WAR,SOCIALISM,ANDTHERISEOFFASCISM: ANEMPIRICALEXPLORATION DARON ACEMOGLU GIUSEPPE DE FEO GIACOMO DE LUCA GIANLUCA RUSSO Therecentascentofright-wingpopulistmovementsinseveralcountrieshas rekindledinterestinunderstandingthecausesoftheriseoffascismintheinterwaryears.Inthisarticle,wearguethattherewasastronglinkbetweenthe surgeofsupportfortheSocialistPartyafterWorldWarIandthesubsequent emergenceoffascisminItaly.Wefirstdevelopasourceofvariationinsocialist supportacrossItalianmunicipalitiesinthe1919electionbasedonwarcasualtiesfromthearea.Weshowthatthesecasualtiesareunrelatedtoabatteryof political,economic,andsocialvariablesbeforethewarandhadamajoreffect onsocialistsupport(partlybecausethesocialistswerethemainantiwarpoliticalmovement).Ourmainresultisthatthisboosttosocialistsupport(thatis “exogenous”tothepriorpoliticalleaningofthemunicipality)ledtogreaterlocal fascistactivityasmeasuredbylocalpartybranchesandfascistpoliticalviolence, andtosignificantlylargervoteshareoftheFascistPartyinthe1921and1924 elections.Weprovideevidencethatlandownerassociationsandgreaterpresence oflocalelitesplayedanimportantroleintheriseoffascism.Finally,wefind greaterlikelihoodofJewishdeportationsin1943–45andlowervotesharefor ChristianDemocratsafterWorldWarIIinareaswithgreaterearlyfascistactivity. JELCodes: D72,P16.
∗ WethankAlfredoDelMonte,NicolaFontana,BenjaminMarx,LuigiPascali, GiacomoPonzetto,RiccardoPuglisi,GuidoTabellini,JoachimVoth,participantsat variousseminars,theeditorsPolAntr ` asandStefanieStantcheva,andfouranonymousrefereesforusefulcommentsandsuggestions.WealsothankAmosConti (ISTORECO),AnnagraziaDeLuca,StefanoPresti,andRaffaeleSavareseforthe assistanceprovidedindatacollectionanddigitizationandgratefullyacknowledge thefinancialsupportoftheMorrellTrustandtheextensivesupportreceivedfrom theemployeesofthemanystatearchivesandlibrariesvisitedaroundthecountry,inparticularthedirectoroftheNationalCentralLibraryofFlorence,Luca Bellingeri,andGianLucaCorradi,EnricoLeonessi,AnnalisaMoschetti,Annalisa Pecchioli,andLinaTavernelli.Thisarticlecombinestwoindependentworking papers, Acemoglu,DeFeo,andDeLuca(2020a) and Russo(2020).
C TheAuthor(s)2022.PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressonbehalfofthePresident andFellowsofHarvardCollege.Allrightsreserved.ForPermissions,pleaseemail: journals.permissions@oup.com TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics (2022),1233–1296. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac001. AdvanceAccesspublicationonJanuary21,2022.
I.INTRODUCTION AsweapproachthecentennialoftheMarchonRomein 1922,whichcatapultedBenitoMussolinitopowerinItaly,there isrenewedinterestinfascism,partlyasaresultoftheriseof right-wingpopulistmovementsaroundtheworld(e.g., Judis2016; Finchelstein2019).Thesemovementsarethreateningdemocratic institutions,mediafreedom,andsomekeyaspectsofstatecapacity(see GurievandPapaioannou2020),andastheresponsesto theCOVID-19pandemicinBrazil,India,Turkey,andtheUnited StatesunderDonaldTrumpillustrate,thesemovementsarealso havingfirst-ordereffectsoncriticaleconomicandsocialpolicies. Somescholarshavearguedthatthesemovementsarecloselyconnectedtofascismandwillsimilarlyturnmoreviolentandantidemocraticovertime(e.g., Stanley2018).Understandingthe factorsthatfueledtheriseoffascismduringtheinterwaryears canshedlightonthedangersaheadandtheimplicationsofthese movementsforeconomicpolicyandpoliticaldynamics.
AninfluentialthesisadvancedbyGermanhistorian Ernst Nolte(1965) aswellastheoriesputforwardbyseveralMarxist historiansinthe1920sand1930smaintainsthatfascismwasa reactiontothethreatofsocialismintheimmediateaftermath ofWorldWarI(seealso Snowden1972; Lyttelton2003).Yetthis perspectivehasbeencriticizedbymanyscholarswhoviewfascism as“theexpressionofanemergingmiddleclass...thatupuntil thatmomenthadremainedexcluded”(DeFeliceandLedeen1976, 71),andconclude“PeoplewhovotedfortheFascistsin1921were probablynotreactingtothe‘RedMenace”’(Brustein1991,662). Thisdebateisnotjustacademic:iffascismwasuniquetoaperiod inwhichWorldWarIandtheSovietrevolutionhadcreateda threatofsocialistrevolutionincontinentalEurope,theremaybe lessreasontofearthattoday’sright-wingpopulistmovements willturnfascist.
Inthisarticle,wecontributetothisdebatebyprovidingevidencethatthe(perceived)threatofsocialismwascriticaltothe riseoffascisminItaly.TheItalianSocialistPartywasoneofthe strongestinEuropeinthefirstquarterofthetwentiethcentury andwascommittedtoahard-linesocialist/communistagenda (Tasca1938).Afterthe1917BolshevikRevolution,itallieditselfwithSovietRussia.BecauseithadopposedItaly’sentryinto WorldWarI,thehardshipsufferedbyItalianswhoservedinthe warandthosewhoremainedbehindcreatedagroundswellof
supportfortheparty,whichcaptured32.3%ofthenationalvote inthe1919elections(Maier1988,129).Atthispoint,theFascistPartylackedacoherentprogramanddidnotevenmanage tocompeteeffectivelyintheelection.Subsequently,thefascists startedreceivingsupportfrommanylocalelitesandmiddle-class Italiansalarmedbythesocialistthreat.By1920,fascistswere betterorganized,receivedmonetaryandpoliticalbackingfrom manyantisocialistlandownersandbusinessmen,andinitiated systematicviolenceagainstsocialistsandotherpoliticiansand organizationsthatopposedthem.By1924,asignificantfraction oftheright-wingandcenter-rightvoteshiftedtotheFascistParty, whichreceivedmorethan65%ofthevoteintheparliamentary elections(DirezioneGeneraledellaStatistica1924).
Ourempiricalstrategyistoinvestigatethelinkagebetween thethreatofsocialismandtheriseoffascistpoliticsinItaly.We firstsubstantiatetheclaimthatthewar’shardshipcreatedabig boosttotheSocialistPartyinthe1919parliamentaryelection, aswellasinthemunicipalelectionsin1920.Weusethemilitary RollofHonortoobtainestimatesofItaliancasualtiesbymunicipalityduringWorldWarI.Wedocumentthatthecasualtiesof footsoldiersinamunicipalitywereunrelatedtoanypriorpolitical,economic,social,ordemographicaspectsofmunicipalities.We showthatmunicipalitieswithhighcasualties(andthusgreater exposuretothewar)experiencedasizableincreaseinthevote shareoftheSocialistPartyinthe1919elections(bothinabsolutetermsandrelativetothe1913elections).Thereisasimilar increaseinthelikelihoodoftheSocialistPartytakingcontrolof municipalgovernmentsin1920.WeinterprettheWorldWarI casualtiesasanexogenoussourceofvariationinsocialistsupport andtracethesubsequentpoliticalresponsestothisvariation.
Ourmainfindingisthatmunicipalitiesexperiencingthis boosttosocialistsupportsawapowerfulfascistresponse.We measurethefascistresponseusingfourdistinctvariables.The firsttwoarethepresenceoflocalFascistPartybranchesin1921 andtheextentoffascistviolencebetween1920and1922,andthe nexttwoarethefascistvotesharesinthe1921and1924elections. WefindthattheperceivedsocialistthreatisassociatedwithsignificantlyhigherfascistactivityandsupportfortheFascistParty usingallfourmeasures.Forexample,ourestimatessuggestthat thebulkoffascistviolenceintheearly1920sandaboutaquarteroftheincreaseinthevoteshareofthefascistlistsfrom1919 to1924appeartoberelatedtothis“redscare”mechanism.We
1236 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS alsoshowthatmostofthiseffectisbecauseoftheconsolidationof right-wingandcenter-rightvotesundertheauspicesoftheFascist Party.
Thereareseveralpotentialthreatstoouridentificationstrategy.Forone,warcasualtiesmayberelatedtootherlong-rundifferencesacrossmunicipalities.Ortheeffectsofwarcasualtiesmay beworkingthroughadifferentmechanism,forinstance,because warveteranssupportedthefascistcause.Weprovideseveralexercisestobolsterthevalidityofourapproachandinterpretation. First,asmentioned,ourinstrumentisunrelatedtoabatteryof pre-1919municipalitycharacteristics.Second,weshowthatthe sourceofvariationweexploitisunlikelytobeconfoundedbyother, competingexplanations.Forexample,wedonotfindaconsistent patternofsupportfromveteransfortheFascistPartyandtheir inclusionhasnoeffectonthecoefficientestimatesforthesocialistvotesharein1919.Moreover,ourinstrumentdoesnotpredict greatersupportfortheNationalistPartyinthe1919elections, thebuildingofnationalist(war)memorials,orgreatervolunteer orspecialassaulttroopcasualtiesfromthemunicipality.Third, inplaceswheretheSocialistPartywasweak,andthusthered scaremechanismisunlikelytobeoperative,theinstrumentdoes notpredictgreaterfascistactivity,bolsteringouroverallcausal mechanism.Fourth,wedocumentthattheshifttowardtheFascistPartywasstrongerwhenthethreatofsocialismcoincided withbetterorganizedlandlordsandalargerfractionofelites, andprovideadditionalevidencethatthisisbothbecausesome oftheelitessupportedtheFascistPartyandbecausethemiddle classesswitchedtheirallegiancefromcenter-rightpartiestothe fascists.
Finally,asanalternativeandcomplementarystrategy,we usetwoothersourcesofvariationinsocialistsupport—droughts insomemunicipalitiesandthedifferentialeffectsoftheSpanish fluepidemic.Inbothcases,theresultsarenotaspreciseasour mainestimatesbutareconsistentwithacausalchannellinking hardshiptosupportfortheSocialistPartyandfromtheretothe riseoftheFascistPartyintheearly1920s.
Wealsoexploretwolonger-termeffectsoffascism.First,we showthatsupportforfascismisassociatedwithgreaterlikelihood ofJewsbeingdeportedfromtheareabetween1943and1945,presumablyreflectinglocalcollaborationwiththeNazis.Second,we documentthatinpostwarelectionscenter-rightpartiesperformed significantlyworseandcenter-leftandotherleft-wingparties
performedbetterinmunicipalitieswheretheFascistPartywas moresuccessfulinthe1920s.Thismaybebecausethecenter-right establishmentbecamepartlydelegitimizedduetoitsalliancewith fascists.
Inadditiontothehistoricalliteraturementionedpreviously, ourarticleisrelatedtoafewworksinpoliticaleconomy.First, Elazar(2000), ElazarandLewin(1999),and Szymanski(1973) alsoemphasizetheredscarehypothesisanddocumentprovincelevelcorrelationsbetweensocialistsupport,fascistviolence,and thefascisttakeoveroftheprovinces. Brustein(1991) and Wellhofer(2003),ontheotherhand,disputethisinterpretationand suggestthatthiscorrelationislikelydrivenbydisaffectedsocialistvotersswitchingtotheFascistParty(seealso Brusteinand Berntson1999 foracross-countryanalysis).Thesepapersdonot havethedetailedmunicipal-leveldatawecollect,donotattempt toexploitpotentiallyexogenousvariationinsocialistsupport,and donotexplorethemechanismswepropose(Wellhofer2003,asa partialexception,usesdatafor570municipalities).1
ArecentinfluentialliteraturestudiestherootsoftheNazi movementinGermany. Voigtl ¨ anderandVoth(2012) documentthe linksbetweenanti-SemiticpogromsintheMiddleAgesandsupportfortheNaziParty,while Satyanath,Voigtl ¨ ander,andVoth (2017) demonstratetheroleoflocalassociations. Adenaetal. (2015) and Voigtl ¨ anderandVoth(2019) exploretheeffectsofradiopropagandaandpublicworks,suchasthebuildingoftheAutobahnnetwork,onNazisupport. Galofr ´ e-Vil ` aetal.(2021) and Kingetal.(2008) exploretheeffectsoftheeconomichardship createdbytheGreatDepression,while Doerretal.(2020) investigatetheconsequencesofthe1931bankingcrisis.Mostclosely relatedtoourworkinthiscontextistherecentpaperby Koenig (2020),whostudiesthelinkbetweenreturningwarveteransand thefalloftheWeimarRepublic. Koenig(2020) findsthatwarveteranswereanimportantsourceofsupportfortheNationalist Party,thoughnotdirectlyfortheNazis.Thiscontrastswithour results,whichshowthattheredscareplayedacriticalroleinthe riseofItalianfascists,withlessconsistentsupportfromveterans.Onedifferencebetweenthetwocountriesmaybethegreater
1.Thecausalmechanismhereisalsorelatedto Acemoglu,DeFeo,andDe Luca(2020b),whoarguedthattheriseoftheSicilianMafiainthelastdecadeof thenineteenthcenturywasaresponsetotheriseofsocialistpeasantorganizations followingtheseveredroughtof1893.
disillusionmentwiththewaramongItalianveterans,especially thosefromtheoldercohorts.
ThereismuchlessresearchoninterwarextremistmovementsoutsideofGermanyandItaly.Tworecentexceptionsare Berg,Dahlberg,andVernby(2019),wholookattheroleofreturningwarveteransinSweden,and Cag ´ eetal.(2020),who exploretheroleofcharismaticleadersinlegitimizingright-wing ideologyinthecontextoftheNazioccupationofFrance.Relatedly, Fontana,Nannicini,andTabellini(2018) estimatetheeffectofthe NazioccupationinthenorthofItalyonsubsequentsupportfor leftistparties.Thereisdebateamonghistoriansconcerningthe roleofindustrialandlandedelitesandthemiddleclassesinthe supportforfascism(Lipset1960; SalvatorelliandMira1964).Our evidencesuggeststhatmiddle-classvoteswerecriticalforfascist electoralsuccess,buttheriseofthepartywashelpedbysupportfromindustrialinterestsandlandownersseekingtocounter thesocialistthreat(Moore1966; Rueschemeyer,Stephens,and Stephens1992).
Therestofthearticleisorganizedasfollows.Thenextsectionprovidesthehistoricalcontext. SectionIII presentsourdata andsources. SectionIV explorestherelationshipbetweenfoot soldiercasualtiesandthesupportfortheSocialistPartyinthe 1919elections,whichwillbeourfirststage. SectionV presents ourmainresults,focusingonthemeasuresofearlyfascistactivity. SectionVI providesevidenceonourproposedmechanism,that theriseoffascismwasrelatedtotheperceivedthreatofsocialism, and SectionVII discussesestimatesusingalternativesourcesof variation. SectionVIII looksatmediumandlong-termoutcomes; SectionIX concludes.The OnlineAppendix providesadditional robustnesschecksandresults.
II.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Inthissection,wetracethehistoricalrootsoffascismin Italy.WedescribehowItalyenteredthewar;thepostwarsocial, economic,andpoliticaldistress;andhowtheSocialistPartybecamethebeneficiaryofthiscrisis.Wedocumenttheredscare generatedbythesurgeoftheSocialistParty,itstakeoveroflocal councils,andthespreadofriotsandruralandindustrialstrikes duringthisera,sometimesreferredtoasthe“redbiennium.”We finallydiscusstheoriginsofthefascistmovementanditsseizure ofpower.
II.A.ItalyandtheGreatWar ItalyjoinedWorldWarIoneyearaftertherestofEurope againstitsformeralliesGermanyandAustria.Althoughthere wasstrongoppositiontothewarinthepopulationatlargeand intheparliament,the“interventionist”coalitionsucceededinengineeringthecountry’sentryintothewar,andthenationalist propagandaspearheadedbyBenitoMussoliniandthenewspaper heheadedplayedacrucialroleinthisprocess.
