Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 15 PageID #: 3431
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI KMART CORPORATION VS.
PLAINTIFF CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-103-GHD-DAS
THE KROGER CO., E&A SOUTHEAST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, FULTON IMPROVEMENTS, LLC, KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, CITY OF CORINTH, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOHN DOE, and ABC CORPORATION
DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT COMES NOW, The Kroger Co. (“Kroger”), by and through its counsel of record, and files this its Motion for Summary Judgment,1 and in support thereof would state unto the Court as follows, to-wit: 1.
On May 2, 2011, the Plaintiff, Kmart Corporation (“Kmart”) filed its Complaint
against Kroger, E&A Southeast Limited Partnership (“E&A”), Fulton Improvements, LLC (“Fulton”), Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”), the City of Corinth (“Corinth”), and the United States of America (“United States”) based on claims arising from floods which occurred on May 2, 2010.2 [Doc. No. 1 at 1, 5] In its Complaint, Kmart alleges its store in Corinth “incurred flood damages as a result of Kroger’s location within a floodway, which was allowed pursuant to a Letter of Map Revision.” [Doc. 1 at 1-2] 2.
In response to the Complaint, Kroger filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c) and a supporting memorandum. [Doc. Nos. 66 and 67]
1
Pursuant to this Court’s Order of October 7, 2013, Kroger was permitted until October 11, 2013 to file this Motion. In its Complaint, Kmart also asserts claims relating to a flood event that took place on April 27, 2011, but Kmart’s counsel has advised the Defendants that Kmart will not pursue those claims. [Exhibit A at 2] Kmart admitted in its deposition that it was only pursuing claims relating to the May 2, 2010 flood event in this action. [Exhibit B at 195] 2
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On August 9, 2013, the Court entered an Order which granted in part and denied in part Kroger’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleading and which left only one claim remaining against Kroger, i.e. common law negligence.3 [See Doc. Nos. 207 and 208 at 5-6] In making its determination on Kroger’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court explained that it would allow Kmart the opportunity to present evidence in support of its negligence claim. [See Doc. No. 208 at 6, 7-8] Now, after many months of time for discovery, it is time for Kmart to present that evidence, and as Kroger will show herein, Kmart cannot present sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. 3.
Kroger is merely a tenant in the building made the subject of this action, which
was actually constructed several years prior to the time when Kroger began leasing it.4 [Exhibit C at 9] Under the terms of Kroger’s lease, matters regarding drainage and the approval of the construction of the building at issue by all regulating authorities are the responsibility of the landlord. [Exhibit C at 9] Further, Kroger’s lease provides that it is the responsibility of the landlord that said building be constructed and maintained so as to comply and conform to all applicable ordnances, rules, statutes, and regulations. [Exhibit C at 9] Kroger has no records that would have placed it on notice that a portion of its retail location made the subject of this 3
Only “Kmart’s claims that Kroger negligently remained in the floodway and otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the Corinth Kmart store from flooding survive[d]” Kroger’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. [Doc. No. 207 at 1] 4
As to Kmart’s allegations against Kroger regarding the construction of the store, the Court made the following comments: Kmart additionally alleges in its complaint that the Corinth “Kroger store was built in a floodway that existed at the time of the store’s construction.” Kmart’s Compl. [1] ¶ 15. However, it is now an undisputed fact that the building occupied by Kroger was not constructed, owned, or initially occupied by Kroger following the building’s construction. Kmart concedes that “Kmart has not sued Kroger for the construction of the Kroger store in a floodway.” See Kmart’s Resp. Opp’n to Kroger’s Rule 12(c) Mot. [78] at 8. Thus, it is not necessary for the Court to address this factual allegation. [Doc. No. 208 at 4 n. 2]
2
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action was located in the floodway designated by map and panel number 280020003B, dated March 16, 1981, prior to the receipt of Plaintiff’s Complaint. [Exhibit C at 19] 4.
The building which houses the Kroger store was removed from the floodway by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) through a “Letter of Map Revision Floodway Determination Document (Removal)” (the “LOMR”) issued on November 18, 2005, because of FEMA’s determination that the structure was inadvertently included in the floodway. [Exhibit D at 1] John R. Krewson, Kmart’s causation expert, reviewed the original construction plans for the development in which the building housing the Kroger store is located, and he testified that those plans show that said building is not in the floodway. [Exhibit E at 241-42] The removal of the Kroger store from the floodway by the LOMR issued in 2005 was revalidated by FEMA for the new flood maps which became effective in September 2010. [Exhibit E, exhibit 2 thereto] 5.
