War Propaganda by demandside

WarPropaganda

StaceyScriver, SchoolofPoliticalScienceandSociology,NUIGalway,Galway,Ireland

2015ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.

Abstract

Thisarticleexaminesthedevelopmentoftheoriesofwarpropagandainthetwentiethandtwenty-ﬁrstcenturies.Beginning withearlytheoristsofwarpropagandathearticleassessesthedevelopmentofa ‘scienceofpropaganda’ followingWorldWar I,beforeconsideringmorerecentworksonwarpropagandathatfocusparticularlyontheroleofinformalsources,suchasthe media.Finally,thearticlebrieﬂyassessestheroleofpropagandaduringthe1991GulfWar.

Whiletheuseofpropagandainsituationsofwarandconflictis neithernewnornovel,thesystematicdevelopmentofpropagandaasanaspectofwarmachineryhasbeenadevelopment ofthetwentiethcentury.WorldWarI(WWI)broughtwithit theneedtocoordinatesupportforwaracrosslargeexpanses ofterritory,tobolsterthemoraleoftroops,andtoweaken theresolveoftheenemy.Statesonbothsidesoftheconflict thusinvestedintheproductionofpropagandaonalargescale. SincetheWWI,warpropagandahasbecomeincreasingly complex,drawingfrom fieldsincludingmarketing,publicrelations,socialpsychology,andpoliticaltheory,andintegrating lessonslearnedfrompreviouswarcampaignsandscholarship onpropaganda.Muchofthesedevelopmentscanbeidentified inGulfWarpropaganda.Thisarticleexaminestheevolutionof knowledgeonwarpropagandathroughthetheoriesofwar propagandathatdevelopedduringthetwentieth-century WorldWars,andthelaterdevelopmentsinpropaganda researchthatfocusedoninformalsourcesofpropaganda, suchasthemassmedia.Finally,thisarticlewillbrieflylook attheroleofpropagandaduringtheGulfWar.

PropagandaandWWI:DevelopingaScience ofPropaganda

Propagandaisanotoriouslydifficulttermtodefine.Ithasbeen variouslyunderstoodas ‘adirectattackagainstman’ (Ellul, 1965),asthe ‘systematicmistreatmentoftruthandinformationandtheirproceduralsafeguards’ (Cunningham,2002), ‘ a meretool’ (Lasswell,1937)and ‘apracticalprocessofpersuasion’ (Taylor,1992).Nevertheless,alldefinitionsofpropagandashareacommonunderstandinginrelationtothe purposeofpropaganda – todirectpublicsympathiesandattitudes.Whiletheuseofpropagandainthissensecanbe observedinmostaspectsofsociallife,frompoliticstopublic healthcampaigns,itsusewithinwartimecontextsrequires specialexamination.Asalldemocraticstatesrequire,atleast, theappearanceofpublicconsenttoengageinconflict,propagandaservesanessentialpurposeduringwar:itmaybe employedtogathersupportforentryintowar,tomaintain supportforanon-goingwar,tojustifyorlegitimizecertain actionsduringwar,todirectpublicsympathiestowardsome foreigngroupsorawayfromothers,todisheartenenemy forces,encourageuprisingagainsttheenemygovernmentor military,ortodevelopsympathyamongtheenemynation fortheinvadingnation,priortoinvasion.Theimportanceof

propagandatowarissuchthatithasbeenarguedthatthe battleforpublicopinionisasimportantduringawarasthe engagementofsoldiersonthefront(Hiebert,2003:p.243).

ToolsandTechniquesofPropagandaduringtheGreatWar Propagandamayconsistofrhetoric,images,music,national holidays,andothersigni ficantculturalsymbolswhicharepresentedwiththeintentionofdirectingpublicopinion.Theuse ofsuchtechniquesandtoolsinsituationsofwarandviolent conflictarenotnew;rather,theyhavebeenidentifiedinuse sinceantiquity(Taylor,2003[1990])andarelikelytohave beeninusesincethebeginningoforganizedwarfare.However, asystematicstudyoftechniquesfordirectingpublicopinionin contextsofwardidnotdevelopfullyuntilthebeginningofthe twentiethcentury.WWI,andtheneedtosecurepublicsupport forthewaronallsides,ledtothedevelopmentofmodernwar propagandathatborrowedtechniquesfromthe fieldsof marketingandpublicrelations(Kingsbury,2010).