Atthestartofthewar,theItaliangovernmentdeclaredthat itwouldremainneutral,perhapsbecauseitwaslaggingbehind therestofEuropeintermsofmilitarypreparedness.TheItalian Armyhadapoortrackrecord,asdemonstratedduringthefirst Italo-Ethiopianwarof1895–96.Politiciansandhigh-rankingmilitaryofficialsweredoubtfulaboutthedisciplineandpreparednessofthetroops(Ceva1999).Moreover,manybelievedthatan alliancewithGermanyandAustriawouldhaveprecludedtherecaptureofItalianterritoriesstillunderAustriancontrolandthus preventthecompletionofItaly’sunificationthathadstartedin 1861(Ragionieri1976a,1962–1965).Consequently,themajority oftheMembersofParliament,includingtheSocialistsandthe Catholics(thePopularParty)wereagainstthewar.Evenmost oftheLiberals,ledbyformerPrimeMinisterGiovanniGiolitti, were“neutralists”—opposedtothewarandinfavorofremaining neutral.Aconfidentialgovernmentsurveyfoundthatthemajorityofthepopulation,especiallyinthecountryside,wasstrongly opposedtothewar(Bianchi2014).
Theinterventionistmovementstartedgainingmomentum afterthebeginningofthewar,however.Adiversecoalitioncomprisingnationalistconservatives,liberalradicals,republicans, democraticsocialists,andrevolutionarysyndicalistscarriedouta campaignofnationalistpropagandaandwerejoinedbyoneofthe mostprominentnewspapers, CorriereDellaSera.Assummarized by Ragionieri(1976a,1975):“These‘storminggroups’exploited thewartocreatearupturefromtheformergovernmentindecisiveness.TheyseizedtheopportunitytoaffirmadifferentItaly, withadifferentleadershipthatwouldbeabletosave[thecountry] fromits‘moralcrisis’.”
Throughoutthisprocess,Mussolinicarriedoutanincessant propagandacampaignforjoiningthewar.BeforeWorldWarI, Mussoliniwasayoung,combativesocialistandoneoftheleaders oftherevolutionarywingoftheSocialistParty.In1913hebecame
editoroftheofficialSocialistnewspaper, Avanti! (DeFelice1965, 135).WhenAustriaandGermanywereonthevergeofdeclaringwar,Mussoliniwroteanopinionpiece,titled“Downwiththe War!,”wherehesuggestedthattheItaliangovernmentshould maintainits“absoluteneutrality”andhelpbringtheconflictto anend(DeFelice1965,222).Thisbecametheofficialpositionof theSocialistParty(Tasca1938,8).However,afewmonthsinto WorldWarI,Mussolinichangedhistuneand,whilestillwritingfor Avanti!,startedarguingforthewar,collecteddonations forhisowninterventionistnewspaper, IlPopolod’Italia,andwas subsequentlyexpelledfromtheSocialistParty(Tasca1938,7).
Monthsofinterventionistpropagandaculminatedindemonstrationsinspring1915,whichconvincedthegovernmentandthe kingtosecretlyjointhewaragainstAustriaandGermany.Even thoughthemajorityinparliamentwasstillagainstthewar,the governmentsigned,withoutparliamentaryapproval,thesecret PactofLondononApril26,1915,committingthecountrytojoin theAllieswithinamonth.Inexchange,Italywaspromisedsignificantterritorialcompensations(Tasca1938,7).OnMay24,1915, PrimeMinisterSalandra,withthesupportoftheking,declared waronAustria.
II.B.ItalianSocialismandtheRedScare Themainwinnersfromthepostwarpoliticalcrisiswerethe SocialistandtheCatholicParties,partlybecauseoftheirantiwar stance.TheSocialistPartybecamethelargestoneinparliament, doublingitsvoteshareto32.3%andtreblingitsrepresentation inparliament(UfficioCentralediStatistica1920,LV).Theinterventionistpartiessufferedaresoundingdefeat.Acontemporary analystobserved:“TheItalianelectoratehasclearlycondemned thewarbyvotingenmassefortheSocialistsandtoalesserextent alsoforthePopulars[Catholics].TheformerbecausetheSocialists alwaysstoodagainsttheparticipationintheconflict,thelatter becausethePopularshadnoresponsibilityinthedecisiontojoin thewar”(Volpi1919,237–238).
TheSocialistParty,foundedin1892,wasadiversecoalition. Whileitsstrongholdwastheindustrialworkingclassofthenorthwesternindustrialtriangle,coveringtheareabetweenTurin, Milan,andGenoa,thepartyalsohadastrongfollowinginrural areas,especiallyinthePovalley.Themaindivisionwasbetween themoremoderatesocialdemocraticandtherevolutionarywings
oftheparty.Themajorityoftheparty’smembershipcamefrom thelaborunions,especiallytheCGL(GeneralConfederationof Labor)andthelocalworkcooperatives.By1912,theCGLhad about640,000members,353,000industrialworkers,and290,000 ruralworkerslocallyorganizedinleaguesandlaborunions,while thecooperativesofworkandproductionhadmorethan800,000 members(Schiavi1914,421,426).Socialdemocratscontrolledthe leadershipoftheunionsand,largelyasaresultofthis,heldthe upperhandintheparty.ThischangedasWorldWarIwasdrawing toaclose.
Theendofthewarincreasedthepopulardiscontentand coincidedwithasevereeconomicrecession.Gerwarthdescribes thesituationasfollows:“Inmanyways[Italy’s]post-warexperience...resembledthatofthedefeatedempiresofeasternand centralEuropemorecloselythanthatofFranceandBritain” (Gerwarth2016,6).Infact,contrarytowhathappenedinParis andLondon,noparadewasorganizedandthevictorywasnot officiallycelebratedfortwoyears.Furthermore,Italianexpectationsforterritorialgainsweredashedandthewarcametobe viewedasthe vittoriamutilata (mutilatedvictory),atermcoined bypoetGabrieled’Annunzio,whoinSeptember1919headeda smallgroupoftroopstoinvadethetownofFiume,disputedbetweenItalyandYugoslavia.
Bythispoint,thebalanceintheSocialistPartyhadstarted changing,withpowershiftingtotherevolutionaries.Duringthe 1918Congress,therevolutionarywingtookcontroloftheparty. Theirprogramaspired“todoasinRussia”.Ayearlatertheparty joinedtheCommunistInternational(Tasca1938,13–14),with itsnewstatuteexplicitlystipulating:“Theviolentconquestof politicalpoweronbehalfoftheworkerswillsignifythepassing ofpowerfromthebourgeoisclasstotheproletarianclass,thus establishing...thedictatorshipofallofthe proletariat”(Payne 1996,89).
InApril1919theSocialistPartyledageneralstrike,demandingthefullandrapiddemobilizationofthearmy.Theunrestthat hadstartedinthenorthquicklyspreadtothesouth,triggering aseriesofruralstrikesandlandencroachments“followingthe gradualdemobilizationofthearmy:forthefirsttime,sharecroppersfromcentralItalyjoinedthemassiveruralstrikesofwaged laborersfromtheNorthofthecountry.WhileinLaziounionsorganizedfarmersandruralworkerstooccupyland,intheSouth landoccupationswereeitherspontaneousorledbyveterans”
1242 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS (Ragionieri1976a,2070).Assupportforsocialistsgrew,theCGL reachedmorethan2millionmembersin1919.Themembershipofruralunions,whichhadpreviouslybeenaround125,000, roseto760,000,whilelaborunionsinthesteelsectorsawtheir membershipsurgefrom16,000to300,000(Ragionieri1976a, 2071).
The1919victoryforsocialists,callsoftheradicalwingfora Bolshevik-stylerevolution,andindustrialstrikesgeneratedared scareinmanysegmentsofItaliansociety.Strikesreachedtheir pinnacleinSeptember1920whenworkersoccupiedfactoriesall overthecountry.Inthecountryside,socialistunionorganization intensifiedandstartedplanningforwidespreadlandcollectivization(DeFelice1965,613–615).Inthelocalelectionsattheendof 1920,socialistsscoredanotherhugevictory,increasingthenumberofmunicipalitiestheycontrolledfrom300to2,100,magnifying fearsofsocialistrevolutionamonglandownersandindustrialists.
II.C.TheRiseoftheFascistParty InMarch1919,MussolinifoundedtheFascidiCombattimento,withtheaimofrestoringthe“spiritofMay1915,”when nationalistdemonstrationshadpushedthegovernmenttoenter thewar.Themovementassembledaroundthenationalistrhetoric ofthe“mutilatedvictory”andattractedrevolutionarysyndicalists, membersoftheeliteshocktroops,andaragtaggroupofnationalistsaswellasfuturistintellectuals(DeFelice1965).Atthis stage,itappealedmoretotheinterventionistsof1915thanto warveterans.
Althoughtheinitialprogramofthefascistmovementwas heavilyinfluencedbyrevolutionarysyndicalistandsocialistideas, itsprowarstancemadeanalliancewiththeSocialistPartyimpossible.TheriftbetweenthetwomovementsintensifiedonApril15, 1919,whenfascistarmyofficialsandformershock-troopsoldiers assaultedthebuildingof Avanti! andkilledthreesocialists.This wasthebeginningoffascistviolenceagainstleftiststhatcameto definetheearly1920s.
The1919electionsweredisastrousfortheFascistParty, whichfailedtowinanyseatsinparliament.Mussolinihadbeen unabletoformacoalitionwithotherinterventionistforces,and theparty’selectoralprogramwasstillill-defined.Twodaysafter theelections,Mussoliniandhismaincollaboratorswerearrested forthearmedassaultonagroupofsocialistscelebratingelectoral
victory,butfollowingPrimeMinisterNitti’srequest,Mussolini wasreleasedthedayafter.
Inthemonthsfollowingthe1919elections,thefascistmovementwasincrisis,andmanystarteddoubtingtheviabilityof thefascistprojectandtheabilityofMussolinitoleadthemovement,astheparty’slocalbranchesclosedandmanyofitsmembersdesertedtheparty(DeFelice1965,587).YetMussolinisoon managedtorefashionthepartyasarobustantisocialistforce, attractingnewmembersmorecommittedtoviolent,antisocialistaction(DeFelice1965,590–592).Assummarizedby Lyttelton (2003,43):“thenoveltyofFascismlayinthemilitaryorganizationofapoliticalparty,”andthisrecipe,withthesupportofthe traditionalright,becamethebasisoffascistsuccessafter1920.
Atthispoint,theItalianstatewasfairlyweakandunable tocontrolthemountingconflictthroughoutthecountry.Inthis environment,antisocialistviolenceinthecitiesstartedmultiplyingandanenergetic“agrarianfascism”emergedinruralareas. DeFelice(1966,3)emphasizesthreeaspectsofthisfascistremaking:“theinclusionofFascisminmainstreampolitics;therise andrapidspreadofagrarianFascismintheruralareasofthe PovalleyandespeciallyintheEmiliaregion;theswiftascent ofareactionary-conservativealliancebetweenthelandlordsand thecommercialandindustrialbourgeoisie...thathadthegoalof bringingpeacetothecountry,giventhatthegovernmentseemed unable—orunwilling—todoso.”
Theexpansionofagrarianfascisminthecountrysidewas probablythemostimportantcomponentofthistransformation andwasenabledbythesupportoffarmersandlandownerswillingtoorganizeagainstpeasantleagues.Theyopposeddemands forhigherwagesfordaylaborers,highersharesofrevenue,lower costsandguaranteedincomeforsharecroppers,andbetterand moresanitaryworkingconditionsforbothtypesofworkers,spearheadedbysocialistsacrossthecountry.In Lupo’s(2005,75)summary:“Theright-wingcomponentsoftheFascistmovement,those fundedbythelargelandownersandactiveinthecountryside wheretheclassstrugglewasmoreviolent,tookoverthecontrol ofFascistorganizationsfromearlyurbanFascistswhostillhad linkstotheirSocialistorigins.”
Fascistorganizationswereextremelyviolent,andused“punitiveexpeditions”againstworkerassociationsandsocialiststo restorethecontroloflandownersinthecountryside.Theseantisocialistactionsgainedtheapprovalandsupportofmany
conservatives,especiallybecauseoftheperceivedimpassecreated byPrimeMinisterGiolitti’spolicyofneutralityinlabordisputes, whichwasthoughttohavestrengthenedworkersandtheSocialist Party(DeFelice1966).
Richlandowners,armyofficials,rentiers,andprofessionals inurbanareasrepresentedtheleadershipofthefirstarmedfascistsquads.Thesesquadswereorganizedinthecitiesandthen directedtothesurroundingcountrysideforpunitiveexpeditions. Armedbythelocalagrarianassociationorsuppliedfromthelocal militarydepotofthearmy,thefascistblackshirtsattacked,intimidated,andkilledworkers,laborers,andsocialists(Tasca1938, 102–103).
Agrarianfascismwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe complicityoftheItalianstate.Aturningpointcamefollowing thesocialistvictoryinthelocalelectionsinBolognainNovember 1920,whenfascistsprovokedviolence,killed10socialistsand inducedthegovernmentprefecttodissolvethecouncilandinstall agovernmentcommissioner.Theseeventsthenformedatemplate forfascists,whostartedtosystematicallyattacklocalcouncils heldbythesocialists(andsometimesbythePopularParty)to forcethemtoresignorcreatechaosandinstability,inducingthe governmentprefecttodissolvethecouncil.
DeFelice(1965,657–658)describesthefastspreadofthe agrarianfascismasfollows.
AfterthetragedyofBologna,thelandownersgainedmomentum andstartedorganizingthemselves....Thecountrysidewasvulnerableandfavorabletoaconservativereaction.Theoldlandowningclass—oftenabsentee,apatheticandfearful—fearedthatthe Socialistunrestin1919–1920wasthestartofaSoviet-likeland expropriation....Inafew weeks,anincreasingnumberofaggressiveFascistsconcentratedinthePoValley,increasingtheintensity ofviolentactions.Followingtheseevents,Fascismbecameamass movementwhichwasinallregardsidenticaltoa“whiteguard”[the counterrevolutionarymovementinRussia].2
2.Indeed,theFascistPartyreceivedcriticalsupportfromlocalagrarianassociations.Forexample,theprefectofPaviaonFebruary28,1921wrote:“The landedclasssponsorstheFascistmovementinthisprovince....Thecommittee isinconstantcontactwiththeCentralcommitteeinMilan...andincloserelationshipwiththeAgrarianAssociationinPavia,whichprovideslargefinancial support.Inexchangeforthefinancialsupport,theFasciofferprotectionagainst peasantstrikes.”TheprefectofVicenzareportedonApril4,1921:“Landowners andlocalbossesinthecountrysideestablishedtheAgrarianFasciorFasciof
Onthebackofruralsupport,theFascistPartysoonbecame oneofthelargestinthecountryandcametocontrollargeareas, especiallyinthecountryside,manyofwhichhadpreviouslybeen socialiststrongholds.
Anotherturningpoint,andtheinevitablerecognitionofthe FascistParty’sincreasingdefactopower,camewhentheliberal governmentthathadformedinJune1920,ledbyGiolitti,includeditintheNationalBlocforthegeneralelectionin1921. GiolittihadcalledtheelectioninanattempttoexploittheapparentweaknessoftheSocialistParty,whichhadbeenbatteredby incessantfascistviolenceandwasdisorganizedbecauseofitsleft wing’ssplittoformtheCommunistPartyintheJanuary1921 LivornoCongress.Giolittihopedtobuildaunifiedconservative andnationalistcoalition,includingthefascists,todefeattheBolshevikforces.
Theelectionstookplaceinaclimateofwidespreadviolence, mostlyperpetratedbythefascists,whichresultedindozensof deathsacrossthecountry.Therewasnoclearmajorityinthevotingbooth,andsocialistskeptmostoftheirseats.“Theoutcome oftheelectionswasclearlycontrarytoGiolitti’sexpectations”(De Felice1966,92).Unabletoformamajoritygovernment,Giolitti resignedinJuly1921.Theensuinginstabilitycreatedanideal environmentforMussolinitointensifystreetviolenceandultimatelytakecontrolofthegovernment.
InlateOctober1922,MussoliniorganizedamarchonRome, whichgatheredabout25,000blackshirts.PrimeMinisterLuigi Factawantedtosendthetroopstostopthem,butKingVictor EmmanuelIIIdidnotagree,andFactaresigned.OnOctober29, 1922,thekingaskedMussolinitoformanewgovernmentand assemblearight-wingcoalition,includingLiberal,Democratic, andCatholicministers.
Oncehetookthereinsofgovernment,Mussolinihadnointentionofgivingthemup.Inthefirstmonths,heconsolidatedhis griponpower,inparticularbyincorporatingfascistparamilitary
SocialDefensewiththegoaloffightingagainstthelocalpeasantleagues....The agrarianfasciaremuchbetterfundedbecauselocalbossesandthelandowners agreedtofundtheorganizations.”OnMarch29,1921theprefectofRomereported that“inMontefiasconeonMarch13,1921locallandownersfundedabranchofthe Fasciwith220memberstocounteractapotentialstrikeandthepossibleviolence fromthepeasants” ArchivioCentraledelloStato(1922).Therearesimilarreports fromotherprefects.
organizationsintothestateapparatusanddissolvingallremainingsocialistlocalcouncils.