Kmart admits that it is aware of no evidence whatsoever that tends to show that
Kroger was involved in any way in the acquisition of the LOMR made this subject of this action. [Exhibit B at 191, 193-94] In fact, Kroger had no involvement in FEMA’s issuance of the LOMR at issue in this matter and did not participate in the process pursuant to which said LOMR was issued. [Exhibit C at 5-6] 6.
In connection with preparing his report, Kmart’s causation expert evaluated the
building that houses the Kroger store in his computer modeling.
[Exhibit E at 236]
In
performing that modeling, Kmart’s causation expert did not take into account any of the operations within the building, and he admitted that his modeling doesn’t depend on who is operating inside the building. [Exhibit E at 236-37] In fact, Kmart’s causation expert testified that none of his opinions depend in any way on who the actually tenant was at the time of the 3
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May 2, 2010 flood event. [Exhibit E at 237] Kmart’s causation expert is not aware of anything that Kroger did that would have increased a risk of flooding at the Kmart store, and he is likewise not aware of any omission of Kroger that would have increased the risk of flooding at the Kmart store. [Exhibit E at 237-38] When asked what Kroger did to increase the risk of flooding at the Kmart store, Kmart’s corporate deponent testified only that it “[c]ontinued to occupy [the building].”5 [Exhibit B at 192-93] The lease assigned to Kroger (hereinafter “Kroger’s Lease”) prohibited Kroger from performing any acts or carry on any practices that might injure the building. [Exhibit F at 89, exhibit 4 thereto at 3] 7.
Kmart’s causation expert also claims that had standard design practices been
followed in the construction of the Kmart store, it would have suffered no flooding on May 2, 2010: Typically, standard design and permitting practice require building floor elevations in flood prone areas, especially in designated flood areas to be at least 3.0 feet above the 100 year flooding elevation. In the case of the Kmart and the Kroger, this would place the floor elevations at 435.2, approximately 3 feet higher than the actual elevation. Had the construction of the building followed the FEMA guidelines, flooding would not have occurred. [Exhibit G at 4] In other words, had the Kmart store been built three feet above the 100-year flood elevation, it would not have flooded according to Kmart’s causation expert.
These
conclusions regarding the construction of the Kmart store are significant as they relate to the allegations of Kmart for the reasons that follow. Kmart’s lease shows that it had to approve the plans for the construction of its store location in Corinth. [Exhibit B at 54, exhibit 2 thereto at 78] Kmart’s lease clearly shows that Kmart had to approve the floor elevation and site drainage for Kmart’s store and the development of the site. Kmart’s lease also required that the buildings 5
Kmart’s corporate deponent explained further that Kmart’s claim that Kroger’s presence in the building increased the risk of flooding at the Kmart store is based solely upon the fact that it had a lease with the landlord. [Exhibit B at 194]
4
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in the development be constructed in accordance with exhibit “B” to the lease, which specifies the location of the building that would later house the Kroger store. [Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto at 10] 8.
For the reasons set forth herein and in Kroger’s Memorandum of Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, incorporated herein by reference, there is no genuine dispute of material fact in this matter as to the claim asserted against Kroger, and Kroger is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the claim asserted against it. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Given the undisputed facts, Kmart cannot prove the necessary elements of its claim for negligence against Kroger. 9.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 requires that summary judgment be entered in the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact, and where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v. CXF Transportation, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 447, 449 (S.D. Miss. 1996), aff’d, 139 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1998). Although given the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence, the non-movant may not rest solely upon unsupported allegations in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Moore v. Mississippi Valley State
University, 871 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1989); Williams, 925 F. Supp. at 449. “We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). 10.
“Rule 56 states that a court may consider only admissible evidence in ruling on a
summary judgment motion.” Mersch v. City of Dallas, 207 F.3d 732, 734-735 (5th Cir. 2000). To screen out incompetent summary judgment evidence, the Court must determine the 5
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admissibility of the expert’s opinion “before reaching the question whether a fact issue exists,” see Mersch, supra, which is a determination that the Fifth Circuit does not disturb on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Mersch, 207 F.3d at 735; Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1991). Where an expert’s opinion is inadmissible, it “cannot be relied upon by plaintiffs to prevent summary judgment.” Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992). 11.