EdwardBernaysnotedthatitwas “duringtheGreatWar, [that]theNationsrealisedthenecessityofsellingtheirnational aimsandpolicies” (Bernays,1942:p.6).Allsidesoftheconflict engagedinpropagandaasanintegralaspectofthewareffort andinstitutionalizedtheproductionofpropagandaingovernmentoffices,includingtheGermanCentralOfficeforForeign Services,theBritishWarPropagandaBoard(alsoknownas WellingtonHouse),andtheAmericanCommitteeonPublic Information(CPI).GermanandBritishpropagandatargeted theirownpopulationstoraisemoraleandsupportforthe warandtovilifytheenemy,andtargetedtheenemypopulation tounderminemoraleanddiscouragesupport.Airdropped pamphletsandradiobroadcastswerecommontoolsforthe disseminationoftheWWIpropagandacampaignsforBritain andGermanyalongwith film,children’sbooks,posters,and manyotherculturalproducts.However,bothcountriesalso targetedtheUSintheearlyyearsofthewarasapotential ally(MurphyandWhite,2007:p.17).Tothisextent,theUS acted,before1917,as “atheatreofof ficialpropagandacombat betweenBritainandGermany” (Messinger,1992:p.22).

UnlikeGermanandBritishwarpropagandathetargetpopulationfortheAmericanCPIwasprimarilyUScivilianswhohad shownreluctancetoenterthewar,althoughtheCPIalsodistributedpropagandamaterialsinneutralstatesandbehindenemy lines.Drawingknowledgefromthe ﬁeldsofpublicrelations andmarketing,theCPIdisseminatedmessagesthatweresimple, one-sided,andwhichportrayedtheenemyinahighlyprejudiced

fashion.Thesemessagesweredisseminatedviaawiderangeof materials,frompamphletsandbookstoeducationalmaterials, ﬁlms,andspeeches,includingtheFour-MinuteMenaddresses inwhichindividualsdeliveredprowar/anti-Germanfour-minute speechesatpublicgatherings.Althougheffectiveinachievingthe supportfromtheAmericanpopulaceforinvolvementinthewar, thesetechniquesalsohada ‘darkside’– Germanswerelargely viliﬁed.Foreshadowinglaterwars,particularlytheWaronTerror wherepatriotismturnedFrenchfriesintoAmericanfries,sauerkrautbecameknownaslibertycabbage,andGermanAmericansexperiencedphysicalattacksanddiscrimination (MurphyandWhite,2007:pp.19,20).

WWIbroughttheimportanceofpropagandaasatoolof warfaretothefore;indeed,ithasbeendescribedas “abloody andrelentlessstruggleinwhichsustainingmoralebecamejust asessentialforbothsidesassustainingthemilitaryeffort” (Taylor,2003:p.176).FollowingWWIconsiderableinvestment wasmadetoimprovepropagandatechniques,buildingon lessonslearnedduringWWI.AlthoughWorldWarII(WWII) utilizedthesametoolsforpropagandadisseminationaswere usedinWWI,suchasairdroppedpamphlets,educationalmaterialsandradiobroadcasts,agreatersophisticationinthedirectingofpublicopinionwasevident. ‘Blackoperations’ wereused, forinstancewheresourcesofinformationwereobscuredin ordertomanipulateperceptionsofeventsornewsstories. DuringWWII,radioprogramswerebroadcastbyBritishpropagandistswhoposedasGermanofﬁcersinordertospreadfalse informationorinformationtoturnthepopulaceagainstHitler’ s regime(Seeforinstance,SeftonDelmer’saccountoftheBritish blackpropagandaradiocampaign, ‘BlackBoomerang’ , 1962). Further,theuseofcensorshipbecameincreasinglyimportant incontrollingthe ﬂowofinformationtothemassmedia,while maintainingtheappearanceofanindependentpress.For instance,inBritainallcommercialcableswereroutedtoasingle pointwherenewswascensoredbeforebeingreleasedtojournalistsandeditors,whowerethenfreetopresentandcommenton theprecensorednewsastheywished(Taylor,2003:p.213).