AlthoughhewasPrimeMinister,Mussolinistillfaceda largelyantifascistparliament,electedin1921.Mussoliniengineeredanewelectorallaw,LeggeAcerbo,tofacilitatehiscompletetakeoverofgovernment.Thelawwasapprovedin1923with thesupportofmanyCatholicdeputieswhowentagainsttheir leadership’soppositiontothelaw.Byinstitutingastronglymajoritarianelectoralsystem,thelawfacilitatedtheconsolidation ofmostright-wingsupportinfascisthands.Inspring1924,Mussolinidissolvedtheparliamentandcallednewelectionswhere fascistlistswonmorethan65%ofthenationalvote.
Theoppositionpartiesapproachedtheelectionsdividedand weakenedbyyearsoffascistviolenceanddeprivedofthecontrol oflocalcouncils.Theyconsideredboycottingtheelectionuntila fewweeksbeforethevote,pointingoutthe“arbitrarinessandthe openviolationoftheconstitutionallaw”bythegovernment(De Felice1966,467).Mussolini’saimwastoco-optthecenter-right andisolatetheopposition,especiallytheleft(DeFelice1966,569–570).Butthisalsomeantthathewantedtolimitstreetviolence andprovethatfascismcouldbringorder.Violenceduringthe electoralcampaigndidnotcease,andtheremayhavebeenas manyas“hundredsofwoundedandseveraldead”atthehandsof thefascists(DeFelice1966,584).
Althoughintimidationandinterferencedidtakeplaceinthe elections,manyhistorianshaveconcludedthattherewasnocentralizedattempttorigtheelectionorcoordinateviolence,and inmostplaces,thelocalstrengthoftheFascistPartydetermined theextentofinterference(see DeFelice1966,588–592; Ragionieri 1976b,2138–2139; Lupo2005,186–187,amongothers).3 Episodes ofintimidation,violence,andvoteriggingweredenouncedatthe openingofthenewparliamentbyGiacomoMatteotti,theleader oftheUnitarySocialistParty.Tendayslater,Matteottiwaskidnappedandkilled.Themurderprovokedaconstitutionalcrisis, resultingeventuallyintheestablishmentofthefascistdictatorship.Mussoliniexclaimedontheeveoftheelections,“Thisisthe lasttimethatweruntheelectionsinthisway.NexttimeI’ll voteforeveryone”(DeFelice1966,584).Mussolinisoonbanned
3.Therewasalsoviolenceaftertheelections,forexampleintheMonzadistrict, wherethePopularPartyscoredamajorsuccessandthefascistlistobtainedonly 16%ofthevotes.
localcouncilelectionsandsetupasingle-partysystem,outlawing allotherpoliticalmovements.From1938onward,electionswere entirelyabolished.
III.DATA Ourdatabasecovers5,775municipalitiesfrom64provinces (outof69inthe1921census).4 Dataforotherperiods,whichareat timesmoredisaggregated,aremappedtothe1921municipalities.
III.A.ElectoralData Theofficialmunicipality-leveldataonthethreenationalelectionsof1919,1921,and1924aremissingfromtheparliamentary archives.Themostcompleteexistingcollectionofthesedatawas undertakenby CorbettaandPiretti(2009),butcontainedconsistentinformationforonlyabout2,000municipalities.Weexpanded thecoverageofthesedatafor5,775municipalitiesforallthree elections,usinginformationfrom1,200localandnationalhistoricalnewspapersandlocalstatearchives.Theformatofnewspaperreportingvariedsignificantly,fromwell-documentedtables, liketheonein OnlineAppendix FigureA1,tovariousreportsin thecontextofothernews,whichwesearchedsystematically.For municipalitiesforwhichwecouldnotgetinformationfromlocalnewspapers,weconsultedlocalarchives,andinmostcaseswe wereabletolocatehand-writtentablessummarizinglocalresults, annotationsbyelectoralauthorities,ortelegraphiccommunicationsfromlocaltocentralelectoraloffices(see OnlineAppendix FigureA2).
OurhistoricalelectoraldatacovermostofItaly,withtheexceptionofafewareas,notablyinCalabriaandSicily,forwhich evenlocalnewspapersorstatearchivesdidnotcontainanyuseful information.
Ourmeasuresofelectoralsupportforfascism, Fascistvote sharein1919,Fascistvotesharein1921,and Fascistvoteshare in1924 comefromthesesources.In1919theFascistPartypresentedcandidatesonlyinafewdistricts.In1921,withafewexceptions,thepartywaspartoftheNationalBlocalliance,joined
4.Inthe1921censustherewere8,355municipalitiesinItaly,excludingthe recentannexationofJulianVenetiaandTrentino.Wemanagedtorecoverthe electiondatafor5,775municipalitiesinthe1919–24elections,whichrepresent oursample.
withseveralconservativeparties.Ourmeasureoffascistvote sharein1921isconstructedfromvotesforfascistlistsandvotes forfascistcandidatesintheNationalBloclists,whomweidentifiedfromannouncementsin IlPopolod’Italia.Weassignedto theFascistPartytheNationalBlocvotesinproportiontothe shareofcandidatevotescapturedbyfascistcandidates.Wewere abletocollectdetailedmunicipality-levelNationalBloccandidate votesfor2,188municipalities,whichmakeupourrestricted(noimputation)sampleforthe1921fascistvoteshare.Weextend thissamplebyimputingthefascistvotesharefortheremaining municipalitiesusingthemostdetailedavailableinformationon fascistcandidatevoteshareatthedistrict,province,orelectoral districtlevel.5
Socialistvotesharein1919, Socialistvotesharein1921,and Socialistvotesharein1924 arealsofromourhistoricalelectoral data,whereas Socialistvotesharein1913 isfrom Corbettaand Piretti(2009) 6 Wealsocollecteddataaboutthemunicipalityelectionsin1920usingreportsin Avanti! andlocalnewspapersand constructedadummyforsocialistcontrolofthemunicipality.
Electoraldatafortheperiod1946–2018aresourcedfrom theofficialelectoralstatisticsoftheItalianMinistryofInternal Affairs.7
III.B.DataonFascistActivity Wecollectedtwofurthermeasuresofthelocalfascistactivities. Franzinelli(2003) records2,561episodesofpoliticalviolence uptoOctober1922,ofwhich2,120werebyfascists,including 709killings.Usingthesedata,wecreatedamunicipalitylevel measureof Fascistviolencein1920–22,whichrecordsthenumber ofviolentepisodesper1,000inhabitantsfortheperiod1920–22. Fromthesamesourcewecreatedthreealternativemeasuresof violence,whichweuseinourrobustnesschecks: Fascistkillings
5.Wecomplementthemunicipality-leveldatawithNationalBloccandidate votesfor39administrativedistricts,23provinces,and28electoraldistricts.The sameapproachwasusedby Brustein(1991) tocomputethefascistvotesharein 1921,butusingonlythedataattheelectoraldistrictorprovinciallevel.
6.Forthe1913electionthesocialistvoteshareiscomputedusingthevotes forthesocialistcandidatesaslistedin Avanti! (1913).Forthe1919electionitis computedusingthevotesfortheofficialSocialistPartylists,whileforthe1921 and1924electionsitalsoincludesthevotesofthebreakawayCommunistand UnitarySocialistparties.
7.See https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it
in1920–22,focusingonkillingsonly; Politicalviolencein1920–22, includingallpoliticalviolence;and Non-Fascistviolencein1920–22,whichexcludesfascistviolence.Wealsocollectedinformation onlocalbranchesoftheFascistPartyinSeptember1921fromthe prefectreportslocatedinstatearchivesthroughoutItaly.Finally, weconstructedadummyforthepresenceoflargedonorstothe FascistPartyintheperiod1919–25(Largedonordummy(1919–25))fromthedetailedinformationprovidedin Padulo(2010).
Thedistributionofourmeasuresoffascistactivitiesacross Italyaredepictedin FiguresI,PanelsC–F. FigureI,PanelB displaysthesocialistvotesharein1919.
III.C.DeportationofJews WecreatedtwomeasuresofthedeportationofJewsfromItalianmunicipalitiesusingthedataprovidedbytheContemporary JewishDocumentationCentre(CDEC).8 Theseareadummyfor anyJewsbeingdeportedin1943–45andanestimateofthenumberofJewsdeporteddividedbytheJewishpopulationasreported inthe1911census.SinceJewishpopulationisavailableonlyat thedistrictlevelandforthedistrictcapital,weapportionnoncapitaldistrictJewishpopulationacrossmunicipalitiesaccordingto theirtotalpopulationandcaptheratioofdeportationstothelocal Jewishpopulationatone.
III.D.WorldWarICasualtiesandRelatedData
TherearevaryingestimatesofthenumberofItaliansoldiers whodiedduringWorldWarI—rangingfrom510,000to600,000. WeusethemilitaryRollofHonor,whichprovidesinformationfor 529,028membersofthearmedforceswhodiedduringthewar (name,datesofbirthanddeath,placesofbirthanddeath,regiment,force,rank).ThedatahavebeendigitizedbytheInstitute fortheHistoryoftheResistanceandtheContemporarySociety (ISTORECO).9 Wefocusonfootsoldiercasualties(representing morethan70%ofallcasualties),becausetheyarelesslikelyto sufferfromselection(navy,airforce,andspecialassaultforces weremorelikelytorecruitfromspecificdemographicgroupsand geographiclocations).
8.See http://www.cdec.it/i-nomi-della-shoah.
9.See http://www.albimemoria-istoreco.re.it
1250 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS FIGURE I
SpatialDistributionofFootsoldierCasualtiesandFascistandSocialistSupport
ThisfigureshowsthespatialdistributionoffootsoldiercasualtiesinWorldWarI relativetopopulation,thesocialistvoteshareinthe1919nationalelection,and ourfourmeasuresoffascistsupport.Seetextforvariabledefinitions.
Ourmaininstrument, Shareoffootsoldiercasualties, isthe numberofcasualtiesamongfootsoldiersoriginatingfromamunicipalitydividedbymalepopulationovertheageofsixinthe 1911Italiancensus.In FigureI,PanelA,weshowthedistributionofWorldWarIcasualtiesamongfootsoldiers.
TherichinformationcontainedintheRollofHonorallowsus tocreateasetofregimentdummiestocontrolfortheeffectsofthe warexperienceinaspecifictheaterofwar.Wealsomeasurecasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersandidentified municipalitieswithcasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattlesof thewar(definedasdaysforwhichmorethan1,000casualties occurred).
Ourdataonveteransareconstructedbysubtractingcasualtiesfromdraftedsoldiers,whicharesourcedfromofficialmilitary statistics(MinisterodellaGuerra1927).Foreachmilitarydistrict,wesubtractedcasualtiesbycohortandobtainedameasure ofreturningsoldiersoverthemalepopulationabovetheageof six,assigningthesamevaluetoallmunicipalitiesineachmilitarydistrict.Wecreatedtwoadditionalvariablesfromthesame data:onefortheveterancohorts1874–95andanotherforthe cohorts1895–1900.Thefirstvariableincludestheveteranswho weredemobilizedbeforethe1919electionsandthereforecould voteinthoseelections,whilethesecondincludesalltheveterans whocontinuedtoserveuntil1920–21andcouldnotvoteinthe 1919elections.
Finally,thedataonthelocationofWorldWarImonumentsin 1921arecollectedfromtheofficialcatalogoftheItalianMinistry forCulturalHeritage.10 Wecreatedtwomeasures:adummyfor thepresenceofaWorldWarImonumentby1921andthenumber ofWorldWarImonumentsper1,000inhabitantsby1921.
III.E.OtherData Weconstructedtwoothersourcesofvariationinsocialistsupport.First,from DirezioneGeneraledellaStatisticaedelLavoro (1917–24) weobtainedestimatesof Excessmortalityin1918 (relativetopre-WorldWarImortalityfor1911–14)asameasureof theeffectoftheSpanishflu,whichwasresponsibleforalarge increaseindeathsin1918inItaly.Thesedataareavailableonly foramuchsmallersampleof207urbanmunicipalities.Second,
10.See http://www.catalogo.beniculturali.it
weconstructedameasureof Relativerainfallinwinter-spring 1918–9 toproxyforlocaldroughts,usingdatafrom427weather stations(gatheredfromtheHydrographicBulletins,1915–79,for the16Italianhydrographiccompartments).11 Relativerainfallis measuredattheweatherstationlevel(aggregatingrainfallfrom December1918toMay1919),usingtheaverageforthewinterspringmonthsfor1915–79asdenominator,andtheninterpolated tothemunicipalitylevelusingtheinverseofthedistancesas weightswithacutoffof30km.Therelativerainfallmeasureis thencappedatone,sothatweonlyexploitshortfallsofrainrelativetoitslong-termaverage(see OnlineAppendix FigureA3for thegeographicdistributionofrelativerainfall).
Wealsocollecteddataonanextensivesetofcontrols.Geographicvariables(municipalitylogarea,elevationofthemain center,andmaximumelevation),anddemographicvariables,includingtotalpopulation,theshareofpopulationbelowtheageof six,theshareofdaylaborers,theshareofsharecroppers,theshare ofelites(entrepreneursandrentiers),theshareof“bourgeoisie” (definedasprofessional,white-collarworkers,andshopkeepers), andtheliteracyratecomefromtheofficialItaliancensus(1911, 1921,1931).Dataondaylaborers,sharecroppers,elites,andbourgeoisieareavailableformorethan700agrarianzonesinthecensus,eachcomprisingseveralmunicipalities,andareassignedto allmunicipalitiesinthezone.Theshareofindustrialworkers andthenumberofpercapitaindustrialfirmsaresourcedfrom the1911industrialcensus.
From MinisterodellaGuerra(1915–18),weidentifiedmunicipalitieshousingwar-relatedproductionplants,whichweresometimesabletosecuredraftexemptionsfortheirworkersaswell aslargeprofitsduringthewar.Usingtheinformationreported in DirezioneGeneraledellaStatisticaedelLavoro(1912),we createdadummyformunicipalitieswithatleastonelandowner association,typicallysetuptodealwithlocalagrarianworkers.
Dataonthenumberofagrarianstrikesin1920aregathered fromthe1921LaborBulletin(MinisteroperilLavoroelaPrevidenzaSociale1921).Dataforthestrikesandstrikersinboth industryandagriculturein1913–14arefromtheLaborBulletins for1913and1914(MinisteroperilLavoroelaPrevidenzaSociale1914).Dataonviolentcrimesandcrimeratesin1874are
11.TheHydrographicBulletinsareavailableat http://www.acq. isprambiente.it/annalipdf/
collectedatthelevelofthe1,813 preture inthestatisticspublished bytheMinistryofJustice(MinisterodiGraziaeGiustiziaedei Culti1875).Finally,dummiesfortheprevalenceoflargelandholding(Largelandholdingin1885)andwidespreadlandownership (Landownershipin1885)comefromthe1882–85Parliamentary Inquest(Jacini1882–85).
Thesummarystatisticsforthemainvariablesusedinour analysisarereportedin OnlineAppendix TableA1.
IV.WORLD WAR ICASUALTIESAND SUPPORTFORTHE SOCIALIST PARTY Inthissection,wedocumenttherelationshipbetween WorldWarIcasualtiesandsupportforsocialists,whichisinterestingitself,butmoreimportantly,itwillbeourfirststagewhen investigatingtheimpactofthethreatofsocialismontheriseof fascism.Asexplainedin SectionII,thedisruption,hardship,and disillusionmentcreatedbythewarwerethemajorcausesofthe surgeinthesocialistvoteshareinthe1919election.Ourpurpose inthissectionistodocumentthisrelationshipacrossItalianmunicipalities.Asexplainedin SectionIII,wefocusonanestimateof footsoldiercasualtiesforthispurpose,whichexcludescasualties amongvolunteersandspecialassaulttroops,suchastheArditi. Footsoldiercasualties,whichmakeupover70%ofallWorldWarI deaths,aremoredirectlyrelatedtoordinaryItalians’warexperiencesthanarecasualtiesamongprofessionalorhighlytrained elitefightersandarelesslikelytosufferfrom“selection”(which wouldoccurifahigherfractionoftroopsinsomeregimentscame fromareaswithgreatercommitmenttothewar).
Ourestimatingequationcanbesummarizedas:
Socialist v oteshare 1919 i (1)
= γ Shareoffootsoldiercasualtiesi + Xi β + εi ,
where Socialistvoteshare1919 i isthevoteshareoftheSocialist Partyinmunicipality i inthe1919election,and Shareoffoot soldiercasualtiesi denotesourestimateoffootsoldiercasualties inthemunicipality(relativetomalepopulationovertheageof six).Inaddition, Xi isavectorofcovariates,whichincludesbasicdemographiccontrols,regimentandprovincefixedeffectsand insomespecificationsalsogeographiccontrols,thevoteshareof theSocialistPartyinthe1913election,andvariousagricultural,
urban,andmilitarycontrols.Thislastsetofcontrolsseparately includesthepopulationshareofveteransfromthebirthcohorts 1874–95,whomadeupabout65%ofallsoldiers,weredemobilized earlierandcouldvoteinthe1919elections,andthepopulation shareofveteransfromthebirthcohorts1896–1900,whowere demobilizedin1920–21.Theseyoungercohortscouldnotvotein 1919andmissedsomeofthemoreharrowingpartsofthewar.12
Inthisandallsubsequentregressions,wereportstandardizedcoefficients(computedafterstandardizingbothleft-hand-sideand right-hand-sidevariables)tofacilitatecomparisonacrossdifferentspecifications.
