Gianna Zou

The Losing War on

Drugs in Colombia:

An Analysis of the Failure and Detrimental E ects of US Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia Gianna Zou The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

A Kultural Blow:

Michael Cai

With the high demand for cocaine in the United States catalyzing its rise in prominence as a drug trafficking nation, Colombia transformed its status from a small cocaine smuggling country in the 1970s to an international cocaine empire by the 2000s. As Colombian drug cartels began fulfilling the growing US demand for cocaine in the 1970s, United States’ policymakers began implementing counternarcotic policies in Colombia – derived from the US-Colombia War on Drugs – to target the expanding US-Colombian drug trade.1 Without restrictions on drug demand, drug supply grows indefinitely, as suppliers, motivated by profit, develop endless ways to fulfill demand. United States anti-drug policies executed in Colombia – aimed to solely combat the growing supply of cocaine produced in Colombia – have continuously failed to significantly reduce cocaine production and exportation to the United States, as well as created devastating side effects in Colombia, including environmental damage and health issues in citizens from aerial fumigation. Additionally, as drug cartels in Colombia grew in both size and power during the ongoing drug trade through the late 20th into the early 21st century, drug trafficking lords acquired increasing power, being able to intimidate and bribe their way out of punishment and capture.2 Rebellions from Colombian paramilitaries and drug cartels opposed to US anti-drug policy and the Colombian government, established their growing power through violence, promoting the continuation of the drug trade, as well as chaos in Colombia. Because of its focus on supply rather than demand, along with its overall ineffectiveness in decreasing cocaine supply, United States’ counternarcotic policies in Colombia were not only unsuccessful in its primary goal to diminish the US-Colombian drug trade, but also destructive to Colombia, as it ravaged the nation with excessive violence, environmental issues, and health threats for civilians.

1 Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (2008) (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 21. 2 Darian Singer, “U.S. Policy Towards Colombia: A Focus on the Wrong Issue,” in Cornell International Affairs Review (2008), 1:14, previously published in Cornell International Affairs Review, http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/ articles/1284/us-policy-towards-colombia-a-focus-on-the-wrong-issue. 115

The increasing demand for cocaine in the United States drove the rise of the US-Colombia drug trade and the need for US counternarcotic policies in Colombia. In June of 1971, as a result of the rapidly growing rate of drug use within the US, President Nixon proclaimed the start of the United States’ War on Drugs.3 Nixon began a campaign that portrayed drugs as “public enemy number one,” an evil that the US could not morally allow, and a security threat, which brought a military aspect into the issue.4 He declared, “The consumption of drugs has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.”5 At the beginning of the war on drugs, Nixon’s administration openly tolerated cocaine, as they saw cocaine as just a minor issue compared to the more commonly used drugs at the time such as marijuana and heroin.6 With the strict legislation regarding marijuana, LSD, and heroin implemented at the beginning of the US War on Drugs, cocaine became the “replacement” drug in the mid-1970s.7 While other drugs were often negatively stereotyped to be primarily used within lower-class and minority communities at the time, cocaine was viewed as glamorous in US society; it was considered the “champagne of drugs.”8 Cocaine, obtained from the leaves of the coca plant, was widely regarded as a harmless drug used only by society’s elite and famous: Hollywood stars, businessmen, well-known singers, etc.9 This sense of high society and the lack of stigma surrounding the drug quickly attracted consumers and contributed to its rising popularity in the US.10 While its societal appeal drew in US consumers, cocaine’s highly addictive and stimulant properties retained them. In the 1980s, crack, which was formed by boiling baking soda with cocaine, became

3 Ed Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging,” The Guardian (London, England), July 23, 2011, https://www. theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years. 4 Richard Nixon, “41 Nixon Remarks Intensified Program for Drug Abuse,” Richard Nixon: XXXVII President of the United States, last modified June 17, 1971, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/Readiness/ DDRP/docs/41%20Nixon%20Remarks%20Intensified%20Program%20for%20 Drug%20Abuse.pdf 5 Alejandro Gaviria and Daniel Mejia, eds., Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia, trans. Jimmy Weiskopf (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 1. 6 Bruce Michael Bagley, “The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 163, https://www.jstor.org/stable/165793. 7 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration, last modified June 2020, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Cocaine-2020_1.pdf. 8 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 1. 9 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration. 10 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war.”

