Russia’scontinuedpremeditated,unprovoked, andunjustifiedwaragainstUkraine”(SD 2022b,3/3,p.2).Thisthemewasrepeatedas anentirephraseintheopeningstatementofallSDbriefingsbutalsoasindividualwords topunctuatestatementsandreinforcethemessage,like“UkraineinthefaceofRussia’s unprovokedaggression”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.3),whiletheWHsimplifieditto“President Putin’saggression”(WH 2022b,3/3,p.22). CNNNewsroom echoedseveraltimes,“Biden condemningtheattackasunprovokedandunjustified”(e.g., CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24, min53),asdid FoxNewsSpecialReport,notablyevenuptoayearintothewar(e.g.,“U.S. determinationtoholdRussiaaccountableforcrimescommitteditsunjustandunprovoked invasionofUkraine”(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2023,3/3b,min44).
Bothinthebriefingsandmediacoverage,thisframepresentstheUkrainianpeople eitherasthesufferingvictimsofPutin’s“brutalattack”(SD,3/25,p.1),“atragedyfor thepeopleofUkraine”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.3),orascourageous:“theUkrainianmilitary, PresidentZelenskyy,andothers,havefoughtcourageously”(WH 2022c,2/28,p.10) and“thepeopleofUkrainecontinuetofightwithcourageandpridefortheircountry”
(SD 2022c,2/28,p.3).Mediacoverage,especiallyCNN,depictedthesetwosidesofthe Ukrainiancitizensindetail.ThisservedtofurtherthemoralconclusionthatRussiais badandralliedsupportandunitytowardsUkraineasthebravevictims.Intermsofwar propagandastrategies,thisaimedtostrengthenthebeliefthatRussiawasresponsiblefor thewar(4)andtoemphasizeearlybattlevictories(2).
ThisframeservesthepropagandastrategyoftheU.S.governmenttoexplainits positionandactionstotheAmericanpeople,toserveasdiplomaticeffort,rallyingallies’ supportforsanctions,andasgeo-politicalposturingtowardsRussia.ItjustifiestheU.S. position,alliedwithUkraineandinoppositiontoRussia,with“unprovoked”attaching fullresponsibilitytoPutinandRussiaandinnocencetoUkraine.
Thetopicofsanctionsdominatedbriefingsandmediaand,inlinewithwarpropagandastrategies(1)and(4),wascarefullyframedasaresponsetotheinvasion,assevere, targetedtoPutinandRussianelites,andascoordinatedwithallies,thelatterservingthe warpropagandastrategy(2)byclaimingunityofallalliesparticipatinginsanctionsagainst Russia.Whiletheirpolicieswererarelythetopicofbriefingsormediacoverage,theEU andNATOwereusedasframingsponsors:
[the]U.S.imposedanunprecedentedpackageoffinancialsanctionsandexport restrictionsinlockstepwithourAlliesandpartnersthatwillisolateRussiafrom theglobalfinancialsystem,shutdownitsaccesstocutting-edgetechnology,and undercutPutin’sstrategicambitionstodiversifyandmodernizehiseconomy.
(WH 2022a,2/24,p.3)
Akeyframingdeviceistherepetitionofrhetoricandthemes,suchas“themostbiting, themostcrippling,themostdevastatingsetofsanctions”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.16),“crippling financialsanctionsonPresidentPutin,hisinnercircle,andtheRussianeconomy”(WH 2022c,2/28),“historicstepsthatarecripplingtheRussianeconomy”,acrossthebriefings analyzedandinmanymediareports.Forexample,FoxNewsreported“Westernfinancial sanctionsagainst[Putin’s]governmentandhiselitesareputtingarealstrainontheRussian Economy”(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022b,2/28,min1:01).
