Central African Republic Operation Vimbezela Protection Force The Battle of Bangui
Destroyed Seleka Technical at Begoua
General Background • Training and Asssitance Team deployed under a 2007 MoU at the request of CAR President Bozize, who wanted to lessen CAR’s dependence on France • Only the DoD followed through; other government departments failed to so so • Trained some 1 300 FACA personnel but various problems effectively stopped the training after 2010
Mission • Protect the SA Training Team in CAR. • Gain control of SA supplied equipment and munitions to prevent them falling into the hands of rebel forces. • Protect South Africans at risk. • Should it come to a fight: Attempt to stiffen the resistance of FACA.
Mission Trigger •
Rebellion broke out in December 2012 and most of CAR overrun by the end of the month.
•
29 December President Bozize asks South Africa for assistance.
•
30 December President Zuma briefed and decides South Africa will not “be seen to run away” and that “Africa cannot afford another series of coups and revolutions”.
•
31 December Defence Minister flies to Bangui to update and sign MoU
Why did we Bother? Economic Realpolitik • We are the major economic power of the SADC and need a stable region within which to grow our own economy. • Therefore, instability within or along the borders of the SADC is of concern to us. • The CAR forms most of the northern border of the DRC, a fellow member of the SADC and already unstable. • Chaos in the CAR will spill over into the DRC and will lead to renewed LRA and ADF attacks on Uganda, leading the Ugandan forces to strike inside the DRC, escalating the conflict there.
Why did we Bother? Areas of Influence and Interest • Area of Influence: The area in which a commander must be able to influence events to ensure successful conduct of his mission; and from which an enemy can affect his forces and the outcome of his mission. • Area of Interest: The area in which a commander must be able to monitor developments that could affect his forces or the outcome of his mission. • The CAR lies within what the SADC and South Africa must understand and treat as an Area of Influence; and events there will also impact in the Great Lakes region: We must be able to exert influence there in our long-term interest.
SADC: Areas of Influence (red) Areas of Interest (orange)
South Africa: Areas of Influence (red) Areas of Interest (orange)
The Rebel Advance: 19 Days from N’dele/Ouadda to Sibut
Deployment • Cannot afford large deployment: Both insufficient uncommitted troops and inadequate airlift. • Mission is not to defend Bozize but to protect SA interests (training team and equipment). • Therefore deploy force sufficiently strong for that purpose or to handle an evacuation of the training team if necessary. • Deployment of small contingent between 2 and 4 January, using chartered Il-76 and SAAF C-130 aircraft.
The Challenge of Distance: Strategic Bangui
Payload Radius is Critical: It may not be possible or practical To refuel at the delivery airfield: Il-76: 20 tons unrefuelled 40 tons maximum A400M: 20 tons unrefuelled 37 tons maximum C-130J-30: out of unrefuelled range 19 tons maximum
3 280 km
AFB Makhado
And remember the vital importance of: • The cargo box size: Payload means nothing if the vehicle does not fit! • The state of the runway: Good enough for a few landings is not good enough!
Force Composition (1) • Mission Command at JOPS • Small Force Headquarters to CAR • 1 Special Forces Group 2 x Hornet with 12.7 mm MG and 107 mm MRL 4 x Land Cruiser with 7.62 mm PKM MG 2 x 14.5 mm HMG • 1 Paratroop Company (rifles, LMGs, RPGs, 60 mm mortars) • 1 Mixed Paratroop Weapons Platoon 4 x 12.7 mm HMG 4 x 81 mm mortar
Force Composition (2) • Tactical Intelligence Team • Electronic Intelligence Team • Signals Detachment • Medical Team • Small Logistic element • Reinforced later with: Special Forces Group with 6 Hornets (5 with 12.7 mm, 1 with 20 mm MG151) Surgical Team
Actions on Deployment • Establish contact with CAR government, FACA, FOMAC and French force at Bangui airport. • Establish base in former police training centre and fortify as best possible. • Commence patrols within 15 km radius allowed; both reconnaissance and contact patrols. • Initiate regular liaison patrols to FACA and FOMAC forces at Damara. • Reconnoitre potential early warning, delaying and defensive positions should fighting break out. • Withdraw training team at Bouar.