the most common form of cocaine in the US.11 It provided a short-lived but extreme, euphoric high to its user and was sold in small amounts at a time. Crack cocaine was simple to make and cost-effective, which propelled its widespread use and production starting in the late 1980s (Appendix A).12

Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Peru and Bolivia – who, by 1984, produced 65% and 25% of the world’s coca supply respectively – dominated the US cocaine market13; this drove the US government to primarily attack coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru, which eventually proved to be successful in reducing exportation from those two countries.14 However, with the fall of these two major drug trafficking countries, cocaine production quickly shifted to be predominantly based in Colombia by 1997 (Appendix B).15 At this point, US-Colombian relations started to become narcotized, setting the precedent for the countries’ relationship throughout the late 20th and early 21st century. The rising US demand for cocaine, along with the initial money earned from the rising US-Colombian drug trade, allowed Colombian drug mafias to establish well-organized trafficking operations and to grow exponentially.16 As a result, by the end of the 20th century, Colombia became prominent as not only the major US cocaine supplier but also as the dominant global cocaine producer.

In an attempt to reduce the growing influx of cocaine into the United States, the US government targeted cocaine supply in Colombia through the failed US-Colombia Extradition Treaty of 1979, which was too difficult to enforce to actually have any positive effect. Article 1 of the extradition treaty states that it allows “...extradition where the offense has been committed outside the territory of the requesting State by a national of that State.”17 This article authorized the Colombian government to

11 Mary Ann House, “Cocaine,” The American Journal of Nursing 90, no. 4 (April 1990): 42, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3426185. 12 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration. 13 Bagley, “The New Hundred,” 170. 14 Jonathan D. Rosen and Marten W. Brienen, New Approaches to Drug Policies: A Time for Change (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 60. 15 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 63. 16 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 123. 17 A. Claudio, “United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty: Failure of a Security Strategy,” U.S. Department of Justice, last modified 1991, https://www.ojp.gov/ ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/united-states-colombia-extradition-treaty-failuresecurity-strategy. 117

extradite any drug criminals involved in the US-Colombian drug trade and have them tried for their crimes in the US.18 The goal of the treaty was to extradite as many drug traffickers in Colombia as possible to a better-developed governmental system. United States policymakers believed that in order to topple cartels’ cocaine production and exportation to the US, the governments needed to displace those necessary in carrying out trafficking operations.19 Without their roles in the cocaine trade, cartels would have little to no profit and would not survive. If the US and Colombian governments effectively enacted the treaty, they would both benefit by significantly limiting the cocaine trade through destroying the dominating drug cartels. Extradition eventually became the biggest fear of Colombian traffickers, especially drug lords; the US justice system was less susceptible to their tactics of bribery, manipulation, and intimidation that allowed them to escape punishment in Colombia.20 If they and their fellow cartel members were extradited to the US, they were almost guaranteed a US prison sentence and would not be able to prevent the demise of their cartels.21 Colombian drug cartels were used to leveraging their large sums of money and threats of violence over their national government to gain control.22 US policymakers also initially saw the extradition treaty as a solution that would significantly reduce the political corruption caused by the drug cartels in Colombia.

However, both the Colombian and US governments struggled to find and capture a significant number of traffickers to extradite to the US, causing the treaty to have little effect on cocaine production and thus be greatly unrealistic and ineffective in both of its goals.23 In fact, after the extradition treaty was ratified, the drug trade between Colombia and the US actually increased due to the lack of policy targeting US cocaine demand, which continued to rise throughout the 1980s. In 1980,

18 Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, last modified 1981, https:// web.oas.org/mla/en/Treaties_B/col_ext_usa_en.pdf. 19 Claudio, “United States-Colombia,” U.S. Department of Justice. 20 Bradley Graham, “Extradition Feared By Traffickers, Resented by Colombians,” Washington Post, last modified August 23, 1989, https://www. washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/23/extradition-feared-bytraffickers-resented-by-colombians/2d2b6a83-c665-478f-8cad-2916719c7c03/. 21 Joshua H. Warmund, “Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic,” Fordham International Law Journal 22, no. 5 (1998): 2386, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1648&context=ilj. 22 David R. Mares, Drug Wars and Coffee Houses: The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 92. 23 Claudio, “United States-Colombia,” U.S. Department of Justice.