TheoriesofWarPropaganda

Inacademiccircles,WWIinitiatedaninterestintheroleof propagandainwarandscholarsbeganpublishinganalysis ofWWIpropagandathususheringinthedevelopmentof a ‘science’ ofpropaganda.Publicopinionspecialistandpolitical advisor,WalterLippmanncontributedtotheunderstandingof propagandaapsychologicalapproachwhichrecognizedthe connectionbetweenperception,ideas,andactions (Lippmann,1998[1922]:pp.29,30).Hewrites, “thosepictures [inone’shead]whichareacteduponbygroupsofpeople,orby individualsactinginthenameofgroups,arePublicOpinion withcapitalletters” (Lippmann,1998[1922]).Lippmann furtherarguedthatthepresscouldnot,andshouldnot,be reliedupontodeliverthenewsobjectively,rather,herecommendedthatthepressbedirectedbyexpertswhoserolewas toorganizepublicopinionforthepress(1998[1922]:p.30). Althoughcriticizedatthetimeforbeingtooinstrumentalist, Lippmann’sideaswerehighlyinﬂuential;EllulandHerman andChomsky,forinstance,builtonhisideasregardingthe massmedia,althoughlargelyrejectedthebeneﬁtsperceived byLippmannofeliteor ‘expert’ interactionwiththepress.

Oftheearlyworksbyauthorsincluding Bernays(1942), Lippmann(1922),and Bruntz(1938),Lasswell’ s Propaganda TechniqueintheWorldWar (1927a)wasamongthemostinfluential.Lasswell,buildingonLippmann’spsychological approach,putforwardavalue-freeconceptionofpropaganda asthe “managementofcollectiveattitudesbythemanipulation ofsigni ficantsymbols” (Lasswell,1927b:p.627).Lasswell’ s understandingofpropagandaissignificantforseveralreasons; first,heidentifiesthatpropagandafunctionsthroughtheorganizationofculturallysigni ficantsymbolsincludingmusic,the national flag,artwork,andwords,inordertoorganizepublic attitudes(Lasswell,1927b:p.629).Secondly,Lasswellrecognizedtheimportanceofthepropagandistwithinsituationsof conflictandwar.Indeed,Lasswellwrotethat “theproblemof thepropagandististointensifytheattitudesfavorabletohis purpose,toreversetheattitudeshostiletoit,andtoattract theindifferent,or,attheworst,topreventthemfromassuming ahostilebent” (Lasswell,1927b:p.629).Thirdly,Lasswell understoodpropagandatobedeliberateandintentional. Lasswell’sconceptualizationofthefunctionofpropagandain warhadmuchincommonwiththatofhiscontemporaries fromtheworldsofpublicrelationsandmarketing;forinstance, Bernaysarguedthatpropagandainvolvestheprimarily elements:toheighten “themorale-unityofyourowncountry, weakenthemoraleofyourenemyandwinoverthemorale oftheneutrals” (1942:p.237).

Lasswell’sanalysisofWWIpropagandaledhimtoargue thattherearesixsigni ﬁcantfactorsevidentinsuccessfulwar propaganda:

1.onemustfastenguilttotheenemyforcreatingthecontexts ofwar;

2.onemustclaimaunityofthepeoplethroughclaimsto commonhistoryandfavorbyGodandproclaimtheinevitabilityofvictory;

3.waraimsmustbeclearlystatedthatappealtoculturally heldideals,suchasfreedom,peace,orsecurity;

4.disseminatingexamplesoftheenemy’sdepravityserves tostrengthenthebeliefthattheenemyisresponsiblefor thewar;

5.unfavorablenewsshouldbecastasenemyliesinorderto preventdisunityanddefeatism;

6.horrorstoriesthatcasttheenemyinpoorlightshouldbe told,dehumanizingtheenemyandthusjustifyingviolent action(in Bernays,1942:p.236).

Thesefactors,inoneformoranother,haveformedthebasis ofmostsubsequentanalysisofthecontentofpropaganda messages.

Germanscholarsalsocontributedtotheunderstandingof propaganda.Forinstance,Hadamovsky,wholaterbecame ChiefofStaffoftheNaziParty’sCentralPropagandaOfﬁce, wrote PropagandaandNationalPower (1933).Buildingonthe workofLasswellandothers,hecontributedarecognitionof thepotentialofridiculeas,heargued, “tolaughattheenemy isasimportantastofearhisstrength” (Hadamovsky,1933) andtheimportanceofthepoliticalsphere,themilitary andpublicopinionbeingpresentedasauni ﬁedwill (Hadamovsky,1933).Thus,hewrites “thosewhodirect awarmustatthesametimedirectpoliticsandpublicopinion” (Hadamovsky,1933).