5.1.2.Subframe1.1:“Putin’sChoice”
Animportantsubframethatbecomesareturningthemeemphasizesthatthewar wasPutin’sdecision.ThewarblamewasassigneddirectlytoPutinaspartofthewar propagandastrategy(1)andtostrengthenthebeliefofPutin’sdepravity(4).WHand SDbriefingshadcongruentpassages,againsuggestingcoordination:“Putinhasmade hischoice.Herejecteddiplomacyandchosewar”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.2)and“Putin hasmadeachoice.Herejecteddiplomacy.Hehaschosenwar”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.4). ThisthemeofPutinortheKremlin’s”choice”isrepeatedthroughoutthebriefings,for example,topunctuateasentence“becauseofPutin’schoices”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.4)orto contextualize:“thisisn’tthefirsttime,ofcourse,Putinhasdecidedthathiscountrycan attackanothercountrywithimpunity”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.3).CNN’sWHcorrespondent pickedupthischaracterization,referringto“VladmirPutin’sassaultonUkraine”(CNN Newsroom 2022a,2/24,min7:34).ItwasalsousedtodifferentiatePutinandRussian leadershipfromRussiancitizens:“achoicePutinmade forthepeopleofRussia.Thisis achoicethathasbeendecidedforthem,notbythem”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.4).Continuing, CNNNewsroom quotedthe2/24WHpressbriefingreferringtoPutinandhiswar,reading SecretaryPsaki’sstatement“despitetheKremlin’spropaganda,thereareRussianpeople whoprofoundlydisagreewithwhatheisdoinginUkraine”(CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24, min19:30).Putin’schoicewasalsousedtosupportsanctions:“inflationisskyrocketing, theRubleistheworst-performingcurrencyintheworld.Itwashisdecisiontogotowar” (WH 2022a,2/24,p.27).Itwasalsousedinconjunctionwithwarpropagandastrategy(5) toclaimtheenemy’sinformationisfalse:Putinwas“falselyallegingthatitisRussiathatis underthreat[...]thatRussiawastheonethathadnochoice”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.8).
“Putin’swarofchoice”isasignificantphraseandpropagandatheme,appearing repeatedlyinmultiplebriefings(WH 2022a,2/24; WH 2022b,3/3; SD 2022a,2/25; SD
2022b,3/3)andmediacoverage.Onthefirstdayoftheinvasion, CNNNewsroom ranatinker headlinequotingtheBidenadministrationthatread“Putinchosethiswar”(CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24,min38).Infact, CNNNewsroom continuedtocarrythephrasewellintothe war,framingareportonday51ofthewaras“Putin’swarofchoice”(CNNNewsroom 2022f, 4/14,min1),confirmingthemedia’slastingadoptionofofficialU.S.verbiage.
5.1.3.Subframe1.2:“PutinasIrrationalandUnstable”
Thissubframerelatestothetropeoftheparanoid,evilemperor,especiallytheRussian dictatorJosephStalin.Thisframewasintroducedbythemedia,notU.S.officials,in questionsduringbriefingsandsegmentsofanalyzedmediacoverageby CNNNewsroom and FoxNewsSpecialReport.However,duringabriefing,U.S.officialsconfirmedtheir previousstatementsreferringtoPutin’sthen-recentspeechesasincreasingly“bizarre”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.16).Framingdevicesintroducedinquestionsduringbriefingsincluded “Weseehimissuingnuclearthreats.SoIwonder,doyoustillconsiderhimarational actor?”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.16).Putin’smentalfitnesswasdiscussedtocontextualizehis nuclearthreatsinbothSDandWH2/28briefings,withofficialsrepeatedlycommenting thatPutin’sremarkswereescalatingorescalatory.Bothprogramsseizedonthetermthe sameday, FoxNewsSpecialReport withasegmentgraphictitled“ItisEscalatory”(2/28, min4:46)and CNNNewsroom reportingthatPutin’snuclearcommentswerea“further escalation”(2/28,min9:27). CNNNewsroom and FoxNewsSpecialReport broadcaststories thatdirectlymentionedorquestionedPutin’smentalhealthorcapacities.A CNNNewsroom storyreportedthattheFrenchPresidentMacronclaimedPutinwasanisolatedandchanged mansincetheylastspoke,whilethewrittenheadlinestated“growingquestionsabout Putin’sgrasponreality”(CNNNewsroom 2022b,2/28,min7:04–10:26;tickerheadline,8:45). MikhailKhodorkovsky,aformeroligarchwhospent10yearsinaRussianprison,claimed Putinwasextremelycruelandshowsclinicalparanoia(CNNNewsroom 2022c,3/3,min 44:28–48:31),whileDominicThomaswasinterviewed,agreeingwithformerPresident Obama’sstatementthatPutinisnotthesameperson,irrational(CNNNewsroom 2022e, 4/7,min6:53–12:49). FoxNewsSpecialReport ranastoryspecificallyquestioningPutin’s mentalstateandcapacity,claiminghewasunhinged,thatformerU.S.SecretaryofState CondoleezzaRiceandothersfelthebecameamadman,notingthatPutindoesnotusea cellphoneortheInternet(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022b,2/28min45:20–47:23).Another FoxNewsSpecialReport headlinedthatPutinwasvisiblyupset,lashingoutattopmilitary commandersfortheirfailures(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022d,3/24,min22:17–24:33).
