Projections 11: Global Ecologies

Projections 11

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Projections

The MIT Journal of Planning

Founder

Eryn Deeming

Editors

Kian Goh

Eric Chu

Faculty Advisors

Amy Glasmeier

Lawrence J. Vale

Editorial Board

D. Michelle Addington

Gabriella Carolini

Roger Keil

David Pellow

Erik Swyngedouw

Layout

Alicia Rouault

Many thanks to Eran Ben-Joseph, head of the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Lawrence J. Vale, chair of the PhD Committee, and Ezra Glenn. In memory of JoAnn Carmin.

© 2015 MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Contents

Editorial - Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design Eric Chu and Kian Goh

Enclosure of the Commons in a Global Economy: British Enclosure and African Land Grabbing Suzanne Song

An “Insiteful” Comparison: Contentious Politics in Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Siting Hilary Schaffer Boudet

Down the Drain or Back to the Roots? Political Ecology of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus Visualized Using GIS in Leh Town, Ladakh, India Daphne Gondhalekar and Adris Akhtar

An Environmental Anthropology of Waste in Cairo: Contexts, Dimensions, and Trends Eman A. Lasheen

Designed Experiments for Transformational Learning: Forging New Opportunities Through the Integration of Ecological Research Into Design Alexander J. Felson

Freeland: Urban Planning Strategy for Almere Oosterwold Lachlan Anderson-Frank with Winy Maas/MVRDV

In Memoriam

Professor JoAnn Carmin

Cover image, “An Impressionistic Visualization of the Human Impact on the Earth’s Surface,” by Nikos Katsikis

Photographs of Jakarta, Indonesia, on pages 6, 19, 150, and 151 are courtesy of Etienne Turpin / anexact office

All other image credits as listed

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Informal trash recycling on the Waduk Pluit, North Jakarta, November 2015. Photo courtesy of Etienne Turpin / anexact office

Editorial Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Eric Chu and Kian Goh Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Engagement in sustainability planning is growing globally, yet we continue to see environmental conditions worsen. Much attention has reasonably been centered on capacities of national actors and policies, but corresponding issues of scale(s), space, and agency have been largely unaddressed. For ex ample, scholars are just beginning to critically assess the interactive dynam ics between state, private, and civic organizations in facilitating collective en vironmental action; the role of global decision-making in shaping local policy action; and the critical interface between urban and ecological spaces and flows. As a result, the complexities and possibilities of state/local agency, global networks, and spatial ecologies as a multidimensional system remain under-theorized. This is particularly important in a time of global ecologies, where worldwide processes now actively transform society and nature every where. This issue of Projections directly addresses this critical intersection of politics, globalization, and built and “natural” environments. Our objec tive is to unearth the political and spatial dimensions of our environmental crisis, and to reassert the physical and environmental aspects of the study of urban politics and processes. The various articles included in this volume highlight key concepts and practices in sustainability planning that address the dynamic interrelationships of global urbanization, ecological change, and the emerging hybridities of society and nature.

Scalar Theories of Environmental Sustainability and World Development

Theories of human development and natural resource use are complex and contested. Scholars prioritize issues of technology, modernization, and in dustrial change, on the one hand, and nation-state political economies, and citizen and social movements, on the other (Rudel, Roberts, and Carmin 2011). The major schools of thought address problems and opportunities at different scales of global political economy. A critical, historical engage ment is necessary to understand and appreciate the implications of these

approaches for the challenges we confront today.

In the 1960s, scholars began to re-comprehend the effects of industrialization and resource-extractive economic production on the state of the global environment through ideas such as human exceptionalism, ecological impact theory, and the new ecological paradigm. Rachel Carson’s seminal work, Silent Spring (1962), successfully recast society’s conception of in dustrialization and development in terms of the ecological externalities and byproducts of modernization that were gradually being experienced by the public. Together with other works such as “Tragedy of the Commons” (Har din 1968) and “Impacts of Population Growth” (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971), Carson’s writing ushered in an era where the study of environmental issues and impacts reentered mainstream social theory. Dunlap and Catton (1979) helped to articulate the “Human Exceptionalism Paradigm,” which directly critiqued the notion that human societies, because of their ability to gener ate culture, technology, language, and organization, were exempt from eco logical principles and from environmental influences and constraints. These ideas formed the foundation of environmental sociology (and the study of the political economy of the environment), premised on the notion that so ciety must shed its anthropocentrism and accept that humans are subject to ecological laws just like other species (Buttel 1987; Dunlap and Catton 1979).

At the same time, authors like Giddens (1991) and Beck (1991) proposed the concept of the world risk society, characterized by a “second moder nity,” to address global ecological and economic dynamics or crises. Rather than articulating industrialization and modernization simply as processes of contestation between capitalist economics (for profit and production) and class (labor, in particular), the authors emphasized the relationship between modernization and the environment through the lens of risk, referring to a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and intro duced by modernization itself. According to this theory, modern societies take complex and deliberate risks, necessitating the reliance on scientists for interpretation of scientific knowledge. The problem faced by modern societ ies, therefore, is the loss of faith in the institutions of modernity and, eventu ally, in the prospect of modernizing reflexively.

In the policy realm, there has been an increasing recognition over the past several decades of the role of global politics and international institutions in addressing the contradictions between environmental protection and eco nomic development. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Rio Earth Summit) in 1992 set the founda tion for important global agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Gupta 2014). Scholarship emanating from these global policy advances mostly notes that environmental politics must either be rescaled vertically down toward provin cial and municipal governments or up toward supranational regimes in order

to ensure effectiveness and accountability (Andonova and Mitchell 2010). Still, this global interconnectedness is not necessarily a new phenomenon, as scholars writing on world-systems theory and the environment have already been noting that the history of colonialism should be considered as the main cause of underdevelopment (Gould and Lewis 2008; Roberts and Grimes 2002). The message was that the major environmental problems of our time needed to be understood in relation to the dynamics of an evolv ing world system, such as global inequalities involving core and peripheral zones.

At the national scale, concepts of ecological modernization posit that the market and its main economic actors should not only be interpreted as forces that disturb the environment, but that major economic actors and market institutions can also work in favor of environmental reform (Mol and Janicke 2009). The theory contends that “when talking about ‘repairing’ the design fault of modern industrial modern production, ecological modern ization asks that environmental factors not only be taken into account, but also that they be are structurally ‘anchored’ in the reproduction of these institutional clusters of production and consumption” (Spaargaren, Mol, and Buttel 2006). Using Western European “environmental states” as exemplars, the assumption here is that a process of industrial innovation encouraged by a market economy and facilitated by an enabling and disciplinary state will ensure regulatory progress toward environmental protection (Blowers 1997; Hajer 1996). In the context of nations in the Global North, this theory suggests that the relationship between environment and development is no longer framed around the ills of industrialization, but rather on reforming and restructuring modes of development with regard to environmental laws and policies (Huber 2009), enabling dialogue and negotiation between an en vironmental bureaucratic state and private sector actors (Mol, Spaargaren, and Sonnenfeld 2009).

In contrast to ecological modernization, the theory of the treadmill of pro duction posits the existence of powerful tendencies within both the capitalist market system and the state toward capital-intensive expansionism (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg and Gould 2000). This results in “additions” (essentially pollution) and “withdrawals” (the depletion of nonrenewable resources) (Gould et al. 2008; Mol and Buttel 2002). The treadmill theory asserts that capitalist economic criteria remain at the foundation of decision-making about the design, performance, and evaluation of produc tion and consumption, thus forming a self-reinforcing “treadmill” of produc tion, consumption, and growth towards ever-expanding profits and returns on investments (Gould and Lewis 2008; Pellow and Brulle 2005). Social in stitutions of modern industrial society “lubricate” the treadmill (Gould et al. 2008). The root of the problem is the power of elite institutions to construct reality and define the environmental situation for the mass public, while ex ercising extraordinary material and structural power over both people and ecosystems.

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Both ecological modernization and treadmill of production theories address state political economy, the role of private capitalist production, and the effects on the country’s politics and society. Both theories offer ideas that engage with civil society, such as reflexive modernization, environmental jus tice, and new social movements around the environment. However, these two nation-state level theories suggest a dichotomous conception of how (and under what circumstances) an environmental state forms and promulgates itself. For scholars of ecological modernization, the state and its associating political changes will give rise to private eco-efficiencies and overall envi ronmental reforms ( Mol and Buttel 2002; Buttel 2000). In contrast, tread mill theorists stress the profit-oriented practices of private economic actors, their autonomy relative to the state, and capitalists’ domination over other state interests (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2002).

We see an opportunity – and an imperative – to rethink these two prevail ing concepts, particularly when economic production flows, civil society net works, and ecological risks and impacts are increasingly transnational. Fur thermore, theories of environment and development at the nation-state level derive its context and empirical support from a sample of countries over whelmingly represented by advanced capitalist and social democracies of Western Europe and North America (Blowers 1997). Many of these critiques draw on issues of environmental justice, social movements, and citizenship, as highlighted in the next section.

Social Movements, Environmental Justice, and Environmental Citizenship

The literature on social movements and mobilization around issues of the environment is vast, especially at an age in which resistance against modern ization and development paradigms are pervasive (Castells 1984; Escobar 1995). Under globalization, local movements are mobilized to defend local traditions, enlarge local autonomy of civil society, and resist the intrusion of foreign ideas and global problems (Della Porta and Diani 1999). The study of environmental movements in the development context is couched in terms of cultural differences, territorial defense, and some measure of social and political autonomy (Escobar, Rocheleau, and Kothari 2002; Escobar 1998). Mobilization, therefore, is aimed at building new patterns of socialization and behaviors that are more conducive to democratic discursive designs (Eckersley 2004). Theorists of environmental movements, marginality, and citizenship sometimes also emphasize the important roles played by rural population and by marginalized social groups, such as women and tribal communities (Escobar et al. 2002; Omvedt 1993), who struggle to protect local ecologies for their basic needs and their unique cultural values. This literature is also highly critical of overly technocratic state interventions that are informed by Western ideas of development and modernity, and thus ig noring the “indigenous” knowledge systems and cultural practices employed

by these marginalized groups for ensuring livelihoods and protecting local environments (Rangan 1997; Scott 1999). Therefore, the goal of some of these environmental movements is to promote underlying concepts associated with ecologically responsible statehood (Eckersley 2004) and, eventu ally, leading to environmental and social justice in sustainable development (Van Der Heijden 1999).

Theories of environmental justice are premised on the notion that basic func tions of societies involve the production of both intense ecological harm and extensive social hierarchies. Ecological disorganization and environmen tal inequality and racism are fundamental to the project of modern nation building (Pellow 2007). The environmental justice movement is a political response to the deterioration of the conditions of everyday life as society reinforced existing social inequalities while exceeding the limits of growth (Pellow and Brulle 2005). The movement argues for distribution, recogni tion, participation and capabilities (Schlosberg 2004), and has sought to redefine environmentalism as much more integrated with the social needs of human populations while also challenging the capitalist growth economy (Pellow and Brulle 2005). Similarly, on the development side, theories on alternative development (and alternatives to development) stress the role of the rights of the marginalized and disempowered, local knowledge, and popular, grassroots movements (Escobar 1995; Friedmann 1992; Pieterse 1998). Both schools, therefore, harken back to the ideas of reflexive modern ization as presented by Giddens and Beck, and refer to an age where society is increasingly reflecting and mobilizing against the byproducts of modern industrialization and economic development.

We see ideas of environmental and green citizenship as an effective analyti cal tool to bridge the different scalar conceptions of environment and devel opment relationships that we have outlined. The concept of environmental citizenship portrays a certain level of embeddedness between state and civil society while reflecting on paths of development that attempt to balance environmental sustainability and responsible development (Dobson and Bell 2005; Eckersley 2004). On one hand, citizens engaging in the civic life of the state help to disseminate an ecological sensibility (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Johnston 2011), empower residents, and contribute local knowledge and experience that would be prohibitively costly for outsiders to acquire (Evans 1996). On the other hand, the rationalization of state environmental functions can be fostered through the enrichment of embedded state-society networks with two key actors in civil society: environmental justice move ments and environmental knowledge professionals (Davidson and Frickel 2004). In order for state-based notions and practices of green democratic citizenship to be justified, one needs to cultivate civil society-based notions and practices of democratic citizenship. These civil society practices of envi ronmental citizenship focus on non-state authorized notions of ecology and development where action towards environment and development requires criticism and transformation of state structures and policies (Barry 2006).

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

At the same time, this process promotes synergy and interaction between the community, experts, and decision-makers (Khanna, Babu, and George 1999). The concept of green citizenship, we would argue, is a good tool to navigate theories of development and environment across these different scales because it pits the normative ideals of environmental sustainability and development against traditional conceptions of resource-intensive mod ernization.

Planning and Design, Theory and Practice

Concepts of “sustainability” and “sustainable development” have been in stitutionalized in global development since the World Commission on Envi ronment and Development’s (WCED) “Our Common Future” report (1987), which defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Most definitions of sustainability acknowledge the importance of promoting environmental integrity, social harmony, and eco nomic viability amongst and across places and spaces (Brown et al. 1987; Campbell 1996). Planning practice plays an important role in interrogating and conceptualizing the relationships between different scales of action as well as the actors and networks necessary to promote sustainability.

In an era of increasing global engagement in sustainability, the concept is increasingly being critiqued as being overly vague. Many scholars note that sustainability practice is often susceptible to “green washing,” or does not lead to transformative behavioral change to combat fundamental challenges such as global climate change. Traditional theories of ecological moderniza tion, production, and environmental justice are in a state of flux due to the emergence of new non-state actors, new ecological risks and vulnerabili ties, and new alternative sustainability practices outside traditional global or multilateral policy realms. Furthermore, many scholars argue that human society is on the cusp of entering the Anthropocene, a new geological era in which humans have become the primary driving force behind planetary change (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Parnell 2016; Steffen and Stafford Smith 2013; Steffen et al. 2011). As a result, planning theory and practice must be reconfigured in order to account for these emerging environmental actors, networks, and flows across rapidly changing and interacting scales of governance.

Planning, as a discipline, is particularly suited to this endeavor. Its normative lens, and its specific set of knowledge claims and methods – what ought to be, and how to get there from here – provide the means to understand, inter pret, and change (to broadly invoke Marx). Alongside, in this volume we also emphasize the role of spatial interventions – of design, broadly constituted. Planning scholarship, in particular around issues of environment and justice, have often reinforced divisions between social and spatial. In environmental

planning, for example, it has tended to draw a line between hard, engineered infrastructure, and measures that are more social and political in focus. Is sues of justice, at the same time, have regularly been considered outside the realm of physical planning, and of urban design – even as scholars rue the spatially unequal impacts of social and environmental injustice. And urban design as a field of planning is in need of exploration, and precision. It’s core theoretical lineages – from the modernist, functional CIAM movement to Kevin Lynch and Jane Jacobs’ views of urban social complexity – now show their limitations faced with a set of new, intertwined challenges of climate change, global urbanization, increasingly interconnected social movements, and the surge of megaprojects changing the urban world.

In this issue of Projections, the articles explore the reconfiguration of envi ronment and society relationships in an era of global ecologies. They include empirical studies of sites around the world, explorations in transdisciplinary research and engagement, and speculations on urban and environmental design interventions.

Beginning with a global, historical perspective, Suzanne Song explores the relationship between the British Enclosure movement and contemporary cases of land grabbing in Ethiopia. The author points out the role of for eign investment in African land grabs, in the context of global markets, and the importance of secure tenure and common pool resources in envision ing sustainable development. Then, Hilary Schaffer Boudet looks through the lens of social movements to analyze opposition to liquefied natural gas facilities in thirteen sites across the United States. Focusing on threat lev els, political opportunity, and internal resources, she probes the conditions for and pathways towards successful opposition strategies. Daphne Gond halekar and Adris Akhtar study the political ecology of water infrastructure in Ladakh, India, using field surveys and GIS analysis to study patterns of urbanization and resource degradation, and to propose alternative, more sustainable methods of development. Eman A. Lasheen probes the sociopo litical landscape of waste management in Cairo, Egypt, exploring the com plex social and cultural orders around the work of the Zabbaleen, informal waste pickers, amidst broader political and economic transitions. Alexander J. Felson proposes a method of combining the tools and strategies of urban and landscape design with modes of knowledge of scientific experiments, towards more effective urban ecological research and practice. And to end, Lachlan Anderson-Frank details the urban design and planning proposal for Almere Oosterwold, the Netherlands, by MVRDV. The Dutch architecture and urbanism firm’s proposal offers a new model for Dutch development, bal anced between collectivism and individualism. It is a 21st Century retelling of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City ideals, situated in an emerging context of global economic pressures and Dutch market liberalization.

In addition to the written articles, visual projects engage with the two ex tremes of scales, from the planetary to the local. The cover image, by Nikos

Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Katsikis, is “An Impressionistic Visualization of the Human Impact on the Earth’s Surface,” at the beginning of the 21st Century. Katsikis combines population density, land use patterns, transportation routes, and communications infrastructures to create a composite map depicting human impact on terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Interspersed throughout the volume, Etienne Turpin’s photographs of Jakarta, Indonesia, document the spatial, physical conditions connected to the ongoing debate around chronic, severe flooding and large-scale urban development.

Together, these articles and visualizations illuminate critical pathways to wards theories and methods to grapple with new global conditions.

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Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

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Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

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Global Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Informal residential housing in Mauru Baru, North Jakarta, November 2013. Photo courtesy of Etienne Turpin / anexact office

Enclosure of the Commons in a Global Economy: British Enclosure and African Land Grabbing

Suzanne Song ETH Zürich

Abstract

This paper explores the enclosure of common land in predominantly agrar ian economies where poor rural inhabitants are disproportionally affected. The relentless, capitalist drive to privatize land through what Harvey terms ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is compared and contrasted through two examples; historical British Enclosure and contemporary African Land Grab bing. The analysis examines the national globalization policies implemented that argue economic development, applies the framework of sustainable de velopment to (a) policy impacts on the poor (b) modes of collective action as reactions (c) possible strategic approaches to explore planning alterna tives in Ethiopia to resist processes of accumulation by dispossession. The unsustainable impacts of impoverishment, food insecurity, marginalization, and migration similarly characterize both the historical and contemporary cases of enclosure. Land degradation and resource overuse are additional factors in the delicate Sub-Saharan environment that are a profound deter minant on the fragile conditions necessary for livelihood and environmental sustainability. Land grabbing exacerbates the decreasing supply of produc tive resources available to farmers. Secure tenure and access to common pool resources (CPRs) are critical for sustainable development. Collective ac tion through the cooperative movement in England mobilized internal class struggles that resisted capitalist accumulation through enabled competition in a globalized free market. The growing cooperative movement in Africa is developing competitive potential but land grabbing is embedded at the global level of neo-liberal politics and needs sustained multi-scalar support by international coalitions. An alternative planning model is discussed that combines cooperatives and CPRs to strategically secure land and incorpo rate socioeconomic, sociopolitical and environmental development that di rectly engages rural communities.

Keywords Sustainable development, rural-urban migration, globalization, accumulation by dispossession, cooperatives, commons

Introduction

This paper explores the enclosure of common land in predominantly agrar ian economies where poor rural inhabitants are disproportionally affected. The relentless, capitalist drive to privatize land through what Harvey terms ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is compared and contrasted through two examples; historical British Enclosure and contemporary African Land Grab bing.

The analysis aims to indicate a possible strategic approach integrating the balanced dimensions of sustainable planning in Ethiopia where land, owned by the federal state, as a productive input to the developing economy and a source of livelihood to poor farmers is critical. The dialectic framework addresses the interdependence of complex drivers and impacts of devel opment and suggests a practical planning model based on combining co operatives and common pool resources (CPRs) that would directly engage rural communities, secure land tenure, mobilize collective action to foster socioeconomic and political development, and aid in resisting environmental resource overuse and degradation. Deterring land grabbing by foreign capital and its domestic facilitation would need to be addressed in conjunction with sustained multi-scalar support of international coalitions.

The well-known historical example of British enclosure occurred during the vast demographic change from the 17th to early 19th centuries when popu lation doubled from 1750- 1850 from 11 million to 21 million people (Voth, 2003, p.224; Redford, 1964, p.14) and GDP in the UK rose from £72.6 mil lion to £323.18 million2 Government supported enclosure policy enabled the shift from a rural agricultural to urban industrial economy that facilitated landowner profits from globalized trade and simultaneously contributed to the rise of poverty, ‘paupers and vagrants’ and exacerbated rural-urban mi gration. At that time,3 arguments that claimed enclosure would benefit na tional economic development by increased food production and agricultural efficiency were used to implement governmental policy through the Parlia mentary Inclosure Acts, peaking from 1750-1820 when over 3,800 acts en closed about 7 million acres (2.83 million hectares) of common open field arable, pasture and waste land or approximately 20% of the surface area of the country and transferred use rights solely to private owners (Turner, 1980, p.324; Makki & Geisler, 2011, p.4). In 1500 45% of the land was enclosed, in 1700 61%, by 1914 it was 95% enclosed (Allen, 1994, p.98).

Today, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa and Ethiopia, drought and crop failure contribute to susceptibility to poverty and famine, predominantly af

“…Urbanism is the mode of appropriation of the natural and human environment by capitalism…”

- Guy Debord1

fecting the rural poor. Ethiopia’s population more than doubled from 1975 to 2011 from 33 million to 84.7 million people.5 From 1994 to 2007 the national population growth rate averaged 2.6% though was slightly lower for the urban population of 12 million than the rural population of 62 million.6 Per capita GDP in 1974 is estimated at $110,7 it rose from $636 in 2005 to $979 in 2011 while annual per capita GDP growth fell from 9.2% to 5% in the same period. Government supported policies target economic develop ment through strategic neo-liberal directives that seek private capital investment to transform a smallholder agricultural to an industrialized agricultural economy. The argument of developing the agro-industry by attracting foreign investment capital spurs policy facilitating the transfer of large-scale tracts of agricultural land to foreigners but precludes meeting such domestic de velopment goals. The impacts of land grabbing that disproportionately dis possess poor farmers of common resources exacerbate decreased domestic productive land supply and water resources that impact domestic food secu rity, rural-urban migration, and threats to the environment.

Similar conditions of demographic growth, the targeted shift from an agri cultural to an industrial economy, and policies supporting capitalist accumu lation by dispossession can be traced in both the historical case of Britain and contemporary Ethiopia. Similar effects of globalization that exacerbate poverty, food insecurity, rural-urban migration, and marginalization also characterize both cases. But in the case of England, capitalist accumulation by dispossession was driven by profit-seeking in the emerging industrialized market of globally traded goods and reinforced by governmental policy that privileged domestic land owners returns. It materialized as internal struggles in class politics between landowners, merchants, landless commoners and laborers. While in the case of Ethiopia, capitalist accumulation by disposses sion is embedded in neo-liberal global politics that privileges foreign capital seeking new resources and returns (Harvey, 2004, 2006). Any shifts in do mestic internal class politics are stymied by lack of simultaneous social and economic development, lack of a peasant material base of land and capital, lack of alternatives for livelihood in industrialized sectors and the fragile ecological conditions of environmental degradation impacting food security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Enclosure in Britain

Loss Of Common Land and Poverty

The loss of common land in the manorial open field system during the time of British enclosure meant the loss of sources of food, fuel and income lead ing many to poverty. Neeson (1993) described how milk from a single cow turned out onto common pasture or waste totaled about half of a laborer’s yearly wages. Income from a calf sold at market would substantially cover rent and land tax for the year (Neeson, p.311). Corn from four acres of arable land would feed a family for an entire year.8 Governing of the commons tied

the amount of arable land rented to the number of animals allowable to pas ture. Sheep, cheaper to buy and maintain than cows, additionally provided wool, milk and lambs. Supplemental food and surplus income were lost from game hunting, fishing, berry and nut picking on common woodlands, fallow, marsh and waste. Common land use provided subsistence and livelihood in an economy where the overwhelming expense was food (Neeson, p.313). Sources of fuel, fodder and household materials were lost- dry fallen wood, dead leaves, furze, peat, reeds, rushes, and gleanings were no longer available. Comparatively, the loss of fuel sources became more valuable as coal became an available substitute that was unaffordable for most commoners.

Food Shortages

Food shortages were common during the period of accelerated enclosures after 1750 from rising market prices, especially from blocked trade during the American War of Independence from 1775-1783 and Napoleonic Wars from 1803-1814 (Allen, 1994, p.97; Allen 1999, p. 217).

After 1800, trade fed the expanding British population with rising consump tion and demand for cheaper imported goods. But the rising domestic mo nopoly grain prices that protected British landowners and merchants from foreign competition through the Corn Laws of 1815-1846 and the financial Panic of 1837 led to grievous depression in ‘the hungry forties’.

Unemployment

Unemployment grew parallel to rising food prices. As sectorial shifts and global market conditions shifted around 1760 (Clark, 1998), relative profit ability turned in the favor of privatized land9 and enclosures surged as raising agricultural crops (open fields) shifted to sheep (fenced-in fields) for wool as a raw good for industrial production. Wool exports were high at this time although prices varied depending on quality high (Bowden, 1952). As raising crops was more labor intensive than raising sheep, where only one shepherd tended an entire flock, unemployment rose. The labor oversup ply was compounded by increased population and decreased real wages that limited the ability to buy food. Total pastoral output increased while arable10 decreased in the latter half of the 18th century and then switched the first half of the 19th century (Broadberry et al., 2010, p.43) as raising crops or livestock shifted depending on prices for corn, wool11 and meat (Redford, 1964, p.70-71).