Finally, ε i isarandomerrorterm,capturingallomittedfactors,whichweallowtobeheteroskedasticandcorrelatedacross municipalities(clusteredatthedistrictlevel).13
Theestimatesof equation(1) arepresentedin TableI.The firstcolumnisourmostparsimoniousspecificationandincludes regimentfixedeffects,whicharedummiesforanydeathsfromthe municipalityinaspecificregimentandcontrolforotherfactors thataffectsoldiersservingindifferentregimentsandtheatersof war;provincefixedeffects,whichensurethatourresultsarenot drivenbythecomparisonofdifferentprovincesandarealsoincludedinallofourspecifications;andbasicdemographiccontrols (inparticular,aquarticinlogmunicipalitypopulationandthe fractionofthepopulationyoungerthansixin1911).14 Thefoot soldiercasualtiesvariablehasastandardizedcoefficientof0.12 withastandarderrorof0.02.Thiscoefficientestimateimplies thatifallfootsoldiercasualtieshadbeenzero,thesocialistvote sharein1919wouldhavebeenlowerby6.5percentagepoints (relativetothetotalsocialistvotesharein1919,31.6%).
12.Activesoldiers,numberingalmost900,000accordingto UfficioCentrale diStatistica(1920,XXVI),didnothavetherighttovotein1919.
13.Eachofthe5,775municipalitiesbelongstooneofthe181administrative districts. OnlineAppendix TableA2showsConley’sspatiallycorrectedstandard errors.Weoptedforthedistrict-clusteredstandarderrorsinthetext,becausethey tendtobemoreconservativeforthetwo-stageleastsquaresestimatesandvery similarforthefirststage.
14.Wealwaysincludebasicdemographiccontrolssincethedenominatorof thefootsoldiercasualtyvariableisanestimateofthemalepopulationofdraft age.Weincludeprovincefixedeffects,becauseItalywasrecentlyunifiedandthere werelargehistoricaldifferencesacrossprovincesinthefirsttwodecadesofthe twentiethcentury,andalsobecauseprovinceboundariesoverlapwithelectoral districts(thusthesefixedeffectsenableustoabsorbdifferencesduetothepopularityofcandidatesandtothepresenceorabsenceofspecificpartylistsindifferent electoraldistricts). OnlineAppendix TableA3showsthattheresultsaresimilar, thoughalittlelessprecise,whenonlydemographiccontrolsareincluded.
TABLEI THE IMPACTOF FOOT SOLDIER CASUALTIESIN WORLD WAR I ONTHE SOCIALIST VOTE SHAREIN 1919
Dep.variable:Socialistvotesharein1919 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
Shareoffootsoldiercasualties0.120.110.100.100.100.10 (0.02)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)
Veterans(classes1874–95)0.180.170.17 (0.07)(0.07)(0.07)
Veterans(classes1896–1900) 0.13 0.12 0.12 (0.05)(0.05)(0.05)
Assaulttr.+volunt.casualties0.000.000.00 (0.01)(0.01)(0.01)
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 R-squared0.600.620.690.690.690.70 Numberofclusters181181181181181181 F-stat.41.6842.2956.3955.2451.6950.59
Notes. ThefootsoldiercasualtyvariableisthecountofWorldWarIfootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationovertheageofsixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported. Column(1)includesregimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulation andshareofpopulationbelowtheageofsixin1911).Column(2)additionallyincludesgeographiccontrols (logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximumelevation).Column(3)addssocialistvotesharein1913. Column(4)addsmilitarycontrols(veteransfromclasses1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellas casualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareofthemalepopulationabovetheageof sixin1911,adummyforthepresenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualties inthehighest-mortalitybattles).Column(5)includesagriculturalcontrols(shareofdaylaborers,shareof sharecroppers,andadummyforthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations).Finallycolumn(6)addsurban controls(industryworkersandindustrialfirmsovermalepopulationin1911,literacyratein1911,theshare ofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).Seethetextforfurtherdetails.Standard errorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.
Therestofthetableshowsthatthisrelationshipisrobust andquitestablewhenarangeofothercovariatesareincluded. Incolumn(2),weincludeadditionalgeographiccontrols(inparticular,logarea,elevationofthemainmunicipalitycenter,and maximumelevation,whichproxiesforruggednessoftheterrain). Theinclusionoftheseadditionalcontrolshashardlyanyeffecton thecoefficientestimateforfootsoldiercasualties.Incolumn(3), weaddthesocialistvoteshareinthemunicipalityinthe1913 elections,whichcontrolsforpermanentdifferencesinpoliticalattitudesinthemunicipality.Thisreducesthecoefficientslightly
to0.10,whichalsobecomesalittlemoreprecise(standarderror = 0.01)andremainssignificantatlessthan1%.Column(4)includesarangeofmilitarycontrols:theshareofveteransinthe populationfromcohorts1874–95and1896–1900,adummyforthe presenceofwar-relatedproductionplantsinthemunicipality,casualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareof themalepopulationabovetheageofsixin1911,andadummyfor anycasualtiesinthemosthigh-mortalitybattles.Thesecontrols havenodiscernibleeffectonthecoefficientestimatefortheshare offootsoldiercasualties.Theveteranvariablesaresignificant, butwithoppositesigns:theshareofveteransfromoldercohorts ispositive,andtheshareofveteransfromyoungercohortsisnegative.Weinterpretthisasevidencethatolderveteransandtheir families,whosufferedmoreduringthewarandmayhavebenefitedfromthesocialistcampaignforearlydemobilization,were morelikelytovotesocialist.Incontrast,thefamiliesofyounger veterans,whodidnotbenefitfromearlydemobilization,werestill underarmsandnotallowedtovote,maynothavehadthesame favorableattitudestowardtheSocialistParty.
Finally,columns(5)and(6)addadditionalagriculturaland urbancontrols,withverylittleeffectonourestimateoftheshare offootsoldiercasualties.15 Becausethecoefficientestimatesin thesecolumnsisabout17%smallerthanthecoefficientestimate incolumn(1),theimpliedquantitativemagnitudesareabout17% smallerthanthosediscussedabove.
FigureII showsabinscatterplotofthefirststage,focusingon ourmostdemandingspecificationfromcolumn(6).Itillustrates therangeofvariationandshowsthatthelinearmodelfitsthe datawell.
Ouroverallinterpretationoftheresultsin TableI isthat warcasualtieshadafirst-ordereffectonlocalsupportforthe SocialistParty.However,wedonotbelievethatthisestimate capturesalloftheeffectsofthewaronsocialistsupport.Many ofthehardshipsanddiscontentcausedbythewarwerecommon acrossmunicipalitiesandwouldthusnotbecapturedbytheshare
15.Theagriculturalcontrolsarethefractionsofdaylaborersandofsharecroppersinthepopulation,andadummyforthepresenceoflandownerassociationsin themunicipality.Theurbancontrolsarethefractionofindustrialworkersinthe malepopulation,thenumberofindustrialfirmsrelativetomalepopulation,the literacyratein1911,thefractionofentrepreneursandrentiers,andthefraction ofthemiddleclassinthepopulation.
FIGURE II
BinScatterplotoftheFirst-StageRelationshipbetweenSocialistVoteSharein 1919andFootSoldierCasualties Residualsandcoefficientestimatesfromthespecificationin TableI,column(6). Pleaseseenotesin TableI.Theaveragebinsizeis130municipalities.
offootsoldiercasualties,andhencethequantitativeestimateis likelysmallerthanthetotaleffectofthewaronsocialistsupport. Allthesame,thestrongeffectoffootsoldiercasualtiesalready indicatesthatthedisruptioncausedbythewarintensifiedthe supportforsocialists.
Thepatternsshownin TableI arehighlyrobust.In Online Appendix TableA4,weconstructvariousalternativeinstruments, forexample,focusingoncasualtiesamongreservistsanddrafted footsoldiers,casualtiesonlyamongdraftedsoldiers,orallcasualties,andshowthattheresultsareverysimilar.Additionalrobustnessresultsarediscussedinthecontextofourinstrumental variables(IV)estimatesinthenextsection.
Oneconcernwithourfootsoldiercasualtiesmeasureisthat despiteourregimentandprovincefixedeffectsandothercontrols, municipalitieswithdifferenthistoricalorcurrentcharacteristics couldhavesentsoldierstosystematicallydifferenttheatersof warormighthaveexperienceddifferentialmortalitybecauseof variationintheunderlyingconditionsormotivationsofthesoldiers.Tocheckagainstthispossibility,whichiscentralforthe interpretationoftheeffectofwarcasualtiesonsocialistsupport andforourlaterIVestimates,in FigureIII weinvestigatethe
1258 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS FIGURE III
FalsificationTests
Theestimatescorrespondtothespecificationsfromcolumns(1)(top-black;color versionavailableonline),(4)(middle-lightblue),and(6)(bottom-green)in TableI. Pleaseseenotesto TableI.Standardizedcoefficientsand95%confidenceintervals arereported.
relationshipbetweenfootsoldiercasualtiesandabatteryofpre1919economic,social,andpoliticalcharacteristicsofthemunicipality.
Specifically,welookatthesupportforsocialistsin1913,literacyin1911,violentcrimes(asashareofpopulation)in1874, thecrimeratein1874,industrialworkersasashareofthemale populationaswellasindustrialfirmsnormalizedbymalepopulationin1911,dummiesfortheprevalenceoflargelandholdingsandwidespreadlandownershipin1885,variousmeasuresof industrialandagriculturalstrikesornumberofstrikersinthe populationin1913–14,theshareofvolunteersandadummyfor anyvolunteersinthe1866independencewar,theshareofpopulationthatweremembersoflocalassociations,andadummy foranysuchmemberinthemunicipalityintheearly1900s.In allcases,wereportestimatesfromthespecificationscorrespondingtocolumns(1),(4),and(6)from TableI (top:black,middle: lightblue,andbottom:green,respectively).Thefirstoftheseis ourmostparsimoniousspecification,andthesecondincludesall ofourcontrolsexcepttheagriculturalandurbanones,andthe lastoneisourmostdemandingspecification.16 Theresultsin FigureIII arefairlyclear:innoneofthe48specificationsforthe16 variableswelookatdoweseeasignificantcorrelationwithfoot soldiercasualties.17 Thispatternbolstersourconfidencethatour footsoldiercasualtiesvariablezeroesinontherandomcomponentofWorldWarIcasualtiesandprovidesanattractivesource ofvariationforinvestigatingtheeffectofthe(perceived)threatof socialismontheriseoffascisminItaly.
V.MAIN RESULTS Inthissectionweprovideourmainresultsontherelationshipbetweenthethreatofsocialismin1919and1920andthe subsequentriseoftheFascistParty.Wefocusonfourvariables, measuringvariousaspectsoflocalsupportforfascism.Thefirst
16.Whenwelookatsocialistvotesharein1913,literacyin1911,orindustrial workersandfirmsin1911ontheleft-handside,thesevariablesthemselves,which areotherwiseamongourcontrols,areexcludedfromtheright-handside.
17.Inthefirstspecification,thecoefficientestimateforsocialistvotesharein 1913issomewhatlargerthantheothertwospecifications,thoughstillfarfrom statisticalsignificanceandalsomuchsmallerthantheestimateforsocialistvote sharein1919(recallthatallcoefficientsarestandardizedandarethusdirectly comparable).
1260 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS twoconcernfascistactivity:violencebyfascistsintheearly1920s andthepresenceofalocalbranchoftheFascistPartyin1921. Thenexttwoprovideinformationaboutsupportfortheparty amongthebroaderpopulationbylookingatthefascistvoteshare inthe1921and1924elections.WestartwithourmainIVmodels,whereweproxyfortheredscarewiththevoteshareofthe SocialistPartyinthe1919elections.Weprovidecomplementary evidenceonlocalsocialistactivityandotherfindingssupporting ourinterpretationin SectionVI,wherewealsosystematically discussvariousthreatstothevalidityofourIVstrategy.
V.A.TheEffectsoftheRedScareonLocalFascistActivity Ourmainoutcomevariablesforfascistactivityinanareaare fascistviolence(squadrismo)between1920and1922,normalized bymunicipalitypopulation,andthepresenceofalocalFascist Partybranchin1921.Asnotedpreviously,violent,antisocialist actionwasahallmarkoftheFascistPartyandplayedanimportantroleinitsrise.Suchactionwasoftencoordinatedbylocal partybranches.Therefore,thesetwomeasurestogetherprovidea fairlycomprehensivepictureoffascistactivitiesinamunicipality. Ourmainregressionmodelis
(2) yt i = α Socialist v oteshare 1919 i + Xi δ + ui ,
where yt i isoneofourmeasuresoffascistactivityinmunicipality i duringtimeperiod t andthesocialistvotesharein1919is ourproxyforredscare.Theothervariablesarethesameasin equation(1),whichwillalsobethefirststageforthetwo-stage leastsquares(2SLS)estimatesreportedinthissection.
Theexclusionrestrictionforthisempiricalstrategyrelieson twopremises,bothofwhicharebolsteredfurtherin SectionVI. First,thefootsoldiercasualtiesvariableshouldbeuncorrelated withmunicipalitycharacteristicsaffectinglocalviolenceandfascistactivity—inotherwords,conditionalondemographiccontrols andregimentandprovincefixedeffects,itshouldbeorthogonal to ui in equation(2).Webelievethisisplausibleinlightofour discussionin SectionIV,whichsuggestedthatdifferencesinfoot soldiercasualtieswereduetorandomvariationinmortalityrates acrossbattlesandareas.Thisinterpretationissupportedbythe evidenceweprovidedin FigureIII (showingthatthisvariableis uncorrelatedwithalonglistofpre-1919municipalitycharacteristics)andbyseveralotherexercisesin SectionVI.Second,the
effectsoffootsoldiercasualtiesshouldbefullycapturedbythe voteshareoftheSocialistPartyinthe1919election.Thisispotentiallymorequestionable,sinceothersocialistactivitiesorthe politicalbehaviorofveteransmayhavecontributedtofascistsupport.In SectionVI,weshowthatthesocialistvotesharein1919 iscorrelatedwithotherpotentialproxiesforredscareandprovide similarresultsusingthesealternativeproxies.Wealsodocument thatourresultsarenotdrivenbysupportforfascistscomingfrom veteransorgreaternationalistfeelinginmunicipalitieswithhigh footsoldiercasualties.
TableII,PanelsAandBpresentourresultsforfascistviolence,andPanelsCandDareforlocalFascistPartybranches. Thestructureofthistableisidenticaltothatof TableI.18
Inallsixcolumnsof TableII weseeasizableeffectofthesocialistvotesharein1919onthesubsequentviolencebyfascists. Inourmostparsimoniousspecificationincolumn(1)(whichonly includesregimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrolsasincolumn(1)of TableI),thecoefficientestimateis0.38 (standarderror = 0.19).Thismagnitudeimpliesthattheoverall increaseinthesocialistvotesharefrom1913,whichis15.6%, shouldbeassociatedwithanincreaseof0.036episodesper1,000 inhabitantsinfascistviolenceintheearly1920scomparedwith thisvariable’smean,0.04.Ourestimatethusimpliesthatthe surgeoftheSocialistPartyin1919mayaccountforthebulkof theoverallincreaseinfascistviolence.19
Theestimatesintheremainingcolumnsarequitestable. Columns(2)and(3)addgeographiccontrolsandthesocialistvote sharein1913,buttheestimatefor α changesonlyalittle(to0.39 incolumn(2)andto0.42incolumn(3)).Column(4)addsthe militarycontrols,whichhaveasmalleffectonthecoefficientof thesocialistvoteshare(theestimategoesfrom0.42incolumn (3)to0.53andisstatisticallysignificantatlessthan1%),and thesevariablesthemselvesarenotstatisticallysignificant,with theexceptionofthedummyforthepresenceofanarmy-supplying productionplant.20
18. OnlineAppendix TableA5presentsthecorrespondingreduced-formestimates.
19.Inthesamewaythatourfirst-stageestimatesdonotcapturethetotal effectsofthewaronsocialistsupportin1919,theseIVestimatesdonotincorporate theeffectsofthecommoncomponentoftheredscareontheriseoftheFascistParty.