5.2.DominantFrame2:”America,DefenderoftheFreeWorld”
Aseconddominantframeinthebriefings,pickedupbythemedia,contextualizesAmericaninvolvementintheRussia–UkraineconflictanditssidingwithUkraine: “theUnitedStateshasundertakentorallytheworldfordemocracyandagainstRussian aggression”(WH 2022c,2/28,p.21)andhadonesubframe.
5.2.1.DominantFrame2
Thisframeisbasedonwidersocio-politicalreferencesthatunmistakablyevokeCold Warerapropagandaofthe“Free-World”vs.theU.S.S.R.StatementsfromWHandSD fittingthisframerepresentcontinuedcoordinatedmessagingfordomesticandinternational consumption.TheframeidentifiesRussianinvasionandcoercionastheproblem,whileU.S. aidandleadershiparethesolution.ThemoralevaluationisthatRussia,astheaggressor, representsthebad,i.e.,totalitarianism,injusticeandcorruption,whiletheU.S.represents thegood,i.e.,freedomanddemocracy,justiceandruleoflaw.Moreover,Ukrainians deserveU.S.protectionasthey,too,foughtfortheirfreedom,“asthepeopleofUkraine continuetofightwithcourageandpridefortheircountry,wewillcontinuetoprovide themtheassistancethattheyneed”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.3).Thisframingmainlyfollowsthe warpropagandastrategiestoclaimunity(2)andtorepresentandprojectinternationallaw, security,socialorderandpeace(3)butalsotoplacewarguiltonRussia(1)andstrengthen
thebeliefthatRussiaisbothcorruptandresponsible(4).Notably,U.S.involvementwas neverfundamentallyquestionedinthebriefings(normedia),creatingacrucialpremiseto theframe:thattheU.S.,asaleaderandprotectorofthefreeworld,wasinvolvedandwould beanactivepoliticalparticipantinthiswar.Followingthispremise,U.S.government messagingfollowedtwotracks:theU.S.showedleadershipbyprovidingthemostaid andmilitaryassistancetoUkraineandtheU.S.wasleadingunifiedalliesagainsttyranny andinjustice.
RegardingU.S.aidtoUkraine,the“headofUSAID,SamanthaPower,isontheground inPolandandhasbeenthereaswell,providingguidance”(WH 2022c,2/28,p.2)and theU.S.wouldsupport“theirsecurityneeds,theirhumanitarianneeds,theireconomic needs,theirpoliticalneeds”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.19).U.S.commitmentwasresolute:“The UnitedStatesisthelargestproviderofassistancetoUkraine”(WH 2022c,2/28,p.1), includinga“packageofupto$350millionforimmediatesupporttoUkraine’sdefenses, bringingthetotalsecurityassistanceoverthepastyeartomorethan$1billioninsupportof Ukraine’sfrontlinedefenders”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.3)andtheU.S.was“expeditingmilitary defenseassistance”(WH 2022b,3/3,p.16).Inallbriefings,aidandsupporttoUkrainewas mentionedandemphasized. CNNNewsroom broadcaststatementsfromZelenskycalling foraid(CNNNewsroom,2/24min,37:04)andamemberoftheUkrainianparliamentcalling formoreweapons(CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24,min24:26).Likewise, FoxNewsSpecial Report interviewedtheUkrainianForeignministerwhocalledforweaponsandlethalaid (FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022a,2/24min10:30).Both CNNNewsroom and FoxNewsSpecial Report coveredU.S.officialsonaidandcallsforaidfromZelensky(CNNNewsroom 2022b, 2/28,min47:05)and FoxNewsSpecialReport airedsegmentsexplainingbattlefieldweapons, trainingandwhatAmericacouldsupply(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022c,3/3a,min31:55).