Rural-Urban Migration and Marginalization

Rural-urban migration in pursuit of a better livelihood resulted as a third order effect from the conversion of arable land to pasture based on labor oversupply, unemployment and poverty. Even with overall population growth through the 19th century,12 most accounts described emptying villages. Oth ers stated that agricultural labor was abundant and that migration was de terred by the Poor Laws 160113-183414 and that the “rural population was increasing in an unhealthy fashion” (Redford, 1964, p.68). Internment of

the poor enacted with the Workhouse Test Act of 1723 aimed to stem ruralurban migration and relieve urban tax pressure of poor relief but served to spatially marginalize the growing poor population at the urban periphery as Green (2010) illustrated in London. Depopulation of rural areas occurred due to attraction of higher real wages15 in urban manufacturing centers (Red ford, 1964, p.67) even though the conversion of land from waste and marsh to enclosed arable and pasture was labor-intensive (Turner, 1980)

Intense town growth in the postwar years between 1821 and 1831 occurred coupled with migration to manufacturing centers located in different regions driven by expansive export growth by sequential concentrations of wool, lin en, cotton, and silk goods (Redford, 1964 p.66). An increased flow of raw materials produced or imported, including cotton imports from the cheap slave labor from new world plantations (Blackburn cited by Makki & Geisler, 2011, p.4), manufactured and sold domestically and internationally was due to market growth in international trade and by 1839 textiles totaled 72% of UK exports (Freeman & Louca, 2002, p.22).

Other factors that affected wage and sticky migration was the influx of Irish handloom weavers from 1826-1833 that accepted starvation wages and crowded out the higher skilled British weavers,16 giving local workers false hope of employment at the factories that stayed open (Redford, p.41-42, p.125) and in hinterlands surrounding growing towns, where workers were attracted to higher wages in industry, agricultural workers were scarce and therefore earned the highest real wages (Redford, p.68).17

Enclosure Policy Arguments and the Fallacy of Privatized Farming

It was rumored that enclosure would double or triple rent (Clark, p.74) but according to Allen (1994, p, 119) the rent gain of 23% on enclosed land was attributable to converting waste to productive land and not to higher produc tivity. Young in the late 1760s and later Lord Ernle (1936) used the argument that enclosure of arable land increased farm efficiency and productivity to influence policy (Allen, 1994). Young professed that agricultural improve ment depended on the shift to large-scale farming that would consolidate the small strips of land (Figure b.optional) farmed by commoners into large crop areas (cited by Allen, 1999,p. 209). Although there is some debate among scholars, empirical data showed enclosed land was not more efficient. Al len’s research showed that small-scale peasant farming was as efficient as large-scale capitalist farming and in the 1770s common open field farms were more efficient than enclosed farms (1982, p.950). Although, there may have been marginal increases in productivity and output, claims for gains were grossly exaggerated. He illustrated that during the main period of Par liamentary Inclosure, agriculture was stagnant in terms of productivity and output (1999, p.209).

According to Allen (1982, p.37, p.951) enclosure was rather a mechanism of state sponsored land reform to bring rent from common open field to market

price. The main effect of enclosure was to redistribute income from farm ers to rich land owners (Yelling cited by Allen, 1982, p.950-951). Wealthy landowners who benefitted from rent increases from enclosure had political power and enacted parliamentary policies in their own favor.

Other arguments given by improvers supporting enclosure in the 18th cen tury were: adoption of better crops- deterred by collective management of fields that were dependent on consensus; suppression of animal diseases; and better control of breeding and overgrazing (Allen, 1994). Common field practices were not as ‘backward’ as enclosure advocates claimed, open field villages adopted new crops when profitable although enclosed villages ad opted new methods more fully (Allen, 1994, p.115). Neeson described in de tail how commoners’ livelihood was at stake and for their own best interest, vigilantly monitored for disease, separated animals from the common herd when exposed to markets, and bred and pastured rams and bulls separately (1993, p.122-133). Although Hardin in “The Tragedy of the Commons” in 1968 used common pasture as an example of overuse, according to Neeson (2003), English commons were actually a successful example of equitable distribution of benefits and stemming degradation through stringent stinting regulations and participation of those who were intimately knowledgeable in local practices. The accounts of overstocking were typically of rich farm ers seeking profit and tactically aimed to reduce the compensation owed to commoners at enclosure (Neeson, 2003, p. 88).18 The small scale farming practices and local know-how reflect Ostrom’s (1990) similarities among en during, self-governing CPR institutions.

Land Grabbing in Africa and Ethiopia

Land Grabbing and the Loss Of Common Land

Although Marx first coined the term, land grabbing is defined by White as the large-scale acquisition of land or land related rights and resources by cor porate entities (business, non-profit or public) that creates dispossession of land, water, forests and other common property resources, their concentra tion, privatization and transactions as corporate property- owned or leased, and in turn the transformation of agrarian labor regimes.19

A report on global land grabbing states that 43% of all large-scale land ac quisitions target land already in use for farming by local communities, has a relatively high population density, is easily accessible by transportation and is in fact land for which local farmers compete. Land grabbing of forested land (24% of the deals) and open and closed shrub land/grassland (28% of the deals) also impact the environment and food security (CDE, 2011, p.17). The increasing commercial pressure on land, its increasing price, and the cheap capital offered to foreign-owned capitalist farms favor land grabbing by foreigners, handicaps domestic producers and crowds out lo cal entrepreneurship (De Schutter, 2011; Rahmato, 2011). According to De

Schutter (2011, p.1) “land grabbing increases susceptibility to food price shocks; reduces the land and water access that would reduce poverty; and is destructive to the livelihood of groups depending on common grazing, fishing grounds, and forests.” More than a dozen African countries have given millions of hectares of farmland to foreign investors in the hopes of spurring agrarian development (Rahmato, 2011, p.2).

According to Rahmato, the Ethiopian government has already transferred about 3.5 million hectares of land to foreign investors with a similar amount slated for the next five years (2011, p.25). The nearly 7 million total hectares of land slated for transfer comprises about 38% of land currently used by smallholders (2011, p.12) and often has use rights belonging to individu als and communities, resulting in smallholder dispossession and threatened livelihoods (2011, p.4-5). Ascertaining exact amounts of common land given over to foreign capital is difficult as land registration is an ongoing process. From 2006 building up to 2008 there was a boom of large-scale land trans fers for cut flower exports (2011, p.12). Cotton, food crops (rice, maize, pulses, oil seeds-sesame) and biofuel crops (palm oil trees, jatropha curcas, and castor oil trees) are the main investment interests (2011, p.13). Sugar cane can be used for either food or biofuel.

Poverty, Agricultural Economics and Food Insecurity

Ethiopia, one of the 34 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa of the 49 listed by the United Nations (UN), has the characteristics of: low level of socio-economic development, low and unequally distributed income, low productivity and low capital investment based on a largely agrarian economy, earnings mainly from export of a few primary commodities, little diversifica tion into the manufacturing sector, and political instability and conflicts.20 Income per capita is about one third of the current Sub-Saharan average and about 29% of the rural population (26.8 million people) lives below the national poverty line21 even though economic growth has been fairly high and health services have improved in the last decade (Rahmato, 2011, p.3).

Agriculture accounts for half of the GDP and 90% of export earnings of which coffee is a major source (Assefa, 2007). Crop production of cereals accounts for a majority of agricultural GDP with livestock production con tributing over a quarter as well (Walton, 2006). Smallholders produce 95% of the agricultural GDP that is predominantly subsistence rain fed farming.22 Ethiopia is highly vulnerable to external global terms-of-trade shocks and has periodically encountered food shortages, famine and received food aid from NGOs.23 More than 50% of the gross capital formation of the Gross National Income (GNI) in Ethiopia is financed by aid. The food crisis of 20062008 showed that African countries that are most reliant on food imports are the least resilient to food price shocks (FAO, 2009; Zoomers, 2010, p.434). The complex factors contributing to Ethiopia’s low development and vulner ability are attributed to a combination of: ineffective and inefficient agri cultural marketing systems, underdeveloped transport and communications

networks, underdeveloped production technologies, limited access of rural households to support services, environmental degradation, lack of partici pation by poor rural people in decisions that affect their livelihoods, climatic conditions, a lack of basic infrastructure such as health and education facili ties, and safe drinking water.24

Rural-Urban Migration from Lack of Productive Land

Lack of available sufficiently productive land is the most common cause of the complex phenomenon of rural-urban migration as poor populations seek a means to obtain income and food (UN, 2011). The growing poor urban population drives expansion of built areas into cheaper agricultural hinter land exacerbating the lack of productive land for food production.25 Ruralurban migration and expanding urbanization exacerbates living conditions and competition for livelihood for both poor rural and urban populations.26 As residence is a requirement for securing land tenure it may prevent rural migration (Rahmato, 2011). The periodic food shortages, natural disasters such as drought, and price spikes in the global food commodities market increase migration and forced local displacement. Farmland is characterized by poor soil nutrients27 and is sensitive to degradation and erosion through agricultural practices that further decrease the supply of productive farmland. Land grabbing exacerbates the decreasing supply of productive farm land available for domestic livelihood (Rahmato, 2011, p.25).

Environmental Degradation and Natural Resource Overuse

Hardin’s 1968 “The Tragedy of the Commons” that linked open-access to free rider behavior and ecological impacts of overuse, falls short of describ ing the complex environmental degradation of the fragile ecosystem of natu ral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Ethiopia neither private nor public ownership of natural resources have stemmed the environmental degrada tion now in crisis due to deforestation, overgrazing, soil nutrient depletion, soil erosion, and desertification that is based on the interdependence of natural, socioeconomic, and political systems (Taddese, 2001). The great est contributor to land erosion is dryland cropping28 while other large-scale farming practices29 impact the precarious conditions of degradation. Largescale farming practices by foreign capitalists, such as monocropping that induces low nutrient recycling and low soil fertility, further exacerbate envi ronmental degradation.

Large-scale farming irrigation systems can reduce the existing water supply for smallholders and the flooding watershed can be lost when control is given over to capitalist foreign investors.30 Large-scale farming could also contrib ute to increasing water pollution in Africa, as environmental practices are not well regulated.31 Fighting land degradation, desertification and mitigating the effects of drought are essential for the economic growth and social prog ress of smallholders who are dependent on common resources.32 Capital investment by farmers, such as tree planting, which is expensive but would combat erosion, decreases with unsecure tenure (Taddese, 2001, p.822).

Political Structure of Land Ownership, Secure Land Tenure and Marginalization

The structure of land ownership in Ethiopia has historically been tied to the changing political regime. Under the communist rule of the Marxist Derg Regime, that via popular uprising in 1974 overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie I’s monarchic rule, the lack of public investment into state nationalized land resulted in declines in productivity, soil degradation, erosion and an incapac ity to support the growing population (Deininger, et al., 2007). After the Derg Regime was overthrown in 199133 following the end of aid contributions from the fallen Soviet Regime, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) enacted reforms in 1997 and 2005 claiming federal owner ship of all land that then transferred rights to lease it to regional authorities. The Ethiopian government claims that ‘unused’ or public lands that do not belong to anyone can be used for the greater national good to bring in hard currency by efficient large-scale foreign investors.

Security of tenure, as Rahmato stated, is not robust as centralized state ownership can remove landholders at any time, does so without their par ticipation, and even when compensation is paid it is unfair and inadequate (2011, p.6-7). Peasants fear the loss of land that they consider common property, its resources, and means of livelihood (2011, p. 21). They value prime forestland34 more than possible new employment opportunities that are generated when it is cleared.35 Regional differences play a large role in land tenure and the success of the land registration process. Traditional common land requires first-time registration and a large amount of disputes have been reported (2011, p. 5).

Rahmato concluded, “The state uses its hegemonic authority over the land to dispossess smallholders and their communities without consulting them and without their consent” (2011, p.5). The problem lies in the political structure where the control of all resources belong to the state or the ruling party- who are ultimately responsible for land grabbing, but build a coalition through lo cal administrators and public agents who hold the authority to lease it- which serves to enhance the political advantage of the state (Rahmato, 2011, p.5). Peasants are threatened to only get access to land if they support local administers in the kebele and woreda where most rural people vote based on ethnic loyalties. Infringements on the right to a secret vote rarely lead to prosecutions. Smallholders lose trust in their local authorities that are complicit in investment decisions that lead to dispossession and their loss of livelihood.

The political hegemony of an ‘unfulfilled democracy’ (Pausewang et al., 2002, p.230) and ‘civic marginalization‘ (Rahmato, 2011, p.26) leaves little political voice for smallholders, chance to build a democracy though po litical competition, or shift power from bottom-up organizations without an independent material base (Pausewang et al., 2002, 239-242).36 As White

stated, “Like all agrarian struggles…in all regions of the world it is at the local level that organized social movements are relatively thin and weak” (2012, p.637). Furthermore, civil society institutions have little political voice since the dominant source of public information is government-controlled media (Rahmato, 2011, p. 7).

The progressive widening of the gulf between the social classes due to a high dependence on land resources will increase social and economic inequality (Rahmato, 2003). The haves and have-nots in the rural population will be in creasingly marginalized within the state’s redefinition of the agrarian struc ture (Rahmato, 2011, p.5, 25). While income inequality is low overall, the Gini coefficient rose from 29.8 to 33.6 indicating increased inequality from 2005- 201237 parallel with increased land grabbing. The increasing income divide confirms Harvey’s premise that the redistribution of capital from the masses to the rich is characteristic of neo-liberal policy and domestic actors benefit from neo-colonial processes of accumulation (2006, p.43).

Economic Development Arguments and the Neo-Liberal Policy of Accumulation by Dispossession

Africa would stand to benefit from its abundant potential farmland and large potential for returns on productivity improvements from increasing global: population growth and demand for food, expanding urbanization, and rising incomes (Rahmato, 2011, p.5). The national Ethiopian strategy to capital ize on global market demand hopes to stimulate economic development by accelerating private sector commercial investment to switch from peasant cultivation to large-scale capitalist farming, increasing agricultural modern ization and increasing land for cultivation. But its neo-liberal structure favor ing foreign investors of large-scale land transactions that produce high value agricultural products such as flowers or vegetables (Rahmato, 2011, p.4-8)38 generates little benefit in the domestic economy. Rahmato concluded “Expe rience in other countries has shown that under proper regulation, domestic capital is more likely to act in ways that are socially responsible than its foreign counterpart (2011, p.27).

The goals laid out in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)39 are advocated by the World Bank and adminis tered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD).40 Regional governments facilitate dispossession through transfers of land into a federal consolidated land bank. According to Rahmato, there is no evidence that MOARD objectives are being met, the costs outweigh any benefits gained and governmental regulations are not structured to meet these goals (2011, p.13). The highest rent charged in 25-50 year leases is less than 135 Ethio pian Birr ($10.47 in 2009 dollars) per hectare per year (2011, p.15). Priority for exports and foreign earnings that preclude benefits to domestic markets are structured through tax exemptions that include: duty free input imports, repatriation of profits and dividends, principal and interest payments on external loans, proceeds from technology transfers, and asset sales in the

event of liquidation. There are no apparent formal provisions made to con tribute to domestic food security, domestic labor quotas, environmental pro tection, infrastructure, tech transfer, energy provision, or social investments (2011, p.25). The technology gap between high-tech capitalist farmers and peasants is so large; no achievable benefits to smallholders are affordable or transferrable (2011, p.25). The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) claim that- leasing out land for bioethanol and biodiesel crops would not interfere with food production or jeopardize food security- is dubious (2011, p.10).

Cooperatives and CPRs in a Combined Model41

In both the historical case of England and recently in Africa, cooperative movements arose when the multitude lacking access to basic needs was likely to benefit by pooling resources to gain market power. The lack of trust in a government that could provide basic needs and politically pandered to the capital leverage of global markets left little alternative except collective action. Recently called out by the UN International Year of Cooperatives in 2012,42 cooperatives foster access to private competition, improve the rural economy, promote fair globalization and have the potential of merging eco nomic and social development goals with their “invaluable contribution to poverty reduction, employment generation and social integration” and their “strengths of the cooperative business model as an alternative means of do ing business and furthering socioeconomic development.”43

Historically, the cooperative movement in England, started in 1844 by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, enabled the multitude to gain ac cess to food and essential goods at affordable prices. Through collective action, a material base for political change was accumulated that effectually resisted44 the internal effects of industrialized globalization and the politi cal hegemony of the wealthy class. As a successful example of a consumer cooperative gaining competitive market power, while incorporating socioeconomically sustainable principles45 that equitably distributed returns and promoted participation, the number of cooperatives grew until the end of the 19th century when they consolidated.46

Recently, Ethiopian farming cooperatives have grown to a membership of over 4.5 million people47 with well-known success stories such as the Sidama and Yirgafcheffe cooperative coffee unions (Assefa, 2007). The ‘renaissance’48 of producer, marketing, savings and credit unions, and multi-purpose farmer cooperatives aid competitive market access, social integration and establish structures that can foster democracy and extend to provide educational ser vices. Marginalization of the landless, especially of vulnerable populations,49 has been mitigated through cooperatives, especially when including assign ment of group rights to common property to confront resource degradation (Tamrat, 2010).

While economic development in Ethiopia may be increasing per capita, pov erty reduction of the worse off in rural areas, national food security, land

degradation, migration and marginalization remain highly dependent on the secure tenure of productive land. Registering more common land rights to local villages and collectively governing productive inputs through CPRs would help to secure land tenure for shared use and returns instead of for corporations, public, or foreign capital; foster participation to strengthen democracy; and promote agricultural practices that are ecologically sustain able. Ostrom’s case studies showed that CPRs have been an enduring, ro bust form of organization with an inherent incentive structure favoring the implementation of practices that promote long-term over short-term gain (1990, p.3).

Combining cooperatives with CPRs would integrate socioeconomic develop ment with securing land tenure (Figure 1). An example of a combined model where rural common land was successfully registered for a cooperative vil lage with international support is the woreda Libokemkem for Buranest Ru ral Town, designated the Amhara Model Town in 2010.50 Agency support (capital) was matched by cooperative input (labor) in a participatory plan ning process that organized projects including: bridge and road infrastruc ture, flood control and rainwater harvesting, with housing, renewable energy, farmer education and other services in later phases.

Figure 1. Accumulation by dispossession processes within a sustainable development framework where the dimensions of economic, social and environmental development are addressed by a combined model of cooperatives and CPRs.

Discussion

The similarity in both cases of the ‘relentless quest of capitalism to privatize everything through processes of accumulation by dispossession’51 is clearly differentiated by the historical-geographical conditions surrounding histori cal England and contemporary Ethiopia. While historically, the external forc es of globalization were manifest as internal class struggle, the contempo rary form of neo-liberal globalization through land grabbing is embedded in complex configurations of capitalist overaccumulation52 as a spatial fix from foreign territories and likely as in the case of China, the formation of foreign class power (Harvey, 2006).

Accumulation by Dispossession: Alternatives and Conditions for Sustainable Urban Planning

Alternatives and organization

Alternative politics to failed neo-liberalism form an impetus for a “resur gence of mass movements voicing egalitarian political demands and seeking economic justice, fair trade and greater economic security (Harvey, 2006, p.66).” Alternative planning depends on addressing alternative politics tak ing into account the complexity of urban systems that concentrate goods, services, distributional infrastructure and human capacities yielding syner gies. Planning is a natural platform that synthesizes and organizes the mul tiple forces forming our environment, cross cutting through the physical and social domain. Land as a factor of production needs to be considered as an input that couples the production of food and the production of space simultaneously although disciplines and professional expertise often split along lines of urban and agricultural development and can decompose them as isolated systems.

International mobilization

If the relentless neo-liberal drive for new resources (and capitalist class pow er formation according to Harvey, 2006) by foreign lands that externalizes the negative impacts of dispossession to home territories in Africa, were resisted then organizational efficacy depends on concerted international mo bilization and sustained multi-scalar struggle.53

Practical midterm targets

If the long-term nature of implementing globally embedded transformation (e.g. global climate change initiatives), then practical action targeting midterm improvement is needed to mitigate the exacerbated direct and indirect impacts of land grabbing. The overarching goal remains to integrate eco nomic, social and environmental aspects into development to bring living conditions for the most vulnerable populations in African LDCs to a subsis tence level while improving their security and potential for livelihood.

Sustainable development

Sustainable development in Ethiopia depends on engaging interdisciplinary planning that simultaneously addresses socio-economic and environmental development to generate basic needs such as food and livelihood, to secure land, to deter rural-urban migration, and to foster democracy. It depends on promoting transfer of land and resource rights to rural communities; building on the strengths of their existing social relations; developing organi zational capacity, knowledge and technology transfer, education and health services, complementary industrial capabilities, and environmentally sus tainable farming practices.

As regional market towns have an important part to play in the democratiza tion of Ethiopia, are one of the fastest-growing demographic sectors since the mid 1960s (Pausewang et al., 2002, p.64), and are local attractors of economic activity- they are logical sites to condense regional centralized services.54 Economies of scale and scope play a critical role in agricultural development to target rural development for surrounding farmers with im proved infrastructure to distribute supplies, health services and farmer edu cation (Mellor, 1966, p.345; Juma, 2011, p.114). Innovative projects and research have tested the potentials of urban resources but large-scale imple mentation remains a challenge (e.g. transforming solid urban waste (SUD) into fertilizer, Kiba, et.al., 2011). Synergies could form by focusing capacity building and endogenous development efforts on market towns while simul taneously securing tenure of surrounding farmland.

Further study is needed on combining CPRs with cooperatives or endogenous developments. More empirical data is needed measuring the correlation of foreign land grabbing in Africa and the magnitude of its impacts on: securing and registering land, common resources, food insecurity, land degradation, migration, income inequality, and the ability of agricultural cooperatives to secure common resources and implement sustainable agricultural practice.

Socio-economic sustainability

If aid has the potential to transform the political economy then its efficacy depends on increasing the capital base of the poor. Supporting capacity building, political empowerment, and domestic markets (food aid reforms that foster local developing economies instead of subsidizing production surpluses from developed countries) depends on accountability to avoid fa voring the existing capital of elites and temptation for corruption.

Incentive structures based on matching capital investment by developmental aid agencies with securing collective land rights for indigenous communities (as in the Buranest example) could build robust resistance to neo-liberal national land policies if local organizations are supported by international efforts to retain and defend land rights. Intervening with organizational and capital support directly to local communities could initiate resistance to the dominant forms of neo-liberal accumulation empowering equitable distribu

tion and collective action. Overwriting the negative connotations of agricul tural cooperatives forced on the population in Derg regime’s process of ‘vil lagization’ could occur with more successful examples of a combined model.

Scalable capacity building based on the existing multi-level local, regional and federation organizational structure of cooperatives55 would use devel opment resources efficiently. With inherent checks and balances, returns directly flow to the poor. Economic security and food security could be lever aged through cooperatives to “recuperate human rights politics” (Harvey, 2006, p.57). Capacity building through endogenous development supported by joint efforts of international, public and private organizations would ben efit farmers and increase local knowledge capital56 but may miss opportu nities that build collective participation and self-help skills for farmers to sustainably organize land, water and food systems and secure land tenure.

Social sustainability

If the production of space is to benefit the dispossessed and eventually check neo-liberal accumulation, the dialectic of space at the levels of absolute (fixed land use rights), relative (flows of capital investment), and relational space (socio-economic and political) needs to be considered simultaneously (Harvey, 2006, p.135). Combining multi-purpose cooperatives (agriculture, housing, credit and savings) with CPRs (water, land, forestry, fisheries) in a value chain would be more efficient and effective for communities, improve chances of extending social services57 (education, industrial transformation/ diversification), foster entrepreneurial business activity and resist political marginalization. Partnering with local organizations in Ethiopia would pro vide knowledge of operations at a local level and encourage participatory governance.

Class power formation, as the inevitable outcome of accumulation by dis possession and land grabbing, needs to be curbed at the global level by international mobilization while transferring land rights to communities to avert domestic capitalist accumulation at the local level. If Harvey’s asser tion holds true then the “mission of the neoliberal state to create a ‘good business climate’ that heralds capital accumulation as the only way to foster growth and eradicate poverty by seeking privatization of assets would de clare competition but open the market to centralized capital and monopoly power” (2006, p.25).

Environmental sustainability

If the alternative politics of ‘reclaiming the commons movement’ is a re sponse to historical neo-colonial struggles (Harvey, 2006, p.64) then contem porary neo-liberal processes of land grabbing could follow a similar path. A combined model could avert capitalist privatization of land and environmen tal degradation if community use rights are secured. The model combines what Harvey calls alternatives and social movements: “local experiments with new production and consumption systems with different social relations

and ecological practices” (2006, p.64) and “pragmatic solutions to immediate problems of social or political exclusions or particular environmental degradations and injustices”(2006, p.111).

Acknowledgement of accumulation by dispossession in planning Acknowledging the ‘failed utopian project’ of neo-liberal accumulation by dis possession in Sub-Saharan Africa by planning means: understanding modes and channels of capitalist accumulation and focusing attention directly on tactics for local participation and secure tenure; engaging international de velopment organizations across sectors, who conversely engage planners, to focus investments from aid, capital and research into scalable, practical and synergistic planning alternatives that are structured to build the capacity of the rural poor; simultaneously addressing the interdependent economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development through terri torial relationships of land, food, capital, built and sociopolitical space; and recognizing the organizational complexity involved, sustained multi-scalar struggle necessary on all fronts, and influence of planning with its boundary of delimitation.

Author’s note: The time to prepare a portion of this research was generously granted by Prof. Dr. Marc Angélil, Chair for Architecture and Design, Institute of Urban Design, Network City Landscape, at the Department of Architecture, ETH Zürich. The cooperatives research was supported in part by an ETH North-South Centre Programme and Partnership Development Grant.

Notes

1 Debord, G. (1994). The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone p.121.

2 Figures from: http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk

3 “With the dawn of the Tudor period began the general movement which gradually transformed England into a mercantile country. The amount of money in actual use was increasing; men possessed more capital, could borrow it more easily, and lay it out to greater advantage. Commerce permeated national life. Feudalism was dead or dying, and trade was climbing to its throne. The Middle Ages were passing into modern times.” (Ernle, 1936)

4 A longer period of accounting for the first and last Parliamentary Acts between 1604-1914 comprises 5265 Parliamentary Acts (Turner, 1980, p.32).

5 Figures from: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/ pdf/policy/WPP2011/Country_Profiles/Ethiopia_Demographic.pdf

6 Addis Ababa with 2.7 mil. of the population had a growth rate of 2.1% while agricultural regions such as Oromia with 27 mil. and SNNP with 15 mil. that are predominantly agricultural producers, had a higher growth rate than Addis Ababa of 2.9%. Amhara with 17 mil. had a growth rate of 1.7%. Population figures from Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 (1994-2007) Population and Housing Census, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission Addis Ababa, 2008.