Bangui SA Base
Routine Patrols within 15 Km: Land Cruisers; Hornets
Routine Patrols within 15 Km of Base: Geckos
Location of SA Training Teams
360 km
The Road to Bouar
Bouar; 1 900 m gravel runway Bosembele Baoro Bossembélé
Vange
Bangui
Vange
Bosembele
Bossembélé
Baoro
Road through the forest, Boanell and Bozinga N
Road through the forest, Yakengue and Dobéré N
Bouar
Bouar: Vulnerability Radios – 107 mm Rockets
Maximum range of 107 mm M Centred on the airfield buildin
Libreville Agreements • Some Chad troops deploy to support government; some doubt as to real motives. • French reinforce contingent in Bangui to 650, but only to protect French interests and the airport. • Rebels stop short of Damara on 26 December and agree to negotiate. • Central African troops deploy in January (740, some north of Damara (‘Red Line’); additional Chad troops. • South African force deploys from 2 - 4 January. • Ceasefire on 11 January and agreement on government of national unity; 17 January Bozize appoints opposition PM and ministers, including some from Seleka.
Rebels Resume Offensive • 23 January cease-fire broken. • Several minor clashes. • 12 March Seleka resumes offensive – possibly as a probe to gauge reaction – and takes Gambo and Bangassou in the south. • 18 March the Seleka members of the cabinet go to Sibut and do not return. • 18 March Seleka claims government not keeping to terms of agreement; give 72 hours deadline.
Rebels Resume Offensive: Take Gambo and Bangassou First real rebel attacks since cease-fire. Perhaps intended to gauge reaction of the FOMAC force.
Gambo and Bangassou Captured 12 March
The CAR: Strategic Relevance
General Situation Map Sibut: Main Seleka HQ
Bossembele
95 km
Damara: FOMAC/FACA
120 km
60 km
Close Situation Map Damara: FOMAC/FACA
Boali: Main Power Station for Bangui
Bafinli: Mpoko River Bridge: FACA
Bangui and Environs To Damara To Bossembele
Airport
SA Base
The CAR Army was a very mixed force
The Central African Force: FOMAC
FOMAC Commander, General Jean-Felix Akaga of Gabon, undertook to hold the “Red Line at Damara, mainly with Chadian (above right) and Congolese trooops .
Chad’s contingent the strongest; others from Cameroon and Gabon
France Protected French Interests and the Airport: Reinforced to 650 then reduced to 250 by March
Other Forces in the CAR Chad and Sudan Army Elements
Ugandan, South Sudan and DRC forces opeating against the LRA. HQ at Obo.
Obo: DRC/Ugandan/South Sudan HQ
Ugandan Troops on Patrol in CAR
Ugandan Troops on Patrol in CAR
Seleka in December 2012 – 1 000 to 1 200 Poorly Armed and Led
Seleka in December 2012
Seleka in December 2012
Seleka in January 2013
Seleka in Late January 2013
Seleka in March 2013
Seleka after the battle
Seleka after the battle
Colonel Ali Abubaker (centre) led the Seleka advance from Damara, and had General Issa Issaka (right) was the Seleka his ‘technical’ shot out from under him; Chief of General Staff and in command of all other 14 men in the vehicle dying. the offensive until wounded. General Arda Hakouma (left) was Chief of Operations, and led the Seleka force from Bossembele to Bangui and then took over from General Issaka. General Hassan Achmat (on right) led the 558-strong Brigade Rouge, with 19 ‘technicals’, from Bossangoa to Bangui, and was later responsible for security in Bangui.
