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CONTENTS
09
RUSSIAN VICTIM? REPOSITIONING STRATEGIES AND REGIONAL DREAMS OF DOMINANCE RUSSIAN NEMESIS? COLD WAR PATHOLOGIES AND ANALYTICAL AFFLICTIONS “PYRRHIC SOVEREIGNTY” THE TREASURE OF THE TENGIZ KEEPING IT REAL ALMATY 2022 LEARN, EXPLORE, SHARE MULTICULTURALISM AS LIFESTYLE IN AZERBAIJAN
THE CASPIAN PROJECT A WEEKLY EDITION FROM THE MODERN DIPLOMACY
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PROJECT TEAM DiMiTRis GiAnnAkOPOulOs DR. MATThEw CROssTOn PETRA POsEGA TEJA PAlkO luisA MOnTEiRO ninA lAvREnTEvA GAbRiElA PAsChOlATi DO AMARAl bRiAn huGhEs TAylOR MORsE JEAnETTE JJ hARPER DiAnnE A. vAlDEz EvAn ThOMsEn
RUssian Victim?
Repositioning stRategies and Regional dReams of dominance
as a new wave of non-western countries strive to elevate their profiles and expand their global influence, Russia is taking steps to help secure its future as their leader.
Jeanette "JJ" Harper Jeanette "JJ" Harper is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.
The status-obsessed country has expressed its desire to integrate the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus into a new Moscow-centric coalition called the Eurasian Union. This alliance would help promote Russia to a greater position of authority in the areas of politics, energy, economic governance, and international security. However, Russia has some major hurdles ahead. In the year since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the official annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the country has experienced a serious downturn in terms of Western affection. While the move did, for the most part, improve Putin’s image in the eyes of the Russian people – who had begun to doubt the president’s ability to foster economic growth and prosperity – it clearly demonstrated the potential to lead to a complete breakdown of relations with its old rival, the United States. The U.S., whose sanctions have forced Russia’s economy to turn inwards, views Russia’s actions as aggressive and challenging.
These U.S.-imposed sanctions retribution for what it considers Russia’s stealth invasion of Ukraine – are concerning to the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus because Russia has expanded its control over their key industries (like energy, transport, and telecoms) and has helped keep them afloat economically during difficult times with generous economic cooperation and postponements of debt. Russia still has strong economic, security, and cultural ties with the former Soviet republics, which have significant ethnic Russian populations, host Russian military bases, and get most of their news and entertainment from Russian media providers, but the sanctions can seriously threaten the future of these relationships. As much as Russia longs to draw these countries into an even tighter embrace, they appear to be seriously rethinking this new reunion with Russia. Many are concerned with Russia’s growing role and its flailing economy, which was already slowing before the Ukraine crisis.
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UnfoRtUnatelY, tHe RealitY is tHat as RUssia continUes to diVoRce itself fRom tHe West it Will likelY call on its foRmeR soViet neigHboRs to cHoose tHeiR alliances These nations can’t help but be wary of the implications of a new union with Russia so relatively soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (in geopolitical terms, a single generation is not a long time.) Unfortunately, the reality is that as Russia continues to divorce itself from the West it will likely call on its former Soviet neighbors to choose their alliances. This at a time when the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus would most prefer maintaining multiple alliances with as many countries that want to cooperate with them. Since their bequeathed Post-Soviet independence, the ‘stan’ countries have been wedged between the two superpowers of Russia and China and have been in close proximity to the instability of Iran and Afghanistan. Making the best of this geographical arrangement, they have learned how to keep the region relatively stable by balancing the interests of the superior regional powers and considering the interests of the United States. Even though they are not particularly happy with the events within Ukraine, their desire to keep a delicate balance in the region (friends to all, neutral most often) is most likely the justification for not isolating Russia or publically criticizing Putin’s Ukrainian strategies.