7 Figures from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2868. pdf

8 In Medieval times, 12 acres were needed to produce enough corn to feed a family for a year. By 1800 the yield of corn had increased so that only 4 acres were needed to produce the same amount. Crop rotation was part of the sustainable agricultural practice that increased productivity with Spring planting, Fall planting and a field left fallow for regeneration of soil nutrients. A fourth replenishing fodder crop such as alfalfa or clover was added later that in turn provided rich manure for fertilization. Ja cobs attributed the population increase described by Malthus as being possible from increased soil fertility and livestock (Neeson, 1993, p.13; Jacobs, 1969, p.16-17).

9 About 80% of the costs were real investments on land improvement- fences, roads, and drainage. They were made cost effective through increases in rent, cost of capi tal, and real rent relative to wages (Clark, 1998, p.100).

10 In absolute terms, more land was arable by 1850 because much of the contribu tion was from converted waste (Allen, 1994, p.117).

11 See Ernle (1936) for Tudor enclosure that was mainly due to the growing wool trade that substituted pasture for tillage and sheep for corn.

12 Increasing population followed plague outbreaks, poor harvests in the 1590s and rising food prices that led to social unrest, and food and enclosure riots in 1598

(Slack, 1984, p.4). According to Slack in the 16th century, population increased faster than productivity and prices rose faster than wages so the purchasing power of labor dropped about 25% until around 1620. The previous impoverishment of farmers due to lack of secure tenure contributed to the growing poor population. The heavy migration of the large class of underemployed and working poor, made vagrancy visibly threatening. Under the reign of Elizabeth the underemployed poor and vagrant were accused of laziness and stigmatized. The Old Poor Law of 1601 aimed to promote social welfare by turning over administration of the poor from overburdened governments to church parishes.

13 Laws leading up the 1601 Poor Law include the 1547, 1551, 1563, 1572, 1576 and 1598 Tudor statutes that developed poor relief, taxation and outlawed begging and vagrancy for the able bodied (Slack, 1984, p.1; Snell, 1992, p.161).

14 The 1834 Act was seen to amend regulation of poor relief seen as the pauper supporting structure that subsidized low wages through the Speenhamland system.

15 Around this time in 1817 Ricardo’s seminal theory of comparative advantage that articulated labor, mobile through migration, would produce real returns to owners of manufacturing or land depending on whichever input was more intensively used for traded goods.

16 Some skilled laborers did not migrate, for instance when handloom weaving in Manchester was replaced by power looms in Lancashire.

17 See Jacobs (1969) chapter “Cities first- rural development later“ and Ricardo’s real wages.

18 Neeson (2003) gave a detailed account of how in the case of a threatened situa tion pastures were simply stinted. The manorial courts and by-laws strictly defined and punished overstocking of livestock on common pasture. Complaints of exces sive rent and subsequent overstocking of commons were reported in 1520 in Tudor England, (Blanchard, 1970, p.439).

19 Marx first coined the term, “Land grabbing on a great scale… is the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great scale. Hence this sub version of agriculture puts on, at first, more the appearance of a political revolution” (Marx 1906 [1867] Capital, Vol. I., p. 470 cited by White et. al., 2012, p.621).

20 Figures from the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/

21 Figures from International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, http://www. ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/ethiopia

22 Figures from International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, http://www. ruralpovertyportal.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/ethiopia

23 Ethiopia has had severe food shortages and famines, in 1985/1986 hundreds of thousands of people died, in 2002/2003 13 mil. rural people were starving. In 2009, 22% of the rural population and were dependent on food and safety net programs,

the number has dropped to 8 mil. rural people. Undernourishment rose in Africa from 2007 to 2008 from 220 mil. to 240 mil. people (Rahmato, 2011, p.3).

24 International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, http://www.ruralpovertypo rtal.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/ethiopia

25 Country wide only one sixth of the population lives in urban centers but with 77 million inhabitants a large absolute number lives in cities with 80% in substandard housing. Cities grew at 4.1% compared to 2.7% overall with values differing depend ing on region, 2008 figures from http://www.unhabitat.org.

26 Basic needs such as housing and food account for 50% of median income in Ad dis Ababa and 79% in Bahir Dar (Planning and Development Cooperative Internation al PADCO, 1998 Figures cited by Asefa, 2007). In comparison, 10.3% of income is spent on food in Switzerland (World Health Organization Nutritional Stunting 20032008 cited by Washington State University). For the urban poor, income available for food is decreased by the high price of housing driven by short supply. In Addis Ababa, the capacity of municipal governments to face affordable housing shortages is overwhelmed (Asefa, 2007); a systemic problem contributing to slum formation and exacerbated by rural-urban migration.

27 Ethiopian soils are nutrient deficient and cannot sustain high crop yields unless fertilized (FAO, 2006).

28 According to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, two thirds of Africa consists of desert or drylands, where three quarters of land is already classified to differing degrees under the precarious condition of degraded. http://www.unccd.int/ en/regional-access/Africa/Pages/alltext.aspx

29 Other large-scale farming practices: for crops- ploughing on steep slopes induces soil erosion, burning dung for fuel instead of returning nutrients to the soil as fertil izer contributes to low soil fertility, while for raising livestock- using leftover crop stubble for winter feeding leaves no ground cover and contributes to erosion, hooves destroy vegetation and compacts the soil so water can not infiltrate which causes more sedimentation and erosion (Taddese, 2001, p.820-821)

30 http://farmlandgrab.org/post/print/20147

31 Pollution is defined by salinization, microbiological contamination, eutrophi cation, excess nutrients, acidification, metal pollutants, toxic wastes, saltwater contamination, thermal pollution, and increases in total suspended solids, as well as natural pollutants (such as arsenic and fluoride) (Rosegrant, 2009, p.209).

32 http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/ ethiopia

33 See Jembere & Woldemelak (2011) “Preface” and “Chapter Three: Social Transformation.” The socialist Derg regime under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam formed two periods: 1974-1987 comprised the Provisional Military Admin istrative Council (PMAC) and the 1987 Constitution formed by the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE); 1987-1991 comprised the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) established in 1991

is the current legal structure of the country, established under the Constitution of 1994, when the EPRDF was voted into power under Meles Zenawi.

34 For an account of deforestation in Ethiopia see James McCann, (1997). “The Plow and the Forest, Narratives of Deforestation in Ethiopia 1840-1992,” Environmental History, p.138-159.35 See Lucky Exports in the case study by Rahmato, 2011, p23.

36 See: “Conclusions“ in Pausewang et al., 2002; James C. McCann, “Prospects for Democracy, Agro-ecology and Civil Society: The election in Amhara Region, Ethiopia’s Rural/Urban Hinterland” in Pausewang et al., 2002.

37 Figures from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ and http://data.worldbank.org

38 See Rahmato (2011, p.9) for policy documents: The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development MOFAD 2006 Document Ethiopia: Building Progress: A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). Addis Ababa, September.vv The Agricultural Development Policy, Plan for Accelerated and Sustain able Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) covers the period 2005-2010. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia FDRE 2002a : Re-Enactment of the Investment Proclamation. Proclamation No. 280, Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa, July 2003a: A Proclamation to Amend the Investment Re-Enactment Proclamation No. 280/2002. Proclamation No. 375, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa, October.

39 Summarized: (1) produce export crops and hence increase the country’s foreign earnings; expand production of crops needed for agro-industry such as cotton and sugar cane, (2) create employment opportunities in the localities concerned, (3) ben efit local communities through the construction of infrastructure and social assets such as health posts, schools, access to clean water, (4) provide the opportunity for technology transfer, (5) promote energy security.

40 In 2010, The Council of Ministers designated MOARD as the lead agency respon sible for land transfers. Over 5000 hectares were consolidated from regions (Rah mato, 2011, p.10).

41 The combined model of multi-purpose cooperatives built upon CPRs was devel oped for the Buranest Rural Town Project in Amhara, Ethiopia with village partici pation. It is in the process of being established. It was proposed for research by a consortium of academic and professional contributors involved with the ETH NorthSouth Centre Programme and Partnership Development Grant and Swiss Programme for Research on Global Issues for Development Pre-proposal on Thematically Open Research in 2012 at the Chair of Prof. Dr. Marc Angélil. 42 http://social.un.org/coopsyear/ 43 http://social.un.org/index/Cooperatives.aspx

44 Earlier instances of resistance to enclosure include the Diggers and Levelers of mid 17th century England, Rousseau in 1755, and those outlined in Neeson (1993) Chapter “Resisting Enclosure.”

45 http://www.ica.coop/coop/principles.html), http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/ history-co-operative-movement, http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-

values-principles

Cooperatives: 3 Values and 7 Principles. 3 Values: Honesty, Openness, Social Re sponsibility. 1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership. 2nd Principle: Demo cratic Member Control. 3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation. 4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence. 5th Principle: Education, Training and Information. 6th Principle: Co-operation among Co-operatives. 7th Principle: Concern for Community.

46 See Holyoake, The History of the Rochdale Pioneers at http://www.malcsbooks. com/self-help-by-the-people-the-history-of-the-rochda.php.

47 Cooperative Union distribution by region: Oromia 39.9%, Amhara 23.1%, Tigra 16.1% (Emana, 2009). The Amhara region had 24 multipurpose cooperative unions in 2007 (Emana, 2009) with 588 affiliated primary cooperatives (Veerakumaran, 2007).

48 See Develtere et al., 2008.

49 Women who may not be eligible to lease land are considered especially vulner able to poverty. The Amhara region has more female than male cooperative members citing Annual Report on Cooperatives for the year 2004/2005 (Develtere et al., 2008, p.134).

50 See http://www.nestown.org/content/buranest-town-project-amhara-model-town

51 Comment from anonymous reviewer.

52 China’s infrastructural projects import foreign capital and labor into Ethiopia. See Delz, S. (30.04.2012). Development At All Costs. Urban Mutations on the Edge Re search Seminar. Lecture conducted from the Chair of Prof. Dr. Marc Angélil, Depart ment of Architecture ETH, Zürich. http://www.angelil.arch.ethz.ch/?g=genfe331b2f8 18181905fa9b023016ff869

53 Comment from anonymous reviewer.

54 See section “Peasant farms serviced by large-scale serving agencies” in Mellor, 1996, p.373.

55 See Emana, 2009.

56 Exploring diversification of income through core support strategies of endog enous development that focus on knowledge acquisition (CECIK, 2010, p.12). “Endogenous Development (ED) can be understood as localized change that is es sentially initiated from within communities, mobilizes and harnesses local resources, and retain benefits within the locality. It consists of a set of collective capacities to undertake local initiatives that are determined, led, and controlled by local people and communities, to improve well-being, that draws from both internal and external resources. Endogenous development is based on local peoples’ own criteria of de velopment, and takes into account not just the material, but also the social, cultural and spiritual well-being of peoples.”

57 Comment from Peter Schmid, President Allegemeine Baugenossenschaft Zürich ABZ, Working Meeting 14.05.2012.

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An “Insiteful” Comparison: Contentious Politics in Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Siting

Hilary Schaffer Boudet Oregon State University

Abstract

Mobilization against proposals for industrial facilities has long puzzled researchers and planners. I focus on three factors drawn from the study of social movements – threat, political opportunity and resources – to explain opposition to thirteen proposals for liquefied natural gas facilities in the U.S. Findings indicate that low threat projects in communities with low political opportunity and limited resources attract little opposition and are approved. More threatening projects in communities with limited internal resources attract opposition from outsiders and result in failed projects. Finally, two pathways result in successful, widespread opposition: either the combina tion of a high threat project in a community with high political opportunity or a project proposed in a community with internal resources.

Keywords citizen participation; energy; politics and society; facility siting; mobilization

Introduction

Mobilization against proposals for large industrial facilities or locally un wanted land uses (LULUs) – hazardous waste disposal sites, landfills, power plants, etc. – has long puzzled researchers, policy makers, planners, propo nents and activists. Through an in-depth analysis of two proposals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) offload terminals1 in California, Boudet and Ortolano (2010) showed that three factors, drawn largely from the study of social movements, could be used to explain mobilization against LULUs: (1) the potential risk posed by the proposal (i.e., threat) (2) the openness of the decision-making structure associated with the proposal (i.e., political op portunity) and (3) the affected community’s resources.2 The rush to site LNG in the early 2000s, which resulted in more than 50 proposals (of which only seven were built), provides an ideal laboratory to understand opposition to large-scale energy infrastructure. Companies propose projects to which regu lators and communities respond, resulting in a race among companies to obtain permits and begin construction prior to market saturation (McAdam and Boudet 2012; Boudet 2011). Currently, the siting of shale extraction and LNG facilities in the U.S. is following a similar course to LNG. Thus, under standing the dynamics of opposition to LNG can provide important insights for similar races to site energy infrastructure.

I expand the analysis in Boudet and Ortolano (2010) in three ways. First, I more thoroughly investigate the role of external resources, in terms of both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and state officials, in opposition ef forts. Second, I examine mobilization against eleven additional LNG propos als from around the United States. Unlike in Boudet and Ortolano (2010), my sample contains examples of both successful and unsuccessful propos als, allowing for connections to be made between mobilization and project outcome. Third, I devise a methodology that allows for the study of a larger number of cases, while maintaining the richness of in-depth fieldwork. In doing so, I develop ways to measure the difficult concepts of threat, political opportunity, resources and mobilization using readily-available data sources validated by fieldwork in each community. Such an approach paves the way for future applications of this framework to studies containing a larger num ber of cases.

My examination of thirteen LNG proposals generates three major hypoth eses that merit additional exploration in future research. First, low threat projects in communities with limited access to decision makers (low political opportunity) and limited resources attract little, mainly local, opposition and are approved and often built. Second, even in communities with relatively limited resources, more threatening projects attract opposition from outsid ers. To the extent these projects are located in communities with better ac cess to decision makers (higher political opportunity), opposition develops. The result is failed projects, either through rejection by regulatory officials

or withdrawal by the company. Third, high resource communities launch suc cessful opposition efforts, regardless of threat or access to decision mak ers. These findings point to the important role played by external NGOs and state officials in opposition efforts against threatening projects, particularly in communities with limited internal resources.

The paper proceeds as follows. I first briefly summarize the relevant litera ture. Then, I provide information about my research methods and variable measurement. Finally, I discuss the community response exemplified by my cases and how the abovementioned factors relate to mobilization and project outcomes.

Relevant literature

I draw on two sets of literature for this analysis: (1) studies of facility siting and NIMBY response and (2) studies of social movements. Both of these literatures have been reviewed extensively elsewhere. The literature on fa cility siting and NIMBY response has been reviewed, for example, by Rabe (1994), Boholm (2004), Lesbirel and Shaw (2005), Schively (2007), Boudet (2010) and Boudet and Ortolano (2010). And the literature on social move ments has been reviewed by McAdam et al. (2001), Caniglia and Carmin (2005), Buechler (2007), Boudet and Ortolano (2010), and McAdam and Boudet (2012). My analysis draws on the political process model of social movements, which, as shown by Boudet and Ortolano (2010), can serve as a unifying framework of the factors and processes at work in driving opposi tion to LULUs.

In developing the political process model, McAdam (1999[1982]) identified three factors which are necessary for movement emergence: (1) threat, (2) political opportunity and (3) resources. These factors map onto three key factors identified in the literature on facility siting and NIMBY response: (1) project risks, (2) decision-making processes and (3) community character istics. For this reason, I draw on the political process model to structure my analysis of thirteen attempts to site LNG facilities.3 I discuss each of these factors in more detail below.

Threat

The siting of an industrial facility presents the possibility of many different grievances or “threats” (e.g., to public safety, health, environment, quality of life) around which a community can mobilize. In the technical and planning literature, these aspects of a facility are often referred to as “risks” (Boholm 2004; Freudenburg 2004; Schively 2007). Following Almeida (2003), threat is defined as “…probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively” (347). Local en vironmental action is often initiated in response to a perceived health risk or threat (Carmin 2003; Freudenburg 1984; Walsh and Warland 1983; Walsh, Warland, and Smith 1993). Moreover, the existence of a threat is particularly important “…in polities where there is some expectation of state respon

siveness and few formal barriers to mobilization…” as in the U.S. (McAdam 1999[1982], xi).

Political opportunity

Social movement scholars also point to aspects of the broader political context, or “political opportunity structure,” as important determinants of movement emergence (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004). Theorists in this tra dition suggest that movements emerge when political elites become more receptive or vulnerable to movement demands (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). This receptivity may result from openness in the institutionalized political system, internal divisions among political elites, or increasing power associated with movement groups (Mc Adam 1996). Similarly, researchers on facility siting have highlighted the importance of fair procedures for decision-making and citizen input in deter mining attitudes toward proposals (Freudenburg 2004; Frey and OberholzerGee 1996; Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, and Aarts 1993).

In recent years, the concept of political opportunity structure has come un der increasing criticism. On one hand, it is seen as too broad, subsuming many conceptually different ideas, mechanisms and measurements (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). On the other, it is too narrow, focusing predominantly on state actors without regard for other important economic institutions – e.g., corporations, banks – who have increasingly become targets of activism (Schurman 2004; Pel low 2007). Here, I address the first criticism by limiting my definition of the concept to refer to how open the institutionalized political system is to the claims of movement actors. However, this decision limits my ability to ad dress the second criticism. Future work should examine the role of “indus try opportunity structures” (Schurman 2004) on community mobilization against siting proposals.

Resources

Resource mobilization theory within social movements’ scholarship suggests that resources, both from within the community and outside the community, supply groups with the capability to organize and take action (Carmin 2003; McCarthy and Zald 1977). I consider each type of resources – internal and external – in turn.

Internal (local) resources

Both organizational capacity and past experience opposing industrial pro posals proved to be important in the two in-depth case studies by Boudet and Ortolano (2010). Research on individual attitudes toward LULU propos als has shown that higher income, younger and more educated homeowners are more likely to oppose LULUs (Dear 1992; Hunter and Leyden 1995). Moreover, Freudenberg and Gramling (1993) found education level to be the only consistent determining factor of individual oppositional attitudes to LULUs. Education affords communities important internal resources (e.g.,

engineers and scientists, who understand technical issues, or lawyers, who are familiar with legal procedures). In sum, Carmin (2003) describes, “four types of resources…frequently associated with local action and responses to community threats: organizations, funding, information and experience” (45). I consider all four factors when measuring the internal resources avail able in each community.

External (nonlocal) resources

Making a distinction between internal and external resources, resource mo bilization scholars argue that, particularly for groups with limited resources, external resources are critical for mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Moreover, many scholars view the social appropriation of existing organiza tions into movement activities as particularly important (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Walsh, Warland, and Smith 1997). Thus, I fo cus my measure of external resources on the appropriation of both nonlocal governmental officials and NGOs.

Research Approach

Case selection

I examined thirteen LNG proposals from across the country. The three Cali fornia cases (Mare Island Energy Project, Long Beach LNG and Cabrillo Port) were included as easily accessible case studies for in-depth data collection and fieldwork. Newly proposed energy projects, other than the three Califor nia cases, were selected randomly from the CSA Illumina Digests of Environ mental Impact Statements (EISs). This database catalogues announcements related to EISs from the Federal Register. Almost all LNG proposals have re quired an EIS.4 The population of projects from which the sample was drawn included only projects that completed a FEIS between 2004 and 2007. Of course, this excluded projects like the Mare Island Energy Project that were announced but withdrawn before an EIS was started. These search criteria resulted in the selection of 49 proposals that constituted the population from which projects would be selected. I then randomly sampled 18 projects for inclusion in a larger research project on energy facility siting. Ten of the 18 projects were LNG proposals. For the analysis presented herein, I include these 10 LNG proposals and the 3 California proposals. Information about each of these cases is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Selected cases

Proposal

Proponent

Location

Projected cost (million $) Timeframe

Affected community On- or off-shore start end

Cabrillo Port BHP Oxnard, CA Malibu, CA Offshore (14 mi.) 550 Aug-03 May-07

Compass Port ConocoPhillips Mobile County, AL Offshore (11 mi.) 500-800 Mar-04 Jun-06

Corpus Christi LNGCheniere EnergySan Patricio County, TXOnshore 500May-03Apr-05

Creole Trail Cheniere EnergyCameron Parish, LAOnshore 900Jan-05May-06

Crown Landing BP Gloucester County, NJ New Castle County, DE Onshore 500 Dec-03 Mar-08

Freeport LNG Freeport LNG Brazoria County, TX Onshore 300 Sep-01 Jun-04

Gulf Landing Shell Cameron Parish, LA Offshore (38 mi.) 700 Oct-03 Mar-07

KeySpan KeySpan Providence, RI Onshore 100 Oct-03Jun-05

Long Beach LNGSound Energy Solutions Long Beach, CA Onshore 350Mar-03June-08

Mare Island EnergyBechtel and ShellVallejo, CA Onshore1500May-02Feb-03

Northeast Gateway Excelerate Energy Gloucester, MA Offshore (13 mi.) 200 Jun-04 May-07

Sabine Pass Cheniere Energy Cameron Parish, LA Onshore 500 May-03 Dec-04

Vista del SolExxonMobil San Patricio County, TXOnshore 600Oct-03Jun-05 1

Data collection

I employed a systematic process to collect data for each case, combining desktop research and on-the-ground fieldwork. The local newspaper of the community affected by the proposal was searched for relevant articles, edi torials and letters-to-the editor concerning the proposal. Most of the local newspapers were available in a searchable format either via Newsbank’s America’s Newspapers database, LexisNexis or directly from the newspaper’s website or editors. The newspapers were searched for terms relevant to each case. My research team read and catalogued the resultant articles, letters-tothe-editor and editorials to accomplish the following: (1) develop a narrative of each case to systematize our understanding of the events surrounding the LNG proposal and (2) identify active individuals and organizations for future interviews. In addition, the section of the Environmental Impact State ment (EIS) devoted to public comments and letters was also examined to confirm the results of the newspaper analysis and identify any additional actors for interviews. In addition to information from newspapers and EISs, we also collected relevant data from the Census Bureau and National Center for Charitable Statistics on socioeconomic information, education levels, and organizational capacity for each community prior to the proposal.

Armed with this information, I conducted site visits to each affected com munity from July 2006 to January 2010 to conduct 106 interviews with key participants identified in the newspapers and to collect organizational data from local groups active in the siting process.5 On average, interviews lasted a little over an hour and were structured as a guided conversation. They fo cused on the (1) major issues and active groups in the community prior to

the LNG proposal, (2) major issues and active groups during the debate of the LNG proposal, and (3) activities undertaken by these groups to express opposition to the LNG proposal.6

In addition to validating and elaborating upon the information found in news paper articles, these site visits provided local perspectives on the level of mobilization and controversy surrounding each proposal. The intent was to capture a “panel of informants” (Weiss 1994) representing different stake holders in the debate – elected officials, decision makers, agency staff, proj ect proponents, supporters and opponents. In addition, newspaper staff members who had closely followed the events surrounding the proposal were interviewed. Two communities – Cameron Parish, Louisiana and Corpus Christi, Texas – were the site of multiple proposals from my sample.

For these proposals, the same informants provided information about the cases in the community.7 Table 2 provides information about data collection for each case. The appendix provides additional information about interview ees cited in the text.

Table 2: Data collection for each case

Table 2: Data collection for each case

Proposal Newspaper ArticlesLetters / Editorials

Interviews # (average length in minutes)

Proposal Newspaper Articles Letters / Editorials

Interviews # (average length in minutes)

Cabrillo Port Ventura County Star Malibu Times 139 89 417 122 24 (78)

Compass Port Mobile Press-Register 66 71 9 (57)

Cabrillo Port Ventura County Star Malibu Times 139 89 417 122 24 (78)

Corpus Christi LNG Corpus Christi Caller-Times 64 4 8 (46)

Compass Port Mobile Press-Register 66 71 9 (57)

Creole Trail Cameron Parish Pilot 70 0 6 (38)

Corpus Christi LNG Corpus Christi Caller-Times 64 4 8 (46)

Crown Landing Wilmington News Journal Gloucester County Times 130 110 12 28 10 (50)

Creole Trail Cameron Parish Pilot 70 0 6 (38)

Crown Landing Wilmington News Journal Gloucester County Times 130 110 12 28 10 (50)

Freeport LNG Brazosport Facts 75 12 8 (64)

Gulf Landing Cameron Parish Pilot New Orleans Times-Picayune 70 22 0 n/a 6 (68)

Freeport LNG Brazosport Facts 75 12 8 (64)

Gulf Landing Cameron Parish Pilot New Orleans Times-Picayune 70 22 0 n/a 6 (68)

KeySpan Providence Journal 108 40 6 (76)

KeySpan Providence Journal 108 40 6 (76)

Long Beach LNG Long Beach Press-Telegram 154 101 8 (97)

Long Beach LNG Long Beach Press-Telegram 154 101 8 (97)

Mare Island Energy Vallejo Times-Herald 81 237 16 (68)

Mare Island Energy Vallejo Times-Herald 81 237 16 (68)

Northeast Gateway Gloucester Daily Times 144 46 4 (46)

Northeast Gateway Gloucester Daily Times 144 46 4 (46)

Sabine Pass

Sabine Pass Cameron Parish Pilot Beaumont Enterprise 70 9 1 n/a 6 (38)

Cameron Parish Pilot Beaumont Enterprise 70 9 1 n/a 6 (38)

Vista del Sol Corpus Christi Caller-Times 64 6 8 (46)

Vista del Sol Corpus Christi Caller-Times 64 6 8 (46)

Note: For newspapers that cover more than one proposal in the sample, the count includes all articles written about any of the proposals in the sample in that newspaper, i.e., it is not divided out by proposal.

Note: For newspapers that cover more than one proposal in the sample, the count includes all articles written about any of the proposals in the sample in that newspaper, i.e., it is not divided out by proposal.

Variable measurement

I focus my analysis on the three causal conditions identified in the political process model – threat, political opportunity and resources – and the rel evant outcomes – mobilization and project success or failure. Following the traditions of grounded theory and case study research, the operationaliza tion of each variable was continuously refined throughout the research pro cess. Variables for each case were scored as high, medium or low based on fieldwork and using criteria drawn from comparisons across cases. The goal of the measurement strategies described herein is to set up a structure to move from time-intensive qualitative data collection to readily-available data sources to pave the way for future application of this framework to studies containing a larger number of cases. The richness from the qualitative data is presented below in the results section to demonstrate the more detailed information used to validate these measurement strategies. See the techni cal appendix for data by case.

