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The Mindanao Examiner

Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2015

MILF releases ‘Mamasapano clash’ report SULTAN KUDARAT – The Philippines’ largest Muslim rebel group has finally released to the Malaysia-led International Monitoring Team its own report on deadly clash between its forces and police commandos in Maguindanao province.

The fighting killed 44 members of the Special Action Force and also 17 MILF members, including 3 civilians and several Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Mamasapano town.

The police commandos had killed Malaysian bomber Zulkifli bin Hir in a top secret operation deep inside an MILF territory, but were ambushed by rebels that sparked daylong clashes that even President Aquino – who authorized the anti-terror mission – failed to stop.

The MILF submitted its report to the Malaysia-led International (Ceasefire) Monitoring Team on March 22. The IMT is also composed of representatives from Japan, Indonesia and Brunei, and supported by the United States and European Union.

The MILF launched its

own probe into the January 25 clashes after lawmakers accused the separatist group of breaking the truce it signed with the Aquino government when its forces killed members of the elite Special Action Force in the remote village of Tukanalipao in Mamasapano town.

“This report was submitted to the Head of Mission of the International Monitoring Team,” said MILF Vice Chairman Mohagher Iqbal, who is also the Front’s chief peace negotiator. “It’s a comprehensive report.”

He said the IMT will also forward the report to Kuala Lumpur being the facilitator of the peace talks between the MILF and the Philippines, and also to the Aquino government through its government peace negotiator Miriam Ferrer.

A copy of the 38-page report furnished by the MILF to the regional newspaper Mindanao Examiner, also blamed police authorities for the clashes, saying the commando operation was not coordinated with the MILF despite an agreement between the cease-fire committees of both groups; and that

it violated the truce.

Iqbal said: “What happened in Mamasapano on that fateful January 25 was a violation of the cease-fire agreement by the Philippine government because there was no prior coordination with the MILF as far as the SAF (Special Action Force) operation was concerned.”

The report also denied that MILF members mutilated or beheaded police commandos, and said members of the Special Action Force even used the slain bodies of policemen as shield during the fighting.

While the report blamed the police for the fighting, the MILF also acknowledged that its commanders from the 105th and 118th Base Commands failed to detect the presence of Zulkifli and Filipino terrorist Basit Usman, who hid near their base and even used a thatched house in Pembalkan village previously owned by an MILF member – Ustadz Baguindali – who died in 2008; and their failure to detect the entry of police commandos in the area.

“The MILF and civilian residents in Mamasapano did not know that Basit

Usman and Marwan were in their community. The house in which Marwan was found and killed belonged to Ustadz Baguindali, who had died in 2008. The MILF did not know that Marwan and Usman had moved into Barangay Pembalkan. When Marwan was killed, he was with the group of Basit Usman, in the vicinity where the BIFF and the break-away group (Justice for Islamic Movement) of Mohammad Ali Tambako (who was captured recently in General Santos City) are based,” the report said, adding, the area is 3 kilometers away from the MILF combatants in Tukanalipao village.

The report said the MILF had in 2005 ordered both Zulkifli and Usman to leave MILF camps and communities after both men were tagged as “terrorists.” The MILF denied it coddled Zulkifli or protected Usman.

“This policy of cleaning its ranks of terrorists has not changed and is the very reason why the (Philippine) government has continued negotiating peace with the MILF,” it said.

It said the MILF will not surrender those involved in the fighting with police com-

mandos because it has the sole to impose sanctions on its members.

In the end, the report recommended to the MILF to file a protest with the Aquino government against the Special Action Force for violating the cease-fire agreement. And for the government to further investigate PO2 Christopher Lalan, of the Special Action Force, for killing four MILF members who were shot dead in their sleep inside a mosque in Tukanalipao village, and a civilian Mohammad Ambilang.

It said new security mechanisms must be immediately put in place by both the government and MILF peace panels to prevent future clashes between security and rebel forces.

The report was prepared by the MILF Commission headed by Ustadz Said Abdusalam whose members included Hussein Muñoz, Toks Ebrahim, Von al-Haq and Ustadz Abu Ubaidah Agkong.

Many groups were demanding President Aquino’s resignation over his failure to prevent the fighting. Aquino called the daylong clashes between commandos and

rebels as a “misencounter” between friendly forces.

The MILF signed a peace accord last year, but the peace process is yet to be completed with passage of Bangsamoro Basic Law now pending in Congress following the carnage. Lawmakers shelved the BBL until investigations into the deadly clashes between Special Action Force and MILF is completed. The BBL is important in crafting a new Muslim autonomous region in Mindanao.

Aside from the multisectoral groups demanding Aquino to step down, lawmakers also wanted him to resign – accusing the President of covering up the deadly clash despite being told by the Special Action Force about the fighting.

There were also rumors of a coup d’état and widespread demoralization among members of the police and military.

The Mamasapano clash drew widespread condemnation and is now threatening not only the peace process, but the presidency as public outcry for Aquino’s weak leadership continues to mount. (Mindanao Examiner)

FULL TEXT OF MILF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION (SIC) REPORT ON THE MAMASAPANO INCIDENT I. BA CKR OUND BACKR CKROUND On January 26, 2015, the leadership of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) organized the Special Investigative Commission (SIC) after a ferocious firefight occurred in Mamasapano, Maguindanao on January 25, 2015 where seventeen (17) combatants from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (MILF-BIAF) died, together with forty-four (44) members of the Special Action Force of the Philippine National Police (PNP-SAF), and three (3) civilian casualties.

The objectives of the probe by the Special Investigative Commission were the following: (1) to shed light on what happened on January 25 and 26, 2015 in Mamasapano, Maguindanao; (2) to assess the conduct of members of the BIAF in relation to the Code of Conduct for BIAF, also known as General Order Number One (G.O. 1); and (3) to propose ac-

tion points to the leadership of the MILF. The following are the members of the Commission: (1) Ustadz Said Abdulsalam – Chairman (2) Hussein “Sonny” Munoz – Member (3) Toks Ebrahim - Member (4) Von AI Haq, and – Member (5) Ustadz Abu Ubaidah Agkong – Member Originally, the Chair of the MILF’s Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and its Head of the Secretariat, Rasid Ladiasan and Butch Malang, respectively, were included in the Commission. But since the action of the CCCH is also subject of the investigation, the two have been excluded from the Commission.

II. A CTION TAKEN BY THE ACTION COMMISSION In the discharge of its

mandate to investigate what transpired in Mamasapano on January 25 and 26, 2015, the Commission conducted the following activities: (1) interviews with the members of the MILF-CCCH; (2) interviews with the members and the leadership of the 105BC and 118BC of BIAF - MILF; (3) interviews with the relatives of the members of the BIAF and civilians who had been killed in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano on January 25 and 26, 2015; and (4) Ocular inspection.

III. NARRA TION OF THE NARRATION FACT S CTS A. From interviews with MILFelements lanuarv 25. 2015 At around 0420H, members of the BIAF residing in the community center in Tukanalipao, Mamasapano left their houses to go to Sitio Amilil, also in the same barangay as they heard gunfires and learned about the

presence and movement of government forces at Barangay Tuka, Mamasapano.

Sitio Amilil, which is around 825 meters away from the community where these BIAF members live, is a place where forces of BIAF’s 105thBase Command (105BC) usually go whenever they fear or learn of an impending attack on their community. This way, any firefight would not happen in the communities where they live, and civilians would not be directly affected by any armed encounter.

While the BIAF members were trekking towards Sitio Amilil at around 0430H, gunshots were again heard coming from the direction of Barangay Pembalkan further away, around 2 to 3 kilometers northeast. Upon reaching the wooden bridge, the MILF forces were fired upon, and two (2) of its men—Omar Dagadas and Ali Esmael—were hit and died. The remaining MILF forces immediately took position by retreating towards the cornfield they had just passed before crossing the bridge, and engaged the forces that had fired at them. Unknown to them, it was the locking forces for “Operation Exodus”, the 55th Special Action Company (55SAC) of the Philippine National Police-Special Action Force (PNP-SAF). It was still dark at this time of day, and the BIAF forces could not distinguish what group had fire at them. The 55SAC was positioned across the 15-meter wide river and was hiding in the cornfield in that part of Sitio Amilil. While the BIAF could not clearly see whom they were fighting against, they concluded that these were not friendly forces as they had initiated the first shots-shots that were fatal to two of their men.

Firing ensued between the two groups. The BIAF members later on construed that the uniformed armed men who at-

tacked them were soldiers of the Philippine Army.