And then there is the issue of Iran and its recent nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries. The Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and the Central Asian ‘stans’ may see the lifting of Iran’s sanctions as an opportunity for them to move away from Russian dependence. Iran is no longer off limits as a trade partner and a southern route through it would effectively change the dynamics of trade in the region, giving the smaller countries of the region more leverage at the bargaining table. This would make it at least plausibly easier to resist Russia’s growing sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia, who played an essential role in securing Iran’s deal, has every intention of benefiting from it by securing lucrative contracts for itself in Iran’s key sectors such as energy and shipping. Also, with the prestige and status as Iran’s main ally, it will most likely use it to improve its global position if not necessarily its international image. Iran stands to benefit from the relationship as well. Under sanctions, Iran’s underdeveloped sectors suffered and now they are free to build up. This means they will need foreign investment – a role Russia is only too happy to fill. The Kremlin has expressed its desire to peacefully cooperate with Iran in the development of Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program. But for many, this does not bode well. Eventually, the issue of Iran’s arms industry will come up again. In five years when the embargo is lifted per the deal, there will be fierce competition among countries that would sell arms to Iran. With Russia becoming increasingly at odds with the West, its emphatic support of and alliance with Iran – whose nuclear deal does not do much to improve its relationship with the United States per se – is highly suspicious and, in my opinion, goes beyond just helping it recover economically.
Because Iran has been clear about its intention to uphold its anti-American policies and has plans to continue providing its support to its allies in the region – who also have negative feelings toward the West – this union should be looked upon with at least some concern and apprehension. With Russia recently joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and taking action to integrate the Eurasian Economic Union with the Silk Road Economic Belt, there is no doubt that Russia is positioning itself to reemerge as the dominant figure in the nonWestern world. A figure that desperately desires to have the same kind of influence the United States has over its Western allies. But if this is what Russia really wants, it will have to change the way it relates to its smaller neighbors. Instead of projecting the image that it wants to “collect them,” perhaps it
should instead redirect its diplomatic energy to soothe them as real partners, equal and engaged. While international relations have never been Russia’s strong suit in the West – take its revoked G8 membership status as evidence – this doesn’t mean it isn’t capable. For example, it could start by improving its image by ceasing to present itself as a victim. It could, instead, start to take responsibility for its own misfortunes. It could stop referring to the break-up of the Soviet Union as a tragedy and can instead treat it as an opportunity to reinvent itself to become a vital part of the international community. The last thing the international community wants to see is Russia head down the road to total economic collapse but if the country continues to violate international norms, it will only further isolate itself - maybe even to the point of another Cold War with the West.
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rUssian neMesis? Cold War Pathologies and analytiCal affliCtions
there have been nuMerous artiCles on the authoritarian strengthening of power in Russia and Putin’s backsliding from democracy throughout the 2000s. Russian positions and initiatives in Syria, Iran, and Ukraine have been portrayed within media venues across the West as evidence of quasi-Soviet revanchism.
Dr. Matthew Crosston Senior Editor Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University
In the midst of this there has been very little consideration of the impact of American positioning on the Russian perspective. This article briefly examines that influence, whether it is the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush or the Republican Party in general, the socalled ‘reset’ interaction under Barack Obama, or American foreign policy analysts and academics meant to be experts on Russia. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security interests, but aims to contain Russia within a continued Cold War box that not only sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in important global security areas. The idea that Russia’s contemporary positions have not evolved beyond the residue of Cold War mentalities seems to be more a product of scholars and practitioners in the West rather than in the institutions of Russia itself.
This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis and whether the West is more responsible for this Cold War pathology than it is willing to admit. There are numerous think tanks, both in the United States and Russia, which are deeply concerned about the state of Russian-American relations. Places like the Moscow Carnegie Centre or the Brookings Institute in Washington DC are regular goto places for the media when seeking expert opinion and analysis. However, these centers have had a decided slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral relations to the Russians, with the explanations ranging from the fairly simple to the rather mystically esoteric. What the American media outlets and think tank personalities fail to recognize is how much of this judgment is coming not from explicitly observable behavior or direct quotes from Russian actors but is placed upon Russia by the so-called experts themselves as they push a decidedly one-sided interpretation.
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What rUssia UsUally finds so irksoMe is that When it does What everyone else does in terMs of exerCising global PoWer, it is JUdged as PsyChologiCally Unstable or defiCient What Russia usually finds so irksome is that when it does what everyone else does in terms of exercising global power, it is judged as psychologically unstable or deficient. In short, if the United States does not trust Russia, it is because of how Russia behaves on the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If Russia does not trust the United States, that is simply Russian posturing and a case of political transference, wanting to blame its own self-made problems on someone else so that it can avoid any accountability. The problem is how readily this is unquestioningly accepted and how few socalled Russian experts are willing to step forward and shine a light on such intellectual superficiality. Moving toward straight politics, while much hope was initially placed on the so-called Obama ‘reset’ in American relations with Russia in 2008, the reality is that enthusiasm quickly faded and subsequently placed the Democratic Party as squarely adversarial in its attitude toward Russia as the Republicans. Indeed, in today’s environment of divided government, having a problem with Russia seems to be one of the few happy consensus points in Washington.
