7
Representations of Black Crime in the American Media by Ava Liu High-profile criminal cases involving young black men in the United States such as the recent Jordan Davis and Trayvon Martin cases were accompanied by an ensuing media circus, in which journalistic outlets fell along a divergent line of opinion regarding the innocence and guilt of the various parties involved. All news agencies received the same basic facts, yet the way various outlets framed the cases was heavily divergent based on pre-existing political attachments. Reactions to the cases by both media agencies and individuals seem to fall along ideological attitudes toward race. Whether a news source’s general political leanings held faith in the criminal justice system’s treatment of blacks often predicted how that source presented the guilt or innocence of the perpetrator. Furthermore, consumers of the news themselves will make judgments based on their subjective construal of the situation. Because crimes involving young black youth tend to engage pre-formed stereotypes that the viewer already has, the viewer judges not only the objective scenario but also their interpretation of events based on the viewer’s subjective background. In this context, journalists operate not just as reporters of reality but also as interpreters of reality. 1 This paper will undertake an analysis of the Jordan Davis and Trayvon Martin cases as examples of how media outlets frame the news so as to obscure or to highlight the societal context around an issue, rendering young black 1 Ericson, Baranek and Chan. “Newsrooms and Journalist’s Cultures” in Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).
victims like Jordan Davis “invisible” amidst a sea of stereotypes. After establishing the thematic framework in which I’m operating, I investigate the role of journalism and how its “objective” standards manifest themselves. Corinne McConnaughty argued in The Washington Post that Jordan Davis the individual was not “seen” because he was lost in a sea of stereotypes that inform our political opinions.2 I confirm this view, and argue that both liberal and conservative news outlets (which respectively eulogized and erased these black youth) rendered it impossible to “see” victims like Jordan Davis and Trayvon Martin. For example, in liberal news outlets, Martin and Davis became symbols of political language construed in stereotypic terms to the degree that Martin’s hoodie and Davis’ music became symbols of racial oppression. I argue that the refractive nature of the news renders claims to “see” an individual as objectively impossible; a better approach is to understand how the media frames a story along symbolic lines. This paper adopts the argumentative perspective that the criminal justice system of the United States is systematically discriminatory against young black men, and I investigate media coverage of the Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis cases with this argumentative frame of reference in mind. I take the stance that the deaths of these young men were the results of racial profiling and modern racism. I support this view by presenting a survey of the academic psychological literature that establishes how the criminal justice system unfairly penalizes young black men. However, rather than examining the situation through a lens of enforced objectivity, it is more important to understand that liberal outlets framed the crimes in a thematic topic-based format 2
Corinne McConnaughty, “Why we can’t see Jordan Davis and why it matters,” The Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2014.
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8 looking at the societal context of race while conservative outlets framed the crimes as outcomes of individual behavior. I further argue that situations involving black crime in the United States should be presented as thematic topic-based stories because there is sufficient societal context to regard these stories as political cases. Ultimately, I conclude that it is important to admit that the way a news story is framed is largely a normative claim rather than a descriptive one, because attempts at descriptive objectivity only obscure how news representation operates on a symbolic level. The Role of Journalism Walter Lippman famously wrote that the role of journalism is to bring “the pictures inside our heads closer to the world outside.” 3 Through the delivery of information, journalism informs public opinion by enabling citizens to know the societal context around them. A wellinformed citizen is able to take positions that guide his or her democratic participation. However, it is also clear that journalism and news do not merely mirror the information that they receive when they transmit news to the public. The news also directly shapes public opinion through journalistic mechanisms such as gatekeeping, agenda-setting, priming, or framing. In this light, journalism not only relays reality, but constantly interprets it. Although journalists recognize that they hold pre-conceived notions when presented with a situation, in the name of “objectivity” they attempt to separate their personal biases from their reporting. This is supposed to allow third-person readers to derive an independent judgment of the situation. However, this ideology of “objectivity” is first that: an ideology.4 No matter how much a journalist or a news
agency tries to present both sides of the story, they will still be playing the roles of mediator and of investigator. Ericson, Baranet, and Chan identify this attempt at “objectivity” as the working ideology of journalism. 5 Journalists strive to be attentive to the perspectives of various groups and they try to present differing perspectives in order to present a balanced set of opinions. However, journalists are also telling a story and stringing together events in a sequence that reflect their view of what the “objective” take on a situation should be.6 Thus, “objectivity” is untenable in a practical context. It is important to remember that journalism is refracting news through a mediated angle as much as it is reflecting the real series of events. A journalist, like a judge, plays a role of mediation, and by mediating the story, they also mediate reality as it is relayed to the information consumer.7 This instills a political effect on the substance of news. Murray Edelman describes political language by explaining that norms of “objectivity” often result in a balance toward the perspective of perceived neutrality that reinforces the predominant ideology. 8 News outlets’ attempts at “objective” reporting typically reflect the political lines that they have already embraced as normative. For example, Fox News will rarely use words like “racism” to refer to crimes against blacks (in line with their dominant political ideology) while The New Yorker would readily label the crimes as such. As language is inherently political, the political content of language informs the news consumer how to think about the story. Additionally, opinions that journalists identify tend to be indexed to the language of key political figures who 5
3 Walter Lippman, The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads (New York: The Free Press, 1922), 3-20. 4 Ibid.
Ericson, Baranek and Chan. “Newsrooms and Journalist’s Cultures,” 97. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Murray Edelman, “Political Language and Political Reality,” PS 18, (1985: 10-19)
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9 determine the dominant debate. 9 In the context of the Martin story, coverage of the event rose dramatically after President Barack Obama spoke and articulated that “Trayvon could have been me 35 years ago.” 10 Thus, journalistic dialogue is shaped around pre-existing and predominant political perspectives. In the context of race relations, pre-existing mediated biases influence how journalists “objectively” approach the broader topic of race in the United States. In particular, journalistic outlets can choose to evaluate racism either as racist intentions, which necessitate an involved attempt to marginalize a specific group, or as racist effects, which include harmful structural effects that persist even in a generally well-intentioned liberal society. If racism is defined with historic and static definitions involving violent and discriminatory acts such as lynching or segregation, these “objective” journalists often will not explore work in recent psychology and sociology work falls outside the discourse of indexed political figures. Regarding race, different media outlets will invariably have different perceptions of what “truth” and “objectivity” are. As Edelman notes, "Clearly, the terms ‘objective’, ‘ideology’, and ‘polemical’, as used in academic writing and speech are themselves political.” 11 Understanding “objectivity” means understanding the mediating bias that a political journalistic source brings to a story, and it requires the dismantling of the institutional biases supporting various perspectives. Framing the Story 9
Ibid. Landler, Mark and Michael Shear. “President Offers a Personal Take on Race in U.S.” New York Times, July 2013.
10
11
Edelman, “Political Language and Political Reality,” 10-19
It is thus important to examine the different frames that various media outlets use to approach a story within the context of their political backgrounds. The concept of “framing” refers to how a news source presents an issue in a way as to tell the audience how to think about it. The media circus around the Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis cases illustrates how the working ideology of objectivity neglects to account for the inevitable political ideology which underlines interpretation. Many leftleaning outlets such as The New Yorker or The Atlantic were accused of “race-baiting” by conservative pundits who argued that stringing the stories in the context of race was not objective. 12 Critics say that these outlets illustrated their bias when they referred to George Zimmerman first as “white” and then as a “white Hispanic” in order to racialize him.13 Moreover, in many cases, liberal outlets committed outright gatekeeping. For example, NBC news edited the broadcast of the police tapes to emphasize Martin’s race in an attempt to make Zimmerman look like he was racially profiling. They edited the audio tapes to emphasize that Zimmerman said “This guy looks like he’s up to no good. He looks black.” However, they cut out three sentences in between, including one in which dispatchers ask Zimmerman: “OK, and this guy -- is he black, white, or Hispanic?” 14 . The above is a clear indication of how liberal media outlets framed the story in a way as to exaggerate their own point of view to emphasize how they “see” and portray Zimmerman and Martin - not only passively through perception but also actively through gatekeeping.
12
Ibid. Andrew C. McCarthy."The Obama Administration's Race-Baiting Campaign." National Review 20 July 2013. 14 A.J. Delgado, "Sorry, NBC: You Owe George Zimmerman Millions." The National Review 27 June 2014. National Review Magazine. Web. 13
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10 At the same time, conservative outlets such as Fox News tended to report the story within a different frame. They presented it as an individual situation of arbitrary nature, without providing the background context as to how black men are unfairly persecuted for crime in America. Shanto Iyengar discusses that when news is created, it often comes in “isolated and highly dramatized episodes that lack the thematic coherence to really explain much of the larger situations from which the stories are drawn.” 15 Conservative news outlets presented the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman as encounters between individuals and not as a part of any larger systematic context. As noted by news reporters, the opinion regarding the verdict in cases like Jordan Davis and Trayvon Martin can largely be predicted based on the news consumer’s prior understanding of racism.16 Conservatives who do not believe racism is still an issue in America tended to empathize with Zimmerman; thus conservative news agencies tended to emphasize Zimmerman’s own Latino ethnicity and his potential innocence in their framing of the story. On the contrary, liberal and progressive news agencies tended to frame the Trayvon Martin case in the opposite light, taking Martin’s innocence as established. In either case, both liberal and conservative outlets in the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis verdict framed the situation to favour their political views. Conservative outlets tended to individualize the situation rather than exploring its greater societal context, whereas liberal outlets tended to racialize the story in a way as to frame its results.
While in both cases attempts were made as to enforce a façade of objectivity, it is clear that in each case objectivity was neither tenable nor obtained, despite attempts to enforce this false objectivity. Both frames thus illustrate the illusive nature of objectivity. What is modern racism? I will now establish the framework upon which modern racism underlies blackness and crime in America to build my case that there is sufficient argument for a thematic frame of the story. However, it is important to acknowledge that this should be an argumentative frame that presents a convincing side. I build this case in order to claim that, although it is impossible to discern the specific thoughts and feelings of perpetrators such as George Zimmerman, there is enough societal context that such an argumentative frame can help elucidate the reality of race relations in America. We cannot objectively recover the intentions and biases under which Michael Dunn or George Zimmerman were operating; nevertheless we can use a thematic storyline to explore the prevalence of racial profiling in America. Academic studies of prison rates and crime have established that crimes with white victims are over-reported compared to crimes with black victims.17 Black men receive harsher sentences as opposed to white men.18 Racial profiling is a common occurrence that affects the daily experience of many blacks.19 Many in America tend to think of racism as a by-gone phenomenon from a far-away era, epitomized by overt actions such as slavery, lynching or segregation. 20 However, racism, although
15 Shanto Ivengar, ‘Framing Responsibility for Political Issues,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 546, (1996): 59-70. 16 Lynn Neary. "Justice And Jury Selection: Judging Jurors Before A Trial." NPR 11 June 2013, Talk of the Nation sec.
17 Welch, Kelly. "Black criminal stereotypes and racial profiling." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23.3 (2007): 276-288. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.
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11 no longer overt and outright, still exists in systemic ways that have emerged in the post-Civil Rights era as “modern racism”. Close in conjunction with modern racism are implicit attitudes regarding race. Rather than holding explicit attitudes of negativity toward blacks, many individuals hold internalized implicit attitudes, which steer their judgement and influence their behavior. 21 In this way, modern racism thrives in America. Implicit attitudes have been measured by psychologists through tests like the IAT (Implicit Attitude Test), which measure how individuals react when primed with stimuli regarding race.22 In this framework, an individual’s subjective apprehension of a situation is based on their construal regarding race. Racial prejudice refers to the attitudes that one holds toward blacks. Rather than outright vitriolic attitudes, racial prejudice often tends to be framed within outgroup vs. ingroup bias, where those who score high on modern racist attitudes will tend to hold minorities more in the outgroup whereas those who score low will tend to welcome the inclusion of minorities. 23 Some key characteristics which are distinct about racial prejudice are “the defense of traditional values (such as the belief in meritocracy, ‘hard work,’ and other values that allow victim-blaming to occur in a situation when a member or members of a racial-ethnic group fail), exaggeration of cultural differences instead of claiming outright genetic inferiority and difference, and limiting positive emotions toward a racial-ethnic group.” 24 Notably, 21 Allen R. McConnell, and Jill M. Leibold. "Relations among the Implicit Association Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures of racial attitudes." Journal of experimental social psychology 37.5 (2001): 435-442. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Roel W. Meertens and Thomas Pettigrew, ‘In defense of the subtle prejudice concept: a retort,’ European Journal of Social Psychology, (1974): 299309.
racial prejudice tends to frame discourse regarding race on an individualistic level where emphasis is placed on the actions of the person and not the context. Those who score high on the Modern Racism Scale and the IAT, and who hold high degrees of racial prejudice may not hold outright attitudes of disdain toward blacks, but they are much more likely to blame individual responsibility for such series of events. They are also more likely to perceive individual events of crime as being the fault of an individual aggressor rather than part of a series of societal circumstances. In addition, there is a high level of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, including documented cases shooter bias and racial profiling. Shooter bias refers to the phenomenon where stereotypes of black males will lead even well- trained police officers to shoot more frequently, resulting in greater tendencies to hurt unarmed black men. 25 Racial profiling refers to the fact that police officers are more likely to pursue black criminals because they fulfill a stereotypical profile of a criminal based on construal patterns built over time. 26 Moreover, several studies have shown the pervasive presence of dehumanization in the racism that exists in police cases involving black males. For example, news stories from 1979 to 1999 in the Philadelphia Inquirer were about four times more likely to describe African Americans convicted of capital with nonhuman language such as “barbaric,” “beast,” “brute,” “savage” and “wild”. 27 The conclusions of racial profiling alter the societal realities that different individuals experience. The previous literature indicates 25 Phillip Atiba Goff, et al. "Not yet human: implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary consequences." Journal of personality and social psychology 94.2 (2008): 292. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.
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12 that there is substantial discrimination against blacks on a systemic level. Surrounding societal context is key in informing the news consumer of the thematic story, as McConnaughty notes when she describes the stereotypic context that informs an individual’s impression of the situation.28 However, it is not possible to prove that Zimmerman or Davis were specifically politically motivated or particularly biased in their individual actions. Elaborating on this background context does allow an individual to understand the injustice that Davis and Martin suffered as innocent bystanders. Simultaneously, through using Davis and Martin as political symbols, political action can be better achieved if framing is used, but it is better to acknowledge how journalism is argumentatively framing the story rather than descriptively explaining it objectively. Stereotypes, Symbols and Construal In addition to the context of framed political discourse elaborated above, there also emerges self-selection bias following the media individuals consume. Media consumers choose which outlets to consume in relation to their political preferences. Moreover, consumers also demonstrate confirmation bias – a well-registered phenomenon in psychology where “people tend to be receptive to information that confirms the beliefs they already hold and that individuals are most likely to respond to messages that resonate with their existing predispositions.” 29 This is also true to the extent that viewers tend to trust information attributed to sources that they agree with and they are less likely to be attentive to information that they 28 McConnaughty, “Why we can’t see Jordan Davis and why it matters.” 29 Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, “Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq,” Political Communication 27 (2010): 5987.
disagree with. Moreover, ego-defense is a mechanism where individuals protect their cherished worldviews in order to minimize emotional discomfort. If an individual already possesses high degrees of modern racism, then they will exhibit ingroup bias and outgroup discrimination. In this way, media consumers choose first to engage with the news outlets that confirm their political preferences and second to selectively identify with the information that conforms to their biases. Because individuals seek out news outlets that affirm their worldview, and because news outlets present information in isolated episodes, pre-existing points of view are often taken as status quo.30 The interaction of these biases is evident in Corrine McConnaughy’s Washington Post on the case of Jordan Davis: “Problematically because in the absence of his individuality, cognitive biases based on social cognition become pervasive. For Davis, that surely means notions of race—and likely gender, perhaps youth—have stood in for information about him. And for a young black male, the consequences involve penalties beyond erasure of the individual.”31 In this way, she refers directly to the dehumanization of Davis. Most importantly, when the conservative media did not present individuating information about Davis and his friends, labels that were stereotype-consistent were applied to the case. In the aftermath of the case, the media referred to it as the “loud music case”, a reference to a common stereotype that black youth who play loud music and lounge in public are “ghetto” or
30
Ibid. McConnaughty, “Why we can’t see Jordan Davis and why it matters.”
31
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13 “dangerous.”32 Similarly, Trayvon Martin’s case became identifiable for his wearing of a hoodie. Liberal media outlets similarly erected symbolic representations of Trayvon Martin’s or Jordan Davis’ case in ways that made them martyrs and not merely “individuals”. These figures took on symbolic roles in ways that obscured their individual circumstances. It is thus not fair for liberal media to claim that it better sees the individual situation. Even the term the “loud music case,” although a typifier of “ghetto” culture, also can serve to rally political interests around the injustice of the situation. The liberal representation of news also created a system of political symbolism. As previously presented in this paper, in situations where construal-based information undeniably informs an individual’s impression of the scenario, thematic coherence explaining the context of modern racism is helpful in informing individuals how judgment toward young black males is harshly formed along preexisting biases. However, such coherence is helpful only when it admits to construing a plausible narrative around the situation. Because news inevitably frames such political stories as the Jordan Davis and Trayvon Martin cases along a mediated bias, it is preferable for them to cease feigning objectivity and rather to frame these stories honestly as argumentative portrayals rather than descriptive ones. Elaborating on the historical context of race relations can help the media consumer better understand how Davis fits into the larger framework surrounding crime and blackness in America. Tying these two concepts together gives the consumer a better understanding of how a societal scenario can inform a situation, but it is still not possible to free oneself from the construals that shaped these representations. It is better to take an
argumentative position on the topic rather than a descriptive one. To take an analytic and descriptive tone is to fall similarly into the biases and construals that informed the larger media’s presentation of these issues.
32
33
Ibid.
Conclusion The news itself attempts to present situations objectively, but it falls into its own pitfalls of mediation. The presentation of black masculinity and crime in the press over the past year and the ensuing controversy is an illustration of how framing a news piece characterizes the way media agencies inevitably present a story. Furthermore, the bias of both news agencies and of their audiences are determined by pre-existing construal frameworks regarding topics such as race. An audience member’s self-selection of news outlets will further inform how that individual reacts to a news piece. When conservative news agencies presented the cases in individuated eventbased snippets, they confirmed previous biases of those who hold individualistic attitudes toward race and crime. As noted by McConnaughy, when a viewer judges the cases of Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis, the viewer is actually judging their stereotypical impression of the typical black male. 33 This has the effect of diminishing and dehumanizing the victim. As I argued throughout the paper, a thematic look at racial discrimination would better reveal the greater context as to how crimes against black men are construed and presented. However, at the same time, a thematic perspective that attempts to explain or derive at the truth of individual actors in a situation such as this will ultimately fail if it attempts to tell a story on the basis of objectivity. It is impossible to discern whether Zimmerman was politically motivated or whether Davis provoked his attack in a way as to cause Ibid.
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14 fear in Michael Dunn because we were not present and we did not witness these events. What is most important in evaluating these events is to understand that news is framed in a way that presents a bias. Media ultimately operates at a symbolic level; however, attempts at descriptive objectivity only obscure this fact. Rather than reifying “objectivity” as a value of adherence in difficult political situations such as race relations in America, the media should contextualize the systematic biases by providing an argumentative thematic context, such as that advocated in the body of this essay. References Altheide, David L. "Format and Symbols in TV Coverage of Terrorism in the United States and Great Britain." International Studies Quarterly 31 (1987): 341-61. Print. Bjornstrom, Eileen. "Race-Ethnicity, Social Class, and Unfair Stops by Police" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ASC Annual Meeting, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Nov 14, 2012 Delgado, A.J. "Sorry, NBC: You Owe George Zimmerman Millions." The National Review 27 June 2014. National Review Magazine. Web. Edelman, Murry. “Political Language and Political Reality 18.” PS. (1985): 10-19. Entman, R. M.. "Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and Cultural Change." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly (2010): 341361. Print. Ericson, Patricia Baranek and Janet Chan. “Newsrooms and Journalist’s Cultures” in Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organization. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Goff, Phillip Atiba, et al. "Not yet human: implicit knowledge, historical
dehumanization, and contemporary consequences." Journal of personality and social psychology 94.2 (2008): 292. Hayes, Danny, and Matt Guardino. "Who's Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq." Political Communication 27 (2010): 59-87. Heffel, S.. "Effects of Racism on Perceptions and Punishment of Intraand Interracial Crimes." Journal of Interpersonal Violence (1999): 17671784. Print. Iyengar, Shanto “Framing Responsibility for Political Issues.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1996): 546:59-70. Jackson, Matthew Christian and Goff, Phillip. "Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, And Contemporary Consequences.." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2008): 292-306. Print. Karpinski, A.. "Attitude Importance as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measures." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 949-962. Landler, Mark and Michael Shear. “President Offers a Personal Take on Race in U.S.” New York Times, July 2013. Lippman, Walter. "The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads." Public Opinion. New York, USA: Free, 1922. 3-20. Print. McCarthy, Andrew C. "The Obama Administration's Race-Baiting Campaign." National Review 20 July 2013. McConnaughty, Corinne. "Why we can’t see Jordan Davis and why it matters." The Washington Post 14 Feb. 2014. McConnell, Allen R., and Jill M. Leibold. "Relations among the Implicit Association Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures of racial attitudes." Journal of
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15 experimental social psychology 37.5 (2001): 435-442. Meertens, Roel W and Pettigrew, Thomas. "In defense of the subtle prejudice concept: a retort." European Journal of Social Psychology (1974): 299-309. Plant, E. A.. "The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural Stereotypes." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (2010): 1358-1366. Print. Sherman-Williams, B.. "Stereotypes and the Construal of Individuating Information." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 90-99. Print. Welch, Kelly. "Black criminal stereotypes and racial profiling." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23.3 (2007): 276-288.
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17
Craftsman and Innovator: An Arendtian Analysis of Two Machiavellis by Dylan Steiner Introduction In Fortune is a Woman, Hanna Pitkin divides Machiavelli as a thinker into two distinctive parts. The first of these parts reveals a Machiavelli consumed with the worship of masculinity and tortured by a foundational fear of the feminine. This Machiavelli, due to his own misogyny and inner struggle with ideals of masculinity, obsessively construes the political realm through the lens of male domination over the unpredictable and dangerous forces of feminine power. 1 It is this first side of Machiavelli that continuously undermines and suppresses the emergence of what Pitkin labels, Machiavelli-at-his-best. 2 Machiavelli-at-his-best is a thinker deeply in touch with the inherently fluid, dynamic, and pluralistic nature of the political world. Moreover, rather than attempting to crush these inherent aspects of politics with the force of male dominance, Machiavelli-athis-best contends that we must instead come to full terms with these aspects and incorporate them in an effort to improve our political existence. 3 According to Pitkin, the semi-conscious advice that this Machiavelli puts forth teaches us how to become more autonomous human beings.4 Pitkin’s analysis of Machiavelliat-his-best derives much of its language from the thought of Hannah Arendt. Indeed, the three categories of action, membership, and judgment, which Pitkin puts forth as the categories through which 1 Hanna Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 105, 109. 2 Ibid., 285. 3 Ibid., 325. 4 Ibid.
Machiavelli most effectively teaches us how to become autonomous beings, are all traceable to Arendtian political theory. 5 This fact suggests that a more directly Arendtian reading, informed by Pitkin’s own work, might lead to a fruitful investigation of Machiavelli’s philosophical intentions and contradictions. It is the aim of this paper to lay the groundwork for such an investigation. Throughout, I will continue to draw heavily upon Pitkin’s interpretive work. In particular, the framework of dividing Machiavelli into two parts – Machiavelliat-his-best and Machiavelli-at-his-worst – will inform my entire analysis. Instead of basing these two parts in a gendered reading, however, I will contend that Machiavelli’s thought can be cleanly and informatively categorized under a distinction that Arendt puts forth in The Human Condition. The first part of this paper will show that much of Machiavelli’s thinking is symptomized by an obsession with the Arendtian category of Work. In contrast, the second part will contend that the most insightful elements of Machiavelli’s thought, corresponding to Pitkin’s Machiavelli-at-his-best, are intimately connected with Arendt’s notion of Action. Moreover, this Machiavelli, much like Pitkin’s Machiavelli-at-his-best, ultimately teaches a form of true autonomy that is grounded in our interdependence. 6 The final section, still drawing from the Human Condition, will attempt to elucidate the psychological factors that substantiate this division of Machiavelli into two incompatible selves. All of this is not to challenge the value of Pitkin’s excellent feminist analysis. It is, rather, to offer a different, albeit related, approach to Machiavelli’s thought that does not necessarily depend upon gendered categories. 5 6
Ibid., 287. Ibid., 324.
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18 A Brief Explication of the Vita Activa In The Human Condition, Arendt presents an understanding of man 7 that is derived from the physical activities he engages in, which she terms the vita activa. 8 The vita activa, distinct from the intellectual vita contemplativa, is divided into three fundamental categories: labor, work, and action.9 The first of these, labor, is concerned with the process by which man produces and consumes the most basic material needed for biological existence. This form of labor is most clearly identifiable with the slave class of the ancient Greeks and the modern wagelaboring class. 10 Although there exist potentially interesting paths of investigation for interpreting Machiavelli through an Arendtian labor lens, I have chosen not to pursue this path due to the lack of any explicit Machiavellian emphasis on labor.11 The second category, work, is concerned with the making of products that are not intended to be consumed. Essentially, work can be understood as the relationship between man as an individual craftsman, which Arendt labels homo faber, and his creation. 12 Homo faber seeks to create objects that are defined by their durability. The summation of these objects ultimately constitutes the human world, or “artifice”, that houses man and serves as a 7
In this paper I will use the masculine noun and pronoun following Arendt’s own terminology. I do not believe that this usage significantly undermines a gender-neutral approach to considering humankind in the abstract. This is, however, up for debate. 8 Hannah Arendt and Margaret Canovan, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 136; Arendt terms man in this process animal laborans, emphasizing the animalistic, or purely biological nature of laboring 11 As Pitkin highlights, the notion of the necessity of labor is perhaps dormant in Machiavelli’s discussion of the importance of fertility or lack of fertility in founding a political society; Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), I.1. 12 Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 136.
bulwark against the constant encroachments of the natural world. 13 Although homo faber is an elevation of man above the level of the essentially animalistic laboring man, Arendtian work, or what she also terms making, is not a political activity. Nonetheless, it is the intention of the second section of this paper to contend that much of Machiavelli’s thought can be seen as an effort to pigeonhole the approach to politics into the category of making. The final category of the vita activa, action, is the most difficult to grasp. Unlike the other two categories, action is by its nature dependent upon the basic existence of plurality, or human “togetherness”. 14 It is, as such, the distinctively political category. Through action, man begins “something new” on his “own initiative”. 15 Through this ability to act, and through the ability to re-act to the actions of others, man creates the intangible, but very real and complex, “web of human relations”. 16 Moreover, it is through action that man reach his highest, or most distinctly human, state of being. Indeed, it is interesting to note that, unlike for labor and work, Arendt does not assign a label to man in the performance of action. This is likely because it is only through action that man truly becomes man. After contending that man can exist while having others labor and work for him, Arendt goes on to argue that human life without action “is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men”. 17 Later in this paper I will contend that Machiavelli-at-his-best presents a lesson on politics that is remarkably similar to Arendt’s notion of action. This Machiavelli offers penetrating insights into the nature of human relations 13
Ibid., 138. Ibid., 176, 180. 15 Ibid., 177. 16 Ibid., 183. 17 Ibid., 177. 14
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19 and recognizes that politics cannot be controlled by Arendtian making. He also notices that it is through embracing action that man becomes truly autonomous. First, however, we must consider the Machiavelli that fails to make these insights. Machiavelli as Craftsman Pitkin argues that much of Machiavelli’s writings are pathologically consumed with the worship of masculine values and the domination of femininity.18 In this section I will argue that the political writings of Machiavelli, except in certain crucial instances, are instead obsessed with the Arendtian notion of making. As previously mentioned, Arendtian making is expressed in the relationship between an individual craftsman, or homo faber, and the creation of a durable artifact. It is important to note that, while homo faber is not in any sense concerned with the political realm, the metaphorical use of making has defined a great deal of political thought in the Western tradition. As Arendt highlights, the prototypical example of this mode of political thinking is Plato. 19 Indeed, The Republic is perhaps the greatest attempt to conceive the political world as the creation of a craftsman.20 It is ironic to note that Machiavelli, in Chapter XV of The Prince, implicitly condemns this Platonic approach to politics for its idealism; ironic because Machiavelli, perhaps unknowingly, falls victim to a very similar mode of thinking. It is the work done in The Prince that most clearly exemplifies Machiavelli’s obsession with Arendtian making. Referencing Montesquieu, Arendt highlights that the fundamental characteristic of tyranny is its basis in isolation – specifically the isolation of “the tyrant from his subjects and the isolation of his subjects from each other through mutual 18
Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman, 324. Ibid., 230. 20 Ibid., 227. 19
fear and suspicion.” 21 It is for this reason that tyranny, for Montesquieu and Arendt, is not a genuine form of government as it contradicts “the essential human condition of plurality…which is the condition of all forms of political organization.” 22 Essentially, the tyrant, bypassing the fundamental political elements of plurality and action, stands in relation to his state as an isolated craftsman seeking to mold the population as if it were mere material. Machiavelli would likely reject the notion that the political actor he idealizes in The Prince is a tyrant. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that Machiavelli’s prince falls comfortably within Montesquieu’s and Arendt’s conception. Besides his counselors, who are subordinate to his aims, Machiavelli’s prince stands and acts in isolation. 23 Indeed, Machiavelli insists that the prince rely solely upon his own virtue, as those that depend upon fortune or the virtue and fortune of others cannot hope to stabilize their rule for long.24 At first glance, Chapter IX, “Of the Civil Principality,” suggests a reading that is counter to the above notion. Continuing with the idea that the prince ought to eliminate the nobility in order to consolidate his rule, Machiavelli goes on to argue that the prince must win the support of the people in order to be politically successful. 25 He concludes that: “for a prince it is necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity.”26 This remark seems to suggest that the prince does in fact exist in an intimate relation with others and that the people do play a role in political action. A closer look, however, reveals that this is not 21
Ibid., 202. Ibid. 23 This action, due to its isolated nature, does not qualify as Arendtian action; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, 2nd ed., trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998), XXII. 24 Machiavelli, The Prince, VI-VII. 25 Ibid., IX. 26 Ibid. 22
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20 the case. Machiavelli writes, “He who arrives in the principality with popular support finds himself alone there” (italics mine). 27 The purpose of relying on the people, then, is precisely to end up in a place of isolation. Why is this the case? The problem of relying upon the nobility in order to become prince is that the prince can “neither command them nor manage them to suit himself” (italics mine). 28 The prince seeks isolation because he first and foremost desires to mold and shape those around him to fulfill his own aims. The prince ought to rely upon the people because they are essentially passive and only seek “not to be oppressed”. 29 The people are therefore the perfect material, willing and ready to obey the shaping hands of the craftsman-prince. Machiavelli takes the idea of the political actor as craftsman to its extreme, however, with his account of founding figures – an account that permeates both The Prince and the republican Discourses on Livy. It is worth noting that Pitkin heavily emphasizes the Machiavellian figure of the Founder. Under her reading, Machiavelli’s idealization of the Founder is based in an unconscious worship of the paternal power in opposition to the feminine. 30 In my own account, I will contend that founding figures represent the archetypal political craftsmen in Machiavelli’s thought. In The Prince, Machiavelli draws attention to the mythical founding figures of Moses, Romulus, Cyrus, and Theseus and labels them the “most excellent” of princes.31 To understand these figures, it is necessary to observe their relation to their respective peoples. Although he does not speak of the early Romans, Machiavelli makes it clear that the defining aspect of
the Israelis at the time of Moses was that they were “enslaved” by Egypt, of the Persians at the time of Cyrus that they were “oppressed” by the Medes, and of the Athenians at the time of Theseus that they were “dispersed.”32 In essence, the Israelis, the Persians, and the Athenians all existed in a more or less non-political state of existence. Their founders, as such, stood in relation to them as semi-divine figures, capable of shaping them into a political form solely through the exertion of their own virtue. In Chapter XXVI, An Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians, Machiavelli draws a parallel between the relation of these “most excellent” founders and their peoples and his own home country of Italy. He claims that Italy is ripe for a new founding, and writes, “In Italy matter is not lacking for introducing every form.” 33 (italics mine) This chapter, then, is really a call for a mythical craftsman. One who will sculpt the inert material that is the Italian population into a new and glorious form. This mode of thinking is not restricted to The Prince. In The Discourses, Machiavelli contends that it “never or rarely happens” that a kingdom or republic is well organized from the beginning, or reformed anew, unless ordered by “one individual.” 34 Continuing, “It is necessary that one alone give the mode and that any such ordering depend on his mind…So a prudent orderer of a republic…should contrive to have authority alone” (italics mine). 35 This dependence of the new ordering upon the orderer’s mind is important. As Arendt highlights, it is homo faber that begins by forming a mental image in his own isolated mind and then utilizes this image to form his creation. 36 Machiavelli reveres ancient republican
27
32
28
33
Ibid. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman, 52. 31 Machiavelli, The Prince, VI.