Wooden footbridge in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano where 105BC men were first fired upon by the 55SAC at around 0430H ofJanuary 25, 2015 As the fighting went on, more BIAF members who are residents ofTukanalipao and of nearby areas came to reinforce the BIAF members that had been first engaged in the fighting.

Most of the reinforcements came from the 105th Base Command (105BC), but there were a few who had also came from the 118th BC. A total of more or less 100 MILF men were eventually engaged on the fighting. As members of the MILF came to the site of the fighting spontaneously, there was no organized central command that was in charge of the whole engagement. The MILF reinforcements set themselves around the location where the SSSAC was positioned in the cornfield in Sitio Amilil near the wooden bridge. In the course of the fighting, some of the MILF men, mostly from the reinforcements, jumped into the river and stayed in the water.

The intense fighting ensued from 0900H - 1300H. During the time, some of the men crossed the river into the cornfield where the SSSAC was positioned, and engaged the latter in close-range firefight.

In the ensuing intense fighting, some of the MILF fighters died. Sueb Kamod, Nasrudin Saptula, and Abdulrahman Abdullah were killed while fighting inside the cornfield where the SSSAC was positioned. Abid Esmail, who sustained a gunshot wound on his chest while fighting inside the said cornfield, was able to get out, but also eventually died from his gunshot wound later that day. Kaharodin Baluno and Mahmod Saga also died and were found near the corn-

field where the SSSAC was positioned. Salahudin S. Camin's body was later found in the river.

The superior number of MILF forces, familiarity with the terrain, coupled with their high caliber firearms, gave the MILF forces advantage and they eventually subdued the SSSAC. When the firing from the 55SAC waned at around 1300H, some of the BIAF forces went inside the cornfield where the 55SAC were positioned purposely to retrieve the dead bodies of their comrades to comply with Islamic tradition to bury the dead within twentyfour (24) hours. While they were in the cornfield retrieving the dead bodies they also took the opportunity to collect war booties. After about twenty minutes of retrieving the dead bodies of their fallen comrades and of collecting war booties, one of the MILF men was able to receive a call from 105BC Commander, Ustadz Zacaria Goma, informing him of the order for a ceasefire. In turn, Ustadz Zacaria Goma also ordered the MILF combatants to pull out from the area, pursuant to the ceasefire agreement and informed them that the team from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and the CCCHs (of the Government and the MILF) were going inside the area. The recipient of the call relayed to his companions the order and they immediately organized a safe withdrawal. The MILF men saw that some of the 55SAC men's bodies were found underneath one another as if purposely piled.

They noticed that the dead bodies sustained multiple gunshot wounds. They realized later from the position of the dead bodies and the number of wounds of some of the SSSAC that some of them had used the bodies of their dead comrades as shield during the intense fighting.

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The Mindanao Examiner

Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2015

FULL TEXT OF MILF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION (SIC) REPORT ON THE MAMASAPANO INCIDENT Continued fr om page 2 from While withdrawing, the BIAF members saw some other armed men moving into the encounter site in Sittio AmiliI, and they recognized some of them as members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).

Januar y' 26. 2015 anuary' On January 26, 2015, four members of the 105BC accompanied their comrade named Melgar Sailila to visit his house in the vicinity ofSittio Amilil to verify if it has not been damaged by the firefight on the previous day. The house is beside a small mosque locally called a "langgaJ'~ not big enough for congregational prayers. It is made of light materials and does not have a minaret or dome.

The Langgal (small mosque) where 4 members of 105BC were shot and killed by P02 Christopher Lalan on January 26, 2015 The 5 men are the following: 1. Musib Kasim 2. Mamarisa Sandigan 3. Rasul Kamsa 4. Norhamid Angkay 5. Melgar Sailila At around 1100H, they prepared their lunch and ate together in the house of Melgar Sailila. At around 1200H, they prayed inside the langgal.

Thereafter, they laid down on the floor of the langgal to take a nap.

As narrated by Melgar Sailila, at around past 1300H, he was awakened by the sound of a gunshot. He saw a man, standing by one of the doors ofthe langgal. He had a pistol drawn and it was pointed at Musib Kasim, who appeared to have been shot while asleep. He then shot Rasul Kamsa and Norhamid Angkay, who both instantly died while asleep.

Mamarisa Sandigan, at this point, was already awakened and tried to get up, but before he could do so, the armed man shot him. Melgar Sailila by then had already realized what was going on and had stood up and jumped out of the opening in the wall of the langgal to escape the gunman. As can be seen in the pictures, the wall of the langgal does not go all the way up to the ceiling, and the opening on the wall was wide enough for someone to get over it. Melgar Sailila ran away from the langgal, and the armed man pursued him. Melgar Sailila luckily escaped from the armed man. Melgar Sailila identified the armed man during the investigation based on the photographs shown him as POZ Christopher Lalan.

The interior of the Langgal showing dried blood on the floor with blood -stained pillow and a man shirt. This was where POZ Lalan shot 4 lOSBC elements.

A little later, at around 1400H, a group of men were walking towards Sitio Amilil from the community in Tukanalipao. The group was composed of four(4) men, namely: 1. Sheikh Abdullah M. Abad, 2. Kapitan Jainal, 3. Mataya Sangki, and 4. Mohammad Ambilang.

While they were near the wooden bridge, the men heard someone from across the bridge shout that they should be careful as "a SAF" was in the vicinity. They stopped walking and decided to wait out the

possible danger. But a few minutes later, they saw a man who had no shirt on and who was holding an armalite, coming towards them. When he was about 50 meters away from Sheik Abdullah Abad and Mohammad Ambilang, who were standing ahead of Kapitan Jainal and Mataya Sangki, Sheik Abdullah Abad shouted, "Civilian kami, wag ka magpaputokf" ("We are civilians! Don't shoot!"). Sheik Abdullah Abad and Mohammad Ambilang raised their hands, to show that they were not armed and that they are not going to fight against the armed man. But the man raised the armalite he was carrying, and started aiming at Mohammad Ambilang.

Mohammad Ambilang then turned around to run away. It was at this point that the man shot at Mohammad Ambilang.

His companions ran away, but the armed man ran after them for several meters. When the men were sure that they had shaken off the armed man, it was only then that they stopped. They realized that Mohammad Ambilang was no longer with them. After a few minutes, they returned to the place where they had met the armed man. They saw a lifeless Mohammad Ambilang where he was last seen alive, already shot and dead.

Later, when the Special Investigative Commission showed the picture of P02 Christopher Lalan to the companions of Ambilang, they confirmed that he is the same person whom they encountered in Sitio Amilil on January 26, 2015 and who shot their companion, Mohammad Ambilang.

B. From interviews with and the report ofthe MILF•CCCH According to Rasid Ladiasan, Chair of the MILF Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, he got information at around 0545H about the firefight from Ustadz Zacaria Goma, the Commander of the 105thBase Command. Ladiasan made further verifications and also informed some of the leaders of the BIAF and the MILF. At 0638H, he sent an SMS to his counterpart in the government, BGen Carlito Galvez, and the head of the GPH CCCH Secretariat, Maj. Carlos Sol, to inform them about the reported firefight. The SMS read this way: "Salam bro, firefight erupted between the AFP and the 105BC at Tukanalipao, Mamasapano. The AFP troops moved in without any coordination and this is difficult to control to avoid encounters between our forces where there is no coordination. This is clearly disregarding and violating the ceasefire. Now with that situation the only option is to ceasefire otherwise it will escalate further."

Another SMS was sent by Mr. Ladiasan to Maj. Sol at around 0642H, again reiterating the message that both forces have to "cease fire", to wit: "We have to ceasefire bro before its too late. Ano kaya bro kung puntahan natin sa area baka may staff kayo kasama at IMT bro ma invite mosila".[What do you think, bro, if we proceed to the area as you may have staff member(s) who can accompany us andyou

may also invite the IMT.] Maj. Carlos Sol suggested that the Joint CCCH and IMT assemble at the IMT Headquarters in Cotabato City. At around 0900H, the group assembled at IMT Hq and subsequently organized the Joint Ceasefire Crisis Team. This Crisis Team was composed of representatives of the GPH CCCH, the MILF CCCH, the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Post UCMP) in Kitango, Datu Saudi Ampatuan and the International Monitoring Team.

At around 0930H, the Crisis Team proceeded to Barangay Kuloy in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao to meet with Ustadz Zacaria Goma, Commander of 105BC, and Ustadz Wahid Tundok, Commander of the 118BC. The team arrived in Barangay Kuloy at about 1130H. The meeting with the two (2) commanders started at around 1200H. It was agreed that to effect a ceasefire and allow the passage of the PNP-SAF from the encounter site in Barangay Tukanalipao to the safer area of Barangay Tuka, Mamasapano, the Crisis Team had to go to the encounter site to talk to and separate the engaged forces and extricate casualties on both sides.