before the treaty’s ratification, Colombia earned about $1.5 billion in the drug trade, which primarily consisted of cocaine.24 From 1985 to 1988, Colombian drug traffickers earned stratospheric profits, about $2.5-$3 billion annually from the trade, with cocaine still as the major earner.25 The extradition treaty was highly unsuccessful. It not only failed to extradite drug criminals in order to target supply (cocaine exportation to the US remained high and Colombian drug mafias obtained increasing power from growing wealth), but it also encouraged retaliation from the drug mafias. Colombian drug cartels would not let the government topple their mission to profit off of drugs, as they continued to grow in size, wealth, power, and status in Colombian society. In 1988, the Medellín cartel kidnapped Colombian president Miguel Pastrana Borrero.26 The cartel pressured Borrero into ensuring the prevention of the extradition of the notorious “King of Cocaine,” Pablo Escobar, and other drug lords. The cartel used Borrero as a bargaining chip in an attempt to gain further control of the government, but the Colombian police eventually found him a week later.27 After his return, he delivered a speech highlighting the escalating corruption within the country: “Last year I said we were on the verge of the abyss. Today, I think we are in the abyss.”28

With the balance of power in Colombia still greatly shifted towards the drug cartels, the US military intervened in the nation with the intention to end, or at least greatly diminish, the US-Colombian drug trade by attacking paramilitary groups connected to the drug trade, which would simultaneously bring back power to the Colombian government; however, the military aid and training provided by the US to the Colombian military were, in the end, unsuccessful in decreasing the size and power of the paramilitary groups. More and more Colombian citizens became increasingly attracted to paramilitary membership by the large profits from their illicit drug production.29 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which the US put in place to reduce political violence and promote economic development in Colombia, provided a limited US military presence in the nation.30 In the late 1970s, the US increased

24 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 76. 25 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 76. 26 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 73. 27 Christopher Woody, “Why the fall of the Medellin cartel failed to stop the flow of drugs, according to a DEA agent who hunted Escobar,” Insider, September 11, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/cartels-took-medellin-cartel-placeafter-pablo-escobars-death-2017-9. 28 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 74. 29 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1. 30 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), https://www.dea.gov/sites/ default/files/2021-04/1990-1994_p_67-76.pdf 119

Despite this, the FARC had continued to expand its role in the cocaine trade, controlling approximately 70% of Colombia’s coca crops by the 1990s (Appendix C).35 The group charged coca growers and cocaine producers high taxes of around $150 per kilogram of coca base, earning an estimate of $68 million annually in the 1990s.36 Additionally, from 1987 to 2004, the FARC had grown from around 3,600 members to 20,000 members, incorporating over 40% of the country’s population,37 indicating the complete ineffectiveness of the US military aid in decreasing the reach of the FARC. Members were promised protection and most importantly, money, which primarily came from their involvement in the drug trade.38 The increase in US drug policy in Colombia had not only expanded the reach of Colombian guerilla groups through increased membership but also fortified the US government and Colombian military roles as their primary enemy.

intervention in Colombia, as US-Colombian drug relations moved to the forefront of the US War on Drugs.31 In the late 1970s, paramilitary groups in Colombia, such as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas) and ELN (National Liberation Army), began trafficking cocaine to fund their activities32; as a result, the US continued and increased counterinsurgency tactics in hopes of combating the drug and government conflict.33 In 1984 alone, the US sent over $50 million in arms and trained thousands of Colombian personnel, in hopes of attacking paramilitary groups suspected to be involved in cocaine trafficking.34 High levels of military aid were given to Colombia’s police and national armed forces to reduce the presence of the FARC, the largest guerilla group in Colombia, and their role in the cocaine industry.