The problem, of course, is how that consensus is built more upon partisan posturing: each side trying to one-up the other in order to earn foreign policy merit points. There are some voices that decry a picture being painted about Russia that combines inaccuracy with heightened rhetoric while purposely ignoring mitigating contexts and less negative observations. However, those voices are extremely rare and at the moment easily drowned out by the drumbeat of American derision. This perfectly matches what Stephen Cohen astutely characterized several years back as ‘Cold War Triumphalism.’ In basic terms, since Russia lost the Cold War it was and should be treated as a de facto defeated nation. This triumphalism has arguably never left American decision-making power given that the advent of this attitude began with President Bill Clinton and has lasted through three presidencies (two Democrat, one Republican), totaling six terms and 24 years. In other words, the American attitudinal perspective toward Russia has witnessed a literal generation passing where the United States has felt justified in selective cooperation, one-way bargaining, uneven playing fields and reluctance on its own part to bury the ghosts of the past because said ghosts give it a decided political advantage. In a sense, the debate is one of degree: there is no doubt Russia has accepted that the end of the Cold War signaled a decided shift in the balance of power. It did not, however, allow that change to mean Russia was now permanently relegated to the status of nation-state also-ran.
And quite frankly, too many voices in American institutions of power, both governmentally and academically, have taken that relegation as an unquestioned reality. As long as the two nations continue to engage each other with this attitudinal chasm, then the relationship will continue to be dogged by vast dierences of opinion and massively divergent interpretations. The opportunity to evolve American analysis on Russia has always been present but ultimately missed. This only makes other analyses that oer up platitudes about Russian mysticism seeking great power or the Russian bear needing to bare its claws or the innate inability of Russia to ever embrace democracy more troubling.
Even fine scholars and commentators have all produced work in the last two years that continue this trend and thus have further concretized a vision of U.S.-Russia relations that seems doomed to animus. The issue at hand seems to be that too many powerful decision-makers in the West feel lately as if they were a bit bamboozled and outplayed, especially with the situation in Ukraine. They felt, rightly or wrongly, as if they ended up with proverbial diplomatic egg on their faces and they did not like it. Even worse, it seemed they could not stand the possibility that this game of chicken ended with only one round (Crimea) and there would be no opportunity to regain the upper hand with future rounds.
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Thus, this situation cannot be just about Crimea. Russia must not be satisfied with this as the end game. There simply must be another chess piece to be moved. Because, well, just because: because Russians aren’t supposed to be diplomatically agile and astute. And they most certainly cannot be strategically deft and subtle. At least, not when they are compared to their counterparts in the West, who think Russians are rash; Russians are emotional; Russians are capricious; Russians are sneaky; and quite frankly, Russians are a bit daft. All of these things they can be because all of these things suit the players at the other end of the chess board. This is the danger of Cold War pathology: it starts to warp observation so that it caters to the desired opinion outcome.
Conflicts are never clean. War has always been this way and it is unlikely that war will be something dierent any time soon. But Syria, Ukraine, and now Iran have been rather frustrating events for many in the West, and especially for those who feel that Russia and the United States line up better as allies and not adversaries. The United States has not been able to come up with something innovative or progressive that might create a new thought process to stop the Cold War pathology with which it is aicted. Faced by this political impotence, the players in the West seem to have fallen back on the tried-andtrue tactic of conjuring a bogeyman. Clearly, that bogeyman is Russia. Alas, it is also somewhat lame because this tactic is not about stopping war or creating new dialogue or fostering true engagement, but rather just about assigning blame. It is about treading down old paths well-worn with miscommunication and purposeful animosity. It is an AFFLICTION, not an ANALYSIS.
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“PYRRHIC SOvEREIgNTY” THE TREASURE Of THE TENgIz
hisTory doEs noT rEpEaT iTsElf, but it often rhymes - or so goes the adage. This is at play in the Caspian today as we witness the convergence of geo-political tension, energy market expansion, and price manipulation. The relatively high levels of regional cooperation between the US, Russia, Iran, and the Caspian nations rose from these factors two decades ago. Or, rather dialectically, rose from the phenomenological inability of most of the actors to engage in a zerosum game. As these factors converge today our attention should focus on the dialectical shift - are we entering a zero-sum game or a second verse to the recent history of market power cooperation? Evan ThomsEn Evan Thomsen is a graduate of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is currently a Master’s student at the worldrenown Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC.