Thus, the Crisis Team divided into 2 groups. Ustadz Wahid Tundok and his men led the first group. Their mission was to go to the encounter site in Barangay Tukanalipao to inform the BIAF men of the call for ceasefire. Ladiasan of MILFCCCH headed the second group with Ronnie Arap and Dave Jungco of the GPH-CCCH Secretariat, and Butch Malang and Toks Upahm of the MILFCCCH Secretariat. Suharto Elhad of JCMP-Kitango and Mr. William Hovland of the IMT also joined them. This group proceeded to Barangay Tuka, where a tactical command post had been established by the PNP and AFP. Ustadz Zacaria Goma stayed at his house in Barangay Kuloy.

Ladiasan sent an SMS to Maj. Sol of the GPH-CCCH Secretariat at around 1230H, saying: "Papuntana kami sa military sa 451B sila Wahid mag pull-out tropang 105BC, kami naman with IMT sa military para tumulong rna extricate PNP SAF. Paalisna kami sa kuloy base ni Zacaria Goma. Paki inform lang wag rna alarm sa bahay ni Goma marami tropa security nya yon."[We are going to the military. the 45th IB together with the IMT to help extricate the PNP-SAF while Wahid Tundok will pull out the 105BC troops from the area. We are leaving Kuloy, the Base of Commander Goma and please inform everyone not to be alarmed by the presence ofmany troops, these are his security.]

At 1255H, Ladiasan's group arrived in Barangay Tuka at the position of the 45th IB of the Philippine Army. The group informed PSupt Henry Mangaldan and PSI Michael John Mangahis of the PNP-SAF and Lt. Col. Romeo Bautista, Commanding Officer of the 45th IB, that a ceasefire had been agreed upon at the meeting with the 2 BIAF Commanders in Barangay Kuloy, Shariff Aguak.

During this time, there was still sporadic gunfire that could be heard in the direction of Barangay Tukanalipao. The Crisis Team learned that Ustadz

Wahid Tundok's group came under fire while moving towards the encounter site.

The PNP-SAF in Barangay Tuka disseminated the call for ceasefire by Phone and radio to the troops on the ground. But gunshots were again heard from three different directions.

Ladiasan's group took cover at the roadside by the banana trees, and waited for the go signal from Ustadz Wahid Tundok to proceed to the encounter site in Barangay Tukanalipao.

At 1315H, Ladiasan's group received a radio call from Ustadz Wahid Tundok. He advised the group to go to the encounter site to assess the situation and determine what other assistance can be given to help resolve the problem. He also reported that there were many casualties already. The group then proceeded first to the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mamasapano, Mayor Benzhar Ampatuan, to discuss, assess the situation, and to request for assistance from the Mayor and from the Chairman of Barangay Tukanalipao. At 1530H, the Crisis Team attempted to enter the encounter site in Tukanalipao but they retreated as they could not proceed further. They had monitored the movement of unidentified armed men and heard gunshots in the area.

Members of the community reported to the MILF CCCH that there were thirty two dead bodies in the area. The information was forwarded to PC Supt.

Napeiias of PNP-SAF and PS Supt. Armilla, OIC Regional Director of PNP PROARMM, who was then at the Headquarters of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Poblacion, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.

At 1600H, it was noticed that there was no longer any exchange of gunfire in Sitio Amilil.

The Crisis Team entered the encounter site in Tukanalipao.

They found dead bodies at Sitio Amilil and in the nearby river.

They noticed a group of armed men in the immediate vicinity who were later identified as belonging to the BIFF under Commanders Bongos, Bisaya, and Indal.

The Crisis Group returned to the Municipal Hall of Mamasapano and informed the Mayor about the situation. They requested for equipment to retrieve the cadavers.

At 1720H, the Crisis Team requested the local and barangay officials to go back to the encounter site with two Kuliglig tractors and an ambulance. It was decided that the cadavers would be brought by the team to the highway where. the PNP-SAF officers were waiting.

The 84SAC of the PNP-SAF At around 1630H and while retrieving the cadavers, the Crisis Team monitored gunshots from the northeast direction, more or less two (2) kilometers from the encounter site. The Commission later found that the area where gunshots were heard is near the boundary between Barangays Pembalkan and Tukanalipao. The Crisis Team never knew of the presence of the 84 SAC in Barangay Pembalkan, Mamasapano until this time.

At about the same time, Maj. Sol received a phone call from BGen Galvez informing him that there remained another group of PNP-SAF being fired upon by an armed group nearby. Subsequent events re-

vealed that the firefight was between the BIFF and the withdrawing 84SAC, which is the "strike team" of Oplan Exodus.

BGen Galvez also called Ladiasan, who assured him that no more MILF-BIAF troops remained in the area and that the PNP-SAF were likely engaging the BIFF and other armed group.

At 1740H, the Crisis Team went back to the tactical command post in Barangay Tuka.

There, Lt. Col. Romeo Bautista explained to the MILF-CCCH the situation and the need to facilitate the rescue of the surviving PNP-SAF about two (2) kilometers north-east of Tukanalipao. The elements of the 6th ID's Reconnaissance Company (DRC) were assigned to assist in extricating the said PNP-SAF from the area.

Ladiasan agreed and advised the MILF CCCH personnel to contact all possible BIAF commanders in the area and to relay to their men the agreement and not to hamper the movement of the 6th ID's Reconnaissance Company who was tasked to rescue the surviving members of the 84SAC. The Crisis Team suspended the retrieval operation in Sitio Amililat around 1830H due to the darkness and security concerns occasioned by the presence of BIFF in the area However, the Crisis Team advised the local officials to facilitate the transport of cadavers to the Municipal Hall of Mamasapano. At 2130H, the local officials of Mamasapano informed the Crisis Team that five (5) cadavers ofPNP-SAF had been turned over to the PNP-SAF. Januar y 26,2015 anuary At 0530H, the local government of Mamasapano resumed the retrieval operation. At around 0730H, the MILF CCCH left Cotabato City to go back to Mamasapano. They first stopped at the camp of the 1st Mechanized Brigade in ShariffAguak at around 0830H. It was agreed therein that civilians will do the retrieval of the bodies in Tukanalipao, and that there will only be 3 people from the MILF CCCH and GPH CCCH who will be allowed to join the retrieval. Mr. Toks Upahm and Ustadz Muin Rinabor of MILF CCCH and Dave Jungco of GPH CCCH were given this task. Shortly before 1400H and after retrieving all the cadavers, the GPH-MILF CCCH left Tukanalipao and returned to the Headquarters of the 1st Mechanized Brigade to account and consolidate all the cadavers retrieved from the encounter site. A total of forty-four (44) cadavers of the SAF were accounted for.

At 1800H, the Crisis Team immediately deactivated and the members returned to the CCCH and IMT offices in Cotabato City.

C. The Casualties from the MILF The Special Investigative Commission conducted interviews of field commanders involved in the incident, relatives of alleged victims, and field verification to establish the identity of the casualties from the BIAFas well as the civilian victims. The Special Investigative Commission confirms here under the names of the seventeen (17) BIAF members who died during the January 25 and 26, 2015 incidents in Mamasapano:1 Some of those killed do not have photographs as their fami-

lies did not want them photographed.

1. Salahudin S. Camin •21 years old •Body was found in the river •Gunshot wound in the head •Buried in Barangay Lapok, Sharif Aguak, Maguindanao 2. Sueb Kemod •34 years old •Body was found inside the 55SAC area •Gunshot in the mouth •Buried in Barangay Pagatin, DatuSalibo, Maguindanao 3. Nasrodin Guiabal Saptula •25 years old •Body was found inside the 55SAC area •Gunshot in the torso •Buried in Barangay Pagatin, DatuSalibo, Maguindanao 4. Kaharodin Baluno •35 years old •Body was found on the ground near the 55SAC area •Gunshot in the head •Buried in Sitio Takulangan, Barangay Lintangan, Mamasapano 5. Mahmod Saga •25 years old •Body was found near Kaharodin's, i.e., near the 55SAC area •Gunshot in the chest •Buried in Barangay Lapok, Shariff Aguak 6. Abdulrahim Abdullah • 24 years old •Body was found inside 55SAC area •Gunshots in the arm and right side of the torso •Buried in Barangay Libutan, Mamasapano 7. Esmail Abid •23 years old •Shot while inside the SSSAC area, but was able to withdraw while wounded; but also died within the day •Gunshot in the chest area •Buried in Sitio Kuta, Barangay Lapok, ShariffAguak 8. Ali Esmail •30 years old •Shot while traversing the wooden bridge •Gunshot in the chest •Buried in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano 9. Norhamid Angkay •29 years old •Shot inside the langgal •Gunshot in the torso •Buried in Barangay Pindsandawan, Mamasapano 10. Mamarisa Sandigan •33 years old •Shot inside the langgal •Gunshot in the torso (right side) •Buried in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano 11. Rasul Kamsa •23 years old •Shot inside the masjid •Gunshot in the torso (side) •Buried in Barangay Liab, Mamasapano 12. Musib Kasim • Age not determined • Shot inside the masjid • Gunshot in the torso •Buried in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano 13. Omar Dagadas •Age not determined •Shot while traversing the wooden bridge •Gunshot in the chest •Buried in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano 14. Paglas A. Kamidon •43 years old •Buried by his family in Ligawasan, Pagalungan Continue to page 4