31 Matthew Knoester, “War in Colombia,” Social Justice 25, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29767072. 32 Central Intelligence Agency, Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes, H.R. Doc. (July 29, 1992). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col24.pdf. 33 Durán-Martínez, The Politics, 15. 34 Central Intelligence Agency, Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes, H.R. Doc. (July 29, 1992). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col24.pdf. 35 Jeremy McDermott, “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income,” InSight Crime, last modified September 6, 2017, https://insightcrime. org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/. 36 McDermott, “The FARC’s,” InSight Crime. 37 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:2. 38 Thomas R. Cook, “The Financial Arm Of The FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 25, https:// digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=jss.

As the size and number of guerilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia grew, the long internal armed conflict within the nation also grew. From 1985 to 1988, paramilitary and guerilla groups assassinated one minister of justice, 50 judges, 12 journalists, and over 500 police officers/ military personnel.39 The assassinators targeted their newly solidified enemies – government officials and their partners – seeing them as a threat to their drug operations and their own lives.40 Despite the large amount of military aid provided by the US, the Colombian government and its officials still lacked power in their own nation and were unable to remedy the large-scale political conflict. Throughout the 1990s, drug mafias murdered up to an average of 3,000 to 4,000 Colombian civilians each year.41 The active US military presence was not only unproductive in reducing cocaine production within Colombian paramilitaries but also provoked increased violence against government workers, as the groups saw the US presence as a threat to their survival.

Through the ineffective application of US money aid in Colombia, billions of US dollars resulted in little effect at reducing the USColombian drug trade due to the policies’ focus on supply rather than demand. Throughout the 1990s, the US government provided almost $1 billion to the Colombian government to further their goals of reducing both drug exportation to the US and the power that organized crime held over Colombian society.42 Specifically, the US gave the majority of its aid to promote “international narcotics and law enforcement” in Colombia.43 With support and funding from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Colombia developed the “kingpin strategy”: an initiative to mitigate drug trafficking by the death or capture of the leaders of drug mafias, also known as “kingpins.”44 United States and Colombian policymakers saw drug mafias as a hierarchical threat, characterized by command and control. Without their “critical nodes” – in this case, the cartel leaders – the most powerful drug mafias would be destroyed. The Colombian government employed this strategy, with

39 Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2010): 101, https://www.jstor. org/stable/24590760. 40 Bruce Michael Bagley, “US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure Bruce Michael Bagley,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (August 1988): 191. 41 William Aviles, “US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 27, no. 3 (July 2008): 413, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734044. 42 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 51. 43 Aviles, “US Intervention,” 413. 44 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 58.

help from the US, to obtain similar results as to what had occurred with the Medellín cartel after the assassination of their founder and sole leader, Pablo Escobar.45 Escobar, often considered the most powerful, feared, and successful narcotráficante of all time, was responsible for earning prodigious amounts of money, dying with a net worth of $30 billion, significantly expanding the scope and worth of the global drug trade, and monopolizing the US-Colombian cocaine trade in the 1980s through the early 1990s.46 Escobar was the epitome of a “kingpin” and one of the many drug lords that leveraged their money and threats of violence over government officials to succeed in their operations. After Escobar’s murder, the infamous Medellín cartel, which had once earned $2 to 4 billion a year and $420 million a week at its peak, quickly met its demise without the intelligence and correspondence from their leader.47 US foreign policy was put in place in the 1990s with the belief that drug cartels would be unable to carry out their operations without their kingpins48; as a result, the exportation of cocaine into the United States would be cut off or at least, significantly reduced.

Nevertheless, the kingpin strategy was in the end, ineffective due to the seemingly endless supply of cocaine produced in Colombia. When policymakers developed the kingpin strategy, they overlooked the fact that after the Medellín cartel fell due to the death of Escobar, the Cali cartel was quick to take control over the cocaine industry.49 This phenomenon is known as the “balloon effect”: when one producer is displaced, its competing producers quickly replace them to fulfill supply and keep the market alive.50 Similarly, with the implementation of the kingpin strategy, large-scale cocaine production decreased as a result of the loss of kingpins; however, due to the stable US demand, hundreds of smaller scaled coca producers were ready to replace the extensive production of larger producers.51 As a result, drug production and trafficking eventually became harder to track as it spread throughout vaster areas and the number of traffickers increased throughout the country.52 In fact, between 1996 and 1998, coca production in Colombia grew about 50% because of the difficulty of locating and preventing drug production.53 With the demand for cocaine in the US remaining fairly