Ibid., XXVI. Ibid. 34 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, I.9. 35 Ibid. 36 Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 173.
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21 lawgivers, including Solon and Lycurgus, for the fact that they stood in relation to their political societies as individual creators. 37 Guided by their own minds, these lawgivers used the tool of law in order to shape their people into the durable form they envisioned. The people, for their part, were wholly passive material, subordinated to the authority of their single 38 As such, craftsman-lawgiver. Machiavelli’s homo faber-based thinking contaminates his analysis of republics as well as his analysis of principalities. There is one final element of Machiavelli’s thought that is worth addressing in this section. While discussing the category of work, Arendt highlights that the creator of artifacts has always been a As such, an “destroyer of nature.” 39 “element of violation and violence” is always present in the craftsman’s act of creation.40 Machiavelli’s writings are filled with violence and the advocacy of violence. An investigation of this advocacy, however, reveals that nearly all of his support for violence is connected with his obsession with making. The prince and the founding figure must violently eliminate all competing political interests so that they may stand alone in their craftsman-like relation to the population.41 Violence must also be used in the shaping of the political form. Cesare Borgia, for example, utilized the brutal services of Messer Remirro de Orco in order to shape the population of Romagna into more pliable material. 42 Finally, Machiavelli’s praise of Roman expansionism, and the inevitably violent process of conquest, can also be understood through Arendt’s category of work. As he makes clear, Rome proceeded with a
37
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, I.9. Ibid. 39 Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 139. 40 Ibid. 41 Machiavelli, The Prince, VIII; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, I.9. 42 Machiavelli, The Prince, VII.
method of expansion that entailed violently “ruining” surrounding cities and robbing them of their free, or political, way of life.43 The purpose of this mode of expansion was for Rome to establish itself as the sole authority, capable of subordinating and manipulating a host of lesser cities. 44 Rome’s mode of expansion, therefore, placed it in the position of the isolated craftsman, looming over the now depoliticized material of subject cities. In sum, we can perceive a great deal of Machiavelli’s thought as an effort to conceptualize the political world as the creation of homo faber. In the final sections of this work I will attempt to explain why this is the case and why it is so problematic. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to analyze the aspects of Machiavelli that are truly innovative and enlightening. It is necessary to analyze Machiavelli-at-hisbest. Machiavelli and Arendtian Action For Hannah Arendt, action is the only activity that allows man to develop into his fully autonomous and human self. It is also the only activity that allows him to reach the political stage of existence. Indeed, the notion of being autonomous and human is intimately related to, if not synonymous with, being political. In order to understand the nature of action, it is necessary to first understand its semimetaphysical aspects. Arendt explains that “to act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin, to set something in motion.”45 Man, in turn, is a “newcomer and beginner” by “virtue of birth.” 46 It is thus distinctively in the nature of man to act or to begin something new. It is for this reason that Arendt writes, referencing Augustine and echoing Kant, that “the principle of freedom was created when man
38
43
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, II.2-II.3. Ibid., II.4. Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 177. 46 Ibid. 44 45
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22 was created.” 47 We must look closer at what Arendt means by a “principle of freedom.” Under a deterministic view of the natural world, every process is interpreted as a mechanical reaction to some previous event. This interpretation applies as much to human life as it does to animals and nonorganic material. Existing as an endless chain of reactions, the natural world cannot be said to have any beginnings. Human action, however, “interrupts the inexorable automatic course of daily life” (italics mine).48 Action, for some reason, cannot be explained by mechanical laws. As Arendt explains, “action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle” (italics mine). 49 While seemingly “infinitely improbable,” action liberates us from a predetermined chain of reactions. Action allows us to begin. Action, however, comes with a catch. Individuals cannot act in isolation, but rather must act in and through an intricate web of human relationships. The reason for this is that action that is not accompanied by speech is not really action at all; it is merely brutish physical movement. 50 It is only through verbal communication that action “becomes relevant,” as it is only through such communication that man “identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.” 51 It is through acting combined with speaking, then, that man reveals himself as an autonomous agent, revealing “who” he is as opposed to “what” he is. Communicating one’s own agency requires an audience of similarly agentive beings. Action therefore demands plurality and the beginning of new collective enterprises. It is essential to note 47
Ibid. Ibid., 246. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., 179. 51 Ibid. 48
that, unlike work, action is not concerned with the creation of some end. It is, rather, in and of itself the end of self-revelation and autonomous being. What does all of this have to do with Machiavelli? What connection could the Florentine secretary possibly have with these seemingly metaphysical notions of freedom? Towards the end of The Prince, Machiavelli embarks on a discussion of Fortune. Explaining that he is occasionally inclined to the opinion that Fortune dominates our entire existence, he goes on to write, “Nonetheless, so that our free will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that Fortune is arbiter of half our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern” (italics mine). 52 While Fortune is not exactly equivalent to the mechanical laws of nature, there exists a fairly clear connection between the two. Both define a nontangible entity that exists outside of human volition,53 both wield enormous power over the unfolding of physical and human events, and both seem to predetermine future occurrences. Despite this nearly omnipotent force, Machiavelli still holds that there remains a realm of human action that is free from Fortune’s authority. It is the intention of this section to demonstrate that Machiavelli, when at his best, offers an understanding of this freedom that is remarkably similar to Arendtian action. Whereas The Prince most fully embodies Machiavelli’s craftsman-like thought, it is in The Discourses on Livy that Machiavelli-at-his-best shines through as the progenitor of Arendtian action. 54 52
Machiavelli, The Prince, XXV; It is perhaps worth noting that Russell Price translates “free will” here as “human freedom”; Niccolò Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner, trans. Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 53 Although the effects of the natural laws are tangible, the laws themselves are not. 54 Although it has not been the basic contention of this paper that Machiavelli’s thinking paved the way for Arendtian theory, I believe that this is largely the case.
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23 Indeed, it is in his analysis of Republican Rome’s domestic politics that he demonstrates a profound, and perhaps revolutionary, insight into the pluralistic, dynamic, and revelatory nature of political existence. Before investigating this analysis it is worth paying attention to a remark Machiavelli makes regarding republican constitutions. After establishing that the founding lawgiver should stand in relation to society like a craftsman, he goes on to contend that “the government organized is not going to last long if resting on the shoulders of only one; but is indeed lasting when it is left to the care of the many, and when its maintenance rests upon many.”55 It is through this recognition of the need for plurality and mutuality that Machiavelli offers his greatest contribution to political thought. His first failure lies in the fact that, especially in The Prince but also throughout The Discourses, he forgets this need. His second failure is his inability to recognize that this need extends back to the very beginnings of political society; the need for plurality and mutuality does not somehow follow upon the initial structuring of society by a mythical founder. The remarkable feature of Machiavelli’s Roman Republic is that, although certain aspects of its legal system were set up by founding figures such as Romulus and Numa, much of its constitution actually arose from a long series of so-called “accidents.” 56 These accidents were in fact a long chain of tumultuous interactions between the plebeian class and the patricians, or noble class. 57 The tumults, as Machiavelli highlights, were not violent in any meaningful sense. Instead, they took the form of protests, the closing of shops, walkouts, and the refusal to enlist in war. In This possibility is worthy of a separate and fuller study. 55 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, I.58. 56 Ibid., I.2. 57 Ibid., I.3.
other words, they took the form of distinctly political action. These tumults were followed by a great number of concessions on the part of the patricians that allowed the plebeians more participatory power in the workings of the state. These concessions took the form of laws, such as the formation of the tribunes and the ability to accuse the nobility in the court system, which ultimately came to constitute the political and legal form of the republic. 58 In essence, the Roman legal system arose from human action working through a complex web of human interrelations, and not from an isolated individual. The republic, then, was the result of an organic, dynamic, and fluid exchange between multitudes of political actors. A crucial aspect of the laws formed by the Romans, unlike laws imposed by a founding lawgiver, is that they were mutually agreed upon through a bargaining process, and took into consideration all interests involved. The nobles volitionally acquiesced to the establishment of the tribunes and the later expansions of plebeian influence because they depended upon the plebeians for the support of their enterprises. The entire citizenry of Rome, therefore, was meaningfully engaged with their laws and with one another. They were meaningfully engaged precisely because it was through their own autonomous decision that the political society around them took its admittedly complex form. The notion of autonomy returns us to the discussion of Fortune at the beginning of this section. In The Discourses, Machiavelli contends that it was through virtue, and not Fortune, that Rome managed to acquire its empire. 59 In other words, the Romans were somehow able to escape from the dominion of
58 59
Ibid., I.7. Ibid., II.1.
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24 Fortune and achieve greatness through their own autonomy. 60 Unfortunately, in this same chapter, Machiavelli slides back into his typical founder-worship and contends that this greatness was the result of Rome’s initial lawgivers. 61 This contention, however, conflicts with the lessons that Machiavelli teaches us when discussing the struggles between the plebeians and the patricians. In the next chapter, Machiavelli states that it was the love of freedom and the common good that truly made Rome great.62 The love of freedom and the love of the common good, however, were not constructed by the Roman founders. Rather, they developed alongside the development of the republican legal institutions which were the product of plebeian and patrician interaction. Indeed, it is only through laws that develop out of the people’s own interests, and that are therefore engaged in volitionally, that a population can truly come to develop a love for their political society; legal structures that are imposed by founders create isolation, not love. Moreover, true political freedom, which Machiavelli terms vivere civile, only arises when the people are engaged with the political society. Love for freedom, then, cannot be given to a population by a lawgiver, but must, rather, arise organically as the population partakes in the creation of, and the participation in, the laws. As such, it was the mutual enterprise of the plebeians and the patricians, and not the isolated work of its founders, that led to Rome’s greatness and its freedom from Fortune. Indeed, through their joint enterprise the Romans began something new, namely the creation of a political structure that was neither
constrained by Fortune nor by the dictations of a craftsman-founder. Of course, Machiavelli is neither fully conscious nor explicit about the above contention that I attribute to him. The reason for this is that there are no real moments where he fully pulls himself away from his fantastical idealization of political craftsmanship. Nonetheless, an honest reading of his praise of the internal dynamics of Roman politics, as well as the respect that he continues to show for the political prudence of the people throughout The Discourses, naturally leads to the conclusion that it was indeed human action that led to the greatness and freedom of Rome. 63 It is also crucial to note that the revelatory element of Arendtian action is at play in Machiavelli’s analysis of Roman politics. Machiavelli insists that the political action of the people bestows upon them an incredible amount of glory. 64 Arendt highlights: “because of its inherent tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is possible only in the public realm.”65 In other words, glory is important because it reveals an actor to others. The people of Rome, both the plebeians and the patricians, achieved glory because, through their incredible political interactions and enterprises, they revealed themselves as agentive and autonomous beings that were, in fact, outside of the dominating grasp of Fortune. The creation of a dynamic and long-lasting society testifies to this fact. Unfortunately, the fantasy of making continuously plagues and contradicts these deeply profound insights into political action and autonomy. In the next sections I will explain why this is so.
60
The Fantasy of Making
Machiavelli’s equation of greatness with expansion might very well be a symptom of his homo faber-like thinking. What is important here, however, is that greatness is something which allows a political society to exist outside of Fortune’s sovereignty. 61 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, II.1. 62 Ibid., II.4.
63
Ibid., I.47, I.58. Ibid., I.58. 65 Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 180. 64
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25 The Machiavelli that recognizes action as the true foundation of political life conflicts with the Machiavelli that perceives politics through the lens of homo faber. The insights of the former Machiavelli also reveal the pathology of the latter’s perception. Most basically, they reveal, as Arendt notes, that thinking of the political actor as an isolated “strong man” is to engage in superstition. 66 This superstition is the result of the “the delusion that we can ‘make’ something in the realm of human affairs —‘make’ institutions or laws, for instance, as we make tables and chairs, or make men ‘better’ or ‘worse’.”67 Ultimately, it rests on the “utopian,” and therefore fantastical, “hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other material.”68 Machiavelli, perhaps without realizing it, repeatedly falls into this mode of utopian thinking. He is undoubtedly right to criticize the delusional attempts of philosophers who think the political world through abstract and imaginative concepts.69 Nonetheless, when Machiavelli sets himself up in the position of the most excellent princes, when he imagines himself as the ancient lawgivers of republics, and when he succumbs to the nearly sycophantic worship of Cesare Borgia, he engages in a mode of thought that is equally utopian. 70 Utopian because he imagines men in these instances to be mere material, capable of being sculpted through violent methods or by an imposed blueprint of rigid laws. In The Discourses, for instance, we often see Machiavelli desperately clinging to a conception of laws in which they rigidly organize and constrain the members of a republic. It is 66
Ibid., 188. Ibid. Ibid. 69 Machiavelli, The Prince, XV. 70 Pitkin draws attention to letters supposedly written by Machiavelli and signed with Borgia’s signature. It would appear that Machiavelli engaged in vicarious fantasies with craftsman-princes. 67 68
this conception that leads him to place such heavy emphasis on the need to violently draw republics back to their original pure forms. He praises the Florentines who “called [for] regaining the state putting that terror and fear in men…since at that time they had beaten down those who, according to that mode of life, had worked for ill” (italics mine).71 The state, in this case, must make men continually internalize fear so that it can more easily manipulate and form them, like material, back into the proper form established by foundational laws. Men, however, are not like material. Rather, they are autonomous agents. Moreover, action, that which makes men autonomous, is, by its very nature, boundless. Action, according to Arendt, “always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries.” 72 As such, laws “are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from within the body politic.” 73 Instead, laws are fundamental to political existence because they are the only principles that offer any sense of limitation of, and protection from, the nearly-overwhelmingly dynamic nature of politics. In other words, laws can never mold and constrain human action, but they can channel it and place certain limitations on it. Action, then, becomes more manageable and can contribute to a thriving political society. Although Machiavelli often misses this essential point, I have tried to demonstrate that there are moments of outstanding insight where he recognizes plurality and dynamism to be inescapable factors of political life, and to in fact be at the basis of effective legal institutions. Indeed, Machiavelli may very well be the first thinker to have recognized this point in any meaningful sense, and, as such, he may very well be the first true political theorist. 71
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, III.1. Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 190. 73 Ibid., 191. 72
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26 Why Are There Two Machiavellis? Pitkin suggests that Machiavelli’s greatest teachings are repeatedly thwarted by an internalized misogyny and an ambiguity concerning the masculine ideal. There is a side of Machiavelli that, perhaps due to his incredible genius and insight, offers political lessons that are wholly, or almost wholly, separate from these internal pathologies. Unfortunately, the remainder of Machiavelli succumbs to these pathologies and understands the political realm solely through the lens of male dominance. As such, there exist two Machiavellis. Up until this point, I have similarly contended that there are two Machiavellis: one obsessed with the fantastical desire to construe the political world as the creation of a craftsman, and the other that understands politics as an inherently pluralistic and dynamic realm through which we act and achieve autonomy. In order to explain why these two Machiavellis exist, I return once more to Arendt’s work in The Human Condition. In the previous section I argued that Machiavelli deceives himself in conceiving the political realm as the result of Arendtian work. What I did not highlight, however, is that this form of deception is enormously tempting, not just for Machiavelli, but for all theorists, and indeed, for all humans. As Arendt explains, it is incredibly difficult to accept the category of action as the sole element of politics. 74 This is because action is, at its foundation, irreversible, and unpredictable.75 Action, with its basis in the plurality of agents, sets of an incredible multitude of action-reaction chains that potentially extend ad infinitum. Moreover, unlike physical laws, action, as the result of an autonomous agent, does not allow us to predetermine its outcome. Arendt
74 75
Ibid., 230. Ibid., 231.
emphasizes that these elements guarantee that the capacity for human action contains an almost overwhelming depth of These “authentic perplexities.” 76 perplexities tempt us to eliminate “the risks and dangers” of human action by introducing into the political world the “much more reliable and solid categories inherent in activities with which we confront nature and build the world of the human artifice.” 77 This temptation is so strong because, as human beings, we have a psychological need to categorize and control; we seek a clear and understandable world to live in so that we may carry out our activities with a sense of certainty concerning their success. 78 Human action, however, violates this need through its complexity and unpredictability. It might now be clear that there exists a difficult paradox in the notion of human action. As originally discussed, action is meant to free us as human beings and allow us to be autonomous, and yet it now appears that action renders us incapable of predicting and acting with any certainty. We seem, as such, to be at the mercy of human action just as we were previously at the mercy of determinism or Fortune. Arendt, happily, recognizes this paradox and acknowledges that no where “does man appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but man” (italics mine). 79 The error in treating this appearance as reality (an error Machiavelli occasionally does and occasionally does not make), however, lies in the mistaken “identification of sovereignty with freedom.” 80 In essence, action never
76
Ibid. Ibid., 230. 78 It is important to emphasize that this is neither a specifically male nor specifically female need. It is a distinctively human need. 79 Ibid., 234. 80 Ibid. 77
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27 promised us sovereignty because it never promised us control. In order to be sovereign, man would have to exist without dependence and, therefore, without others. But, as Arendt famously states, “No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth.” 81 Indeed, to be sovereign is to violate the very basis of action and freedom, which are contingent upon being embedded in a plurality of human agents. Freedom allows us to act autonomously from nature and to begin new things; it does not, could not possibly, allow us to control and dominate. Earlier I related Machiavelli’s Fortune to the freedom-robbing power of natural laws. There is little doubt, however, that Fortune unconsciously incorporates the unpredictability of human action as well. In other words, it incorporates what robs us of, or fails to allow us, sovereignty along with what robs us of freedom. It is the unpredictable nature of human action that causes Machiavelli to personify Fortune as a woman, who must be beaten and struck down.82 In this representation, Machiavelli delusionally suggests that the unpredictable nature of human existence can be crushed and molded in such a manner that we, or some individual, can obtain sovereignty over it. It is this type of thinking that repeatedly drives him to imagine the political world as something that could be created by a craftsman. Fortunately, Machiavelli offers another metaphorical representation of Fortune. He suggests that Fortune is actually similar to “violent rivers…which…flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift earth from this part, drop in another.”83 This representation of Fortune is, in some sense, permanently unpredictable. It cannot be beaten down or molded and we cannot establish sovereignty over it. Nonetheless, there
remains an element of hope. Men, in times of quiet, can construct “dikes and dams” so that, when the violent rivers of Fortune rise again, they either “go by canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging.” 84 It is important to recognize that the construction of dams and dikes, unlike the beating down of a woman, requires the cooperation of men, not the work of one man. It is also worth noting that the language Machiavelli uses here is remarkably similar to the language Arendt uses when posing her solution to the unpredictability of action. Arendt contends that the solution is the use of mutual promises, agreements, and legal arrangements. Through these methods “certain islands of predictability are thrown…in which certain guideposts of reliability are erected” (italics mine). 85 Crucially, if these islands are stretched too far, if they attempt to account for every element of unpredictability, they inevitably lose their binding power and the “ocean of uncertainty” consumes them.86 I believe, and it has been my intention to demonstrate, that Machiavelli’s dikes and dams, or at least the dikes and dams of Machiavelli-at-his-best, are ultimately the same as Arendt’s islands of predictability. Through the mutual participation in a civil state, through the political process of bargaining, and through the agreement to volitionally abide by mutually determined laws, Machiavelli shows us how we can achieve a human existence of true freedom, albeit one that lacks sovereignty and the certainty of craftsmanship. In essence, for Machiavelliat-his-best and for Hannah Arendt, the solution to the unpredictability of human action, and indeed the unpredictability of human existence at large, is not the fantastical creation of a constraining artifice, but, rather, more political and
81
84
82
85
Ibid. Machiavelli, The Prince, XXV. 83 Ibid.
Ibid. Arendt and Canovan, The Human Condition, 244. 86 Ibid.
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28 coordinated human action. As Arendt so beautifully writes: “Man’s inability to rely upon himself or to have complete faith in himself (which is the same thing) is the price human beings pay for freedom; and the impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do, of knowing its consequences and relying upon the future, is the price they pay for plurality and reality, for the joy of inhabiting together with others a world whose reality is guaranteed for each by the presence of all.”87 References Arendt, Hannah and Margaret Canovan. The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Print. Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discourses on Livy. Trans. Harvey Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996. Print. Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. 2nd ed. Trans. Harvey Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Print. Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Trans. Russell Price. Ed. Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print. Pitkin, Hanna. Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Print.
87
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Post-Zionism and Israeli Politics: Accusations and Alternatives by Stephen Reimer Since its emergence in the mid1980s, the concept of post-Zionism has presented a fundamental ideological threat to Israeli society as it exists today. As the focus of numerous academic works, postZionism and its formation as a theory has been almost exclusively led by scholars of Israeli politics, sociology, and culture. At its core, post-Zionist discourse challenges many of the basic features of the Israeli state, including the state’s Jewish identity, democratic character, and relation to the Jewish diaspora. In a sense, post-Zionism objects the continued use of Zionist principles, which influenced the trajectory of Israel’s political and societal development by claiming that Zionism as a state building project has outlived its usefulness. Post-Zionist rhetoric claims that Israel must abandon Zionism as a state-led project in favour of recasting the country as “a state for all its citizens.”1 The purpose of this analysis is to neither condemn nor defend post-Zionism, but rather to describe and evaluate some of the main charges of post-Zionism against Israel in its current state. Additionally, I will argue for alternative changes that can be made to the Israeli political system and society in general, which may mimic the propositions made by post-Zionism, without calling for the absolute 1
Like much of the terminology frequented in the postZionist literature, the idea of “a state for all its citizens” is rather loaded. However, for the purposes of this analysis, this phrase will be understood as Israel’s adoption of policies which bring it closer to a state in which no group of people (whether that be based on religion, ethnicity, ideology etc.) is given any preferred treatment over another in terms of state activities. The pursuit of a completely equal and multicultural society is what drives the meaning behind “a state for all its citizens”.
abandonment of Israel as a Jewish state. After an important discussion of Zionism and its relationship to post-Zionism, which will guide the subsequent sections, the emergence of the post-Zionist ideology will be illustrated. Then, this analysis will look at post-Zionism as it relates to Israeli democracy and democratic institutions, Israel’s connection with the Jewish diaspora, and issues related to ethnic minorities in Israel, such as the Arabs, Mizrachim, Sephardim, and Russian and Ethiopian immigrants. With this, some modest policy adjustments and other recommendations will be proposed, with the intention of accommodating at least some of the concerns presented by postZionist discourse. Zionism and Post-Zionism: A Definitional Challenge Before we can hope to more fully understand what is meant by post-Zionism, a comprehensive understanding of Zionism must be worked out. Like post-Zionism, the concept of Zionism carries with it considerable controversial baggage, as the proponents and opponents of Israeli policies both have used the term negatively and positively to describe the state. For the purposes outlined here, Zionism will be defined in such a way as to mitigate these value-laden perspectives on the term, and will instead focus on an ideological description as seen from the perspective of the term’s founders. Commonly understood to be the “Father of Zionism”, Theodor Herzl conceptualised Zionism as a project to be undertaken by the global Jewish community, as a final and comprehensive solution to the then termed “Jewish Question.” 2 The Jewish Question, as described by Herzl, is understood as the systematic and detrimental existence of 2 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: Dover Publications, 1988).
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31 anti-Semitism, which would prevail for as long as Jews existed as minorities in various countries. 3 Herzl’s Zionist project calls for global Jewry to “return to Zion” by establishing a new state in Palestine4, which he makes clear will not be a theocracy, but instead a place where “every man [is] as free and undisturbed in his faith or his disbelief as he is his nationality.”5 From the outset Zionism was to be a secular, nationalist movement intended to relieve global Jewry from ages of compounded anti-Semitic repression through the establishment of a new entity in the Jewish ancestral homeland, in which the Jews would be the majority. Different sub-facets of Zionism emerged over time, with each enriching the concept of Zionism with some other additional factor. Labour or Socialist Zionists saw Zionism as an opportunity to produce a socialist utopia for the Jews, while many Religious Zionists emerged to battle the secular tendencies of Herzilian Zionism. 6 However, by the time that a significant Jewish society had been installed in Palestine, the notion of Zionism, as laying the foundation for the Israeli state, was characterised by collectivism, socialism, secularism, and a connection with Jewish collective memory and history. Since the age of Herzl, Zionism has adopted many additional meanings and 3
Herzl, The Jewish State. When Herzl was writing his seminal work, “The Jewish State” in 1896, there was little difference between Palestine and the ancestral Jewish home of Eretz-Yisrael , or The Land of Israel. Later on, the distinction of Israel being the ancestral home of the Jews would play an important role in the Zionist project. At this time however, Herzl uses “Palestine” to simply describe a specific landmass. Furthermore, Herzl uses the word “state” to describe the goal of the Zionist project. Whether this was simply used as a synonym for “homeland”, or was chosen for strategic political purposes is unclear from this text. 5 Herzl, The Jewish State. 6 Avishai Ehrlich, “Zionism, Anti-Zionism, PostZionism,” in The Challenges of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics, Ephriam Nimni ed. (London: Zed, 2003), 73. 4
has evolved in accordance with challenges and political realities that have come with the progression of the Zionist project.7 For example, Zionism as a vehicle for socialist utopia in Israel has mostly been replaced with a Zionist state that has adopted the principles of classical liberalism. Economic liberalisation, which was bolstered in the post-1977 Likud era, has seen a strong atmosphere of collectivisation be replaced with one of individualism. In this way, Zionism must be understood as being in a constant state of flux while maintaining a commitment to the welfare of the Jewish people. 8 Today, to describe Israel as a Zionist state is to continue with the projectfocused essence of the term, as the modern state that continues to embody the Zionist goals of seeing Jewish life prosper and be protected. It is important to juxtapose this understanding of Zionism with antiZionism before addressing the post-Zionist ideology. The cultural and political agenda of the anti-Zionist school is determined by Zionist discourse, though in negative terms.9 While anti-Zionists may long for a pre-Zionist age, post-Zionism recognises the crucial role that the Zionist era has played in the development of the Israeli state, but also heralds the closure of this era. 10 Post-Zionist ideology has emerged out of a reanalysis of Israeli history and society that challenges some dominant national narratives about the formation of the Israeli state, along with challenges to the dominant Zionist representations of Israeli society. 11 The findings of these so
7
Ibid., 63. Ibid., 65. Adi Ophir, “Identity of the Victims and the Victims of Identity: A Critique of Zionist Ideology for a Postzionist Age,” in Post-Zionism: A Reader, Laurence J. Silberstein ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008), 90. 10 Ibid. 89. 11 H.C. Kelman, “Israel in Transition from Zionism to Post-Zionism,” The ANNALS of the American 8 9
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32 called “New Historians” and “Critical Sociologists” have formed the basis of the post-Zionist concept.12 Much like Zionism, post-Zionism encompasses a variety of positions and is used in a strategic manner. In essence, “post-Zionism is a term applied to a current set of critical positions that problematise Zionist discourse, and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations that it produced.” 13 In this fashion, post-Zionists see that the Zionist project has been fulfilled, and that continuing to adopt the project’s ideology is not only a useless endeavour for the purposes of state building, but is actually a detriment to the principles of democracy. This is the core charge of post-Zionism against the Israeli state, that a supposed “ethnocracy” which favours Israeli Jews over other ethnic components of the Israeli people must be eradicated in order to achieve true liberal democracy in Israel, as an ethnic state is incongruent with a multi-cultural society.14 These accusations are highly contentious, and therefore will be given particular attention in a subsequent section. The “New Historians”: Israeli Historiography and the Origins of PostZionism It is with the works of Israel’s “New Historians” (a term coined by Israeli author and historian Benny Morris) that the underlying sentiments of Post-Zionism began to emerge in the field of Israeli social science. According to Morris, the work of the New Historians was a product of access Academy of Political and Social Science 555.1, (1998): 47. 12 Laurence J. Silberstein, “Reading Postzionism: An Introduction,” in Post-Zionism: A Reader, Laurence J. Silberstein ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008), 7. 13 Laurence J. Silberstein, The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 2. 14 Ephriam Nimni, “Introduction,” in The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics, Ephriam Nimni ed. (London: Zed, 2003), 3.
to recently declassified documents, and the fact that these interpreters of history were writing in the early 1980s, a period of Israeli self-criticism mostly fuelled by popular opposition to the Lebanon War. 15 Furthermore, he points to the importance of the declassifying of state documents which occurred in this period, as these historical sources newly accessible to researchers provided a narrative in contrast to the popular one administered by the state 16 . Combined, these two factors saw the production of works by many New Historians that challenged many popular narratives about the 1948 War of Independence. This event which formed the foundation of the Zionist state was given particular focus by the New Historians both because new documents specific to that period were available, and because this is the pivotal event in Israeli history, the perception of which bears heavily on how the subsequent Zionist experience is perceived. 17 Where the dominant Zionist narrative of the 1948 war presented a history that depicts an Israeli actor void of condemnation while fighting to liberate their state from oppressors, the New Historians present an arguably fairer view, where Israel is seen as a perpetrator of some ills against the Arabs. By lending at least some blame to Israel for the Palestinian refugee problem, which arose after the 1948 war, the New Historians recognise that the causal thrust of the displacement of countless Palestinians lies somewhere between the Israeli-Zionist narrative of migration led by Arab 15
Benny Morris, “The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past,” in Making Israel, Benny Morris ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007), 15. 16 Israel’s Archives Law, particularly its key “thirty year rule” which released documents from the late 1940s and early 1950s, allowed for this access to government papers, including Israeli Defence Force (IDF) reports of the events of the 1948 war (Morris 2007, 14). 17 Morris, “The New Historiography,” 15.