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The Mindanao Examiner

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FULL TEXT OF MILF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION (SIC) REPORT ON THE MAMASAPANO INCIDENT

Continued fr om page 3 from 15. Tanto A Bulao • 37 years old • Buried by his family in Ligawasan, Pagalungan 16. Rahman Duma • 30 years old • Buried by his family in Ligawasan, Pagalungan 17. Samsudin Guiapar • 34 years old • Buried by his family in Tukanalipao, Mamasapano D. Wounded BIAF members The Special Investigative Commission also verified that there were twenty-five (25) members of the BIAF who were wounded as a result of the fighting between the PNP-SAF and the BIAF in Barangay Tukanalipao on January 25, 2015.2 E. Civilian Casualties The tragic incident in Mamasapano on January 25 and 26 killed not only the combatants from the BIAF and the PNP-SAF, but likewise took the lives of at least three (3) civilians.

1. Badrudin Langalen Badrudin was a 21-yearold farmer from Tukanalipao.

In the early morning of January 25, 2015, he left his house and told his wife, Sarah, that he was going to the market of Tukanalipao to charge his cellphone, as there was a power interruption the night before.

He never got to return home, but was later found dead, with his hands tied behind his back, and with multiple gunshots, including in the head. On the way to the market, he must have stumbled across the men of 55SAC, who must have tied him up and brought him with them.

His body was found in the site encounter, together with the bodies of the 55SAC. He left not only his wife Sarah, but two (2) young children as well.

2. Sarah Tot (or Sarah Pananggulon) In the early morning of January 25, 2015, eight-yearold Sarah was sleeping at their house in Sitio Inug-og, Barangay Pembalkan, Mamasapano when they were roused from their sleep by sudden bursts of gunfire. Together with her parents--Tot and Samira Sampulna, and 5yearold brother Saidin, they crouched low and quickly moved out of the house. Tot brought the family towards a banca in the nearby river in order to escape and to find safer grounds.

Unfortunately, Sarah's body was hit by bullets.

Tot was likewise shot on the upper right portion of his back, while Samira was hit on her face. While her parents survive, albeit wounded, Sarah died.

3. Mohammad Ambilang On January 26, 2015, 33year-old Mohammad Ambilang was asked by an aunt to accompany her to get some of her belongings from her house in Tukanalipao after she had evacuated therefrom to Mohammad's house in Barangay Libutan, Mamasapano. He readily obliged, foregoing with the income that he could have earned driving his motorcycle for a fee. But when he accidentally crossed paths with P02 Christopher Lalan, he was shot and killed by the latter. He left a wife and two young children.

SSUES IV IV.. IISSUES The investigation was guided by the following questions, to which answers were sought: 1. On the armed encounter on January 25, 2015 between MILF BIAF and PNPSAF a. What led to the armed clashes between the BIAF forces and the PNP SAF in the early morning of January 25, 2015 in Mamasapano? b. Were there lapses on the ground in heeding the call for ceasefire? c. Did the BIAF members violate the Code of Conduct Governing BIAF Affairs, also known as General Order No.1 Did the BIAF members use unnecessary force in fighting the PNP-SAF? Did they engage in mutilation? Did they desecrate the dead? Did the BIAF members commit other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law? d. Did BIAF members take the firearms and personal effects of the dead SAF? If yes, is this justified?

2. On the actions taken by the MILF-AHJAG and MILFCCCH after it was known that there was an encounter a. Were there lapses in the handling of the situation by the MILFAHJAG and MILF-CCCH? b. Did the Crisis Team do everything it could to immediately stop the firefight?

3. On the allegations that the MILF is coddling Marwan. a. Did the MILF coddle Basit Usman and Marwan?

V. FINDINGS 1. As to the armed encounter a. What led to the anned clashes between the PNP-SAF and the BIAFforces in the early

morning ofJanuary 25, 2015?

The operation of the PNPSAF in Mamasapano on January 25, 2015 caught the BIAF forces by surprise. The BIAF forces, mostly from the 105BC, are residents of Mamasapano, mostly from Barangay Tukanalipao. The action of some of the men of 105BC in going to Sitio Amilil, as was their usual practice whenever there are clashes or impending clashes, was justified, as the main purpose was to ensure that the clashes do not happen in the populated areas. As there was no coordination between the government and the MILF through the AH/AG and CCCH mechanisms, the BIAF cannot be faulted for concluding that the PNP-SAF forces that they chanced upon in Sitio Amilil were enemies, especially after they were fired upon, and after two (2) of their men were shot and killed by the PNP-SAF. The assertion of the 105BC that it was the 55SAC who made first shots is supported by the circumstances obtaining at that time. The 55SAC was already in the cornfield, and it was the 105BC that was moving in when the first gunshots were fired. Besides, there was very little illumination at that time (0430H), negating the possibility of the moving BIAF to spot the already positioned 55SAC in the cornfield while the latter had the advantage of having night vision goggles.

The action of the MILFCCCH in informing the GPHCCCH about the reported encounter in Mamasapano at 0638H shows that the MILF was concerned about preventing or stopping any armed clash between the parties. It was also MILF-CCCH's Chair Rasid Ladiasan who suggested to the GPH-CCCH that they needed to go to Mamasapano so that they could effectively enforce a ceasefire.

Clearly, there was violation of the implementing guidelines of the ceasefire agreement between the GPH and the MILF. Article II of the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities (signed on November 14, 1997) reads this way: Police and military actions and administrative logistic activities shall continue to be undertaken by the GRP throughout Mindanao and the entire country. In the pursuit thereof.

Confrontational situations between the GRP and MILF forces

shall be avoided by prior coordination with the latter. These actions include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Peacekeeping and police actions such as preventive patrols, investigations, arrest, searches and seizures undertaken by the Government against criminality, especially against piracy, robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, murder and other criminal acts.

[Underscoring supplied] In the Revised joint AFP/ PNP AHJAG Operational Guidelines for the Ad Hoc joint Action Group (AHJAG) signed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and the Chair of the GPH Negotiating Panel on July 23, 2013, it is also clear that there should be coordination between the government and the MILF. The pertinent provision of said Guidelines is found hereunder, appearing on page 7 of said document: f. Except for operations against high priority targets, a list of which shall be provided by the GPH Panel to the MILF Panel, the AHJAG shall inform the GPH and MILF CCCH at least 24 hours prior to the conduct of AFP/PNP operation in order to allow sufficient time for the evacuation of civilians and to avoid armed confrontation between the GPH and MILF forces.

This provision, read with the rest of the document and in consonance with the main purpose of the creation of the AHJAG reiterates the need for coordination with the MILF through its CCCH, at least 24 hours before the conduct of the operations against wanted personalities. However, there is an exception, and the exception is with regard to high priority targets, in which case the coordination can be done for less than the minimum 24 hours. The exception pertains only to the number of hours within which to coordinate and not to the requirement for coordination.

It is interesting also to note that one of the signatories to this document, representing the Philippine National Police as Chief PNP, is Police Director General Alan Purisima, who had admitted "advising" PNPSAF Chief Getulio Napenas not to coordinate with the AFP and the Acting PNP Chief, as he himself (Purisima) would take care of such coordination. b. Were there lapses on the ground in heeding the call for ceasefire?

The MILF CCCH, upon learning of the January 25, 2015 encounter, immediately undertook steps to effect a ceasefire and prevent bloodshed. But there were so many circumstances obtaining in the encounter site that hampered its efforts. These circumstances included the difficulty in communications as cellular phones of the BIAF members were rendered inutile because of the intermittent and weak signal in the encounter site, or were drained of power due to the power outage the night before. The fierce fighting that was already on-going when the CCCHs and the IMT intervened. It was happening in an open field and had evolved into a battle of survival for the combatants. The ceasefire mechanisms were not coordinated through the protocols under the ceasefire agreement.