45 Woody, “Why the fall” 46 Woody, “Why the fall” 47 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 70. 48 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 31. 49 Woody, “Why the fall”. 50 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 32. 51 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 57. 52 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 60 53 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 147.

stable, attempts to decrease cocaine exportation by targeting the supply proved to be unsuccessful, as the balloon effect will occur as long as US cocaine demand remains high. All in all, US money aid that was meant to reduce cocaine exportation was highly ineffective: cocaine production in Colombia became more widespread, allowing its producers to more easily escape capture.

With the growth of drug-based organized crime and as a result, persistent cocaine production and trafficking in Colombia despite US efforts to mitigate it, the US government and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana’s administration designed Plan Colombia – a six-year development and counternarcotic plan, alongside the already established US program, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) – in 1999 in an attempt to achieve the goals that the US had previously failed to fulfill. In July of 2000, President Bill Clinton officially signed the US Plan Colombia aid package into law.54 From 2000 to 2005, the ACI funded approximately $2.8 billion for Plan Colombia,55 and from 2000 to 2008, the US provided, on average, $472 million per year in total for the plan.56 While the goals of Plan Colombia from the perspectives of the United States and Colombia overlapped, the US government was more focused on preventing the trafficking of illegal drugs, viewing the promotion of societal peace within Colombia as a side effect.57 Overall, Plan Colombia intended to eradicate cocaine production, promote economic and social development in Colombia, and end the violent arms conflict in the nation.58 The main goal of the US government was to limit, if not eliminate, significant amounts of cocaine from entering the US59; they believed that targeting the supply would affect the US demand by affecting the purity, availability, and therefore, the affordability of cocaine within the US.

The major legislation passed in Plan Colombia, the aerial fumigation of cocaine crops,60 was not only unsuccessful in significantly reducing

54 Aviles, “US Intervention,” 410. 55 “Plan Colombia”: Elements for Success, H.R. Doc. No. 109, 1st Sess. (Dec. 2005). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT25278/html/CPRT109SPRT25278.htm. 56 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 51. 57 “Plan Colombia”: Elements for Success, H.R. Doc. No. 109, 1st Sess. (Dec. 2005). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT25278/html/CPRT109SPRT25278.htm. 58 Justin Delacour, “Plan Colombia: Rhetoric, Reality, and Press,” Social Justice 27, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 65, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768036. 59 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 152. 60 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1. 123

the number of cocaine crops in Colombia, but also threatened the health of Colombian farmers and damaged Colombia’s environment with the dangerous chemicals released from the fumigation.61 Drug Enforcement Administration estimates show that after the initial implementation of aerial fumigation, overall cocaine production in the Andes– but primarily in Colombia – actually increased from 840 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2000 to 995 metric tons in 2001.62 The Cocaine Availability Working Group estimated that about 263 metric tons of 100% pure cocaine were readily available in the US in 2001,63 an 11 metric ton increase from 2000.64 This occurred even after the US provided Colombia with $231 million in aid, primarily for fumigation, in 2000.65 United States demand remained stable and fumigation was failing to reduce coca production efficiently enough. However, amplified coca eradication proved to be slightly effective when cocaine production decreased back to 880 metric tons in 2002.66 But still, overall cocaine production was higher in 2002 compared to 2000. Though fumigation may have been successful in slightly diminishing the continued growth of cocaine production, overall cocaine production was still higher two years after Plan Colombia’s implementation than before. The US Department of Justice estimated that Colombian drug cartels provided over 90% of the cocaine smuggled into the US throughout the early 2000s,67 a significant increase from 70% to 80% in the 1980s, displaying the long-term ineffectiveness of US antidrug policies in Colombia and the losing war on drugs for the US.68 This outcome can, once again, be credited to the “balloon effect,”

61 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1. 62 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 63 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2004, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-002, at 1 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ ndic/pubs8/8731/8731p.pdf. 64 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2004, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-002, at 1 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ ndic/pubs8/8731/8731p.pdf. 65 “U.S. Aid Over,” Washington Office on Latin America. https://www.wola.org/files/1602_plancol/content.php?id=us_aid. 66 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 67 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 68 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 70.