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33 authorities, and the Palestinian narrative of a preconceived and forced displacement. 18 The New Historians also emerged with works depicting the Yishuv as a colonialsettler society 19 and challenging preconceived notions of Israel’s commitment to peace after the 1948 war.20 By challenging many dominant Zionist narratives, the school of New Historians paved the way for post-Zionism to enter discourse on Israeli politics and society. Anita Shapira, an Israeli historian and critic of post-Zionism, contends that the impact made by post-Zionist on Israeli history and historiography demonstrates the use of history as a political tool. According to her, collective memory is no longer explicitly shaped by the state and its narrative, but also by intellectuals, journalists, and other media sources that find the distribution of perspectives contrary to the dominant narrative both intriguing and marketable. 21 The postZionist and neo-historical induced diversification of Israeli collective memory as a source of identity has seen palpable changes to the political views of many Israelis. Most notably, a heightened sympathy for the situation of the Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and other minorities has emerged – though this is not the only gradual shift that the emergence of post-Zionism has witnessed. As a critic of post-Zionist rhetoric, Shapira argues that this new historiography is merely an 18
Ibid., 20. Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military, (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 65. 20 Ilan Pappé’s book on the 1948 war and its immediate aftermath outlines Israel’s inward focus on issues such as immigrant absorption and economic development. With relative calm on its borders, Israel’s change in priorities from peace to state development diminished their interest in drawing a peace agreement with King Abdullah of Jordan, who was eager to see this happen (Pappé 1988, 188). 21 Anita Shapira, “Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the ‘New Historians’ in Israel,” History and Memory 7.1 (1995): 32. 19
ideological construct that serves particular interests, as opposed to a search for deeper truth. 22 Despite this critical view of the impacts made by the New Historians, it is undeniable that a resultant post-Zionist discourse has opened political space in Israel for review of numerous political and social issues through an ideologically original lens. Several major changes to Israeli society since the 1980s also lend support to a post-Zionist ideology. Most notably, the election of Likud in 1977 saw the introduction of economic reforms intended to promote privatisation and entrepreneurism, which arguably initiated a shift in Israeli society from collectivism to individualism. This shift highlights a disconnect between the Israeli people and the state, as individual interests and views superseded those of the state. In this way, individualism was accompanied by a heightened tolerance for dissent and criticism of government policies and perspectives, such as those featured in postZionist discourse. Challenges to Jewish cultural hegemony by inflows of new immigrants (Ethiopians, former citizens of the USSR, etc.) along with a heightened demand for social equality from certain sectors of Israeli society, mostly a result of post-Oslo Accord frustrations, also contributed to the rise of post-Zionism. Taken together, the narratives brought forward by the New Historians, along with the more empirically-orientated changes outlined here have opened a space for previously uncontested realities and attitudes to be challenged. The Political Implications of Post-Zionist Discourse Democracy (Israeli Ethnocracy?) Perhaps the most critical charge made by post-Zionism is that as it stands, Israel is not a liberal democracy, but rather 22
Ibid., 33.
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34 some sort of ethnocracy whereby a particular ethnic group attempts to extend or preserve disproportionate control over a contested, multiethnic territory.23 This kind of argument is brought forward as a product of post-Zionist discourse, which lends greater agency and focus to Israelis of a minority ethnic group and how they function in the political system. According to this post-Zionist claim, the subordination of Sephardim and Mizrachim Jews to Ashkenazi Jews in Israeli politics reflects the emergence of a supposed ethnocracy as opposed to a theocracy. 24 Yiftachel, the developer of the Israel-as-ethnocracy argument, writes that despite the appearance of democratic structures within the Israeli political system, such as elections and a functioning legislature, the allocation of privileges and resources is made along ethnic lines.25 Sammy Smooha, a professor of Sociology at Haifa University, posits this distinction while taking the argument one step further. He claims that “there is no separation in Israel between religion and nationality”, and that it is this inability of Israel to abandon its status as a Jewish state which bars it from fulfilling the criteria of a liberal democracy. 26 A liberal democracy is only possible for Israel if ethnicity is privatised, such that Israeli identity and nationalism are purged of any Jewish elements, in both the religious and cultural sense. 27 In this way, it would appear that the Zionist project, as an undertaking in protecting and upholding Jewish nationalism and culture, must be abandoned for Israel to claim to be a true liberal democracy. 23 Oren Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine.” in Post-Zionism: A Reader, Laurence J. Silberstein ed., (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008), 125. 24 Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” 127. 25 Ibid.,125. 26 Sammy Smooha, ‘Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype,’ Israel Studies 2.2, (1997): 202. 27 Ibid.
These claims in accordance with post-Zionist ideology pose a serious threat to the essence and purpose of the Israeli state. In order to illustrate how these concerns may be addressed without abandoning Israel’s Jewish identity, one could look to the case of the Israeli Arabs, the largest and more organised of the ethnic minorities in Israel. As with any state, the government in power determines the allocation of resources and opportunities. In the Israeli Knesset the government is always formed by way of composing a ruling coalition, such that the constituent members of the ruling coalition all have some influence over government decisions, such as resource allocation. In this way, it is the inability of Arab political parties to enter ruling Knesset coalitions that prevents them, and all Israeli Arabs by extension, from having substantial access to the resource distributing mechanism built into the ruling coalition. As Smooha points out, the majority of Israeli Arabs agree that their interests can be advanced by democratic means, so why have Arab parties been unable to participate in ruling coalitions?28 Simply put, the intrinsic and fundamental hostility towards the Israeli state by Arab parties makes them inaccessible coalitions partners to all other parties. A “functional acceptance”29 of the Jewish nature of the state is required for Arab parties to be able to achieve real change for their constituents by democratic means. The post-Zionist narrative presented by Yiftachel suggests that asymmetry of resource distribution is a function of ethnicity, when in fact this is not the case. It is a lack of functional acceptance of the Israeli state, which happens to fall along 28
Ibid., 225. “Functional acceptance” is an original concept that describes a political position which neither rejects nor fully embraces the notion of Israel as a Zionist state. Maintaining a position of this nature enables Arab parties to engage more effectively within the Israeli political system. 29
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35 ethnic lines, that fosters this inequality. As demonstrated by the emergence of many ultra-Orthodox parties in the Israeli Knesset, functional acceptance has the potential to bring parties that harbour views incongruous to Zionism into the fold of potential coalition partnership. 30 By adopting functional acceptance, Israeli Arabs and other minority groups are better able to meaningfully participate in democratic processes and serve their own interests via Israel’s democratic institutions. Smooha’s liberal-democratic requirement of the abandonment of the Jewish component of Israeli nationalism is circumvented when this understanding is adopted. Minorities and Cultural Plurality Post-Zionist rhetoric relating to the situation of minority cultures, such as the Israeli Arabs, Mizrachim, Sephardim, and Russian and Ethiopian immigrants, calls for a greater plurality of culture in Israeli society via the entrenchment of multi-cultural values. In this way, postZionism recognises the importance of Jewish culture in the process of state formation, but also notes that with an increased prevalence of non-Jewish cultures, multiculturalism must be adopted. With regards to cultural plurality, the dominant Zionist understanding is that Israel cannot accommodate post-modern cultural pluralism, as this would require an abandonment of the Jewish character of the state.31 In broad terms, the Ashkenazim have occupied the upper echelons of most
spheres of Israeli society, such as the military, politics, and cultural production.32 This is most likely a legacy of the pre-state period, where the first waves of immigrants to Palestine being primarily Ashkenazi Jews. The Mizrachim, Sephardim, and Beta-Israel community33, despite sharing a common fundamental religious background with the Ashkenazim, present a complex instance of cultural incompatibility, where the ethnic and religious components of these groups do not match. In the case of the Mizrachim in particular, being from both Jewish and Arab decent provided for a decree of “otherness” to envelop this community when large numbers of Mizrachim immigrated to Israel from surrounding Arab countries shortly after the 1948 war.34 Resulting resentment from the dominant Ashkenazi community for the pressures this influx posed on state resources has had a long-term effect on continued Mizrachi and Sephardi inferiority in Israel. Furthermore, the Russian and Israeli Arab communities do not even share this religious component of the dominant cultural discourse. 35 So the question remains, how does Israel account for this plethora of cultures present in the country, with varying degrees of similarity to the dominant culture, without abandoning the Zionist identity of the state, as called for by post-Zionist discourse? Cultural pluralism in Israel will not closely resemble multiculturalism as seen in Canada or the United States. The emergence of a civic religion in Israeli 32
Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” 127. The Jewish Ethiopian community that immigrated to Israel in the 1980s and 1990s. 34 Ella Shohat, “Rupture and Return: Zionist Discourse and the Study of Arab Jews,” in Post-Zionism: A Reader, Laurence J. Silberstein ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008), 238. 35 Most Russians in Israel are not Jewish, yet were allowed to immigrate after the collapse of the USSR by way of the Law of Return, which permits the children and grandchildren of Jews to immigrate to Israel. 33
30
Many anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox political parties who oppose Zionism on religious grounds have adopted functional acceptance so as to be able to influence the politics of a society, which they are begrudgingly a part of, in order to see their religious interests met in the societal context. 31 Shlomo Sharan, “Pluralism, the Post-Zionists, and Israel as the Jewish Nation,” in Israel and the PostZionists: A Nation at Risk, Shlomo Sharan ed. (Brighton: Sussex Academy, 2003): 227.
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36 political culture provides a lucrative means of rectifying the issue of cultural pluralism, which is highlighted by post-Zionism. Put plainly, a civic religion is a series of observances that mimic the role of religious observances, but are synthesised by the state for the purposes of state cohesion. Formed in the early years of statehood, the notion of a civic religion was utilised in order to socialise the diverse group of people who were now becoming Israeli citizens. To accommodate for the varying degrees of religiosity within this Jewish population, civic religion was installed to replace a religious-Jewish identity with an Israeli one, based on elements of national pride and accomplishment. The establishment of Israeli Independence Day as a national holiday and the creation of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) are just two examples of how civic religion has connected secular Jews with more religious Jews in contemporary Israel. Returning to the circumstance now addressed by the post-Zionist ideology, the principles of civic religion utilised in the early years of statehood can be expanded to an even more diverse body of Israeli citizens, who now differ in terms of heritage, culture, and ethnicity as opposed to just varying levels of religiosity. This expanded civic religion may include a Jewish component, so as to uphold the Zionist nature of the state. However, this Jewish component must be revitalised so as to discharge the dominant Jewish culture (i.e. Ashkenazi) in favour of a Jewish culture, which still consistent with the basic principles of Zionism, is more accommodative to other Jewish ethnocultures (i.e. the Sephardim, Mizrachim, and Beta-Israel community). This now broadened Jewish component need not preclude non-Jewish Israelis, mostly the Russian immigrants and Israeli Arabs, from participating in Israeli nationalist culture. By broadening the scope of several components of the old civic religion (such as the IDF) and introducing newer elements
(such as Israel’s accomplishments in the high-tech industry and capitalist entrepreneurship more generally 36 ), the structure of civic religion transcends ethnic and cultural divisions. Although the utilisation of enhanced civic religion cannot be relied on to resolve all issues of cultural pluralism, it may address some of these concerns posed by post-Zionist ideology. The American-Jewish Diaspora The strong ties that Israel has with the Jewish diaspora, most notably in the United States, are something distinctive to the state, as no other country appears to have this link with persons invested in the state, but who are not necessarily citizens or decedents of citizens. The influence that American Jews have on politics in Israel is an important dynamic of the Israeli system, as access to funding for different political parties helps to shape political outcomes. Furthermore, the Law of Return, though it is highly unlikely that American Jews will ever have to take advantage of expedited immigration to Israel en masse, acts as an important symbol that connects world Jewry with Israel. Despite all this, postZionism also has implications for this authentic relationship. Firstly, the Law of Return, which provides citizenship for any Jewish person landing on Israeli soil, but not for members of the other ethnic/cultural groups, which comprise the modern Israeli state, is targeted by post-Zionism as asymmetrically favouring Israeli Jews over non-Jews. As post-Zionist ideology proposes the downgrading of the status of non-Israeli Jews in favour of non-Jewish Israelis, Jews living in the diaspora face threats both to the dominant narrative upon which much of their Jewish identity is based, and to their symbolic access to Israel via the Law of 36 The strides that Israelis have made in these fields are not contingent on ethnic or cultural classifications, and thus could be utilised as sources of Israeli national celebration and tools for civic religion.
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37 Return.37 Furthermore, there exist critics of the American-Jewish diaspora from postZionism, which challenges the notion of extraterritorial (noncitizen) Jewish actors having significant power and influence in the Israeli political system, as agency is taken away from actual Israeli citizens.38 In this way, the important role that the Jewish diaspora has played in Israeli political life is threatened by post-Zionism. Also, a diasporatic dislocation between Israel and American Jewry poses another potential problem, as when a primary source of “Jewishness” for American Jewry is distanced from this population, a redefining project must be undertaken to develop a new understanding of what it means to be Jewish in America.39 This post-Zionist interpretation of Israeli-diaspora relations challenges the global understandings of the Zionist project, whereas Zionism is intended to serve all Jews and not just those who live in Israel. Jewish-American systems of philanthropy, if removed as post-Zionist rhetoric proposes, could undermine a major source of identity for these diaspora Jews, as well as harm relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora. 40 In lieu of reliance on, and preferential treatment of, the Jewish diaspora in Israeli society, postZionism recommends that Israel adopt tactics of self-reliance and draw their attention away from pleasing foreign donors in favour of turning attention inward to the Israeli populace as it stands. Unlike the issues of democracy and cultural plurality, the diaspora issue 37
Ephriam Nimni, “From Galut to T’futsoth: PostZionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas,” in The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics, Ephriam Nimni ed. (London: Zed, 2003), 117. 38 Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” 133. 39 Laurence Kolter-Berkowitz, “Post-Zionism and the Dynamics of American Jewry,” Response: A Contemporary Jewish Review 67, (1997): 87. 40 Ibid.
does not directly attack the Zionist nature of Israel. Furthermore, as Israeli society continues to progress towards values of individualism and capitalist selfsufficiency, much of the philanthropic work being done by American Jews becomes unnecessary. By contributing to the Zionist project through philanthropy as opposed to making aliyah, 41 American Jews have characterised their relationship with Israel and the Zionist project in a particular way. However, a reinvention of this relationship does not necessarily spell demise for the relationship as a whole. In order to evolve from a “continuous over-identification with, and in many cases, subservience to the State of Israel’s realpolitik,” 42 American Jewry may strengthen the vitality and autonomy of Jew diasporic life in numerous ways. Instead of pouring time and resources into the Israeli state to serve its interests (which may not be of concern to American Jews), the development of new Jewish diaspora institutions have the potential to refurbish an American Jewish identity which is no longer so closely linked with philanthropy towards Israel and its own national activities. Post-Zionism in Israel: Lacking Pervasiveness Through this analysis, the notion of Israel as a Jewish state has been defended by providing alternatives to some post-Zionist claims. However, why is it so crucial for the state to remain Jewish in the face of this opposition? The Zionist project, which saw the establishment and development of the state of Israel, has continued to shape the character of the state as a strong ideological foundation. To remove this foundation with an abrupt shift to post-Zionism would most certainly put 41
Aliyah, meaning “ascent” in Hebrew, is the act of immigrating to Israel for quasi-religious purposes. Generally one is said to be “making aliyah” when they immigrate to Israel from the diaspora. 42 Nimni, “From Galut to T’futsoth,” 118.
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38 the societal fabric of the country at risk. Furthermore, developing a multi-cultural society is not a simple task. As has been demonstrated in many European countries where cultural intolerance has been rampant for many years, building a society without a common cultural and national framework is arduous at best and impossible at worst. In this way, a nonZionist Israel would fail to function and disintegrate. It would seem that the abundance of literature on post-Zionism and its different facets is rather misleading. This rich literature seems to overstate the pervasiveness of post-Zionist discourse within Israel. With no political parties or other significant social movements in Israel claiming to pursue a post-Zionist ideology, it is unlikely for there to be drastic challenges to policy along these lines in the near future. The expansion of the postZionist ideology has mostly been at the hands of intellectuals and scholars, both Israeli and non-Israeli, who recognise and have outlined areas of concern in Israeli society and have provided solutions based on a normative ideology. With little palpable support within Israel, it would appear the developments in post-Zionism are likely to continue to be scholarly, critical, and quixotic. Overall, post-Zionism brings forward numerous issues in Israeli politics and society, which it prescribes as being the product of a decaying Zionism. As the New Historians have “rediscovered” Israel’s past, new attitudes and perspectives on past events have emerged, which have implications on the way in which contemporary politics and society is viewed. However, as addressed in this analysis, many of the charges made against the Israeli state may be addressed without abandoning the state’s Zionist nature. By adopting a function acceptance of the Israeli political structure, concerns of unequal access to democratic institutions brought forward by the Arab political
parties are subdued. With regards to minorities and cultural pluralism, a bolstered civic religion may assist in uniting otherwise ethnically and culturally divided Israeli citizens. As the dynamic between Israel and the Jewish diaspora changes, new opportunities for developing Jewish identities outside of Israel emerge. In this way, post-Zionism presents an intriguing intellectual exercise which challenges many preconceived notions about Israel, though has few immediate political consequences. References Ehrlich, Avishai. "Zionism, Anti-Zionism, Post-Zionism." The Challenge of PostZionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics. Ed. Ephraim Nimni. London: Zed, 2003. 63-97. Print. Herzl, Theodor. The Jewish State. New York: Dover Publications, 1988. The Project Gutenberg, 2 May 2008. Web. 1 Dec. 2013. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/25282/ 25282-h/25282-h.htm#I_Introduction>. Kelman, H. C. "Israel in Transition from Zionism to Post-Zionism." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 555.1 (1998): 46-61. Print. Kimmerling, Baruch. The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military. Berkeley: University of California, 2001. Print. Kolter-Berkowitz, Laurence. "Post-Zionism and the Dynamics of American Jewry."Response: A Contemporary Jewish Review 67 (1997): 86-91. Web. Morris, Benny. "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past." Making Israel. Ed. Benny Morris. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007. 11-28. Print. Nimni, Ephraim. "From Galut to T’futsoth: Post-Zionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas." The Challenge of
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39 Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics. Ed. Ephraim Nimni. London: Zed, 2003. 117-152. Print. Nimni, Ephraim. "Introduction." The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamental Politics. Ed. Ephraim Nimni. London: Zed, 2003. 119. Print. Ophir, Adi. "Identity of the Victims and the Victims of Identity: A Critique of Zionist Ideology for a Postzionist Age." Post-Zionism: A Reader. Ed. Laurence J. Silberstein. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008. 81-101. Print. Pappé, Ilan. Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-51. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. Print. Shapira, Anita. "Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the ‘New Historians’ in Israel." History and Memory 7.1 (1995): 9-40. Web. Sharan, Shlomo. "Pluralism, the PostZionists, and Israel as the Jewish Nation." Israel and the Post-Zionists: A Nation at Risk. Ed. Shlomo Sharan. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2003. 22748. Print. Shohat, Ella. “Rupture and Return: Zionist Discourse and the Study of Arab Jews.” Post-Zionism: A Reader. Ed. Laurence J. Silberstein. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008. 233-255. Print. Silberstein, Laurence J. The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print. Silberstein, Laurence J. "Reading Postzionism: An Introduction." PostZionism: A Reader. Ed. Laurence J. Silberstein. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008. 1-30. Print. Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 198-241. Print. Yiftachel, Oren. "Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine." PostZionism: A Reader. Ed. Laurence J.
Silberstein. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2008. 121-147. Print.
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The ImPact of Agency on Democratic Consolidation by Juliette Bronchtein Introduction The literature on the role of agency on democratization focuses on the decisions of various actors and their effects in creating – or failing to create – a successful democratic transition. One of the more compelling arguments made to this effect is that of O’Donnell and Schmitter, who discuss how the process of pacting, the process of reaching negotiated agreements or compromises with regards to power sharing and the protection of other key interests, between political elites can lead them to democratize. This argument, and other related literature, limits its scope to the transitional period from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. However, this paper contends that several of the mechanisms in the argument of pacting are extendable beyond the transitional component of democratization, to a larger process of democratic consolidation. Similarly, the relevant actors in pacting in the context of democratic consolidation can be extended to include not only elite actors but also actors representative of larger social groups. One instructive case study for extending O’Donnell and Schmitter’s framework is Tunisia. Tunisia is the success story of the Arab Uprisings in terms of democratization and is the most recent and relevant case currently for studying democratic consolidation. It allows for detailed observation of the mechanisms of pacting as applied to consolidation. By observing these mechanisms in the Tunisian case, it is possible to extend the scope of pacting and agency theories beyond influence on democratic transition and strengthen their weight as an explanatory variable in the overall study of democratization. The case
of Tunisia is even more instructive when juxtaposed to Egypt. This paper will make the comparison in order to illustrate the positive effects of pacting on democratic consolidation through a cross case comparison of the success of Tunisia, and the failure of Egypt to consolidate their democracy post democratic transitions. Defining Key Concepts Not Transition but Consolidation Contrary to the pre-existing literature on pacting, this argument focuses on democratic consolidation as opposed to democratic transition. Schedler discusses the traditional conceptualization of democratic consolidation as “the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual ‘reverse waves.’” 1 He extends definition by specifying additional and particular tasks.2 Successful democratic consolidation can therefore be identified as the success of political compromise in accomplishing these tasks. He also discusses alternate conceptualizations of consolidation: avoiding democratic breakdown, assuring the continuation of the democratic system into the near future, avoiding reversals of
1 Andreas Schedler. "What is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal Of Democracy 9.2 (1998): 91. 2 As a result, the list of "problems of democratic consolidation" (as well as the corresponding list of "conditions of democratic consolidation") has expanded beyond all recognition. It has come to include such divergent items as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic stabilization. (Schedler 91-92).
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42 the political achievements made in transition.3 Another alternative definition is consolidation as the idea of completing democracy, or moving beyond a diminished subtype and completing a pending transition and removing authoritarian legacies.4 Finally he raises the idea of consolidation as organizing democracy, or “institution-building”, an idea he attributes to Schmitter, and deals with the logistics of creating the appropriate infrastructure for a democracy.5 Empirically these definitions lend themselves to the processes of a) constitution writing, b) holding viable and representative elections absent of the cooptation by incumbents of the prior authoritarian regime, and c) meeting the demands of the newly represented masses on a range of political, economic and societal issues. The observation of pacting in these processes allows for an extension of a theory of agency beyond the specific setting of relinquishing authoritarian control to a democracy, to the actual dynamics of consolidating that viable democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter on Pacts Focusing specifically on the extension of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s argument on pacting as a mechanism of democratization, it is important to identify the extendable aspects of their theory. They define pacting as: “An explicitly but not always publicly explicated or justified agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define or redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of
Ibid., 95. Ibid., 98. 5 Ibid., 100. 3 4
mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.”6 The first critical component of this definition is the concept of a pact as a mutual agreement among a select set of actors. This implies an element of compromise in the negotiations between relevant political groups. However, compromise is not limited to the process of democratic transition; democratic consolidation may also require it in order to prevent reverting to authoritarianism. Another distinction to make in extending the argument to consolidation is that ‘key actors’ is a conveniently vague term. O’Donnell and Schmitter discuss political elites as the primary actors involved in making pacts, which is logical given that the scope of their argument is democratic transition. 7 In transitional arguments pacts occur in the immediately preceding context of a still authoritarian regime, however for an extension to consolidation pacts continue beyond the period of regulation to that of forming a viable government. For an argument on pacting in consolidation, the key actors must also include negotiating groups that represent the masses, which now have a claim to political input in the democratic system. Another critical component of this definition is that, at its core, a pact is “a negotiation by which actors agree to forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each other’s vital interests.” 8 Protecting vital interests is the most extendable concept from transition to consolidation, particularly in the processes 6 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986) 37. 7 Ibid., 4. 8 Ibid., 38.
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43 of writing a Constitution, establishing and holding viable elections, and addressing economic and political demands. Actors differ in their preferred final outcome of all these consolidation processes, for example in what is included in the text of the state’s constitution. Within each actor’s range of interest, certain ones are more important than others. This ranking of preferences and interests leads itself well to the argument of actors’ willingness to compromise on relative power and forego certain interests in order to obtain more important preferred outcomes. In a nod to structuralist arguments O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that pacts most often occur in scenarios where “competing groups are interdependent for their preferred solutions [and] changes in the relations between actors and emergence of new actors impose the necessity of renegotiating.” 9 Where transitions produce political uncertainty or an insufficient level of political support for any one actor in the new system, the context of consolidation is as conducive to the emergence of pacting behavior as a context of transition. Several of these conceptual extensions are empirically demonstrated in the Tunisian case which shows how pacting can be a strong explanatory factor for the success of democratic consolidation and not merely transition, particularly when juxtaposed to Egypt. Case Selection: The case selection of Tunisia as a consolidated democracy requires further explanation. Tunisia has undoubtedly moved past the category of democratic transition, as its politics have moved from the phase of overthrowing the old political order, to the phase of creating a new political order. 10 Still, there are definite obstacles to classifying Tunisia a Ibid. Sami Zemni. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." Mediterranean Politics (2014): 1.