Threat

To measure the threat posed by the proposal, I constructed a metric based on the location and regasification technology of the facility – key factors high lighted in newspaper articles and interviews.8 If the facility was to be located onshore, a distinction was made between those facilities located in popu lated areas (greater than 2009 people per square mile) and those located in unpopulated areas (less than 200 people per square mile).9 Facilities located in populated areas pose more of a threat than those in unpopulated areas. If the facility was to be located offshore, a distinction was made among the several technologies available for regasification. These technologies can be divided into two categories: open-loop and closed-loop. Open-loop technolo gies use seawater to warm the LNG. Closed-loop technologies use air or burn a portion of the imported natural gas for warming. The National Marine Fisheries Service, state fisheries regulators, environmental organizations and fishing groups have expressed serious concerns about how the use and release of seawater by open-loop technologies may affect surrounding fish populations. Thus, many viewed open-loop technologies as more threatening than closed-loop.10

In light of these considerations, the operationalization of threat for facili ties was as follows (see Table 3). The threat associated with the facility was scored as high if the proposal was located onshore in a populated area. The threat was scored as medium if the facility was located offshore with open-loop regasification. Finally, the threat was scored as low if the proposal was located onshore in an unpopulated area or offshore with closed-loop regasification.

Table 3: Levels of threat for LNG proposals

Score Criteria Cases

High (n=4)

Medium (n=2)

Low (n=7)

Onshore, populated Crown Landing KeySpan Long Beach LNG Mare Island Energy

Offshore, open-loop Compass Port Gulf Landing

Onshore, unpopulated or Offshore, closedloop

Cabrillo Port Corpus Christi LNG Creole Trail Freeport LNG Northeast Gateway Sabine Pass Vista del Sol

Political opportunity

To measure the political opportunity for mobilization against the proposal, I constructed a metric based on the jurisdiction (i.e., local, state or federal) and process of selection (i.e., percent elected) of key decision makers influencing the fate of the proposal (see Table 4). If key decision makers were elected, information was included on whether they faced an upcoming elec tion. This measure gives a sense of how accessible and responsive decision makers would be to concerns expressed by members of the affected commu nities. Political opportunity associated with the facility was scored as high if key decision makers were located at the local level and elected and facing an upcoming election. Political opportunity was scored as medium if key deci sion makers were located at the state or local level and elected but not facing an upcoming election. Finally, political opportunity was scored as low if all key decision makers were located at the federal level and none were elected.

Resources

Internal (local) resources

To measure the resources available in the affected community for mobiliza tion, a metric was constructed based on education levels (to represent infor mational resources), income levels (to represent funding resources), organi zational capacity and past experience (see Table 5). Education and income levels were drawn from U.S. Census data on the percent of the affected com munity’s population with a bachelor’s degree and median household income (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Organizational capacity was measured based on the number of nonprofit organizations in the affected community.11 This type of historical data is available from the National Center for Charitable Statis tics maintained by the Urban Institute (National Center for Charitable Statis tics 2002). Organizational capacity data was selected for the closest month and year available before the initial announcement of the relevant proposal

and normalized by population.12 Data on past experience fighting industrial proposals (in the past 5 years) was gathered via interviews and newspapers.

Table 4: Levels of political opportunity for LNG proposals

Score Criteria Cases

High (n=2)

Local officials among key decision makers and Some of decisions makers elected and Elected decision makers facing upcoming election

Long Beach LNG Mare Island Energy Medium (n=6) State or local officials among key decision makers and Some of decision makers elected

Cabrillo Port Compass Port Crown Landing Freeport LNG Gulf Landing Northeast Gateway

Low (n=5)

Only federal officials among key decision makers and No decision makers elected

Corpus Christi LNG Creole Trail KeySpan Sabine Pass Vista del Sol

Table 5: Levels of internal resources for LNG proposals

Score Criteria Cases

High (n=2) Previous experience successfully defeating a similar proposal

Medium (n=6) No experience successfully defeating a similar proposal and ≥15% of population college educated and ≥$35,000 median household income and ≥3.5 nonprofits per 1000 people

Low (n=5) No experience successfully defeating a similar proposal and <15% of population college educated and <$35,000 median household income and <3.5 nonprofits per 1000 people

Cabrillo Port Compass Port

Crown Landing Freeport LNG KeySpan Long Beach LNG Mare Island Energy Northeast Gateway

Corpus Christi LNG Creole Trail Gulf Landing Sabine Pass Vista del Sol

A community’s internal resources were scored as high if the community had successfully opposed a LNG facility in the previous 5 years. According to interviews, this type of experience created important connections among community members and made subsequent mobilization easier. For com munities without this sort of experience, I relied on secondary data sources for scoring, determining the following breakpoints based on my knowledge of the cases.

A community’s internal resources were scored as medium if at least fifteen percent of the population was college educated and income levels were thirty-five thousand or more and the community had at least 3.5 nonprofits per thousand people. A community’s internal resources were scored as low if less than fifteen percent of the population was college educated and income levels were less than thirty-five thousand and the community had less than 3.5 nonprofits per thousand people.13

External (nonlocal) resources

Although not measured prior to mobilization, I include a scoring of the exter nal resources involved in each proposal because of the critical role outside groups play in the narratives below. External resources were scored as high if I found evidence of involvement by external governmental and non-govern mental organizations; medium with evidence of involvement by external gov ernmental organizations only; low with evidence of involvement by external NGOs only; and otherwise none (see Table 6).14

Table 6: Level of external resources for LNG proposal

Score Criteria Cases

High (n=6)

Evidence of involvement by external governmental and non-governmental organizations

Medium (n=0)

Low (n=4)

Evidence of involvement by external governmental organizations only

Evidence of involvement by external nongovernmental organizations only

None (n=3) No evidence of involvement by external organizations

Cabrillo Port Compass Port Crown Landing Gulf Landing KeySpan Long Beach LNG

Freeport LNG Mare Island Energy Northeast Gateway Vista del Sol

Corpus Christi LNG Creole Trail Sabine Pass

Mobilization

Social movement scholars divide measurements of mobilization into institu tionalized actions, or those that occur within the structures provided by both the governing body and project proponent for public feedback, and conten tious actions, or those that occur outside of these structures. However, the siting of an industrial facility provides opportunities for both types of activi ties, and I wanted a measure of opposition that would include both. Thus,

determinations about the level of mobilization were based on letters-to-theeditor, maximum number of speakers at a single EIS hearing, coordinated appearances at meetings (other than EIS hearings) organized by others, public meetings planned by opponents, protest events and lawsuits.

Mobilization was scored as high if many letters and speakers voiced concern about the proposal (<50 combined) and opponents organized more than two events (coordinated appearance, public meeting or protest event). Mo bilization was scored as medium if few letters and speakers voiced concern about the proposal (<50 combined) and opponents organized more than two events. Mobilization was scored as low if few letters and speakers voiced concern about the proposal (<50 combined) and opponents organized one or two events. Cases with fewer than 50 letters and speakers combined and no organized events exhibited almost no mobilization. See Table 7 for the scoring of each case.

Table 7: Levels of mobilization for LNG proposals

Score Criteria Cases

High (n=4)

Many letters and speakers (≥50 combined) and More than two organized events

Cabrillo Port Compass Port Long Beach LNG Mare Island Energy

Medium (n=2)

Few letters and speakers (<50 combined) and More than two organized events

Crown Landing Gulf Landing Low (n=3) Few letters and speakers (<50 combined) and One or two organized events

Almost None (n=4)

Few letters and speakers (<50 combined) and No organized events

Freeport LNG KeySpan Northeast Gateway

Corpus Christi LNG Creole Trail Sabine Pass Vista del Sol

Results

Table 8 displays the results of my analysis of threat, political opportunity, resources and mobilization across all thirteen LNG proposals. Four types of response are represented: (1) federal and local acceptance, (2) local opposi tion, (3) non-local opposition, (4) widespread opposition. I discuss each in turn below.

Federal and local acceptance

All of the proposals that fall in the “federal and local acceptance” category (i.e., those projects that experienced no opposition) were onshore facilities located in unpopulated areas on private property in the Gulf Coast (Sabine Pass, Creole Trail, Vista del Sol and Corpus Christi LNG). This choice of loca tion by the proposing companies created the ideal conditions for community acceptance: low threat (because the surrounding area was unpopulated), low political opportunity (because the land for the facility was privately owned and there was no separate state-level environmental review, so the only gov ernmental review was federal) and low resources (because of a rural location in the Gulf Coast).

The Gulf Coast (with the exception of Florida) has a long history of accepting and encouraging oil and gas development on and near its shores (Gramling and Freudenburg 1996). Indeed, each of these four LNG proposals were sought out by the local community, via advertisements by local economic development corporations, and accepted with open arms. For example, when Cheniere Energy first proposed the Sabine Pass LNG facility in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, a local police juror (the equivalent of a county commissioner) was quoted in the local newspaper as saying to Cheniere representatives at a public meeting, “All of Cameron Parish is behind your project. When you called, I thought we had got a call from heaven” (Wise 2003). Several inter viewees in Louisiana and Texas spoke about the importance of the oil and gas industry to the Gulf Coast economy and their comfort with these types of developments (interviews 1-4). Kristi Darby, of Louisiana State University, commented in a Mobile Press-Register article that, “People in Louisiana are used to having the petroleum industry around. The oil industry has been in Louisiana for decades. The communities are not afraid” of LNG (James 2005).

Community members saw these projects as a potential source of revenue and jobs. At the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hearing about the Draft EIS for the Sabine Pass project, Bobby Conner, the local tax assessor, asserted that:

Cheniere Energy…would be a great help to our tax base, which is dwin dling...because... everybody’s everybody’s going deeper and deeper offshore to drill for oil and gas these days. And the LNG facility, it would be real welcome…Since 1999, Louisiana has lost 4,000 jobs in the petro chemical industry and is on track to lose another 18,000 in 2004-2005. Nowhere have they been stinged [sic] more sharply than the ammonia fertilizer industry where natural gas makes up 90 percent of the process. Four years ago there were nine aluminum plants in Louisiana. Today we have three. This has made the LNG project a top priority in our state and in our nation (Draft EIS Hearing on Sabine Pass LNG and Pipeline Project 2004, 22).

At ExxonMobil’s press conference announcing the Vista del Sol LNG proposal in San Patricio County, Texas, Governor Rick Perry stressed that:

Texas and the United States need secure supplies of natural gas to at tract industries, assure development and to continue the strong econom ic growth we are experiencing in our state and throughout the nation. This project will bring jobs and other economic benefits to San Patricio County and the greater Corpus Christi area and will provide long-term supplies of natural gas for our industries, power plants and homes (quot ed in Powell 2004).

Table 8: Mobilization against LNG proposals

Federal and local acceptance

Creole Trail Low Low Low None None Approved Low

Vista del Sol Low Low Low Low None Approved

Corpus Christi LNG Low Low Low NoneNone Approved

Sabine Pass LowLow Low NoneNone BuiltLow threat projects in communities with limited political opportunity and resources attract little opposition and are approved and often built.

Local opposition Freeport LNG Low Medium Medium LowLow Built

Northeast Gateway Low Medium Medium LowLow Built

Non-local opposition

Crown Landing High Medium Medium High Medium Rejected

KeySpan High Low Medium High Low Rejected

Gulf Landing Medium Medium Low HighMedium Withdrawn More threatening projects in communities with limited political opportunity and internal resources attract opposition from outside groups, resulting in failed projects.

Widespread opposition

opposition

Mare Island Energy High High Medium Low High Withdrawn

Two pathways result in Compass Port Medium Medium High High High Withdrawn

Cabrillo Port Low Medium High High High Rejected

Long Beach LNGHigh High MediumHighHigh RejectedTwo pathways result in widespread opposition: the combination of a threatening project in a community with access to decision makers or projects proposed in communities with internal resources.

Thus, in many ways, the LNG proposals in this category were not merely “accepted” but actively campaigned for as a way to spur local economic de velopment. Any mobilization in these cases was in support of the proposed facilities. All of these facilities were approved and one was built.

Local opposition

The next set of proposals (Freeport LNG and Northeast Gateway) experi enced little, mainly localized opposition. These two proposals – one onshore in an unpopulated area and the other offshore, closed-loop – had low levels

of threat associated with them. Thus, despite having medium levels of po litical opportunity and resources, opponents struggled to foster opposition beyond the locally-affected community. As exemplified by the Freeport LNG project, in both cases local opponents confronted larger regional- and statelevel forces that favored LNG development.

Freeport LNG is located on Quintana Island, Texas – an island surrounded by industrial development but home to about fifty residents and a prime birding destination. Dow Texas Operations – Dow’s largest integrated site – is located just across the ship channel in Freeport. It is the city’s largest employer. As a large user of natural gas, Dow was supportive of the Freeport LNG proposal and signed a purchasing agreement for 500 million cubic feet of gas per day upon completion of the facility (Antosh 2003). Although several Quintana residents were strident opponents of the facility and eventually partnered with birding groups from nearby Lake Jackson and Houston, Dow’s support made it difficult for this opposition to spread elsewhere in the region. In fact, local opposition was quickly dismissed by other residents: “The Texas Gulf coast has been in the center of the petrochemical industry for genera tions. To say that the area can’t accommodate a LNG operation would be like choking on a gnat after swallowing a camel” (Hawes 2004). As a result, opponents of the Freeport LNG facility focused efforts on securing mitigation (interview 5). These efforts resulted in the relocation of a popular birding park on Quintana Island and the purchase of 78 acres in nearby Surfside for wetlands mitigation.

Similarly, opponents of the Northeast Gateway facility proposed for offshore Gloucester, Massachusetts, also confronted a wall of regional support. As one of the few offshore proposals along the East Coast, Northeast Gate way was seen by many politicians, including Governor Mitt Romney, as the preferred option for a much-needed LNG facility in Massachusetts. The off shore proposal avoided the public safety concerns associated with stronglyopposed onshore proposals in other locations like Fall River, Massachusetts. Thus, despite strong opposition from local fishing groups in Gloucester, the mobilization never spread to others within the community or to environmen tal groups at the regional- or state-level. For example, despite numerous appeals from Gloucester’s Mayor (an opponent), Fall River’s Mayor repeat edly voiced his support for the offshore Gloucester option as the preferred site (interview 6). In addition, the Conservation Law Foundation, a power ful environmental group and frequent opponent of offshore development in the Northeast, never took on the Northeast Gateway proposal directly, despite requests from local Gloucester opponents. Angela Sanfilippo of the Gloucester Fishermen’s Wives Association (another opponent) lamented the fact that, after so many years spent quarreling with regional environmental groups and government regulators over fisheries protection, when it came time that they could have all been on the same side, “we lost fishing ground in the name of clean energy” (interview 7). Once it became clear that the Northeast Gateway proposal would be approved, opponents of the Northeast

Gateway, like those on Quintana Island, focused their efforts on mitigation. Coordinating an “eleventh hour” effort, they successfully secured $24 million from the proposing company (interview 6).

In both locations, the facilities were eventually built, but relations between the company and community remain strained. For example, because of the lack of support company officials encountered in Gloucester, they chose to locate the headquarters for Northeast Gateway in nearby Salem (inter view 8). In sum, the low-threat proposals in medium-opportunity environ ments and medium-resourced communities tended to experience low levels of mainly localized opposition. And, while these projects were approved, when built, companies continued to experience local resistance and hostility.

Non-local opposition

The next set of proposals (Gulf Landing, Crown Landing and KeySpan) were higher threat facilities located either onshore in populated areas of the Northeast of offshore in the Gulf with open-loop regasification. Political op portunities for opponents in these cases were medium or low because key decision makers were mostly located at the national level and non-elected, and internal resources for mobilization in all three locations were modest. As a result, these projects experienced low- to medium-levels of opposition from the community. Unlike in the locally opposed cases, however, state-level bureaucrats and external NGOs took an active role in opposing these facili ties, often using legal means to block approval.

In the case of Crown Landing, the facility became part of a larger jurisdic tional dispute between Delaware and New Jersey. BP proposed the facility in Logan Township, New Jersey, on the Delaware River. This location placed the pier of the facility inside Delaware’s border and in direct violation of Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act, which prohibits the construction of certain types of industrial facilities within the coastal zone. Delaware regulators re jected the proposal, with support from Delaware environmental groups, who were long-time defenders of the Coastal Zone Act. New Jersey, with support from BP, filed suit against Delaware. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually de cided in favor of Delaware, and BP withdrew the project. Because the state of Delaware took such an active role in opposing the project to defend its jurisdiction, mobilization was somewhat muted and legalistic in nature. For example, Delaware environment groups immediately partnered with the En vironmental Law Clinic at Widener University to develop legal briefs on the issue. New Jersey residents, with a few notable exceptions, and elected offi cials were largely supportive of the proposal because of the jobs and revenue it would bring to the area.

Similarly, most of the opposition to KeySpan was driven by the Rhode Is land Attorney General and his staff (interviews 9-11). They researched the impacts of the facility, gathered expert witness testimony, distributed infor mation and advocated on behalf of the people of Rhode Island. They did

not, however, incite mobilization. Interviewees noted that the response from the community was somewhat subdued compared to past events (interviews 10-11). In contrast, the community reaction in nearby Fall River, Massachusetts, to defeat the Weaver’s Cove LNG proposal was much more organized and impassioned. Indeed, Assistant Attorney General Paul Roberti admitted that his strategy was not to garner support from the general public, whom he thought FERC would ignore, but from expert witnesses (interview 11). Unlike in Fall River, the population surrounding the KeySpan location was very diverse and majority minority. For example, one Providence resident told The Providence Journal that many residents do not speak English and “I seriously doubt their views will be heard” (Reynolds 2004). Thus, the op position’s strategy was to rely on legalistic arguments against the proposal. This strategy proved successful. FERC rejected the proposal due to safety concerns in June 2005.

The Gulf Landing proposal, located in southwest Louisiana, drew much of its opposition from regional- and state-level fisheries regulators and environ mental and fishing organizations located across the state in New Orleans. This project, located offshore Louisiana, was the third offshore, open loop proposal in the Gulf of Mexico. The previous two offshore, open loop proposals in the Gulf had sailed through the approval process with no community opposition. Those two projects had, however, caught the attention of federal and state fisheries regulators who were concerned about the potential im pacts to the fishery from the open loop regasification system. Agency offi cials began to alert environmental and fishing organizations to the potential dangers posed by this technology (interviews 12-14). These groups, mainly based out of New Orleans (on the other side of the state from the Gulf Land ing proposal), began to get involved with the release of the Gulf Landing Final EIS in early December 2004 (interview 15). This document was the first to include a standardized methodology to assess potential fisheries impacts from open loop regasification. The range of potential impacts to fish popula tions was large and the upper limit caught the public’s attention (interview 16). As a result, in addition to eliciting the same negative comments from fisheries regulators, the Gulf Landing Final EIS also drew negative comments from the Sierra Club’s Louisiana Chapter and the Gulf Restoration Network. Fishing organizations were also becoming concerned as fishermen began to swamp message boards on a popular fishing website, RodNReel.com, and inundate regulators with calls about the issue. The Louisiana Charter Boats Association decided to take on the cause and eventually joined forces with environmental groups to form the Gumbo Alliance against open loop LNG in Louisiana. Despite this opposition, the Gulf Landing facility was approved in February 2005, and the Governor of Louisiana elected not to use her veto power against the proposal, despite extensive lobbying by opponents be cause she provided the likely political avenue for rejection of the proposal.

This setback did not faze the growing opposition movement against the pro posal and open loop LNG more generally. Instead, the Sierra Club, Gulf Res

toration Network and Louisiana Charter Boats Association, with the help of the Tulane Environmental Center, sued the federal government for approving the Gulf Landing facility. The lawsuit against Gulf Landing failed, but the company eventually withdrew the approved facility in March 2007.

In all three cases, non-local opposition from state-level officials and/or ex ternal NGOs replaced local mobilization as the means for defeating the pro posal. Thus, despite weak levels of local mobilization, the proposals were still defeated.

Widespread opposition

The fourth set of cases (Long Beach, Mare Island, Compass Port and Ca brillo Port) resulted in widespread mobilization but via two different paths. In the cases of Long Beach and Mare Island, mobilization was driven by a combination of high threat and high political opportunity. In the cases of Compass Port and Cabrillo Port, it was driven by strong internal resources. I discuss each path in turn.

Because internal resources were lower, opposition to the Mare Island and Long Beach proposals was unexpected. For example, the Mare Island Energy Project was proposed in Vallejo, California – a city that had recently lost a major economic engine with the decommissioning of the Mare Island Naval Shipyard and was desperately seeking a source of additional revenue and jobs for its flagging economy. As a result, city officials were initially sup portive of the proposal. It was not until new residents to Vallejo started protesting due to the potential threats posed by the facility that city leaders changed their mind about the proposal. See Boudet and Ortolano (2010) for a more on this case.

Like Vallejo, Long Beach was experiencing a budgetary crisis just before it received its LNG proposal, slated for the city’s port, in early 2003. Con sequently, the Long Beach LNG proposal and its potential to increase city revenue appealed to many city leaders. Moreover, city residents had suffered a quadrupling of natural gas prices during California’s 2001 energy crisis. The potential for a steady supply of natural gas from the proposal was also attractive to city leaders. Like Vallejo, Long Beach also did not have many internal resources for mobilization against the proposal. In the late 1990s, Long Beach experienced the loss of two major sources of employment – the Navy and McDonnell Douglas. As a result, many long-term residents moved away. Moreover, many of its residents, especially those who live closest to the Port, are “poor and brown…To be an activist and speak up at meetings, you have to believe that government works and your voice will be heard. Many Latinos don’t” (interview 17).

As in Vallejo, what Long Beach opponents lacked in resources, they made up for by exploiting the high levels of threat and political opportunity. The Long Beach Terminal was to be located less than two miles from city hall in the

Port of Long Beach, one of the country’s busiest ports. Local opponents and state officials were concerned about the potential impacts to both human health and commerce of placing a potentially explosive LNG facility in such a busy location where many dangerous chemicals were already transported and stored (interview 18). According to comments filed by state officials on the Draft EIS, the LONG Beach LNG facility “…could pose a risk to the health and safety of the approximately 130,000 people living, working or visiting in the area within approximately three miles of the proposed site” (Cali fornia Public Utilities Commission 2005, 2). Along with other onshore LNG facilities around the country, the Long Beach project also became the subject of a jurisdictional dispute between federal and state regulators. When the proposing company filed an application only with federal regulators, state regulators sued. As a result, Long Beach opponents could piggyback off of the efforts of state officials in terms of developing technical and legal argu ments against the facility.

However, in addition to the opposition provided by the state, which in many respects is similar to what happened among the cases of non-local opposi tion described above, Long Beach opponents were afforded a local political opportunity provided by a provision of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The lead agency for the California Environmental Impact Report (EIR) on the project was the Port of Long Beach, a non-elected body. In the case of EIR certification by a non-elected body, CEQA permits an appeal of this certification to the next highest elected body – in this case the Long Beach City Council (State of California 2003). Thus, some of the mobiliza tion efforts by opponents went toward lobbying city council members and organizing coordinated appearances at council meetings. Myown also ran for an open council seat in April 2006, in part “to ensure that every candidate, even those in the mayor’s race, would be forced to take a position on the pro posal” (interview 17). Although she did not win the election, Myown ensured that the LNG issue was prominent during the campaign with both of the key contenders in mayoral race expressing opposition to the proposal in favor of offshore alternatives.

Soon after the election of a new mayor who was opposed to the proposal, Port of Long Beach Commissioners voted to abandon the EIR process and end negotiations with the proposing company about the LNG facility.15 Most interviewees seemed to think the project’s demise was related to a combi nation of community opposition, state agency opposition and the mayoral election (interviews 17, 18-21). These two cases provide important evidence that opposition can successfully derail projects despite a lack of internal resources.

In contrast, Cabrillo Port and Compass Port followed a path to mobilization driven by internal resources, as opposed to threat and political opportunity. Oxnard had successfully defeated an onshore LNG proposal on its shores prior to the Cabrillo Port proposal. Thus, the community was home to a

plethora of local environmental and community organizations that were fa miliar with LNG and viewed opposing such projects as part of their mission. In addition, the project was located in Southern California, an area known for its environmental activism, particularly against industrial development on the coast. These organizational resources supported the opposition ef fort against the proposal, with opponents relying on both institutional and contentious means to express their point of view that LNG was not needed in California. Of all the proposals considered in this study, Cabrillo Port pro voked by far the most opposition, mobilizing somewhere between two and three thousand people first for a paddle out protest in Malibu and then for a rally at the hearing on the project’s Final EIS in Oxnard. This fierce resis tance came despite the fact that the project posed little threat as an offshore, closed-loop proposal and opponents only had a medium level of opportunity in the form of a gubernatorial veto.

In many ways, the Compass Port proposal is strikingly similar to the Cabrillo Port proposal. The Compass Port facility was to be located offshore Mobile, Alabama, which was one of the few Gulf Coast communities to oppose and defeat two previous onshore LNG proposals by ExxonMobil and Cheniere En ergy, respectively. This experience meant that community members were organized, aware and somewhat distrustful of LNG proposals. Although initial ly supportive of ConocoPhillips’s offshore Compass Port proposal because it lessened potential safety impacts, opponents of the previous onshore pro posals in Mobile quickly became aware of the open-loop regasification issue through a local newspaper reporter at the Mobile Press-Register (interviews 22-23). The newspaper had become an important source of information for LNG opponents around the country on both the safety and environmental impacts of LNG receiving terminals (interviews 17, 23). Once aware, much of the momentum, garnered from the defeat of the onshore LNG proposals, was successfully transferred to oppose the Compass Port facility through the hard work and dedication of Mobile BayKeeper. Mobile BayKeeper’s execu tive director, Casi Callaway, also served on the Board of the Gulf Restoration Network, a regional environmental organization, and could thus learn from the experiences of LNG opponents in Louisiana. Following a pattern that had proven successful in Louisiana, the opposition in Alabama brought together an “unlikely alliance” of commercial fishermen, recreational fishermen and environmentalists (interviews 22, 24). The improbability of such an alliance was demonstrated by the fact that the commercial and recreational fishing groups so hated working together that their representatives requested to be placed on opposite sides of the podium during joint press conferences. The last event organized by opponents in Mobile drew over 400 participants to a town hall meeting with Governor Riley on Compass Port (Raines 2006, interview 24). This turnout indicated fervent opposition to open-loop LNG, and Governor Riley threatened a veto of Compass Port. As in the case of the Cabrillo Port proposal, existing organizations in Mobile organized fierce resistance to Compass Port, despite the fact that the project posed only a medium level of threat as an offshore, open-loop proposal and opponents

only had a medium level of opportunity in the form of a gubernatorial veto.