The conditions of the market, and that of the actors in the Caspian, are similar today as they were in the mid to late 1990s. The US is readjusting its position in the market through overseas and domestic expansion; Russia is balancing the test of their geopolitical muscle with economic contraction; and Russia and Iran remain uneasy bedfellows in order to maintain their shared geostrategic interests against encroaching Western and Chinese competition and needs. Meanwhile, economic warfare is just the beginning as the global price drop and unsteady market fluctuations are likely to last well past the next decade.
The Tengiz oil field is at the center of this economic dance, both in the 90s and today. Chevron’s entrance into the Western portion of Kazakhstan did not come without regional backlash. This, among other similar US corporate ventures, pushed Russia and Iran into a strategic partnership and created Russian-led legal debates around drilling rights and Caspian Sea boundaries for the better part of the decade. Two factors were largely at play in Russia’s capitulation - its weak economy and a lack of a clear strategic purpose. In the late 90s it would have been easier to argue that this represented a victory for liberal institutionalism and an opportunity for cooperation between former foes. Today, I argue that the choice of cooperation was an illusion in that it was the only choice truly available.
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CASPIAN REgION HAS SEEN NO PARADIgM SHIfT IN WHAT COULD bE CALLED A PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP ONLY A CHANgE IN THE ROLE Of THE PATRON: THE gLObAL MARkET REPLACED RUSSIAN HEgEMONY Cooperation via necessity one can call it. It is not only individuals, but states, whose rationality is allowed to operate within the parameters of the market. Whether this was in actuality the plan then or in a post-hoc fashion the plan all along, Russia appears to have shored up for the zero-sum game. The Caspian is now caught between the forces of the free market and Russia’s privileged area of influence. This should appear ironic to many: free trade, open markets, and cooperation are intended to be self-actualizing, while increased dependence creates conditions for peace and stability. I am not optimistic enough to believe that this negation on the ground will result in its sublation. Rather, I contend that the traditional cycle will continue, whether through a rapprochement of temporary cooperation by market constraints or zero-sum contestation.
It is also important to remember that liberal institutionalism is far from being cemented in the Caspian region, nor is its free market economy a carbon copy of US export. It is at best a work in progress and at worst a possible perversion. In short, the peace-creating tides of open markets have fallen short of their ambitions. So too have many of the geostrategic aims of the US, Russia, and the Caspian as a whole. For the US, the Caspian as a region and an energy market represented an opportunity to bring new nations and historic foes into the fold of the international order. The problem was that this succeeded as an effect rather than an affect, ie, the landscape changed but the conditions did not. Russia’s strategic errors were more clear but arguably less structurally problematic. The Caspian quickly moved from Soviet, to former Soviet, to a piece of Russia’s privileged area of influence. Russia’s use of force and subversion, in the name of maintaining control over the Caspian, yielded a net negative result. What is important here is whether it was Russia’s methods or capacity to project power that failed. The 90s saw a significant decrease in Russia’s capacity for power projection. Today its methodology has remained but its capacity has arguably increased. The other Caspian nations, specifically Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan rather conversely, continue to sit on the sidelines while their fate is decided. I say conversely because it would be rash to evaluate these Caspian nations with the same rubric and presuppositions as great powers.
Source: Macrotrends.net; Energy Information Administration, BLS
Their sovereignty of the past two decades, if viewed from a purely geostrategic lens, is a ‘pyrrhic sovereignty.’ Ultimately, the Caspian region has seen no paradigm shift in what could be called a patron-client relationship only a change in the role of the patron: the global market replaced Russian hegemony. In 1998, Richard Matzke, then President of Chevron Overseas Petroleum, gave a speech that resonates clearly today. “The Caspian oil industry was once just a question mark on the post-Communist landscape. But today, the industry is becoming a regional force. It has developed momentum - and markets of its own…
Low prices sent the emerging Caspian oil industry a powerful message that it needed to hear: Isolation on the world map can not provide insulation from world oil market trends… or global investment requirements.” (bold and italics are mine). It is clear that the Caspian is not isolated from the global market. Nor is it isolated from the geostrategic interests of great and regional powers. What is unclear is what will rise from renewed regional contestation - a new opportunity for cooperation or a zero-sum game that may have similar players occupying new roles or revised roles but still may seem depressingly familiar to geopolitical analysts around the globe.
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KeePinG it reAl
AlmAty 2022 Promises the most resPonsible, Convenient And sustAinAble Winter GAmes ConCePt in over thirty yeArs
AlMATy 2022 wAnTS To chAnge the way Olympic Winter Games are planned for and hosted by ensuring a true and lasting Olympic Legacy for the city and region, and that inspires more cities to bid for the Games in the future.