CritiquingandDetectingPropaganda:TheSeven DevicesofPropaganda

ThesuccessofAmericanandBritishpropagandaduringWWI broughtwithitafearofbeingmanipulatedbypropaganda. Propagandabecamelargelyassociatedwith ‘theenemy’ as opposedtoanexpectationofobjectivereportingandinformationdisseminationfromone’sowncountry.IntheUS,interest grewamongthepublicindevelopingskillstodetectenemy propaganda.TheInstituteofPropagandaAnalysis(IPA)publishedaframeworkfortheanalysisofpropagandain1937. Theframeworklaidoutthefollowingsevencommonpropagandadevices(from Sproule,2001):

1. Name-calling – attachesnegativeassociationsthroughthe useofpejorativewordsandlabels “tothoseindividuals, groups,nations,races,policies,practices,beliefs,andideals whichhewouldhaveuscondemnandreject.”

2. Glitteringgeneralities –“virtuewords” suchas “truth, freedom,honor,liberty,socialjustice,publicservice,the righttowork,loyalty,progress,democracy,theAmerican way,Constitutiondefender” areusedtoassociatethe propagandists’ viewpointwithattitudesandideasthatare positivelyperceived.

3. Transfer –“thepropagandistcarriesovertheauthority, sanction,andprestigeofsomethingwerespectandrevereto somethinghewouldhaveusaccept.” Sproulenotesthat “effortstoestablishidentiﬁcationbetweenapolitical projectandtheaudience’sreverencefornationalorreligious symbolism” werecommonformsoftransfer(2001:p.136).

4. Testimonial – linksthepropagandists’ positiontosome speciﬁc,favoredpersonorinstitution,therebyassociating theirprogramorideaswiththepositiveassociationsalready establishedwiththepersonorinstitution.

5. Plainfolk – AsSprouleexplains, “Persuadersandleaders presentthemselvesas ‘justplainfolks’ toestablishan identitywithordinaryAmericans” (Sproule,2001).

6. Cardstacking – overemphasisandunderemphasisareused todrawattentiontosome ‘truths’ anddistractfromothers, inordertodirectpublicopinioninsuchaway “thatthe audienceforgetsinconvenientinformationandembraces halftruths” (Sproule,2001).

7. Bandwagon – Thepropagandistpresentsinformationsothat itappearstobealreadyacceptedandthustohavepeople “followthecrowd,” because “everybody’sdoingit” (Sproule,2001).

AlthoughcriticizedfollowingWWIIasbeingoverly simplisticandaddinglittletoLasswell’sanalysis(Sproule, 2007:p.131),theframeworkhasmadealastingimpression throughitsdigestiblerhetoricandeasyapplicationtopropagandacontent,andhasbeenreinvigoratedmorerecently throughanalysisoftheGulfWarandtheWaronTerror.

PropagandaintheNewWorldOrder:TheGrowing SigniﬁcanceofInformalSourcesofPropaganda

AsintheWorldWars,propagandawasanessentialtoolofthe ColdWar.WhileSovietpropagandaremainedprimarily aproductoftheState,theU.S.publicdemonstratedlittle

tolerancefordirectstate-issuedpropaganda.Indirectcontrol orcovertcontrolofinformationthusbecameanincreasingly importantaspectofpropagandaintheUS.Televisionnews programswereparticularlyimportanttoolsforpropaganda duringtheColdWar,withthestatetightlycontrollingthe ﬂowofinformationwhichwasreportedbyostensiblyindependentnewsprograms(Bernhard,1999:pp.4–6).

Sincethe1970sscholarlyinterestinwarpropagandahas focusedincreasinglyontheroleofthenewsmediaandcapacity fornewscorporationsandjournaliststodeliverinformation independentfromtheinterestsofthestate(Jowettand O’Donnell,1992).Whileanumberofauthorshavestudied theroleofthemediainthedisseminationofpropaganda duringperiodsofwarandconﬂict,including Ellul(1965), GaltungandVincent(1992), JowettandO’Donnell(1992), and Schecter(2003),thePropagandaModeldevelopedby EdwardHermanandNoamChomsky(1988) presentsthe mostsigniﬁcantdevelopmentintheanalysisofthemedia’ s roleinwarpropagandaindemocraticstates.