As stated above, Kmart’s sole remaining cause of action against Kroger is for
common law negligence, i.e. “Kmart’s claims that Kroger negligently remained in the floodway and otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the Corinth Kmart store from flooding.” [See Doc. No. 207 at 1] In a negligence claim, there are four elements that must be established by the plaintiff: (1) duty or standard of care, (2) breach of that duty or standard of care, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damages or injuries. See Lopez v. McClellan, --- So.3d ---, 2010 WL 1664937, *6 (Miss. App. 2010). In order for Kmart’s claim to survive a motion for summary judgment, Kmart must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of each element of negligence. See Smith v. Campus Edge of Hattiesburg, LLC, 30 So.3d 1284, 1287-88 (Miss.App. 2010). Proximate cause is a concept which is more accurately defined by reference to the distinct concepts of which it is comprised, which are:
(1) cause in fact; and (2)
foreseeability. See Lopez, 2010 WL 1664937, *7. “Cause in fact means that, but for the defendant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred.” Huynh v. Phillips, 95 So.3d 1259, 1263 (Miss. 2012). 12.
This Court stated that, “[u]nder general negligence principles, it is conceivable
that Kroger and Kmart were neighboring store tenants with a duty of reasonable care to prevent harm to each other,” based on the authority of Rhaly v. Waste Mgmt. of Miss., Inc., 43 So.3d 509, 6
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511-12 (Miss.App. 2010). [Doc. No. 208 at 5] Given the undisputed facts of the instant case, however, the decision in Rhaly is entirely distinguishable and serves as no basis for liability against Kroger. The decision in Rhaly is initially distinguishable for the simple fact that the opinion discloses that Mike’s Gas Plus, the business served by Waste Management and either the tenant or owner of the property on which the offending dumpster was placed, was not a defendant to the action, see Rhaly, 43 So.3d at 511, and the opinion in Rhaly does not discuss the principles of liability of a tenant or owner of property to a tenant or owner of adjacent property. Moreover, unlike the evidence showing that Waste Management placed a dumpster on property adjoining the property owned by the plaintiffs in Rhaly, Kmart cannot prove any affirmative act or omission that can serve as the basis for liability against Kroger. 13.
Consistent with the holding in Smith v. Campus Edge of Hattiesburg, LLC, 30
So.3d 1284, 1286-88 (Miss.App. 2010), simple occupation of property on which a condition was created by a prior landowner that causes flooding of an adjacent property cannot serve as the basis for liability for negligence in an action against the current owner or tenant of the property. The decision in Smith is consistent with prior Mississippi law. In Martin v. Flanagan, 818 So.2d 1124 (Miss. 2002), the Court analyzed a claim for damages due to the accumulation of water on a public road which caused a motor vehicle accident, and sued the landowner and tenant who was farming the property. The Court found that the tenant’s mere use of the property to engage in the economic endeavor of farming did not constitute a sufficient “affirmative act” upon which to base liability. 14.
As stated previously by this Court, it is an undisputed fact that the building
occupied by Kroger was not constructed, owned, or initially occupied by Kroger following the building’s construction. [See Doc. 208 at 4 n. 2] Moreover, Kmart concedes that it has not sued 7
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Kroger for the construction of the Kroger store in a floodway. [See id.] Consequently, the reasoning applied by the courts in Smith and Martin applies directly to the facts before this Court to show that Kroger, the current tenant, cannot be held liable for a condition, i.e. the building constructed by a prior owner of the property, which may have caused flooding in the Kmart store based on Kroger’s simple occupation of the property. 15.
While this Court has previously determined that Kmart is not entitled to offer
evidence to prove the allegations concerning the issuance of the LOMR, specifically that the LOMR improperly permitted the Kroger store to remain in the floodway, this Court stated further that, “with respect to Kmart’s alternative allegation that Kroger was aware of the LOMR and knowingly and improperly allowed its store to remain in the floodway, the Court finds that Kmart should be allowed to present evidence to support this allegation, as the same supports Kmart’s common-law negligence claim.” [Doc. No. 208 at 7-8] Having had its opportunity to conduct discovery, Kmart cannot present substantial evidence that Kroger knew or should have known that its location had been in a floodway at some point. 16.