Given these circumstances. the MILF CCCH immediately suggested to its

counterpart that they go to the encounter site in order to talk to the commanders and interposition themselves in the midst of the encounter. When Ustadz Wahid Tundok went to the encounter site in Sitio Amilil, his purpose was precisely to talk to the men in the field. And despite the heavy fighting, he was able to finally arrive at the encounter site to talk to some of the men to cease firing before 1330H. From this account, it is clear that the 105BC, upon receipt of the order to stop firing, immediately ceased shooting at the 55SAC. There were no lapses in heeding the call for a ceasefire. Unfortunately, it was already too late as most of the SAF's 55 SAC had already been killed in the course of the intense fighting even before the order for a ceasefire was received on the ground.

The Special Investigation Commission found the following undisputed facts: 1. The PNP SAF did not coordinate their entry and operation in Tukanalipao.

Mamasapano with the existing coordination mechanisms such as the AHJAG and the CCCH of the peace panels.

2. The BIAF forces residing in Mamasapano were not informed the PNP SAF operation conducted on January 25, 2015.

3. The MILF CCCH was the first to inform their counterparts in government of the unfortunate encounter in Mamasapano on the said date.

4. The MILF CCCH was the first to suggest to their counterparts in government to immediately proceed to the encounter site to find ways to effect a ceasefire and disengage the fighting forces. c. Did the BlAF members use unnecessary force in fighting the PNp•SAF? Did they engage in mutilation? Did they desecrate the dead?

After the initial advantage of surprise on the part of the PNP-SAF, the BIAF got the upper hand in the fighting. Their strong points included familiarity with the terrain, their location vis-a-vis their adversaries, their superior number, and the use of the "Barrett".

During the battle, the PNp•SAF stayed in the cornfield while the BIAF forces were able to cover themselves in the river banks, and coconut trees surrounding the cornfield. The fighting also became so intense that at one point, the men were shooting at each other with only 3-4 meters between them.

Despite the advantages, the BIAF did not use unnecessary force or employ any method of warfare that violated International Humanitarian Law. Rather, they faced their adversaries employing the weapons that were available to them, and using their advantages to the fullest.

Reports about mutilation, beheading, and willful killing are unfounded. The viral video of an armed man shooting at close range a man apparently from the PNP-SAF 55 SAC while the latter was lying down on the ground and already wounded, does not clearly show that it was BIAF's l05BC which is responsible for this It is a known fact that there are other armed groups in the area including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fights (BIFF), and private armed groups (PAGs). Any of these groups could have entered the encounter site after the MILF pulled out of the area

after a ceasefire was effected, as was in fact witnessed by the withdrawing l05BC men. This is also consistent with the narrative of the Crisis Team that when they entered the area at around 1530H, they sensed the presence of armed men therein.

The Special Investigative Commission also looked into the question of whether BIAF elements desecrated the dead bodies of the slain 55SAC members, as some of the bodies of the latter were found in the far end of the river banks when they were located by the retrieval teams organized by Crisis Team with participation of the local officials. But the l05BC members say that they did not move the dead bodies of the 55SAC, except when it was necessary in order to get their firearms. It must be noted that in this narrative, it was not the lOSBC that was the last group to be at the encounter site.

There was the BIFF and other people who had come in just as the lOSBC was leaving. Also, many of the other bodies were retrieved only the next day. In the meantime, the municipal government had mobilized people (civilians) to help in the retrieval. The Barangay officials of Tukanalipao, Dasikil and Libutan provided the necessary assistance. The Officials had also mobilized their own people for the retrieval operations. Hence, there were a lot of civilians who had entered the encounter site. Many of them brought the dead bodies near the river, as the bodies were to be brought across the river in order to be transported to the highway of Mamasapano.

Given the above circumstances, some of the personal belongings of the SAF who were killed in the encounter may have been taken by other armed groups and civilians who participated in the retrieval operations. Some of the pictures taken during the retrieval operations are attached hereto, one showing civilians pulling on a rope that had been tied to the foot of a cadaver, dragging it out of its original position. The next picture shows how the bodies were taken out of the encounter site across the river, as part of the retrieval operations. d. Did BIAF members take the firearms and personal effects of the dead SAF? If yes, is this justified?

The members of the BIAF, in the course of fighting and after it had waned, took steps to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades and used this opportunity to take war booties when it was apparent that the enemies had already died.

This is nothing extraordinary. In fact, this is the usual action taken by rebel groups.

It is also recognized as an acceptable behavior of armed non-state actors under Rule 49 of Customary International Humanitarian Law based on a study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The said rule provides that' The parties to the conflict may seize military equipment belonging to an adverse party as war booty." This customary law had already been set forth in the Lieber Code (or the instruction signed by President Abraham Lincoln to the Union Forces of the United States during the American Civil War).

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FULL TEXT OF MILF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION (SIC) REPORT ON THE MAMASAPANO INCIDENT Continued fr om page 4 from Still, in the interest of peace, these firearms have been returned to the government on February 18, 2015. The MILF leadership took the initiative of asking their men to return the firearms.

As to the personal effects of the slain PNP SAF, the Commission finds the assertion of the 105BC elements that they had taken the firearms primarily, as these are certainly of greater value to them. Especially considering that there was an order to retreat from the encounter site, the 105BC had to pull out within a limited period of time.

It is also noteworthy that when requested by Mayor Ampatuan, some civilians did return some personal effects and equipment belonging to the slain PNP SAF, thereby showing that civilian also had access to them. e. Did the MILF coddle Basit Usman and Marwan?

The MILF and the civilian residents in Mamasapano did not know that Basit Usman and Marwan were in their community. The house in which Marwan was found and killed belonged to Ustadz Baguindali, who had died in 2008. The MILF did not know that Marwan and Usman had moved into Barangay Pembalkan Mamasapano. When Marwan was killed, he was with the group of Basit Usman, in the vicinity where the BIFFand the break-away group of Mohammad Ali Tambako are based. The house is found in Barangay Pembalkan, Mamasapano, which is more than 3 kilometers away from where the MILF combatants were living in Barangay Tukanalipao. It is not at area where the MILF has presence or control. Note that the site where the encounter between the BIAF and the 55SAC took place is not in Pembalkan, but about 2 kilometers away in Sitio Amilil in Tukanalipao.

It should be noted that as early as 2005, Marwan, and other individuals with "terrorist" tags have been oredred to leave MILF camps and communities. This policy of cleaning its ranks of terrorists has not changed and is the very reason why the government has continued negotiating peace with the MILF. It is also the policy that underlies the creation of the Ad Hoc joint Action Group (AHjAG), where the MILF is to coordinate and cooperate with the AFP and PNP in the interdiction of criminal elements in MILF communities.

2. Actions taken by the MILF CCCM As pointed out earlier, it was the MILF CCCH Chair who called the attention of the GPH CCCH about the encounter in Mamasapano at 0637H of january25, 2015. It was also the MILF CCCH Chair who proposed for the physical presence of the respective CCCHs and the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mamasapano in order to effectively implement a ceasefire, as the fighting had already started and communications through cellular phones were not working because of weak signal. Thereafter, the joint CCCHs and the IMT created a Crisis' Team and proceeded in a convoy of vehicles to Mamasapano.

It was around 1130H when the CCCHs and the IMT arrived in Mamasapano.

While in Mamasapano, it was the CCCHs and the IMT,

constituted as a Crisis Team, that sought ways to reach the commanders on the ground.

They were able to talk to Commanders Zacaria Goma and Wahid Tundok of the MILF BIAF. It was also the Crisis Team that coordinated with the AFP and the PNP SAF for the rescue of the surviving 84SAC. All said, the MILF CCCH in cooperation with the GPH CCCH did everything it could. and despite all difficulties, to stop the fighting and to save the surviving PNP-SAF after the ceasefire was effected.

VI. FINDINGS AND REC OMRECOMMENDA TIONS MENDATIONS 1. As to the liability of MILF men who took part in the clash The BIAF members were justified in fighting back after it was fired upon by the PNP-SAF 55 SAC in Tukanalipao. Without prior coordination, the BIAF did not know that the forces in Sitio amilil were government forces with whom there is a holding ceasefire agreement.When they were fired upon in the wooden bridge of Tukanalipao, the BIAF could not have done anything else but to fire back, as two (2) of their men were instantly killed in the assault of the PNP-SAF men.

Granting, without admitting, that there is any liability on the part of the 10SBC for the violation of the ceasefire, the disciplinary action should be carried out by the MILF. This is in accordance with the Implementing Operational Guidelines on the General Cessation of Hostilities.