20.Estimatesformilitarycontrolsareshownin OnlineAppendix TableA6, andtheirinterpretationisdiscussedin SectionVI.
TABLEII 2SLS AND OLSESTIMATESOFTHE EFFECTSOF SOCIALIST VOTE SHAREIN 1919 ON FASCIST VIOLENCEIN 1920–22 AND FASCIST PARTY LOCAL BRANCHESIN 1921 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
Dep.variable:Fascistviolencein1920–22(episodesper1,000inhabitants)
PanelA:2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.380.390.420.530.500.50 (0.19)(0.19)(0.21)(0.21)(0.21)(0.20)
PanelB:OLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.110.100.080.080.070.07 (0.02)(0.02)(0.03)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)
Dep.variable:PresenceoflocalbranchesoftheFascistPartyinfall1921
PanelC:2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.390.410.440.500.500.50 (0.17)(0.18)(0.20)(0.21)(0.21)(0.20)
PanelD:OLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.060.060.060.060.060.06 (0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181
Notes. 2SLS(PanelsAandC)andOLS(PanelsBandD)regressionsofthefascistviolence(episodesper 1,000inhabitants)in1920–22(PanelAandPanelB)andthepresenceoflocalfascistbranchesinthefall of1921(PanelCandPanelD)onthesocialistvotesharein1919.Theexcludedinstrumentisthecount ofWorldWarIfootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationoverthe ageofsixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported.Column(1)includesregimentandprovincefixed effectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulationandshareofthepopulationbelowtheageof sixin1911).Column(2)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximum elevation).Column(3)addssocialistvotesharein1913.Column(4)addsmilitarycontrols(veteransfrom classes1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteers asashareofthemalepopulationabovetheageofsixin1911,adummyforthepresenceofarmy-supplying productionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattles).Column(5)includes agriculturalcontrols(shareofdaylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummyforthepresenceoflocal agrarianassociations).Finallycolumn(6)addsurbancontrols(industryworkersandindustrialfirmsover malepopulationin1911,literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthe bourgeoisie).Standarderrorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.
PanelBpresentsOLSestimatesforthefascistviolencevariable.Weseefairlypreciselyestimated,highlysignificant,but muchsmallereffects.Forexample,incolumn(1),theOLSestimateis0.11(standarderror = 0.02),insteadofthe2SLSestimate0.38.ThisgapbetweentheOLSandIVestimatesis notunexpected:OLSestimatesarebiasedtowardzerobecause
municipalitiesthataremoreleft-leaningwillvotemoreforthe socialistsin1919andfeaturelessfascistactivitylater.WediscussthisdifferencebetweenOLSandIVfurtherin SectionVI.
Theestimatesforthepresenceofalocalfascistbranchare presentedin TableII,PanelsCandD.The2SLSestimateincolumn(1)is0.39(standarderror = 0.17)andimpliesasimilarly sizableeffect:theoverallincreaseinthesocialistvotesharefrom 1913to1919nowaccountsfora7.9percentagepointincreasein theprobabilityofafascistlocalbranch(abouthalfofthisvariable’smeanof14.5%).Inallpanelsofthetable,theestimatesare fairlystableacrosscolumns,onceagainincreasingourconfidence thattheinstrumentedsocialistvotesharein1919isnotcapturing omittedmunicipalitycharacteristics.TheOLSestimatescontinue tobepreciseandsignificantbutmuchsmallerthantheIVestimates.
Overall,theresultsinthistableareuniformlyconsistentwith ourhypothesisthattheredscare,asproxiedbythesocialistvote sharein1919,hasalargeandstatisticallysignificanteffecton fascistactivity.
V.B.ElectoralMeasuresofFascistSupport In TableIII,wepresentresultsusingourtwomeasuresof electoralsupportfortheFascistParty.Thesearefascistvote sharesinthe1921and1924elections.Ashighlighted,the1924 electionoccurredafterthemarchonRome.Thisraisesquestions aboutelectoralfraudandvoterintimidation,whichwehaveno systematicwayofrulingout.Nevertheless,becauseviolenceand electoralfraudorganizedbylocalfascistsquadsandthepartyare anindicationoftheirstrengthinthearea,weinterpretfascist votesharein1924asmeasuringbothsupportamongordinary Italiansandtheabilityofthelocalpartytomobilizeandcoerce votes.Allthesame,resultsusingthe1924voteshareshouldbe interpretedwithcaution.
Westartwiththe2SLSresultsforfascistvotesharein1921in TableIII,PanelA,whichhasthesamestructureas TableII.21 In
21. OnlineAppendix TableA7reportsfirst-stageresultsfortheslightly smallersampleusedforthefascistvotesharein1921.Inaddition, OnlineAppendix TableA11presentsanalogousresultsforthefascistvotesharein1921 usingtherestricted(no-imputation)sampleofmunicipalities.Thequalitativepatternofresultsisverysimilar,thoughthequantitativemagnitudeoftheestimates islargerinthissmallersample.
TABLEIII 2SLS AND OLSESTIMATESOFTHE EFFECTSOF SOCIALIST VOTE SHAREIN 1919 ON FASCIST VOTE SHAREIN 1921 AND 1924
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
Dep.variable:Fascistvotesharein1921
PanelA:2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.300.330.370.360.360.34 (0.17)(0.16)(0.18)(0.19)(0.20)(0.18)
PanelB:OLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.010.010.010.010.000.01 (0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)
Observations5,3585,3585,3585,3585,3585,358 Numberofclusters175175175175175175
Dep.variable:Fascistvotesharein1924
PanelC:2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.400.450.500.540.530.51 (0.17)(0.16)(0.17)(0.17)(0.17)(0.17)
PanelD:OLS
Socialistvotesharein1919
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Notes. 2SLS(PanelsAandC)andOLS(PanelsBandD)regressionsofthefascistvotesharein1921(Panels AandB)andfascistvotesharein1924(PanelsCandD)onthesocialistvotesharein1919.Theexcluded instrumentisthecountofWorldWarIfootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmale populationovertheageofsixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported.Column(1)includesregiment andprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulationandshareofthepopulation belowtheageofsixin1911).Column(2)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter, andmaximumelevation).Column(3)addssocialistvotesharein1913.Column(4)addsmilitarycontrols (veteransfromclasses1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroops andvolunteersasashareofthemalepopulationabovetheageofsixin1911,adummyforthepresenceof army-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattles).Column (5)includesagriculturalcontrols(shareofdaylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummyforthepresence oflocalagrarianassociations).Finallycolumn(6)addsurbancontrols(industryworkersandindustrialfirms overmalepopulationin1911,literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareof thebourgeoisie).Standarderrorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.
allsixcolumnsof TableIII,weseeasizableandverystableeffect oftheredscareonsubsequentelectoralsupportforfascists.In thespecificationincolumn(6)ofPanelA,thecoefficientestimate is0.34(standarderror = 0.18).Thismagnitudeimpliesthatthe
FIGURE IV
BinScatterplotofthe2SLSRelationshipbetweenFascistSupportMeasuresand SocialistVoteSharein1919.
Residualsandcoefficientestimatesfromthespecificationincolumn(6)of TablesII and III.Socialistvotesharein1919isinstrumentedwithfootsoldier casualtiesrelativetothemalepopulationovertheageofsixin1911.Theaverage binsizeis130municipalities.
increaseinthesocialistvotesharefrom1913to1919canexplain 1.3percentagepointsofthevoteshareoftheFascistPartyinthe 1921elections(aboutaquarterofthisvariable’smeanof5.1%).
Theresultsforthefascistvotesharein1924,presentedin PanelC,areverysimilar.The2SLScoefficientestimateinthe sixthcolumnis0.51(standarderror = 0.17)andsuggeststhat theredscarenowexplainsan8percentagepointsincreaseinthe fascistvoteshare,whichissmallerasaproportionofthefascist voteinthiselection,averaging61.9%acrossthemunicipalities inoursample.Thoughproportionatelysmallerthantheother quantitativemagnitudesreportedinthissection,thiseffectis stillsizable.Anothernotabledifferenceinthistableisthatthe OLSestimatesarenowimpreciseandinsignificant.
FigureIV depictsvisuallyourmostdemandingspecification forourfourmeasuresoffascistsupportusingbinscatterplots
1266 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS andindicatesthattherelationshipineachcaseisapproximately linear.
V.C.Robustness Furtherrobustnesschecksfortheresultsinthissection(and forthefirst-stagerelationshipdiscussedintheprevioussection)areprovidedinthe OnlineAppendix.Briefly, OnlineAppendix TableA8showsthattheresultsareverysimilarwhen thesouth,wherefascismwasinitiallyweaker,isexcluded. Online Appendix TableA9documentstherobustnessofourresultstoalternativeconstructionsofthefootsoldiercasualtiesvariable.In OnlineAppendix TableA10wereplaceregimentfixedeffectswith eitherfronttimessemesterorfronttimesmonthfixedeffectsto morefinelycontrolforotheraspectsofwarexperience.Finally, OnlineAppendix TableA11demonstratesthatourresultsarerobust whenweusealternativemeasuresoflocalviolenceandfascist electoralsupport,whenwefocusontheno-imputationsamplefor 1921,whenwecontrolforvotesharesinthe1919elections,and whenwecomputetheparty’svotesharesin1924focusingonlyon theofficialFascistlists.
VI.INVESTIGATINGTHE MECHANISM Inthissection,wefirstprovideevidencesupportingourinterpretationthatthesocialistelectoralvictoryin1919ledtoa redscareandthatthevoteshareofthepartyinthiselectionis areasonableproxyforlocalstrikeandorganizationalactivities ledbysocialists.Wedealsystematicallywithanumberofthreats toouridentificationstrategy,providingseveralpiecesofevidence bolsteringthereliabilityofourinstrumentandouroverallinterpretation.Weexplorehowsupportfromlandownersandelites contributedtotheriseoffascism.
VI.A.SocialistVoteShareandAgrarianStrikeActivity
Afirstconcernwithourstrategyisthatevenifourinstrument isvalid,thesocialistvotesharein1919maynotbeadequately proxyingforredscare.Todevelopourcausalmechanismfurther, wenowshowthattwomeasuresoflocalsocialistactivitythatwere importantintheearly1920sarecorrelatedwiththesocialistvote sharein1919.Thefirstisadummyforsocialistwinsinthe1920 municipalelections.Asmentionedin SectionII,theseelections
tookplaceattheheightoftheredwaveandaftertheleftward shiftoftheSocialistParty.Intheelections,socialistsgainedcontrolofabout2,100municipalities,wherelocalpowerpassed“from thehandsofthetraditionalrulingclassestotherepresentatives ofthewageearners.Membersofthemiddleclassesfoundthemselvesoustedfromlocalandprovincialbodiestheyhadcometoregardastheirsalmostasamatterofcourse”(Snowden1972,274). Fearsamongthemiddleclassesandlandownersintensifiedwhen confrontedwith“redflagshoistedintriumphandwavingfromthe cityhalls”(Ragionieri1976a,2100)andafairlyradicalagenda bynewlocalgovernments,includinglargesocialspendings,tax increases,andplanstohavelocalauthoritiesadjudicatelabordisputes(DirezionePSI1920).“Facedwiththissortofthreat...the landlordsreactedmassivelyandwithviolence.Itisnoaccident thatinsuchcrucialcentersasCremona,Bologna,andFerrara thedevelopmentoftheFascistsquadsbeganinearnestinthe autumnof1920,afterthelocalelectionsandafterthelandlords hadbeenforcedtosignaseriesofpactsincorporatingsubstantial gainsforthe[workers’]Leagues”(Snowden1972,275).Oursecondmeasureisalsorelatedtotheseevents:agrarianstrikesin 1920,whichwereoftenassociatedwithdemandsforhigherwages andbetterworkingconditions.
Theresultswithbothvariablesarepresentedin TableIV. PanelsAandBarefortheformervariable,correspondingto2SLS andOLS,respectively,andPanelsCandDareforthelatter. Forsocialistwinsinlocalelections,weseestrongcorrelations withthesocialistvoteshareinthe1919nationalelections.The 2SLSestimatesinPanelAareonceagainlargerthantheOLS, thoughthegapismuchsmallerthanthoseinprevioustables,and theOLSandthe2SLSestimatesarequitestableacrossoursix specifications.Foragrarianstrikes,weseeasomewhatdifferent pattern.InPanelD,thereisastrongOLSassociationwiththe socialistvotesharein1919,butthe2SLSrelationshipisweaker andnotstatisticallysignificant.22
Theresultsin TableIV supportaparticularcausalmechanism:ahighvotesharefortheSocialistPartyinamunicipality wasassociatedwithmoresocialist-ledactivities,manyofwhich,
22.ThelackofsignificantIVestimateinthiscasemaybebecauseofthe smallersamplewheretheagrarianstrikevariableisrelevant(ruralmunicipalities)orbecauseinitiatingnewagrarianstrikesmayhaverequiredalonger-term organizationinthearea.
TABLEIV 2SLS AND OLSESTIMATESOFTHE RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN SOCIALIST VOTE SHAREIN 1919,LOCAL ELECTIONS, AND AGRARIAN STRIKESIN 1920 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
Dep.variable:Socialistmajoritydummyin1920
PanelA:2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.820.830.850.770.750.76 (0.15)(0.15)(0.16)(0.15)(0.16)(0.15)
PanelB:OLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.540.540.500.500.490.50 (0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)
Dep.variable:Agrarianstrikesin1920
PanelC:2SLS Socialistvotesharein19190.00 0.01 0.020.000.000.00 (0.11)(0.11)(0.13)(0.14)(0.13)(0.13)
PanelD:OLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.090.080.090.090.090.09 (0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181
Notes. 2SLS(PanelsAandC)andOLS(PanelsBandD)regressionsofadummyformunicipalitieswhere theSocialistPartywonthemajorityofvotesinthe1920localelections(PanelsAandB)andagrarianstrikes in1920(PanelsCandD)onsocialistvotesharein1919.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported.Column(1) includesregimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulationandshareof populationbelowtheageofsixin1911).Column(2)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthe maincenter,andmaximumelevation).Column(3)addssocialistvotesharein1913.Column(4)addsmilitary controls(veteransfromclasses1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecial assaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareofthemalepopulationabovetheageofsixin1911,adummyfor thepresenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortality battles).Column(5)includesagriculturalcontrols(shareofdaylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummy forthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations).Finallycolumn(6)addsurbancontrols(industryworkersand industrialfirmsoverthemalepopulationin1911,literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursand rentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).Standarderrorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.
intheturbulentdaysoftheearly1920s,tooktheformofstrikes andrevolutionaryaction,intensifyingtheperceivedthreatofsocialisttakeover,especiallyamonglandownersandelites(seealso laterdiscussion).
In OnlineAppendix TableA12,wegoonestepfurtherand presentIVestimatesthatuseasanendogenousvariableeither
thedummyforsocialistwinsinthe1920localelections(PanelA) oranindexofsocialistactivity(redscareindex)constructedas anunweightedaverageofthe(standardized)measuresofsocialist voteshareinthe1919nationalelections,thedummyforasocialist wininthe1920localelection,andagrarianstrikeactivity.The resultsareverysimilar,bothquantitativelyandqualitatively,to thosepresentedinthetext.
Finally,ourcausalmechanismsuggestsasimplefalsification exercise.Iftheeffectsofthefootsoldiercasualtiesinstrumentare workingthroughperceivedsocialistthreat,thentheinstrument shouldnotpredictgreaterfascistactivityorvotesinmunicipalitieswherethisperceivedthreatisweak.Thisexerciseisinthe spiritofthestatisticalproceduresproposedin BoundandJaeger (2000), Angrist(2004),and D’Haultfœuille,Hoderlein,andSasaki (forthcoming),whoexplorewhetherthereisamarginalcausaleffectinsubsamplesof“never-takers”(unitsthathavezeroorvery smallprobabilityoftreatment).Specifically,wefocusontwosubsamplesofnever-takermunicipalitieswheresocialistswereweak. Thefirstismunicipalitieswherepredictedsocialistvotesharein 1919fromthefirst-stagespecificationincolumn(1)of TableI is inthebottomquartile,23 andthesecondismunicipalitieswhere theSocialistPartydidnotfieldacandidatein1913.