as eradication resulted in the displacement of coca crops, rather than its permanent elimination.69

Additionally, cocaine exportation to the United States and the cocaine epidemic in the US continued to thrive in the years following the initial implementation of Plan Colombia. United States cocaine prices decreased and supply increased throughout the first stages of the implementation of the plan.70 Developing technology used by cartels to transport their products in innovative and sneaky ways was making it increasingly difficult for the US and Colombian governments to win this long-standing war on drugs. With drug mafias now extremely established, the mafias’ revenue was only growing; as a result, they were able to afford the highest-tech equipment to gain control over all parts of the drug trade.71 Cartels now had full control over the production, communication, exportation, and financial logistics of the drug trade.72 The US government was struggling to devise strategies to keep up with the changing nature of the trade.73 Based on estimates collected from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2000 to 2006, cocaine production, along with cocaine exportation to the US, in Colombia remained fairly stable,74 despite the ongoing US aerial fumigation policies in Plan Colombia. Furthermore, in April of 2004, the Justice Department’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) published a report that declared that cocaine in both powder and crack is “readily available throughout the country and overall availability appears to be stable.”75 Over three decades after the initial declaration of the war on drugs, Colombia’s drug cartels were still fulfilling the high demand for cocaine with increasing levels of production and exportation of cocaine. Just a year before the aforementioned NDIC report, National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS) data indicated that 81.7% of state and local law enforcement agencies within the US reported powder cocaine availability as high or moderate, with 75% of these agencies saying the same for crack.76 This was a 5.5% increase from 2002,77 and a mere 0.5% 69 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 52. 70 Delacour, “Plan Colombia,” 68. 71 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 72 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 73 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 74 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 52. 75 Veillette, Plan Colombia, 5. 76 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 77 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 125

of these local agencies indicated that powder cocaine was not available in their area.78 The steadily decreasing price of cocaine in the US in the early 2000s also reflects this increasing availability of cocaine (Appendix E).79 Even with Plan Colombia continuing its aerial fumigation throughout the early 2000s, fumigation policies proved to still not be enough to reduce cocaine production and diminish the US-Colombian drug trade.

Not only was aerial fumigation ineffective in its goal of reducing cocaine production in Colombia, it was devastating the lives of rural Colombians and Colombia’s environment. From 1999 through 2005, the US government employed aerial fumigation in Colombia by spraying a chemical herbicide called glyphosate over coca plants from the air to attack coca cultivation.80 When using aerial fumigation, the pilots’ distance from the crops can cause various issues during the spraying period: the wind may carry the chemical, which can kill any crop that it lands on, off to the wrong crops; pilots may accidentally designate the wrong crops as coca crops to spray; aerial fumigation can cause the wrongly targeted land to be unviable to grow any crops, and farmers may accidentally be hit by the chemical.81 It was later discovered in 2015 by the World Health Organization (WHO) that glyphosate could be considered a human carcinogen, a substance capable of causing or stimulating cancer risk in humans.82 After experiencing aerial fumigation firsthand, many farmers from local Colombian communities reported issues regarding their skin and respiratory and gastrointestinal system.83 In a report produced by the president of the Colombian government’s Special Narcotic Advisory Commission, Daniel Mejia, and a Professor of Economic Development, Adriana Camacho, it was revealed that

78 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf. 79 Adam Isacson, “Restarting Aerial Fumigation on Drug Crops,” Washington Office on Latin America, last modified March 7, 2019, https://www.wola.org/ analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-crops-in-colombia-is-a-mistake/. 80 Daniel Mejia and Adriana Camacho, The Health Consequences of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops: The Case of Colombia, 2, June 2015, https://www. cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-408-Camacho-Mejia-HealthConsequences-Aerial-Spraying-Colombia.pdf. 81 Hylton, “Plan Colombia,” 102. 82 Keith A. Solomon et al., “Coca and poppy eradication in Colombia: environmental and human health assessment of aerially applied glyphosate,” review, Pub Med, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17432331/. 83 Adam Isacson, “The Many Lessons of Plan Colombia,” Washington Office on Latin America, February 4, 2016, https://www.wola.org/analysis/the-manylessons-of-plan-colombia/.