Article II, (4)(b) of said Guidelines provides: c. The CCCH shall inform immediately the commanders of GRP and MILF forces whose units or members are alleged to be violating this Implementing Guidelines and Ground Rules. It shall be the responsibility of the GRP and MILF to take immediate and necessary actions to stop any violation and punish respective forces who violate this Implementing Guidelines and Ground Rules.

Item 5 of the same Article III ofthe Guidelines is also relevant: 5. Disposition of violations of cessation of hostilities.

The GRP and the MILF will take appropriate actions on their respective forces who violate this Implementing Guidelines and Ground Rules.

Surely, this case is covered by the Implementing Operational Guidelines as it pertains to the engagement in hostilities by forces of the MILF and the GPH. It is not an ordinary crime that may have been directed at civilians, but direct armed confrontation between the parties that have signed a ceasefire agreement.

As to the matter of liability for commission of acts that are violative of international humanitarian law, there is no evidence that would show this. In fact, the evidence shows the contrary-that is, it was not the BIAF which was responsible for these acts. A scrutiny of the viral video showing the killing of Joseph Sagonoy, a member of the SSSAC, does not clearly identify the killer as one of the members of the BIAF. Even the allegation that the firearm of Sagonoy is one of the 16 firearms that were returned by the BIAF to the government does not prove that the killer of Sagonoy was a BIAF member. The taking of the firearms is different from the act of killing. And as stated by the BIAF members, they took the firearms of the dead SSSACand

those who had been immobilized, but there was at least one other group that had come into the encounter site after the BIAF left it at around 1400H. And it was not until 1600H that the Crisis Team was successful in entering the encounter sight. There was a good two (2) hours when the other armed group, i.e., the BIFF, was able to get into the encounter site and may have committed the despicable act.

2. As to the liability ofPNP•SAF The MlLF should file a protest regarding the violation of the ceasefire by the PNP SAF. The coordination that is required under the Operational Guidelines was not undertaken by the GPH. Without the coordination, the gun battle was inevitable when the two armed groups crossed paths, especially after the BIAF was fired upon by the PNP-SAF. Furthermore, there should be investigation to determine the liability of P02 Christopher Lalan of the PNPSAF SSSAC, who killed four (4) combatants of the MILF while the latter were sleeping inside a makeshift mosque in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano at past 1300H on January 26, 2015.

Under international law, the MILF men would be considered hors de combat as they were not in a position to make an assault on P02 Lalan. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1944, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, provides: Article 4.Safeguard of an enemy hors de combat 1. A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be 'hors de combat' shall not be made the object of attack.

2. Aperson is 'hors de combat' if: (a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself: provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.[Underscoring supplied] In addition, P02 Lalan killed a civilian, Mohammad Ambilang, who was unarmed and who had said so and put up his hands in the air to show such fact. Despite this, he was show and killed by P02 Lalan, an unjustified act that would put this in the ambit of violation of International Humanitarian Law. 3. As to the weapons and personal effects of PNP-SAF who were killed inencounter While the taking of war booties is justified in international law, in the interest of peace, these were returned to the Government of the Philippines. It should also be noted that other armed groups and ordinary civilians also took the firearms and other personal effects of the killed SAF. Hence, the MILF can only return those that were taken by its combatants.

4. As to the issues and violations to the GPH - MILF Ceasefire Agreement and the Implementing Guidelines of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group The PNP SAF violated the GPH - MILF Ceasefire Agreement and the Implementing Guidelines of AHJAG as it did not coordinate the operations through the established proto-

cols of the ceasefire mechanisms. If only the ceasefire mechanisms were accorded the necessary coordination in this operation, this unfortunate and tragic encounter could not have happen and the primacy of the peace process between the GPH and MILF safeguarded.

The BIAF - MILF forces were categorized as enemy forces by the PNPSAV' despite the fact that there is an existing ceasefire agreement and the signing of the GPH - MILF Comprehensive Agreement on the Bansamoro (CAB).

5. As to IHL and human rights Violations, committed by the PNP-SAF The PNP-SAF committed Human Rights violations. P02 Christopher Lalan committed human rights violation when he killed the four (4) MILF men when they were asleep inside the langgal who were in no position to defend themselves. He should likewise be held accountable for killing Mohammad Ambilang, a civilian who has clearly shown no aggression as he in fact raised his hands and made known that he is a civilian. The injury sustained by Ambilang in the back indicated that the killing was attended by qualifying circumstances that aggravated the actions of P02 Lalan.

The PNP-SAF must also be held accountable for the death of Badrudin Langalen whose dead body was found inside the position of the 55SAC blocking force in Sitio Amilil, Tukanalipao, Mamasapano.

The same accountability must be sought for the 8-year-old Sarah Tot. VII. A CTION POINT S ACTION POINTS FOR THE MILF LEADERSHIP FORTHE 1. Failure ofintelligence in the 10SBC and H8BC areas of responsibility.

Operationally, the 105BC and the 118BC cover, among others, the municipality of Mamasapano. As regular base commands, these structures include appropriate intelligence units designed to gather and classify information. Information gathering is vital to the operation of the Base Commands and the BIAF, as a whole. Further, information is vital in the operations of the force, whether in times of peace or war. The Commission notes with concern the glaring failure of intelligence on the two Base Commands both in their failure to intercept and monitor the entry for Marwan and Usman in the area near the communities of the MILF. While it is true that the houses occupied by Marwan and Usman are in Barangay Pembalkan, Mamasapano, some three (3) kilometers away from the MILF communities, agood intelligence operation should have enabled these Base Commands to detect and report the presence of Usman and Marwan to the BIAF Command. The laxity exhibited by the two Base Commands, perhaps influenced by the over confidence in the relative peace obtaining in their communities brought about by the ceasefire agreement with the overnment and the signing of the CAB, should not go unnoticed. This attitude should not be tolerated. The Commission therefore recommends that the leadership imposes appropriate disciplinary action against the erring officials of the 105 BC and the 118 Bc. The same failure of intelligence is true with respect to the entry of the more or less 300

PNP-SAF into the MILF Community in Barangay Tukanalipao. Ideally, every movement of government forces and other armed groups in MILF communities must be monitored and correspondingly reported. The failure of intelligence in the case of the January 25, 2015 incident in Mamasapano resulted in the deaths of 17 MILF combatants and three (3) civilians, the injury of the 25 MILF combatants as well as the injury of four (4) civilians.3Appropriate sanction is recommended.

2. On the need to transition the relationship ofthe BIAF and the AFP/PNP from prevention of hostilities to greater partnership and cooperation.

The CCCH and the AHJAG are mechanisms created by the Parties during the course of the peace negotiations but prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The CCCH was established through the "Implementing Administrative Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities “signed on 12 September 1997 to enforce the agreement of the parties on the cessation of hostilities and to prevent the occurrence of violence between the armed forces of the parties.

The AHJAG was created through the Joint Communiqué Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed on May 6, 2002 in Cyberjaya, Malaysia. The AHJAG is designed to work in tandem with the CCCH for the isolation and interdiction of criminals operating in MILF areas. The AHJAG required the parties to undertake joint actions. Under the CAB and the Annex on Normalization. new mechanisms meant to redefine the new relationship of the parties were created. Post-CAB and under the Annex on Normalization the following mechanisms were envisioned to effect greater cooperation in addressing security challenges, such as the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC), Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPSC) and the Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs). Post CAB, note that the mechanisms, not just the actions. are joint. A new level of partnership on security is sought to be established by the operationalization of these mechanisms.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission recommends to the leadership that measures be immediately undertaken so that the new security mechanisms be immediately put in place.

The MILF leadership must direct its Peace Panels and its representatives in the JNC to convene with their respective counterparts from government to take immediate steps to operationalize the Joint Peace and Security Teams so that it may properly perform its functions and thereby establish a new relationship between the BIAF and the Security Forces of the GPH. 3. The case of MalWan and Basit Usman The hut where Marwan was found and killed on January 25. 2015 is situated in Barangay Pembalkan, Mamasapano. It is around three (3) kilometers from Barangay Tukanalipao where the MILF combatants are based and where the BIAF encountered the 55SAC. The hut is made of light materials andits floor area measures 8x12 feet.

This kind of house is referred to by the locals as "dal'san" - a place for temporary stay used by farmers as temporary resting place for the day while they are working on their farm lots. This hut used to be the dal'san of Ustadz Baguindali, a member of the BlAF who died in 2008. The hut where Basit Usman stayed is located some 119 meters from the hut where Marwan was found and killed. The two huts are surrounded by corn farms and banana trees and isolated from the other houses in Pembalkan.