Sibut: Main Seleka Base in Janaury 2013
Sibut; Captured 29/12/12 Main Seleka Force Concentration
95 km
Some Forward Seleka Elements Damara
FOMAC Battalion FACA Battalion
FACA and FOMAC Positions at Damara
Approximate Position of FOMAC force 8 000 m
FACA force in Damara environs
FOMAC Force north of Damara Direction of Seleka Advance
3 500 m
General Area of FOMAC Deployment
FACA Force at Damara Direction of Seleka Advance
4 900 m
General Area of FACA Deployment
The Seleka Offensive of March 2013
Bossangoa Captured 22 March 140 km
Bossembele Captured 22 March
Attack 22 March 120 km
Sibut Damara Captured 22 March Attack 22 March
Bangui and Environs SA OP Mpoko River Bridge
Seleka Attacks
SA Defensive Position Blue Line to Mpoko Bridge - 9 500 m
Y- Junction SA Base
Airport
Damara
Ambush SF Reconnaissance Patrol 4 x Land Cruiser with PKMs 2 x Hornet with 12.7 mm
FACA and FOMAC
Seleka Advance
Black Line: SA Early Warning Force – Special Forces Group Green Line: SA Delaying Force – One Para Platoon/MG Sec Bafinli Bridge FACA Battalion SA Base – Police College
Blue Line: SA Defensive Position – Para Company/Mor Gp/ MG Gp 2000 FACA Troops in City
Black Line: Early Warning Position (Looking NNW) Seleka Advance
Black Line: SA Early Warning Force Monitor bridge; Delay; Disengage; River refuses left flank. Tactical HQ (1 Land Cruiser; Casspir Ambulance) SF Group 2 x Hornet with 12.7 mm, 107 mm MRL 4 x Land Cruiser with PKM
Black Line: Early Warning Position (Looking NW) 3 200 m; crest of road 2 000 m
Black Line: Screening Position (Looking NW) Seleka Advance 600 m
350 m
Green Line – Looking North: Delaying Position
3 600 m
Green Line – Looking NW 3 600 m
Seleka Advance
900 m
Green Line: SA Delaying Force Task: Monitor and Delay; River Refuses Left Flank Tactical HQ (1 Land Cruiser, Casspir Ambulance) 1 x Paratroop Platoon, 12.7 mm MG Section Special Forces Group as Mobile Reserve
Seleka Attacks to clear Hill
Blue Line: SA Defensive Position Seleka Advance
Two Para Platoons 2 x 60 mm mortars
4 x 81 mm mortars
- One Para Platoon - 4 x 12.7 mm MGs - 1 x 60 mm mortar
Tactical HQ Special Forces Group as Mobile Reserve
Blue Line Looking North
1 000 m
400 m Two Para Platoons 2 x 60 mm mortars
4 x 81 mm mortars 81 mm coverage
2 100 m One Para Platoon 1 x 60 mm mortar 4 x 12.7 mm machineguns
Blue Line Looking North
The four 12.7 mm MGs must have caused immense damage from here
Blue Line Looking East
One Para Platoon 1 x 60 mm Mortar 4 x 12.7 mm MGs 1 500 m
2 Para Platoons with 2 x 60 mm Mortars; this position lost and recaptured more than once
4 x 81 mm Mortars
Blue Line Looking North/North-East
View from 1 and 2 Platoons towards 3 Platoon
One Para Platoon 1 x 60 mm Mortar 4 x 12.7 mm MG
7 400 m
1 200 m
SA Tactical Intelligence Team Observation Post
The Bridge over the Mpoko River at Bafinli
SA Tactical Intelligence Team Observation Post
The Bridge over the Mpoko River at Bafinli
SA Tactical Intelligence Team Observation Post
First Clash south of the Bridge SA Observation Post Seleka Attack First Clash on Bafinli Road
Tactical HQ Special Forces Group Stalled Seleka Attack
Para Company Holding Blue Line Positions
Fighting on Two Fronts Seleka Attack
Mpoko River Bridge
+/- 6 000 m
Running Battle; SF Repeatedly Outflanked or Enveloped
Stalled Seleka Attack
Blue Line Position Para Company The Y-Junction
The SA Base
Seleka Advance
Para Company Withdrawal Route
The Y-Junction
+/- 2 000 m along road
The SA Base
The Road from Y-Junction looking towards Bafinli
The Fight at the Y-Junction
The Y-Junction From the Blue Line
From Bafinli
From Bossembele
The Y-Junction
NW along the Road to Bossembele
Seleka Advance
Para Company Withdrawal Route
The Y-Junction Fight Paras fight clear; move to the base in groups
The SA Base
Looking south from the Y-junction
The former Police College – An Indefensible Position that was defended