fumigation significantly increased the likelihood of dermatological and respiratory problems and miscarriages (Appendix D) in Colombian municipalities with positive levels of aerial eradication.84 The report suggests that when there is one standard deviation increase (increasing the population of the study by a unit), aerial spraying will increase miscarriage rate by 10%.85 The various health consequences of fumigation on Colombians were not on par with the minor, short-term reductions in cocaine production caused by the dangerous spraying.

Moreover, the destruction of agricultural land and contamination of vital water sources from fumigation exacerbated economic difficulties and forced home displacement for many Colombian farmers that depended on their land and water sources to support themselves and their families with basic necessities. The accidental spraying of non-coca crops from aerial eradication has also damaged several bio-diverse regions in Colombia and promoted deforestation. Coca crop growers have expanded further as a result, deforesting four hectares for every hectare of field lost to fumigation, to avoid government intervention in their illegal activities.86 The desperate need to fulfill supply encouraged the expansion of cocaine production in Colombia, ultimately resulting in environmental consequences. Cutting down forests contributes to increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and thus the urgent global warming issue, and the loss of habitat for animals.87 The unintentional killing of natural crops also causes changes in the ecosystem and interactions between plants and animals.88 While aerial eradication was intended to decrease coca production, it has instead damaged the health of Colombians, nature, and the environment.

In addition to using aerial fumigation to tackle major cocaine production, Plan Colombia increased US military aid to support Colombian police and armed forces to attack drug cultivation and trafficking in Colombia.89 The US was focused on preventing drug exportation into the US and promoting social development within Colombia, as it contributes to security in the Andes.90 However, the implementation of further military aid, in terms of military equipment, was highly susceptible to benefitting

84 Mejia and Camacho, The Health, 21. 85 Mejia and Camacho, The Health, 21. 86 Isacson, “The Many.” 87 Jonathan D. Rosen, Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014), 22. 88 Rosen, Losing War, 21. 89 Marcella, PLAN COLOMBIA, 4. 90 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, 1, June 22, 2005, https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL32774.pdf. 127

Colombian guerilla and paramilitary groups. From Borrero’s kidnapping in 1988 to the early 2000s, political corruption in Colombia remained prevalent. The US forwarded military equipment to Colombian armed forces, who, due to persistent political disorder in Colombia, often illegally transferred the equipment to Colombia’s paramilitary and guerilla groups in exchange for protection and money.91 Therefore, providing aid to Colombian armed forces risked exacerbating the human rights crisis and the growth of the drug trade in Colombia, as they could likely be aligned with the paramilitaries and guerilla groups. Based on statistics, it can be concluded that the military aid did in fact increase violence within the country, as in the early 2000s, paramilitaries murdered over 370 journalists and 400 human rights defenders, and almost 500,000 women experienced sexual abuse.92 Compared to the mid-to-late 1980s, about 31 times more journalists were assassinated in the early 2000s. Mainly because of the corruption inside the Colombian armed forces and Colombia as a whole, Colombian officials often illegally allocated US aid to the enemy groups, making the policy useless and ultimately, counterproductive.

Amidst several other unsuccessful US policies in Colombia, the “high-value target” strategy adopted by the US government was also unsuccessful, as it failed to achieve its goals of decreasing insurgency and the drug trade, instead, contributing to avoidable violence. Similar to the kingpin strategy, the high-value target strategy was essentially a campaign to assassinate specific targets involved in the drug trade and considered a threat to society.93 This strategy fulfilled its goals to assassinate armed forces leaders such as Raul Reyes, who was suspected of helping promote trafficking activities within the FARC, and Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, also known as “Colombian Bin Laden” or Mono Jojoy, who was the second-in-command to the FARC and at the core of the group’s drug trafficking operations.94 Following these assassinations, the FARC did decrease in size due to fear of assassination,95 yet, there was no observed decrease in drug exportation to the US and political unrest in Colombia: the main goals of the high-value target strategy.96 Colombia did not gain any political peace from the deaths of these

91 Amnesty International’s position on Plan Colombia, 2, June 21, 2000, https:// www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/amr230492000en.pdf. 92 Gabriel Marcella, PLAN COLOMBIA: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES (Scotts Valley: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 11, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11577. 93 “U.S. Aid Over,” Washington Office on Latin America. 94 Cook, “The Financial,” 26. 95 Cook, “The Financial,” 27. 96 Isacson, “The Many.”

paramilitary leaders, and neither did the US achieve its long-standing goal of limiting the US-Colombian drug trade, solidifying this policy as both unnecessary and violent.