Resultsfromthisfalsificationexercisearepresentedin FigureV,whichfirstshowsthereduced-formrelationshipbetweenourinstrumentandthefourmeasuresoffascistsupport (forspecifications1,4,and6asusual).Itthendepictsthesame reduced-formrelationshipforthetwosubsamplesofnever-takers. Theeffectsoffootsoldiercasualtiesaresmallandinsignificant inthesenever-takersubsamples,andexceptforthefascistvote sharein1924,theestimatesareverypreciseandtwostandard deviationconfidenceintervalsexcludetheestimatesfromthefull sample.In OnlineAppendix TableA13weshowthatestimates fromthefullsampleandthenever-takersubsamplesarestatisticallydifferentfromeachotherusingstandardChowtests andreport p-valuesadjustedformultiplehypothesistestingthat confirmthatthenever-takerestimatesarejointlyinsignificant. Overall,thisfalsificationexerciseincreasesourconfidenceinthe
23.Wechosethemostparsimoniousfirst-stagespecificationtofocusonthe variationcomingfromfootsoldiercasualties,ratherthantheothercovariates, suchastheparty’svoteshareinthe1913election.Theresultsaresimilarwhen weusethepredictedvaluesfromothercolumnsin TableI
1270 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS V
ComparisonofReduced-FormEstimatesofFascistActivityonFootSoldier CasualtiesintheFullSample,MunicipalitieswithPredictedSocialistVoteShare in1919intheBottomQuartile,andMunicipalitieswithNoSocialistCandidate in1913
Thisfigurereportsstandardizedcoefficientestimatesand95%confidenceintervalsforreduced-formregressionsoffascistviolencein1920–22,fascistlocal branchesin1921,andfascistvotesharesin1921and1924onfootsoldiercasualtiesdividedbymalepopulationovertheageofsixin1911.Weconsiderthree samples:thefullsample,thesubsampleofmunicipalitieswherepredictedsocialistvotesharein1919fromthefirst-stagespecificationincolumn(1)of TableI is inthebottomquartileofthedistributionofmunicipalities,andthesubsampleof municipalitieswithnosocialistcandidatesinthe1913nationalelections.Foreach outcomevariableandeachsample,wereportthreespecifications,correspondingto columns(1)(top-black),(4)(middle-lightblue),and(6)(bottom-green)from TableI. Seetextforadditionaldetails.
validityofourinstrumentand,moreimportantly,inthespecific channelviawhichthisinstrumentishypothesizedtoaffectfascist activityintheearly1920s.
VI.B.ThreatsagainstInstrumentValidity Thereareseveralconcernsaboutthevalidityofthefoot soldiercasualtyinstrument.Wegrouptheseconcernsintotwo. First,footsoldiercasualtiesmaybecorrelatedwithvariouscrossmunicipalitydifferencesthatmighthavedirecteffectsonboth 1919electionoutcomesandpoliticalconflictinthe1920s.Though
FIGURE
thispossibilitycannotbefullyruledout,thebatteryoftestsreportedin FigureIII confirmthatourinstrumentisorthogonal toalargenumberofpre-1919characteristics.Thecaseforsuch orthogonalityisalsobolsteredbythefactthatinalloftheresultsreportedsofar,thecoefficientestimatesarefairlyinsensitive acrossspecifications,suggestingthatanyconditionalcorrelation betweenvariousmunicipalitycharacteristicsandfootsoldiercasualtiesissmall.
Second,footsoldiercasualties,eveniforthogonaltopre-1919 municipalitycharacteristics,maybeworkingthroughotherchannels.Themostimportantalternativehereisthatthisinstrument maybecorrelatedwithdirectright-wingsupportornationalist sentimentsfromreturningveterans.Arelatedconcernisthatour instrumentmaybesimultaneouslygeneratinggreatersupportfor bothsocialistsandfascists.
Wenowdiscusswhytheseconcernsareunlikelytoapplyin oursetting.Tostartwith,ourcoefficientestimatesarenotaffected whenwedoordonotcontrolforthefractionofreturningveterans inthepopulation.24 Thecoefficientestimatesforthesevariables, inturn,donotsupporttheviewthattheywerestronglyopposedto socialists—wesawin TableI thatthefractionofveteransfromthe 1874–95classesinthepopulationispositivelycorrelatedwiththe socialistvoteshare,andsimilarresultsarepresentedin Online Appendix TableA6.
Moredirectly,in FigureVI weinvestigatewhetherthereis anyevidenceofrisingnationalistorprowarsupportinorshortly after1919inmunicipalitieswithgreaterfootsoldiercasualties. Welookatthevoteshareofthetwomainprowarparties,fascistsandnationalists,inthe1919elections,andtwomeasuresof prowarmonumentsbuiltbetween1919and1921.Wefindfairly precisezeroestimatesforthelastthreeoutcomes.Forthe1919
24.Thisfindingisinlinewithrecenthistoricalcontributionsthatpropose amorenuancedviewoftheroleofveteransthantheprevioushistoriography. Forexample Alcalde(2017,65–66)summarizeshisviewasfollows:“thealleged antisocialistorientationoftheItalianveteranswasacontingentandconstructed phenomenon,theproductofalongevolutionofdiscoursesandrepresentations,in whichFascismplayedacrucialrole....TheItalianveteransasamasswerenotthe anti-Bolshevik,national-revolutionarymenofactionthatthefascistimagined.” Moreover,afterthe1919elections,“theItalianCameradeiDeputatiwascomposed of27.97percentex-servicemen.Ironically,theItalianSocialistPartywasthegroup withthehighestpercentageofveteransamongitsparliamentaryrepresentatives (47.4percent)”(Alcalde2017,75).
1272 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS FIGURE VI
CorrelationbetweenFootSoldierCasualtiesandSupportforFascismand Nationalism
Theestimatescorrespondtothespecificationsfromcolumns(1)(top-black),(4) (middle-lightblue),and(6)(bottom-green)of TableI.Pleaseseenotesto TableI andtextforvariabledefinitions.Standardizedcoefficientsand95%confidence intervalsarereported.
fascistvoteshare,thepointestimatesarepositive,butstatisticallyinsignificant.Thecomparisontotheeffectsonthesocialist votesharein1919,shownatthetop,indicatesthatthequantitativemagnitudeofthiseffectisalsosmall.
Evenifthereisnopopulation-wideincreaseinprowaror nationalistfeelingintheyearsrightafterWorldWarI,one mightbeworriedthatasubsetofthereturningveteransthat hadverystrongnationalistormilitaristicfeelingsmayhavebeen atthecenteroffascistactivities.Indeed,therearewell-known WorldWarIveterans,suchasDinoGrandi,ItaloBalbo,orCesare
MariaDeVecchi,whoplayedmajorrolesinthefascistmovement.Twogroupsofveteransmaybeparticularlyimportantfor thischannel:thespecialassaulttroops,theArditi,andvolunteers (recallthatourfootsoldiercasualtiesmeasuredoesnotinclude casualtiesamongassaulttroopsorvolunteers).Therestof FigureVI looksatfourmeasuresofcasualtiesamongthesegroups— theArditibythemselves,volunteersbythemselves,thetwocombined,andadummyforanyArditiorvolunteercasualtiesinthe municipality.Intheseexercises,therelatedmilitaryvariableis neverincludedontheright-handside.Wedetectnoevidenceofa statisticalassociationbetweenourfootsoldiercasualtiesinstrumentandanyoneofthesefourmeasures.
Overall,wefindnoevidenceofgreaternationalistorfascist views,votes,oractivitiesbeforetheredbienniumorofgreater concentrationofvolunteersandspecialassaulttroopsinmunicipalitieswithmorefootsoldiercasualties.Theseresultsargue againstasimplerelationshipbetweenfootsoldiercasualtiesand supportforright-wing,prowarpoliticalgroupsoranytypeofpolarizationbeforetheredscare.Assuch,theybolsterourinterpretationthatthebuildupofsupportfortheFascistPartycameafter theredscareandwasmostlikelyaresponsetoit.
VI.C.OLSversusIV TheargumentsintheprevioustwosubsectionsonthevalidityofourIVstrategynotwithstanding,thegapsbetweentheOLS andIVestimatesmayappearconcerning.Inthissubsection,we arguethatthesegapsareinfactquiteplausible.Intuitively,the OLSrelationshipbetweensocialistsupportandfascistactivity shouldbesignificantlybiasedtowardzero.Thisisbecausethere isanaturalsourceofnegativecorrelationbetweenthesocialist votesharein1919andtheerrorterm ui inoursecond-stage equation(2):whenwefocusontheentiresourceofvariationinthe socialistvoteshare,wearecapturingthefactthatsomemunicipalitieshaveamoreleft-leaningpopulation,votingforsocialists ingreaternumbers,andwillthusbelesslikelytosupportfascism subsequently.
Butdoesthisexplanationholdupunderscrutiny?Weusethe Bayesianproceduredevelopedby DiTragliaandGarc´ıa-Jimeno (2021),whichtacklesexactlythisquestion.Briefly,theirproceduretakesasinputmomentsfromthedataaswellaspriorsontwoimportantvariance/covarianceterms.Thefirstisthe
1274 THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS extentofmeasurementerror—signal-to-noiseratio κ —inourkey right-hand-sidevariable,socialistvotesharein1919.Thismeasurementerrorispresentinlargepartbecauseourvariableis onlyanimperfectproxyfortheextentofredscare.Thesecondis thecorrelationbetweentheendogenousright-hand-sidevariable andthesecond-stageerrorterm,denotedby ρSVSu (usingthenotationin equation(2) andwith SVS denotingthesocialistvote sharein1919).Theprocedurethenjointlyestimatesthepossiblerangeofcorrelation ρFCu betweentheinstrument,footsoldier casualties FC,andthesecond-stageerrorterm, ui (whichwould leadtobiasedIVestimates),andtheimpliedvalueofthecausal effectpurgedofthisbias, α .
In OnlineAppendix TableA14,wereporttheresultsfrom thisprocedure.Wetake κ tobeintherange(0.5,1].Thecorrelationbetweenthesocialistvotesharein1919andthedummyfor socialistwininthe1920localelections,forexample,isonly0.616, confirmingthatneitherisaperfectproxyforperceivedredscare. Weset ρ SVSu ∈ [ 0.1, 0.9],whichrepresentsarangeofvalues forthecontributionofpersistentleft-leaningattitudestosocialist votes1919.Forinstance, ρ SVSu =−0.1impliesthat10%ofvariationinsocialistvoteshareisduetothispersistentideological component.
Theresultsareencouragingforourinterpretationofthegaps betweentheOLSandIVestimates.Inallcases,thisBayesian procedureimpliesthatwecannotrejectthenullhypothesisof zerocorrelationbetweentheinstrumentandthesecond-stageerrorterm(theconfidenceintervalfor ρ FCu alwaysincludeszero). Moreover,theBayesianestimatesof α arealwaysstatisticallysignificantlydifferentfromzeroandtheconfidenceintervalsalways includeourIVestimates.
Overall,weconcludethatthedifferencesbetweentheOLS andtheIVestimatesareinlinewithasizableendogeneityproblemintheOLSandthusconfirmtheimportanceoffocusingonan exogenoussourceofvariationinthelocalsupportfortheSocialist Party.
VI.D.WhereDidFascistVotesComeFrom?
Weexplorewherefascistvotesinthe1921and1924elections camefromin TableV.ThefirstsixcolumnsinPanelAreport 2SLSestimateswithvotesharesofthePopularPartyandthe
TABLEV E STIMATESOFTHE E FFECTSOF S OCIALIST V OTE S HAREIN 1919 AND F OOT S OLDIER C ASUALTIESONTHE V OTE S HAREOF S OCIALIST ,C ATHOLIC, AND T RADITIONAL P ARTIESIN 1921 AND 1924
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)
Dep.variable:Popular(Catholic)Traditionalparties’Socialistvote votesharein1921votesharein1921sharein1921
PanelA:2SLS Socialistvotesharein1919
PanelB:Reducedform
Shareoffootsoldiercasualties
tofootsoldiercasualties
Observations5,1725,1725,1725,1725,1725,1725,1725,1725,172
Numberofclusters173173173173173173173173173
Dep.variable:Popular(Catholic)Traditionalparties’Socialistvote votesharein1924votesharein1924sharein1924
(0.19)(0.20)(0.19)(0.16)(0.18)(0.19)(0.14)(0.15)(0.15)
(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)
PanelC:2SLS Socialistvotesharein1919
PanelD:Reducedform
Shareoffootsoldiercasualties
Impliedvoteslostdue
tofootsoldiercasualties
12 January 2023
TABLEV C ONTINUED
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181181181181
Votesharein19190.2050.3700.323 Votesharein19210.2060.3210.297 Votesharein19240.0900.0650.147
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Notes. 2SLS(PanelsAandC)andreduced-form(PanelsBandD)regressionsofthePopularParty(columns(1)–(3)),ofthetraditionalparties(columns(4)–(6 )),andofthesocialist voteshare(columns(7)–(9))in1921(PanelsAandB)andin1924(PanelsCandD).TheexcludedinstrumentinPanelsAandCisthecountofWorldWarIfoots oldiercasualties fromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationovertheageofsixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported.Thethreespecificationsc orrespondtothosefrom TableI , columns(1),(4),and(6).Column(1)includesregimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulationandshareofthe populationbelowtheageofsix in1911).Column(4)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximumelevation),thesocialistvotesharein1913,a ndmilitarycontrols(veterans fromclasses1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareofthemalepopulationabo vetheageofsixin1911,a dummyforthepresenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattles).Column(6)includesag riculturalcontrols(shareof daylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummyforthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations)andurbancontrols(industryworkersandindustri alfirmsovermalepopulation in1911,literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).Standarderrorsclusteredatthedistrictl evelareinparentheses.
traditionalright-wingpartiesin1921ontheleft-handside.25 Theseestimatesindicatethatsocialistvotesharein1919isassociatedwithdeclinesinthevotesharesoftheseparties.26 Columns (7)–(9)turntotheSocialistParty’svotesharein1921(including thevotesofthenewlyformedCommunistParty).The2SLScoefficientestimatesfortheeffectofthesocialistvotesharein1919are nowsizableandpositive(around0.85),suggestingthatsocialists in1921retainedmostoftheadditionalvotestheygainedin1919 becauseofthelocalpopulation’sreactionstothewar—ascaptured byourfootsoldiercasualtiesinstrument.
PanelBpresentscorrespondingreduced-formestimatesfor the1921election.Usingthenationalvotetotalsandreducedformcoefficients,wecanderiveroughestimatesofwherefascist votesin1921camefrom.First,thetotalfascistvotesincreasedby about426,000betweenthe1919and1921elections.Becausethe electoratealsoexpanded(inparticularwiththeadditionofover 500,000veteranswhocouldnotvotein1919),thevotetotalsofthe PopularandtheSocialistPartiesincreasedaswell(by139,000for theformerand48,000forthelatter).Othertraditionalright-wing partieslostvotes.Second,wecanuseourreduced-formestimates toobtainsomeupperboundsonhowmuchoftheincreaseinfascist votesin1921camefromthosewhovotedforsocialistsbecause ofthehardshipscreatedbythewarin1919butthenswitchedto fascistsin1921.Formally,weusethereduced-formestimatesfrom PanelBforthiscomputation.27 Thereduced-formestimatesimply thatfootsoldiercasualtiespredictadecreaseof216,000votesfor thePopularParty,107,000forothertraditionalright-wingparties, and46,000forthesocialists.Theseestimatesareupperbounds, especiallyforsocialists,becausewedonotknowwhether,say,
25.Thetraditionalright-wingpartiesincludethosetakingpartintheNational Bloc,suchastheNationalist,Liberal,LiberalDemocrat,andAgrarianParties,but excludethePopularPartyandofcoursethefascists.
26.In OnlineAppendix TableA15weshowthattheresultsaresimilarwhen weincludeontheright-handsidetherelevantparties’1919votesharestocontrol formeanreversioninthesupportforaparty(wecannotdothisforthesocialists, sincetheirvotesharein1919isourendogenousvariable).
27.WefocusonreducedformstomakethevotelossesoftheSocialistParty comparabletothoseoftheotherparties.Inparticular,wecomputethelossesofthe otherpartiesbyusingreduced-formestimatesandevaluatingthematthemean ofthefootsoldiercasualtiesvariable.Wecomputesocialistlossesbyestimating thereducedformforthe1919and1921votesharesoftheparty,convertingthem intovotelosses/gainsusingthesizeofthetotalelectorateinthedifferentelections andthentakingthedifference.
formersocialistvoterswhoswitchedawayfromthepartyvoted forfascists,orforsomeotherparty,orabstained.Overall,wesee thattheincreaseinthesupportfortheFascistPartyin1921was modest(relativetothetotalelectorateofover6.5million)and camemostlyfromthePopularPartyandothertraditionalrightwingparties,thoughfascistsmayhavemarginallybenefitedfrom thevotesofformersocialistsupportersaswell.
Fascistvotesincreasedmuchmoreinthe1924election.PanelsCandDpresent2SLSandreduced-formestimatesforthis election,andweagainseedeclinesinthevotesharesofthePopularandothertraditionalright-wingpartiesinbothpanels.The patternfortheSocialistPartyisdifferentthanin1921,however. Forexample,inPanelC,columns(7)–(9),the2SLSestimatefor theSocialistPartyvotesin1921isstillpositivebutmuchsmaller thaninPanelA,implyingthatthesocialistsretainedonlyafractionoftheadditionalvotestheyobtainedinthe1919election.