ThePropagandaModel

WrittenduringtheColdWar,thePropagandaModeldevelopedby HermanandChomsky(1988) examinesnewsmedia behaviorinrelationtostateinterests,callingintoquestion thenotionofthemediaasa ‘fourthestate’ taskedwithholding governmentpowersincheck(KlaehnandMullen,2010:p.12) andisapplicabletostatesinwhichthenewsmediaisunder corporateratherthanstatecontrol.Rather,HermanandChomskyarguethatthemediaoftenreflectstheinterestsofthe economicandpoliticalelite,although “itismuchmoredifficulttoseeapropagandasystematworkwherethemediaare privateandformalcensorshipisabsent” (1988:p.1).The PropagandaModelsetsoutaseriesof five ‘filters’ whichthey argueacttocleansethenewsofdissentingviews,attitudes, andinformationviamoneyandpower.The filtersare

1.thesize,concentratedownership,ownerwealth,andpro ﬁt orientationofthedominantmass-media ﬁrms;

2.advertisingastheprimaryincomesourceofthemassmedia; 3.therelianceofthemediaoninformationprovidedby government,business,and ‘experts’ fundedandapproved bytheseprimarysourcesandagentsofpower;

4. ‘ﬂak’ (i.e.,negativeresponses)asameansofdiscipliningthe media;and

5. ‘anticommunism’ asanationalreligionandcontrolmechanism.(Itisreasonabletonowarguethatanticommunism hasbeenreplacedbyanti-Islamismasacontrolmechanism (see,forinstance, Brown,2008)).

Thus,inthecontextoftheColdWar,HermanandChomsky arguethat “theseelementsinteractwithandreinforceone another.Therawmaterialofnewsmustpassthroughsuccessive filters,leavingonlythecleansedresidue fittoprint.They fixthe premisesofdiscourseandinterpretation,andthedefinitionof whatisnewsworthyinthe firstplace,andtheyexplainthebasis andoperationsofwhatamounttopropagandacampaigns” (1988:p.2).HermanandChomsky’smodelimportantly contributestotheunderstandingofwarpropagandaamethod foranalyzinghowanapparentlyindependentmassmediaacts toreproducetheinterestsofthestateandeconomicelites.In

termsofwarpropagandathisisparticularlysignificantasit helpstoexplainhowsupportforwarcanbecreatedandmaintainedbythestate,throughan ‘independent’ massmedia.As willshortlybeexamined,the firstGulfWarpresentsoneof themostsignificantexamplesofthemassmedia’srolein disseminatingprowarpropaganda.

PropagandaandtheGulfWar

Asthisarticlehasargued,theWorldWarsestablishedthe contextsfortheuseofpropagandaonamassivescaletogarner supportforwarandtodemoralizetheenemy.Italsocreated thecontextsthroughwhichsuccessfulandunsuccessfulpropagandacouldbestudiedleadingtoscholarshiponwarpropagandathatdrewfromtheWorldWarexperiencesand incorporatedknowledgefromdiverse fields,includingpublic relations,marketing,andpoliticalscience.Thisworkhas producedacompendiumoffactorsevidentinwarpropaganda. Acrossthevariouslistingsoffactors,devices,andelements, thereareseveralcommonaspectsidentifiableincluding:the needtoestablishaclearenemy,topresentwarasajustcause, toattachsentimentsfavorabletothewarefforttopositively perceivedattitudessuchaspatriotismorliberty,andtoreach theenemywithinformationthatwillacttonegateattitudes ofresistanceandswaythegeneralenemypopulacetoward viewsfavorabletotheirenemy(seeforinstance, Bernays, 1942; Sproule,2007). HermanandChomsky(1988) further provideamethodforunderstandinghowpowerandwealth creates filtersthroughwhichnewsiscleansedofinformation thatmaygocountereliteinterests.Thesetoolsprovidethe potentialtobetterunderstandthefunctionandformofwar propaganda.Inthefollowingsection,Americanpropaganda duringtheGulfWar,disseminatedbyboththestateandthe newsmedia,willbeconsideredasitrelatestotheabovefactors.

EstablishingtheEnemy/AttachingGuilt

HaroldLasswellarguedthatwarpropagandamust,inthe ﬁrst instance,attachguilttoanenemyasanessentialfactorin directingpublicopiniontowardprowarsentiments(1927a). Hadamovskyaddedthatridiculewasasimportantasfearin portrayingtheenemyinapoorlight(1933)whiletheIPA notedtheroleof ‘name-calling’ inwarpropaganda(Sproule, 2001:p.136).Intheleadupto,andduring,theGulfWarSaddamHusseinbecamethetargetofridicule,name-calling,and blameforthewar;indeed,SaddamHusseinbecameperhaps themostvividsymboloftheGulfWar.