9
10
consolidated democracy; during Ennahda’s brief rule the party experienced assassination of two of its leading politicians, the constitutional drafting process exceeded multiple deadlines, election results were subverted to rule by a technocratic government in the hopes of more expedient completion of the constitution, and overall Tunisians are generally dissatisfied with their own levels of democracy.11 However, it is particularly in comparison to the other democratic transitions of the Arab Uprisings that Tunisia stands out as the consolidating democracy of the MENA region. The Egyptian transition has been effectively subverted by a military cooptation of politics resulting in a regime eerily similar to the previous authoritarian one. 12 The Syrian and Libyan transitions have devolved into chaos and violence. By contrast, Tunisia has avoided civil wars and military coups and “has largely avoided the violence and political chaos that has beset other Arab states [...]. Now the country of 11 million people is to set to more fully embrace democracy with the popular election of an executive just a month after a peaceful ballot selected its first legislature” and has managed to produce “a constitution that is widely seen as unprecedented in the Arab world for its modernity and a Recently, the Transitional Governance Project, a survey research and party capacity-building project I am a part of with Ellen Lust, Dhafer Malouche, Gamal Soltan and Jakob Wichmann, found declining support for democracy in Libya and Tunisia. In two recent polls conducted in Tunisia, we found that between 2012 and 2014, the proportion of Tunisians agreeing or strongly agreeing that democracy is the best form of government fell from 86 percent to 64 percent. Interviews I recently conducted in Algeria also suggested declining support for democracy. Citizens expressed concern about instability, which they perceive as growing in Tunisia and Libya.’ (Benstead) 12 "Egypt: Abdul Fattah al-Sisi profile." BBC News Middle East. BBC. 11
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44 legislature in which no single political stream is clearly dominant,” passed in January of 2014.13 Since Ben Ali’s departure Tunisia can be easily situated in the literature on consolidation based on its engagement of the legal and technical process of institution building. This process has aimed to create a new political system beyond the mere institutionalization of revolutionary demands. 14 This classification references Schedler’s discussion of consolidation as the organization of democracy. With presidential run offs scheduled for one month from the time of writing, the process of democratic consolidation is classifiable as in-progress. Still the unique dynamics and structure of Tunisian politics 15 are Tamer El-Ghobashy. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal. 14 Sami Zemni. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." 2. 15 The agreement on the type of executive power has also been complex. Ennahda insisted on a parliamentary system while the opposition parties proposed a presidential one. Finally, a semipresidential government system has been introduced in the Constitution. The executive power is shared between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The President of the Republic will be elected by universal suffrage for a term of 5 years, although his power is not very strong. The government is responsible to the Parliament at the time of its formation. The government can also be dismissed by a constructive motion of no-confidence that entails the approval of another Prime Minister.’ (Szmolka 133)… political groups agreed to a closed and blocked list system of proportional representation (Decree number 35, May 10, 2011, concerning the election of the National Constituent Assembly). They have chosen an aseptic criterion as regards the demarcation of constituencies. So, administrative divisions were used as constituencies (27 districts corresponding to 24 governorates) as well as six additional districts for voters abroad. Apportionment criteria took into account population and administrative divisions, intentionally over-representing divisions with fewer residents. As far as the lists of candidates were concerned, equality between the sexes was guaranteed by means of “zipper lists,” (139). 13
conducive to the framework of O’Donnell and Schmitter because of the degree of party interdependence it generates. It is therefore suitable to extend their argument on the impact of pact-making from transition to consolidation, particularly when examined in comparison to less successful consolidation in Egypt. Pacting and Consolidation in Tunisia Arguments about pacting and consolidation are founded on identifying the relevant actors. In order to extend the pacting argument from transition to consolidation, the key actors will necessarily exceed the elite groups traditionally considered. O’Donnell and Schmitter reference incumbents of the authoritarian regime, the military and economic elites. 16 However, consolidation assumes that the system is more representative of the masses than was the prior authoritarian regime. Therefore the groups involved in pacting should be representative of the interests of the masses and not just elites. While the actors in this argument are different than those in the argument by O’Donnell and Schmitter, they are still able to engage in similar patterns of behaviour. In Tunisia, the actors involved in building pacts do in fact differ from the traditional set of elites. The military and economic elites are noticeably removed from the pacting process. This is by virtue of their political non-involvement, or because they took on a more benign role, siding with the political and economic masses respectively. 17 Rather, the most Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 38. 17 The National Bar Association, the Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts and the The Tunisian Human Rights League are 3 additional groups who have joined what is known as the ‘Quartet’ Mediating banner, created the roadmap in September of 2013 for a new electoral law, constitution, appointment of prime minister and cabinet, and spearheading a national dialogue 16
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45 relevant political actors are the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), Al Nahda (Ennahda), and Nidaa Tounes. Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes are the two main political actors in the new regime, and their interests are most at odds with one another based primarily on party ideology. Ennahda is an Islamist political party, which saw enormous success in the first post-transition elections. However this success was largely conditional on its successful coalition building with two parties – Congress for the Republic and Democratic Alliance for Work and Freedoms – to forms the ‘Troika’ which won 41% of parliament seats. 18 Nidaa Tounes is a secular party, or a self-defined ‘modernist party’, which rejects the systemization of Islam as “alien to the Tunisian national character.” 19 It is composed largely of old regime political elites, whose primary goal remains to defeat Ennahda at the polls. As a result it has also engaged in extensive coalition building with a number of parties to build a stronger political base. 20 The UGTT has refrained from political association to a party, but remains highly active in politics 21 and affected the political and consolidation process to a large extent. The process. However these movements, and the formation of the Quartet were all spearheaded by the UGTT and so it is a suitable representative indicator of societal interests, particularly given the unanimity in action of these 4 groups (Tavana 8). 18 Alaya Allani. “The Post-Revolution Tunisian Constituent Assembly: Controversy Over Powers and Prerogatives.” The Journal of North African Studies 18.1, (2012): 133. Monica Marks and Omar Belhaj Salah. “Uniting for Tunisia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2013. 21 The UGTT called a general strike during the period of political turmoil under Ennahda rule, spearheaded the formation of the Quartet as political mediators, created the adhered to roadmap for the Constitutional and electoral process, has Union leaders involved in party politics and all democratic negotiations (Tavana 2 and 9). 20
UGTT plays the pivotal role of extending the pacting argument from transition to consolidation by way of including the masses because citizen’s conceptualize it as the “guarantor of the revolution” and the manner in which they “have held unusual sway in moderating between the dominant forces in the nation.”22 The form of pacts has typically fallen into three larger trends in Tunisia: coalition building, power-ceding, and Constitutional concessions. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive but are distinct enough to merit discussion independently. These instances of pacting have contributed to the ability to avoid similar fates as the transitions of its Arab neighbors and resulted in more successful consolidation. Coalition Building in Political Parties The structure of the Tunisian political system is such that it is highly improbable impossible for a single party to gain a majority in the government institutions. This ties into the conditions of interdependence cited by O’Donnell and Schmitter as conducive to pact-building.23 The political scene in Tunisia can be characterized as made of “fragmented, pluralistic and conflicting forces.” 24 Both of the major political actors lack the necessary voter constituency to command a legislative majority alone. This has generated extensive coalition-building practices by both. Coalition building necessarily involves compromise with the implicated smaller parties in order to protect key interests when entering into a power sharing agreement. Coalition building should therefore be treated as a Tamer El-Ghobashy. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal. 23 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 38. 24 Sami Zemni. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." 2. 22
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46 form of pacting. Ennahda and its engagement of parties to form the Troika required a tacit agreement “to accept certain reforms in exchange for sharing government power.”25 The platform of the coalition tried to adopt a conciliatory and unified approach inclusive of minority member preferences, implementing some of its recommendations, such as those on appointments to the Central Bank.26 These political moves closely parallel some of the possible agreements discussed by O’Donnell and Schmitter. For Nidaa Tounes, its goal of defeating Ennahda in election was a powerful incentive to compromise and form a sizeable enough coalition to present an effective challenge to the Islamist party. Along with four other parties, Nida Tounes created the “Union for Tunisia.” 27 Although Nida Tounes withdrew from the coalition prior to the 2014 elections to run its own list of candidates, it showed a demonstrable willingness to compromise and negotiate when it appeared to lack the necessary electoral base to achieve its key interest of defeating Ennahda. Moreover, Nidaa Tounes itself is a coalition party, comprised of old regime politicians and leftist politicians who share an interest in preventing the rise of an Islamist political system. 28 This experience with internal compromise may explain the heightened ability to compromise with other parties. With the secularist party winning the largest bloc in the legislature, but still lacking a clear majority in the parliament Nidaa Tounes again will have to enter coalitions to pass legislation going forward. Its past participation in coalition parties
may explain the optimism in Tunisia that the parties will be able to avoid ideological polarization such as is seen in Egypt in order to achieve a key interest of effective governance and continued political support. 29 Tunisia’s main political party actors have proven more capable of engaging in pacting as coalition building, thus avoiding legislative standstills that preclude meaningful or effective governance. In contrast, the main postrevolution political actor in Egypt was the Muslim Brotherhood, a party that had long been exiled and excluded from any political involvement. In the elections immediately following the revolution, it attempted to build a coalition on a large scale by forming the Democratic Alliance with well over 40 parties. Less than four months later only 11 of the original parties remained.30 What is notably different from the failure of Nidaa Tounes to remain in the Union for Tunisia is that, as opposed to the one party unilaterally withdrawing on the basis of its demonstrated political support in exit polls,31 in Egypt almost all the parties broke away leading the coalition to crumble as opposed to merely losing one key partner. Nidaa Tounes seems better positioned to re-engage in coalition building and compromise when it sees it as necessary for obtaining its political goals and protecting its interests as O’Donnell and Schmitter would suggest. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seems unable to hold the support of any of its coalition partners and there is no indication that this will change in the near future. Conceding Power to Protect Interests
Alaya Allani. “The Post-Revolution Tunisian Constituent Assembly: Controversy Over Powers and Prerogatives.” 134. 26 Ibid. 27 Monica Marks and Omar Belhaj Salah. “Uniting for Tunisia.” 28 Tamer El-Ghobashy. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal. 25
Ibid. Wickham, Carrie R. Wickham. The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) 249. 31 Tamer El-Ghobashy. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal. 29 30
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47 The next major incident of pacting followed Ennahda’s electoral victory in 2011 when it ceded power to a technocratic government in the face of widespread discontent. The party faced a period of difficult governance signaled by tense relationships, lack of dialogue with Nidaa Tounes and the UGTT, and several other instances of political turbulence. Ensuing this difficult period, societal discontent with Ennahda’s governance peaked with the formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF). This group was another example of Tunisian coalition building tendency and united with the purpose of dissolving Islamist governance in Tunisia.32 While the NSF was composed of the Union for Tunisia and several other political parties. it was the UGTT who took the lead as the representative of societal interest. In July, the NSF issued a strong and detailed condemnation of the country’s elected Constituent Assembly (NCA) and demanded a) the continuation of work towards a Constitution under the supervision of experts and b) a shift to technocratic government to oversee the process, in addition to a proposed roadmap for achieving these stated goals. 33 This conflicted with Ennahda, who had previously taken the position that it was willing to discuss all solutions to discontent except for the dissolution of the NCA because maintaining the institution’s legitimacy was a key interest for them. The months following the original proposal saw the development of a political dialogue among the country’s major political actors: Ennahda’s leading politician Mohamed Gannouchi, UGTT Secretary General Houcine Abassi, the president of the Constituent Assembly Mustapha Ben
Laura Guazzone. "Ennahda Islamists and the Test of Government in Tunisia." The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 48.4 (2013): 37-41. 33 Ibid., 41.
Jafaar among others. 34 By September the demand for the dissolution of the NCA had been abandoned, and Ennahda had accepted the UGTT’s political roadmap. 35 This signaled a willingness by Ennahda to “under certain conditions […] forgo its dominance in the government in order to save the transition from failure.”36 The accomplishment of Ennahda and Tunisia is the use of compromise to mitigate the effects of failed governance towards a total breakdown of the democratic process. Ennahda’s preference for consensus and democratic bargaining was compatible with the demands of political pluralism in Tunisian society and this has managed to “guarantee a certain degree of stability for the political transition process and the country’s institutions […] Ennahda has been able to contribute positively to the Tunisian transition process thanks to its […] political moderation.” 37 By accepting a reduced role in government, they were able to protect a key interest of sustaining the Constitution writing process, which, as later discussed was essential to their larger ideological goals of somewhat institutionalized Sharia. This ties back into the aspect of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s argument on pacting that discusses a willingness to sacrifice political power in order to maintain vital interests. This is an extraordinary feat compared to the situation in Egypt where ineffective governance by Morsi led to comparable levels of discontent. The difference in outcome of Tunisian democratic consolidation as outlined above, and the quasi-military coup in Egypt can be related directly to the success or failure of pacting respectively. Ennahda pursued a more conciliatory and inclusive governing strategy than the Freedom and Justice Party
32
Ibid. Ibid. 36 Ibid., 42. 37 Ibid., 48. 34 35
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48 (FJP) in Egypt. They included ministers and other representatives from government parties skeptical of Sharia, the constitution, and the party’s legislation. They also governed with awareness of secular demands, whereas the FJP governed in a way that suggested its primary goal was to “consolidate power and to undermine checks on its authority, which in turn alienated opposition parties as well as many Egyptians.” 38 The overwhelming concentration of executive power granted to Morsi precluded the transitional period of compromise on Constitutional principles and governmental organization found in the Tunisian case. 39 Finally, the military’s reinsertion into politics subverted the democratic process in Egypt, to the extent that Egypt has experienced exactly the type of breakdown Schedler states is necessary to avoid in order to successfully consolidate. Compromise in Constitution Drafting Schedler’s alternate discussion of Democratic Organization as a process of consolidation, defined in an earlier section, is most visible in the Constitutional drafting process of Tunisia. The drafting process was marked by a high level of compromise that can be accurately classified as pacting. Compromise in Constitution writing came in two main stages: procedural and substantive. First, the various actors had to establish an agreed upon, fair, constitution writing assembly. Next, they engaged in the challenge of attempting to maintain certain key interests to be realized in the Constitution. It is largely the willingness to compromise on certain articles or phrasings of the document, as well as patience with the process, which led to the John M. Carey. “Why Tunisia Remains the Arab Spring’s Best Bet.” Dartmouth College and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Sept 2013, p. 2-3. 39 Ibid., 3. 38
accomplishment of an Constitution amenable to the major parties involved. The Constituent Assembly was created by the Tunisian High Authority 40 who opted for a system of proportional representation because: “the main objective of this Constituent Assembly was to prepare a new constitution and therefore choosing proportional representation seemed an obvious way to endure a body that would be representative of all political formations within the country. This is a ‘risk averse’ model of constitutionalism where the goal is more to prevent a democratic breakdown than to design an idealized end state.”41 Despite disagreement in this stage on the substance of the constitution, the key stakeholders in the process, including the citizens, were involved in creating the procedural framework.42 The outcome was therefore representative of and accepted by ‘The High Authority was created to organize the shift from revolution to elections. As the government feared the growing instability within the country and the still growing revolutionary legitimacy of street politics, it installed the new institution through the fusion of two institutions created before: on the one hand, the ‘Committee for political reform’ – constituted solely by legal experts with the aim to reform the constitution – created hastily by prime minister Mohammed Ghannouchi a day after Ben Ali’s disappearance and, on the other hand, the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (CNPR), created by opposition groups in February. With the creation of the High Authority, the government opened the way for a more pronounced break with the past, but, at the same time, tried to control this process by bringing the revolutionary legitimacy of mass mobilization from the streets into the more controllable environment of commissions and dialogue platforms’ (Zemni, 7). 41 Sami Zemni. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." 8. 42 Ibid., 15. 40
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49 the pluralist range of interest in Tunisian politics and society. The most controversial substantive aspects of the constitution were the place of Islam in the state and the organization of the electoral system. The debates and negotiated outcomes related to these issues are important examples of pacting in practice. Ennahda preferred a parliamentary electoral system, while the opposition parties were committed to a presidential one. The outcome was a compromise: a semi-presidential system with agreed upon closed and blocked list system of proportional representation.43 On the issue of religion, Ennahda proposed and later renounced clauses on sharia as the sole source of legislation, and inclusion of blasphemy as a crime. As a result, Article 141 of the Constitution recognizes Islam as the official religion of the State but the mention of Sharia is absent from the document. This came at the expense of extremist support but garnered a wider range of support for the government as a whole and has allowed a continued albeit limited place for Islam in the country’s Constitution despite the preference of secular parties for its total exclusion. 44 Although the Constitutional process was protracted, it is possible to classify it as a success given its approval in January. The clauses appear amenable to the majority of relevant political actors and it has served as the basis for what appear to be a successful electoral process. Again the remarkable contribution of pacting to successful consolidation is evident when comparing the constitutional process of Tunisia against that of Egypt. The constitution writing process in Egypt Inmaculada Szmolka. "Political Change in North Africa and the Arab Middle East: Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Processes." 135-140. 44 Laura Guazzone. "Ennahda Islamists and the Test of Government in Tunisia." 39. 43
began in December of 2012 and was suspended by the army less than a year later in July whereas Tunisia’s constitution was completed a month prior to the Egyptian failure and was ratified in January of 2014. 45 In Egypt there were disagreements over the composition of the Constituent Assembly because of the absolute majority of Islamists, whereas Tunisia was able to progress beyond disagreements of framework and focus on compromising on particular voting articles. 46 The inability of the Egyptian Constituent Assembly to compromise and come to an agreement on electoral laws led to the dissolution of the People’s assembly and a unilaterally drawn regulated electoral system created by the SCAF in a manner than grants the executive – a position now held by another military general – considerable centralized power for extended terms. 47 The resulting electoral system thus lends itself to a likely reversal to sustained authoritarian rule by a military leader with concerning similarities to the prior regime. 48 The compromises made in Tunisia have resulted in an organization of politics that appears to be more truly democratic in form.49 Based on the comparison of these cases it is probable that pacting lends itself to a smoother and more sustainable process of Constitution writing, a more successful process of Democratic Organization and of avoiding Democratic Reversals, and overall positively contributes to democratic consolidation. This is consistent with the outcome of pacting predicted by O’Donnell Inmaculada Szmolka. "Political Change in North Africa and the Arab Middle East: Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Processes." 135. 46 Ibid., 132. 47 Ibid., 139-140. 48 "Egypt: Abdul Fattah al-Sisi profile." BBC News Middle East. BBC. 49 Tamer El-Ghobashy. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal. 45
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50 and Schmitter, further reinforcing the argument that the pacting model can be transfused from transition to consolidation.
compromise proposes a strong possible explanatory role for pacting, The difference has been widely attributed to different level of professionalization and resulting involvement in politics of the military in Conclusion The Tunisian case illustrates, in a each country. While this is a compelling preliminary manner, the possibility of argument, the differences in the party extending arguments about the role of elite building, power-sharing and constitution pacts on democratic transition, to a larger writing processes of the two countries are argument of general pacting on democratic equally interesting and important. The consolidation. However, unlike O’Donnell presence of compromise, classifiable as and Schmitter’s argument – which pacting in each instance, seems to explain contends that pacting may actually the variation in these processes and merits circumvent democracy because the power- attention as a possible causal variable of sharing and interest protection of elites successful consolidation. This attention is limits the representativeness of wider particularly necessary given the possibility publics50 – this argument holds that pacting it holds for extending the scope of an with key actors, representative of a important theory in the literature on agency plurality of political interests and of society, and democratization. results in a better process of democratic consolidation. The identified mechanisms References of pacting may have entirely different effects on transition than on consolidation Allani, Alaya. "The Post-Revolution contingent on which groups are represented Tunisian Constituent Assembly: in the pact-making process. In a political Controversy Over Powers and context which has progressed beyond Prerogatives." The Journal of North authoritarianism and necessarily represents African Studies 18.1 (2012): 131-40. the preferences of the masses, not just JSTOR. Web. 11 Oct. 2014. elites, pacting can be effective in protecting Benstead, Lindsay, Ellen Lust, Dhafer key interests of all relevant actors. This can Malouche, and Jakob Wichmann. mitigate political conflicts, which increase "The Tunisian Elections: Hope in the risk of a reversion to authoritarianism Uncertain Times." The Washington or other forms of democratic breakdown. Post: The Monkey Cage 27 Oct. 2014. The contrast is visible in the comparison of Web. 15 Dec. 2014. Tunisia and Egypt, two cases that <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blo successfully transitioned from gs/monkeycage/wp/2014/10/27/tunisianauthoritarianism via revolutionary elections-bring-hope-in-uncertainoverthrow of the respective dictators but times/>. vary drastically in the outcome of their Carey, John M. "Why Tunisia Remains attempts to consolidate. the Arab Spring's Best Bet." There have been compelling Dartmouth College and the suggested alternative explanations for the International Institute for Strategic different outcomes in consolidation of Studies. London . Sept. 2013. Web. democracy in Tunisia and Egypt; however, 11 Oct. 2014. the stark difference in willingness to "Egypt: Abdul Fattah al-Sisi profile." BBC News Middle East. BBC , 16 50 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. May 2014. Web. 15 Dec. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 38. McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
51 2014.<http://www.bbc.com/news/wor ld-middle-east-19256730>. El-Ghobashy, Tamer. "Tunisia Holds First Presidential Vote Since Arab Spring." The Wall Street Journal 21 Nov. 2014. Google Scholar. Web. 11 Dec. 2014. Guazzone, Laura. "Ennahda Islamists and the Test of Government in Tunisia." The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 48.4 (2013): 30-50. Taylor and Francis Online. Web. 11 Oct. 2014. Marks, Monica and Omar Belhaj Salah. “Uniting for Tunisia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 March 2013. Web. 11 Dec, 2014. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Phillipe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. All, pp. 378. Schedler, Andreas. "What is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal Of Democracy 9.2 (1998): 91-107. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. Szmolka, Inmaculada. "Political Change in North Africa and the Arab Middle East: Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Processes." Arab Studies Quarterly 36.2 (2014): 128-48. JSTOR. Web. 11 Oct. 2014. Tavana, Daniel, and Alex Russel. "Tunisia's Parliamentary and Presidential Elections." Project on Middle East Democracy (2014): 1-31. Web. 15 Dec. 2014. <http://pomed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/TunisiaElection-Guide-2014.pdf>. Wickham, Carrie R. The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Web. 11 Dec. 2014.
Zemni, Sami. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." Mediterranean Politics (2014): 1-15. Taylor and Francis Online. Web. 11 Oct. 2014.
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The Failure of Consociationalism and the Fragile Political Scene in Lebanon by Ryan Plano Carved out of the French League of Nations Mandate at the conclusion of World War I, Lebanon as we know it today is a diverse country that has attracted the attention of political scientists for generations. It has experienced a turbulent history since it became independent in the middle of the 20th century, and its approach to power-sharing among its various ethnoreligious groups has generated a multitude of literature. This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of why powersharing has been so problematic in Lebanon and why the country currently finds itself with little more than the skeleton of a state. In doing so, I explain two central, and interrelated, outcomes: the failure of consociationalism, and the current uncertainty of governance in Lebanon. The first outcome is important because it demonstrates the weaknesses and limited applicability of a prominent model of power-sharing, which has implications for the efficacy of such arrangements more broadly and for the future political trajectory of Lebanon. The second outcome is important because most scholars and observers would agree that Lebanon’s extremely weak state apparatus is a serious cause for concern, both for the Lebanese people, and for the region’s stability as a whole as various outside forces compete to use Lebanon to achieve their goals. It is not unreasonable to fear that the longer the state remains weak, the more difficult it will be to remedy. In explaining these outcomes, this paper primarily utilizes the framework articulated by Michael Hudson, who has a different take on the prevailing pro-
consociationalism discourse that was spurred by the work of Arend Lijphart nearly four decades ago. Hudson argues that consociationalism has been more of a problem than an advantage for Lebanon for various reasons, while Liijphart assumes that consociationalism is a good fit for Lebanon. Although Hudson’s approach is generally quite convincing, I will draw upon the work of others in this paper to provide a strengthened counter to Lijphart’s assumption. Moreover, I argue that the failure of consociationalism and the resulting fragile state are best explained by four factors: the inherent flaws of Lijphart’s consociationalism, the failure of the Lebanese case to successfully incorporate even the promising elements of the consociational model, the neglected development of a national identity since independence, and the uniquely damaging role of external forces. Consideration of Existing Literature This paper will begin with a consideration of existing literature, with attention to the primary strengths and weaknesses of the approaches offered. Much has been written on the subject of power-sharing since Arend Lijphart first proposed his model, and several of these later contributions offer a useful take on why Lebanon has found itself it such dire straits. Specifically, I will address articles by Michael Hudson, Professor and Director of the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore; Lise Morjé Howard, Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University; Ian O’Flynn, Senior Lecturer of Political Philosophy at Newcastle University; Massimo Di Ricco, freelance journalist and Professor at Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Andrew Rigby, Professor at the Center for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University; and Boaz Atzili, Associate Professor at the American University School of International Service.
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54 I strove to examine a variety of perspectives from scholars in various subfields. It only makes sense to begin my argument with Lijphart’s seminal 1977 work. I will be assessing relevant parts of his book Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. While it is an interesting and useful source on politics in plural societies, it is problematic in many respects, and I find the approaches of others to be more helpful in the case of Lebanon. Lijphart begins his book by outlining the four elements of consociationalism: a grand coalition of “all significant segments of the plural society;” the principle of mutual veto or a similar minority-protective mechanism; proportionality as the primary basis for political representation, bureaucratic appointments, and public funds allocation, and a “high degree of autonomy for each segments to run its own internal affairs.” 1 He acknowledges that such a system may not be the ideal for many countries, but he argues that it is nevertheless the “best kind of democracy” that can be expected.2 In an attempt to be pragmatic, he raises a disconcerting implication: is it acceptable to assume that certain countries simply cannot have as strong of a democracy as the Western European ideal that he discusses at length? His focus on the success of Western cases of consociationalism seems to come at the expense of a full consideration of the appropriateness of the model in other countries. In his assessment of Lebanon, Lijphart claims that it is “concrete evidence” that consociationalism can work in the “Third World.”3 Given that the only other success story he cites is Malaysia, 4 which is a contested case itself, it is
problematic to claim that the model can definitely work in developing countries as a whole. Lijphart’s failure to consider the vast diversity among these states limits the robustness and applicability of his model. A final feature worth noting here is the degree to which Lijphart believes segmental autonomy should exist in a plural society. He asserts that sharp cleavage lines encourage the organization of politics along appropriately segmental lines. 5 In addition to assuming that segmental political organization is necessarily preferable in all plural societies, Lijphart’s claim risks condemning Lebanon to a feeble democracy in which groups remain isolated. This is not only ethically questionable, but it contradicts his assumption that a transition to democracy from consociationalism is generally easy. 6 While this paper will return to Lijphart throughout, it is usually in opposition to his model and his perspective on Lebanon in particular. On the other hand, Michael Hudson takes a quite different approach from Lijphart. While consociationalism works well in Lebanon according to Lijphart, Hudson believes that it has prevented the state from addressing serious socio-economic and ideological challenges.7 Indeed, one can make the case that Lebanese leaders have routinely been more interested in retaining their share of political power rather than in reducing economic inequality, lowering unemployment rates, and moderating ideologues on the extremes. Hudson argues that consociationalism is not a model that can be applied to every plural society, as advocates of consociationalism often
1
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25. 2 Ibid., 48. 3 Ibid.,153. 4 Ibid.
5
Ibid.,169. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 52. 7 Michael Hudson, Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 229. 6
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55 suggest. 8 Lijphart would likely argue that the conditions could be changed in Lebanon to allow his model to fit better. Hudson, however, implies that it would be preferable to consider ways in which the model can be tweaked in order to fit Lebanon. This seems like a better approach; states are complex and altering models for states may be more feasible and less problematic than the other way around. Unfortunately, Hudson fails to fully address this possibility in the Lebanese case, which would have been an interesting addition. Yet, he does suggest that Lebanon shows the need to continually develop powersharing models rather than rely on old ones. He writes that consociationalism in particular may “actually have exacerbated divisions and hastened the collapse” of any kind of effective state. 9 For Hudson, consociationalism is flawed because it fails to balance the desire for an autonomous state with the need for a strong state. In Lebanon, this has led to Maronites coopting the state to be an instrument of perpetual dominance. It is clear that Hudson has a very different view on consociationalism than Lijphart, and his piece persuasively argues that flaws in the model have played a major role in the failure of consociationalism and resultant instability in Lebanon. While Hudson sees consociationalism as universally problematic, Lise Howard believes that success under the model is not impossible, just unlikely. She argues that true consociationalism is really only achievable in societies in which there are sufficient cross-cutting cleavages. 10 It is no surprise, then, that Lebanon’s attempt at consociational governance failed. By far the most important cleavage in Lebanon is 8 Hudson, Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, 232. 9 Ibid., 233. 10 Lise Morjé Howard, “The Ethnocracy Trap”, Journal of Democracy 23.4 (2012): 158.
religious sect. This shortcoming demonstrates a major flaw of Lijphart’s model in scope: it does not apply to nearly as many countries as he claims. Howard sees Lebanon more as a case of what she calls “ethnocracy,” a political system in which “political and social organizations are founded on ethnic belonging rather than individual choice.”11 Indeed, Lebanese find it difficult to hold identities that are more complex than one-dimensional labels like “Shi’a” or “Maronite”. Howard also discusses the problem of placing too much emphasis on group rights in plural societies. She reminds us that once such a principle becomes institutionalized in a constitution, as was the case in Lebanon, it becomes “very difficult to banish.” 12 This highlights the danger of path dependency in political development – established ways of doing things become difficult to change over time – but it is important to not overstate this. As the Arab uprisings demonstrate, radical change is rarely expected but, nevertheless possible. More broadly, her concern over the institutionalization of group rights, a necessary feature of Lijphart’s model, is valid in that it may hinder future attempts at democratic consolidation, a process that many scholars believe requires a privileging of individual rights. Howard’s piece helps reveal some of the flaws in the Lijphart’s model and shows how Lebanon’s attempt to institute and maintain consociationalism has reverted it to its less attractive relative, ethnocracy. In his 2010 article, Ian O’Flynn focuses on a particular flaw of consociationalism. He argues that the model proposed by Lijphart requires engineering by ethnic leaders, which creates too rigid of a system. For him, predetermination of ethnic accommodation means that some groups will be privileged
11 12
Ibid., 155. Ibid.,165.