In this case, Kmart cannot show that “but for” any action or omission of Kroger
its injuries would not have occurred. In connection with forming his opinions, Kmart’s causation expert did not take into account any of the operations within the building, and he admitted that his modeling doesn’t depend on who is operating inside the building. [Exhibit E at 236-37] In fact, Kmart’s causation expert testified that none of his opinions depend in any way on the identity of the actual tenant at the time of the May 2, 2010 flood event. [Exhibit E at 237] Had Kroger breached its lease with its landlord and left the building prior to the May 2, 2010 flood event, Kmart cannot show that it would not have suffered any injury because the building about
8
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which it complains would still be there. As such, Kroger’s occupation of the building cannot be said to be a “but for” cause of Kmart’s injuries. 17.
In its Complaint, Kmart alleges that “[t]he Kroger store was built in a floodway
that existed at the time of the store’s construction” and that the “Kroger store should have been leveled, but in 2005 the Kroger store was permitted to remain in the floodway pursuant to a [LOMR] issued by [FEMA].” [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 15] However, Kroger’s Lease prohibited it from performing any acts or carry on any practices that might injure the building. [Exhibit F, exhibit 4 thereto at Kroger/Kmart 000057] Accordingly, Kroger cannot be held liable for negligence for failing to perform an act that it was contractually prohibited from doing, i.e. destroying its landlord’s building. Moreover, Kmart similarly cannot argue that that Kroger should have made some other alterations to the site’s water drainage to avoid risk of flooding to the Kmart store, because Kroger’s Lease further provided that the landlord would provide and maintain proper and adequate water drainage. [Exhibit F, exhibit 4 thereto at Kroger/Kmart 000064] Kroger would have been in breach of its lease had it undertaken any such efforts. 18.
Additionally, as found by the Court in the case of Yazoo and M.V.R. Co. v. Sultan,
63 So. 672 (Miss. 1913), the tenant has no authority to make any change or alteration to the property not owned by him, even if such action could have prevented damage to an adjoining landowner caused by surface water. Furthermore, the court in Sultan quoted with approval the case of The Kankakee & Seneca Railroad Co. v. Horan, 23 Ill. App. 259 (Ill.App. 2 Dist 1886), which stated “‘[t]he appellee was a mere tenant, and had no right to dig such a ditch, and was not compelled to do so.’” Sultan, 63 So. at 674. Based upon the fact that the defendant was a tenant, the court held that the plaintiff had no right to recovery against the tenant and all claims were dismissed. 9
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19.
Kmart relies upon the opinions of its causation expert, John Krewson, to show
that the location of the building which houses Kroger’s store caused flood damage to Kmart’s store in Corinth. [Exhibit H at 15-17] Krewson’s opinion that the Kroger store caused flood damage relies entirely upon the HEC-RAS models that he ran which allegedly showed that the existence of the Kroger store in its current location caused a rise in the flood water at the Kmart store on May 2, 2010. [Exhibit G at 6-7] Both Krewson and Kmart have now admitted that the HEC-RAS model he used was flawed due to a data entry error.
Moreover, this error is
significant, because as Kmart and Krewson have both admitted that the later HEC-RAS model, created in an effort to correct the flaw in the original HEC-RAS model, showed that the existence of the Kroger store in its current location caused “no significant difference in the rise of the flood at the Kmart building.” [Doc. No. 176-1 at 3] As such, Krewson’s expert testimony is not admissible because it fails to satisfy the standards articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow. Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and the requirements of FED.R.EVID. 702. Kroger has filed a Motion to Exclude Testimony of John R. Krewson, see Doc. No. 259, along with a supporting memorandum, see Doc. No. 260, for the reason stated above and for other reasons as well. Rather than re-state all of the reasons for why this Court should exclude the testimony of Krewson, Kroger incorporates herein by reference its Motion to Exclude the Testimony of John R. Krewson and its supporting memorandum in the interests of judicial economy. [See Doc. Nos. 259 and 260] Those pleadings amply demonstrate that this Court should exclude Krewson’s opinions. Consequently, Kmart can show no evidence in opposition to Kroger’s Motion for Summary Judgment that the existence of the building which housed the Kroger store on May 2, 2010 caused flood damage to Kmart’s store in Corinth.