From2August1990,thedayIraqinvadedKuwait, numerousarticlesdescribingHussein,hispast,hischaracter, evenhisphysicalappearanceappearedinnewspapersinAmerica.AbriefscanoftheNewYorkTimesbetween3and5August revealsHusseinasa ‘megalomaniac’ (Sick,1990:p.1), ‘ paranoid,’‘amadbull,’‘coldlycalculating,’ and ‘ruthless’ (Lewis, 1990:p.1)andcomparisonswithHitlerandtheBlitzkrieg abounded.InPresidentBush’sAddressontheInvasionof Kuwait(1990b),hedrawsaconnectionbetweenAmerica’ s roleindefendingKuwaitagainstHussein’saggressionand America’sroleindefendingEuropeagainstHitler,stating, “As wasthecaseinthe1930’s,weseeinSaddamHusseinan

aggressivedictatorthreateninghisneighbors.” Thedepictions ofHusseinthatcenteredoninsanityandaggressiveirrationality wereimportantnotonlyincreatinganegativeperceptionof HusseinbutalsoincementingsupportforBush’spositionas awartimeleader.BushfurtheridentiﬁesSaddamHussein andhisactionsasthecauseofthewar.HeclaimsthatHussein had ‘promised’ nottoinvadeKuwait(Bush,1990b).Inthis way,Bush’sspeechputstheguiltforstartingthewarsquarely ontheshouldersofSaddamHusseinandthuslargelyabsolving theAmericanpopulaceofanysuchguilt.

However,asHadamovskynoted,ridiculeisalsoanimportantdeviceofwarpropaganda.Thiswasalsomobilizedduring theGulfWarinrelationtoHusseinwhofeaturedheavilyin cartoons,comedysketchessuchasSaturdayNightLive,even popular ﬁlms,like1991’sHotShots!featuringafeminized Husseinloungingbesidehispoolwithacocktail,andinpoliticalspeechesandnewspaperarticles.Suchacharacterizationof theleadercontributedtowardthedehumanizationofHussein andultimatelytotherallyingofsupportfortheGulfWar (Conners,1998:p.96).ThenegativeportrayalofHussein wassosuccessfulthatonecommentatordescribedHusseinas “GeorgeBush’ssecretweaponinbringingaboutthewar” (Mueller,1993:p.203).

JustCauseforWar

Atrocitystoriesareacommonfeatureofwarpropaganda.Such storieshelptodehumanizetheenemy,linkingthemwithacts andattitudesthatareunimaginabletotheaudience.This createstheconditionsinwhichindividualsaremorelikelyto supportenteringinto,ormaintaining,awar.Imagesofpast atrocitiesbegantosurfaceinnewspapersafterIraq’sinvasion ofKuwait,includingpicturesofKurdishchildrenslaughtered withnervegas.Newsagenciesdisseminatingtheseimages neglectedtomentionthatitscomponentpartsmayhave beenpurchasedthroughagriculturalgrantsfromtheU.S.and thatthehelicoptersusedtospraythegaswereAmericanmadeandpurchased,orthatPresidentReaganblockedthe passingofabillthatwouldhavepunishedsimilarattacksby cuttingIraqofffromU.S.loans,militaryandnonmilitaryassistance,credits,creditguarantees,anditemssubjecttoexport controls(HurdandRangwala,2001:p.1),demonstratingan instanceofwhatSproulecalls ‘card-stacking’ (Sproule,2001: p.136).OneparticularlyinﬂammatorystoryaboutIraqi soldierspullinginfantsoutofincubatorsinahospitalin Kuwaitandthrowingthemonthegroundtodieelicited hugepublicoutrageandwasusednolessthansixtimesin asinglemonthbyGeorgeH.W.BushtopointoutSaddam’ s ruthlessanddespicablenature,beforethestorywasexposed asalie.Nevertheless,thestorywassuccessfulpropaganda:it hasbeencreditedwithswayingpublicopiniontowardsupport ofthewar(Cohen,1992:p.1).