RegardingtheU.S.leadingunifiedalliestowardscertainvictory(2),hedgingagainst disunityanddefeat(5),framingdevicesincludedthatthiswas“abouttheunityofthe vastmajorityoftheglobalcommunityinstandingupagainstPresidentPutin,it’smore aboutAmericanleadershipinthismoment,andit’smoreaboutevenunityhereinstanding upagainsttheaggressionofPresidentPutin”(WH 2022c,2/28,p.24).WhiletheU.S. representsthe“Free-World”,“Putin’sassaultonUkraineisanattackontheprinciples thatundergirdglobalpeace,stability,andsecuritytheworldover”(SD 2022a,2/25p.2). Putinwasseenas“oneofthegreatestunifiersofNATOinmodernhistory[...]youseea NATOAlliancethatwasincrediblyunifiedandagreementamongEuropeansthatthere neededtobeadditionalassistanceprovidedintheformofsecurityassistancetoUkraine” (WH2/28,p.3).Rhetoricalrepetitionunderlinedthis:“theresponsetoRussia’swarhas beenunity–unityamongworldleaders,unityinEurope,unityamongpeoplegathering aroundtheworldtoprotestPresidentPutin’swarofchoice,includingthousandsofpeople inRussiaandBelarus”(SD 2022b,3/3,p.3).Themediareferencedthis,too,forinstance when CNNNewsroom stated“ZelenskysaysRussiahasnotjuststartedagainstUkraine butalsotheentiredemocraticworld”(CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24,min,52).Another tacticsuggesteddisunitybetweenPutinandcitizens,claimingtheRussianpopulacewere “rejecting[Putin’s]violenceagainstthepeopleofUkraine”andwere“callingontheir governmenttostopthisunprovokedandunjustifiedwar”(SD 2022a,2/25,pp.3–4). CNN Newsroom reportedtheRussiangovernmentcrackingdownondomesticwarprotesters andmakingarrests(1742people)(CNNNewsroom 2022a,2/24,min18:27–19:47).
5.2.2.Subframe2.1:RussiaViolatestheRulesandNormsofInternationalRelations AsubframeemphasizesthatRussiaandPutinbroadlyviolatedinternationalnorms andrules,disruptedseriousinternationaldiplomacyandengagedinillegalactivities. ThesethemesrelatetopropagandastrategiestoplacewarguiltonRussia(1),tostrengthen thebeliefsthatPutinandtheRussianelitewereresponsible(2),topositiontheU.S.as representinglawandorder,peaceandstability(3),andtocounterRussiannewsand informationthatcontradictedtheU.S.perspective(4).Italsoledtothebrandingofthis warasillegal,anotherpropagandatechnique(LegalFilter)usedtodemonizeRussia
whileinsinuatingtheU.S.representsjustice,legalityand“theFreeWorld”(Hyzen 2023b). RussiaandPutinwereseentoviolatethe“internationalrules-basedsystem”whichwas intertwinedwithrhetoricandlanguageofcriminalactivity:“Putin’swarofchoicehas requiredthatwefollowthroughonimposingthemassiveconsequencesandseverecosts, andthatweensurehisflagrantviolationofinternationallawwillbeastrategicfailure”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.4).Theframingascriminalityincludesphrasessuchas“Russianeliteswho arecomplicitinPutin’skleptocracyandtheirfamilymembers”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.2)and “wearegoingtohuntdownandfreezetheassetsofRussiancompaniesandoligarchs[and] anyotherill-gottengainsthatwecanfindandfreezeunderthelaw”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.20). Thisgivessanctions,asaformofwarfare,theauraofa“just”response,inaccordancewith thelaw,tounjust/illegalaggression,keepingopenthepossibilityofaprovokedwarwhich islegalifastatehasnochoice.Asaproxywar,theU.S.iswithinitsrighttoretaliatewith harshsanctions.