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56 over others, which offends the important principle of “political equality.”13 This is a point worth highlighting; deciding with certainty from the beginning which groups will be part of the power-sharing arrangement seems to set up the system to fail. In Lebanon, changing demographics meant that the system initially put in place became obsolete rather quickly. As an alternative, he suggests a system in which groups can emerge more spontaneously and in which the agreement among groups prevents the dominance of any one group.14 This is an attractive idea that would likely go a long way in containing ethnic tensions in countries that are considering what type of power-sharing arrangement to pursue. However, O’Flynn fails to adequately address the practicality of reforming systems that are already pre-determined, like in Lebanon. Is it feasible to change such an arrangement after it has become established? While O’Flynn does not provide all the answers, his piece helps to clarify a major failure in Lijphart’s model and show how Lebanon has failed to maintain a power-sharing arrangement. Massimo Di Ricco’s article addresses the failure of Lebanon to ensure that its people are able to profess identities other than religious ones in the political arena. He stresses the importance of looking at intragroup dynamics, rather than painting over them in favor of a group-level view, as has occurred in Lebanon. 15 Whether this is a failure of the model or just a failure of Lebanon is unclear, but this remains a significant cause of Lebanon’s failure to successfully incorporate consociationalism and of its current situation of political instability. But what 13 Ian O’Flynn, “Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies”, Representation 46.3 (2010): 286. 14 Ibid., 285. 15 Massimo Di Ricco, “Communal Individuals, Secular Identity and Sectarian Games: Sheikh Naboulsi’s Fatwa and the Quest for a Lebanese Extended Citizenship”, Ethnopolitics 10.1 (2011): 78.
accounts for this failure? According to Di Ricco, the Lebanese state lacks adequate power to prevent one-dimensional identity formation, 16 but it is difficult to draw the line between state and group autonomy. Certainly, each country must be considered its own case, which Lijphart’s model does not easily accommodate. Di Ricco reminds us that it will be difficult to reform the Lebanese system, but that the main challenge will be “to combine within the same system the maintaining of collective forms of expression and the creation at the same time of a political sphere where individuals can express themselves just as individuals,”17 echoing Howard. One major issue with Di Ricco’s analysis is his lack of attention to the practicality of instituting a favorable balance between group and individual expression in Lebanon. Nevertheless, his article is a useful contribution in developing an understanding of why Lebanon finds itself in such an unfortunate political situation. While most authors focus on internal dynamics in explaining outcomes in Lebanon, Andrew Rigby emphasizes the important role played by external forces. He argues that since Lebanon was carved out of the French Mandate, outside forces have had a significant contributory role in the near-failure of the Lebanese state. Specifically, “nearly half of the population was deeply resentful of its arbitrary incorporation in a Christian dominated state” as a result of French oversight. 18 Rigby usefully ties together several concepts; for him, the failure of the state has been the result of a failure “by political elites to reform a rigid political system” when confronted by domestic and external pressures. 19 This echoes the sentiment of O’Flynn, with the helpful additional 16
Ibid., 86. Ibid., 90. Andrew Rigby, “Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics”, Parliamentary Affairs 53.1 (2000): 170. 19 Ibid., 172. 17 18
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57 consideration of outside forces. Rigby argues that unless external situations change, it will be very difficult for Lebanon to improve its political system, and thus recover from its current condition.20 Indeed, I think external developments are uniquely important in Lebanon, and Rigby is right to bring this into the discourse, highlighting the need for regional stability. At the same time, we should not overstate the influence of external forces, which risks condemning states in rough neighborhoods to continued political dislocation. Finally, Boaz Atzili adds to the discussion started by Rigby. He begins his discussion with a consideration of domestic issues, then focuses on the role of external forces. He argues that the Lebanese bureaucracy “appears to be modern, centralized, and rational” but in reality directly reflects a “traditional, feudal, and fractured society.” 21 This is an interesting contribution because it focuses on the bureaucracy as a whole, rather than just leaders. Atzili sees the problem with Lebanon’s political arrangement as one that runs deeper than the elite level. But the bulk of his article addresses the external forces with which Lebanon must contend. His article implies a vicious cycle in Lebanon: consociationalism perpetuates sectarian identity, which contributes to a weak state, which allows outside groups to hold considerable influence in domestic affairs, which in turn keeps the state weak and promotes continued sectarianism because most of these groups operate along sectarian lines. For Atzili, the central problem is that consociationalism in Lebanon, while allowing for political compromise, perpetuates the country’s sectarian issues. 22 In summary, Atzili’s article is a fresh take on the various factors 20
Ibid., 180. Atzili, Boaz, ‘State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33.8 (2010): 762. 22 Ibid. 21
which have led to Lebanese power-sharing and state failure. Overview of Outcomes Before directly addressing the processes behind the failure of consociationalism and resulting volatile state in Lebanon, it is prudent to first briefly outline the outcomes themselves. Regarding the first outcome, there are numerous instances that demonstrate how consociationalism has failed in Lebanon. It should be noted that a complete failure is not necessary for the model to be determined unsuccessful in a country. If there are serious mishaps, the arrangement as a whole suffers greatly, especially if the goal is first and foremost stability, as Lijphart argues. 23 One instance of the failure of consociationalism in Lebanon is the fact that due to the weakness of the state, its “fate is constantly determined by surrounding regional circumstances.” 24 This is, of course, not conducive to stability, nor is it particularly sustainable. Another component is the perpetual polarization of communal groups, 25 which only serves to reinforce sectarianism, rather than help to work towards a more inclusive and functional democracy. A third aspect of consociationalism’s failure in Lebanon is how difficult it has become to reformulate the system. Contrary to Lijphart’s claim that transition to consolidated democracy would be relatively simple,26 reality tells us that such a change would likely require major political unrest, if not another civil war.27 More specifically, it is quite clear that historical junctures in Lebanon have 23
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 150. 24 Imad Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (New York: Routledge, 2014), 12. 25 Ibid. 26 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 52. 27 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 12.
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58 demonstrated the failure of consociationalism. After clashing with the de Gualle government over the speed of independence, Lebanese rejoiced when the last French troops finally exited in 1946.28 With the formation of the unwritten National Pact and subsequent constitution in 1943, consociationalism was officially established in Lebanon, with top leadership positions reserved for certain communities, and the parliament seats allotted along sectarian lines. Hailed at the time as a genius solution to a primordial problem, the “shortcomings of consociationalism would resurface in later years.” 29 Indeed, by the late 1950s, just over ten years after consociationalism was instituted, disagreements among sectarian groups exploded as violence spread across Beirut. 30 Sectarianism continued to dominate Lebanese politics throughout the 60s and early 70s, exacerbated by rapid urbanization of Muslims to Beirut and an influx of Palestinian refugees. 31 When a failed assassination attempt on Christian political leader Pierre Gemayel nevertheless killed two Christian militiamen, a series of reprisals laid the foundation for a devastating, 15-year civil war.32 Lebanon’s 1958 strife and 19751990 civil war is evidence enough of the failure of consociationalism, but it is also important to review more recent events, which have culminated in the second, and related, outcome: the current situation of extreme political instability in Lebanon. In late 1989, with external mediation, Lebanese leaders reached an agreement to end the war, dubbed the Taif Agreement after the Saudi city in which it was
28
Ibid., 30. Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 31. 30 Ibid., 35. 31 Ibid., 40. 32 Ibid., 41. 29
debated. 33 The Agreement “reconfigured the political power-sharing formula that formed the basis of government in Lebanon.”34 In the next 18 years, Lebanon saw multiple alternations in power and impressive infrastructural recovery, notably under Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. However, when Hariri was assassinated in 2005, it was clear that the period of relative stability was coming to an end.35 The Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 2006 only served to further intensify communal conflict, including a government crisis marked by resignations and a de facto closure of Parliament for several months.36 As the country teetered on the verge of civil war again in 2008, renewed Arab mediation efforts produced the Doha Agreement, demanding the immediate formation of a new government and modifications to electoral law.37 While tensions were largely diffused, and the government was able to function again, the result was “consolidated sectarianism.” 38 As time went on, the Lebanese state “became notorious for its inability to implement policies that promoted progress and prevented deterioration.” 39 A short-lived government under Saad Hariri, Rafik’s second son, collapsed in 2011 when opposition ministers resigned en masse from parliament while Hariri was visiting President Obama in Washington, 40 signaling the end of the latest ‘Doha’ republic in Lebanon. These historical 33
Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner, “Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon”, Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies 11 (2009): 3. 34 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 57. 35 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 59. 36 Makdisi and Marktanner, “Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon”, 4, 37 ibid., 5. 38 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 75. 39 Ibid., 77. 40 Ibid., 79.
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59 junctures demonstrate that the two outcomes explained in this paper, the failure of consociationalism and its current highly unstable situation, have become realities for Lebanon. The next section will analyze in detail the factors which have led to these calamitous outcomes. Processes Behind the Outcomes In reviewing existing literature, this paper has already begun to explain the outcomes. This section seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the four major factors that contributed to the failure of consociationalism and resultant political uncertainty in Lebanon. Flaws in the Consociational Model The first factor, and one of the most significant, is the failure of the model of consociationalism proposed by Lijphart and supported by many since. One flaw in the model lies in the assumption that identities in plural societies are immutable and therefore require a power-sharing arrangement in which such identities are dominant or at least important. As Howard explains, advocates of consociationalism tend to assume that ethnicity is a “primordial category,” and that political institutions should reflect this.41 The reality is, unsurprisingly, more complicated. Ethnic identities, regardless of whether these are religious, racial, or along other lines, are cultural constructions that can be “mobilized, politicized, and reified” by the state, but they do not have to be. 42 In Lebanon, French colonial leaders and local officials opted to emphasize ethnic identity in politics because this was the prevailing strategy, but this unnecessarily emphasized cleavages, arguably contributing to the failure of the arrangement over time. O’Flynn takes a slightly different approach to this issue, arguing that group identity is
not a “set of essential attributes that all members must inevitably possess,” but rather a dynamic and often unpredictable relationship among members.43 The failure to account for this in Lebanon meant that citizens were forced into boxes, which only led to increased sectarianism and the growing instability of the political system. Another flaw in the consociational model lies in its assumption that organizing political systems along ethnic lines is preferable to other methods in plural societies. Lijphart claims that “not only should all significant segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally.” 44 He seems to ignore the possibility that other political arrangements may be a better fit, depending on the case studied. In Lebanon, the group privileged by the initial agreement - the Maronite community - refused to acknowledge changing dynamics, so the principle of proportionality was arguably absent. It is not surprising that this occurred; groups who find themselves in positions of power seldom let it go easily. Given this fact, it seems dangerously presumptuous to claim that all plural societies can benefit from instituting consociationalism. Howard takes this a step further by pointing out an inherent problem in organizing a political system along ethnic lines. She argues that the “organizing principle of ethnicity tends to leave out people of mixed heritage” as well as those who do not feel that “ethnosectarian affiliation should be so salient.”45 Contrary to Lijphart’s claims, it is clear that consociationalism in Lebanon in effect perpetuates ethnic tensions unnecessarily. Groups who do not primarily identify along ethnosectarian lines are unable to adequately voice their concerns 43
Flynn, ‘Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies’, 284. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 39. 45 Howard, “The Ethnocracy Trap”, 160. 44
41 42
Howard, “The Ethnocracy Trap”, 159. Ibid.
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60 and affect change. The assumption that organizing politics along ethnic lines is a positive development had a role in leading to the failure of consociationalism in Lebanon and the development of a weak state. A third flaw in the model stems from the principle of compromise. While Lijphart suggests that agreement among leaders will be fairly easy if each community has a seat at the table, this does not seem to be borne out by the evidence. Howard,46 who refers to Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict,47 discusses one component of this. Ethnic leaders constantly risk being out-flanked by the more extreme voices in their communities, which renders compromise difficult. Another component is the erasure of those who do not identify primarily along ethnic lines. These actors “are usually wiped out from the political discussion, and have difficulty finding any influential role in the power-sharing process.” 48 This has absolutely been the case in Lebanon, where sectarianism routinely crowds out secularists, nationalists, and others. This major oversight of the model has contributed to its failure in Lebanon. A final flaw in Lijphart’s model is its focus on stability over democratic strength. Both are obviously important, but the model only seems to be concerned with the former. O’Flynn states this problem bluntly, writing that empirical political scientists “are primarily concerned with political stability,” 49 to the detriment of ensuring that the political system is robust and resilient. In Lebanon, leaders who formed the National Pact in 1943 were far
more concerned with maintaining Lebanon’s stability in the immediate postcolonial environment, apparently assuming that democratic strength would logically follow. This was clearly not the case. It is also important to distinguish between shortterm and long-term stability. Lijphart argues that consociational democracy was satisfactorily achieved in Lebanon “for more than thirty years.”50 But if it ended up collapsing, especially out of reasons stemming from the model itself, is consociationalism really a method of achieving stability? Hudson argues that the Lebanese case allows one to answer this question with an emphatic ‘no’. For him, “consociational devices at best do not have a great deal of potency in building legitimacy and stability. At worst, they may actually have exacerbated divisions and hastened the collapse.” 51 Lijphart tries to cover this fault by arguing that a transition to fully-fledged democracy is simple,52 but this does not seem to be the case. As Howard explains, it may actually be more difficult to achieve “liberal democracy” starting from consociationalism than from other arrangements because society is “formally segmented and organized against itself.” 53 Indeed, I think it is safe to say that the very nature of consociationalism has led to the model’s failure in Lebanon and the subsequent state collapse. Failure of Lebanon to Incorporate the Model’s Positive Aspects In addition to the failures of the consociational model itself, another factor that has contributed to the failure of 50
46
Ibid., 161. 47 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985): 410411. 48 Di Ricco, ‘Communal Individuals, Secular Identity and Sectarian Games: Sheikh Naboulsi’s Fatwa and the Quest for a Lebanese Extended Citizenship’, 78. 49 Flynn, ‘Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies’, 283.
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 149. 51 Hudson, ‘The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed’, 233. 52 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 52. 53 Hudson, ‘The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed’, 162.
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61 consociationalism and the current state of affairs in Lebanon is the failure of Lebanon to incorporate even the promising elements of the model. Perhaps the biggest component of this has been the rigidity of Lebanon’s interpretation. The Lebanese system is built upon consociational institutions that accommodate the largest religious sects. For example, “by convention, the president must always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim.”54 This principle has limited the ability of the Lebanese people to pick their leaders, arguably encouraging self-disenfranchisement. If a non-Maronite knows the President will necessarily be a Maronite, they presumably will have less incentive to be involved in the electoral process, especially if religion is quite important to them. As if the consociational model was not already enough of an obstacle, the rigidity of the Lebanese version stands as a further impediment to democratic consolidation. The institutions in ‘ethnocracies’ like Lebanon “bring new and stubborn obstacles that render transition to liberal democracy difficult.” 55 In particular, the cooperation that is so important to Lijphart is absent from countries like Lebanon. According to Howard, the “rigid nature of subnational, ethnically-based political institutions undermines the bases of national consensus,” 56 with detrimental effects on the state as a whole. Hudson supports this argument by writing that the “most fundamental deviation from the model” in Lebanon is the system’s failure to produce
a working grand coalition. 57 This does indeed seem to be the case; including only so-called major religious groups in the process only serves to weaken the political system and the state. The problems associated with the rigidity of Lebanese consociationalism have worsened over time. While the arrangement seemed to work for a while, it became clear by the 1970s that “the Lebanese system was too rigid and too unresponsive to cope with the demands being made upon it.” 58 While most authors seem to have little to offer by way of a solution, O’Flynn makes an interesting suggestion: he argues that “instead of identifying groups in advance, it is also possible to allow them to emerge spontaneously through the normal political process.” 59 Seeing as the rigidity of the Lebanese version of consociationalism is one of the reasons the arrangement failed, it would make sense to structure a future system with more flexibility regarding group privileges. Another component of the failure of the Lebanese iteration of consociationalism is that using religion as an identifier when constructing a political system raises the issue of how secular the state can be. Most scholars would agree that some kind of secularism is required for a state to achieve consolidated liberal democracy. Relying on religious identity to mobilize people risks this process, with concerning implications for state efficacy. In Lebanon, it has meant that the state has been limited in its ability to limit sectarian conflict and confront security threats.60 The decision to use religion as the primary political label in Lebanon has played a role in its failure to maintain consociationalism. 57
54
Flynn, ‘Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies’, 285. 55 Hudson, ‘The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed’, 155. 56 Iibid., 159.
Hudson, ‘The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed’, 230. 58 Rigby, ‘Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics’, 174. 59 Flynn, ‘Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies’, 285. 60 Howard, ‘The Ethnocracy Trap’, 160.
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62 The final component of Lebanon’s failure to incorporate the positive parts of the consociational model is the general lack of oversight by leaders, which led to a failure to avoid pitfalls and mitigate risks. The Lebanese system is inadequately developed, with unclear boundaries between groups, and between groups and the state. 61 The strength of the various religious communities relative to the state means that authoritarian outcomes are more likely as community leaders informally jockey for power outside the formal arena of the state.62 The state’s failure to clearly articulate and codify rules of engagement regarding inter-community and community-state relations has been to its detriment. Another oversight has been the state’s passive acceptance of self-isolation of communities. Lijphart’s 1977 claim that Lebanon’s high segmental isolation “is good because it is only social not territorial” 63 has become increasingly inaccurate over time. Since 1943, members of religious communities have regularly moved in order to join their fellow believers and separate themselves from their non-believing countrymen. For example, in the wake of the 1958 conflict, Beirut experienced a massive influx of residents, but this coincided with neighborhoods becoming increasingly segregated by sect. 64 A final oversight is the lack of containment of group autonomy regarding personal status. As Rigby discusses, “personal status laws and the institutions through which they were applied remained exclusively under the control of the religious leaders of the country’s seventeen officially recognized
61 Di Ricco, ‘Communal Individuals, Secular Identity and Sectarian Games: Sheikh Naboulsi’s Fatwa and the Quest for a Lebanese Extended Citizenship’, 86. 62 Ibid., 86-87. 63 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 156. 64 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 32.
sects,” with virtually no state regulation.65 The state’s lack of input on such matters severely handicapped its ability to maintain its governing capacity. The resultant trajectory can be summed up nicely: “Lacking both an effective concentration and a legitimate distribution of power, the Lebanese political system over the past decade has evolved in terms of a third model.”66 Unfortunately, this ‘third model’ has been nothing more than extreme weakness and instability. Neglected Development of a National Identity While the deficiencies of the consociational model and the inability of the Lebanese state to incorporate even the promising parts of it are two major factors that explain the failure of the arrangement in Lebanon and its current dire situation, a third factor is the neglected development of a national Lebanese identity since independence. Some of the elements discussed previously, including the rigidity of the political system and the residual effects of sectarian conflict, especially from the 15-year civil war, have stunted Lebanese nationalist development. It is important to ensure that religious groups do not feel excluded, but it is equally important to make sure that democracy can be achieved. The state’s perspective of these two as mutually exclusive has been problematic, to say the least. Democracy and stable governance cannot survive long unless people are “prepared to take the broader view” and recognize the importance of cultivating an overarching Lebanese identity.67
65 Rigby, ‘Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics’, 172. 66 Hudson, ‘The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed’, 234. 67 O’Flynn, ‘Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies’, 287.
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63 Part of the problem was the assumption that the unity that finally pushed France to agree to withdraw in 1943 would be enough to forge a sustainable Lebanese identity. In reality, while “the colonial power supplied the external threat that increased internal unity,” it was fleeting and the failure of the state to compensate was a serious misstep. As sectarian identity routinely trumps national identity in Lebanon, the power-sharing arrangement has regularly failed and the state now finds itself unable to accomplish much at all. The question now is what can be done to rectify this situation. Specific situations remain elusive, but whichever ones are employed must depoliticize sectarian loyalties “so that a civic consciousness can emerge based on shared Lebanese identity and sense of national interest.”68 The failure to build a strong national identity also has implications for protecting the country against external meddling, a factor which is detailed in the next subsection. Because the state stands as a basic frame in which sectarian groups hold sway, Lebanon’s current unfortunate situation will likely continue. The ultimate objective of Lebanese leaders, then, must be to increase “social cohesion” under a more distinctly Lebanese banner.69 Damaging Role of External Forces The fourth and final factor advanced by this paper to explain the failure of consociationalism in Lebanon is the uniquely damaging impact of external forces. While Ottoman governance afforded Lebanon considerable autonomy, it also forged ties between it and Europe.70 Upon the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, the 68
Rigby, ‘Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics’, 178. 69 Makdisi and Marktanner, ‘Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon’, 13. 70 Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 15.
French were given Greater Syria, including Lebanon, as part of their League of Nations Mandate. Even though these Mandates were instituted under the pretense of encouraging more effective self-rule, 71 the French resisted departing Lebanon (and Syria) until the mid-1940s. Part of the French plan for the region included the drawing of new boundaries for Lebanon in order to create a Christian-majority state,72 alienating non-Christians and encouraging them to look outside of the state for support and guidance. As the state continued to operate along sectarian lines, its weak capacity allowed outside groups to spring up and compete with the state for loyalty. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s and 1980s and Hezbollah since 1982 have capitalized on state weakness “to advance their own, transnational, agendas.” 73 Hezbollah in particular has been able to establish a “surrogate” state in Lebanon from which to operate, including the provision of public services. 74 In addition, Lebanon has been occupied at times by Israel and Syria, which has only further divided Lebanese citizens along religious lines. Broadly, these and other foreign powers have been active in “supporting their respective allies among the different sects to achieve advantageous geo-strategic positions.” 75 This has undoubtedly had a negative impact on the stability of the Lebanese state as well as the efficacy of the consociational system. As mentioned previously, external forces have been part of a vicious cycle in Lebanon: the consociational arrangement emphasizes sectarian identity, which perpetuates the weaknesses of the state, and 71
David Miller, ‘The Origin of the Mandates System’, Foreign Affairs 6.2 (1928): 277-289. 72 Howard, ‘The Ethnocracy Trap’, 156. 73 Atizili, ‘State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon’, 759. 74 Ibid., 769. 75 Imad Salamey, ‘Failing Consocationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options’, International Journal of Peace Studies 14.2 (2009): 92.
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64 in turn allows outside groups to compete with the state. 76 This culminates in a continually incapable state that has essentially collapsed. It seems as though Rigby is correct in saying that unless Lebanon’s relations with external actors change, it will be hard for the state to consolidate its power effectively.77 External forces have certainly contributed to the failure of consociationalism and the current environment in Lebanon. This situation will only encourage groups like Hezbollah to continue to use Lebanon as a battleground and recruiting source. Concluding Remarks Nearly four decades ago, Arend Lijphart declared that consociationalism in Lebanon was a success. 78 While this may have been marginally true for the 19431958 period, and perhaps even for periods after, it is clear that consociationalism has ultimately failed in Lebanon. The powersharing agreements made between the country’s various sects have proved unsustainable several times.. In order to provide a more complete picture of why power-sharing has been so problematic in Lebanon, I explored at length four processes: the inherent weaknesses of Lijphart’s consociational model, the failure of the Lebanese case to successfully incorporate even the favorable elements of the model, the disregarded development of a national identity since independence, and the uniquely damaging role of external forces. While I primarily drew upon the framework developed by Michael Hudson in 1988 and supported by scholars since, I also deliberately emphasized the role of external forces and lack of national identity, aspects that few scholars talk 76
Atizili, ‘State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon’, 763. 77 Rigby, ‘Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics’, 180. 78 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective, 149.
about at length. As this paper has demonstrated, it is of the utmost importance to consider a wide range of factors when seeking to explain the political trajectory and outcomes in Lebanon. It is my sincere hope that further analysis will provide a useful tool to those who are fighting the uphill battle of trying to reform the Lebanese system. This paper helps explain why power-sharing has been so fraught in Lebanon, but more work is needed in order to develop clear and feasible policy options. Only once scholarly research is used to develop actionable reforms can the Lebanese system become more inclusive, more stable, and more democratic. References Atzili, Boaz. “State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33.8 (2010): 757-782. Print. Di Ricco, Massimo. “Communal Individuals, Secular Identity and Sectarian Games: Sheikh Naboulsi’s Fatwa and the Quest for a Lebanese Extended Citizenship.” Ethnopolitics 10.1 (2011): 77-92. Print. Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Print. Howard, Lise Morjé. “The Ethnocracy Trap.” Journal of Democracy 23.4 (2012): 155-169. Print. Hudson, Michael C. “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed” Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus Eds. Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills. London: I.B. Tauris, 1988. 224-239. Print. Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Print.
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65 Makdisi, Samir, and Marcus Marktanner. “Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon.” Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies 11 (2009): 1-15. Web. Miller, David Hunter. "The Origin of the Mandates System." Foreign Affairs 6.2 (1928): 277-289. Web. O’Flynn, Ian. “Democratic Theory and Practice in Deeply Divided Societies.” Representation 46.3 (2010): 281-293. Print. Rigby, Andrew. “Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics.” Parliamentary Affairs 53.1 (2000): 169-180. Print. Salamey, Imad. “Failing Consocationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options.” International Journal of Peace Studies 14.2 (2009): 83-105. Print. Salamey, Imad. The Government and Politics of Lebanon. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print.
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A Force to Be Reckoned With: The Sophisticated and Effective Strategies of the Islamic State by Sophie Jewett The Islamic State (IS), formerly known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or alShram (ISIS), is a Sunni Muslim jihadist group that seeks to create an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant region, which includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus, and part of southern Turkey. In its infancy it was known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) affiliated with al-Qaeda and sharing its ideology.1 However, ISI began defying orders from al-Qaeda and their tactics grew more violent until al-Qaeda broke ties with them in the spring of 2014.2 In response, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State the new Islamic Caliphate, meaning they claim dominion over Muslims worldwide.3 Ever since, IS has been relatively unrestricted in its pursuit of three immediate political objectives: first, achieving a large following throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world; second, gaining territorial control in Iraq and Syria (and eventually across the Levant); and third, securing a financial base for its continued political program. The Islamic State is often mistakenly 1
U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate, and Foreign Affairs Committee, “The ISIS Threat: The Rise of the Islamic State and their Dangerous Potential,” (2014). 2 Ibid. 3 “The Promise of Allah,” Al Hayat Media Center. ISIS declaration of the Caliphate under the Islamic State (2014).
presented as rogue terrorist group. However, I argue that this ignores the sophistication of their operation and the increasing political threat they pose to the region. This essay seeks to clarify the prudence of the Islamic State (IS) by identifying what strategies they use to achieve the aforementioned objectives and assess their effectiveness based on strategy literature and empirical evidence. This essay will employ an understanding of strategy as an amalgamation of the definitions provided by John Baylis and James J. Wirtz in Strategy in the Contemporary World. Strategy as the “the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power.”4 In order to achieve preconceived political goals. Baylis and Wirtz emphasize the idea of strategy as a plan of action, a conscious systematic scheme. Therefore, the strategies presented in this essay are assumed to be carefully planned out by IS in order to establish and secure a Muslim state under the rule of alBaghdadi and the Islamic State. Achieving a Large Following in the Middle East and the Rest of the World The Islamic State is able to cultivate a large following through sophisticated use of social media, propaganda publications, and terror messaging. Social media as a strategic tool to grow a supporter base is a relatively new phenomenon but has proven extremely effective in the last 4
John Baylis and James Wirtz, “Introduction” in Strategy in the Contemporary World Baylis et al. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5.
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decade. The Arab Spring is evidence of the unprecedented reach of social media,5 and in the case of IS its use has had devastating effects. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamim of the Middle East Forum at Oxford University remarks how one of the more noticeable aspects of IS’s strategy is “its outreach to Syrian populations by employing social media with remarkable effectiveness.”6 IS’s strategy to obtain a large following is to use Facebook and Twitter as platforms to spread its extremist ideologies and colonialist agendas. The most worrisome effect of this strategy has been its effectiveness in recruiting fighters not only from Iraq and Syria but also from countries outside the Middle East, such as British and American citizens. Social media has been an effective way for IS to gain supporters in the thousands because of “multilingual [...] messages [,] fram[ing] its campaign in epochal terms, [and] the image of unstoppable, implacable power.”7 This means that IS broadcasts their military successes and appeals to Muslims to join their movement in many languages all around the world. In the case of IS, social media has shown itself to be an effective strategic tool to create a common movement that extends across borders and nationalities, uniting disillusioned Muslims in a desire for radicalization.
5 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 11. 6 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.” Middle East Forum Vol. 16 (2014): 8. 7 Scott Shane and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media,” New York Times (2014).
In addition to being present on major social media platforms, IS also issues annual reports and a publication named Dabiq in which they outline their “claim to religious authority on the basis of political control.”8 The interesting thing about Dabiq is that it is primarily published in English as well as in French, German, Russian, and Arabic, and is made available digitally. It is clear that IS wants its ideology and agenda available “both to enemies and to potential [IS] supporters in the Western world”9 in order to grow their following. In the publication IS is surprisingly open about its military strategy and future plans, in an attempt to distance itself from “shadowy terrorist cell[s]”10 such as al-Qaeda and be viewed as a legitimate state. These publications also provide a certain amount of transparency and accessibility for isolated Muslims, wanting to join IS’s forces. Even though one cannot completely trust the statements coming directly from IS sources, they have proved remarkably accurate so far. For example, according to Alex Bilger at the Institute for the Study of War, IS outlined their focus on Mosul as a target long before they took control of the city on June 10th 2014.11 Most shocking of IS’s messaging has been the YouTube videos showing the executions of Western journalists and aid workers by an IS soldier given the pseudonym “Jihadi John”, which are readily 8
Harleen K. Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State,” Institute for the Study of War (2014). 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Institute for the Study of War,” (2014).
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available online. The recorded beheadings began with American journalist James Foley in August 2014 followed by American journalist Steven Sotloff in September, British aid worker David Haines later in September, British aid worker Alan Henning in October, and most recently 26-year old American aid worker Peter Kassig in November. The reasoning behind the strategy of publishing executions of foreigners is two-fold. First, according to Islamic strategist Abu Bakr Naji in his book Management of Savagery, “it is necessary that punishment for spying and giving loyalties to the enemies of God [be] firmly established among the people through our enlightening media.”12 In other words, IS is posting executions online in order to display religious superiority and mercilessness towards non-believers and non-cooperators. Second, Naji claims that another goal of the Islamic State is to push America to abandon “the war by proxy until it by using fights directly”13 psychological strategies, such as arousing uproar through broadcasting decapitations. IS strategy is to lure the US into a war fought on their terms. Indeed, the beheadings of American citizens have spurred public support in the U.S. for military intervention and on November 7th 2014, Obama announced the deployment of 1500 troops to Iraq to train and advise Iraqi and Kurdish forces. The effectiveness of IS media strategy can be disputed. On the one hand its social media campaigns have
proven effective in spreading their ideology and attracting supporters to join the IS army.14 In addition, the publication of annual reports and the journal Dabiq give IS a sense of validity and demands that they be perceived as more than a mere rebel group. On the other hand, the broadcasting of terror and medieval punishment techniques risks delegitimizing IS and their claim for statehood because it is a step away from the lawful institutional behavior related to the legitimacy they are otherwise seeking.15 There seem to be conflicting outcomes of the same strategy in terms of strengthening the group’s legitimacy. This is, of course, spoken from a subjective view of legitimacy, disregarding the fact that some may view savage violence and executions as a way to demonstrate power and somehow strengthen legitimacy rather than undermine it. In any case, in terms of growing a large following and reaching extremist around the world, social media use has been a highly effective strategy for the Islamic State.
12
14
Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), 66. 13 Ibid., 10.
Gaining Territorial Control in Iraq and Syria In June 2014, IS seized Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, and in July they seized a key city in Syria, Raqqa, which also gave them access to an important military air base, al-Tabqa. Capturing these strongholds “demonstrated once again that [IS] is capable of conducting broad military operations in accordance with wellconceived strategy to achieve major Al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State,” 8. James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” Understanding Modern Warfare (2007): 193.