10
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20.
Kmart’s lease shows that it had to approve the plans for the construction of its
store location in Corinth. [See Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto at 7-8] Kmart’s lease required that the buildings in the development be constructed in accordance with exhibit “B” to the lease, which specifies the location of the building that would later house the Kroger store. [Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto at 10] Exhibit “B” to the Kmart Lease is an engineering drawing that specifies the exact location for the construction of the building that would later house the Kroger store (on the drawing it is identified as a “Foodworld” store which was the original tenant that occupied the location prior to Kroger). [Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto at exhibit B] Given these matters, it is fundamentally unfair to allow Kmart to pursue a claim for negligence against Kroger for the location of the building which houses Kroger’s store in Corinth, particularly when Kroger was not a party to the construction of the building.
Not only is it fundamentally unfair, it is
inconsistent with Mississippi law. 21.
Where a party signs a contract, he is bound by it and cannot take a position which
is inconsistent with his contract to the prejudice of another. See Brown v. Anderson, 80 So. 3d 878, 882 (Miss.App. 2012); American Olean Tile Company v. Morton, 157 So.2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1963). “The consummation of an agreement may estop a party to the agreement from asserting a claim inconsistent therewith.” Walker v. Walker, 59 So.2d 277, 284 (Miss. 1952). 22.
Kroger adopts and incorporates herein by reference the arguments and evidence
proffered by E&A and Fulton in their respective motions for summary judgment and supporting memoranda. [See Doc. Nos. 248, 249, 267, and 268] In the interests of judicial economy, Kroger will not repeat all of those arguments in its Motion and supporting memorandum. 23.
Kmart cannot prove the necessary elements of its claim for negligence against
Kroger. For the reasons set forth herein and in Kroger’s Motion for Summary Judgment, there is 11
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no genuine dispute of material fact in this matter as to the claim asserted against Kroger, and Kroger is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the claim asserted against it. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56. 24.
In support of its Motion, Kroger relies upon the pleadings filed in this action, its
supporting memorandum, and the following exhibits: Exhibit A:
Letter Dated April 26, 2013 from John Balhoff, counsel for Kmart.
Exhibit B:
Excerpts of Deposition of Dale Menendez, Kmart’s 30(b)(6) Representative.
Exhibit C:
Responses of Kroger to Kmart’s Interrogatories.
Exhibit D:
Letter of Map Revision.
Exhibit E:
Excerpts of Deposition of John Krewson.
Exhibit F:
Excerpts of Deposition of Wissam Shtaih, Kroger’s 30(b)(6) Representative.
Exhibit G:
Flooding Evaluation by John R. Krewson.
Exhibit H:
Plaintiff’s Responses to Kroger’s First Set of Interrogatories.
12
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, Kroger respectfully requests that summary judgment be entered in its favor as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. Kroger further prays for general relief. This, the 10th day of October 2013. Respectfully submitted, THE KROGER COMPANY
By:_/s/ David A. Norris ____________ Of Counsel OF COUNSEL: David A. Norris (MSB No. 100616) Edley H. Jones III (MSB No. 3201) Stephen F. Schelver (MSB No., 101889) McGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC City Centre South, Suite 1100 200 South Lamar Street (Zip - 39201) Post Office Drawer 22949 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-2949 Telephone: (769) 524-2314 Facsimile: (769) 524-2333 Email: dnorris@mcglinchey.com; ejones@mcglinchey.com, sschelver@mcglinchey.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned David A. Norris, McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, hereby certify that on this day, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the following: Ryan O. Lumainis James M. Garner John T. Balhoff, II SHER GARNER CAHILL RICHTER KLEIN & HILBERT, LLC 909 Poydras Street, 28th Floor New Orleans, LA 70112 Email: rluminais@shergarner.com Mary Clift Abdalla FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC 200 S. Lamar Street, Suite 100 Jackson, MS 39201 Email: abdallamc@fpwk.com Walter G. Watkins , Jr. FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC P.O. Box 22608 Jackson, MS 39225-2608 Email: wwatkins@fpwk.com Walter Garner Watkins , III FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC P.O. Box 22608 Jackson, MS 39225-2608 Email: trey@fpwk.com Gerald Haggart Jacks JACKS, ADAMS & NORQUIST, P.A. P. O. Box 1209 Cleveland, MS 38732-1209 Email: gjacks@jacksadamsnorquist.com Jamie Ferguson Jacks JACKS, ADAMS & NORQUIST, P.A. P. O. Box 1209 Cleveland, MS 38732-1209 Email: jjacks@jacksadamsnorquist.com 14
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Charles E. Ross WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205-0651 Email: cer@wisecarter.com Terry Dwayne Little DANIEL, COKER, HORTON & BELL - Oxford P.O. Box 1396 Oxford, MS 38655 Email: tlittle@danielcoker.com Wilton V. Byars , III DANIEL, COKER, HORTON & BELL P.O. Box 1396 Oxford, MS 38655 Email: wbyars@danielcoker.com John Evans Gough , Jr. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE - Oxford 900 Jefferson Avenue Oxford, MS 38655-3608 Email: john.gough@usdoj.gov and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-ECF participants: None THIS, the 10th day of October 2013.