Looking North/North-East from the Base
The Road South from the Y-Junction Towards the Base
Looking East from the Base
Buildings next to the northern corner of the base
Route to Airport: 5 km of Potential Street Fig SA Base
Yellow Line
The Route to the Airport - Final Leg
The Abandoned Vimbezela Base
R4 taken from Vimbezela base
The Intended Response: Counter-Strike from DRC and Uganda
SAAF Gripens at Ndola, Zambia, en route to Kinshasa
Rooivalk and Oryx to Gemena and Paratroops to Entebbe
The Intended Response Bangui
Gemena Entebbe
Kinshasa Strategic Distances: Makhado – Ndola: Ndola – Kinshasa: Waterkloof – Entebbe: Bloemspruit – Gemena: AFB Makhado AFB Bloemspruit
AFB Waterkloof
1 140 km 1 745 km 2 890 km 3 645 km
The Intended Response
Operational Distances: Kinshasa – Bangui: 1 010 km Gemena – Bangui: 185 km Entebbe – Bangui: 1 612 km
Operational/Tactical Airlift Bangui to: Bambari Bria Ouadda N’dele Birao
-
280 km 450 km 590 km 505 km 795 km
Unrefuelled Radius: C-27J: 925 km with 10 tons C-295: 725 km with 9.5 tons
CAR: Roads – Mostly less than Perfect
CAR: Airfields – Mostly a little Basic
Bambari Airstrip
N’dele Airstrip
Birao Airstrip
SA/SANDF Shortcomings The key failings and capability gaps included: • Utterly inadequate intelligence. • No on-site political/diplomatic support. • Lack of linguists. • Inadequate airlift capacity to: Allow quick reinforcement Deploy armour or helicopters. • Lack of tanker aircraft to facilitate a quick fighter deployment.
SANDF Shortcomings • Inadequate reconnaissance capability. • Inadequate surveillance capability. • Ineffective tactical communications. • Lack of combat vehicles. • Lack of protected logistic vehicles. • Inadequate firepower. • Lack of precision weapons. • Lack of weapons for urban combat.
Reconnaissance/Surveillance Systems in Service
Tactical Reconnaissance/Surveillance In Service
Locally Developed
Shortcomings: Light Armoured Vehicles The Deployed Force Lacked: • Mobile, protected direct fire support capability. • Protected mobility for its infantry. • Mobile, protected close indirect fire support capability. • Protected logistic vehicles.
Not followed Through or not Taken up
Offered but ‘too expensive’
Question: Deployable Medium Armour?
Example: French Forces in Mali
Example: French Forces in Mali
Example: French Forces in Mali
Example: French Forces in Mali
Looking Forward: Badger • Badger and Rooikat will be deployed in future operations – by road, rail, sea or air – because opposing forces will be more dangerous in the future. • Should we not have a proper fire-support variant as well as mobile long-range 105 mm artillery?
The Potential Impact of Artillery 155 mm G5 Black Line 127 mm Bate Green Line 105 mm G7 Mpoko River Bridge 127 mm Visarend
The Potential Impact of Artillery • Artillery with the reach to support both fronts from a single position would have been invaluable, allowing an instant switch of combat power to where it was most needed. • The G6 may be impractical, but the G5 fits into a C-130 and the Bateleur into the chartered Il-76.
Artillery: The ones that got away?
Artillery: Time for Precision Fires?
Infantry: Time for Precision Fires?
Infantry: Close-Quarters Weapons • Assault rifles are not ideal for fighting in rural villages or urban squatter settlements: Over-penetration and bullet carry hold a real risk of causing civilian casualties. • The infantry needs to look at combat shotguns and also at submachineguns – as well as handguns
Do not forget the humble pistol!
Infantry: Close Fire Support
Infantry: Close Fire Support Direct fire is one thing; mortars and artillery another but are likely to cause more damage than desired. Even the 60 mm patrol mortar is quite big and its bomb over-destructive. Perhaps time to go back to the original “grenade thrower?