Whatdotheseestimatesimplyaboutthecontributionof formersocialistvoterstotheriseoftheFascistPartyin1924? Thisquestionismoredifficulttoanswerbecausewedonot knowwhethervoterswhohadpreviouslysupportedtheSocialist Partyactuallymanagedtocasttheirballot.First,asnoted above,althoughtherewasnocentralizedcoordinationoffascist actions,partycadresundertookviolentactsandintimidated votersinseveralmunicipalities,andmuchofthiswastargeted atpreventingsocialistsfromvoting.GiacomoMatteotti,the leaderoftheUnitarySocialistParty,inhislastparliamentary speechonMay30,1924,beforebeingkidnappedandmurdered byfascists,denouncedthat“InthePoValley,inTuscany,andin otherregions...electorsvotedunderthecontroloftheFascist Party....Onlyasmallminorityofcitizenscouldfreelyexpress theirvotingpreferences:forthemostpartonlythosewhowere notsuspectedofbeingSocialists.Our[comrades]wereimpeded byviolence.”28
Thisrepressiondidnotstartwiththeelection,andasEbner explains:“PoliticalviolenceintheyearsaftertheMarchonRome continuedtoservethesamepurposesasbefore:itsuppressed opposition,[and]replacedSocialistandnon-Fascistadministrations” Ebner(2010,37),butitwasintensifiedtodiscourageantifascistvotesduringthe1924election.Second,thereisevidence
28.See https://storia.camera.it/regno/lavori/leg27/sed004.pdf
that,expectingsystematicintimidationandafascistvictory,many socialistsdidnotturnout.Indeed,asmentionedin SectionII, socialistsandotheroppositionpartiesconsideredboycottingthe elections(DeFelice1966,584).TheSocialistnewspaper Avanti! summarizedtheparty’spositionas:“theelectoraldayisover, andallarounduswesee...thepreferredweaponsofthereactionarybourgeoisie,coercion,arbitrarydecisions,violence,”and thisperception,too,contributedtolowturnoutamongitssupporters(reportedin Visani2014,111).Third,eventhoseformer SocialistPartysupporterswhomanagedtocasttheirballotsbut didnotvoteforsocialistsmayhaveswitchedtomoremoderate partiesthanthefascists.Thesecaveatsnotwithstanding,wecan againprovideanupperboundestimateofthevotesthatcame fromformerSocialistPartysupporters.
Tostartwith,atthenationalleveltheSocialistPartyvotes declinedfromabout1.83millionto1.05millionbetween1919and 1924.Thuswecanviewthedifference,780,000votes,asanupper boundonthevoteswitchfromsocialiststofascists.Thisisabout 17%ofthe4.67millionvotestheFascistPartyreceivedin1924.In comparison,thetotalnumberofvoteslostbythePopularParty andothertraditionalright-wingpartiesissignificantlylarger, 2.16million.
Inaddition,usingthesamestrategyoutlinedinnote 27,the reduced-formestimatesimplythatfootsoldiercasualtiespredict adecreaseof106,000votesforthePopularParty,104,000votesfor othertraditionalright-wingparties,and258,000fortheSocialist Party.Thus,thesourceofvariationwearefocusingongenerates onlyasmallpartofthe4.67millionadditionalvotestheFascist Partyreceivedinthe1924election.Thepartymayhavereceiveda biggerboostfromnew,youngervoters.Indeed,eventhoughthere isnodetaileddataonvotesbydemographicgroup,contemporary accountssuggestthatmanyoftheyoungervoterssupportedthe FascistParty.Petersen,forexample,notesthatamongfascists, “therewasanexceptionallythickpresenceofstudentsfromhigh schoolsanduniversities”(Petersen1975,659).
Overall,alargeportionoftheincreaseinthesupportfor theFascistPartyin1924appearstohavebeendrivenbynationaltrends.Thecontributionofvoterswho,asareactiontothe hardshipsofthewar,supportedthesocialistsin1919andthen switchedtofascistsin1924seemstobemodest.
VI.E.LocalElitesandFascistActivity Asdiscussedin SectionII,thehistoricalrecordsuggeststhat thefascistmovementmayhavereceivedconsiderablesupport fromlocalelites,especiallyinruralareaswheremajorlandholdersandsomesmallholderswerealarmedbyagrarianstrikesand thenewsocialistlocalgovernments.Weinvestigatethisissuefurtherin TableVI,wherewelookatwhetherthesurgeinsocialist votesharein1919ledtoastrongerfascistreactionwhenthe eliteswerebetterorganized.Weusetwo(imperfect)measures ofeliteorganization:thepresenceofalandownerassociationin ruralareas,andtheshareofentrepreneursandrentiersinthe population,whichmaybemorerelevantforurbanareas.Our focusistheinteractionofthesevariableswiththeincreaseinsocialistvotesharein1919.Wepresenttheseresultsintwoways. InPanelsAandC,wefocusonIVmodels,wherewehavetwo endogenousvariables—thesocialistvotesharein1919andits interactionwiththemeasureofeliteorganization—andbothare instrumented,withfootsoldiercasualtiesandtheirinteraction withtheelitevariables.Tosavespacewelookatthespecificationsfromcolumns(1),(4),and(6)anddonotshowthefirststages (justreportingtheKleibergen-Paap F-statistics).InPanelsBand D,wepresentreduced-formestimates,wherewedirectlyinteracttheshareoffootsoldiercasualtieswiththeeliteorganization variables.Itshouldbenotedthatbecausetheseeliteorganization variablesarenotexogenoustoothercharacteristicsofthemunicipality,theirinteractionsmaystillsufferfromendogeneity,and theseresultsshouldbeinterpretedwithgreatercautionthanour otherestimates.
WeseeinPanelsAandBthattheinteractionswiththe landownerassociationsareimportantfortheearlyriseoffascism,includingtheparty’svoteshareinthe1921election.This patternisconsistentwiththehistoricalrecord,wherethesupport oflargelandholdersforthefascistcause,andagainstagrarian strikesandagainstworkerandsharecropperdemands,wascriticalfortheriseoftheFascistPartyinthecountryside.These interactionsdonotappeartobeimportantforthevotesharein 1924.Incontrast,thepresenceofentrepreneursandrentiersmattersmorefortheparty’svotesharein1924,consistentwiththe businesscommunityandbothsmallandlargeentrepreneurssupporting,votingfor,andorganizingthevotefortheFascistParty in1924.
TABLEVI H ETEROGENEOUS E FFECTSOF S OCIALIST V OTE S HAREIN 1919 ON L OCAL F ASCIST S UPPORT
FascistviolenceFascistlocalbranchFascistvoteshareFascistvoteshare in1920–22in1921in1921in1924
Dep.variable:(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
PanelA:Heterogeneouseffectsinthepresenceoflandownerassociations,2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.350.510.510.370.480.500.290.360.350.400.540.51 (0.18)(0.20)(0.20)(0.16)(0.19)(0.20)(0.16)(0.18)(0.18)(0.17)(0.17)(0.17)
Socialists × landownerassociationdummy0.850.740.750.530.410.410.760.730.75
(0.46)(0.44)(0.43)(0.19)(0.21)(0.21)(0.41)(0.40)(0.39)(0.19)(0.20)(0.19)
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat.19.7126.0124.6119.7126.0124.6120.0224.9124.2019.7126.0124.61
PanelB:Reducedform
Shareoffootsoldiercasualties0.040.050.050.040.050.050.040.040.030.050.050.05 (0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)
Casualties × landownerassociationdummy0.210.220.230.140.140.150.180.190.20 0.02 0.000.00 (0.08)(0.08)(0.07)(0.06)(0.07)(0.07)(0.06)(0.06)(0.06)(0.04)(0.04)(0.04)
PanelC:Heterogeneouseffectsinthepresenceofelites(entrepreneursandrentiers),2SLS
Socialistvotesharein19190.340.490.470.380.500.500.300.370.340.370.520.49 (0.17)(0.19)(0.20)(0.17)(0.21)(0.20)(0.17)(0.19)(0.19)(0.18)(0.17)(0.18)
Socialists × elites0.440.440.490.040.050.05 0.03 0.07 0.070.270.250.34 (0.17)(0.17)(0.21)(0.17)(0.19)(0.22)(0.12)(0.13)(0.14)(0.15)(0.14)(0.16)
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat.16.1616.6113.5016.1616.6113.5016.6216.2212.8716.1616.6113.50
12 January 2023
TABLEVI C ONTINUED
FascistviolenceFascistlocalbranchFascistvoteshareFascistvoteshare in1920–22in1921in1921in1924
Dep.variable:(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
PanelD:Reducedform
Shareoffootsoldiercasualties0.040.050.040.040.050.050.040.040.030.040.050.05 (0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)
Casualties × elites0.100.100.090.020.020.020.00 0.01
(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.04)(0.03)(0.03)
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,3585,3585,3585,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181175175175181181181
Notes. 2SLS(PanelsAandC)andreduced-formregressions(PanelsBandD)oftheheterogeneouseffectofthesocialistvotesharein1919onfascisminthepres enceoflandowners’ associations(PanelsAandB)andtheshareofelites(PanelsCandD).Theendogenousvariablesaresocialistvotesharein1919anditsinteractionwit hthemeasureofelite organization.ExcludedinstrumentsarethecountofWorldWarIfootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationover theageofsixin1911andits interactionwiththeelitevariables.Theleft-hand-sidevariablesarethefascistviolence(episodesper1,000inhabitants)in1920–22(columns( 1)–(3)),thepresenceoflocalfascist branchesinthefallof1921(columns(4)–(6)),thefascistvotesharein1921(columns(7)–(9))andin1924(columns(10)–(12)).Standardizedcoeffic ientsarereported.Thethree specificationscorrespondtothosefrom TableI ,columns(1),(4),and(6).Column(1)includesregimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulation andshareofpopulationbelowtheageofsixin1911).Column(4)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximumelev ation),thesocialistvoteshare in1913,andmilitarycontrols(veteransfromclasses1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolun teersasashareofthemale populationabovetheageofsixin1911,adummyforthepresenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mor talitybattles).Column (6)includesagriculturalcontrols(shareofdaylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummyforthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations)andu rbancontrols(industryworkers andindustrialfirmsovermalepopulationin1911,literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).St andarderrorsclusteredatthe districtlevelareinparentheses.
Inaddition, OnlineAppendix TableA16looksatadummy forsizabledonationstotheFascistPartyfromtheareaasan outcomevariable.Socialistvoteshareinthe1919electionsdoes nothaveastatisticallysignificantmaineffectonthisvariable, butithasasignificantinteractionwithlocalelitepresence.This suggeststhatinareaswheretherewerelandownerassociationsor moreentrepreneursandrentiersinthepopulation,ahighervote shareforsocialistsmadetheeconomicelitemorelikelytomake significantdonationstofascists.Thisresult,too,isconsistentwith largelandownersandbusinessintereststurningtotheFascist Partywhentheystartedfearingfurtherdemandsandgainsby socialists.
VII.RESULTSWITH OTHER SOURCESOF VARIATION Ourmainhypothesis—thattheeffectoftheperceivedthreat ofsocialisminpost-WorldWarIItalycontributedtotheriseof fascism—wouldalsosuggestthatothersourcesofvariationgeneratinggreatersupportfortheSocialistPartyshouldhavesimilar effectsonfascistactivitiesandsupport.Wenowinvestigatethis questionlookingattheeffectsoftheSpanishfluanddroughtinducedeconomichardship.
TheSpanishflupandemic,whichaffectedEuropein1918 andkilledabout50millionpeoplearoundtheworld(Johnsonand Mueller2002),wasalmostasdeadlyanddisruptiveasWorldWarI inItaly(IstitutoCentralediStatistica1958).29 Thehardshipand theeconomicdistressitcreatedalsofueleddiscontentwiththe existingregimeandincreasedtheelectoralappealofsocialists.
OnlineAppendix TableA17,PanelAshowsresultsexploitingthissourceofvariation.30 Thefirstthreecolumns(once againcorrespondingtothesamethreespecificationswefocuson
29.Wecomputedthedeathsin1918comparedwith1911–14,whichleads toabout494,500excessdeaths.Thisestimate,eveniflargerthantheseverely undercountedofficialestimateof275,000,isinlinewithothers,forexample, Tognotti(2015),andisalsocomparabletothenumberofItaliansoldierswhodied inthewar,estimatesofwhichrangebetween510,000and600,000.
30.Oneappealingaspectofthissourceofvariationisthatwhileourmainsampleisdominatedbyruralmunicipalitiesandthedroughtinstrumentweuseinthis sectionismainlyforthecountrysideaswell,theSpanishfluaffectedurbanareas morethantheruralareas,andoursampleforthisexerciseincludes207urban municipalities.Forexample,usingdatafrom DirezioneGeneraledellaStatisticae delLavoro(1917–1924) wecomputean83%averageexcessratein1918forurban municipalitiesascomparedto69%excessmortalityforruralmunicipalitieswith
throughout)showapreciselyestimatedpositiveeffectofexcess deathsonthesocialistvotesharein1919,whichisagainour proxyforredscare.Therestofthecolumnsshowthe2SLSestimatesusingthissourceofvariation.Thereisapositiveeffect onthefascistvotesharein1924andfascistbranchesin1921, buttheseestimatesareonlymarginallysignificantorjustbelow significance.Wedonotfindasystematicrelationshipbetweenred scareandfascistviolenceorthe1921voteshareoftheFascist Partywhenusingthissourceofvariation.Theimpliedquantitativemagnitudesaresimilartothosewesawwithourmainresults. Ournextsourceofvariationisfromdroughtinagricultural areas.31 Amedium-sizedroughtinthewinter-springof1918–19 (thesecondmostsevereoftheyearsbetween1915and1928afterthe1921Europeandrought)affectedpartsofItaly,including thePovalley,Tuscany,andSardinia.Hereweinvestigatewhether drought-inducedhardshipsanddiscontentalsoincreasedthesupportfortheSocialistPartyinthe1919electionsandwhetherthis boostedsubsequentfascistactivity.Weadoptthesameparameterizationasin Acemoglu,DeFeo,andDeLuca(2020b) andmeasure theextentofdroughtconditionsbyrelativerainfall(benchmarked torainfallin1915–1979)andcapthisvariableatone(sothatwedo notexploitthevariationcomingfrommorerainthanusual).32 The resultspresentedin OnlineAppendix TableA17,PanelBshowa
respecttothe1911–14average.Wealsoverifiedin OnlineAppendix FigureA4(a) thatexcessdeathsfromSpanishfluarebroadlyuncorrelatedwiththesamepre1919economic,social,andpoliticalvariablesthatwestudiedin FigureIII.Though weseeonenegativeandonepositivestatisticalassociationwiththesevariables, thevastmajorityofthecoefficientsarenotstatisticallydifferentfromzero,bolsteringthecasethattheintensityoftheSpanishfluwasuncorrelatedwitha diverserangeofmunicipalitycharacteristics.
31. Acemoglu,DeFeo,andDeLuca(2020b) showedthattheseveredroughtin 1893inSicilyboostedthesupportforpeasantorganizations,whichwerestrongly alliedwiththeSocialistParty.Forotherworksontheeffectsofrainfalland droughtsonpoliticaloutcomes,see,amongothers, Miguel,Satyanath,andSergenti(2004); BrucknerandCiccone(2011); Hsiang,Meng,andCane(2011); Dell (2012); Hsiang,Burke,andMiguel(2013); Madestametal.(2013); Waldinger (2013); Dell,Jones,andOlken(2014); Bonnieretal.(2015).
32.See OnlineAppendix FigureA3forthegeographicdistributionofrelative rainfallinwinter-springof1918–19. OnlineAppendix FigureA4(b)showsthatour relativerainfallvariableisuncorrelatedwithmostofthepre-1919economic,social andpoliticalcharacteristics.Comfortingly, OnlineAppendix TableA18documents thatthereisnoassociationbetweenrelativerainfallinotheryears(whichdo notfeatureadrought-inducedsurgeinsocialistsupport)andfascistelectoral performancein1924exceptfor1925–26.
fairlypreciserelationshipbetweenourrelativerainfallvariable andthesocialistvotesharein1919.Theremainingcolumnsshow thatthereisapositiveassociationbetweentheinstrumentedsocialistvotesharein1919andthefascistvotesharein1924,butwe donotdetectasignificantrelationshipwithourothermeasures offascistsupport.
Overall,eventhoughtheseresultsareweakerandhaveto beinterpretedwithgreatercaution,theyareconsistentwithour keyargument—thateventsthatincreasedsocialistsupportled toacounterreactionfromurbanandruralelitesandthemiddle classes,contributingtotheriseofItalianfascism.