Barangay Pembalkan is not an MILF controlled area and in fact, the area is frequented by elements of the BIFF and the forces of Mohammad Ali Tambako, a breakaway group of the BIFF. Also, during the wet season, this area is often inaccessible as the Liguasan Marsh expands and inundates this area. Farming is conducive only during the dry season.

According to the civilianresidents interviewed by the Commission, the person living in the hut where Marwan was found and killed introduced himself as "Madz." The residents of this Sitio never knew the person livin in the hut was Marwan.

During the ocular inspection, the Commission found that there were very few bullet holes on the wall of the hut where Marwan was found and killed. The trajectory of the bullets also indicate that the fatal shot did not come from the shots fired outside the house as the bullet holes are roughly 18 inches above the floor. If the shots were fired while Marwan was lying down, he could not have been hit while if he was standing and engaged the elements of the SAF in a firefight, the injuries sustained should have been at his lower body and not on the chest. There are also no bullet holes on the floor of the hut. In all likelihood, the fatal shot must have been fired at close range and while Marwan was lying on the floor.

In the immediate vicinity of the hut, there are no indications of bomb explosion as there are no craters on the ground around the hut. Neither is there indication of an intense firefight in or around the hut.

The sparse provision inside the hut and the thick vegetation growth (weeds) in the immediate surroundings of the hut indicate the occupants have just recently occupied the hut.

The 84SAF encountered the BIFF on their withdrawal and intense fighting occurred in an area in about 927 meters from the hut where Marwan was found and killed. Informations indicate that Marwan was buried by the forces of Mohammad Ali Tambako around the areas of Barangays Pembalkan and Dasikil, known lairs of the BIFF and the forces of Mohammad Ali Tambako.

The MILF in 200S, pursued with renewed vigor the policy of cleansing its camps and communities of individuals with terrorist tag. The policy remains until today. Measures, however such as spot checks by the leadership must continue to be undertaken to ensure that none in the rank and file of the BIAF liaise with terrorist. It is recommended to the leadership that the General Staff of the BIAF put in place additional measures to ensure that the policy laid down in 200S in regard to terrorist are vigorously carried out in all their camps and communities.

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Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2015

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The Mindanao Examiner

Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2015

Brother Danny Cuarteros of the Jesus Miracle Crusade

Troops embrace Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry ISABELA PROVINCE – It was a glorifying experience indeed for army soldiers, who, despite their life and death mission to keep peace alive and protect democracy, have managed to give much of their time to reflect and thanked the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry for bringing the words and love of God to their camp in San Mariano town in the northern Filipino province of Isabela.

In celebration of their 19th church anniversary, members of the Tuguegarao Outreach Station of the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry, brought enlightenment and faith to the headquarters of the 86th Infantry “Highlander” Battalion in Alibadabad village.

Members of the army battalion patiently waited for the Bible-bearing men and women – all clothed

in white and blue – of the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry.

The much encounter between soldiers and preachers of God started with songs of joyful praises with a youthful and followed by solemn songs glorifying Jesus Christ – the Lord and Savior of Christians, a great prophet of Muslims, and one the best philosophers among the unbelievers.

The tiger-faced soldiers listened intently to the miracles that happened in the lives of a former battered wife – Sister Rose Balisi, who was in the past endured being beaten up regularly by her alcoholic husband, whose life turned around for good after they were baptized in water. And the rags-to-riches story of dirt-poor impulsive gambler Brother Kamshy Gabuyo, who stole money from his wife that wanted him dead, and is now will-

ing to pay for it.

And also the hearttouching story of Brother Danny Austria, a scion of a wealthy family who was able to put a stop to his drug addiction, and his family’s unthinkable entry into the United States.

Also the near-death experience of Brother Ismael Manaoat, a former distributor of wines and liquor; and Brother Rolando Danao, alias Ka Willy, a former member of the communist rebel group New People’s Army, who testified – in the name of God – that for the one whole year in the

armed group, he killed more than 20 people, and abandoned this evil deed after being convinced to serve the Lord Jesus and baptized at the Jesus Miracle Crusade in Tuguegarao City.

For the soldiers, the testimonies of those who spoke before them were sincere as they narrated their stories that touched the emotions and hearts of the uniformed men and eventually surrendered to the will of God. For Colonel Jose Real, the battalion commander, the presence of Jesus Miracle Crusade In-

ternational Ministry brought miracles through the power of God. He also testified that ever since he assumed command early last year and permitted the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry to regularly conduct Bible studies and praise worship services, his unit miraculously suffered no casualties in armed clashes with New People’s Army rebels.

As Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry founder Pastor Wilde Estrada Almeda always say: “Miracles are events that happen which are

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Maritess Fernandez Publisher/Executive Producer (On Leave) Al Jacinto Editor-in-Chief/Producer Don Micael Moleño Graphics/Video Editor Mindanao Examiner Productions Web Master REGIONAL PARTNERS Mindanao Daily Business Week Mindanao Star NEWS/ADVERTISING OFFICES Mark Navales Central Mindanao Richard Suarez Pagadian City Zamboanga del Sur

Alan Navales North- South Cotabato Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat Jeng Fernandez Juna Subd., Matina, Davao City

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: Ely Dumaboc/Jun Feliciano Zamboanga Peninsula The Mindanao Examiner Regional Newspaper is published weekly in Mindanao, Philippines.

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The players of the Southshield soccer team and their coaches Greg Napuran (right) and Jian Jun Yu (left) that recently won the nine and under and 10 and under divisions of the 78th Araw ng Dabaw bootfest at Tionko Football field in Davao City.

Southshield Soccer Team Rules 78th Araw ng Dabaw Bootfest DAVAO CITY – The Southshield soccer team dominated the recently concluded 78th Araw ng Dabaw football tournament at the Tionko Football field here.

The Southshield soccer team members are students of Southpoint School who won the nine and under and 10, and under divisions of the annual football tournament.

The nine and under team of the Maa-based school is composed of Bob Benedict Braceros, Karl Sumampong, Charles Kenn Chiu, Andrei Joshua Guingguing, Rhyan Gabrielle Jamisola Dordas, Kristoff Madrid, Devon Kierulf and Zyk Lopez who beat Anak Bansalan 1-0 to win the championship.

The team coached by

former University of Mindanao goalie Greg Napuran won the crown without any defeat due to the strong effort of the team and most valuable player Karl Sumampong.

The 10 and under team coached by Pagadian City native Jian Jun Yu and led by Adrian Elarmo, Alexis Tabada, Aaron Pelonio and Rian Mendoza, won the championship after beating Anak Bansalan in the Finals via a thrilling penalty shootout 2-0.

Alexis Tabada, a member of the Davao City 12 and under team, was declared as most valuable player in the division after scoring the game winning looping goals in the penalty shoot-out.

Meanwhile, the seven and under team of

Southshield lead by Jian Matthew Goyonan andYuan Jakob Guingguing took the second place behind champion Hyenas in the same tournament.

The 12 and under division of Southshield coached

by Angelo John Adana placed fourth in the tournament. With their successful Araw ng Dabaw campaign, Southshield now hopes to get the championship crown at the Del Monte Cup football tournament in Bukidnon province on April 9 and 10. (Bobbie Braceros)

difficult to explain and therefore unbelievable.

But we just have to believe because these happened because of our living God’s will.”

It was also Pastor Almeda who led a dozen “prayer warriors” to a miraculous journey and mission of 100-days of fasting and prayers that victoriously convinced the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf to release the 21 Sipadan hostages in Talipao town in Sulu province in 2000. And the victorious peace mission is related in vivid detail in the book, “Miracles in Moroland” written by American professor Dr. Sam Smith.

For his part, Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry Minister Luke Smith, brother of Dr. Sam Smith, proudly related that Americans take pride in honoring soldiers because they chose to risk their lives to protect the American people. He then told a story about how George Washington, the first President of the United States of America, led his army to victory by extolling them to trust God which led to the printing of the phrase “In God We Trust” in all U.S. dollar bills.

Minister Luke Smith and his beloved wife Sister Annaliza AlmedaSmith, assisted by Brother Danny Cuarteros, and then asked the soldiers to “surrender their lives” to the Living God and get baptized in water in the name of Jesus Christ.

“As a response to the call, the officers and men of the Highlander battalion humbly raised their hands in surrender. They then joined the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry peace crusaders in jumping to joyful songs and joined them in a traditional military boodle fight. It was indeed a sight to behold,” said Brother Cuarteros, who was also among the prayer warriors that journeyed with Pastor Almeda in Sulu to free the Sipadan hostages. (With a report from Mindanao Examiner – Manila Bureau)

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Bogo City among 2015 UN Sasakawa winners

ogo City has been chosen as one of the 33 winners of the 2015 United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction. The UN Information for Disaster Reduction (UNIDR) announced this during the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction at the Sendai International Center in Sendai, Japan recently.