15
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political and military goals.”16 IS strategy in seizing these key areas has been compared to strategies from Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, and upon further investigation, the comparison seems surprisingly appropriate. The “three-phase Maoist model, the gold standard for insurgency”17 consists of first cultivating local support, then using guerilla warfare to mount attacks on important government targets, and finally capturing cities using conventional warfare.18 In fact, Mao’s phases can be directly linked to IS’s strategic plans, outlined in their annual reports, as well as empirical insurgent activity, and might explain IS’s success in capturing territory. Baylis explains how local support for any insurgency group is the cornerstone of guerrilla warfare and that “[w]ithout the consent and active support of the people, the guerrilla would be little more than a bandit.”19 Despite facing resistance from the Syrian army, the Kurdish army, and various other rebel groups,20 IS has gained a strong support base among local Sunnis using ideological propaganda and terrorism.21 In fact, some scholars hold that “the use of terrorism as a tool of an insurgent action is [in itself] one of propaganda [and] terrorism’s effectiveness in 16 Jeffery White, “Military Implications of the Syrian Regime’s Defeat in Raqqa.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2014). 17 Elliot Ackerman, “The Islamic State’s Stratgey Was Years in the Making,” New Republic Magazine (2014). 18 ibid. 19 John Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare,” in Contemporary Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987). 20 Felix Legrand, “The Colonial Strategy of ISIS,” Arab Reform Initiative (2014): 2 21 Al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State,” 8.
rallying the masses has proven successful”22 as demonstrated by Communist insurgencies in China and Vietnam. Mao used this form of guerrilla warfare in order to “carry out violent attacks against advanced militaries.”23 In the beginning guerrilla warfare was used out of necessity due to lack of resources and lack of formal, military training. However, Mao’s guerrilla strategies often helped turn the tide of battles in the favor of the militarily weaker revolutionaries. Similarly, the Viet Cong were able to outlast American and South Vietnamese forces using guerrilla warfare and exhausting enemy resources. IS forces have used these strategies when attacking military targets. For example, when taking the city of Mosul in Iraq, the Iraqi army reported that being under constant attack by guerrilla fighters weakened their resources and ability to withstand the eventual IS takeover.24 W. R. Polk defines Mao’s second phase of insurgency, guerrilla warfare, as a small military force that can adapt to terrain and that is “quick to attack and quicker to retreat, hanging on the edge of superior forces to pick off stragglers and to disrupt, loot, or destroy the cumbersome supply.”25 This definition corresponds to the strategy used by IS forces in the summer of 2014. The constant attacks on 22
Aaron M. Young Sr. and David H. Gray, “Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future,” Global Security Studies 2, No. 4 (2011). 23 ibid. 24 Jeremy Bender, “How ISIS Managed to Take Mosul,” Business Insider (2014). 25 W.R. Poly, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerilla War From the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008).
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government structures and institutions are a part of what Naji calls the strategy “vexation and exhaustion,”26 essentially combining guerrilla warfare with extreme, widespread terrorism. “Vexation and exhaustion” is a strategy that weakens the enemy using guerrilla warfare, forcing the adversary to overextend, spreading itself thin in an attempt to protect itself on every flank.27 T.V. Paul explains that one of the few ways a weaker power can gain military advantage in an asymmetric war is by “launch[ing] counteroffensives so as to wear down the adversary and thereby deny the latter strategic as well as tactical gains.”28 Combining guerrilla tactics and terrorism is key to IS’s expansionist success in Iraq and Syria because it has had an “almost singular focus on efforts to take and hold land [through guerrilla warfare] and simultaneously to win the ‘hearts and minds,’ of the populace by the means of terrorism,”29 says professor at Walsh College, Dr. Richard Chasdi. Mao’s third phase involving conventional warfare to finally capture key strongholds, can be seen in play at this very moment. Islamic State troops are marching through northern Iraq “seizing major cities like Tikrit and significant infrastructures like the Mosul Dam,”30 with Baghdad as the likely near-future target. By conventional warfare it is meant that 26
Naji, The Management of Savagery, 8. Ibid. T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, (Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 26. 29 Dr. Robert Chasdi, “Al Qaeda 3.0: Fusion of Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare,” Huffington Post (2014). 30 Ackerman, “The Islamic States Strategy”.
IS’s attacks have been executed in company- or battalion formations,31 using military force to clear an area and then proceeds to secure these areas as IS power positions, according to military adviser General David Patraeus.32 Author and journalist Elliot Ackerman, imagines this stage of IS’s conquering strategy as that of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive in 1972,33 when the Viet Cong had completed the first two stages and switched focused to defeating the enemy “in conventional pitched battles.”34 Mao’s three phases of insurgency is useful in analyzing the actions of the Islamic State because it highlights that their territorial captures are the result of premeditated military strategies, and not the arbitrary whims of a rebel militia group. Baylis’ article and the empirical cases of Chinese and Vietnamese insurgencies prove that mimicking Mao’s phases of insurgency has been a successful strategy in striving toward IS’s goal of gaining territorial control in Iraq and Syria. Securing a Financial Base The Islamic State has implemented a sophisticated system of acquiring revenue in order to economically secure both its current activities and its future state. Jonathan Kirshner’s arguments on the importance of economic security for the success of states can also be applied to IS as a proto-state because they seek to establish an operational Islamic state.
27 28
31
Eli Lake and Jamie Dettmer, “Iraq”s Terrorists are Becoming a Full-Blown Army,””World Affairs Journal (2014). 32 Ibid. 33 Ackerman, “The Islamic States Strategy”. 34 Baylis and Wirtz, “Introduction”.
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He holds that “mobilizing and extracting resources from society, and maintaining domestic economic stability are all crucial for success.”35 In other words, securing an economic base is essential for the success of IS. Financial Times reports that IS has three main sources of income: first, taxes extracted from the areas under their control; second, funds from anonymous investors and donors; and third, and most importantly, their oilsmuggling network in Iraq and Syria.36 As IS brought cities in Iraq and Syria under its control, it implemented taxations for local businesses in these areas. This is a way for IS to strengthen its legitimacy by establishing “administrative and civil control in its conquered territories”37 as well as funding its operations. State-building scholar Ariel I. Ahram explains that IS “enforced taxes on a variety of commercial activities, including telecommunications companies”38 and has established a tax authority in the Syrian city of Raqqa. The New York Times has reports of people saying the current IS tax of “$20 every two months from business owners in exchange for electricity, water, and security [which are confirmed with] official receipts stamped with the IS logo [is] less than they used to pay in bribes to Mr. Assad’s government.”39 The previously mentioned annual reports outline the many military 35 Jonathan Kirshner, “Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War,” Review of International Political Economy (1998): 69. 36 Daragahi, Borzou, and Erika Solomon. "Fuelling ISIS Inc." Financial Times (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. 37 Joseph Thorndike, “How ISIS is Using Taxes to Build a Terrorist State,” Forbes (2014). 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
operations of IS as well as how much money is spent on various aspects of IS activities. The reasoning for the specifics and details of the allocation of funds is to “demonstrate its record to potential donors,”40 who are usually rich Sunnis from Syria, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. These reports reassure existing and potential donors and wealthy sympathizers that IS indeed “operates like an army and that it has state-building ambitions.”41 In his outline of IS strategy Naji states that as IS begins “administering some of the regions (by the permission of God) financial revenues will rush in upon us from charitable giving,”42 meaning that donations were always meant to be a part of IS’s financial strategy. Many sources, such as CNN and Business Insider, have reported that IS has been “garnering wealth at an alarming pace [due to] black-market oil sales.”43 IS has tapped into a sophisticated black oil market in Syria and Iraq making fuel cheap for their own operations as well as being able to sell oil at a discounted price to regional buyers, including the al-Assad regime.44 The Iraq Oil Report estimates that IS is receiving approximately $1m a day only in oil sales.45 Naji stresses the necessity of taking control of oil fields 40
Khalaf, Roula and Sam Jones. “Selling Terror: How ISIS Details Its Brutality” Financial Times (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. 41 Ibid. 42 Naji, The Management of Savagery, 48. 43 Grett Lugiuarto, “ISIS Is Making an Absurd Amount of Money on Ransom Payments and Black-Market Oil Sales,” Business Insider (2014). 44 Ibid. 45 Hussein, Mohammed, Christine van den Toorn, Patrick Osgood, and Ben Lando. “ISIS earning $1m per day from Iraqi oil smuggling.” Iraq Oil Report (2014).
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due to the “political importance of petroleum [because it is] the artery of the West.”46 Naji also outlines the historic inequality of oil, stating that the West has consumed oil at a low price and now “states which obtain petroleum from Muslim lands […] must pay the true price [and] Muslims [are rightful] in demanding the difference of the price from all the previous years.”47 With the financial resources obtained from local taxes, wealthy donors, and the black oil market, IS is able to increase the legitimacy of its proto-state, for example by paying their soldiers and employees reasonable salaries, and providing them with cars and homes.48 IS is also able to acquire sophisticated equipment, such as guns and cameras, used to amplify social media presence and terrorist activities. The most pervasive conclusion gathered from this essay is that the Islamic State is a highly strategic group with political objectives and “not simply a military or terrorist organization.”49 IS has proved its prudence in designing efficient strategies in striving towards its immediate political goals. In efforts to cultivate a large, widespread following IS has used social media, Dabiq and annual progress reports, and video of terrorist acts. In a way, the acts of terrorism counteract its claim for legitimacy because they are the actions associated with violent terrorist groups rather than a structured and lawful regime. However, overall these strategies have been effective because 46
Naji, The Management of Savagery, 42. Ibid. 48 Daragahi and Solomon, “Fueling ISIS Inc.” 49 Gambhir, “Dabiq: The strategic movement of the Islamic state,” Institute for the Study of War (2014). 47
they have led thousands of volunteers to join the IS army, it has provided a certain amount of transparency and legitimacy, and demonstrated power and influence. IS’s guerilla strategy, modeled on Mao, to conquer and control territory in Iraq and Syria has been particularly effective as shown in the extent of territory coming under IS control in the course of a few months. Finally, creating a financial base through commercial taxes, wealthy donors, and black market oil sales, has legitimized IS in its claim to statehood by proving the opportunity to sustain its political agenda. This essay has attempted to prove, even though the Islamic State uses savage tactics, referring “to them simply as ‘terrorists’ negates their very serious political goals: the establishment of a Caliphate,”50 and that underestimating IS could prove disastrous considering their capability to develop and implement sophisticated strategists with real ability to achieve their political goals.
References Ackerman, Elliot. “The Islamic State’s Strategy Was Years in the Making,” New Republic Magazine (August 8, 2014): accessed November 20, 2014. Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham," Middle East Forum, January, vol. 16. (2014). Baylis, John. “Revolutionary Warfare,” Contemporary Strategy. New York: Holmes & Meier (1987). 209-29. 50
Ackerman, “The Islamic States Strategy”.
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Baylis, John and James J. Wirtz, “Introduction,” in Baylis et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007): 1-15. Bender, Jeremy. “How ISIS Managed To Take Mosul,” Business Insider (October 2014): accessed November 20, 2014. Bilger, Alex. "ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Millitary Command," Institute for the Study of War (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. Chasdi, Dr. Robert. “’Al-Qaeda 3.0’: Fusion of Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare,” Huffington Post (October 6, 2014): accessed November 20, 2014. Daragahi, Borzou, and Erika Solomon. "Fuelling ISIS Inc." Financial Times (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. Gambhir, Harleen K. "Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State." Institute for the Study of War (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. Hussein, Mohammed, Christine van den Toorn, Patrick Osgood, and Ben Lando. “ISIS earning $1m per day from Iraqi oil smuggling.” Iraq Oil Report (2014). Khalaf, Roula and Sam Jones. “Selling Terror: How ISIS Details Its Brutality” Financial Times (2014): accessed November 19, 2014. Kiras, James D. “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” Understanding Modern Warfare (2007): 185-207. Kirshner, Jonathan. “Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War,” Review of International Political Economy (1998): 64-91.
Lake, Eli and Jamie Dettmer. “Iraq’s Terrorists Are Becoming a FullBlown Army,” World Affairs Journal (June 2014): accessed November 22, 2014. Legrand, Felix. “The Colonial Strategy of ISIS,” Arab Reform Initiative (2014): accessed November 20, 2014. Logiurato, Brett. “ISIS Is Making An Absurd Amount Of Money On Ransom Payments and BlackMarket Oil Sales,” Business Insider (October 2014): accessed November 23, 2014. Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: Public Affairs (2012). Naji, Abu Bakr. The Management of Savagery, trans. William McCants. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Centre (2006). Paul, T.V. Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge University Press (1994). Polk, W.R. Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq. New York: Harper Perennial (2008). “The Promise of Allah,” Al Hayat Media Center ISIS declaration of the Caliphate under the Islamic State (2014):<https://ia902505.us.archive. org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf> Shane, Scott, and Ben Hubbard. "ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media," New York Times (2014): accessed November 23, 2014. Thorndike, Joseph. “How ISIS Is Using Taxes To Build A Terrorist State,”
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Forbes (August 2014): accessed November 22, 2014. U.S. Congress, U. S. Senate, and Foreign Affairs Committee. "The ISIS Threat: The Rise of the Islamic State and their Dangerous Potential." (2014): accessed Nov. 20, 2014. White, Jeffrey. “Military Implications of the Syrian Regime’s Defeat in Raqqa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (August 2014): accessed November 20, 2014. Young Sr, Aaron M., and David H. Gray. "Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future," Global Security Studies 2, no. 4 (2011): accessed November 20, 2014.
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Are National Elections Becoming European?: A Party-Level Analysis By Oscar Isham
European elections.” 4 This paper will seek to test this claim of a shift in the relationship between national and EP elections; i.e. whether Europe, contrary to the second order model, has become an influential force in national political contests. The analysis of this paper is derived from the national party-level, using data coded from their manifestos. This will determine whether the European issue has truly manifested itself in domestic politics, to the extent that parties have incorporated it into their national policies. This paper will first examine the changing attitudes within the European Union (EU) toward European integration, which are the key to the claim that the European issue is becoming a more salient one in national politics. Secondly, it will explore the concept of “EU issue voting”,5 which can be broadly understood as the operationalization of public perspectives on the phenomenon of integration. The subsequent empirical study utilises data from the Manifesto Project 6 database to analyse European national party emphasis given to the subject of “Europe” (both positively and negatively) since the year 2000 to determine whether, as Hix and Crombez suggest, Europe is becoming a more prominent issue in national politics.
Introduction The predominant perspective within European political study is that both national and European level elections are fought primarily over domestic issues, with the latter contests being of lesser importance to both voters and the political participants. Known as the “second-order model”, 1 this theory argues that European elections are “fought in the shadow” 2 of their national counterparts, and therefore that national parties have a lesser incentive to campaign on European level issues, even during European Parliament (EP) elections. Furthermore, the “second-order model” claims that many citizens utilize these European contests as an extra opportunity to evaluate their national government’s performance and voice their opinions on the – in their view more important – domestic issues that are most relevant at the time. However, in a 2013 European Politics and Policy article,3 looking forward to the 2014 EP elections, Simon Hix and Christophe Crombez suggested an alternative interpretation to this classical Perspectives on European Integration theory. “Far from European elections being There exists a consensus among national elections these days,” they write, many scholars that public opinion on “national elections have started to become European integration shifted perceptively after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.7 The 1
Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, “Nine SecondOrder National Elections – A Conceptual Framework For The Analysis Of European Election Results”, European Journal of Political Science Research 8, (1980); Cees Van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996). 2 Simon Hix and Michael Marsh “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections”, The Journal of Politics 69.2, (2007). 3 “Why the 2014 European Parliament elections will be about more than protest votes,” http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/06/03/europea n-parliament-elections-2014/
4
Ibid. Catherine De Vires “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European Integration Affects National Elections”, European Union Politics 8.3, (2007). 6 The Manifesto project is based on quantitative content analyses of parties’ election programmes from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945. For data set see: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets 7 Erik Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot Box?: European Integration and Voting Behaviour in the New Member States”, Comparative Political Studies 37.5, (2004); Geoffrey Evans and Sarah Blunt, “Explaining Change in British Public Opinion on the 5
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78 observed trend indicates an increase in “European de-politicization.” 13 While large public consciousness, interest and – and usually Eurosceptic – emphasis on the comprehension regarding European political European issue is found at the national party affairs; “it is clear that Europeans have level, this is predominantly observed on the grown considerably more wary of the political left/right extremes. Those on the integration process than they once were.” 8 right protest what they see as the project’s This increased salience of the European infringement upon national sovereignty, issue has not, however, been a necessarily while those on the left reject its neoliberal positive change from the point of view of economic character.14 Most national parties pro-integrationists. De Vires and Edwards in Europe however have not traditionally argue that since Maastricht, and in embraced the European issue as one worthy particular over the past decade, European of significant political attention in national integration has witnessed a “dual trend”: a contests. The question facing these parties is downward spiral in public support for the integration project and a concomitant thus whether there is sufficient public increase in opportunities for the public to appetite to engage with the European issue at national elections to make it worth express these concerns.”9 It appears therefore that the bringing the issue to the fore. While public public’s permissive-consensus on Europe 10 contestation over Europe has centred on the from the late 20th Century has been left well core questions of “where the train of and truly behind. As a consequence of this European integration is heading, who is in increased European consciousness in the the driver’s seat and whether it should go so public sphere 11 the subsequent question is fast”, 15 only in a very few instances have whether or not national parties have reacted any of these questions been truly embraced in parallel by increasing their political by national parties during their general emphasis on Europe. The paradox facing elections. On the contrary, there has been a mainstream national parties in this situation propensity for national party “elites” to is that, “public opinion is, on average, much “depoliticise European integration or at more Eurosceptic than mainstream elites.”12 least to have a low interest in EU matters.”16 Most national political elites would According to some scholars however, recent therefore prefer, if possible, to avoid raising integration, economic crises, and national the topic with the generally more political realignments have potentially Eurosceptic voters, a phenomenon known as “changed the [national] political environment” 17 concerning Europe and the EU – this is the claim the empirical analysis of this paper will test. European Union: Top Down or Bottom Up?”, Acta Politics 42, (2007). 8 Catherine De Vires, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How European Integration Affects Parties’ Electoral Fortunes”, European Union Politics 11.1, (2010). 9 Cathrine De Vires and Erica Edwards, “Taking Europe to it’s Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism”, Party Politics 15.1, (2009): 5. 10 Ibid. 11 Erik Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot Box?: European Integration and Voting Behaviour in the New Member States”, Comparative Political Studies 37.5, (2004). 12 Catherine De Vires “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European Integration Affects National Elections”, European Union Politics 8.3, (2007), 367.
13
Peter Mair, “The limited impact of Europe on national party systems”, Journal of European Public Policy 23.4, (2000). 14 De Vires and Edwards, “Taking Europe to it’s Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism” (2009). 15 Catherine De Vires and Kees van Kersbergen, “Interest, Identity and Politics Allegiance in the European Union”, Acta Politica 42, (2007), 309. 16 Mair, “The limited impact of Europe on national party systems”, (2000). 17 Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity, (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1970).
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79 integration between a voter and a party, 20 EU Issue Voting These changing conditions in however as previously discussed, elite and Europe have led to an increasing focus on public opinions are often highly polarised. ‘EU issue voting’, defined as “the process Peters argues that a citizen of whereby individual preferences over Europe still “does not feel himself or herself European integration directly influence vote to be a European citizen”21 thus it stands to choices in national elections.” 18 Thus reason that European issues remain unlikely according to the issue voting theory, the to act as a central issue in national elections more salience the public attaches to the EU over and above domestic concerns. issue, the more it will factor into national However, in their 2012 study “How electoral contests. How much EU issue European Do you Feel? The Psychology of voting affects a national party’s public European Identity,” Bruter and Harrison support will depend on that party’s suggest that, “across Europe, European ideological position on Europe. This paper’s identity is much stronger than what anyone analysis will indicate the amount of seems to think – and further strengthening emphasis given by national parties to the now.” 22 The potential exists for national EU issue over time, and thus the scope of elections to act as channels through which potential for EU issue voting at national citizens can communicate their interests regarding the EU 23 , a phenomenon that elections. National parties in government are, would increase in parallel with EU by definition, the most involved in the “identity”. The EU issue-voting concept European political system; their leaders sit on the European Council and their ministers suggests an electoral connection between participate in the Council of the European national and European politics. An increase Union. Previous studies have shown that would therefore support the theory that EU issue voting is “expected to be higher national elections are becoming more among parties in opposition” 19 due to European. However, for this to be possible, opportunistic use of the EU as a platform to national parties would be required to give openly criticise government policy. voters the option at national elections to However even with high levels of EU issue vote on European issues; i.e. different voting, national elections remain dominated parties taking different positions on the EU, by party cleavages over domestic policy, and allowing the public to decide between rather than those at the EU level. Voters are them. The empirical analysis of this paper known to examine a wide variety of seeks to determine to what extent this different issues, weigh different preferences, opportunity has been offered by parties at and act according to various influences national elections to their voters across when making their vote choice in a national Europe, and if, as Hix and Crombez’s election. Tillman’s EU voting hypothesis assessment would suggest, there has been a states the extent to which Europe factors into national vote choice depends directly on the level of agreement over EU 20 Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot Box?:
18
De Vires, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How European Integration Affects Parties’ Electoral Fortunes”, (2010), 92. 19 De Vires, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How European Integration Affects Parties’ Electoral Fortunes”, (2010), 92.
European Integration and Voting Behaviour in the New Member States”, (2004). 21 Jit Peters, “National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice”, European Constitutional Law Review 1.1 (2005). 22 Michael Bruter, How European Do You Feel? The Psychology of European Identity (Lansons Communications, 2012), 13. 23 De Vires, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How European Integration Affects Parties’ Electoral Fortunes”, (2010), 92.
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80 tangible increase in this occurrence in recent per member state. The data was calculated years. by combining both the positive and negative mention average percentages of all parties competing per election, per member state. Empirical Analysis The principal objective of this For example, for Sweden in 2002 the analysis is to determine to what extent average percentage devoted to positive national parties have, since 2000,24 utilised EU/Europe mentions in the manifestos of the ‘European issue’ in national electoral the 8 national parties coded was 2.07 per campaigns. The entries in the tables and cent, the number for the same parties, in the figures represent “per” variables indicating same manifestos for negative mentions was the relative share of statements about 0.94 per cent, thus combined this gives a Europe/EU in relation to all statements in a data value of 3.02 per cent. Figure 1 graphs the averages taken national party manifesto, i.e. “0.35” indicates that 0.35 per cent of the party from Table 1 of all the EU parties coded in manifesto was devoted to that category. the three time periods. The graph shows a Using the comprehensive data gathered by drop in European-wide average total the Manifesto Project on 23 EU member mentions from 3.29 to 2.21 per cent, a 32.8 states, I have calculated Europe-wide per cent decrease. This data suggests that, at averages for both the total percentage and the party level, national elections are individual percentages (positive 25 vs. becoming less ‘European’ in nature – on negative26) of national party manifestos that average, parties are paying less attention to pertain to the EU/Europe over this time Europe in their national campaigns than period. By examining the trends over a they did either 5 or 10 years ago. However, period of 14 years (where data is available), as this analysis combines both positive and the analysis will illustrate whether parties negative mentions of the EU, it is have increased or decreased their emphasis potentially skewed by a small number of on Europe/EU at the national level, and in extreme parties; for example the UK Independence party manifesto in 2001 was what manner this has occurred. Table 1 shows the total percentage coded as 33.89 per cent EU-negative. of national party manifestos devoted to the Therefore the first step in improving the EU/Europe from all parties competing for accuracy of this data set is to distinguish an election in each time period, displayed between positive (Table 2) and negative (Table 3) mentions in national party manifestos. 24 I have chosen this cut-off point to represent the Tables 2 and 3 take the same situation in ‘Euro-Europe’. By starting the analysis in format as Table 1, in this instance reflecting the year 2000 I avoid the large political, social and the two constituent values that combine to economic upheaval caused by the introduction of the create the average totals. Table 2 represents Euro in 1999, which may have caused a major shift in results not controlled for in my data. the average percentage of positive mentions 25 Positive mentions of European Community/Union in member state national election party in general. May include the: Desirability of the manifestos, and Table 3 represents the same manifesto country joining (or remaining a member); for the negative percentage of mentions. Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union; Desirability of increasing the This separation provides a more accurate ECs/EUs competences; Desirability of expanding the representation of the nature and focus of competences of the European Parliament. national party attitudes over the time period 26 Negative mentions of the European toward the EU/Europe, and reveals some Community/Union. May include: Opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by highly significant results, as can be seen in European authorities; Opposition to the netFigure 2 below. contribution of the manifesto country to the EU budget. (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1)
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81 Table 1 Europe in national election manifestos by country (total), 2000-2014 EU MEMBER STATE
2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009
2010 – 2014
FINLAND SPAIN SLOVENIA GREECE ITALY NETHERLANDS BELGIUM PORTUGAL LITHUANIA SWEDEN AUSTRIA IRELAND FRANCE DENMARK LUXEMBOURG GREAT BRITAIN GERMANY BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA
1.13 1.55 1.91 2.16 1.15 2.47 2.80 1.41 2.93 3.02 3.69 3.73 4.08 4.26 5.03 7.06 7.49
3.58 1.85 1.27
1.39 1.50 1.23
1.91 3.04 2.22 2.12 5.50 1.38 4.50 1.33 5.13 3.18 6.16 2.93 4.17 1.38 1.45 3.64 1.73 2.67 1.93
4.32 2.51 1.72 2.75 1.38 1.44
SLOVAKIA EU AVERAGE STD DEV
3.29 1.89
0.71 2.90 2.30 4.05 1.84 1.05 2.08 1.19
3.39
5.45
2.89 1.43
2.21 1.28
*Note: Missing entries indicate where the Manifesto Project had no data for the country during that time period. *Note: Where there was more than one election per period, the totals were averaged (e.g. 2 elections = total /2)
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% Average mentions in manifestos
82 Figure 1 Europe (total) in national election manifestos, 2000-2014 3.50 3.30 3.10 2.90 2.70 2.50 2.30 2.10 1.90 1.70 1.50 2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009
2010 - 2014
Time Period Average Mentions: Total Table 2 Europe in national election manifestos by country (positive), 2000-2014 EU MEMBER STATE
2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009
2010 - 2014
FINLAND
0.57
1.88
0.76
SPAIN
1.21
1.47
1.15
SLOVENIA
1.62
1.05
1.15
GREECE
0.63
ITALY
2.13
1.91
2.69
NETHERLANDS
2.28
1.76
1.54
BELGIUM
2.64
2.00
1.57
PORTUGAL
1.21
1.11
0.58
LITHUANIA
2.35
5.50
1.19
SWEDEN
2.07
0.91
0.69
AUSTRIA
2.31
3.56
IRELAND
2.60
1.03
FRANCE
3.77
4.11
DENMARK
1.30
1.25
LUXEMBOURG
4.68
4.88
GREAT BRITAIN
2.05
1.85
1.57
GERMANY
7.09
3.23
1.58
0.58 2.02
BULGARIA
1.38
CZECH REPUBLIC
1.39
1.58
ESTONIA
3.58
0.95
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83 HUNGARY
1.73
1.67
POLAND
2.37
1.00
ROMANIA SLOVAKIA
1.82 4.00
2.98
2.34 1.32
1.40 0.67
EU AVERAGE STD DEV
2.38 1.59
Note: Missing entries indicate where the Manifesto Project had no data for the country during that time period Note: Where there was more than one election per period, the totals were averaged (e.g. 2 elections = total /2)
Table 3 Europe in national election manifestos by country (negative), 2000-2014 EU MEMBER STATE
2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009
2010 - 2014
FINLAND SPAIN SLOVENIA GREECE ITALY NETHERLANDS BELGIUM PORTUGAL LITHUANIA SWEDEN AUSTRIA IRELAND
0.56 0.34 0.29 0.40 0.17 0.20 0.16 1.60 0.58 0.94 1.38 1.13
1.70 0.38 0.23
0.63 0.35 0.08
0.00 1.28 0.22 1.01 0.00 0.47 0.95 0.29
1.64 0.97 0.15 2.16 0.18 0.75
FRANCE DENMARK LUXEMBOURG GREAT BRITAIN GERMANY BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA SLOVAKIA
0.31 2.96 0.35 5.00 0.41
1.02 1.93 1.28 1.08 0.95 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.08
EU AVERAGE STD DEV
0.99 1.26
0.58 0.60
0.13 0.88 0.73 2.47 0.25 0.10 0.41 0.19 1.62 0.76 0.74
Note: Missing entries indicate where the Manifesto Project had no data for the country during that time period Note: Where there was more than one election per period, the totals were averaged (e.g. 2 elections = total /2)
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84
Figure 2 Europe (total, positive & negative) in national election manifestos, 2000-2014
% Average mentions in manifestos
3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009 Time Period Series1
Figure 2 (Stacked Area Chart) illustrates more transparently the nature of the downward trend observed in Figure 1 in comparison to its two constituent parts: negative and positive mentions. The figure shows that over the observed period, there was a 41.2 per cent decrease in positive mentions (2.38 – 1.4), and a 23.2 per cent decrease in negative mentions (0.99 – 0.76) of EU/Europe in the national manifestos. This more detailed breakdown of the data enables more accurate explanatory inferences to be made regarding the observations, demonstrating that a simple downward trend as observed in Figure 1 is an inaccurate representation of the data.
Series2
2010 - 2014
Series3
towards European integration are indeed capable of influencing national vote choice27 this empirical analysis suggests that the politics of national parties are not on average reflecting this. The implication of this finding is that national parties simply aren’t giving voters the opportunity to make Europe a key national electoral issue. While the data show that the EU/Europe is far from non-existent in national politics, it certainly appears to be on the decrease in terms of its prevalence since the year 2000. 2.