PositiveAssociations

On11September1990,Bushaddressedajointsessionof congress.Hestatedintheopeningparagraphofhisspeech that “followingnegotiationsandpromisesbyIraq’sdictator SaddamHusseinnottouseforce,apowerfulIraqiarmy invadeditstrustingandmuchweakerneighbourKuwait”

(Bush,1990a:p.1).Therepresentationofa ‘rich’ and ‘ powerful’ Iraqinvadinga ‘smaller’ and ‘peaceful’ Kuwait(Bush, 1990b)wasusedtocreatethesemblanceofajustwarinwhich Americawasdefendingtheweak,thusassociatingthewarwith positivenotionsofhonor,liberty,andfreedom.InBush’s11 September1990speechhepraisedtheservicemeninthe Gulf,describingthemasbrave,well-trained,anddedicated andstates, “iftherewaseveratimetoputcountrybeforeself andpatriotismbeforeparty,thetimeisnow” (Bush,1990b: p.2).Thisstatementconflatespatriotismwithsupportforthe waranddissentwithselfishness.HegoesontostatethatAmericawasdefending “civilizedvaluesaroundtheworld” (Bush, 1990b),invokingthefamiliarconceptofAmerica’sgrandrole asacivilizationalforceandthusitsdutytodefend ‘civilization’ whenunderthreat.Indeed,asAllenetal.’sstudyofmedia framingintheGulfWarindicates,mediacoveragegaveprimary emphasistothemesthatconflatedpatriotism,militarism,and nationalism(1994:p.272).Bush’sstatementsalsoreassured askepticalpopulationthatthewarwasright,just,andmoral. Thecommonuseoftermssuchaspatriotism,civilization, liberty,freedom,andhonorare,indeed, ‘glitteringgeneralities’ asdescribedbytheIPA(Sproule,2001:p.136)whichbring withthempositiveassociationsthathelptoobscurethe complexandoftendistressingfactsofthewarandattachpositivesentimenttothepositionofthespeaker.Inthisway,the useofpositivetermsinassociationwiththeprowarposition wasaneffectivetechniqueofGulfWarpropaganda.

DemoralizingtheEnemy

Afurtheressentialaspectofwarpropaganda,accordingto Bernays(1942:p.237),isthedemoralizationoftheenemy. AmericanGulfWarpropagandadidnotshyfromengagingin thisaspectofpropaganda.Effortstodemoralizetheenemy duringtheGulfWarincludedthedroppingofleaﬂetsthat resembledIraqiDinarbutprintedwiththetitleof ‘Safe ConductPass’ informingtherecipientthatthey ‘donothave todie’ iftheyliedowntheirweaponsandceaseresistance. Radiobroadcasts,megaphoneannouncements,andpamphlets werealsousedtodemoralizetheIraqiarmyandcivilianpopulaceandquellresistance.TheeffectivenessoftheU.S.campaign todemoralizetheIraqi ‘ enemy ’ wasdescribedbyoneU.S. Colonelasfollows:

PSYOP[psychologicaloperations]messagespersuadedapproximately44percentoftheIraqiarmytodesert,morethan17,000to defect,andmorethan87,000tosurrender radiobroadcastsand leaﬂets,helpedcausethedefection,desertionandsurrenderofsome 40,000Iraqis allwithout ﬁringashot.

Jones,1994:p.22

TheRoleoftheNewsMediainGulfWarPropaganda

TheGulfWarpresentsanexceptionalopportunitytoexamine theroleofthenewsmediaindisseminatingstatepropaganda. Becauseofthenatureofthiswarthatwaslargelyfoughtinthe airandbecauseofmilitaryregulations,thepressdependedon militarybrieﬁngstogaininformation(Jacobs,1992)andnews wasthus ﬁlteredpriortoreceiptbynews-stations,similartothe experienceofthenewsmediainBritainduringWWII.This

limitedthepress’ abilitytoengagedirectlywiththewar,but leftthemtorelatetheappearanceofthewartoanaudience athome.However,theimportanceofappearanceintheGulf Warwasnotlimitedtoreportingonthewaritself;securing thepublicapprovalfortheGulfWaralsodependedheavily onthe appearance ofapprovalathome.