VIII.MEDIUM-TERMAND LONG-TERM OUTCOMES DidthesupportforandtheruleoftheFascistPartyinItaly havealonger-termeffect?Thereisnoconsensusanswertothis question.Thefascisttakeoverofpowerwasanepochalevent, whichcouldhavealteredItaly’ssubsequenteconomicorpoliticaltrajectory.Ontheotherhand,thefascistgovernmentlost mostofitslegitimacyanddisintegratedinSeptember1943,as theAlliedforcesinvadedsouthernItalyandsetupthe“KingdomoftheSouth,”andthepuppet“RepublicofSal ` o,”headedby MussolinibutdefactoruledbyGermanNazis,cametocontrol thenorth.TheSal ` oregimeconclusivelycollapsedattheendof WorldWarII,andMussoliniwasdulyexecuted.Givenitsabrupt end,itispossiblethatfascistrulehadminimaleffectonlater events,includingpostwarpoliticaldevelopments.Webrieflyinvestigatetheseissuesinthissection.WestartwiththepotentialeffectoflocalfascistactivityonthedeportationofJewsfrom Italy,andthenturntoitspotentialeffectsonpostwarpolitical alignments.
VIII.A.DeportationofJews About9,000Jewishcitizensandrefugeesweredeportedfrom Italytovariousconcentrationcampstowardtheendofthewar, mostlyundertheRepublicofSal ` o.Anti-Jewishlawswerefirst introducedinItalyin1938andbarredJewsfrompublicemployment,schools,anduniversities.Measuresincludingconcentration campsandforcedlaborwerediscussedatthebeginningofthewar, and“afterthearmisticeofSeptember8,1943,therewasanew harsheningofanti-Jewishmeasuresdrivenandsometimeseven
initiatedbythelowerranksofthepartyhierarchy...NewmeasureswerebeinginvokedbythebaseoftherebornFascistParty fromSeptember1943onward,andinOctober,callsfromtheFascistpressbegantodemandadefinitive‘solution’totheproblem” (LevisSullam2018,43–44).
AlthoughtheearlyliteraturedownplayedtheroleofItalians intheatrocitiesagainstJews(DeFelice1961; Zuccotti1996), recentstudieshaveemphasizedthemajorroleofItalianforces andfascistsympathizersinJewishdeportations(Sarfatti2006; LevisSullam2018).InthewordsofLevisSullam,theywere“men motivatedbyideology—thoughnotnecessarilybyantisemitism,” huntingdownpartisans,antifascistsoldiers,andJews,and“made nodistinctionamongtheirvictims:theywerealltraitorsorenemiesofFascism,enemiesofthenation”(LevisSullam2018,36).
In TableVII,welookattherelationshipbetweenlocalsupportforfascistsinthe1920sandthedeportationofJewsfrom thesameareatwodecadeslater.Namely,weestimateregressions similarto equation(2),exceptthatthekeyright-hand-sidevariableisthevoteshareoftheFascistPartyin1924,whichweview asthemostcomprehensivemeasureoffascistsupport.Thisvariableisnowinstrumentedwiththefootsoldiercasualtiesvariable asin equation(1).Theresultsareverysimilarwhenweusea fascistsupportindex,computedasanunweightedaverageofall our(standardized)measures(OnlineAppendix TableA19),when wesimplylookatthereducedformwithfootsoldiercasualties (OnlineAppendix TableA20),orwhenwerestrictthesampleto municipalitiesintheRepublicofSal ` o,whichwasunderGerman controlafter1943(OnlineAppendix TableA21).
In TableVII,PanelA,weconsideradummyvariablefor whetheranyJewsweredeportedfromthemunicipality.InPanel B,wefocusonestimatesofdeportedJewsrelativetotheJewishpopulationinthemunicipality(asexplainedin SectionIII). Finally,inPanelC,weconsiderasimilarmeasurebutexcludeall municipalitieswithconcentrationcampsinwhichJewsfromother areasweretemporarilyheldandlaterdeportedtoNazicamps, sincethissourceofvariationmaynotbeasinformativeabout localsupportforJewishdeportations.Inallpanels,wepresent thesamesixspecificationsusedinourmaintables.Inaddition, thesemodelsalsocontrolforthedurationofGermanoccupation ofthemunicipality,whichmayhavedirectlyaffectedJewishdeportationsfromthearea,andfortheestimatedshareofJewish populationfromthe1911census.
TABLEVII 2SLSESTIMATESOFTHE EFFECTOFTHE FASCIST VOTE SHAREIN 1924 ON JEWISH DEPORTATIONS 1943–45
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
PanelA:Jewsdeportationdummy(1943–45)
Fascistvotesharein19240.890.810.820.770.830.82 (0.46)(0.42)(0.42)(0.38)(0.42)(0.43)
PanelB:DeportationsoverJewishpopulation(cappedat1)
Fascistvotesharein19241.080.990.990.920.990.97 (0.50)(0.44)(0.43)(0.38)(0.43)(0.44)
PanelC:DeportationsoverJewishpopulation(cappedat1,nocamps)
Fascistvotesharein19240.950.880.880.810.870.86 (0.46)(0.41)(0.41)(0.36)(0.40)(0.41)
Regiment/provinceFE
Demographiccontrols
ShareofJewishpop.in1911
DaysofGermanoccupation
Geographiccontrols
Socialistsharein1913
Militarycontrols
Agriculturecontrols
Urbancontrols
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters181181181181181181
First-stage F-stat6.529.229.8211.569.8810.04
Notes. 2SLSregressionsofadummyfortheoccurrenceofthedeportationofJewsin1943–45(PanelA); thenumberofdeportedJewsin1943–45overthe1911Jewishpopulation,cappedat1(PanelB);thenumber ofdeportedJewsin1943–45overthe1911Jewishpopulation,cappedat1andexcluding39municipalities withconcentrationcamps(PanelC)onthefascistvotesharein1924.Theexcludedinstrumentisthecount ofWorldWarIfootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationovertheageof sixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsarereported.Column(1)includesregimentandprovincefixedeffects, demographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulationandshareofthepopulationbelowtheageofsixin1911), theshareoftheJewishpopulationin1911,anddaysofGermanoccupationintheperiod1943–45.Column (2)includesgeographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximumelevation).Column (3)addssocialistvotesharein1913.Column(4)addsmilitarycontrols(veteransfromclasses1874–95and fromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareofthe malepopulationabovetheageofsixin1911,adummyforthepresenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants, andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattles).Column(5)includesagriculturalcontrols (shareofdaylaborers,shareofsharecroppers,andadummyforthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations). Finallycolumn(6)addsurbancontrols(industryworkersandindustrialfirmsovermalepopulationin1911, literacyratein1911,theshareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).Standard errorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.
Inallcases,wefindstatisticallysignificantandsizableassociationsbetweenlocalfascistactivity(proxiedbythefascistvote sharein1924)andJewishdeportations.Forexample,thecoefficientof0.82(standarderror = 0.43)inPanelA,column(6)implies thataonestandarddeviationincreaseinthefascistvoteshare
in1924isassociatedwith22%greaterlikelihoodofJewsbeing deportedfromthatmunicipality.
Overall,thesefindingsshowthatlocalfascistsupportmay havehadsomemedium-runeffectsandalsosupportthemore recenthistoriographyontheroleofItalianfascistsinthedeportationofJews.
VIII.B.PostwarPoliticalAlignments WeinvestigatewhethertherewereanydurablepoliticalconsequencesofItalianfascism.In TableVIII,welookatlonger-term politicaleffectsoffascistvoteshareinthe1924election,andinstrumentthisvariablewith equation(1).Itisaprioriunclear whethergreaterlocalsupportforfascisminthe1920sshould translateintoapersistentadvantagefortheright,orwhetherit mayhavecreatedabacklash,disadvantagingcenter-rightparties inthepostwarera.
Intermsofoutcomes,wefocusonthevotesharesofvariouspartiesinpost-WorldWarIIelections.Sincethenumberand namesofpartieshavechangedinItalyoverthepast70years, wegroupdifferentpartiesintofourcategories:left,center-right, extremeleft,andextremeright.Forexample,thecenter-rightincludestheChristianDemocratsformostofthepostwarelections, andtheleftincludessocialistsandcommunists(whichbytheearly 1970shadlargelyassumedasocialdemocraticplatform).Theextremerightincludesvariousnationalistorneofascistmovements, suchasMSI(ItalianSocialMovement)until1992anditssuccessors,andtheextremeleftincludestheCommunistInternationalistParty(inthe1946and1948elections)andthenDP(Proletarian Democracy)andotherminorlists,whichinthe1960sand1970s filledthespaceontheleftvacatedbythecommunists.
TableVIII,column(1)poolsdatafromallelectionsbetween 1946and2018,whiletheremaining19columns(9inPanelAand 10inPanelB)lookatoneelectionatatime.Inallspecifications, wefocusonthesetofcovariatesusedinourmostdemanding specification,column(6)inourusualtablestructure.Wefinda consistentandsizablenegativeeffectofthelocalsupportforthe FascistPartyinthe1924electiononthecenter-rightvoteshare inalmostallelections.Inthepooledspecification,thecoefficient estimateis 0.60(standarderror = 0.24),whichimpliesthat a10percentagepointgreatersupportfortheFascistPartyis associatedwithmorethana4percentagepointdeclineinthe
TABLEVIII Dep.variable:Votessharesof
PanelA:Elections1946–1979
(0.24)(0.47)(0.49)(0.52)(0.47)(0.40)(0.43)(0.45)(0.50)(0.42)
Extremeright0.200.170.320.330.190.460.500.110.34 (0.18)(0.34)(0.36)(0.27)(0.30)(0.33)(0.29)(0.31)(0.34)
Election(s)1946–2018194619481953195819631968197219761979
Observations109,7255,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775 Numberofclusters5,775181181181181181181181181181
First-stage F -stat.10.109.949.949.949.949.949.949.949.949.94
ONTINUED
TABLEVIII C Dep.variable:Votessharesof (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)
PanelB:Elections1983–2018
Left0.810.900.470.450.230.410.670.470.570.77 (0.43)(0.46)(0.37)(0.26)(0.25)(0.32)(0.38)(0.30)(0.38)(0.46)
(0.44)(0.40)(0.45)(0.29)(0.36)(0.35)(0.43)(0.41)(0.63)(0.44)
(0.38)(0.55)(0.41)(0.37)(0.40)(0.48)(0.43)(0.41)(0.23)(0.31)
Extremeleft
Extremeright0.410.090.140.14
(0.42)(0.46)(0.36)(0.29)(0.30)(0.43)(0.40)(0.39)(0.33)
Election:1983198719921994199620012006200820132018
Observations5,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,7755,775
Numberofclusters181181181181181181181181181181
First-stage F -stat.9.949.949.949.949.949.949.949.949.949.94
Fullsetofcontrols
Notes. 2SLSregressionsofthevotesharesofpost-WorldWarIIpartiesfortheperiod1946–2018onfascistvotesharein1924.Theleftcolumnidentifiesthepa rtywhosevote shareisusedasthedependentvariableintheregressionsineachrow.Theheading Election identifiestheelection(s)includedinthesample.Theexcludedinstrumentisthecount offootsoldiercasualtiesfromamunicipalitydividedbythetotalmalepopulationovertheageofsixin1911.Standardizedcoefficientsforfascistv otesharein1924arereported. Allspecificationsincludeourfullsetofcontrols.Weincluderegimentandprovincefixedeffectsanddemographiccontrols(quarticinlogpopulatio nandshareofpopulationbelow theageofsixin1911),geographiccontrols(logarea,elevationofthemaincenter,andmaximumelevation),thesocialistvotesharein1913,militar ycontrols(veteransfromclasses 1874–95andfromclasses1896–1900aswellascasualtiesamongspecialassaulttroopsandvolunteersasashareofthemalepopulationabovetheageofs ixin1911,adummyforthe presenceofarmy-supplyingproductionplants,andadummyforanycasualtiesinthehighest-mortalitybattles),agriculturalcontrols(shareofda ylaborers,shareofsharecroppers, andadummyforthepresenceoflocalagrarianassociations)andurbancontrols(industryworkersandindustrialfirmsoverthemalepopulationin1911 ,literacyratein1911,the shareofentrepreneursandrentiers,andtheshareofthebourgeoisie).Standarderrorsclusteredatthedistrictlevelareinparentheses.PanelA,c olumn(1)reportsapooled2SLS regressionfortheperiod1946–2018whereallcontrolsareinteractedwithelectiondummiesandstandarderrorsareclusteredatthemunicipalityle vel.
voteshareofthecenter-rightparties.Mostofthisvotelossgoes totheleft,butsomeofitiscapturedbytheextremeleft.Inonly twoelectionsdoweseeasmallandmarginallysignificantpositive effectontheextremeright.33
Ourinterpretationfortheseresultsisthatthecenter-right’s fallbehindfascistsinthe1920smayhavedamagedtheirlongtermreputation.Weshouldnotethatwearenotabletoruleout analternativeinterpretation:theinstrumentedfascistvoteshare in1924mayalsobecapturingsomeofthelonger-termeffects ofthesocialistsupportinthe1919election.Thereasonweare notfavoringthisinterpretationisthatasourresultsin TableV demonstrated,muchoftheboostthatthesocialistshadreceived fromwardisruptionhadalreadydissipatedby1924,andwesuspectthatitisnotthecauseofthelong-termeffectsonthepolitical fortunesofcenter-rightpartiesinthemunicipality.
IX.CONCLUSION ThisarticlerevisitedtheriseoffascisminItaly.Weargued thattheFascistPartybenefitedfromtheperceivedthreatofsocialismintheaftermathofWorldWarI,whichmademanylandowners,businesses,andcenter-rightvotersturntoittocombatsocialistdemands.TheSocialistPartywasintheascendancyafterthe warandhadshiftedtotheleftbecauseofitsinternaldynamics andtheimpactoftheBolshevikRevolution.
WedocumentedastrongassociationbetweenWorldWarI casualtiesinanareaandthevoteshareoftheSocialist Partyinthe1919elections.Wearguedthatthisrelationship isnotexplainedbyanypre-1919economic,social,orpolitical characteristicsofmunicipalities.Rather,itcapturestheeffectsof thehardshipanddisillusionmentfeltbysoldiersandtheirfamilies.Webolsteredthisinterpretationbyshowingthatcasualties arenotassociatedwithgreatervotesfornationalistorprowar partiesinthe1919elections.Noraretheycorrelatedwiththe subsequenterectionofnationalistsymbols,suchaswarmemorials.Wethenusedthissourceofvariationtoisolatethegrowthin localsupportforfascistsinresponsetothisperceivedthreatof socialism.
33. OnlineAppendix TableA22showsthattheresultsareonceagainvery similarwhenweusetheindexcombiningallfourmeasuresoffascistsupport, ratherthanthe1924voteshare.
THEQUARTERLYJOURNALOFECONOMICS Wefurtherreinforcedthisinterpretationbyprovidingvariouspiecesofevidenceinsupportofourproposedmechanism.We alsoshowedthattheeffectsarelargerinmunicipalitieswhere businessorlandowninginterestswereorganizedandsupported thefascistcause.
Ouranalysissuggeststwotentativelessonsaboutthecurrent right-wingpopulistmovementsfromthisepisodeinItaly.Thefirst turnsontheroleofaspecificperceivedthreat(inthisinstance, theredscare)thatconvincedtheelitestosupportfascistsandthe middleclassestovoteandsometimesjointhemasacounterweight tosocialists,especiallywhentraditionalpartiesappearednotup tothetask.Thesecondrelatedlesson,however,suggeststhatin manywaysItalianfascism,justlikeNazisminGermany,may havebeenuniquetothepost-WorldWarIera,inwhichsociety andpoliticshadbecomemilitarizedandthethreatofasocialist/communistrevolutionappearedrealtomany.Ifso,therecent surgeinthepopularityofright-wingpopulistpartiesisunlikely toturnintoclassicfascism.Nevertheless,inlinewiththefirst lesson,someotherperceivedthreats,suchasdisruptivecultural changeorimmigration,couldemboldenfar-rightpoliticalmovementswhilebroadeningtheirappeal(SkocpolandWilliamson 2016).Itisthereforeimportanttoinvestigatethisissueinfuture work,forexample,byexploringwhetherlocalsupportforextreme right-wingmovementsincreaseswhentherearemorefundamentalthreatstoexistingsocialarrangementsorgreatereconomic hardshipasinthepost-WorldWarIera.
MIT,UNITED STATES
UNIVERSITYOF LEICESTER,UNITED KINGDOM
FREE UNIVERSITYOF BOZEN,ITALY UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA,SPAIN
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL AnOnlineAppendixforthisarticlecanbefoundatthe QuarterlyJournalofEconomics online.
DATA AVAILABILITY Dataandcodereplicatingthetablesandfiguresinthisarticle canbefoundin Acemogluetal.(2021) intheHarvardDataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CLJTSC.
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