In these two cases, energy companies, recognizing the difficulty of siting an onshore LNG facility in a given community due to safety concerns, proposed what they thought would be considered a more palatable offshore proposal. While this move lessened the threat posed by a facility and changed political opportunity structures for mobilization, it did not affect the underlying in ternal resources for mobilization against LNG, which were primed and ready given past experiences. Thus, the timing of these proposals, in terms of the community’s experience with previous LNG proposals, was extremely impor tant in cultivating resources and influencing mobilization levels.

Discussion and Conclusions

My examination of thirteen LNG proposals generates three main hypotheses that should be tested with additional case study work. First, low threat proj ects in communities with limited access to decision makers (low political opportunity) and limited resources attract little, mainly local, opposition and are approved and often built. Second, even in communities with relatively limited resources, more threatening projects attract opposition from outside groups. The result is failed projects, either through rejection by regulatory of ficials or withdrawal by the company. Third, two pathways result in success ful, widespread opposition: either the combination of a high threat project in a community with access to decision makers (high political opportunity) or a project proposed in a community with internal resources.

For both social movement theory and the literature on facility siting, my re search highlights the importance of configurational thinking; i.e., the idea that different combinations of causal conditions can come together to pro duce the outcome of interest, in this case mobilization against LULU propos als. A comparison between the thirteen cases suggests that it is not just the magnitude of each individual factor presented in the conceptual framework (i.e., threat, political opportunity and resources) but also their combination that is important in determining mobilization outcomes. High levels of mo bilization can take place with some factors at very low levels, provided other factors have high levels.

This finding is similar to the conclusion reached by Gamson, Fireman et al. (1982) in an experimental study of collective rebellions. They concluded that a combination of five distinct factors had to be present for rebellion. Each factor individually was necessary but not sufficient for an uprising. Signifi cantly, deficiencies in one factor could be compensated for by high values in another. This configurational thinking is typical of comparative case study work, where investigators tend to think in terms of the “causal recipes” or “the causally relevant conditions [independent variables] that combine to produce a given outcome [dependent variable]” (Ragin 2008, 6-1). However,

as Rihoux and Ragin (2009) point out, this conception of causality is con trary to many of the assumptions underlying mainstream statistical tech niques. In statistical analysis, “…the impact of a given independent variable on the dependent variable is assumed to be the same regardless of the values of the other independent variables” (Ragin 2008, 112). The results of my work suggest that, in comparison to mainstream statistical reasoning, configurational thinking may be more appropriate for understanding mobili zation efforts against proposals for LNG facilities and LULUs more generally.

In practice, these findings point to the important role played by non-local governmental officials and NGOs in opposition efforts against threatening projects, particularly in communities where political opportunities and in ternal resources are limited. For example, with the exception of the Mare Island Energy Project16, external groups played key roles in dismantling all the failed projects in communities with low to medium internal resources. Conversely, local opposition alone appears ineffective in disabling projects, as shown in both the Freeport and Northeast Gateway cases. In essence, state and regional players compare the risks posed by multiple proposals, and, if the infrastructure is deemed necessary, the least risky proposal often garners support (or at least avoids opposition) from state and regional leaders. For example, Northeast Gateway, with its offshore location, was seen as the less risky alternative for LNG development in Massachusetts. Thus, local officials and community members must continually assess a proposal in their own community in comparison to other similar proposals in the state and region. Facility proponents do, and, as a result, often propose facilities in multiple locations to hedge risks and win the race to approval. For example, ExxonMobil proposed LNG facilities near Corpus Christi, Texas; Mobile, Ala bama; and offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Excelerate Energy proposed facili ties offshore in the Gulf of Mexico and Massachusetts. NorthernStar Natural Gas proposed facilities in California and Oregon. Each company therefore had multiple irons in the fire and could abandon a proposal that experienced opposition. This idea of a “race to site” is not uncommon in the energy sec tor and suggests that opposition from state or regional leaders and delaying tactics by opponents may be just as effective in disabling a project as tactics aimed at outright rejection.

1. LNG is natural gas that has been cooled to cryogenic temperatures for transporta tion in tankers. Offload terminals receive these tankers and vaporize the LNG for dis tribution. An LNG facility represents a classic example of a LULU, imposing negative impacts on a local community but wider benefits to the region.

2. Breaks in trust were another causal factor identified by Boudet and Ortolano (2010). However, my interviews did not indicate that breaks in trust played an impor tant role in the mobilization efforts in the additional cases.

3. While some efforts have been made to analyze LULU responses using theories from the study of social movements (Devlin and Yap 2008; Diani and Van der Heijden 1994; Flam 1994; Kitschelt 1986; Sherman 2011; Walsh, Warland, and Smith 1997), only Boudet and Ortolano (2010) explicitly make use the political process model.

4. The Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge, the second offshore LNG proposal in the Gulf of Mexico, was subjected only to an Environmental Assessment, a lesser version of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This decision came despite protests from the National Marine Fisheries Service that an EIS should be required. All other offshore LNG proposals in the U.S. were subjected to an EIS.

5. The author conducted all site visits except for one to Providence, Rhode Island, to collect information about the KeySpan proposal. This site visit was conducted by R. Wright.

6. Interview protocols are available from the author upon request.

7. For the Gulf Landing project, additional interviews were conducted in New Orleans because there was mobilization against the project there. The number of interviews for the Gulf Landing proposals reported in Table 2 includes only these additional interviews conducted in New Orleans.

8. My measure of threat is, to some extent, independent of public perceptions of the risk posed by the facility but is consistent with the literature on facility siting, which assesses the risks posed by a facility in terms of distance and technical factors. Moreover, perceptions can easily be manipulated by mobilization efforts, meaning they are not necessarily independent of the outcome of mobilization.

9. I selected 200 people per square mile as the threshold between low and high population density by comparing population densities to my knowledge of each affected community. Based on site visits, the onshore Gulf Coast projects were located in low population density areas when compared to the other locations in our sample. Indeed, with the exception of Brazoria County, all Gulf Coast projects are located in counties with less than 100 people per square mile. I chose to include Brazoria County as low population density because the higher population density of this county is mainly driven by development in other parts of the county, particularly those areas close to Houston. In fact, given the stark divisions in population density between those proposals located in the Gulf Coast and elsewhere, I could have se lected the cutoff anywhere between 174 (Brazoria County, TX) and 784 (Gloucester County, NJ).

10. Although a few onshore facilities were initially proposed as open-loop systems, such proposals were quickly switched to closed-loop due to negative reactions from regulators who were concerned about the potential risk to biological resources in near-shore estuaries.

11. This data is only available at the county level. Thus, for the cases where the af fected community was a city, county level data was utilized.

12. As an example, for the Mare Island Energy Project, which was announced in May 2002, data on nonprofits in Solano County was taken from July 2001. The next dataset on Solano County was only available for July 2002, which falls after the an nouncement of the proposal.

13. Scoring was validated by examining the number of internal organizations appropriated into the opposition, as indicated via newspaper data and interviews. Results, shown in the technical appendix, corroborate scores, particular the difference between low and medium / high resource communities.

14. Note that external governmental involvement carried more weight than NGO in volvement in my scoring scheme, based on interviewee responses. However, because no cases in my sample involved government organizations without NGOs, this weight ing deserves additional study.

15. Sound Energy Solutions, the proposing company, sued to try to force the Port to complete its review but lost when a judge dismissed the case in March 2008.

16. The Mare Island proposal is the only one in the sample that did not go through an EIS process because it was withdrawn at the stage of leasing the land before the company submitted an official application for governmental review. However, given the amount of local opposition and the fact that local opponents were already con tacting state officials, I would argue that, had the company continued with the pro posal, it would have also attracted opposition from external governmental officials.

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Down the Drain or Back to the Roots?

Political Ecology of the Water-EnergyFood Nexus Visualized Using GIS in Leh Town, Ladakh, India

Daphne Gondhalekar Technical University of Munich Adris Akhtar

University

Abstract

of Bonn

Urban water infrastructure development is often unable to keep up with the rapid pace of transformation of cities in developing economies such as India, impacting access to safe drinking water with concomitant water-relat ed health risks. Especially in regions where water is already scarce and which are being affected by climate change, integrated urban planning inside a political ecology framework enabling “playing politics with principle” partic ularly in terms of water resources management is urgently needed. The case study of Leh Town, headquarter of Leh District and cultural capital of the Ladakh region, is considered one of the fastest-growing small towns in India. A fertile green oasis in a semi-arid high-altitude region of the Himalayas, Leh has witnessed very rapid change of water consumption and wastewater production patterns particularly in the past decades due to huge growth of the tourism industry. Using WorldView-2 very high-resolution satellite imagery of 2011, Google Earth imagery of 2003, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis and field survey conducted in 2012-14 we find that drinking water resources are being polluted as a result of inadequate waste water management infrastructure. This study advocates a partially decentral ized wastewater recycling and reuse system as an alternative development choice for long-term food, water and energy security as well as water-related health risk reduction, and to enable Leh to be a lighthouse project for future cities visioning.

Keywords

Urban planning; political ecology; water resources management; health; climate change; Geographic Information Systems (GIS); future cities vision ing; India

Introduction

Rapidly transforming urban areas in developing economies such as India face urgent water-related environmental challenges (Marcotullio, 2007). Lack of adequate water and sanitation infrastructure rends urban populations especially vulnerable to health risks (McGranahan et al., 2001; Alexander and Ehrlich, 2000). This situation is being exacerbated by climate change (Vörösmarty et al., 2000). Although one of the earliest examples of public sewerage was found in the ancient Indus Valley (Jha, 2010), only 16 % of the urban population in India today have access to adequate sanitation resulting in large-scale open defecation and thus ground and surface water pollution (WHO & UNICEF, 2006). Whilst decentralization in the water sector in India has helped to empower local stakeholders, it has not ensured resource use efficiency (Saravanan, 2009). Research has addressed this problem but in a fragmented manner (Galea and Vlahov, 2005). To tackle the complex set of issues surrounding urban health, new approaches are needed (Butsch et al., 2012). Especially in regions where water is already scarce, transsectoral or integrated urban planning is urgently needed to address water and health challenges more effectively. Large cities have received much academic attention, but there is still a dearth of studies on smaller cities. These are facing huge development pressures with far less capacity to address them. International experts may add to pressure by pointing at hygiene but with out engaging sufficiently to offer realistic integrated solutions, leaving local governments to fall prey to “business as usual” options recommended by international consultants.

In the 19th century, when centralized sewage systems were first developed, these proved very effective in curbing water-related health risk caused by lack of adequate wastewater management. The paradigm accompanying this technological innovation, to use water only once, has been very persis tent in the face of water-related development challenges (Drewes, 2014). Centralized sewage systems are water-intensive to operate: thus, in regions facing water scarcity, alternative means of dealing with wastewater are becoming increasingly important in order to conserve water resources (Lüthi et al., 2011). There are many alternative means of wastewater recycling and reuse including Ecosan (Haller, 2010), with various inherent advantages such as water conservation, nutrient recovery, lower maintenance cost, etc. (Tilley et al., 2008), but they have rarely been implemented at the neighbourhood scale (Sanimap, 2009). Instead, the flush toilet and centralized sewage sys tem, which have been termed “ecologically mindless”, remain a preferred option (Narain, 2002) as a symbol of “modernity”.

Marx pointed out that economic growth entails political implications, and a political ecology perspective assumes a mismatch between natural resourc es consumption and political aims. Political ecology studies on urban water management have strongly focused on access to (drinking) water and water

governance (privatisation) issues in terms of globalisation (Bakker, 2003; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Swyngedouw, 2004; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2010), within a general framework of the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ (Heynen and Robbins, 2005) and social and environmental justice critiques (Harvey, 1997, 2009). The cultural dimensions of such transitions figure prominently in political ecology studies of (eco-) tourism (Stonich, 1998; Duffy, 2000; Holden, 2008) but are underemphasised in political ecology of urban water studies.

Development and implementation of innovative alternatives to “business as usual” options may be hampered in several ways: it has been written that technological development usually has a cumulative and patterned charac ter and technological paradigms have powerful heuristic features, so that “the efforts and technological imagination of engineers and of the organisa tions in which they work … are ‘blind’ to other technological possibilities” (OECD, 1992: 38-42). Technological change can however also be seen as re sulting from interactions of many actors (Poel and Franssen, 2002) who are always capable of discovering new technologies, new behavioural patterns and new organisational set-ups (Dosi, 1997). Further, the relation between technological advancement and economic growth is complex: it is not clear what drives implementation of innovation (Cimoli and Dosi, 1994). Although innovation has often been effected by crisis (Drewes, 2014), alternative ways to bring about a paradigm shift need to be found. To affect change, local governments need to be enabled to play “politics with principle” (Saravanan and Gondhalekar, 2013, 2014).

The aim of our study is to conceptualize such an alternative way by visual izing a trans-sectoral or integrated urban planning approach using a typical case study example of a rapidly transforming small town. After explaining the method of our study in section 2, we highlight interlinkages between land-use change, water consumption and wastewater production in the results section 3. In section 4 we discuss how these findings could be utilized to inform an integrated urban planning approach supported by geographic information systems (GIS) before concluding in section 5.

The case study: Leh Town

Leh Town is considered one of the fastest-expanding small towns in India (Rieger-Jandl, 2005:123). Situated in a remote semi-arid region in the Hima layas at an altitude of 3,500 meters above sea level, Leh is a green oasis of agricultural fields crisscrossed by streams with a dense historic center and nestled between barren mountains (Fig. 1). Leh is the headquarter of Leh District of the Jammu and Kashmir State of India and according to the 2011 Census of India has a population of 30,870 inhabitants. In addition, 40,000 army personnel live in Leh (Skeldon, 1985) and several tens of thousands of migrant workers come to Leh every year. The Ladakh Autonomous Hill

& Akhtar

Figure 1. Geographical location of Leh Town, Ladakh, India

In Leh, water is a very limited commodity. Precipitation is only 115 mm per year (Owen et al., 2006:384) therefore snow and glacial melt water is the only available surface water. The apparent lushness of Leh is thus not a natural occurrence, but the result of hundreds of years of extremely careful water management. Until as little as a few decades ago, Ladakh was still a largely self-sufficient traditional irrigation agriculture society (NorbergHodge, 1991), but since 1974, when Ladakh was opened to tourism, the number of visitors has increased exponentially, particularly in the last decade: ca. 180,000 tourists visited Leh in 2012 (Fig. 2), mostly in the summer months between April and October. In winter there are very few tourists due to extremely cold temperatures.

Development Council (LAHDC) has been governing Ladakh since 1995.

Figure 2. Year-wise number of visitors and guesthouses and hotels opened in Leh (Source: Tourist Board Leh)

To cater to these, hundreds of guesthouses and hotels (GH/H) have been con structed in Leh (Fig. 2). Although Leh has a masterplan published in 1996, urban development is haphazard (Eichert, 2009:77). Growth of the tourism industry and the accompanying increasing use of flush toilets and showers is rapidly pushing up water demand and wastewater production. Traditional sanitation, the Ladakhi dry toilet, does not require any water and in Ladakh human faeces are commonly used as agricultural fertilizer. However, it does have some hygiene challenges so that 99 % of tourists prefer the flush toilet (Akhtar, 2010:57). The water supply and wastewater management systems have been unable to keep up: the Public Health Engineering Department (PHE) supplies over 80 % of Leh Town’s water demand by groundwater ex traction in the summer months (LEDeG, 2010), but only manages to provide water for 2-3 hours per day (Akhtar, 2010:71). Groundwater extraction is not regulated: the India Groundwater Act has yet to be ratified in the semiautonomous Ladakh Region. Environmental pollution in Leh is already severe, with 60 % of point sources of surface water pollution within 100 metres of rivers and streams (Gondhalekar et al., 2013). Further, wastewater in Leh is currently only collected in septic tanks and soak pits that are not properly managed, so that groundwater pollution due to seepage is assumed. Surface water is decreasing (Eichert, 2009:53) possibly as a result of climate change, which is affecting groundwater recharge (LEDeG, 2010). Increase in water-borne diseases such as hepatitis and diarrhoea were already recorded in Leh over a decade ago (Bashin, 1999). Incidences of acute diarrhoea in Leh still seem to be increasing, but this can not be causally linked to wa ter pollution (Gondhalekar et al., 2013). The food-grain import dependency ratio of Leh is already 60 % (Pellicardi, 2010:89), and despite large-scale hydro-power development, Leh faces regular power cuts, so that issues of long-term food and energy security need also to be seriously addressed.

Therefore, an integrated water energy food nexus urban planning approach is needed in Leh that can also address water-related health risk, which this study aims to conceptualize.

Methodology

Field surveys were conducted between July 2012 and April 2014 in collaboration with our research partner, the Ladakh Ecological Development Group (LEDeG), a local NGO. Building on existing data (Akhtar, 2010 and Thoma 2006), we mapped new GH/H using geographic positioning (GPS). We used geographic information systems (GIS) kernel density method using quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986: 76) to spatially cluster points of wastewater disposal and relate these to potential pollution of drinking water resources. A WorldView-2 very high-resolution satellite image (ground resolution 50 cm, © DigitalGlobe, supplied by European Space Imaging) of November 2011 served as a base map. To detect land use change, we used Google Earth imagery from 2003 as a reference. We also conducted a socio-economic questionnaire survey of 200 households, representing 5 % of all HH in Leh, selected using an open-source random selection algorithm (http://www.spatialecology.com/index.php, open source), questionnaire survey of ca. 318 GH/H and semi-structured interviews with various local stakeholders.

Results

Land use change and increase in barren land

There has been a huge increase in guesthouses and hotels (GH/H) to cater to the surge of tourists visiting Leh in the last decades. In 1980 there were only 24 GH/H in Leh, but by 2010 there were 282, and by 2013 the number had increased to ca. 360 GH/H in business, with another ca. 60 not yet in business or under construction (Fig. 3).

Leh has 21 wards, of which 10 have irrigated agricultural land area, whilst the others are predominantly dry and desert-like. We find that over 90 % of GH/H in Leh are located in its agricultural wards. Of these, 67 % of GH/H are located in two agricultural wards directly adjoining the ancient town cen ter, Karzoo and Tukcha wards. Therefore, we focused on these as the wards with the most rapid rate of urbanization, to identify trends that may become relevant for other wards of Leh in the coming decades.

Figure 3. Increase in GH/H in Leh Town from 1980 to 2013

Urbanization in Leh is mainly in terms of GH/H construction as there are only minimal cottage industries, and restaurants are usually integrated into existing buildings. Other major land uses in Leh include wooded areas, roads, riverbeds, and desert land. In 2003, agricultural land comprised ca. 45 % of Karzoo and Tukcha wards. We find that in these two wards, ca. 10 % of agricultural land has been built up, and ca. 30 % of formerly agricultural land has been left barren in the last decade (Fig. 4).

This trend is also visible in the results of the HH (households) survey: aver age income in Leh has doubled in the last decade. Agriculture was a source of income for 28 % of the population ten years ago, but has since decreased by 3 %. In the predominantly agricultural wards, the number of HH stating that agriculture is a source of income has increased in the last ten years by 4 %. For those HH still engaged in agriculture in Leh, the amount of land being farmed on average has decreased by 41 % in the past decade.

4. Land use change in Leh from 2003 to 2013

Water demand increase

In Leh, freshwater is supplied by a centralized and by a decentralized system. Currently, PHE supplies following daily estimates during summer months (PHE, 2013): 1-2 million litres extracted via 4 tube wells from the Indus River aquifer; 1,3 million litres extracted from various tube and bore wells inside Leh; 0,8 million litres channelled from various springs near the top of Leh.

Thus, PHE is currently providing 3 to 4 million litres of water per day and most it through groundwater extraction via bore and tube wells. The Indus River aquifer is used for PHE tube well extraction, while an aquifer below Leh, fed by glacial and snow melt water, is used for private and PHE tube and bore well extraction. The aquifer below Leh is very shallow, and at several loca tions, water bubbles directly from the surface in marshy areas. Water from the Indus River aquifer is pumped ca. 300 m in vertical distance upwards and several kilometres horizontally to reservoirs distributed in Leh, which is very energy intensive, then distributed by a gravity pipe system with several hundred public and private water taps and by water tankers. In addition, hand pumps that draw water from the Leh aquifer at a maximum depth of about 10 m are distributed throughout Leh. According to our survey, Leh has 46 public hand pumps. We find that 85 % of HH use PHE taps, 18 % hand pumps, and 8 % bore wells as their drinking water source. Few HH have a private bore well (20 bore wells owned by HH were surveyed by us), but some only use these to water the garden.

However, 60 % of GH/H use a private bore well as a decentralized water sup ply source (Fig. 5), up from 42 % in 2009 (Akhtar, 2010:58). According to

Figure

our survey, reasons for the increasing use of private bore wells are that PHE only provides water for 2-3 hours in the mornings, which is considered insuf ficient to run a GH/H with showers and flush toilets, and concern about PHE water quality and low water pressure.

Of the surveyed GH/H, 186 GH/H stated rates of extraction: the total amount of fresh water that these GH/H extract sums up to 690,000 l/day. Using this data, we calculated high-density areas of groundwater extraction in Leh (Fig. 5), which predominantly overlap with the highest densities of GH/H in direct proximity to the town centre. Outliers are large hotels that are removed from the town centre to profit from a quiet atmosphere. Interestingly, spatially the location of the pipeline is also close to the highest densities of groundwater extraction, although it might be expected that water supply closer to the pipeline could be better than far from it.

Figure 5. Decentralized freshwater supply

If we take an average of what GH/H are extracting, and multiply this by 60 % of the total 360 GH/H which are currently in business, who are assumed to a have a bore well, this figure comes to about 1 million litres being extracted by GH/H in Leh. This is about one third to one quarter of the quantity that PHE extracts daily and thus a sizeable amount that needs to be considered in planning water supply of Leh holistically. The owner of a hotel with 18 en-

suite rooms interviewed reported extracting up to 8,000 l per day during the tourist season. Nonetheless, awareness of the need for water conservation in Leh seems to be high: according to our survey 99 % of GH/H owners are interested in participating in a water-saving wastewater management pilot study.

Wastewater production and water pollution

In our survey ca. 30 % of HH thought that groundwater is being polluted due to lack of adequate wastewater management GH/H. Therefore, we analysed where potential drinking water pollution is occurring in terms of soak pits and septic tanks belonging to GH/H, which we assume are producing vastly more grey and black wastewater than HH. According to our survey, septic tanks and soak pits in Leh are very poorly managed and hardly ever emptied so that seepage and potential groundwater pollution is assumed. The goal of this spatial analysis is to generate a GH/H wastewater discharge (WWD) map of Leh for the tourist season, taking amount of wastewater and type of treatment into account, to reveal areas with low to very high WWD.

Of the surveyed GH/H, 195 provided information on the number of beds (NB), and type of wastewater treatment. We assume that all GH/H beds in Leh are fully booked during the tourist season. A tourist uses ca. 75 l of wa ter per day (Akhtar, 2010). Wastewater is distinguished into Grey Water (GW) and Black Water (BW) at a ratio of 2/3 GW and 1/3 BW (Akhtar, 2010). Next, to calculate the amount of GW and BW produced by each GH/H per day, we multiply NB by 50 l GW per day and 25 l BW per day. The resulting amount is weighted by a factor (w) according to the type of GW and BW treatment used by each GH/H in order to calculate grey water discharge (GWD) and black water discharge (BWD), and the sum is the complete WWD:

WWD = GWD [NB*50*w] + BWD [NB*25*w]

We identified 3 different wastewater treatment types used by GH/H in Leh, namely soak pits, septic tanks or “other”. We assume that using a soak pit to dispose GW is an appropriate treatment and therefore we set 1 as the weighting factor: if a GH/H uses “other” options rather than soak pits or septic tanks for GW treatment, e.g. if it is collected and disposed of in an open field or backyard, we consider this a worse option (weight 1.5). The worst option is disposal of BW other than using a septic tank or a soak pit, but this is normally not used by GH/H in Leh. Disposing the BW in a septic tank is considered appropriate (weight 1) and in a soak pit inappropriate (weight 2) (Fig. 6).

Figure 6. High densities of wastewater production and perception of groundwater pollution

The WWD map resulting using kernel density method indicates where point features are concentrated (Fig. 6). According to the World Health Organiza tion (WHO, 1996) drinking water extraction locations should be located at a minimum distance of 30 m from WWD locations. We classified the WWD determined earlier into 4 classes from low to very high amount of WWD and by 3 classes in terms of pollution intensity of WWD: high, medium and low. Next we overlaid all bore wells and hand pumps with the WWD map (Fig. 7) and through a 3-dimensional buffer analysis (30 m vertically and horizon tally) identified sites of WWD that are too close to drinking water extraction locations and thus may be impacting their quality.

Figure 7. Overlay of WWD sites and drinking water extraction locations

Out of the total of 284 water extraction locations in Leh we mapped (see above), 180 (46 hand pumps, 9 private HH bore wells, 125 bore wells ho tels/GH) extract freshwater from less than 30 m depth. Out of these, 93 (of which 92 are GH/H bore wells) are located within a 30 m radius of a WWD area (Fig. 7). Out of these, 12 are located in an area with high amount of WWD, 31 in an area with medium amount of WWD, and 50 in an area with low amount of WWD. Thus we find that 33 % of freshwater extraction locations in Leh are too close to sites of WWD and 4 % are too close to highly polluting WWD sites. Thus, drinking water quality at these extraction locations may be at risk. According to our survey, the average bore well depth of GH/H in Leh is 33 m, thus these bore wells may generally be at risk. Nonetheless, GH/H are producing about 1 million litres per day of wastewater, and this is a huge underutilized resource.