Despitethisself-ascribedleadershipandmoralhighground,peacetalkswerenotably absentfromU.S.officialstatements(cf.above).Answeringajournalist’squestion“President[Biden]saidthathethinksthatPutinisgoandtrytoexpandbacktheSovietUnion”, U.S.officialsresponded,“PresidentPutinhasmore—hasgranderambitionsinUkraine. Hence,themilitarycampaigniscontinuing”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.33).Thisisaframing deviceofColdWarerapropagandaofthefreeworldvs.theU.S.S.R.U.S.officialsfurthermoreinsinuatedthatdiplomatictalksweredeceptiveandatactictocontinuemilitary operations,claiming:“Moscowwasusingtheso-calledpretenseofdiplomacy,pretending totakepartinseriousdiplomaticdiscussions”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.15).Themessaging assertedthattheUnitedStates,alliesinEurope,OSCEandtheNATO–RussiaCouncil engagedingood-faithdiplomaticeffortstoavoidwarbut“ateveryturn,theRussian Federationrejectedthoseoffersofsubstantive,constructiveengagement”(SD 2022c,2/28, p.10).U.S.officialsclaimedtheywere“nevergoingtotakediplomacyeveroffthetable. Butagain,nowisnotthemomentforthat”(WH 2022b,3/3,p.7),yettherepeatedmessage wasthat“diplomacyatthebarrelofagun,diplomacyattheturretofatank–thatisnotreal diplomacy”(SD 2022c,2/28,p.10).
5.3.Counter-Frames
Therearenocounter-framesquestioningtheenemyorinvasion.Fundamentally,there wasagreementbetweenthemediaandgovernmentthattheproblemwasRussia,and especiallyPutin.Counter-framesquestionthepositionoftheU.S.onsanctions,energy policyanddiplomacy.
5.3.1.Counter-Frame1:”Sanctions:TooWeak,TooClumsy?”
Acounter-frametothedominantframingofsanctionswasidentifiedinthepress questionsduringthebriefingsandwasimplicitinthegovernment’sdefenseofthoseU.S. sanctions.Thecounter-frameconteststheU.S.officials’framingofthelistedsanctionsas thebestsolutionfollowingtwotracks,onesuggestingthatsanctionsaretooweakorslowto beeffectiveandanotherthatsanctionscouldhurtWesterneconomiesortheRussianpeople (ratherthanelites),bynotsanctioningRussia’senergysector. FoxNewsSpecialReport’s WHcorrespondentespousedthiscounter-frameonthefirstdayoftheinvasion,producing anentiresegmentquestioningsanctions’effectiveness,concludingthatsanctionswerea weakresponsefromtheU.S.andfromBidenspecifically(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022a, 2/24min,12:37).
ThisframeisimplicitlyrebukedbyU.S.officials’claimsthattheirsanctionswere principledanddesigned“toberesponsible,toavoideventheperceptionoftargetingthe averageRussiancivilianand,ofcourse,unwantedspilloversbacktotheU.S.ortheglobal economy”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.5)andthattheU.S.wouldcontaineconomicrippleeffects bycoordinating“inlockstepwithourAlliesandpartners.Andbecausewethinkthe spillovereffectswillbemanageable”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.11).
Thegovernmentframingofsanctionswasfurtherquestionedbyajournalist:“Sothe worldjustsitsbackandwatchesthathappenuntilthesesanctionstakeeffect?”(WH 2022a, 2/24,p.8)and“Isitfairtosay,then,intheimmediatetermtheU.S.isbasicallyunableto stopPutin?”(SD 2022a,2/25,p.11).U.S.officialsrespondedbydeflectingtolong-term policy:“Europeansneedtodothat;weneedtodothat.Ifwedomoretoinvestinclean energy,moretoinvestinothersourcesofenergy”(WH 2022b,3/3,p.10).Inanexpert interview, CNNNewsroom reportedthattheEUwassendingalifelinetoRussiabybuying energy.Germanywastryingtomovetowardsrenewablesources;however,itspolicywas atoddswithRussiansanctions(CNNNewsroom 2022e,4/7,6:53–12:49).
5.3.2.Counter-Frame2:“It’sBiden’sUnjustifiedWaronCarbon” FoxNewsSpecialReport, whilecoveringtheRussia–Ukrainewar,regularlyquestioned andcriticizedBiden’senergypolicy.Discussionsaboutenergy-relatedsanctionswere reframedfromRussiawagingwaragainstUkrainetoBidenwagingwaragainstoil.The mostnotablesegmentwasaguestappearancebyformer SpecialReport hostBritHume. HumeintroducedwhathecalledBiden’s“WaronCarbon”,stronglyadvocatingtorepeal environmentprotections,insteadbuildingnuclearpowerplants,takingthe“shackles” offdomesticenergycorporations,framingthisastheonlywaytohurtRussiaandPutin withsanctions(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022b,2/28,min13:11–16:53).Inreportingona speechinwhichBidencalledPutinaPariahandvillain, FoxNewsSpecialReport dugup avideostatementfromBidenata2021diplomaticsummitwhereheidentifiedPutinas “bright”,“tough”anda“worthyadversary”(FoxNewsSpecialReport 2022b,2/28min, 13:50),suggestinginconsistency.Thesetypesofeditsappearedacrossdifferentreports fromanchors,reporters,intervieweesandpanels,reflectingFox’sdomesticpoliticaland propagandagoals.