Infantry: Breaching and Bunker-Busting
Infantry: Direct Fire Support Weapons
And for those who enjoy police movies‌
The Challenge of Distance Bangui
Payload Radius is Critical: It may not be possible or practical To refuel at the delivery airfield: Il-76: 20 tons unrefuelled 40 tons maximum A400M: 20 tons unrefuelled 37 tons maximum C-130J-30: out of unrefuelled range 19 tons maximum
3 280 km
AFB Makhado
And remember the vital importance of: • The cargo box size: Payload means nothing if the vehicle does not fit! • The state of the runway – good enough for a few landings is not good enough!
Operational/Tactical Airlift Bangui to: Bambari Bria Ouadda N’dele Birao
-
280 km 450 km 590 km 505 km 795 km
Unrefuelled Radius: C-27J: 925 km with 10 tons C-295: 725 km with 9.5 tons
CAR: Roads – Mostly less than Perfect
CAR: Airfields – Mostly a little Basic
Bambari Airstrip
N’dele Airstrip
Birao Airstrip
Initial Lessons Learned
Some Initial Lessons Learned (1) “One does not begin a war – or, sensibly, one should not begin a war – without first being clear what one wishes to achieve by the war, and to what purpose…” General Carl von Clausewitz, strategist (1780-1831)
Government did have a clear aim but…
Some Initial Lessons Learned (2) • Do not believe your own advertising: • South Africa believed that the ECCAS forces (FOMAC) would hold the ‘Red Line’ and prevent Seleka simply driving into Bangui; • South Africa believed the AU and the ECCAS would show some backbone, would not accept a coup d’etat and would use force to restore the situation
• Understand and accept that supposed allies may: • Be less than honest or at least hedging their bets; • Change their minds; or • Be less effective than expected.
This is critical at all levels for future operations.
Some Initial Lessons Learned (3) • Do not under-estimate the enemy; intelligence is often over-optimistic: eg Op Savannah, Op Boleas and now in the CAR. • The enemy forces can change; in composition, strength, weapons and leadership. • The enemy’s thinking and intentions can change. “No matter now enmeshed a commander becomes in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account” Winston Churchill (1874-1965)
The force commander did, hence the early warning line and the OP at Bafinli – just in case.
Some Initial Lessons Learned (4) “Success in war is determined by the political advantage gained, not by victorious battles” Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
• A tactical victory, even an outstanding tactical victory as at Bangui, will achieve nothing without follow-through. • The follow-through was implemented but not executed; we need to advertise it to drive home the point that: “our strategy is one of preventing war by making it selfevident to our enemies that they’re going to get their clocks cleaned if they start one” General John W. Vessey Jr. US Army
We have the capability, but we must advertise it!
Some Initial Lessons Learned (5) “a goal without a plan is just a wish” Larry Elder, author
“First, you have to have a plan” General George S. Patton (1885-1945)
“No plan survives the first contact with the enemy” Helmuth von Moltke
“In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable” General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969)
The force commander understood all of this, and that saved our bacon.
Some Initial Lessons Learned (5) “However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results” “Winston Churchill (1874-1965)
What were the Results?
What were the Results? • The Primary Mission was accomplished! • The Secondary Mission was largely accomplished! • The subsidiary missions fell away. • The force commander retained control throughout, and the force at no stage lost cohesion. • The force accomplished the mission with the minimum of casualties. • The force did so despite being grossly outnumbered and out-gunned. • Strategic command and control functioned as it should – on the ‘mission command’ principle.
What were the Results? The successful execution of this mission and the way in which our troops conducted themselves presented a strategically important message that South Africa has competent combat forces: • That will enhance South Africa’s ability to head off crises in the future. • That will reduce the risk faced by South African troops in future operations.
What did we do Wrong?
What did we do wrong? • As already indicated: We did not check and follow-up intelligence. We believed our own advertising. We under-estimated the enemy.
• We did not ensure unity of command in the theatre; the training team should have been under command. • We did not heed the warning of the attacks of 12 March. At that point we should have reinforced or withdrawn. • We deployed an ad hoc force instead of one that has built cohesion over time. We got away with it again… • We did not exploit asymmetry: Why did we not exploit the edge offered by the SAAF, UAVs, armour, artillery?
Looking Forward
Looking Forward Most military operations are, in their essence, ‘come as you are parties’. The enemy will not often give time to think, plan and prepare. That is why continuous thinking and contingency planning are critical to future success. Remember Eisenhower: “planning is indispensable”
It is the planning process that opens the officer’s mind to alternatives; and that gives him the mental agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities and recover from setbacks.