Discussion

Generally, the trend of urbanization in Leh is increase in consumption of limited water resources and of built-up and barren agricultural land: various ecosystem functions including evapotranspiration and food production and hence food security may be seriously affected. So far official figures show

no decrease in agricultural land. To address food security in Leh, LAHDC is planning to turn an expanse of desert area on the bank of the Indus River opposite Leh into irrigated agricultural land. However, this may require huge additional amounts of groundwater extraction or diversion of Indus River wa ters. Further, decrease in agricultural land also signifies decrease in irrigated land area, which in turn may be impacting groundwater aquifer recharge. The capacity of the groundwater aquifers is not known but is assumed to be limited. As mentioned in the introducing section, groundwater extraction is not regulated in Leh. According to our survey, inhabitants think that some springs in Leh seem to have dried up because of high rates of groundwater extraction. Huge amounts of energy are being used to lift water from ground water aquifers to Leh, although the town is already facing regular power cuts. Therefore, further increase in water demand also has implications in terms of energy security. The cultural landscape of Leh needs protection for longterm sustainable development, ecological health and sustainable tourism industry growth. To address existing limitations in Leh, water, energy and food need to be considered as “three sides of the same coin”.

The Ladakh Vision Document promotes Ladakh as an eco-tourism destina tion and even an “ideal society”, and aims to conserve and protect water resources, in practice this is difficult to implement as the environment is commonly degraded due to lack of awareness or for short-sighted monetary gains (LAHDC, 2005). To deal with the wastewater management issue in Leh, LAHDC is planning to implement a centralized sewage system by 2040 designed by a Delhi consultant (Tetra Tech, 2009), based on the following assumptions:

• Population estimate for 2040 is 67,888 (not including tourists): figure has been reached by using 5 different projection meth ods’ average.

• Total length of sewerage pipes will be ca. 80 km of piping at least 2 m below ground to avoid freezing.

• One STP is planned below Leh in a barren area, where recycled wastewater is to be used for agriculture and surplus discharged to Indus River.

• Average STP discharge: 13 million litres per day (MLD) in 2040 (7 MLD in 2015).

• Project assumes 135 litres per capita per day (LPCD) water supply, requires minimum 100 LPCD of wastewater to flush the pipes.

• Operation and maintenance (O&M) cost is to be met by a ser vice charge.

This design of the centralized sewage system invites several questions. Tour ists numbers do not figure into it hence PHE is now planning to implement the centralized sewage system without connecting GH/H. PHE currently aims

to provide every inhabitant in Leh with 70 LPCD. However, the design requires PHE to provide almost twice as much LPCD just in order to flush the 80 km long piping system. Wastewater from GH/H, if added to the system, could help to flush the pipes and decrease the need to lift additional water. Accord ing to an interview with a PHE expert, the total cost of the centralized sew age system estimated in 2009 may now increase by 30 %. The consultant assumes that HH will bear the O&M costs through an annual service charge. However, even if all HH pay the service charge, only half of the O&M costs will be met. Currently, only half of HH are paying for their PHE water con nection taps hence we may assume that also not all HH will pay the service charge. Each HH will have to construct its own connection to the centralized sewage system, so that HH may opt to continue disposing their wastewater as before. Although the consultant spent several weeks in Leh, few consul tants from India have experience with implementation of centralized sewage system under such extreme climatic conditions as those in Leh. This may mean that O&M costs may turn out even higher than predicted. Finally, the centralized sewage system, which aims to deal with wastewater in order to protect groundwater resources quality, may not be able to meet the objective of water-related health risk reduction because sewage pipes are planned to run alongside freshwater provision pipes and there is high risk of seepage due to very long pipes, harsh climate and rugged topography. PHE also sees the main bottleneck in energy availability, as we find in our survey. Further, 99 % of HH in Leh use the traditional Ladakhi dry toilet in winter.

We recommend that the centralized sewage system is a suitable option for Leh Old Town and other dense urban areas of Leh. However, as an alterna tive, a decentralized wastewater recycling and reuse system for the agricul tural wards area of Leh, where urban density is very low, may be a more suitable option: if wastewater treatment occurs in several smaller STPs (Fig. 8), this may enable:

• Less water required for flushing and hence less energy intensive.

• Decrease in environmental pollution and seepage due to shorter pipes.

• Renewable energy potential (solar power can be used to run smaller pumps and biogas may be won from manure).

• Using recycled wastewater for irrigation agriculture (also in winter e.g. for vegetable production) and to regenerate barren land (e.g. urban parks).

• Nutrient recycling: continued use of manure rather than chemi cal fertilizers.

• Recharging the aquifer proportionally to demand locally.

• Potentially lower construction and O&M costs.

• Potential eco-tourism and “green jobs” opportunities.

• Wastewater treatment to be tailored to demand, potentially sav ing energy.

8. Centralized and decentralized sewage system options

One large hotel in Leh constructed its own private decentralized STP in late 2013 because all septic tanks were full and is currently testing the quality of the recycled water. To implement a decentralized wastewater recycling and reuse system effectively on a larger scale will require significant increase in awareness of various stakeholders. Leh is very much in the international focus as a summer residence of the Dalai Lama, who visits Leh every other year, and destination for hundreds of thousands of spiritual and nature-lov ing visitors. Therefore innovation in Leh would have far-reaching visibility and thus impact. Other towns in the region have already considered alternatives, e.g. in Shimla (CSE, 2010) decentralized sewage treatment and wastewater recycling has been implemented.

Prevalence of “business as usual” options seems to have various drivers, not just in Leh but in many other towns and cities globally. But building decisionsupport systems based on geographic information systems (GIS) at local levels can support capacity building of local governments and help to enable informed and innovative decision-making by enabling a visioning of alterna tive water futures. International, national and particularly regional actors should strive to contextualize and innovate socio-technical and institutional dimensions by playing “politics with principle” to enable an integrated water, sanitation and hygiene strategy, in order to reduce the threat from waterrelated diseases (Saravanan and Gondhalekar, 2013, 2014). In this, Leh has the potential to be a future cities visioning lighthouse example.

Figure

Conclusion

Although the issue of climate change is so pressing, decentralized waste water recycling and reuse has rarely been implemented on a larger scale. We tend to think that innovation is coupled with risk. But under climate change, the opposite may hold true: implementing “business as usual” options, which have driven us to crisis, under uncertainty, may hold risk for us. Alternative water futures need to be implemented at scales where their effec tiveness for the development of small and large towns and cities alike can be monitored and evaluated, within a political ecology framework able to foster and nurture such innovation. The water energy food nexus approach can help to visualize and hence enable such a framework. If such innovation can be achieved here, the case of Leh can serve as an innovation example for many other contexts globally that are facing rapid urbanization in water-stressed regions and hence water management challenges.

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by a Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant within the 7th European Community Framework Programme (PIRG06GA-2009-256555) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) (KE 1710/11), and is conducted in collaboration with the International Centre for Inte grated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

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An Environmental Anthropology of Waste in Cairo: Contexts, Dimensions, and Trends

Eman A. Lasheen Harvard University

Abstract

Waste management is often discussed as a series of abstract physical processes. However, in reality these processes are almost always intertwined with social and political aspects in the urban context that transform them into tales of survival and struggles for social justice, particularly in devel oping countries. This paper studies the problem of solid waste manage ment in Greater Cairo from an anthropological perspective, investigating the intersection between the environmental implications of the garbage crisis in the city, the social justice issues in the scavenger settlements of Zabbaleen, and the broader political framework. This is done through examining three interrelated components: the contexts as socio-political spheres of action, the dimensions as indicators of the magnitude of the problem, and the ap plied trends as physical embodiment of environmental policies. The aim of this study is to highlight the importance of human-related factors such as political attitudes, pro-environmental behavior and policy making on waste practices in Cairo. It concludes by providing recommendations on how to improve and further develop the waste management sector through adjust ing these elements.

Introduction

Environmental anthropology is an established field of research dedicated to the study of human and environment interactions (Kottak, 1999). Recently these interactions have been most prominently reassembled in the culture of consumerism (Wilson, Shienberg, & Casanova, 2012). With current and expected growth in urban population, cities are becoming massive engines of consumption. Subsequently, waste management problems are becoming more complicated, widespread and diverse. The capacities of many exist ing waste management sectors often fail to adequately and evenly provide basic waste services. This is especially tangible in cities of the developing world- exacerbated by many factors such as poverty, illiteracy, lack of envi ronmental awareness and political and administrative corruption. The im pacts of failed waste management systems are very serious. The simplest manifestation of the problem is the daily appearance of uncollected trash accumulation that interrupts the physicality of streets and spaces. Grow ing at breathtaking rate, street garbage can provide breeding ground for disease-causing vectors, clog drains, cause flooding, contaminate runoff and threaten ecosystems. (Woodson, 2000)

Effective management of municipal solid waste (MSW) is one of the greatest challenges facing local governments in developing countries today. From a global perspective, waste production is remarkably fast growing. According to a very recent report titled ‘What a Waste’ produced by the World Bank in early 2012, the world’s cities produce 1.3 billion tones of MSW per year and are projected to produce 2.2 billion tons by 2025. Waste is also growing more complex, further challenging effective management (Hoornweg & Bha da-Tata, 2012). This paper discusses the problem of failed SWM systems from an anthropological standpoint. It aims at highlighting the interrelated nature that binds social, political and environmental aspects in the Egyptian urban context.

Contexts

The Socio Political Context: ‘Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice’

The most predominant chant of demands, repeated by millions of the city’s outraged citizens during the 2012 Egyptian revolution was strikingly very precise. The symbolic needs of bread, freedom, and social justice capture the state of deprivation that was and still is pervasive in the Egyptian soci ety. However, the notion of social justice in public perception refers mostly to wages, job opportunities and distribution of resources among all social levels. Issues of environmental justice in general and the sociology of waste in particular are a bit further in the mind. A logical interpretation of this deficient meaning is that other social-economic stresses are overwhelmingly distracting. In a mega city struggling against infrastructural, political, eco nomic, organizational, and legal challenges, waste is typically disposed of

without consideration for environmental concerns, human health issues, and social impacts.

Many researchers argue that economical conditions should be listed as a key cause of environmental degradation in third world countries, not only as a form of resource deficiency but as an obstacle in the path of collective soci etal environmental awareness. Inglehart’s post materialism thesis proposes the notion that the inhabitants of poorer countries are less likely to demon strate environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviors (Inglehart, 1995). In one of the earliest works on urban waste management in Cairo, Haynes and El-Hakim (1979) attribute the consideration of environmental issues as low priority concerns among the public in comparison to the other problems mainly to economic difficulties and overpopulation, “when people are poor, jobs are scarce, productivity is low, inflation is rampant, population growth is high, and the per capita economy is stagnant, in what context does one frame environmental considerations?” (Haynes and El-Hakim, 1979). There’s a great portion of truth in these studies however- solid waste man agement remains a responsibility of local governments and municipalities. The absence of clear policies and environmental awareness on the higher level is much more of a reason for the current state.

The Policy, Legislative, and Institutional Contexts

The Egyptian Environmental Policy Program (EEPP) was founded in 2002 to support policy, institutional, and regulatory reforms in the environmental sector (Khayal & Zaki, 2010). One of the objectives of this program was to improve efficiency and performance of the SWM sector through a com bination of strategic planning, improved administration, enhanced public awareness, with a specific focus on supporting private sector participation (Hamed, 2005).

An in-depth study of the program reveals stagnant and theoretical approach es, lacking greatly on real life solutions and clear implementation strategies. Most of the regulatory policies are non invasive, directed towards attracting foreign investors and local businessmen to act as stakeholders. The role of the government then would be the planning, and arranging for the enabling environment for businessmen to work safely (Bushra, 2000). The current framework reflects the capitalistic vision from which privatization trends are derived. The operational issues are then delegated to the second authority in the hierarchy, which is that of the governorates and municipalities that then define their individual strategies regarding the different aspects of the SWM process. They are responsible for key issues such as scope definition, financ ing, public/private participation strategies, legal actions against violations, and technical specifications (Khayal & Zaki, 2010).

While this hierarchic distribution of power in the formal process may seem sound, there’s a growing gap between policy and implementation. This could be attributed to the ambiguity of the overarching framework in one sense and

the specificity of the responsibilities lying on the governorates’ shoulders in another sense. This authoritative gap allows for nepotism, administrative corruption, and bureaucratic practices. This gap is widened even more by further distribution of authority among a number of ministries that tap into waste management within the governorate. Currently the responsibility is divided between the Ministry of State for Environment Affairs (MSEA/EEAA), Ministry of Local Development, Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban De velopment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, and Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Khayal & Zaki, 2010). Without a clear identification of the role of each of these stakeholders, the institutional framework will continue to dysfunction the way it does right now.

Another major obstacle is the absence of a strong legislative framework. There has never been a clearly devised SWM law in the Egyptian Constitu tion. The existing set of laws and amendments in the Egyptian jurisdiction are too general and insufficient. Moreover the absence of reliable law enforcement strategy is even more important. Nowadays the scene of a donkey pulled cart dumping loads of garbage on a road right next to a police officer is very common.

The Behavioral Context

It would be simply incomplete to draw the reasons of this crisis from policy and legislative components only. How a society processes pro-environmental behaviors depends partially upon individual beliefs and ethical/moral values, and also upon infrastructural elements such as political and social systems that might hamper or encourage pro-environmental actions (Rice, 2006). Be haviors such as public disposal of garbage and open burning are increasing exponentially in the city. On an individual level, there’s a state of careless ness that has evolved over the years about the impact of individual behavior on the environment. No one seems to care about what happens beyond the limits of their homes (Salama, 2004). Explanations provided for understand ing the causes of such indifference are various. Some relate it to a lack of designated infrastructure such as collection services and street bins which forces people to perform polluting activities against their will. Others at tribute these negative behaviors to absence of environmental awareness on the dangers and risks related to the problems of waste management. This area of research carries promising potentials for further studies, dedicated towards the case of Cairo specifically.

Dimensions

The Social Justice Dimension

The Zabbaleen are considered the largest, most efficient, and most renowned group of informal garbage collectors in the world. But certainly there are many other scavenger based communities, which undeniably exist in third world countries like the Muslim minority in Kolkata, India; the Roma gypsies

in Romania; and the Bangladeshis and members of the Muslim minority in Delhi (Anschutz & Sheinburg, 2006). Most of the garbage collecting commu nities emerge and evolve around megacities. These communities share many common aspects that emanate around their interest in the economic value of waste. Most remarkably, the profession reflects a certain social affiliation that is generally perceived as ‘low status’ (Stix, 2012). Another commonality is the unsanitary living conditions that are associated with scavenger settle ments. Health issues such as high mortality and morbidity rates (especially among children), high incidence of animal epidemics, widespread illiteracy, poor environmental conditions, and low income are all omnipresent in these communities (Fahmi, 2005).

The Zabbaleen population in Cairo is divided upon 6 scatter settlements on the outskirts of the city referred to as ‘garbage villages’ (Anschutz & Shein burg, 2006). They are paid only minimal fees for their garbage collection ser vices by the city’s inhabitants. Despite the crucial role they perform for the overall wellbeing of the city, they are severely marginalized and low ranked in society (Fahmi & Sutton, 2006). That, coupled by the extremely catastrophic living conditions, it’s quite amazing how they’ve managed to endure through the decades, retaining their hardworking attitude and gratefulness for their very little earnings. The social ranking of Zabbaleen has not seen dramatic changes since their start, being looked upon not in association with their vital role in cleanliness of the city but as people who live with and earn a living from other people’s refuse. They did however experience uplifting stances in their lifetime when international institutions took notice of their practice (Furniss, 2012). The international acknowledgment and media buzz created around them did in fact re-introduce them as important stakeholders in society but not for long. They are generally dubbed as “garbage people’, perceived as unclean, uned ucated and outcasts which according to them is very demoralizing (Iskandar, 2009).

The Environmental Dimension

In the dawn of the 2010 revolution, Cairo’s congested garbage problem hit crisis level. According to the ministry of environment’s spokesman, Cairo accounts for 55 percent of the country’s waste, producing 14,000 tons of waste per day (Viney, 2012). The latest deterioration is due to contractual disputes between the government and the foreign companies commissioned to collect garbage from the capital’s streets for years, according to Mohamed Abdel Raziq, an official from the cleaning authority. Most of these companies have stopped working pending the renegotiation of contracts. Currently it is roughly estimated that only 60% the city’s daily waste is collected by mixed efforts from the remaining portion of private companies and the traditional garbage collectors, the Zabbaleen, leaving around 8000 tons of garbage unmanaged (Fahmi, 2005). City residents have no choice but to dump their garbage at the nearest vacant land plot or open space. Moreover, low-in come residents living in dense urban areas who don’t have the luxury of

empty plots or public space simply burn their refuse in front of their homes (Furniss, 2012). In order to fully capture the dimensions of the present state, a clear understanding of the historical transformations in the solid waste practices is needed.

A Timeline of Waste in Cairo

Despite the fact that MSW is a responsibility of governments and munici palities, the earliest form of waste management system that has ever been known in Cairo was established by people not by authorities, but by a col laboration that dates back to the beginning of the last century. The first societal authority in this parallel government was a group of migrants from the Dakhla oasis in the western Egyptian desert. They were called Wahiya, which means ‘oasis people’. They settled in Cairo and embarked themselves on managing the city’s waste as a living (Neamatalla, 1998). The Wahiya were picky collectors, interested in the economic value of their collected refuse. That made them more focused on recyclable material like paper and plastics, but not in organic household byproducts (Leven, 2005). As a result, they only collected portions of the garbage that was available. They were joined in the 1940s by another group of Coptic migrants from southern Egypt, later to be named ‘Zabbaleen’ or garbage collectors. This group used to work in agriculture and as pig breeders in the rural south (Stix, 2012). Confronted by crop failure, diminishing economic resources, and combined with agrarian reforms by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, they were forced to move towards he northern urban cities. At first they settled in tin squatters houses in Imbaba, very near to the urban core of Cairo at that time (Didero, 2012). After being evicted from Imbaba, they were relocated to Muqattam in 1970. In 1975, when construction work on a Coptic Church began in Muqat tam, people started feeling more secure and thus more inclined to build permanent stone homes instead of tin shacks (Neamatalla, 1998).

Together, these 2 symbiotic groups organized themselves into a highly func tional system involving distinctive roles in the waste management process. The Wahiya acted as waste brokers, controlling the rights to the domestic waste of Cairo, while the Zabbaleen rented collection routes from them and were thus provided with access to waste as a resource (El-Hakim & Haynes, 1979). They spontaneously became involved in an integrated waste business and initiated micro-enterprises composed of entire families operating on the collection, sorting, and recycling of garbage. As the city expanded in both size and population, so did the empire of garbage collectors.

By the 1980s, the Zabbaleen had developed a highly efficient, people based waste management system and gained international recognition for having the highest recycling rates in the world. They even surpassed Seattle’s re cycling rate of 37 percent, which was the highest in the US and most of Europe at that time (Leven, 2006). This period marks two very important transformations in the life of the Zabbaleen communities. The first was that they were finally acknowledged and appreciated on an international level. A

global reputation was growing serviced by a phenomenal amount of research about literally all aspects of the Zabbaleen’s life. The research acted as unin tentional publicity, highlighting the range of problems and challenges facing these groups. The studies also caught the attention of many humanitarian institutions and NGOs who were willing to provide substantial amounts of funding for environmental projects dedicated towards improving the lives of the Zabbaleen physically and technically. The most prominent of these donors were the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, Oxfam, the Association for Garbage Collectors (ACG), and the Association for the Protection of the Environment (APE) (Fahmi & Sutton, 2006). These funds were directed to wards building schools, training individuals, financing micro enterprises and further developing their recycling industry in specific and their community in general.

The second milestone was in the form of a local political accreditation of the Zabbaleen’s creative and well-organized practice. For the first time in the history of SWM in Cairo, the government offered to partner with the them, supported by professional expertise and foreign aid to legitimize and formal ize the Zabbaleen’s entrepreneurial system into a more established service that would have the capacity, coverage, and technical proficiency to meet the demands of the ever expanding city (Leven, 2006). Chronologically, this particular incident in the course of the relationship between the formal and informal sectors could be marked as an era of possibility for best practice. The Zabbaleen started dreaming about better chances in life, the city’s in habitants who were well serviced, and the city became relatively clean.

However this euphoric state of collective satisfaction of all stakeholders did not last long. In the year 2000 the government started advertising plans for relocating the Zabbaleen’s practice from their settlement at the Muqattam area to a fairly distant new development 25 kilometers towards the eastern Katamiya desert, claiming that their practices were too polluting and unhy gienic to be located near urban areas (Fahmi, 2005). Secondly, they were confronted by the government’s privatization of the sector, which involved hiring multinational waste management companies to take over the Zab baleen’s routes and rights to waste collection. Fifteen-year contracts were signed in 2002 with four international waste management companies to pro vide ISWM service in Alexandria and parts of Greater Cairo (Leven, 2006). This was a very devastating move, threatening the survival of Zabbaleen. It has also proved to be unsuccessful for many reasons. One of them is the so cietal preference of the door-to-door collection system of household waste, provided by the Zabbaleen rather than street collection provided by the com panies. Another reason is the ongoing disputes between some of these com panies and authorities in charge of managing the contracts over particular interpretations of some terms, delayed payments, and other administrative issues (Fahmi & Sutton, 2006). Also, many observers include the complete disregard towards the successful indigenous practice of the Zabbaleen and not considering them as key actors in the waste process as a reason, despite

some unsuccessful attempts that were made to contain them within the pri vate companies.

Furthermore, with the onset of swine flu in 2009, one final blow was directed at the Zabbaleen community. The government preformed mass slaughter of all the pigs owned and raised in their settlements as a precautionary procedure after increasing national fears over the possible outbreak of the epidemic. The process of pig eradication was implemented in a fast, brutal manner without any compensation to the pig owners. This step had very se rious implications on the recycling industry and the Zabbaleen’s existence. Not only were the pigs used in the recycling process as consumers of organic refuse, but they were also considered as economic assets for the Zabbaleen. The Egyptian government’s decision was criticized by many by locally and internationally not only as an act of inhumanity against the animals but as an unnecessary step that had nothing to do with swine flu prevention, since no cases had been detected at that time (Furniss, 2012). The outcomes of this cull were soon visible as piles of organic waste the pigs once consumed started showing up on Cairo’s streets, posing serious health risks.

From that date onward, the SWM system in Cairo has been a chaotic scene of unsynchronized and inadequate efforts. The recent political upheaval against the Mubarak regime and the instability that followed is not a main cause of the problem as many of the officials are trying to imply. The events have in deed provided conditions for a state of idleness in many aspects of life in the city, but are definitely not the root cause of the problem. The Zabbaleen, as with many other Egyptian citizens, have been aspiring for reform. They were hoping for tangible changes in policies that improvise the SWM sector. So far this anticipated change has not been seen. When Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood Party was elected President of Egypt in 2012, he vowed to resolve Egypt’s waste management issues in his first 100 days in office. It was said that this would be done through a waste management strategy that would replicate Turkey’s current system without any further detail (Stix, 2012). The plan lacked any elaborations on the position of whether the Zab baleen would be included in the formal waste management system or not, and the roles in which they might be reintroduced into the waste business has never been mentioned.

Trends

Privatization

A general consensus derived from the examination of the historical trans formations in the sector is the intrinsic nature that binds the environmental conditions in the city with the practices of the Zabbaleen community. One can easily draw parallels between each major setback that has affected the Zabbaleen over the course of this last decade and the immediate conse quences on the environmental quality in the city. It is therefore evident that

SWM policies are definitely detrimental to the environmental protection and social justice simultaneously. The privatization policies have demonstrated significant unfavorable social and environmental outcomes that prove the system to be defective. Despite the government’s defense of the system as an important step towards integrated solid waste management, the sys tem has visibly failed to address the basic issues of ecological, social and economic sustainability (Didero, 2012). The companies are only required to achieve recycling rates of 20%, which is incomparable to the traditional recycling rates of 80%, and yet they don’t even get close to that in reality (Fahmi, 2005). The services provided are very often insufficient in terms of technical equipment like street bins, loaders, trucks, recycling and compost ing facilities, and workers.

The inconsistency of the collection services and the new billing system im posed by the government through the monthly electricity bills have culmi nated into waves of public dissatisfaction. The idea was to collect a monthly fee for garbage collection from every household estimated according to the amount paid for electricity, as an indicator for social status. It was said that this would guarantee that the fee was reasonably and fairly calculated. There was no way not to pay since the amount was included automatically to the to tal bill. Hundreds of lawsuits have been filed against the government for adding these fees without prior public consent, claiming that this was against an article in the Egyptian Constitution (Leven, 2006). Most importantly, many reports have documented very recent violations on behalf of these compa nies resembled in garbage dumping all around the Cairo ring road, in the desert, and in rural irrigation canals, instead of the designated disposal facilities (Viney, 2012).

From a social justice perspective, privatization trends brought in more eco nomic and psychological burden, which increased the social vulnerability of Zabbaleen as low-income minorities. With a painful history of serial evic tions, uncertainties about relocation plans and the takeover of their profes sion through privatization, they became desperate and helpless.

Avoidance

In the specific case of Cairo, there is an implicit political legacy of de-prior itizing environmental issues- what could be described as a form of ‘political avoidance’ of complicated environmental problems. The official announcements that follow any environmental problem in the city, starting from gar bage pileups, the black cloud, etc., are always superficial, short-termed and defensive. One possible reason for this attitude is the absence of true con cern about sustainability in itself. In fact the issues of environmental protec tion have never been a priority to any previous government. Furthermore, according to Gomma (1997), in Egypt, one of the main reasons that environ mental issue surfaced on the government’s policy agenda was because for eign donors were willing to finance and support environmental projects that

would result in sustainable development. Salama Ahmed Salama, a promi nent Egyptian writer in AlAhram Weekly stated the following:

“The attention accorded to infrastructure, tourist and investment projects answers, first, to the interest of businessmen, while the prioritizing of partic ular neighborhoods is equally divisive. The results we see everywhere, as any sense of belonging is undermined, and the piles of rubbish grow” (Salama, 2004).