DespitemassiveantiwarprotestsandevenpollsthatsuggestedthatapluralityofAmericansactuallysupportedthe notionofallowingIraqtoretainaportionofKuwaitin exchangeforpeace(Mueller,1993:p.203),themedia continuedtoinsistthatthemajorityofAmericanssupported militaryinterventioninKuwait.Protestsreceivedlittleairtimeandwhenprotesterswereshown,wereportrayedas “untrustworthy,dishevelled,non-conforming ‘others’” (Allen etal.,1994:p.273).Infact,ofthe2855minutesoftelevision coverageoftheGulfcrisisbetween8August1990,and3 January1991,only29minutesor1%coveredpopularopposition(Allenetall.,1994:p.257).Themediasuppressionof dissenthelpedconsolidateaviewofunitywithinthenation, suchthata ‘uniﬁedwill’ waspresented,conformingtothe adviceforsuccessfulpropagandaby Hadamovsky(1933) and Lasswell(1927a) andthenotionofthe ‘bandwagon’ bytheIPA.ThistheorylargelycompareswithNoelle-Neumann ’sSpiralofSilence(1984)hypothesiswhichargues thatindividualswillself-censorviewsthattheyperceiveas unpopularsoastoavoidsocialretributionandisolation resultinginaspiralofsilence.

Themedia,inpresentingtheGulfWarasonethatreceived tremendousapproval(Kellner,1992:p.1),appearstohave playedasigni ﬁcantroleinactuallysecuringthisapproval throughabandwagonorunitedwilleffect.Althoughthe publicwasinitiallydisinclinedtoengageinwar,on16January 1990,pollsdemonstrateasuddenshifttowardsupportfor militaryaction(Allenetal.,1994:p.255).InreviewingPaletz analysisofthemediaintheGulfWarthroughthelensofthe PropagandaModel,HerringandRobinsonidentifywherethe Propagandamodelcanbeimplicitlyidentiﬁed,shownby HerringandRobertsonbelowinsquareparenthesis:

Insufficientdedicationtothefreedomofthepress,fearofprovoking governmentaloutrage[the flak filterofthepropagandamodel], sharedframesofreferencewithgoverningelites[theideological filter ofthepropagandamodel],andthepursuitofsalesandratings[the advertising filterofthepropagandamodel]areamongthefactors thatcanhelpexplaintheacquiescencetogovernmentcurbs,no matterhowreluctant,ofmediaexecutives.

HerringandRobinson,2003:p.560

Inthisanalysis,themediathusappearsasatoolofpropaganda.Throughtheexpectationofindependence,thepublic largelyaccordsthemassmediaaspecialstatusas ‘testimonial,’ thuspermittingthedisseminationofinformationasneutral. However,asinformationpassesthroughvarious filters,the stateandcorporateelites(oftenaligned)stripthenewsofinformationharmfultotheirposition.Nevertheless,throughreferencetotheirspecialstatus,themediadisseminationof selectedinformationwhichreflectseliteinterests,actstocreate theappearanceofauni fiedwillwhichthepublicwillfallinline with.Incontextsofwarandconflict,thenewsmediaisthereforeanimportantsourceofpropaganda,withthecapacity,as

describedinrelationtotheGulfWar,todirectpublicopinion inasigniﬁcantways.

ThePotentialofWarPropaganda

Thisarticlehasprovidedabriefexaminationofaselectionof themostinfluentialscholarsofwarpropagandainthetwentiethandtwenty-firstcenturies.Warpropagandaisboth acontributor,andaresponse,towarandconflictandscholarshiponwarpropagandademonstratesboththeseimpulses:it hasattemptedtoadvancethesuccessandpossibilitiesof propagandatosupportwareffortsandtoestablishthemeans torecognizeandcounterpropaganda.Whiletheearlytwentieth-centurytheoristsofwarpropagandaanalyzedtheform andfunctionofpropagandacommonlyperceivingitas aneutraltooltobeusedtodirectpublicopinion,propaganda tookonanincreasinglynegativeimagefollowingWWIand analysisbegantofocusratheratdefendingagainstordecipheringpropaganda.Mostrecently,thebehaviorofthemassmedia andnon-statesourcesofwarpropagandahavebeenthefocus ofscholarlyinquiry.Thegrowthofsocialmediaasatoolfor thedisseminationofwarpropagandawillnodoubtspawn newtheoriesandmodelsamongscholarsofpropaganda. Nevertheless,whatissharedbytheapproachestothestudy ofwarpropagandaistherecognitionthatpropagandais asigni ficantaspect,andtool,ofwar.

Seealso: MilitarySociology;Securitization;ViolenceandMedia; War,Sociologyof.

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