s/ David A. Norris David A. Norris
275735.2
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 24 of 43 PageID #: 3471
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 25 of 43 PageID #: 3472
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 26 of 43 PageID #: 3473
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 27 of 43 PageID #: 3474
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 28 of 43 PageID #: 3475
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 29 of 43 PageID #: 3476
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 30 of 43 PageID #: 3477
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 31 of 43 PageID #: 3478
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 32 of 43 PageID #: 3479
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 33 of 43 PageID #: 3480
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 34 of 43 PageID #: 3481
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 35 of 43 PageID #: 3482
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 36 of 43 PageID #: 3483
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 37 of 43 PageID #: 3484
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 38 of 43 PageID #: 3485
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 39 of 43 PageID #: 3486
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 40 of 43 PageID #: 3487
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 41 of 43 PageID #: 3488
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 42 of 43 PageID #: 3489
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-2 Filed: 10/10/13 43 of 43 PageID #: 3490
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 34 PageID #: 3491
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 2 of 34 PageID #: 3492
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 3 of 34 PageID #: 3493
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 4 of 34 PageID #: 3494
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 5 of 34 PageID #: 3495
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 6 of 34 PageID #: 3496
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 7 of 34 PageID #: 3497
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 8 of 34 PageID #: 3498
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 9 of 34 PageID #: 3499
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 10 of 34 PageID #: 3500
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 11 of 34 PageID #: 3501
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 12 of 34 PageID #: 3502
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 13 of 34 PageID #: 3503
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 14 of 34 PageID #: 3504
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 15 of 34 PageID #: 3505
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 16 of 34 PageID #: 3506
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 17 of 34 PageID #: 3507
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 18 of 34 PageID #: 3508
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 19 of 34 PageID #: 3509
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 20 of 34 PageID #: 3510
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 21 of 34 PageID #: 3511
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 22 of 34 PageID #: 3512
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 23 of 34 PageID #: 3513
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 24 of 34 PageID #: 3514
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 25 of 34 PageID #: 3515
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 26 of 34 PageID #: 3516
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 27 of 34 PageID #: 3517
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 28 of 34 PageID #: 3518
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 29 of 34 PageID #: 3519
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 30 of 34 PageID #: 3520
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 31 of 34 PageID #: 3521
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 32 of 34 PageID #: 3522
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 33 of 34 PageID #: 3523
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-3 Filed: 10/10/13 34 of 34 PageID #: 3524
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-4 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 2 PageID #: 3525
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-4 Filed: 10/10/13 2 of 2 PageID #: 3526
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 10 PageID #: 3527
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 2 of 10 PageID #: 3528
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 3 of 10 PageID #: 3529
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 4 of 10 PageID #: 3530
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 5 of 10 PageID #: 3531
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 6 of 10 PageID #: 3532
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 7 of 10 PageID #: 3533
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 8 of 10 PageID #: 3534
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 9 of 10 PageID #: 3535
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-5 Filed: 10/10/13 10 of 10 PageID #: 3536
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 82 PageID #: 3537
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 2 of 82 PageID #: 3538
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 3 of 82 PageID #: 3539
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 4 of 82 PageID #: 3540
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 5 of 82 PageID #: 3541
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 6 of 82 PageID #: 3542
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 7 of 82 PageID #: 3543
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 8 of 82 PageID #: 3544
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 9 of 82 PageID #: 3545
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 10 of 82 PageID #: 3546
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 11 of 82 PageID #: 3547
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 12 of 82 PageID #: 3548
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 13 of 82 PageID #: 3549
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 14 of 82 PageID #: 3550
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 15 of 82 PageID #: 3551
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 16 of 82 PageID #: 3552
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 17 of 82 PageID #: 3553