All the 33 winners were recognized for their outstanding contributions to disaster risk reduction.

Bogo City's flagship program on Information Management in Preparation for Disasters or “I.M Prepared” Program - a system of disaster preparedness measures that starts with the family wins the Sasakawa recognition.

Bogo Mayor Celestino Martinez Jr. said the “I.M. Prepared” program aims to change the mindset of the people from reactive to proactive and it encompasses beyond government’s existing mechanisms in addressing preparedness issues down to the family level through baseline data, family interaction and drills, capacity building, barangay information and education drive in schools.

Martinez said a ready local government unit can only be achieved if the families are ready as well while they deserve the best service from the government. He said most local governments invest more on expensive equipment and

training for rescue teams, but undermine the basic and essential disaster risk reduction management service which is family preparedness.

Martinez claimed that no one should be exposed to hazards. "If you prioritize on disaster risk reduction and management response alone, it is tantamount to saying that one should first be carried away by flood water or screaming for help before the government can serve you," he said.

He said another advantage of family preparedness is that the local government can maximize its resources efficiently.

The four-strong Sasakawa Award jury used a criteria to select the final short-list of nominees, assessing how influential, extensive or encompassing, permanent and innovative the nominees actions are.

The winning Sasakawa Laureatte Allan Lavel, is a disaster risk researcher and consultant based in Costa Rica. Born in Britain, but based in the Americas for most of his career, Lavel is a highly respected researcher and practitioner in disaster risk reduction. His work spans four decades, adopting a multi-disciplinary and holistic approach. He has also authored a number of publications and has presented papers in 42 different countries.

Lavel on the other hand, has pledged his commitment to coordinate with the City of Bogo and the province of Cebu through Governor Hilario Davide Jr. for possible development and replicating the Bogo disaster risk reduction and

management practice in other local governments. The Sasakawa Award attracted 88 nominations from 44 countries, including the Philippines, which placed its official bet on Albay province. Bogo’s ‘I.M Prepared” program has been hailed as one of the best practices in disaster risk reduction and management by the Department of Interior and Local Government which also nominated Bogo to the Sasakawa Award.

Because of Bogo's commitment to disaster risk reduction and management, the Department of Science and Teccnology said it would donate a hybrid monitoring system while the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology said it would also set up a state-of-the-art, solar-powered earthquake monitoring system that allows the transmissions of data every microsecond.

Ben Frederick Rodriguez, Bogo City’s local disaster risk reduction and management officer, has been trained on weather forecasting and the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration.

Bogo is currently formulating its localized weather forecast in Cebuano under the supervision of Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. It is the only local government in the Visayas capable of such. (Fayette Riñen, Bogo City)

Color-coded storm-surge warning, gamiton na sa PAGASA

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apil na sa Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) sa ilang mga forecast ug bulletins ang color-coded warning alang sa mga storm surge.

Matud pa ni Cecilia Monteverde, Officer-inCharge sa Hydrometeorol-

ogy Tropical Meteorology Instrument Research and Development station sa PAGASA, ang color nga green nagpasabot nga walay alerto ug dili kinahanglang moevacuatet.

Ang yellow nagpasabot nga alerto o magbantay tungod sa posibleng storm surge, samtang ang orange o kahil nagpasabot nga

posibleng adunay storm surge ug gi-aghat ang mga residente nga mahimong maapektuhan nga mobakwit na.

Ang red nga warning usab ang nangahologan og “take action” nga nagpasabot nga kinahanglan nang mobakwit ang tanan tungod sa dakung hulga sa kinabuhi sa tawo. (ECB)

The Comelec has approved Resolution No. 9934 on March 24 for the re-scheduling of the election period for the April 25, 2015 SK polls. The new resolution further stated that the new election period will be from April 10 to May 10. (Cebu City Pio)

Cebu’s cassava livelihood project in Camotes Island is approved

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he Regional Project Advisory Board (RPAB) has approved Cebu’s proposed P1-million small livelihood project for San Francisco on Camotes Island.

It said the funding would come from World Bank under the Philippine Rural Development Program (PRDP) of the Aquino government through the Department of Agriculture (DA). Estella Rodriguez, PRDP provincial management project officer, said the project was approved with minor revisions after the RPAB review recently.

She said the approval went on as expected because

some of the documentary requirements were waived to accommodate the need of the typhoon Yolandastricken areas.

“The funds would be available in three months time,” she said. The Cassava Production and Marketing Project covers 32 hectares of cassava plantation in San Francisco town. Its proponent is the Camotes MultiPurpose Cooperative which is accredited by the Cooperative Development Authority two years ago.

The cooperative will shoulder 20% of the total project cost as counterpart, while the Capitol will contribute 20% of the remaining 80% of the cost as re-

quired under the agreement. This livelihood subproject is part of the Investment for Rural Enterprises and Agricultural and Fisheries Productivity (I-REAP) component of PRDP. Victor Geralde, head of Capitol’s I-REAP Unit, said Camotes is the top producing area of Cassava in Cebu. “Camotes Island produced more than half of the two thousand tons of locally-produced Cassava,” he said. At least P7 million is allotted by the Capitol this year as counterpart of identified livelihood projects for PRDP funding. (RMN, Cebu Government)

PCA, magmugna og multi-sectoral advisory council nga motuki sa coco levy assets

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ng Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) magmugna og multi-sectoral advisory council nga mohimo og rekomendasyon sa implementasyon ni Presidente Benigno Aquino og duha ka executive orders kalabot sa gi-planong privatization sa coco levy assets.

Matud pa ni Presidential Communications Operations OfficeR Sonny Coloma, Jr. nga

nakakuha siya og pamahayag gikan ni Presidential Assistant for Food Security and Agricultural Modernization Francis Pangilinan, kinsa miingon nga ang PCA motubag sa mga kabalaka sa mga maguuma.

Gikataho nga daghang coconut farmer organizations ang ni-kuwestiyon sa mga bag-ong executive orders nga gipagawas sa Presidente diin matud pa nga ang maong mga mando wala misubay sa

nahisgotan sa niaging konsultasyon ug may mga pangutana ang mga maguuma sa planong privatization sa coco levy assets.

Sa niaging semana, gipagawas ni Aquino ang Executive Orders 179 ug 180 kalabot sa inventory ug privatization sa coco levy assets. Ang maong mando nagtakda usab og sumbanan o guidelines alang sa reconveyance ug sa paggamit sa coco levy assets. (MBCN)

Pagmugna og trabaho ug pagpakunhod sa inflation rate, mas hingosgan pa sa gobyerno

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as hingosgan pa sa gobyerno ang pagmugna og dugang trabaho ug ang pagpakunhod sa inflation rate sa nasud sa nahabiling termino sa administrasyon ni Presidente Benigno Aquino.

Kini ang giseguro ni

ARMM

Presidential Communications Operations Officer Sonny Coloma, Jr. human migawas ang resulta sa Pulse Asia survey nga nag-ingon`g mayorya sa mga Pilipino ang dismayado sa pagtubag sa gobyerno sa mga problema sa nasud.

“In the next 15 months, the administration will inten-

sify efforts at job creation while maintaining fiscal discipline in order to rein in inflation. Good governance is imperative in achieving inclusive growth,” matud pa ni Coloma. Matud pa sa Kalihim nga adunay tukmang mekanismo ang gobyerno aron pagsiguro sa pagmugna og dugang trabaho taliwala pa

Southern Mindanao

Davao

gihapon sa pagpatuman og disiplina ug madaginutong paggamit sa pondo sa katawhan. Gipasabot pa ni Coloma nga ang maayong pagdumala pa gihapon ang mahinungdanong giya sa pagkab-ot sa inclusive growth. Giingon`g doblehon pa sa gobyerno ang pagpaningkamot sa

nahabiling panahon sa termino sa administrasyong Aquino aron matubag ang panginahanglan ug interes sa katawhan. Mao kini ang pasalig sa Palasyo kalabot gihapon sa nahisgotang survey diin ang paghimo og aksiyon batok sa inflation rate, hangyo nga dugang suholan ug pagbatok sa korapsiyon

Western Mindanao

Cebu

ang tulo ka nag-unang concern o gikabalak-an sa publiko. Base sa maong survey, mikabat sa 46% ang angay nga paghimo og aksiyon batok sa inflation, 44% alang sa umento sa suholan ug 40% gikan sa kanhi 36% alang sa pagbatok sa korapsiyon.

(ECB)

Manila