A second reason is the lack of technical, ground-based implementation expertise. The approach is always “more passive, dedicated to temporary solutions and not focused on the roots” (Hamed, 2005). These findings reso nate with a survey conducted by Eric Denis in his book, People and Popula tion, which found that out of 2000 respondents only 19 percent of thought that the Egyptian government is concerned about environment issues (Leven, 2006). This depicts the population’s lack of faith in the policies applied by the government.

This political avoidance is very often masked by cosmetic actions that demonstrate a lack of both vision and true intention to change the current condi tions. An example of these politically motivated interventions is a one-day campaign called “Clean Homeland,” announced by ousted president Mo hamed Morsi in the very first months of his term, encouraging people to get out of their homes and collect garbage from streets and lots for municipal trucks to haul away. Many people responded positively to this call and some piles were removed. The very next day, new piles started building up once more. It was also very frustrating to the garbage collectors- when Morsi’s “Clean Homeland” campaign coordinators didn’t respond to their calls for discussion and ideas on how to address the city’s severe waste problems (Viney, 2012).

After almost one year of political turmoil in the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster and the enactment of a military coup, the future of Egypt’s environmental and social wellbeing is looking more stressful and less onto the path of re form.

Conclusion

The outcomes of this paper resonate with many previous research findings on the importance of enhancing, developing and reintroducing the Zabba leen into the waste management process. A summary of hypotheses formu lated form the study is presented below:

• The environmental anthropology of waste in Cairo is best de scribed as a deeply rooted relationship between the notions of cleanliness and justice in the city. A solution for the problem

must involve looking into both aspects.

• The state of complete social vulnerability of the Zabbaleen community and the city’s current garbage crisis is a physical depiction of failed environmental policies.

• A political shift in paradigm with real intentions to prioritize waste management is the only way towards reaching a sustain able solution.

• There is great need for behavioral studies that examine cultur ally suitable ways of improving the people’s attitude towards waste disposal and perception of the Zabbaleen’s profession.

• A detailed study of legislative reforms in the SWM laws is high ly recommended.

There’s no magical solution for the SWM problem in Cairo, However, the contexts are clear, the dimensions are interrelated and the trends can be changed.

References

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Designed Experiments for Transformational Learning: Forging New Opportunities Through the Integration of Ecological Research Into Design

Alexander J. Felson Yale University Abstract

Landscape and urban designers are increasingly drawing on ecological understanding to inform the sustainability and resilience aspects of their projects. The design practitioners working on these projects rely on environ mental consultants, professional ecologists, as well as urban ecology as the points of references for these purposes. However, they are confronting gaps in the understanding of urban ecosystems and of what constitutes a sustainable or resilient urban landscape. Research to fill those gaps is limited and can be out of sync with the timeframe of design projects. As a result, what is incorporated as the sustainability aspects of design projects are not necessarily supported by relevant scientific evidence. Given that ecologists have limited functions as consultants in design projects, designers often at tempt to translate ecological concepts into design strategies on their own, raising the added question of the capacity of the designer to translate the science into practice. Notwithstanding these issues, the demand for the inte gration of ecology into design is an opportunity for designers and ecologists to collaborate. On the one hand, ecologists seek to understand and study urban ecosystems quantitatively and qualitatively. On the other hand, de signers seek a more rigorous approach to building and monitoring sustain able and resilient urban ecosystems. Fostering this integration can deepen our understanding of what is “sustainable” and “resilient;” and brings this understanding to bear on urban design. Designed experiments provide one approach to situate urban ecological research as designed urban spaces and installations through the design process. Building on the concept of designed experiments and a review of precedents, this paper explores ways of deepening the relationship and integration of ecology and design with the goal of informing future collaboration.

Introduction

A simultaneous movement is underway in both landscape architecture and ecology to reframe the relationship of science to practice. Ecologists are looking to action science as in the Earth Stewardship Initiative to clarify what needs to be studied, expand on how scientific research can inform shaping strategies, improve communication among multiple parties via interdisci plinary strategies, and identify pragmatic actions for scientists (Chapin et al. 2011, Felson et al. 2013a). Concurrently, landscape architects are seeking to improve the evaluation of the sustainability of designed landscapes such as through the Landscape Architecture Foundation’s Landscape Performance Series (LPS), a program aimed toward promoting the integration of monitor ing as evidence-based science into designed projects.

Both initiatives represent an attempt to foster integration and interdisciplin ary cross-fertilization of practices and ideas within each of the respective fields. For instance, through the Earth Stewardship Initiative, some ecolo gists are making a shift from studying ecosystems to shaping them and in so doing are assuming a role approximating that of designers (Figure 1). Con comitantly, designers employing evidenced-based science and monitoring of built projects are increasingly drawing on ecologists’ research and monitor ing strategies and so mimic the functionality of ecological researchers. One example is Seven Ponds Farm (Figure 2) where the design team, Nelson Byrd Woltz Landscape Architects, transformed what was once overgrazed pastureland into a designed restoration of grassland and meadow and forest focusing on biodiversity and ecological services. Working with the property owners, Woltz established restoration experimentation emphasizing the criti cal importance of ongoing monitoring in the designed landscape (Aronson and Handel 2013).

It is important to underscore that programs like the Earth Stewardship Ini tiative and LPS are still in the developmental stages particularly as regard frameworks and approaches, and gaining buy-in amongst professional so ciety members as well as in establishing a track record. Moreover, they are largely being carried out as distinct disciplinary initiatives limiting to some extent their impact, either intended or prospective, i.e., in enhancing our understanding of sustainable design, or more broadly the ecological under standing of urban ecosystems. In the case of the LPS, the approach has been to establish post implementation monitoring and assessment of exist ing built projects focusing on performance metrics. This approach will generate site-specific information about how the one-off designed landscapes perform. However, the approach leaves out the role of hypotheses and ex perimentation design as a means of analyzing aspects of designed land scapes to inform our broader knowledge. As a result, the monitoring being performed is not framed around critical research questions and therefore does not further basic science.

Figure 1. Ecological planning project. Image by Ecological Society of America

Figure 2. Seven Ponds Farm. Photo by Nelson Byrd Woltz Landscape Architects

These initiatives, nonetheless, provide a foundation upon which to build. This foundation lies in the theoretical framework offered by the shifting role of ecologists in the Earth Stewardship Initiative, and the structured relationship between design and research in the LPS. In both cases, the ecologist and landscape architect are situated in new roles.

Designed Experiments for Transformative Learning

To optimize the impact of these shifting roles, and to further deepen the relationship of science to practice, a transdisciplinary approach known as designed experiments are being advanced as an effective iterative process where ecologists and designers can collaborate and work out relationships to deconstruct disciplinary barriers and increase integration. To this end, designed experiments utilize the creative design process to situate experi ments as components of urban spaces (Felson and Pickett, 2005, Felson et al. 2013b), allowing ecologists to shape built environments by influencing how they are designed, constructed, evaluated, and maintained and also al lowing designers to more effectively integrate ecological research into design projects to inform resilient and sustainable projects. Designed experiments have already been applied to the design and implementation of numerous real-world urban sites (Felson et al. 2013a).

At the core of designed experiments is the redefinition of the relationship between ecologist and designer in the design process itself, thus advancing, in a concerted and coordinated manner, the efforts underway in both ecol ogy and in design to study and shape urban ecosystems (Felson et al. 2013). From the ecologist’s perspective, the design process opens up opportunities to integrate experiments into urban spaces that can further enrich ecological understanding of urban ecology, expand the conception of urban space and reveal synergies across disciplines. For the designer, the incorporation of experimentation into design establishes a legitimate synergy with ecological science that goes beyond the metaphorical and supports the development of evidence-based sustainable design. In short, through designed experiments, the opportunity exists to systematically embrace the shifting roles of ecolo gists and designers and in so doing enhance our application of evidence based sustainable and resilient landscapes.

The ecologist in this context is re-positioned as an active participant in the design process, working collaboratively with designers from the start of a design through to the post-construction phase, including the ongoing assess ment of the built results (Figure 3) (Johnson and Hill 2002; Nassauer 2012; Felson et al. 2013). This feature marks a departure from the traditional col laboration between ecologist and designer and fosters the transdisciplinary nature of the approach.

In pedagogy and practice, designers have a history of utilizing ecological concepts and outcomes of ecological research to inform design (McHarg 1969, Spirn 1984, Johnson and Hill 2002, Forman 2008). That is to say, they translate their understanding and interpretation of those concepts and outcomes into projects. For example, Kate Orff’s Oystertecture uses the oys ter life cycle to create a harbor nursery linking the biological processes of an organism to the scales of remediation of a harbor ecosystem (Figure 4). This translation has been an important means of infusing design projects with ecology, and of synthesizing a range of multi-disciplinary and multistakeholder inputs into projects. A further example of this is the application of data or spatial mapping in new ways through design such as in Anuradha Mathur’s and Dilip da Cunha’s (2001) book Mississippi Floods: Designing a

Figure 3. Mapping the design process for urban ecology. From Felson et al. (2013b)

Figure 4. “Oystertecture.” Images by SCAPE Landscape Architecture

Figure 5. Alluvial valley of the Lower Mississippi River. Map by Harold Fisk, 1944

Shifting Landscape which reinterprets geographer Harold Fisk’s extensive maps of the Mississippi River (Figure 5). This translation and synthesis can lend itself to a more loose and metaphorical application of the science which can have its own constraints or emergent qualities depending on what infor mation the designer relies on, how the information is applied, and how it is synthesized with other aspects of a design.

To elaborate, design intended to provide ecological solutions often do not rely on site-specific research but on observation and the translation of broad ecological theory. In translating ecological theory, designers can disregard underlying assumptions and context specific ecological factors that may not be applicable to designed landscapes or even to urban conditions. Among ecologists, there is a growing literature on urban ecosystems (Grimm et al. 2008, Pickett et al. 2011, McDonnell 2012, Adler and Tanner 2013, Forman 2014) including non analogous novel ecosystems in human dominated land scapes (Lundholm et al. 2012, Kowarik 2011); but these are still relatively new areas of research and in many cases supported with limited studies and anecdotal information (Pataki et al. 2011). Consequently, the current working understanding of urban ecosystems and of what constitutes a sus tainable or resilient urban landscape is changing (Collins et al. 2010). Given these limitations, what is being relied upon to inform ecological solutions may not be applicable, especially in the urban context.

Moreover, in re-interpreting outcomes of ecological research and ecological

theory and synthesizing these with other issues to fit into a design, the designer may not fully reflect on the meaning or the theory of those outcomes. As seen in the case of Downsview Park, the theory of ecological succession was evoked as the basis of the design (Figure 6). However, arguably, the design is more appropriate to the theory of island biogeography including habitat patches and corridors, and less relevant to succession.

When designers weave ecological concepts into design there is no peer review to ensure that they accurately reference underlying ecological theories. For ecologists, peer review is relied upon to critique ecological research meth ods, outcomes and analysis. They collectively build on peer-reviewed work to seek and develop a shared understanding of ecological theory (e.g. Boone et al. 2012). The loss in translation and lack of a peer review process in design constrain the ability of designers to address gaps in scientific knowledge.

While this translation and synthesis can be seen as an imminent constraint particularly from the ecologist’s perspective, being able to synthesize multi ple variables is a valuable process for designers. The synthesis of multi-disciplinary concepts, together with social cultural economic and environmental conditions is fundamental to creative design. In some cases, designers may re-evaluate ecological concepts for their aesthetic or representational value, and not so much for their operational or functional value. This repurposing of the concepts has given rise to the concept of “designer ecologies” (Ma rie-Lister 2007). For the purposes of ecology and ecological design, these

Figure 6. Proposal for Downsview Park, Toronto, 1999. Images by James Corner Field Operations with Nina-Marie Lister

aspects of the design process can be useful to further urban ecological un derstanding and societies’ understanding of resilience and sustainability (Czerniak 2007). Designed experiments capitalize on this potential on the design side.

On the ecology side, examples of integrative efforts with design also exist and can inform the development of designed experiments. These include: adaptive management, where ecologists seek to translate ecological princi pals into management and design strategies (Pulliam 2002, Barthel et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2004, Marie-Lister 2012), urban restoration ecology (Faeth 2005, Alberti 2015), brownfields reclamation (Kirkwood 2001), green infra structure (Hobbs et al. 2006, Pataki et al. 2011), conservation biology and landscape ecology (Dramstad 1996, Forman 2003), and design of habitat corridors (Hilty 2006). In addition, ecologists are increasingly working di rectly with designers as consultants, for example, in Steven Handel’s work on the Brooklyn Bridge Park and Applied Ecological Services’ role on the Fresh Kills Project (Figure 7). Notwithstanding these efforts, researchers are still exploring options for a conceptual framework to facilitate ecological research in urban environments (Cadenasso and Pickett 2008, Boone et al. 2012).

Despite recent shifts in the theoretical understanding of the broader impact of humans on ecosystems (Kareiva et al. 2007) and the growing influence of applied ecology, much of what constitutes urban ecological knowledge relies on assumptions from research carried out in environments where people have less impact. Urban ecologists have often studied ecology in cities focusing on remnant ecological patterns and processes, such as extant wildlife and

Figure 7. Habitat diversification, Fresh Kills Park. Image by Field Operations

flora (Angold et al. 2006), and in so doing leave out other critical drivers of urban ecology such as social, economic and political factors. Notably, more recently ecologists have shifted from ecology in cities to ecology of cities (Pickett et al. 2008) where they explore coupled human natural systems and social-ecological systems (Tàbara and Chabay, 2013). Still, the limitations in the theories, standardized language (MacGregor-Fors 2011), and existing research and data make it challenging to infer urban ecosystem structure and processes that translate science into practical design applications and management tools (Cadenasso and Pickett 2008). Researchers are discover ing and demonstrating that assumptions about urban ecosystem structure and function often differ from expectations. This is true from an ecosystem perspective in terms of hydrology and biogeochemistry (Kaye et al. 2006, Groffman et al. 2004), urban biodiversity (Faeth et al. 2011, McKinney 2006, Sukopp 2008 ), succession (Burghardt et al. 2011, Robinson and Handel 2000), pollination, animal behavior, morphology and genetics (Shochat et al. 2006). Addressing these methodological, theoretical, and data limitations is key to advancing urban ecology.

Some of the challenges that urban ecologists must address in conducting research on urban ecosystems and developing a compelling theory for incorporating social systems and institutions in ecological terms include: deter mining ways of incorporating socioeconomic factors even more so than bio logical ones as drivers of urban ecosystem structure and process; defining a common terminology for comparability of results across locations (Mac Gregor-Fors 2011); explicitly incorporating temporal dynamics (Ramalho and Hobbs 2012); and conducting studies at multiple spatial scales (Clergeau et al. 2006) and over longer timescales and larger landscapes (Robertson and Hull 2001). These challenges necessitate the development of a more holis tic framework for understanding these complex drivers (Grove et al. 2009). Within this framework the interpretation of biological systems must take place alongside interpretation of human decision-making, programming, dwelling, and other patterns (Alberti et al. 2014). Beyond these challenges, fundamental questions still remain regarding the scope of the field, the defi nition of urban ecosystems, and the role people should play as components of their larger ecosystems (Weiland and Richter 2009). Moving the discipline forward will require expanding the breadth of knowledge beyond variables historically considered in ecology. This expansion requires revisiting the relationships between ecologists and other disciplines, navigating the physical constraints of cities, and addressing social structures to include the influ ence of norms, rules, learning capacity, power, and technology.

Examples of this can be found in Baltimore and Phoenix where urban ecol ogy is being developed through long-term ecological research (LTER), funded by the National Science Foundation. For ecologists, these funded projects have played critical roles in beginning to overcome some of the aforemen tioned barriers, and to amass data on how urban ecosystems change over time. Already, both urban LTER sites have established a series of long-term

measurement programs.

The Baltimore Ecosystem Study (BES), under the direction of Steward Pickett, focuses on applying new theories and integrating biological, physical, and social sciences through research, education, community engagement and outreach. BES has set up monitoring stations for long term data on fac tors including nitrogen retention across urban landscapes (1993-present), nitrous oxide fluxes in lawns and forests (1998-present), and fluctuations in urban riparian water table, nitrate and phosphorous concentrations at multiple locations along a watershed (Pickett et al. 2011). In addition, they have long-term data on a variety of social factors including governance net works, land use management practices, housing data, household income, and locational choices for homeowners and companies. At the Central Ari zona Project-Long Term Ecological Research, researchers have developed a phosphorous budget (Metson et al. 2012) and are also developing a carbon budget for Phoenix metropolitan region. The complex and heterogeneous conditions have made it difficult to attain data for an accurate account of the carbon dynamics. In addition, the conceptual frameworks for these LTERs have shifted. For example, Baltimore has gone from patch dynamics, to the sustainable city, to resilient cities and is shifting again for the latest funding cycle.

Designed experiments can complement these existing long term studies, by utilizing the design of large scale urban design, infrastructure, and land scape projects as opportunities to introduce research experiments and in sert monitoring devices in locations that have otherwise been inaccessible.

Design Process for Iterative Learning

By establishing a core role for the ecologist from the start of the design process, designed experiments realign the research goals of the ecologist, the aesthetic goals of the designer, and the sustainability goals of the client (Felson et al. 2013b). In this way, the experiment is as critical to the design and to satisfying the client’s needs as is the design to the experiment. It builds on the advantages of the design process to synthesize multiple vari ables enabling ecologists to navigate the complexity of conducting research in human dominated and influenced landscapes. At the same time, in linking ecological experiments to urban landscapes, it can generate more relevant and much needed data on urban ecosystem processes (Pataki et al. 2011) and advance broader environmental education goals (Robertson and Hull 2001). In addition, the experiments themselves inhere the public identity and cultural relevance of the design.

Given that the design process entails multiple stages for interface with com munity, political, and regulatory processes necessary for building in urban areas, collaborating with designers through the design process is particular

ly advantageous for ecologists. Establishing research in urban environments requires buy-in from multiple stakeholders to the intrinsic value of research to a project. By situating experiments as an integral part of the design of a project, both ecologist and the designer are better placed to advocate jointly for the realization of the project as a whole.

Designers can also assist in addressing the actual site selection and lay out of experiments: choosing sites, configuring treatments and establish ing comparable replicate and control studies. Ecological researchers have historically sought to minimize the potential for disturbance of a research site by people and as well to make the research inconspicuous. In an ur ban environment (such as a heavily used park), however, ecologists are hard pressed to avoid such disturbance. Urban ecologists moreover have come to the realization that, in order to study the dynamic relationships among humans, other organisms, and their environment, they must rely on more assumptions and accept greater levels of uncertainty in their research than in controlled experiments (Robertson and Hull, 2001). Through the design process, ecologists have a useful entry point to situate research in urban landscapes (Felson et al. 2013) and further through collaboration with the designer address some of the challenges with producing replicable data or data that yields high probability rate, controlling variables and defining boundaries between research space and public space so as to generate long-term, comparable quantification of urban processes and patterns. For the designer, the collaboration will require going beyond post-construction measurement of performance, to support integrating hypothesis driven ex perimentation with controlled variables and a testable experimental design across multiple locations.

The track record of designed experiments thus far has exemplified how the design process can effectively serve as a structured framework to facilitate collaboration between ecologists and designers in a manner that mutually reinforces and advances the interests of both fields. In the following exam ples, we demonstrate how designed experiments work in practice.

NY-CAP MillionTreesNYC 2009

One example of a designed experiment is the New York City Afforestation Project (NY-CAP), part of the Million Trees Project.

Given the limited number of experimental urban forestry studies and the brief duration of most studies, research projects exploring longer-term eco logical dynamics are essential for evaluating afforestation dynamics (Oldfield et al. 2013). With the intent of collecting data that would better inform future park management practices and capital decisions, the NY-CAP design team including professional ecological consultants worked with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to pursue hypothesis-driven research focusing on forest performance and evaluation management practices within the development of an urban park. Together they integrated testable hypoth

eses into the design, construction and monitoring of an urban forest (Felson et al. 2013) (Figure 8).

NY-CAP facilitates urban forest research to refine our understanding of the performance and viability of a constructed urban forest in the face of de graded site conditions and human interventions. The experimental design focuses on the impacts of alternative pre-treatment strategies and varied plant diversity treatments on ecosystem functioning including invasion dy namics, species recruitment and turnover, and the time to canopy closure. Research plots included eight different treatments, consisting of a factorial arrangement of pre-treatment soil amendments with and without compost, stand complexity with shrubs and herbs versus without, and tree species richness with two versus six species (Felson et al. 2013, Oldfield et al. 2013). Concurrently, designers worked to incorporate the experimental layout into a functional urban park design and aesthetic.

Figure 8. MillionTreesNYC, 2009, New York City Afforestation Project (NY-CAP)

One of the challenges encountered in moving forward with the experimental research was budgetary. The experimental design component of the project was included as part of the design with no additional fee. Thus the ecologists’ involvement was voluntary. Upon completion of the design contract in 2009 (and after the establishment of the experimental layout), academic institutions were invited to establish direct relationships with NYCDPR so as to further refine the experimental design and research protocols (Felson et al.2013c). An early academic partnership with Yale University in 2009 has allowed for a second phase of ecological analysis that included baseline as sessment.

Earth Stewardship Initiative Demonstration Project - Sacramento American River Parkway, 2014

For the 99th annual Ecological Society of America conference, ecologists working with landscape architects, environmental consultants, and agency officials, developed a demonstration project using designed experiments as a teaching tool and strategy for operationalizing Earth Stewardship, specifi cally through increasing research opportunities and the relevance of ecolo gists, while supporting the goals of city leaders and community interests.

The basic premise for the demonstration project was the recognition that cities should work for people and ecosystems. Large-scale urban green infra structure often has multiple demands from maintenance and operations, to ecological performance and recreation. Addressing these demands moving forward requires a deeper understanding, monitoring, and adaptive manage ment of coupled human-natural systems. The project therefore advances the notion that integration of ecological theory, research, and applications with the knowledge and practices of consultants, practitioners, and policy makers is increasingly recognized as necessary when modifying the built environ ment. It further proposes designed experiments as a framework to facilitate such integration.

Using the American River Parkway as a case study and designed experiments as a framework, ecologists, landscape architects, and environmental con sultants collaborated with the American River Parkway Foundation, the Sac ramento Area Flood Control Agency, the Water Forum, and the Sacramento County Regional Parks to formulate ways to enhance flood resilience, reduce erosion, promote species diversity, increase pollinator habitats, and other maintenance challenges (Figure 9).

Figure 10. Themes,

Figure 9. Site analysis to conceptual design process, Earth Stewardship Initiative demonstration project, 2014

Earth Stewardship Initiative demonstration project

The initiative included a week-long interactive demonstration of how ecolo gists working with planners and landscape architects, government officials, and non-profit groups can move a city toward sustainability. Interdisciplinary groups focused on, 1) resilient park ecosystems and habitats with the goal of maintaining and enhancing terrestrial ecosystems and habitats within a programmed parkland through ecological design, enhanced plant commu nities, and bioengineering; 2) degraded ecosystems restored as amenities where degraded sites could be reconstructed as opportunities for social, recreational, and environmental regeneration; 3) managed populations and communities for parks where designed habitats with beneficial species man agement practices can support habitats while reducing maintenance and operations costs and encouraging community engagement; 4) managed hy drology, aquatic habitats, and recreation, employing ecological design strat egies to meet water demand while mitigating flooding and enhancing aquat ic recreational and industrial activities; and 5) spatial planning for climate change to manage the effects of climate change on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. The groups incorporated ideas generated from four other re search themes to develop a climate change synopsis with an emphasis on policy and planning (Figure 10).

The groups then elaborated on site-specific projects that described ways of realigning biological communities with urbanization patterns and urban form to improve both human well being and environmental services.

Merging Ecology and Design: Challenges and Opportunities

As exemplified by these projects, combining the strengths of ecology and de sign can help develop paradigms for projects that build on empirical data to engage with ecosystem processes. As earlier discussed, there is a movement towards greater reciprocity between the two disciplines such that ecologists are being asked to engage with constructed environments, and designers are required to study with increasing specificity the existing systems of the sites on which they build, and to integrate monitoring and metrics of environ mental systems into the design of buildings, landscape, and infrastructure. For urban ecological research to become an integral component of public spaces, it is necessary to foster greater mutual understanding and go be yond simply adding ecology to design and vice versa.

For ecologists, experiments are a means to produce data. The form of the ex periment itself is valued for its function and not explicitly for its aesthetic. As such, when ecologists design experiments, they employ a hypothesis-driven approach based on substantial amount of field knowledge and understand ing of the organism and ecosystem as well as the lifecycle patterns and evolution of the species being studied. While the relationship of the layout and aesthetic of the experiment itself is secondary to the phenomena being

measured for ecologists, this is not the case for designers. Designed experi ments build hypotheses around a site and program. Since experiments are the component within ecological research practices that can best navigate the urban context and constraints, a shift in priority that experiments take on in designed experiments is a compromise. Nonetheless, by staging the site and experimental design from the outset of the process, ecologists are afforded the opportunity to cycle through a series of hypotheses and testing strategies.

Given the benefits to be derived from collaboration between designers and ecologists through designed experiments, identifying projects and locating sites for designed experiments is a critical next step that will likely further define the values and constraints of this new approach. A number of options exist for establishing designed experiments. One option is to fit them into existing design projects and customize experiments to a particular design, as seen in the NY-CAP example. Another is to fit urban design into a research project. A third would be projects in which the research and urban design components are present and overlapping, as in the American River Parkway example (Felson et al. 2013a). Projects can be developed by brainstorming and identifying sites that might accommodate experiments, and pursuing grant funding or community programs. Selecting sites that appear through out cities across the country, such as median strips, front yards, or detention basins, would be ideal for establishing replicable experiments. Importantly, channeling ecological experiments through design projects could support the spread of research sites across the city.