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Almaty has a very long tradition in winter sports, beginning in the 1950’s during the Soviet Union when the city was the center for outdoor winter sports activities. After becoming an independent country two decades ago, Almaty began improving its status as the number one winter sport center in Eurasia. Almaty has continuously flourished into a true winter sports city and one of the top tourist destinations in all of Eurasia. The growth of winter sports in Almaty is directly tied to the city and region’s long-term goals and is a key element in the planning for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. A new winter games model focused on the Athletes Almaty 2022’s Games Concept is one of the most compact in over 30 years. All venues are located within a 30-kilometer radius of the Olympic Village - an unprecedented convenience for the movement’s most important stakeholders, the athletes, as well as for the Olympic Family and spectators.
Real winter Sports Venues for Real winter Sports Seventy percent of the venues necessary for the Games already exist and are currently fully utilized for winter sports. Since 2000, Almaty has added six top-tier venues to its already existing collection of worldclass ski resorts and other competition venues. By 2017, 80% of the venues necessary will exist due to Almaty hosting the 2017 Winter Universiade. According to Minister of Culture and Sport of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mr Arystanbek Mukhamediuly:«Almaty’s bid for the Winter Games is driven by our people’s passion for winter sports and is well aligned with our long-term sports infrastructure plan. Almaty will only need two additional competition venues for the Games. Rising demand from the city and region makes the addition of these venues a natural continuation of our strategic plan. Hosting the Winter Games will further the development of winter sports in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region».
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Real Sustainability Means an eco-Friendly winter games Almaty 2022 is also one of the greenest and most sustainable plans in over 30 years due to its numerous existing venues and minimal construction needs. Only two additional venues need to be built - the Sliding Center and the Almaty Olympic Arena. No sensitive mountain ecosystems will be affected by their construction and no large-scale transportation projects are required to reach the mountain venues from the city.
Real winter Sports hosting experience Almaty’s venues have hosted numerous major winter sport events including the 2011 Asian Winter Games, the 2015 FIS Junior Nordic World Championships Under 23, the 2014 World University Speed Skating Championship, the 2015 ISU World Sprint Speed Skating Championships, the 2012 & 2013 FIS Nordic Combined World Cups, the 2010 through 2014 FIS Ski Jumping Grand Prix, and the 2010 through 2012 FIS Ski Jumping Continental Cups. Through the successful delivery of these international competitions, Almaty has proven itself as a trustworthy and competent host. From its 2011 Asian Winter Games experience, to the upcoming 2017 Winter Universiade, the largest global winter sports competition after the Olympic Winter Games, Almaty will benefit from a wealth of friendly and experienced event professionals and volunteers, as well as in-depth technical and sports expertise, heightened by the high-level events hosted and planned to take place.
winter games Deserve Real winter weather Almaty’s winter climate will provide the ideal competitive conditions for both the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. Almaty has plenty of snow and plenty of water. The city’s mountain venues average between 120-150 cm of fresh, natural snow coverage during the proposed Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games periods, and the annual accumulated snowfall adds up to 8 meters. Any man-made snow requirements will be easily met using Almaty’s numerous mountain lakes and rivers with no impact to the existing water needs of the region. Vice-Chairman of Almaty 2022 Bid, Mr Andrey Kryukov said: «Our sensible, affordable and sustainable Games Plan is based on real venues, real winter sports hosting experience and real snow and winter ambience. Almaty can prove that a nation doesn’t need to be a superpower or spend tens of billions of dollars to host a Winter Games.Consistent with the goals of IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020 reforms, Almaty 2022’s planning for the Winter Games utilizes our existing resources and is directly linked to our city’s long-term goals. Rather than changing our city to fit the Games, we adapted the Games plan to fit our city’s needs. This is real change of the Winter Games and exactly what we mean by ‘Keeping it Real».