Policy, Strategy, Operations, Tactics • Policy provides the basis for national strategies that set the future course of the country. • The military must play a role at the policy level: • Policy is what drives strategy; • Ill-informed policy-makers can formulate policies and national strategies that place the country at risk; • It is the military’s responsibility to ensure that policy makers are accurately informed regarding current and future military capabilities, threats and risks. • Strategy, Operations and Tactics are not rank dependent; they are concepts and actions that can be relevant at all levels of command, depending on the situation.
Strategy, Operations, Tactics: The Example of the CAR Deployment • The decision to deploy a protection force to the CAR was a strategic decision based on national policy. • Thus, that company group, small though it was, was in its purpose a strategic force. • Therefore its commander had strategic responsibilities, including liaison with the CAR President and the French embassy. • The nature of the deployment and of the theatre, meant that its commander had to act, mainly, as an operational level commander, manoeuvring, not fighting his forces. • The nature of the battle as it developed, however, also required him to take tactical decisions.
Some Closing Thoughts
Do we learn from our successes or failures - or from those of our opponents?
Moral Courage “the most valuable and usually the most absent characteristic in men� Patton
Wishful Thinking is no Substitute for Thinking and Planning
FOCUS
The Secret of Success: FOCUS • Focus on the mission and the intended outcome. • Optimise your force, your plan and your support. • Control the execution of the operation. • Understand the actual outcome. • Seize any opportunities that may arise.
Focus on the Purpose of the Mission • The mission was to protect or extract the training team; anything else was secondary. • The force commander focussed on his mission, using the indefensible base as a focal point for manoeuvre and for concentration to enable him to achieve his objective. • He did not allow that base nor other factors to divert his thinking from the primary mission.
Despite unexpected developments - the failure of FOMAC and FACA - he accomplished his mission.
Optimise your Force, Plan and Support The force commander analysed his situation and chose his course of action within the resources available to him. He: • Reconnoitred and analysed the area around him. • Made effective use of his de facto alter ego. • Established regular patrols, including contact patrols. • Established and maintained contact with other forces. • Reconnoitred defensive positions, rehearsed moving into them, and kept an eye on the open flank. • Developed a fall-back plan. • Confirmed the use of the airport facilities. • Attempted to obtain additional resources.
He did the best he could with what he had.
Control the Execution of the Plan The force commander: • Formed: A small, mobile tactical HQ centred on himself. A mobile back-up HQ centred on his chief of staff. A small mobile reserve for contingencies. • Placed an OP to monitor the open flank. • Divided is force into two coherent elements each able to operate independently. • Ensured he had competent people handling support. • Ensured that he was present at the critical place at the critical time.
These measures enabled him to retain control.
Understand the Actual Outcome The force commander: • Once warned of the disappearance of the FACA battalion at Bafinli, understood that this was the critical point. • Once he had taken the measure of the situation on the Bafinli Road, understood that his mission required him to fall back on the base and then the airport. • When overtaken by circumstances, he understood that a negotiated ceasefire was the best means to enable him to complete his primary mission successfully.
He did not allow either initial tactical victory or the later impossible situation to cloud his thinking.
Understand the Actual Outcome The mission commander: • Monitored the situation as it developed. • Understood the likely outcome at each stage. • Took the necessary steps to: Provide what additional forces and support he could. Extract the casualties. Withdraw the force, completing the primary mission. The top command level: • Understood the situation as it developed; • Understood that the strategic situation had changed; and • Prepared for a counter-strike to restore the situation.
All three levels understood the actual outcome at each stage.
Seize any Opportunities that Arise The Force commander was presented with no opportunities to change to operational situation other than the fact that the opposing commander proposed a cease-fire. He saw in that the best opportunity to complete his primary mission, and seized that opportunity. He also put aside any anger and distrust at FOMAC’s failure, and accepted the offer of a FOMAC company commander to provide transport for the wounded and then for equipment to the airport. The top command structure saw in the chaos in Bangui that there was an opportunity for swift action to restore the situation, and took steps to do so.
And always remember that little enemies may have bigger friends‌