In retrospect, United States efforts to reduce cocaine production and exportation from Colombia throughout the late 20th and early 21st century were largely unsuccessful. US anti-drug policies in Colombia, which included an extradition treaty, military aid, aerial coca crop fumigation methods, and kingpin and high-value target strategies, failed to diminish the US-Colombian drug trade and bring about positive lasting effects in either country. Instead, the policies contributed to negative side effects, which have riddled Colombia with violence, environmental damage, civilian health threats, and even increased coca production and cocaine exportation. With US demand for cocaine and Colombian cocaine production and exportation remaining high to this day, it is clear that the measures taken by the US government were ineffective in accomplishing goals on both ends of the narcotized USColombian relationship and detrimental to Colombia’s citizens, land, and society. Almost four decades after the first US-Colombia Extradition Treaty, cocaine is now the second most widely-used recreational drug in the United States,97 and Colombia retains its reputation as the top global producer of cocaine,98 relatively unchanged since the beginning of the series of US counternarcotic policies implemented in Colombia. To this day, the drug epidemic still plagues the United States, with the US drug overdose rate most recently hitting a startling high peak – quadrupling since 1999 – at over 100,000 deaths in a year.99 Now accounting for tens of thousands of deaths annually in the United States, cocaine, once seen as a glamorous and harmless drug by US society, is not so glamorous anymore.100

97 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war”. 98 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war”. 99 Reynolds Lewis and Kaitlin Sullivan, “’A staggering increase’: Yearly overdose deaths tops 100,000 for the first time,” NBC (New York City), November 17, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/yearly-drugoverdose-deaths-top-100000-first-time-rcna5656. 100 Lewis and Sullivan, “’A staggering”.

Appendix A: The approximated national population-weighted crack indexes from the years 1979 to 1999. Source: Fryer, Roland G., Jr., Paul S. Heaton, Steven D. Levitt, and Kevin M. Murphy. Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact. April 2006. https://scholar. harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fhlm_crack_cocaine_0.pdf.

Appendix B: The approximated value in metric tons of cocaine produced by Andean countries from 1995-1999. Source: Marcella, Gabriel. PLAN COLOMBIA: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES. Scotts Valley: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11577.

Appendix C: FARC presence in Colombia and area of land covered with coca crops during the 1990s. Source: McDermott, Jeremy. “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income.” InSight Crime. Last modified September 6, 2017. https:// insightcrime.org/news/analysis/ farcriches-yearly-income-up-to580-million/.

Appendix D: Effects of aerial spraying in nearby areas on miscarriages. (*** and ** are statistically significant, indicating that there is sufficient evidence in the data to indicate that the municipalities with positive levels of aerial spraying have high miscarriage rates compared to normal miscarriage rates at an alpha (type 1 error) levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively; R-squared indicates how well the model can explain the data between a range of 0 and 1 – 1 indicates that the model can account for all incidents relative to the data, while 0 indicates that the model can account for no incidents) Source: Mejia, Daniel, and Adriana Camacho. The Health Consequences of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops: The Case of Colombia. June 2015. https://www. cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-408-Camacho-Mejia-HealthConsequences-Aerial-Spraying-Colombia.pdf.

Appendix E: U.S. Cocaine Street Prices (Dollars Per Gram) – Adjusted for Inflation (2016 U.S. Dollar Value) Source: Isacson, Adam. “Restarting Aerial Fumigation on Drug Crops.” Washington Office on Latin America, March 7, 2019. https://wola.org/ analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-cropsin-colombia-is-a-mistake//

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