A cozy and Friendly winter games Additionally, Kazakhstan is one of the most open and diverse countries in the world with over 100 ethnicities and 40 religious denominations all living peacefully within its borders. Forty percent of Almaty’s population is under the age of twenty-four, and the city offers a variety of dining and entertainment options to visitors of all ages and ethnicities. Finally, Almaty 2022’s budget is prudent, and all Games guarantees are fully backed by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Almaty’s OCOG budget is 1.7 billion US dollars and its Non-OCOG budget is only 4.5 billion; this reflects moderate, sensible spending. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s economy is sound. The Kazakhstan National Fund - created as a stabilization fund in 2000 - has a
current balance of 75 billion dollars, and it continues to grow. That is “cash in the bank” for the Games. Mayor of Almaty city, Mr Akhmetzhan Yessimov said: «Almaty is a vibrant and cosmopolitan city full of young and passionate winter sport enthusiasts who passionately want to bring the Games to our city. Almaty 2022 is fully supported by our Government and we have the financial strength necessary to deliver a great Games experience for the athletes and participants. To be ready for 2022, Almaty has been investing in winter sports facilities and experience for over a decade, and on 31 July we hope to earn the opportunity to showcase to the world the tremendous progress our country has made».
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learn, exPlOre, sHare MulticulturalisM as lifestyle in azerbaijan
AzerbAijAn hoSTS the International Summer School entitled "Multiculturalism as lifestyle in Azerbaijan: Learn, Explore, Share". The project was jointly organized by Baku International Multiculturalism Centre, "Knowledge" Foundation under the Azerbaijani President and Baku Slavic University.
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The summer school, which is to be attended by the local and foreign students who completed the interdisciplinary course "Azerbaijani multiculturalism" during the spring semester of the current year, as well as influential figures of science, will be held from July 21 to August 1. The summer school has organized on the idea and the initiative of the service of the State Counselor on Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Aairs. It will also involve Azerbaijani and European scientists in addition to the students from eight foreign and seven local universities. Local and foreign scientist will deliver lectures to the students during the summer school, which will involve totally 70 students of Belarusian State Linguistic University, Charles University and Masaryk University of the Czech Republic, Vilnius State University of Educational Sciences and Vytautas Magnus University,
Tbilisi State University, the Ural Federal University and the Institute of Russian Language in Russia, University of Naples and University of La Sapienza, Sofia University St. KlimentOhridski, Ardahan University and Sakarya University of Turkey, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, Baku State University, Azerbaijan State Economic University, Azerbaijan Technical University, Lankaran State University, Nakhchivan State University, Ganja State University, Baku Higher Oil School. The participants of the summer school will gather in Baku on July 21 and 22. The first two days of the program include familiarization with the capital city, the meeting of participants with State Counselor on Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Aairs, academician Kamal Abdullayev, and the leaderships of Baku International Multiculturalism Centre, "Knowledge" Foundation and Baku Slavic University.
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During tHe Walks OrganizeD in tHese regiOns, stuDents Will be able tO see firstHanD Multicultural sPirit Of azerbaijan Participants of the Summer School will leave for education and recreation center in Nabran on July 23. During the period until August 30, the students will visit Guba, Gusar and Khachmaz and take part in various activities in these regions. The events will also be attended by the representatives of local authorities, residents and young people of the region. During the walks organized in these regions, students will be able to see firsthand multicultural spirit of Azerbaijan. High level experts from Germany, Israel, Russia and Azerbaijan will give lectures and hold discussions, which will be instrumental in enhancing knowledge and experience of the participants. The main target of the international summer school is to give students an opportunity to add practical experience to their theoretical knowledge already gained from the course "Azerbaijani multiculturalism". Foreign students will complete their theoretical knowledge they gained during the semester with practical observations.
The summer school has very rich program. The participants will enjoy a nice stay, have exciting lectures, intellectual discussions and meet new friends during this period. The students were divided into dierent groups. A dance competition, as well as sports and intellectual competitions will be held among these groups. The winners will receive special prizes. The organizers will try their best so the foreign students gain deeper and more objective knowledge about Azerbaijan and are able to observe the role of multiculturalism in the life of Azerbaijanis. In order to acquaint students with the multicultural situation in Azerbaijan, they will be informed about the Azerbaijani culture, art, history, as well as the historical traditions of tolerance and their roots, and historical realities of the day. In addition, all kinds of excursions will be conducted to the religious institutions of various peoples. After completion of the summer school, Baku International Multiculturalism Centre will continue staying in touch with these students. Possibly, after the completion of the school, they will start scientific researches on Azerbaijan, considering that the majority of students specialize in international relations, history, ethnography, geography and so on, it will be very interesting for them to observe the multicultural environment in Azerbaijan, the country's national minorities, culture, lifestyle as well as the rights and freedoms provided by the government. In their theses and dissertations, they may prefer issues they have seen in Azerbaijan. The relations of these students with Azerbaijan will become more active, their interest increase, the country will become home for them and hopefully their interest to Azerbaijan will turn to love to the country.
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