CNNNewsroom ranacriticalsegmentquestioningwhytheU.S.wasnottargeting Russia’senergysectorforsanctions(CNNNewsroom 2022d,3/7,min20).Thoughspecific mediawerenotidentifiedinbriefingtranscripts,reportersquestionedU.S.officialson energypolicyandsanctionsexemptingRussianenergysales,towhichofficialsreplied, “thisistheoneareawhereRussiahassystemicimportanceintheglobaleconomy[ ] That’snottosaythatwehaveadependenceonRussia;Russiadependsonthoserevenues justasmuchastheworldneedsitsenergy”(WH 2022a,2/24,p.7).
6.Discussion
TakingthefirstweekoftheRussian–Ukrainewar,wecombinedaquantitativetopic analysisandqualitativeframinganalysisofU.S.officialpressbriefingsandU.S.partisan cablenetworknewstounderstandkeycharacteristicsofpropagandadisseminationin timesofwar,cruciallyfocusingonstate–mediarelationships.
WefoundthatU.S.officialsconnectedwithlingeringColdWarpropagandanarratives tocharacterizetheRussia–UkraineconflictasRussiavs.the“FreeWorld”,implying Putin’sgoalsbeyondUkrainewereakintothere-establishmentoftheU.S.S.R.U.S.officials presentedaprofessional,disciplinedandWH-SD-coordinatedpropagandacampaigntoset theagendaandframethewarand,thus,dictatethegovernment’sdesirednarrativesto themediabyfocusingoncertaintopicsandspecificinterpretationsorframes.Assuch,we confirmedthatU.S.messagingcompliedwiththesixprinciplesofwarpropaganda(Bernays 1942),predominantlybyusingtrueinformation.Bymaintainingatightlycontrolledscript withreturningphrasesandthemes,like“unprovoked,unjustifiedandillegal”or“Putin’s warofchoice”,U.S.officialsaimedtodownplaycompetingnarrativesandunfavorable storiesand,insomecases,ignoresomedetailsaltogether.
Bothleft-of-center CNNNewsroom andright-of-center FoxNewsSpecialReport followed thegovernmentlogicandfundamentalpremises,includingnotquestioningU.S.involvement(asthegovernmentensured“nobootsontheground”ordirectairsupport)andthe ColdWarframingofRussiaandPutinastotalitarianaggressorsagainstUkraineasbrave victimsrepresentingtheWestanddemocracyand,therefore,worthyofdefensebythe
leaderofthefreeworld.Thisfitsthe HermanandChomsky (1988)propagandamodel. Likewise, CNNNewsroom and FoxNewsSpecialReport adoptedthephrase“Putin’swar”or “Putin’saggression”inreportsalongwithpersonalcriticismsofPutin.AlongColdWar lines, FoxNewsSpecialReport inparticulardepictedChinaandRussiaasclosealliesand enemiesoftheU.S.,thusagainstfreedomanddemocracy.
Bothmediaoutletsspentmuchofthebroadcasttimeonbattlefieldandairstrike reports,conformingtostandardmedialogicforwarreporting.Whilethisattentiontothe battlefielddidnotoccurinU.S.officialstatements,itservedthecrucialpropagandastrategy ofstrengtheningthebeliefthatthewaristheenemy’sfault(4)andsupportedthiswith horrorstoriesfromtheconflict(6). FoxNewsSpecialReport coveragefocusedonbattlefield andairstrikereports,nearlyalwaysbroadcastwithfootageofbattlesanddestruction. CNN Newsroom,partofamediabrandthatwasbuiltonwarreporting,stronglyemphasized warstories,tragedy,interviewswithfleeingrefugeesandshelteringcivilians,wounded soldiersandcivilians,andgraphicfootage.