Conclusions

The inclusion of research ecologists in urban design projects requires a combination of enhanced dialogue to advance education and formalized frameworks and funding to encourage participation. Incorporating ecological considerations into their designs instills a proactive role for designers to promote urban research and create urban environments that are aestheti cally and ecologically sound. The synthesis of design and research will opti mally lead towards new kinds of urban public spaces designed and built to test and monitor. The creative modification of traditional practices of eco logical research, which is required in order to integrate considerations of aesthetics, urban function, and community involvement, could also generate new experimental possibilities at a variety of scales. Collaboration between ecologists and designers can help to provide ecological experimentation with a culturally recognizable public identity, in order to enhance its meaning and perceived value. Thus the experiment itself is re-conceptualized from an instrument that serves as a means to an end, to obtain results addressing testable hypotheses, to a multifunctional urban object (or system) coupling experimental goals with urban design applications. Implementing designed experiments should expedite the translation of scientific knowledge into con

struction of ecosystems and services for urban areas. It can help us estab lish long-term research sites and produce new, innovative forms of urban landscapes.

Urban ecology is at a stage of tremendous growth. Designers have much to benefit from improved urban ecological understanding and integration into their projects. At the same time, designers need to focus more on areas of uncertainty and what is not known, and not just on existing knowledge. As designers improve their understanding of knowledge gaps in ecological sci ence they can better comprehend where decisions need to be made without scientific knowledge and where additional scientific assessment would be applicable. Designed experiments define a joint role for both ecologists and designers and force them to consider what is as yet not known and what is uncertain, and to formulate design as experiments to begin to provide an swers to questions of sustainability and resilience.

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Freeland: Urban Planning Strategy for Almere Oosterwold

Lachlan Anderson-Frank with Winy Maas/MVRDV

Abstract

Freeland, MVRDV’s urban planning strategy for Almere Oosterwold, re-envi sions the way that land is developed in the Netherlands. It proposes remapping the regulation of buildings and development towards community-driven initiatives, while reinventing the relationship between governments, people, and their urban fabric through the power of the collective via the Internet. It proposes a place of radical liberation, where architectural freedom extends to the urban environment as a whole, challenging and empowering citizens to become active participants in the land development process. This essay elaborates the conceptual background of the project, its ambitions, and its approach.

Discourse

MVRDV is a globally operating architecture and urbanism firm which has pursued a radical, often research-oriented spatial agenda since its founding in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in 1993. MVRDV’s design method emerges out of an exploration and understanding of the vast amounts of complex data which accompany the contemporary building process. This ranges from regulations such as height and volume restrictions, to visitor numbers, cli matological, and economic data. The approach is grounded in rational de sign decisions which improve people’s quality of life through buildings and urban plans, in contrast to the often opaque design processes that prevail in the design industry. Mass housing has always held particular significance for MVRDV, with 10 out of 40 completed buildings falling into this category (and many of these subsidized housing). Similarly, out of 550 total projects, ap proximately one-fifth has focused on urbanism and master plans, as a result of the belief that contemporary architectural practice must be integrated with an understanding of and engagement with the modern city.

Over the past twenty years, a discourse has formed around MVRDV’s work, in part through publications such as Farmax, KM3, and Metacity/Datatown, research which extends beyond the architectural projects to the role of ar chitects and urbanists in society. Key propositions such as ‘density’ and ‘variety’ are now typical preoccupations for the profession, but found con

ceptual drive in MVRDV’s early work. Embedded in these debates are issues of sustainable economic and built development, individual expression and initiative, and perhaps above all, quality of life. The firm continues to pursue a fascination for investigative research, particularly in relation to density, the public realm and the influence of architectural form on daily life.

The projects of MVRDV, whether private or publically funded, or internation ally or locally initiated, attempt to improve upon and contribute to their lo cation through the provision of positive program mixes and architectural experiences, as well as public green space. The radical nature of these proj ects, many of which are unrealized, has brought the issues they explore to the forefront of concerns within the profession. Freeland, the proposal for Almere Oosterwold, represents, in some ways, a culmination of MVRDV’s ideas, designs, and buildings – to create a better future for cities and their inhabitants. It places an individual’s initiative in creating communities at its heart, in an attempt to revolutionize the way that cities are built.

Context

Most Dutch housing developments of the last forty years have encircled existing cities, replacing agricultural landscapes with sprawling low-rise neighborhoods. These neighborhoods neither replicate the programmatic liveliness of urban environments, nor the idyllic agricultural quality of rural villages. Instead they often create monotonous and mono-functional hous ing areas which ignore the individual at every level. The encroachment of cities into green landscapes appears to be a global issue in an era of rapid urbanization. What is unique in the Netherlands is that this situation has oc curred in spite of the extensive regulation of land development and the built environment; so that despite the efforts of governments and urban planners, development has, in many places, replicated the American suburban model of low density, low diversity developments.

In 2008, MVRDV was commissioned to create an overall development strat egy for the city of Almere’s growth over the next 30 years. Almere is a New Town built on reclaimed land since the 1970s, and it has grown – not co incidentally – into a prime example of the suburban condition described above. The municipality plans to add 60,000 homes and 100,000 jobs to the area by 2030, in part to relieve development pressure on the existing outer suburbs of Amsterdam. MVRDV convinced the municipality of Almere to ‘re pair’ the mono-functional character of its existing housing stock by adding neighborhoods with more urban qualities in the west, and neighborhoods with more rural qualities in the east (Freeland), integrating job creation into the new development and turning Almere into a diverse and balanced city. Freeland is then not only a revolution in urban planning principles, but also in social terms. New Towns in the Netherlands, of which Almere is the biggest,

were built to relieve development pressure on existing cities, and to provide low cost, high quality housing for the disadvantaged. This has resulted not only in monotonous housing environments, but also in a lack of social diversity in such environments, and areas of concentrated poverty. Freeland presents an opportunity to attract a wider variety of people to Almere, if they have a dream and the initiative to build it. Rather than a push to attract the wealthy through exclusive, architect-designed suburbs, as has happened elsewhere in the Netherlands, the land prices in Oosterwold will be relatively low compared with rest of the country. This will be made possible by the re moval of the high initial investment and risk on the part of the municipality which are normally associated with new infrastructure provision; and also by the fact that the land is municipally owned and has no historical ownership because it is reclaimed.

Freeland is thus a new, bottom-up strategy for creating a mixed living and working environment on “new” land, rather than a way of densifying an ex isting suburb. That prevailing suburban model ultimately creates sleepertowns of commuters, which lack architectural and programmatic diversity and quality of life. Not only are such developments unsustainable in terms of energy use, but the model weakens those communities by driving away public and private investment in jobs and infrastructure into similarly monofunctional and segregated office and industrial parks. In this sense Freeland can be understood as a reaction against the modernist planning ideal of separate zones for separate functions, and as an attempt to reintegrate living and working so as to benefit from the synergetic possibilities therein.

The ability to add new extremes of density to Almere allowed MVRDV to ex plore ways to create a new format of suburban environment in Oosterwold, characterized by open green spaces and, crucially, agriculture. Even in the Netherlands, where urban and rural conditions often blend, life and buildings in the countryside are organized with a different set of rules and interpreta tions than in an urban environment; what seems to be problematic or even unacceptable in an urban environment (in relation to traffic, safety, noise, access to facilities, and responsibility for infrastructure) may seem natural in the countryside. Freeland is based on the notion of bringing the ease, freedom and self-organizing principals that have always been present in rural environments, back to the city, and in the process, developing an agricultural area in a sustainable, high-quality way.

Freeland is then not so much an attempt to extend the city into the coun tryside, but the reverse: to extend the qualities of the countryside into the city so as to create a mediating condition between the two, and in doing so to preserve rural planning attitudes and lifestyles. Through the restric tion of built area to 18% of the land, and the required 59% agricultural land-use, Freeland will create a new kind of settlement in Oosterwold, which combines development with the preservation of a green, productive, working landscape. In a country as small and densely populated as the Netherlands,

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the concept of a green belt becomes a kind of green web, covering everything which is not city and preventing total and continuous urbanization. It is rel evant to mention here that this is an anxiety which preoccupies Dutch archi tects and urban planners including MVRDV, as well as citizens, who place a high cultural value on access to green space and agricultural lifestyles. And the fear appears quite prescient given the rapidly increasing size of many urban conurbations, and the loss of green spaces and traditional lifestyles in the Netherlands and around the globe. Freeland is a response to these concerns through its emphasis on green space and agriculture, and is an attempt to involve and encourage local, communal and collective initiatives as the driving force behind land development, in opposition to commercial developers and the products they create.

Liberation

Urbanism originated in collectivism: the discipline formed to build and ar range common interests such as infrastructure, energy supply and public space; and now often extends to the private provision of buildings for living, working and shopping. How people live in cities is then the very direct result of how they have agreed to organize society through elected systems of gov ernment and their regulatory power. The positive aspect of this is that cities are cleaner, more harmonious and increasingly safer. Any conflicts between neighbors have been minimized by building social structures and frameworks which resolve competing interests. In Europe, the triangle of zoning, build ing regulations and aesthetics display a highly sophisticated level control by professionals, defining how a building affects its immediate surroundings on every level. Cities in that sense are the result of rules which spring from the consensus and restrict the level of freedom of each individual for the benefit of the common good. This is a social contract that all citizens are bound to – voluntarily or not.

Cities planned down to the smallest variation in curb height, as many in the Netherlands now are, certainly guarantee safety and provide more comfort than the chaotic pre-industrial European city or market-oriented American urban region. But at the same time they limit individual freedom, and have become almost totalitarian in their elimination of civic participation through the professionalization of urban planning. Top down planning and endless regulations not only determine the way we (should) live but also seem to treat citizens as irresponsible infants, determining what is spatially ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. They may be developed with good intentions, but eventually make our cities become inefficient, inflexible, unsurprising and ultimately unattractive. They leave little room for individual creativity or innovation in the urban environment, or collective efforts by citizens to improve their communities. In the Netherlands in particular, such top-down planning has led to a prevailing monotony in suburban environments, while doing little to promote sustainable development and the creation of communities. The

processes of development have ultimately become allied with the interests of large organizations, and are unresponsive to the needs of individuals, communities and locales. Rather than representing a diverse collection of citizens needs and desires, they represent a mass-produced dream: those consumer products termed ‘lifestyle aspirations’ by the real-estate industry.

Today many European countries seem to struggle with the growing tension between individualization and overregulation in urban planning. As people find new freedoms in many spheres of their lives, particularly the digital, their physical environments have become increasingly restrictive. Slow and complex procedures are in contrast with our rapidly changing societies, which are more and more oriented towards consumption, and as a result, individualization. We can personalize everything in our life, from cars to shoes, but personalizing one’s house or neighborhood requires going through overly complicated permission processes. Above and beyond aesthetic choice, it seems that individual agency is stymied by complex and bureaucratic plan ning procedures, leading to an enormous gap between citizens and citybuilders. Freeland attempts to close this gap by encouraging initiatives on a practical level through freedom of expression, but also on an ideological level through its requirement of citizens to engage in providing their own in frastructure, and ultimately creating their own living environment. In cutting loose the development of land from government investment in infrastructure, so too it can be freed from the government dictate which has resulted in that programmatic and architectural monotony. So too, perhaps it can be cut loose from the vested interests of other large organizations, which ignore the individual in favor of their own vision of the ‘collective good’.

Risk

Freeland can be framed as a response to the current global economic cli mate. Municipal governments in the Netherlands, as elsewhere, have felt the deep cuts in public spending more directly than on a national level. This creates a situation whereby investments are locked, and new developments frozen. Freeland is an evolution of the common practice of public-private investment partnerships in infrastructure provision, and repackages the pro cess so as to become popularly, and indeed democratically accessible. By substituting risk-averse public capital for risk-seeking private investment, a significant barrier to new development is removed, and the potential for a more local, economically resilient, and ecologically sustainable commu nity created. Similarly, investment risk is distributed across a wider number of parties, rather than solely resting on government, which in the case of Almere is small and municipal. Yet despite the economic climate, Almere desires growth on an enormous scale. It is the forging of compacts, commit ments and relationships fostered by Freeland’s pioneer-style infrastructure provision which will create economic and social resilience, of the kind that only bottom-up, organic growth can create. A built ecology of sorts will arise,

which relies on community and compromise to create sustainable develop ment and a high quality of life at the local level, on the ground.

Is such a thing possible? To maintain the agency of local forces in build ing development, while mobilising private initiative and capital? Rather than placing regulator barriers between companies or families who wish to share infrastructure, space or facilities, it will encourage symbiotic relationships in a way eschewed by the simplicity of a single, top-down master plan. With an approximately 2:1 ratio between housing and business / office functions a requirement of Freeland, the quality of developments will be maintained through the involvement and advocacy of local residents.

Cities in the Netherlands and surrounding European countries face enor mous competition for investment, headquarters, jobs and ultimately, inhab itants. Western Europe is incredibly well connected by transport and infra structure in comparison with other areas of a similar size in other countries: location often becomes a qualitative choice rather than a quantitative reality. Almere, like other municipalities, is competing for inward investment, but unlike most other municipalities in the Netherlands, owns a large amount of unused land. To increase its attractiveness as an area to live and work, Al mere wanted a revolutionary planning methodology which would offer unique conditions for businesses and people to relocate there. These factors came together to create an unparalleled opportunity in the Netherlands for tabula rasa development; Freeland is MVRDV’s experimental hypothesis for this situation, aiming to create a high quality living area with mixed-use characteristics and diverse architectural and urbanistic qualities as a product of so-called ‘do-it-yourself urbanism.’

Responsibility

Freeland is just a small part of a growing movement to make a urbanism a collective and participatory movement, rather than an elitist, professional ized network. By providing space to develop individual initiatives, the area of Oosterwold will gradually evolve, from its existing state as unused land, to a diverse, living and working landscape. It will develop as a rich assem blage of programmatic qualities, which divide the advanced requirements of contemporary urban planning into publicly accessible, bite-sized pieces, to be addressed individually and collaboratively. The complexity of social net works, agreements, disagreements and alliances will be the basis for a new form of urbanism.

Freedom goes hand in hand with responsibilities; of course Freeland does not exist outside of law – it is not a complete anarchy. In addition to the freedom to develop one’s own plot in whatever way one might wish, citizens also have the freedom to create their own infrastructure and public space: an open-source city. You need a road? Do you have four-wheel drive? In that

case a dirt track will be perfectly sufficient. You want a driveway or a ring road? You can have both. Investment can be minimised according to need, as long as basic access is maintained for the rest of the area in the form of perimeter roads and paths.

Step-by-step a network of streets and paths grows; without a preconceived plan, Freeland’s road network and public spaces will developed pragmati cally, as needed. Required energy supply, waste disposal and water storage are arranged, as much as possible, on each parcel. The autonomy and selfsufficiency of each plot, or group of plots, is a condition for the freedom to build whatever you want, however you want. The result will be a collec tion of individual initiatives, which form symbiotic relationships that reflect the complexity of the contemporary world far more than top-down planning. Rather than relying on large providers of energy, water, and waste treatment, you must organize the services yourself; choose the most appropriate sys tem, and perhaps collaborate with neighbors to reduce the cost. It becomes possible to develop an ecologically and economically sustainable city which functions as a kind of built organic system. Flexible and efficient, resilient and self-mediating, the power to create the city comes not from the state, but from citizens themselves, empowered by their relative freedom to create their own lifestyles and environments, rather than consume prefabricated ones.

Another collective element is required in Freeland to begin to realize the proposition of a sustainable, even autarkic, community. In Freeland citizens are responsible for contributing to the food supply of the area, and to main tain the green, agricultural character of the development: 59% of all land must be set aside for agriculture. Even with industrialized farming methods such as greenhouses, it is difficult to produce enough volume or variety of food for one’s own table. The answer to this is then, as with everything in Freeland, collaboration! By surrounding each development with agriculture and public green space (10%), city and countryside are mixed to create that continuous green landscape of yore. Freeland responds to a global trend towards local, responsibly and sustainably produced food. It will be a labora tory for regional food production and distribution, in a country where farm ing has come full cycle to become a core industry. New forms of mixed enterprise, with food for the city and the region as a base, can be coupled with services in the fields of health care, recreation, education and hospital ity in Freeland. Agriculture is an important economic pillar of the continuous green landscape, and is maintained for its economic, social and aesthetic benefits.

And public transport? Initially Freeland will exist without mass transit, and solutions will be created by residents themselves. The resources to do so must come from the individual and collective intelligence, using creativity and initiative as tools. Freeland’s urbanism is not guided by the placement of public transport as other forms of urbanism before it – the transport follows development itself. So eventually, if a bus service has enough po tential users, the municipality can provide one. This strategy also applies to other forms of infrastructure in Oosterwold. The municipality is by no means excluded from participating in development, rather, it can intervene when deemed necessary and worth the added investment.

The tabula rasa infrastructure development of Freeland demonstrates how ‘I-Land’ quickly becomes ‘We-Land’.The project redefines the role of govern ment and citizens, allowing people to create their immediate environment and contribute to a part of their city, individually and collectively. A partici patory and adaptive urbanism, based on a process with an open end. An ur banism as a form of ‘crowd planning’, based on ‘swarm intelligence’, where common components are developed as needed.

An initiator might build a house for themself, and having successfully created the infrastructure to do so, could start a neighborhood of friends and other likeminded people. A small business owner might set up their production line in the neighborhood, producing packaging for the local bio-industry. A col lective farming plot provides summer salads for the neighborhood in its lowtech poly tunnels, and is eventually sold to an entrepreneur which makes use of the nearby packaging factory to cut out middle-men and transport costs, distributing his produce in local supermarkets. The original neighborhood

included a farmer who bought 50% of the land to grow exotic fruit in glass houses. Some of this fruit is also eventually passed through the packaging factory, which expands its business to include the packing of produce, and also incorporates a small front-of house shop. Waste treatment is integrated into this system to provide fertilizer, and a retired resident starts a pickup service for local schoolchildren. Developments, and social structures grow organically, through individual and collective agency. Dedication and com mitment are an integral part of building communities, and in Freeland will help to re-engage citizens with urbanism, giving them the responsibility to influence the environment they live in.

Implementation

The keystone of the Freeland development model is a web-based community forum and tool which coordinates land acquisition, regulates use, and is overseen by an area manager. The required ratios of various types of devel opment can be spread over multiple ownership as long as the overall ratios of Oosterwold are maintained. The forum will help to manage existing devel opments, optimize new buildings, suggest collaborations and create syner getic possibilities for adjacencies. It will adjust and adapt to what has been built, providing a central reference point for new initiatives. It is this digital forum which will combine ideas and create alliances between future inhabit ants, be they farmer or small business owner, optimist or cynic. The forum strengthens the sense of the collective through participation and accessibil ity, which carry enormous potential when compared with traditional planning systems and regulations. It will bind people together in the collective spirit of land development and living community, like the first pioneers, which has been lost through the constant intervention of central government and large of organizations.

The forum represents MVRDV’s ‘bare-bones’ approach to urban planning with Freeland. Having developed numerous urban planning concepts over the last twenty years, and realised several of them, Freeland represents a new direction in the firm’s work. Rather than a typical top-down approach, the project and the software integrate basic rules and expectations relating to land use, in effect the minimum acceptable quality and character develop ments, and leaves the rest to the individual. Starting with these criteria, and the overall zoning of the area as residential, Freeland will develop organically according to people’s needs, desires and dreams. This organic development depends heavily on initiators combining a high degree of freedom with a highly developed sense of responsibility. Empowerment, on the grand scale of 4363 hectares, is the driving concept behind Freeland. By re-engaging citizens with development and planning, a more sustainable built ecology will arise through user-initiated urbanism and demand-led growth.

Experiment

Just as Freeland allows individuals freedom to experiment, the proposal is itself an open-ended experiment. The proposal is a collaboration between MVRDV, the municipality of Almere, various other municipal and provincial governments, and a wide variety of other local and regional stakeholders and advisors including experts in agriculture, water management and sustainable energy. Freeland is a long term vision for the next 30 years of Oosterwold’s development; beginning with opportunities for initiatives and land aquisi tion, following more detailed consultations on engineering issues, wildlife protection, political roles, and financial strategies. Freeland is not however a one-size-fits-all solution; rather, it is a carefully tailored response to the cur rent state of urban development in the Netherlands. Certainly it should not be seen as a call to the application of neo-laissez-faire development policies across the world. Neither is a solution aimed at entire cities or city-centers, but rather, it is a way of mediating between the urban and rural, and an attempt to improve upon the prevailing suburban model. So too, Freeland is a solution for cities which desire perimeter growth in a high quality and sustainable way, rather than a dense, mass-housing solution.

Having begun the development of Freeland in Almere, MVRDV was asked to apply the strategy in a German city, specifically to a series of former Ameri

can Army barracks. The socio-cultural context demanded an adaptation of the principals of Freeland, as did the application of the strategy to an exist ing building stock, in significantly less rural area. Many of the challenges posed by this transposition will be explored through workshops with citizens, governments and other stakeholders. Collaboration, and rather idealistically, positive engagement, will be the key to adapting the model to a different location. The cultural, urban, and regulatory context of the Netherlands is unique, even among European countries, and it is out of this that Freeland has emerged. The transposition of the model will come not so much from MVRDV, but from those who wish to apply it to their own urban environments, wherever they may be.

The potential of Freeland as an ideology for development, rather than as a specific master plan for Almere Oosterwold, may well be greatest in the United States. Famously individualistic, and still with large expanses of un developed land, the concept might find success in replacing the prevailing, and ultimately unsustainable suburban development model. To re-empower American citizens to build their own cities and homes, rather than relying on development corporations, has the potential to once again transform the American landscape, just as the car has done over the last century. The pa rameters of Freeland, designed for Almere, are adaptable, and provide a new paradigm for the regulation of development. And yet, in the United States, where freedom is so prized, it might be that Freeland would be perceived as entirely restrictive despite its ‘light-touch’ rules. From March 2016 onwards, and over the coming years, eyes from around the globe will be watching the development of Freeland in Almere; watching to see what might happen, and what kind of living and working environment can be created.

Special thanks to the city of Almere, where Freeland will be realized for the first time in Oosterwold.

Authors’ note: This piece was primarily written by Lachlan Anderson-Frank while employed at MVRDV, and contains both his own opinions and analysis as well as descriptive and conceptual text written by Winy Maas, principal and cofounder of MVRDV.

Construction of the first of 18 proposed reclaimed islands as part of the NCICD “Giant Sea Wall” masterplan, view from bridge in West Jakarta, November 2015. Photo courtesy of Etienne Turpin / anexact office

Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Sewage being pumped out of Waduk Pluit, over existing sea wall, into barges for transport to land reclamation site, North Jakarta, November 2015.

Photo courtesy of Etienne Turpin / anexact office

In Memoriam

Professor JoAnn Carmin 1957 - 2014

It is with deep sadness that we report the death of Professor JoAnn Carmin, our valued colleague, collaborator and friend, on July 15, 2014 of complica tions from advanced breast cancer. She had been fighting cancer for years, bravely and without self-pity through many treatments and much suffering, and continued her immensely productive work and mentoring of her students to the end. Her courage, endurance and continued commitment to her work during her battle with cancer were extraordinary.

JoAnn was an Associate Professor at MIT in the Department of Urban Stud ies and Planning, and conducted research around the world on environmen tal governance, policy and most recently on climate adaptation at the local level. She was a leading scholar and top global expert, called upon for exper tise by the World Bank, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the global league of cities addressing climate change (ICLEI) and other major institutions. Most recently she was a lead co-author of an excellent chapter on adaptation for the American Sociological Association’s Task Force on Cli mate Change, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

JoAnn earned her B.S. and M.S. degrees at Cornell University in manage ment and organizational theory, where she took an early interest in the study of environmental citizen organizations and movements, environmental governance and environmental justice. She went on to earn her Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1999, and while there she developed a particular interest in local environmental politics and the many citizen environmental movements emerging in postCommunist Eastern Europe, beginning with extensive field work in the newly independent Czech Republic.

Her doctoral dissertation, supervised by Professor Richard (Pete) Andrews, was an early and important contribution to understanding of environmental movements and local governance in the Czech Republic, and began a sub stantial continuing research program expanding this work to the rest of postCommunist eastern Europe. She taught first at Virginia Tech, and then at MIT, where she rose to the rank of tenured associate professor. She also was Director of the Program on Environmental Governance and Sustainability in MIT’s Center for International Studies, and gave strong leadership to the department’s graduate programs.

From the beginning of her graduate studies JoAnn showed concern for the many ways in which vulnerable groups are most impacted by environmental burdens, and she spent much of her career studying community responses to environmental inequalities. Her work explored the strategies and tactics used by environmental NGOs and environmental justice activists so that mar ginalized groups could have more meaningful participation in decisions that impact their land and territories. Among many places, her research took her to the gold mines of Eastern Europe, in places such as Rosia Montana in Romania. She did not call herself a scholar activist, but she was very much one, caring deeply about environmental justice and giving voice to vulnerable populations in her many articles and books.

At MIT JoAnn became one of the early scholars to study the emerging re sponses of cities around the world to global climate change. At a time when both policy and academic discussions were centered almost exclusively on mitigating climate change by reducing carbon emissions, she took the risk of focusing on urban adaptation to climate change, one of the most important issues of the 21st century for cities around the world, whether or not mitigation efforts are successful. In just a few years she pioneered a new field, including surveys of municipal governments around the world as well as case-study fieldwork on the initiatives of local governments on five conti nents. By the time of her death she was one of the world’s leading experts on urban policies for adapting to the growing risks of climate change. She served as lead author of the report of Working Group II of the Fifth Assess ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (released in 2014), and coordinating lead author of the urban technical report for the 2011-12 United States National Climate Assessment, as Associate Editor of

Urban Climate, and on the boards of many professional journals and schol arly organizations. In 2011-2013 she was awarded a prestigious Abe Fellow ship to study in Japan; she also was awarded visiting research fellowships at Yale, Duke, and the Prague University of Economics.

JoAnn published four books, most recently Environmental Inequalities Beyond Borders: Local Perspectives on Global Injustices (with Julian Agyeman) and Green Activism in Post-Socialist Europe and the Former Soviet Union (with Adam Fagan), both published in 2011. Two earlier books were EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe (with Stacy VanDeveer) and Collaborative Environmental Man agement: What Roles for Government? (with several co-authors). She also pub lished a steady stream of scholarly articles, many of them co-authored with her students and other rising young scholars. At least as important in their impact were her reports for policymakers on urban climate change, including reports for the World Bank, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and others. She was immensely productive, she exuded competence, and she was an exacting scholar.

Memoriam: Carmin

Ecologies: Politics, Planning, and Design

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Urban Studies & Planning