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 18 of 82 PageID #: 3554
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 19 of 82 PageID #: 3555
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 20 of 82 PageID #: 3556
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 21 of 82 PageID #: 3557
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 22 of 82 PageID #: 3558
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 23 of 82 PageID #: 3559
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 24 of 82 PageID #: 3560
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 25 of 82 PageID #: 3561
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 26 of 82 PageID #: 3562
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 27 of 82 PageID #: 3563
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 28 of 82 PageID #: 3564
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 29 of 82 PageID #: 3565
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 30 of 82 PageID #: 3566
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 31 of 82 PageID #: 3567
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 32 of 82 PageID #: 3568
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 33 of 82 PageID #: 3569
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 34 of 82 PageID #: 3570
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 35 of 82 PageID #: 3571
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 36 of 82 PageID #: 3572
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 37 of 82 PageID #: 3573
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 38 of 82 PageID #: 3574
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 39 of 82 PageID #: 3575
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 40 of 82 PageID #: 3576
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 41 of 82 PageID #: 3577
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 42 of 82 PageID #: 3578
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 43 of 82 PageID #: 3579
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 44 of 82 PageID #: 3580
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 45 of 82 PageID #: 3581
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 49 of 82 PageID #: 3585
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 50 of 82 PageID #: 3586
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 51 of 82 PageID #: 3587
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 52 of 82 PageID #: 3588
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 53 of 82 PageID #: 3589
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 54 of 82 PageID #: 3590
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 56 of 82 PageID #: 3592
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 57 of 82 PageID #: 3593
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 58 of 82 PageID #: 3594
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 59 of 82 PageID #: 3595
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 60 of 82 PageID #: 3596
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 61 of 82 PageID #: 3597
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 63 of 82 PageID #: 3599
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 64 of 82 PageID #: 3600
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 65 of 82 PageID #: 3601
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 66 of 82 PageID #: 3602
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 67 of 82 PageID #: 3603
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 68 of 82 PageID #: 3604
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 69 of 82 PageID #: 3605
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 70 of 82 PageID #: 3606
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 71 of 82 PageID #: 3607
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 72 of 82 PageID #: 3608
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 74 of 82 PageID #: 3610
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 75 of 82 PageID #: 3611
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 76 of 82 PageID #: 3612
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 77 of 82 PageID #: 3613
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 78 of 82 PageID #: 3614
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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 80 of 82 PageID #: 3616
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 81 of 82 PageID #: 3617
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-6 Filed: 10/10/13 82 of 82 PageID #: 3618
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 1 of 29 PageID #: 3619
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 2 of 29 PageID #: 3620
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 3 of 29 PageID #: 3621
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 4 of 29 PageID #: 3622
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 5 of 29 PageID #: 3623
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 6 of 29 PageID #: 3624
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 7 of 29 PageID #: 3625
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 8 of 29 PageID #: 3626
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 9 of 29 PageID #: 3627
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 10 of 29 PageID #: 3628
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 11 of 29 PageID #: 3629
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 12 of 29 PageID #: 3630
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 13 of 29 PageID #: 3631
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 14 of 29 PageID #: 3632
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 15 of 29 PageID #: 3633
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 16 of 29 PageID #: 3634
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 17 of 29 PageID #: 3635
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 18 of 29 PageID #: 3636
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 19 of 29 PageID #: 3637
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 20 of 29 PageID #: 3638
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 21 of 29 PageID #: 3639
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 22 of 29 PageID #: 3640
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 23 of 29 PageID #: 3641
Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 269-7 Filed: 10/10/13 24 of 29 PageID #: 3642
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