Thecaseconfirmsthatpropagandaoriginatesfromboththegovernmentandmediain interestingways.TheU.S.governmentsucceededtoasignificantextentingettingspecific messagesandfundamentalcontextsoftheRussianinvasionacrosstoandrepeatedin themedia,confirmingHermanandChomskyandwiderpropagandamodelstudiesas wellastheindexingmodelthatputjournalist–elitesourcerelationsattheheartofthis process.Atthesametime,themediaalsoprovidedtheirownfocus,closelyrelatedto medialogic,especiallyintheattentionto(strongimagesof)thebattlefield.Thepartisan mediawecoveredalsointroducedtheirownframes,somethatpartlycountered(aspects of)thestate’sposition.Notably,atnearlyanyopportunity, FoxNewsSpecialReport heavily criticizedtheBidengovernmentandDemocraticpoliticianslikeNancyPelosionenergy policy.However,theywereneverindisagreementaboutthecoreoftheU.S.position, confirmingthehegemonicworkofindexing.Interestingly, FoxNewsSpecialReport relied heavilyontheDefenseDepartment’sbriefingandquotedthebriefingonthefirstdayof thewar,avoidingtheBidenadministration’spoliticizedcommunications,perhapsshowing theirpartisanship.
Crucially,ouranalysisshowedhowpropagandawasgeneratedmostlythroughfacts ratherthanmis/disinformation.Barring(future)discreditingofeventsaside,wefound largelyaccuratemediaaccountsofU.S.sanctions,airstrikes,destruction,theMoskva sinking,andthenumberofRussiansoldierscrossingthebordersorUkrainianrefugees fleeing.OfficialstatementsfromPutin,BidenandZelenskywerenotfalsebutrather carefullycuratedbythemedia.
Atthesametime,importantinformationwasabsentfromboththegovernment briefingsandmediacoverage.TherewasverylittlementionofpeacebyU.S.officials,who deflectedthetopicwithstatementslike“diplomacyishighlyunlikelytobearfruit,toprove effective,inthemidstofnotonlyconfrontationbutescalation”(SD 2022c,2/28,p,10),nor wasitcoveredbytheU.S.media,whereasmediainothercountriesdevotedsignificant coveragetoit(Nordenstrengetal. 2023).Thisreflectsthatpeaceanddeconflictionwereof lowstrategicpriorityincommunications.Likewise,briefingsnormediaofferedinformation regardingUkraine’stenuoushistorywithdemocracyandcorruption(Kuzio 2015),rather framingUkraineasavictimdesperatelytryingtoretainitsfree,liberaldemocracy.This wasanimmediatechangeinrhetoricfrompreviousskepticismofgovernmentsandmedia towardsUkrainejoininginstitutionsliketheEUorNATO,relatedtoUkraine’shistorical inclusionasaColdWarenemy.Critically,thegovernmentandmediademonstratedalack ofcontextualizationofthecurrentconflictintheRussianannexationofCrimeain2014,let aloneRussia’sattackonGeorgiain2008.Geopoliticaldriversoftheconflict,arguablya proxywarbetweenworldpowers,andtherecenthistoryoftheregionwereabsentfrom briefingsandmediacoverage.Aboveallelse,thisabsencehelpsinachievingtheU.S.’s centralpropagandagoal:notcontrollingeveryframeorissuebutdominatingthepremises onwhichtheissuesarediscussed.
7.Conclusions
ThiscontributionprovidedacomparativequantitativeandqualitativeanalysisofofficialU.S.communicationsandU.S.partisanmediacoverageinthefirstweekoftheRussian invasionofUkraine.Itaimedtouncover(RQ1)howtheU.S.governmentpropagated theRussia–Ukrainewaranditsinvolvementinit;(RQ2)towhatextenttheU.S.media pickedupU.S.governmentpropagandaattemptstosettheagenda;and(RQ3)howtheU.S. governmentandpartisanmediaframedtheRussia–Ukrainewarandhowthegovernment andmediaframeswererelated.Theoretically,wecombinedpropagandastudieswith indexingtheorytounderstandtheworkingofpropagandaintheearlydaysoftheconflict withafocusonstate–mediarelations.Theresultssuggest,regardingRQ1,anarrowfocus anddistinctframingoftheconflictonthepartoftheU.S.government.RegardingRQ2, weshowthatpartisanmediapartlytookoverthegovernmentagenda-setting,whilealso touchingonothertopicsthatfitmedialogic,especiallyrelatingtothebattlefield.Likewise, regardingRQ3,theresultsshowthat,intermsofframing,partisanmediaprovidedsome counter-framesinlinewiththeirideologicalpositions,yetoverallconformedtothedominantU.S.governmentframingofthewarasunjust,unprovokedandpremeditated,as Putin’schoice,andthepositionoftheU.S.astheleaderofthefreeworldanddefender ofdemocracy.