The most significant changes in total and positive EU mentions occur between the two most recent time periods (2005-2009 and 2010-2014), and in both cases the changes are Findings negative. 1. There is an overall decrease in total, positive and negative mentions over the The data show that not only are total and positive mentions of the EU/Europe in observed period (2000-2014). This would appear to, at the national party level, directly counter the theory that national elections are becoming European. 27 Mathew Gabel, “European Integration, Voters, and In fact it suggests that the exact opposite is National Politics”, West European Politics, 23.4, Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot true. While it may be that Europe’s public is (2000); Box?: European Integration and Voting Behaviour in increasingly Euro-savvy, and that attitudes the New Member States”, (2004). McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
85 national party manifestos declining, but also European citizenry are more Eurosceptic that they are doing so at an increasing rate. than mainstream political elites. 29 This Between the first and second time periods, analysis reveals however that negative total EU/Europe mentions saw a 12.2 per attitudes toward Europe are on the rise in cent decrease, then subsequently between national political parties. Whether these are the second and third time periods, a further true ideological opposition, or a public 23.5 per cent decrease. The most dramatic support strategy however is a question not change of all was in positive mentions answered by this study. An important between the second and third time periods, implication of these findings is that which dropped by 40.2 per cent across the although Europe is less prevalent in national European Union. Not only does this data elections, as a political topic the gap therefore call into question the claim that between the traditionally more Eurosceptic national elections are becoming European, it public and traditionally more pro-European also suggests that positive attitudes of elites may be reducing. national parties towards the EU are This being said, individual country declining at an increasing rate. Despite the data reveal that negative European coding is decrease in positive mentions however, at accounted for by a relatively small number the most recent time period positive of heavily Eurosceptic parties: the 20 most mentions are still 45.7 per cent higher than Euro-negative party manifestos – out of the negative. Thus although positive mentions 482 coded – account for 51.4 per cent of all are decreasing, European national parties of negative mentions over the entire period are still on average far more pro- than anti- (see Appendix A), therefore the final European in their election manifestos. analysis of this paper will test whether the observed trends thus far are representative 3. Negative mentions undergo the least of the political ‘mainstream’, or solely of overall change throughout the total the totalled range of European political time period (2000-2014), they are also parties and ideologies. the only data set to show an increase between any two periods (2005-2009 Further Examination – Fringe or and 2010-2014). Mainstream? As previously observed, total and negative As previously discussed in this mentions of Europe decrease consistently paper, strong stances towards the European throughout the total time period. What is project are usually to be found on the equally noteworthy however, is the 31 per national political fringes 30 in the parties cent increase in negative mentions between who look to garner votes through the second and third periods. Despite the differentiating themselves from the political overall decrease, this more recent negative “mainstream”. To test whether the findings increase (notably concurrent with the timing of the first analysis are heavily influenced of the European economic crisis), when by these ‘fringe’ parties, I have repeated the combined with Findings (2), is potentially process as used on the original data, indicative of one of Europe’s most however this time using only the data for noteworthy political phenomena: parties who received > 10 per cent of the national vote share at their manifesto’s Euroscepticism. Defined as either principled (hard corresponding election. Euroscepticism) or pragmatic (soft Euroscepticism) opposition to the European 29 De Vires “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How project 28 it is generally believed that European Integration Affects National Elections” (2007): 367. De Vires and Edwards, “Taking Europe to it’s Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism” (2009).
30 28
Leonard Ray, “Mainstream Euroscepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?” Acta Politica, 42.2/3 (2007).
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% Average mentions in 'mainstream' manifestos
Figure 3 Europe (total, positive & negative) in national ‘mainstream’ election manifestos, 2000-2014 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 2000 - 2004
2005 - 2009
2010 - 2014
Time Period
Average Mentions: Total As figure 3 (Stacked Area Chart) shows (See Appendices B, C & D for table data), the data for ‘mainstream’ party manifestos over the entire time period displays some similar trends to the original: overall decreases in total (by 21.7 per cent) and positive (by 28.4 per cent) mentions. In terms of negative mentions, again in parallel to the original data, there is an increase between the latest two time periods, however in this case by less than half as much (13.2 per cent). This dataset differs significantly however in that there is an observed increase in total and positive mentions between the first two time periods (before the larger decrease), and also in the fact that there has been an overall increase (by 26.3 per cent) in negative mentions over the total observed time period. The implications of this secondary analysis suggest that the importance of the ‘European issue’ is in fact relatively similar (in terms of total mentions) for both mainstream and more ‘fringe’ European
Average Mentions: Positive parties. The two sets of observations – all parties vs. mainstream parties – were so imilar in their numbers of total European manifesto mentions that on average the two sets had only a 1.01 per cent difference (2.8 per cent vs. 2.77 per cent). Where there was a more marked discrepancy was in the distribution of positive vs. negative mentions between the two data sets. With all parties (mainstream and nonmainstream) included, the data shows that there were on average 61.2 per cent more positive than negative mentions, however the figure for mainstream parties alone was an average 83.1 per cent gap. Therefore this analysis suggests that while the ‘EU issue’ as a whole may be hold similar status for both the mainstream and non-mainstream parties, the latter are the more Eurosceptic group. Conclusions This study has addressed the question of the relationship between
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87 national elections and European politics phenomenon. This analysis is limited in its from the point of view of national parties; in prescriptive capacity to understand the this respect it is set apart from the multitude whole question of Europe in national of research on citizen and voter preferences politics as it only truly examines one side of on the same subject. The findings of this the voter-party story – the policy data analysis call into question the claim preferences of national political parties. highlighted in the introduction to this paper; However the results do provide an insight namely that national elections are becoming into the question and wider debate, and European in nature. The data of this study reinforce the unpredictable and volatile instead suggest that Europe has, over the nature of both European and national past 14 years, become less of a political politics, especially when the two collide. issue over which national parties compete. The European issue remains one that is widely dispersed throughout the **Please contact author for more continent’s multitude of political groups, information on data used. those few who do ascribe it a strong priority in their national campaigns are small in number and generally of the Eurosceptic References variety: likely to be on the fringes of their nation’s political spectrum. 31 Since the Bache, Ian, and Andrew Jordan. The Europeanization of British politics. millennium, the European Union has Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave undergone major structural and institutional Macmillan, 2006. change through the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon, faced unprecedented economic Bruter, M., and S. Harrison. "How European Do You Feel? The challenges with the 2010 Euro crisis, and Psychology of European Identity." witnessed significant social change in terms Lansons Communications, 2012. of public attitudes and demographics, however despite all of these factors, this De Vires, Catherine and Edwards. 2009. analysis shows that national parties have “Taking Europe To It’s Extremes: been decreasing their policy emphasis on Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism”, Party Politics 15 (1), Europe. 5-28. Using this analysis as a basic platform for gauging the general direction De Vires, Catherine and Kees van Kersbergen. 2007. “Interest, Identity that national parties are taking towards and Politics Allegiance in the Europe, two key questions for further study European Union”, Acta Politica 42, arise most distinctly. Firstly, an examination 307-328. of whether citizens of Europe are content for the European issue to be so marginalised De Vires, Catherine. 2007. “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European in national politics, or if they feel that the Integration Affects National two arenas are becoming inescapably Elections”, European Union Politics 8 intertwined and should thus have greater (3), 363-385. overlap. And secondly, a closer examination of the nature of the recent rise in Euro- De Vires, Catherine. 2010. “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How negativism in national parties highlighted in European Integration Affects Parties’ this study, to examine the roots and Electoral Fortunes”, European Union motivations of this highly significant Politics 11 (1), 89-117. Evans, Geoffrey and Sarah Blunt. 2007. 31 Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan, The Europeanization “Explaining Change in British Public of British Politics (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Opinion on the European Union: Top Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
88 Movements, pp 165-194. Cambridge: Down or Bottom Up?”, Acta Politics Cambridge University Press. 42, 173-190). Tillman, Erik. 2004. “The European Union Gabel, Mathew. 2000. “European at the Ballot Box?: European Integration, Voters, and National Integration and Voting Behaviour in Politics”, West European Politics 23 the New Member States”, (4), 52-72. Comparative Political Studies 37 (5), Hix, Simon and Christophe Crombez. 2013. 560-610. “Why the 2014 European Parliament Van der Eijk, Cees and Mark Franklin eds. elections will be about more than 1996. Choosing Europe? The protest votes.” Europpblog, June 3. European Electorate and National http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/ Politics in the Face of the Union. Ann 06/03/european-parliament-electionsArbor: University of Michigan Press. 2014/ Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh. 2007. “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections”, The Journal of Politics 69 (2), 495-510 Lindberg, Leon and Stuart Scheingold. 1970. Europe’s Would-be Polity, Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall. Mair, Peter. 2000. “The limited impact of Europe on national party systems”, Journal of European Public Policy 23 (4), 27-51. Manifesto Project Database. (2014). Full Dataset [Data file]. Retrieved from https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ Peters, Jit. 2005. “National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice”, European Constitutional Law Review 1 (1), 6872. Ray, Leonard. 2007. “Mainstream Euroscepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?”, Acta Politica 42 (2 / 3), 153-172. Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework For The Analysis Of European Election Results”, European Journal of Political Research 8, 3-44. Steenbergen, Marco and David Scott. 2004. Contesting Europe? The Salience of European Integration as a Party Issue, in Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (eds) European Integration and Political Conflict: Parties, Voters, Interest Groups, and Social McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
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Cultural Genocide in Aboriginal Residential Schools in Canada by Marianne Emler Indian residential schools have been an important topic of discussion in Canada as of late. The apology put forward by Stephen Harper and the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 marked a historic change in the government’s approach to residential schools.1 These events seemed to signal that the Canadian government was ready to take the steps to address what Prime Minister Stephen Harper describes as a “sad chapter” in the country’s history,2 largely referring to the existence of residential schools which first opened in Canada in the mid-1800s.3 While Aboriginal people were originally favourable to the idea of these schools, seeing them as an opportunity for their youth to gain an education that would allow them to “prevent [their] race from perishing, and to enable [them] to stand on the same ground as white men”4, their views would rapidly change as they realised that the cost of this education was the abandonment of their native culture.5 However, despite opposition from Aboriginal peoples, residential schools were opened across Canada. In 1894, as their resistance to these schools grew stronger, the government amended the Indian Act making attendance compulsory.6 1 Stephen Harper, "Statement of Apology." Aboriginal Affairs and North Development of Canada. 11 Jun. 2008. Web. <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca%2Feng%2F1100100015644%2F1100100 015649>. 2 Ibid., 208. 3 Agnes Grant. No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada. Winnipeg: Pemmican Pub., 1996. 58-59. 4 Ibid., 58. 5 Ibid., 59. 6 Ibid., 65.
What then followed was decades of abuse and cultural destruction, resulting in the death of over 4,000 Aboriginal students.7 As information about residential schools begins to surface and official policy goals are revealed, scholars have begun to question whether or not the Canadian government can be charged with committing crimes of genocide against its Aboriginal people in residential schools. This essay will examine the case of residential schools, focusing on their alleged purpose as well as the actions that took place within them, in terms of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). Following this, we shall consider the notion of cultural genocide, which was removed from the original draft of the UNCG. Finally we shall evaluate how the Canadian government has been able to evade charges of genocide despite having ratified both the UNCG and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to evaluate whether or not the Canadian government can be charged with the crime of genocide for its treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools, we must first examine the UNCG and determine how residential schools may or may not fit its criteria for genocide. Article II of the UNCG states that: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such; a) Killing members of the group 7
Mary Kennedy. "At Least 4,000 Aboriginal Children Died in Residential Schools, Commission Finds." National Post. 3 Jan. 2014. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/01/03/at-least4000-aboriginal-children-died-in-residential-schoolscommission-finds/>.
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91 b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”8 The notion of “intent” is often seen as problematic since it remains highly subjective. This vagueness is used both by groups arguing that a genocide has been committed against them, as well as by their opponents who seek to defend themselves against charges of genocide. In the case of residential schools in Canada, however, the numerous statements made regarding the purpose of residential schools leave little room for doubt. The Canadian government’s main objective was to bring about the assimilation of Aboriginal children, with this coming at the cost of their Aboriginal language, culture and heritage, essentially “tak[ing] the Indian out of the child.”9 In the late 19th century, it became clear that Aboriginals were opposed to propositions of enfranchisement that were being made to them. This led the Canadian government to redirect its efforts, focusing instead on the assimilation of the Aboriginal youth in residential schools.10
After experimenting with day schools, the Canadian government came to the conclusion that these were insufficient as a means of assimilation, with Sir Hector Langevin, the Secretary of State for the Provinces, declaring in 1883 that, “If you leave [children] with the family [the children] may know how to read and write, but they will remain savages.”11 Residential schools were therefore seen as a solution to this problem, by removing Aboriginal children from “the deleterious home influences to which [they] would otherwise be subjected.”12 In addition to seeking to detach children from their community’s cultural influences, the residential schools were intended to place Aboriginal children at the bottom of the economic ladder by providing them with only the most basic education which meant many left the school illiterate.13 One characteristic commonly attributed to genocide is the loss of human life. According to Duncan Campbell Scott, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, in 1913 “fifty percent of children who passed through these [residential] schools did not live to benefit from the education they received therein.”14 This startling high death rate is largely the result of the tuberculosis epidemics which ravaged student populations in residential schools. Indeed, in 1904 tuberculosis was actually identified as the leading cause of death among Aboriginal people. This was significantly due to the large, poorly ventilated dormitories in which the children 11
8
“Convention on the Prevention” 1948, 174. Gloria Galloway. "Ottawa Ordered to Find and Release Millions of Indian Residential School Records." Globe and Mail. 30 Jan. 2013. Web. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/otta wa-ordered-to-find-and-release-millions-of-indianresidential-school-records/article8001068/>. 10 Andrew Woolford. "Ontological Destruction: Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples." Genocide Studies and Prevention 4.1 (2009): 81-97. Web. doi:10.1353/gsp.0.0010. 9
Wahbung: Our Tomorrows. Winnipeg: Manitoba Indian Brotherhood. 1971. 12 Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 65. 13 David B. Macdonald and Graham Hudson. "The Genocide Question and Indian Residential Schools in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 45.2 (2012): 427-49. doi:10.1017/S000842391200039X. 432. 14 Charles Leslie Glenn. American Indian/First Nations Schooling: From the Colonial Period to the Present. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 195. McGill Journal of Political Studies -Volume VI, Winter 2015
92 slept, where poor air circulation created the perfect conditions for the outbreak of an epidemic.15 Bryce, a medical inspector for the Department of the Interior described these conditions as being so poor that it was almost as if they had been “deliberately created.”16 While statements of the sort may raise concern, the evidence of intent we have does not seem sufficient to support an accusation of genocide against the Canadian government. However, the Canadian government was undoubtedly negligent. The fact that the death rate of children in non-residential schools was five times as low as that of residential schools suggests that even if it did not directly kill these children, the Canadian government’s negligence makes it partly responsible for their deaths.17 Whilst the Canadian government may not have orchestrated the violent deaths of children in residential schools, recent testimonies from residential school survivors have highlighted the extreme brutality of staff and described many brutal forms of punishments given to the children, ranging from beatings to starvation or choking.18 However it was the revelations of sexual abuse that most greatly shocked Canadians when, in October 1990, Phil Fontaine, then-Grand Chief of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, revealed he had been sexually abused as a child at Indian Lake Residential School.19 This type of abuse has been described as “incestuous”, as it took place between the children and the staff, who acted as their
“surrogate parents” in these schools.20 This sexual and physical abuse, in addition to cutting them off from their families and Nations, has caused many residential school survivors to develop mental illnesses. Chief among these is Residential School Syndrome (RSS), which presents itself among survivors who suffer symptoms similar to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.21 This condition is said to be virtually identical to Concentration Camp Syndrome that can be observed in survivors of Nazi and Soviet concentration camps.22 The long-term mental repercussions endured by residential school survivors would constitute strong evidence in favour of a genocide ruling, if it were possible to explicitly identify this as having been the government’s intention. However, as with the killing of Aboriginal children, the government may be at the root of these mental problems, but evidence lacks to support that this outcome was their explicit aim. Article II, section (c) of the UNCG considers acts committed with intent such as “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”23 As was illustrated by the tuberculosis epidemic, the sanitary conditions in schools were often very poor. This was the case despite that fact that the Canadian government had been made aware of these conditions on numerous occasions. The government claims that 20
15
Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 118. 16 Ibid. 17 David Roberts. "Death Cast Shadow at Boarding School for Indian Children." Globe and Mail. Nov. 15, 1990. 18 Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 226. 19 Wayne K Spear. “‘I Had Been Sexually Abused at Residential School.’" The Huffington Post. Nov. 1, 2012. Web. 30 Nov. 2014.
Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 228. 21 Charles Brasfield. "Residential School Syndrome." British Columbia Medial Journal 43.2 (March 2001): 78-81. Web. <http://www.bcmj.org/article/residential-schoolsyndrome>. 79. 22 Ward Churchill. Kill the Indian, save the Man: The Genocidal Impact of American Indian Residential Schools. San Francisco: City Lights, 2004. 70. 23 United Nations, General Assembly, “Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide”, 174-177 (General Assembly of the United Nations 1948). 174.
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93 budget restrictions prevented it from carrying out suggested renovations to the schools, which would have helped to improve air circulation and lower the risk of tuberculosis transmission.24 While it cannot be said that the Canadian government was actively involved in the homicide of children during the tuberculosis epidemic, the government may indeed have created living conditions that would be likely to result in the deaths of Aboriginal children. Reports of the poor design of schools, highlighting the fact that they put children at increased risk of tuberculosis, were circulating as early as 1897.25 Despite this, very few schools were fortunate enough to see improvements, as both the government and the church claimed they could not fund improvements.26 Depending on what is meant by “physical destruction” of a group, the case can also be made that loss of culture leads to a loss of group identity, will ultimately result in the “extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the remainder of the community.”27 The next section of Article II of the UNCG addresses the issue of governments preventing births in a group. While preventing new births amongst Aboriginal peoples who attended residential schools does not appear to be a viable argument to support a case of genocide against the Canadian government, and so section (d) does seem to provide support in substantiating such claims. Indeed, the lack of sexual education in residential schools, with girls instead being taught to “abhor” their bodies,28 appears to
be the closest residential schools got to preventing new births. This is still a long way off from measures such as forced sterilizations, to which this section of the UNCG tends to refer.29 Section (e) seems to be the one that most strongly supports claims of genocide against the Canadian government, because the Indian Act sanctioned the forced transfer of children to residential schools. Indeed Section 119, paragraph 6 states that:
24
29
Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 118. 25 Ibid., 117. 26 Ibid., 121. 27 Antonio Cassese, Guido Acquaviva, Mary Fan, and Alex Whiting. International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 219. 28 Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada, 230.
“A truant officer may take into custody a child whom he believes on reasonable grounds to be absent from school contrary to this Act and may convey the child to school, using as much force as the circumstances require.”30 The impact this document may have had is difficult to quantify, as we rely almost exclusively on testimonies from survivors who have chosen to come forward. Regardless, this document provides undeniable evidence of the Canadian government’s support for the forcible removal of children from their families, although once again we must find genocidal intent in the governments’ actions, to be able to accuse it of crimes of genocide. Article II of the UNCG, which we have examined above, provides substantial arguments to support accusations of genocide against the Canadian government. Rhonda Copelon. "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International Criminal Law." McGill Law Journal 46.217 (20002001): 218-40. HeinOnline, pp. 227-228. 30 "Backgrounder - Changes to the Indian Act Affecting Indian Residential Schools." Government of Canada; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada; Communications Branch. 2010. <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015573/1100100015574>.
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94 However, the problem of the notion of ‘intent’ is once more apparent. The main reason we struggle with the lack of specificity of this term is that in the UNCG that was adopted by the General Assembly, no indication is given as to whether genocide also includes what is often referred to as cultural genocide or ethnocide. Cultural genocide had been specifically included in the draft of the UNCG, but this was later removed after critics commented that it seemed unreasonable “to include in the same convention both mass murders in gas chamber and the closing of libraries.”31 The draft article on cultural genocide stated that it “consists not in the destruction of members of a group nor in restriction on birth, but in the destruction by brutal means of the specific characteristics of a group.”32 One of the draft article’s authors, lawyer Raphael Lemkin, provides us with a justification for the inclusion of cultural genocide in the UNCG. He argues that cultural genocide is “a policy which by drastic methods, aim[s] at the rapid and complete disappearance of the cultural, moral and religious life of a group of human beings”, differing from forced assimilation which uses only “moderate” forms of coercion.33 It could be argued that, by listing “mental harm” as a means of destroying a group, Article II section (b) of the current UNCG does provide groups with the opportunity to put forward charges of cultural genocide against the state.34 However, building a case of genocide that 31 David Nersessian. "Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law." Human Rights Dialogue 2.12 (2005): 7-8. Web. <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archiv e/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139.html/ :pf_printable>. 32 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1947). 27. 33 Ibid., 28. 34 Woolford, 87.
is based on mental harm, triggered by abuse and loss of heritage which has occurred as a result of residential schools, is likely to be much more difficult than a case which could refer specifically to the loss of a key aspect of culture such as language. In addition to the forced transfer of children that we find in the current UNCG, the draft convention also included the “prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse.”35 Recognising the prohibition of a language as a tool of genocide in the UNCG would have greatly helped in building a genocide case against Canada, as the prohibition of native languages was indeed one of the hallmarks of residential schools. Upon entering residential schools, students were forbidden to speak in their native tongues. Many testimonies highlight this as one of the most strictly enforced rules in residential schools, leading to the most frequent punishments. This rule was enforced so strictly that even children who had no previous knowledge of English would be beaten if they spoke in another language.36 Many Aboriginal elders, such as Vi Hilbert, an Upper Skagit Elder, have pointed out that “culture is embedded in the very architecture of a language.”37 Schools preventing children from speaking their native languages meant that many were then unable to communicate with their parents when they would eventually return home.38 This in turn prevents the transmission of the Aboriginals’ oral tradition, “a complex process synonymous with the native Ways of Knowing and Interacting, through which language, culture and identity are transmitted intergenerationally.”39 Breaking this chain of transmission would then prevent future 35
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 29. Grant, No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada,189. 37 Ibid., 193. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 36
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95 generations from gaining this knowledge, and this was most likely the goal of the Canadian government. The policy of prohibiting native languages in schools was likely inspired by the United States’ Peace Commission of 1867, which argued that “schools should be established, which children should be required to attend; their barbarous dialect should be blotted out and the English language substituted.”40 This essay has, thus far, highlighted various aspects of residential schools that would provide strong evidence to support charges of crimes of genocide against the Canadian government, if only the governments’ ‘intent’ to “destroy” Aboriginal groups could be identified. However, even if this ‘intent’ could be identified, it may still remain impossible to charge the Canadian government with crimes of genocide. The reason for this is that, when ratifying UNCG in 1952, Canada’s Pearson government was able to exclude aspects of the UNCG which it felt were of “little relevance” to Canada, claiming that these were aimed at some specific events in Europe.41 As a result, only Article II sections (a) and (b) of the UNCG form part of the Canadian Criminal Code. This notably excludes the forced transfer of children, under section (e). The reason given for this by Prime Minister Pearson, was that “mass transfers of children to another group are unknown… in Canada.”42 This justification does not seem to hold much weight when we consider the fact that forced transfers are described in the Indian Act under Section 119. The credibility of Pearson’s claims is further weakened as he then goes on to state that “mental harm” is simply a “physical injury
to the mental faculties.”43 Pearson’s apparent ignorance of the existence of mental illnesses seems unlikely, considering the fact that institutions such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists had been founded over a century before Pearson’s statements were made.44 Enacting the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (CAHWCA) in 2000, which fully implements the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, appears to resolve the lacunas of Canadian criminal law. This now authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute both citizens and noncitizens of Canada for crimes of genocide that may have been committed anywhere in the world.45 However, MacDonald and Hudson identify weaknesses in the CAHWCA, noting that while crimes committed outside of Canada can be brought to trial regardless of when they took place, the same is not true for Canada. In Canada, genocidal acts are only deemed to be prosecutable if these occurred after the international adoption of the Rome Statute.46 In essence, this means that there is a retroactivity clause in Canada which that prevents trials for genocidal acts that were committed prior to the 17th of July 1998.47 The implication of this is that, even if one was able to identify the ‘intent’ of the Canadian government to commit genocide through residential schools, it will be impossible to press charges against the government in a Canadian court. As a trial cannot be held at a national court, Aboriginal peoples will need to explore other avenues of justice if they wish for a ruling of genocide to be made. One possibility would be to bring a case 43
Ibid. "College History and Archives." Royal College of Psychiatrists. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. <http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/usefulresources/thecollege archives.aspx>. 45 Macdonald and Hudson, 436. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 430. 44
40
Jon Allan Reyhner and Jeanne M. Ovawin. Eder. "Teaching American Indian Students." A History of Indian Education. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. 41. 41 Macdonald and Hudson, 435. 42 Ibid.
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96 against Canada to the UN Human Rights Committee. Cases such as Lovelace v. Canada are encouraging for this.48 It must be remembered, however, that the UN Human Rights Committee, like many international organisations, lacks enforcement mechanisms, allowing countries to be selective in choosing what they will enforce. An example of this is the Committee’s ruling in Waldman v. Canada concerning the allocation of public funds to Catholic schools in Ontario, as the recommendations made have so far been ignored.49
prevents this “sad chapter” of its history from being unearthed and exposed in trial. The Canadian government’s efforts to protect itself at the national level are supplemented by the absence of clarity which we have seen in the UNCG. This lack of clarity allows Canada to frame the intentional prevention of the transmission of a group’s culture as an unfortunate side effect of their goal of assimilating and integrating Aboriginal peoples into mainstream Canadian society.
The psychological trauma and physical abuse that Aboriginal children suffered in residential schools is undoubtedly one of the most tragic chapters in Canadian history. It is shocking to discover that this is actually part of the country’s recent past, with the last residential school closing its doors in 1996.50 There are many questions about this period that still remain unanswered. Despite the suffering and tragic loss of life that occurred in residential schools, we can conclude that the government of Canada cannot be charged with genocide for its treatment of Aboriginal children in these schools. Canada has successfully insulated itself from such a prosecution by drafting only certain “relevant” sections of the UNCG into the Canadian Criminal Code. In addition, by implementing a nonretroactivity clause as part of its implementation of the CAHWCA and the Rome Statute of the ICC, the government
"Backgrounder - Changes to the Indian Act Affecting Indian Residential Schools." Government of Canada; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada; Communications Branch. 2010. Web. <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015573/1100 100015574>. Brasfield, Charles. "Residential School Syndrome." British Columbia Medial Journal 43.2 (March 2001): 78-81. Web. <http://www.bcmj.org/article/residenti al-school-syndrome>. Cassese, Antonio, Guido Acquaviva, Mary Fan, and Alex Whiting. International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. Churchill, Ward. Kill the Indian, save the Man: The Genocidal Impact of American Indian Residential Schools. San Francisco: City Lights, 2004. Print. "College History and Archives." Royal College of Psychiatrists. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. <http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/usefulreso urces/thecollegearchives.aspx>. Copelon, Rhonda. "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International
48
René Kuppe and Richard Potz. Law & Anthropology: International Yearbook for Legal Anthropology. Vol. 10. The Hague, Netherlands: Klumer Law, 1999. 49 Report of the Human Rights Committee. Report. Vol. II. New York: United Nations, 2000. 50 "Residential Schools." Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 7 Nov. 2014. Web. <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca%2Feng%2F1302882353814%2F1302882 592498>.
References
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97 Criminal Law." McGill Law Journal 46.217 (2000-2001): 218-40. HeinOnline. Galloway, Gloria. "Ottawa Ordered to Find and Release Millions of Indian Residential School Records." Globe and Mail. 30 Jan. 2013. Web. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ne ws/politics/ottawa-ordered-to-findand-release-millions-of-indianresidential-schoolrecords/article8001068/>. Glenn, Charles Leslie. American Indian/First Nations Schooling: From the Colonial Period to the Present. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print. Grant, Agnes. No End of Grief: Indian Residential Schools in Canada. Winnipeg: Pemmican Pub., 1996. Print. Harper, Stephen. "Statement of Apology." Aboriginal Affairs and North Development of Canada. 11 Jun. 2008. Web. <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca%2Feng%2F11001000156 44%2F1100100015649>. Kennedy, Mary. "At Least 4,000 Aboriginal Children Died in Residential Schools, Commission Finds." National Post. 3 Jan. 2014. Web. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/0 1/03/at-least-4000-aboriginalchildren-died-in-residential-schoolscommission-finds/>. Kuppe, René, and Richard Potz. Law & Anthropology: International Yearbook for Legal Anthropology, Vol. 10. The Hague, Netherlands: Klumer Law, 1999. Macdonald, David B., and Graham Hudson. "The Genocide Question and Indian Residential Schools in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 45.2 (2012): 427-49. Web. doi:10.1017/S000842391200039X.
Nersessian, David. "Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law." Human Rights Dialogue 2.12 (2005): 7-8. Web. <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/pub lications/archive/dialogue/2_12/sectio n_1/5139.html/:pf_printable>. Report of the Human Rights Committee. Report, Vol. II. New York: United Nations, 2000. "Residential Schools." Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. Web. 7 Nov. 2014. <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca%2Feng%2F13028823538 14%2F1302882592498>. Reyhner, Jon Allan, and Jeanne M. Ovawin Eder. "Teaching American Indian Students." A History of Indian Education. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. Print. Roberts, David. "Death Cast Shadow at Boarding School for Indian Children." Globe and Mail. Nov. 15, 1990. Web. Spear, Wayne K. “‘I Had Been Sexually Abused at Residential School.’” The Huffington Post. 1 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/wayne -k-spear/residentialschool_b_2049925.html>. United Nations, General Assembly, Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948). 174-177. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1947). 1-85. Wahbung: Our Tomorrows. Winnipeg: Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, 1971. Woolford, Andrew. "Ontological Destruction: Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples." Genocide Studies and Prevention 4.1 (2009): 81-97. Web. doi:10.1353/gsp.0.0010.
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Neocolonialism, Neopatrimonialism, and Weak Civil Society: Factors Contributing to Domestic Support for Uganda’s AntiHomosexuality Bill, 2009 by Sean Cohen Introduction: Uganda’s AntiHomosexuality Bill, 2009 On September 25, 2009, Ugandan Member of Parliament David Bahati proposed the Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB) to Uganda’s Parliament. 1 By recriminalizing homosexuality, the AHB expanded on existing Ugandan legislation, which prohibits consensual sex between individuals of the same sex, a crime punishable by life imprisonment. 2 Inter alia, the bill called for the death penalty in situations of “aggravated homosexuality”,3 criminalized the “promotion of homosexuality”, 4 and imposed a fine and imprisonment for persons who failed to disclose knowledge of homosexual offenders to the appropriate Ugandan
1 The full text of the AHB can be found here: <http://www.publiceye.org/publications/globalizingthe-culture-wars/pdf/uganda-bill-september-09.pdf.> This paper focuses on the bill proposed in 2009, which was tabled in 2010. The bill was reintroduced in slightly amended form in 2012, passed in Uganda’s parliament in 2013, and signed into law in 2014. (Kristen Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism, “Tradition, and Human Rights in Uganda’s Gay Death Penalty, African Studies Review 55, (2012): 91-92; Lucas Paoli Itaborahy and Jingshu Zhu, StateSponsored Homophobia, International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association, (2014): 49.) 2 “Uganda: Anti-Homosexuality Bill Is Inherently Discriminatory and Threatens Broader Human Rights, Amnesty International, (2010): 6. 3 Ibid.,10. 4 Ibid.,14.
authorities. 5 In violation of international law, the proposed legislation would also nullify Uganda’s legally binding international human rights commitments, 6 and several of its clauses violated Uganda’s Constitution.7 While the AHB met predictable outrage from domestic and international human rights organizations, Uganda’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, and a number of foreign governments, domestic attitudes against homosexuality drove support of its proposal. Mass demonstrations were held in Uganda’s largest cities in support of the proposed legislation, which Cheney called “a textbook example of a ‘moral panic,’”8 a view echoed by Sadgrove et al.9 This paper attempts to identify the main factors that contributed to the moral panic that led to domestic support of the AntiHomosexuality Bill. I argue that neocolonialism manifest in pressure from American evangelical actors, neopatrimonialism, and weak Ugandan civil society are factors that contributed to domestic support for the AHB, and offer 5
Sylvia Tamale, “Sylvia Tamale, Impact Assessment of the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2009,, The Equal Rights Review 4, (2009): 53. 6 “Uganda: Anti-Homosexuality Bill, 17. 7 Tamale, anti-Homosexuality Bill assessment,, 54. 8 Sociologist Stanley Cohen coined the term “moral panic.” He defines it as a period when a “condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerge to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.” Herdt writes that moral panics are viewed domestically in the society where they occurring as “large social events occurring in troubled-times when a serious threat by evil-doers incites social reaction.” See Giblert Herdt, “Introduction: Moral Panics, Sexual Rights, and Cultural Anger,” in Moral Panics, Sex Panics: Fear and the Fight over Sexual Rights, ed. Gilbert Herdt (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 3, 5. 9 Joanna Sadgrove et al., “Morality Plays and Money Matters: Towards a Situated Understanding of the Politics of Homosexuality in Uganda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 50, (2012): 111.
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100 evidence that these factors motivated its neocolonialism in the African context draw proposal. To support this argument, I use parallels between current Western influence comparative political analysis to apply on the continent and the legacies of these factors to explain the existence of colonialism. The importance of similar legislation in Nigeria, and to show neocolonialism for understanding domestic that the absence of these factors helps to support for Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality explain the legal rights and protections of Bill cannot be overemphasized. As Tamale LGBT people in South Africa. outlined, the preamble of the AHB cites “[strengthening] the nation’s capacity to deal with emerging internal and external Homophobia: A Neocolonial Import The widespread domestic support threats to the family unit,” and for Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill can “[protecting] the cherished culture of the be explained by moral panic. Gilbert Herdt people of Uganda” as reasons for justifying writes that moral panics over sexuality its existence.14 Implicit in the above justification “generate the creation of monstrous enemies—sexual scapegoats. This of protecting Ugandans from Western ‘othering’ dehumanizes and strips cultural influence is that homosexuality is individuals and whole communities of un-African. However, most scholars argue sexual and reproductive rights.” 10 Sexual that homosexuality has existed on the panics are, according to Cheney, “deeply African continent for centuries.15 In fact, as political constructions.” 11 This point is Amory suggests, “virulent homophobia further elaborated by Amory, who writes may be the real western perversion at work that “sexual orientation has become a here.” 16 K. Kendall, quoted in Dlamini, cause, or perhaps an excuse, for political shares this view, believing that persecution and personal violence in “homophobia is far more likely to qualify 12 diverse African contexts.” as ‘unAfrican’n[sic] than homosexuality.”17 Neocolonialism contributed to this moral In the context of moral panic, the timing of panic, but not in the ways that Ugandan the AHB is not coincidental. The bill was officials argue. introduced several months after American The colonial project in Africa evangelicals spoke at an anti-gay involved Western “conquest, enslavement conference in Uganda called the “Seminar and subjection” to Western hegemonic on Exposing the Homosexual Agenda”. 18 institutions and culture. 13 Notions of Hence, Cheney maintains that “U.S. conservative evangelicalism therefore 10 Quoted in Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism,” 79. Herdt refers to moral panics over sexuality as sexual panics. In a society where a sexual panic is occurring, “through state and non state mechanisms that impinge on institutions and communities, people become totally overwhelmed by and defined through the meanings and rhetoric of sexual threats and fears.” See Herdt, “Introduction: Moral Panics, Sexual Rights, and Cultural Anger,” 5. 11 Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism,” 83. 12 Deborah Amory, ““Homosexuality” in Africa: Issues and Debates,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 25, (1997): 5. 13 Edwin Brett, “Dependency and Development: Some Problems Involved in the Analysis of Change in Colonial Africa,” Cahiers d’études africaines 11,
(1971): 13; Crawford Young, “The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy,” in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 41. 14 Tamale, “Human Rights Assessment,” 49-50. 15 Amory, ““Homosexuality” in Africa,” 5; Busangokwakhe Dlamini, “Homosexuality in the African Context,” Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, (2006): 129; Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism,” 80. 16 Amory, ““Homosexuality” in Africa,” 5. 17 Dlamini, “Homosexuality in the African Context,”131. 18 Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism” 84.
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101 constitutes the real neocolonialism in this case—not homosexuality.” 19 It is also The Anti-Homosexuality Bill in a rumoured that Ugandan Member of Neopatrimonial Context Parliament David Bahati has strong ties Neopatrimonialism, partly with the American evangelical organization disguised by moral panic, helps explain called “The Family”. 20 Thus, it could be domestic support for Uganda’s Antiargued that neocolonial pressures not only Homosexuality Bill, and may also explain led to domestic support for the AHB, but why it was proposed. A neopatrimonial motivated Bahati to propose it, and political system is defined as one “in which motivated his fellow legislators to support the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal it in Parliament. 24 In other words, Jackson and Rosberg emphasize institution. that domestic and foreign notions of neopatrimonialism is the expression of legitimate government must be personal rule through the use of state differentiated. 21 They argue against the resources and bureaucratic institutions.25 In Weberian definition of the state, the Ugandan context, the proposed Antimaintaining that a legal, not empirical, Homosexuality Bill can be understood as understanding of statehood allows both a neopatrimonial response to, and contemporary postcolonial African states to sustaining cause of, moral panic that “influence and take advantage of contributed to domestic support of the bill. international rules and ideologies Parliamentary legislation, in other words, is concerning what is desirable and the state resource used by David Bahati and undesirable” for their domestic and foreign other Ugandan Members of Parliament, to affairs. 22 Ironically, in maintaining that address the concerns and demands of their homosexuality is a Western import, clientele, moral panic stricken constituents. Chabal and Daloz recognize the rejecting Western criticism of the AntiHomosexuality Bill, 23 and continuing to importance of the neopatrimonial model, support the proposed legislation, Ugandan but stress that it can only be useful in an legislators are actually losing their analytical sense if it is acknowledged that institutionalization [in independence from international political Cbureaucratic actors, by falling victim to the influence of Africa] never managed to overcome the neocolonialism manifested in homophobic strongly instrumental and personalized sexual panic. Yet, neocolonialism alone characteristics of ‘traditional’ African cannot fully explain the moral panic that administration.” 26 They go on to suggest led to domestic support for Uganda’s Anti- that there is “profit to be found in the weak institutionalization of political practices.”27 Homosexuality Bill. Cammack shares this view, and argues that “with so little accountability, so much 19 Ibid., 92. centralization of power, and such high 20
Sadgrove et al., “Morality Plays and Money Matters,” 113. 21 Robert Jackson and Carl Robserg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridicial in Statehood,” World Politics 35, (1982): 7. 22 Ibid., 21. 23 For example, in response to the threat of withdrawn foreign aid as a result of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, Ugandan Ethics Minister James Butoro said, “I say that Uganda’s integrity is more than the money they give us (Sadgrove et al. 115).
24
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62. 25 Ibid., 61-62. 26 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 2010), 12-23. 27 Ibid., 13.
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102 political stakes, it is not surprising that went so far as calling similar 2012 human rights abuse and politically inspired legislation a “Christmas present”hfor her crime are common in [neopatrimonial] constituents, that is to say, clientele.34 The neopatrimonial argument for states.” 28 In other words, Cammack understands that African political actors explaining domestic support for Uganda’s who violate human rights have rational Anti-Homosexuality Bill can be taken one step further. Sadgrove et al. argue that political reasons for doing so.29 As Bareebe and House reported, many moral anxieties in Uganda can be “Ugandan gays are a lot like nuclear placed in a financial context. 35 Cheney weapons in North Korea: the threat to blow observes that “fertility [is] a barometer of one up gets intensified whenever either social stability” for Ugandans and the government comes under increased country as whole.36 Traditionally, Ugandan pressure.”30 Sadgrove et al. hold a parallel women receive dowries from their view, and write that Ugandan homosexuals husbands and their families, as well as are “a scapegoat for other problems such as material support from these sources for rising unemployment and poverty.” 31 their children.37 As Uganda’s fertility rate is Tamale expresses identical views. 32 The among the top in the world, 38 Cheney Anti-Homosexuality Bill was proposed at a argues that “[Ugandan] women’s time when Uganda’s President, Yoweri opposition to male homosexuality […] has Musevini, was facing domestic opposition more to do with perceived threats to their due to his increasingly autocratic rule, and [material] well-being than with child reports that he misappropriated funds from protection or the mere maintenance of foreign aid and aided rebels in the fertility”. 39 Ugandans thus perceive Democratic Republic of the Congo. 33 homosexuality as threatening the traditional Accordingly, from a neopatrimonial family because homosexuals “redirect perspective, it could be argued that Bahati resources into newly formed networks” and and other young MPs who are part of access “new patronage networks and Museveni’s National Resistance Movement opportunities”.40 (NRM) supported the AHB to distract In this light, political actors used Ugandans from opposition towards the Ugandans’ sexual panic to “[pit] capitalist government, and to provide them with a ideals against spiritual ones so that state and bureaucratic resource, in the form [Ugandans] see the tools of a rights-based, of legislation, to address their moral panic. capitalist, Western model confronting a Political rhetoric in Uganda surrounding God fearing, family-oriented Uganda”. 41 the bill supports this view: Uganda’s This also helps explain the Ugandan Parliamentary Speaker, Rebecca Kadaga, government’s criticism of Western states that threatened to withdraw aid from their 28 Diana Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?” Development Policy Review 25, (2007): 604. 29 Ibid., 599. 30 Gerald Bareebe and Brett House, “How Uganda’s ‘Kill the Gays’ Bill is a Homophobic Farce,” National Post, (30 Nov. 2012). 31 Sadgrove et al., “Morality Plays and Money Matters,” 110. 32 Tamale, “Human Rights Assessment,” 51. 33 Bareebe and House, “How Uganda’s ‘Kill the Gays’ Bill is a Homophobic Farce.”
34
Ibid. Sadgrove et al., “Morality Plays and Money Matters, 114. 36 Cheney, “Locating Neocolonialism,, 87. 37 Ibid., 88. 38 World Bank, “Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman), World Development Indicators, (2014). 39 Ibid. 40 Sadgrove et al., “Morality Plays and Money Matters, 122-123. 41 Ibid.,114. 35
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103 country as a result of the bill. Therefore, the human rights organizations’ attempts to Anti-Homosexuality Bill can be understood influence the media’s coverage of the Antias a state resource provided by political Homosexuality Bill. Following content patrons to their clients in order to protect analysis, it was found that domestic their material interests surrounding coverage of the AHB increased as a result marriage and childbirth. Understanding this of international pressure. 46 However, in beneficial neopatrimonial relationship, Uganda’s state-owned New Vision and owned Daily Monitor Ugandan legislators and their constituents privately newspapers, the newspapers with the supported the bill. largest circulation in the country, human rights organizations did not achieve much Weak Civil Society in Uganda A final factor that helps explain coverage against the proposed legislation,47 domestic support of Uganda’s Anti- which reflects their limited influence Homosexuality Bill is weak civil society in compared to the influence of state and Uganda. Civil society refers to a voluntary private actors. space between the state and the family, 42 The AHB’s clause criminalizing capable both of representing the country’s the promotion of homosexuality would various groups and of countering the state’s directly affect the efforts of civil society hegemonic ambitions.”43 Chabal and Daloz groups, including human rights advocates, question the ability of civil society to effect academics, students, donors, and nonpolitical change in Africa, arguing that governmental organizations, to advance African politics is often manifested in LGBT rights and advocate against the patron-client relations that render civil bill.48 Moreover, moral panic stirred by the society unnecessary and irrelevant. 44 In proposal of the bill contributed to increased Uganda, domestic support for civil society, hostility against these groups. This fact was and the influence of civil society, have made painfully obvious in 2011 when waned as a result of historical and David Kato, a gay activist and co-founder structural factors, including fear in of the organization Sexual Minorities participating in civil society, political Uganda, was murdered. LGBT civil society repression of civil society, and external groups cannot peacefully and safely actors’aoverlooking of human rights assemble in Uganda or hold LGBT pride interests when providing foreign aid. 45 events, and cannot expect to receive Civil society was weakened further by the security, let alone sympathy, from proposal of the AHB, which rendered it authorities at such events, or rallies.49 Thus, largely unable to quell the moral panic weak civil society failed to quell the moral contributing to its domestic support. panic in Uganda that contributed to In a comprehensive study, Strand domestic support for the Antievaluated the effectiveness of Ugandan 46 42
Khalid Medani, Lecture Sept. 3 2014 at McGill University 43 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works, 19. 44 Ibid., 21. 45 Susan Dicklitch and Doreen Lwanga, “The Politics of Being Non-Political: Human Rights Organizations and the Creation of a Positive Human Rights Culture in Uganda,” Human Rights Quarterly 25, (2003): 483484.
Cecilia Strand, “Kill Bill! Ugandan human rights organizations' attempts to influence the media's coverage of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill,, Culture, Health & Sexuality 13, (2011): 923. 47 Ibid., 926. 48 Tamale, “Human Rights Assessment,, 53. 49 Susan Dicklitch, Berwood Yost, and Bryan Dougan, “Building a barometer of gay rights (BGR): A case study of Uganda and the persecution of homosexuals,, Human Rights Quarterly 34, (2012): 461.
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104 Homosexuality Bill, and facilitated its politics perspective, should the factors proposal. Moreover, as sexual panic applied to the Ugandan case be found to continues to spread in Uganda, there are no contribute to domestic support for Nigeria’s signs that Ugandan civil society is gaining anti-homosexual legislation, their relevance in influence. for the Ugandan case will be increased. Nigerian society is conservative and highly religious, and is considered the Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage world’s most intolerant society towards (Prohibition) Act, 2013 Together, the factors discussed LGBT peoples. 51 In this regard, a above—neocolonialism manifest in spokesman to Nigeria’s president Goodluck pressure from American evangelical actors, Jonathan told the Associated Press that the neopatrimonialism, and weak civil 2013 law “is in line with [Nigerians’] society—help explain domestic support for cultural and religious inclination.” 52 There Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill, is only a small amount of scholarly specifically, the widespread moral panic research into homophobia in the Nigerian that underlay the proposed legislation. The context, perhaps due to the fact that the marginalizing effects of moral panic are not Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act was unique to Uganda. Nigeria already had laws signed into law less than one year ago. Still, criminalizing homosexuality when its it appears likely that a neocolonial government passed in 2013 and signed into perspective, similar to the case of Uganda, law in 2014 the Same Sex Marriage can explain homophobic attitudes in (Prohibition) Act, a bill largely similar to Nigeria. This view holds that Nigerian Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill. This attitudes towards homosexuality as unnew legislation imposed further restrictions African can be explained by the Western on homosexual activity, and severe import of homophobia through external punishments for those in violation of the actors such as foreign religious groups. In law.50 fact, there is evidence that American Nigeria is a suitable country for evangelical groups actively promote anticomparison with Uganda for a number of gay views in Nigeria and throughout reasons besides the fact that its laws against Africa.53 It is less clear if homosexuality are similar. Its population, like Uganda’s, is ethnically diverse, though neopatrimonialism is a factor contributing it is a larger country in terms of both to domestic support for Nigeria’s anti-gay population and area. Both countries share a legislation. Schneider argues that “the bill similar colonial legacy, having gained is a calculated move to change the focus of independence from the United Kingdom Nigerian political debate at a time when within two years of each other (1960 for President Jonathan’s luck appears to be Nigeria and 1962 for Uganda). However, running out.” 54 As in the case of Uganda, while the vast majority of Ugandans are Christians, just over half of Nigeria’s 51 Associated Press, “Associated Press, Goodluck population is Muslim. From a comparative Jonathan Bans Gay Meetings”, CBC News, (13 Jan. 2014). Ibid. 53 Are US Evangelicals Exporting Anti-Gay Views?,, Al Jazeera, (24 Nov. 2014). 54 James Schneider, “The Politics Behind Nigeria’s Anti-Gay Law Must Be Understood Before Cameron Reconsiders UK Aid,, The Independent, (15 Jan. 2014). 52 50
Itaborahy and Zhu, State-Sponsored Homophobia, 42-43; the full text of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013 can be found here: <http://www.placng.org/new/laws/ Same%20Sex%20Marriage%20(Prohibition)%20Act, %202013.pdf.>
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105 then, this legislation can be viewed as a too early to assess the effectiveness of state resource used to address the moral Nigerian civil society groups advocating panic of Nigerian citizens, while distracting against Nigeria’s new bill, the weakening them from other domestic issues. The of Nigerian civil society as a result of the legislation may also support the demands of legislation will lessen the influence of these religious leaders in Nigeria’s north who groups, preventing the domestic promotion follow Sharia law, which also criminalizes of tolerance towards LGBT people. Thus, it and imposes punishment for is expected that moral panic towards homosexuality.55 However, unlike the case homosexuality will remain in Nigeria, and in Uganda, political support for the with it, domestic support for legislation legislation seems less concentrated in targeting homosexuals. individual political patrons, such as Accordingly, with regards to the Member of Parliament David Bahati in the Nigerian case, there are indications that Ugandan context. Still, considering the neocolonial, neopatrimonial, and weak civil level of sexual panic towards society factors contribute to domestic homosexuality in Nigeria, and the support for its anti-LGBT legislation, and functioning of neopatrimonial African contribute to moral panic in response to politics generally, as advanced in LGBT peoples. The Same Sex Marriage aforementioned arguments by Bratton and (Prohibition) Act has been a law for less van de Walle, and Chabal and Daloz, it than one year, and further research, seems probable that future research could especially fieldwork, is needed to develop a uncover stronger patron-client relations better understanding of homophobia in tying domestic support for Nigeria’s Same Nigeria, and provide additional support for Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act with the relevance of the aforementioned factors. clientelist, material-based desire for such Still, because evidence suggests the factors legislation (such as in the case of Ugandan are relevant in understanding the Nigerian case, their relevance in explaining the women). With regards to civil society, Ugandan case is increased. Human Rights Watch reports that although Nigerian civil society groups, and the Constitutional Protection of LGBT Nigerian independent media, can openly Persons in South Africa A final case to be studied with criticize the Nigerian government, activists and journalists are frequently the subjects regards to the legal status of LGBT persons of arrest and intimidation by state is that of South Africa. South Africa, like authorities. 56 The Same Sex Marriage Nigeria, is located some thousands of (Prohibition) Act, in close parallel to kilometers from Uganda. Its population is Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill, ethnically diverse and slightly larger than weakens civil society, as it imposes a Uganda’s. Its population is predominantly prison sentence of up to ten years on Christian. Furthermore, under Apartheid, individuals who participate in LGBT- homosexuality was criminalized. At the related civil society groups.57 Though it is height of the anti-Apartheid movement, constitutional protection for South Africans against discrimination on the basis of 55 Itaborahy and Zhu, State-Sponsored Homophobia, sexual orientation was proposed. This 42. 56 protection was included in South Africa’s World Report 2014: Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, (2014). interim constitution in 1993, and 57 Itaborahy and Zhu, State-Sponsored Homophobia, incorporated into its new constitution in 43. 1996, which came into force in 1997. McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
106 Accordingly, South Africa became the first contributed to political stability in South country in the world to explicitly afford Africa, and the maintenance of what could constitutional protection against be considered a rational-legal Weberian discrimination on the basis of sexual state. Neopatrimonialism in South Africa orientation. 58 The absence of the served to support the African National neocolonial, neopatrimonial, and weak civil Congress (ANC), 60 and the ANC’s society factors that contributed to domestic bureaucratic resource, a rights-based support for Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality political platform, resonated with its Bill help explain domestic support for supporters, who were marginalized during LGBT rights and protections in the South Apartheid. The consequences of African context. neopatrimonialism in the South African By definition, South Africa’s anti- context were the opposite of those in the Apartheid movement was an anti-colonial Ugandan context with regards to LGBT movement, which sought not only to put an rights and protections. end to the apartheid experiment, but also Finally, civil society in South liberal, multiracial democracy. 59 Whereas Africa can be viewed as stronger than civil in Uganda, neocolonial pressure from society in Uganda or Nigeria. On the one American evangelical groups contributed to hand, the African National Congress’ moral panic targeting LGBT persons, in Constitutional Committee’s decision to South Africa, in the final years of resistance include protection against discrimination on to Apartheid, international pressures for the basis of sexual orientation in the party’s socioeconomic equality for peoples of all proposed bill of rights can be explained ethnic and cultural backgrounds prevailed. “largely on account of the lobbying work of The overwhelming domestic and local gay groups and gay activists within international support for liberal democratic the international anti-apartheid consolidation in South Africa made the movement. 61 Furthermore, South African passing of a liberal constitution possible. courts were responsive to pressures from Moral panic towards any minority group civil society groups focused on LGBT would have been domestically dismissed as issues; the cause of these groups, equality contradictory in light of the peaceful for LGBT persons, became stronger as the transition from Apartheid that occurred in result of several landmark cases, which South Africa, culminating in its first free expanded the protections and rights of and fair election in 1994. LGBT persons.62 In the South African context, there It can thus be argued that in the is an absence of the neopatrimonial factors South African case, the absence of the that, in the Ugandan context, resulted from, factors that contributed to Ugandans’ and contributed to, sexual panic towards support for the Anti-Homosexuality Bill LGBT persons, and domestic support for help explain support for and the emergence legislation targeting homosexuals. The of LGBT rights and protections in South peaceful transition from Apartheid Africa. This, in turn, lends further support to the relevance of neocolonialism, 58
A.J.G.M. Sanders, “A.J.G.M. Sanders, the Law: A Gay Revolution in South Africa?, Journal of African Law 41, (1997): 105. 59 Jeffrey Kopstein, Mark Lichbach, and Stephen Hanson, Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 469.
60
Tom Lodge, “Neo-Patrimonial Politics in the ANC,, African Affairs 113, (2014): 2. Sanders, “Homosexuality and the Law”, 104. 62 Vasu Reddy, “Decriminalisation of Homosexuality in Post-Apartheid South Africa,, Agenda 20, (2006): 147. 61
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107 neopatrimonialism, and weak civil society threats to the livelihoods and rights of for understanding domestic support for and LGBT persons in these countries, but also the proposal of the AHB in Uganda. carry with them broader implications for human rights in Africa. Regarding the need for further Conclusion: LGBT Rights and Beyond This paper maintains that scholarly investigation, a close examination neocolonialism, neopatrimonialism, and of Ugandan politics and Parliamentary surrounding the Antiweak civil society help explain the moral debate panic that contributed to domestic support Homosexuality Bill could help to reveal in Uganda for the Anti-Homosexuality Bill whether or not there is a clear link between of 2009, proposed by Ugandan Member of domestic support of the legislation and its Parliament David Bahati. Comparative actual proposal, and could identify links neocolonialism, political analysis of LGBT rights in Nigeria between and South Africa lends further support to neopatrimonialism, weak civil society, and the relevance of these factors in explaining policy-making in Uganda. While these domestic support for the AHB. factors contributed to domestic support of Specifically, the presence of similar factors the bill, further study could also help is argued to have contributed to domestic determine whether the bill’s proposal was support for the Same Sex Marriage the result of pressures from the Ugandan (Prohibition) Act of 2013 in Nigeria, and population at large, or of Bahati’s personal the absence of similar factors is argued to or MPs’ elite interests. This paper also suggests three have contributed to the constitutional rights and protections of LGBT persons in South focal points for future research and analysis Africa. The evidence offered suggests that of LGBT acceptance and human rights in the factors contributing to domestic support the African context: neocolonialism, of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill also neopatrimonialism, and civil society. These motivated its proposal, though further are only three of innumerable political research is needed to conclude whether or factors that could help shed light on these not the same factors that explain its support subjects. However, it is noteworthy that motivated its proposal in the first place. As these factors can more generally explain Reddy argues, “respect for homosexuals is sociopolitical political change in Africa, regarded as a ‘litmus test for human rights and not just LGBT acceptance and human in previously colonial or democratic rights. This should serve as a clear societies, where colonial masters and indication to students of comparative missionaries criminalised the longstanding politics that politics are at play in more 63 ways than meet the eye on the African practice of homosexuality.” Understanding of the changing human continent. rights landscape in Africa would therefore benefit from further comparative political References research on the cultural and legal acceptance of LGBT peoples throughout "Are Us Evangelicals Exporting Anti-Gay Africa. This is especially pressing in light Views?" Al Jazeera. 27 Jul. 2012. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. of current legal developments in Nigeria and Uganda, which not only pose further Uganda: Anti-Homosexuality Bill Is Inherently Discriminatory and Threatens Broader Human Rights: 63 Vasu Reddy, “Homophobia, Human Rights and Gay Amnesty International, 2010. Print. and Lesbian Equality in Africa,, Agenda 16 (2001): 84 Amory, Deborah P. ""Homosexuality" in McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
108 in the African Context." Agenda: Africa: Issues and Debates." Issue: A Empowering Women for Gender Equity Journal of Opinion 25.1 (1997): 5-10. 20.67 (2006): 128-36. Print. Print. Herdt, Giblert. “Introduction: Moral Panics, Associated Press. "Nigeria President Sexual Rights, and Cultural Anger.” Goodluck Jonathan Bans Gay Moral Panics, Sex Panics: Fear and the Meetings." CBC News. 13 Jan. 2014. Fight over Sexual Rights. Ed. Gilbert Web. 24 Nov. 2014. Herdt. New York: New York University Bareebe, Gerald, and Brett House. "How Press, 2009. Uganda’s ‘Kill the Gays’ Bill Is a Homophobic Farce." National Post. 30 "World Report 2014: Nigeria." Human Rights Watch. 2014. Web. 24 Nov. Nov. 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2014. 2014. Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa." Itaborahy, Lucas Paoli, and Jingshu Zhu. State-Sponsored Homophobia: Democratic Experiments in Africa: International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Regime Transitions in Comparative Trans and Intersex Association, 2014. Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge Print. University Press, 1997. 61-89. Print. Jackson, Robert H, and Carl G Rosberg. Brett, Edwin A. "Dependency and "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Development: Some Problems Involved Empirical and the Juridical in in the Analysis of Change in Colonial Statehood." World Politics 35.1 (1982): Africa." Cahiers d'études africaines 1-24. Print. 11.44 (1971): 538-63. Print. Kopstein, Jeffrey, Mark Lichbach, and Cammack, Diana. "The Logic of African Stephen E Hanson. Comparative Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Politics: Interests, Identities, and Donors?" Development Policy Review Institutions in a Changing Global 25.5 (2007): 599-614. Print. Order. 3rd ed. New York: Cambridge Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as Political University Press, 2014. Print. Instrument. Oxford: James Currey, Lodge, Tom. "Neo-Patrimonial Politics in 2010. Print. the ANC." African Affairs 113.450 Cheney, Kristen. "Locating (2014): 1-23. Print. Neocolonialism, "Tradition," and Medani, Khalid Mustafa. eCourse Human Rights in Uganda's “Gay Death Overview.” African Politics, McGill Penalty”." African Studies Review 55.2 University. 3 Sep. 2014. Lecture. (2012): 77-95. Print. Reddy, Vasu. "Homophobia, Human Rights Dicklitch, Susan, and Doreen Lwanga. and Gay and Lesbian Equality in "The Politics of Being Non-Political: Africa." Agenda: Empowering Women Human Rights Organizations and the for Gender Equity 16.50 (2001): 83-87. Creation of a Positive Human Rights Print. Culture in Uganda." Human Rights ---. "Decriminalisation of Homosexuality in Quarterly 25.2 (2003): 482-509. Print. Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Brief Dicklitch, Susan, Berwood Yost, and Bryan Legal Case History Review from M Dougan. "Building a Barometer of Sodomy to Marriage." Agenda: Gay Rights (BGR): A Case Study of Empowering Women for Gender Equity Uganda and the Persecution of 20.67 (2006): 146-57. Print. Homosexuals." Human Rights Sadgrove, Joanna, et al. "Morality Plays Quarterly 34.2 (2012): 448-71. Print. and Money Matters: Towards a Situated Dlamini, Busangokwakhe. "Homosexuality Understanding of the Politics of McGill Journal of Political Studies - Volume VI, Winter 2015
109 Homosexuality in Uganda." The Journal of Modern African Studies 50.01 (2012): 103-29. Print. Sanders, A.J.G.M. "Homosexuality and the Law: A Gay Revolution in South Africa?" Journal of African Law 41.01 (1997): 100-08. Print. Schneider, James. "The Politics Behind Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Anti-Gay Law Must Be Understood before Cameron Reconsiders UK Aid." The Independent. 15 Jan. 2014. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. Strand, Cecilia. "Kill Bill! Ugandan Human Rights Organizations' Attempts to Influence the Media's Coverage of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill." Culture, Health & Sexuality 13.8 (2011): 917-31. Print. Tamale, Sylvia. "A Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Ugandan AntiHomosexuality Bill 2009." The Equal Rights Review 4 (2009): 49-57. Print. World Bank. "Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman)." World Development Indicators. 2014. Web. 23 Nov. 2014. Young, Crawford. "The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy." The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Eds. Rothchild, Donald S. and Naomi H. Chazan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 40-66. Print.
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