Ourstudyconfirmsandcontributesto Zollmann’s(2019)calltodemarginalizepropagandastudiesby(re)integratingthemintojournalismandpoliticalcommunication studies.Weshowpropagandatobeasmuchabout(reconfigured)factsandinformationas aboutdisinformationandliesand,inthecaseofstatepropaganda,tobecloselyrelated toindexing(cf. Kennis 2009).Basedonjournalist–elitesourcerelations,itresultsinthe mediafollowingelites’agenda-settingandframingofevents,particularlyintheearly stagesofthisevent.Ourstudyfurtherhighlightsthatlegacymediaremaincrucialinstate propagandaefforts,and,thus,areaworthyfocusofanalysis,theexistenceofpropaganda notwithstanding.Methodologically,ourstudyshowstheimportanceofcombiningquantitativeandqualitativeapproaches.Especiallyinatimethatfavorsbigdataanalysis,our studyshowstherelevanceofaqualitative,inductiveapproachinunearthingtheintricacies ofpropaganda.
Thecombinedquantitativeandqualitativeapproachdoescomewiththelimitation ofasmalldatasamplethatcoversonlyashortperiodofstateandmediacommunication andthatisrestrictedtotheexecutivebranchofgovernmentandtelevision.Assuch, ourstudyfindingsregardinghowU.S.statepropagandahelpedtosettheagendaand framingoftheUkraine–RussiawarcoverageintheU.S.cannotbeextendedbeyondthe highlychargedstartingperiodoftheconflictorextrapolatedtoothermedia.Forinstance, longer-termtrackingofpropagandamayshowevidenceof Entman’s(2003)“cascading networkactivation”modelthatsuggeststhatovertime,politicalandotherelites,media andaudiencescontributetoevolvingnewsframes,inlinewithhegemonicroomfor discussionanddisagreementasHermanandChomsky’spropagandamodelacknowledges. Entman’smodelalsoremindsustoconsiderthe(active)audience,somethingourstudy doesnottouchuponandthatcertainlyneedsattentioninfollow-upresearch.However, theabsenceofanaudienceandalonger-termperspectivedoesnotundermineourkey findingsregardingthestrengthoftherelationshipbetweenexecutivepowerandmediain theoriginalagenda-settingandframingattheoutsetofacrucialconflict.
AuthorContributions: Conceptualization,A.H.andH.V.d.B.;methodology,A.H.andH.V.d.B.;formal analysis,A.H.;investigation,A.H.andH.V.d.B.;resources,A.H.;datacuration,A.H.; writing—original draftpreparation,A.H.andH.V.d.B.;writing—reviewandediting,A.H.andH.V.d.B.Allauthorshave readandagreedtothepublishedversionofthemanuscript.
Funding: Thisresearchreceivednoexternalfunding.
InstitutionalReviewBoardStatement: Notapplicable.
InformedConsentStatement: Notapplicable.
DataAvailabilityStatement: Dataforthequalitativeframinganalysisarepubliclyavailable.White HousePressBriefingscanbeaccessedhere: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/ (accessedon9January2023).TheStateDepartmentbriefingscanbeaccessedhere: https://www.state.gov/department-press-briefings/ (accessedon9January2023).TheCNNand FoxNewsfootagecanbeobtainedfromInternetArchive:DigitalLibraryofFree&BorrowableBooks, Movies,Music&WaybackMachine(accessedon11July2022).
Acknowledgments: WewanttothankR.MacdonaldandK.LeetaruattheInternetArchivefor helpfulsupportinobtainingthevideomaterials;D.YanichandH.WolgastattheUniversityof Delawarefortheirinputinthedevelopmentofourcodingschedule;Em.K.Nordenstreng(Tampere University)andtheteamofinternationalcolleaguesinvolvedinanalyzingearlyreportingofthe Ukraine-Russiaconflict(Nordenstreng2023);J.VandenBulck(UniversityofMichigan)andK.Panis (ThomasMoreUniversityofAppliedSciences)fortheirhelpfuladviceonthequantitativeanalysis. ConflictsofInterest: Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest.
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