Julian Hough

The Perpetual Foreigner:

The E ects of Orientalism on US Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans during the Cold War (1945-1991) Julian Hough

“Every empire … tells itself and the world … that its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate,” historian Edward W. Said sardonically criticized the US for using “the War on Terror” as a cover for American imperialism in his LA Times article entitled “Blind Imperial Arrogance” in 2003.1 In the same article, Said lamented the “woefully inadequate” knowledge the US had of Arabs and Islam while protesting that such inadequacy unjustly placed anyone sympathetic to the Arab culture under attack.2 This scathing critique of the US approach to the Middle East brought to light Orientalism, which Said himself first defined in 1978 as a system by which “the West was able to manage and even produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.”3 While complex and continuously evolving, Orientalism can be described in three essential characteristics. First, it dichotomizes the world into a mutually-exclusive dyad composed of the “Self” (the “West” or the “Occident”) and the “Other” (the “East” or the “Orient”).4 Then, it allows the “Self” to construct and produce knowledge about the “Other” in a way that serves the interests of the “Self.”5 Based on the self-constructed—hence often “woefully inadequate”—knowledge, it provides cultural and political discourses through which the “Self” defines its own “power and superiority” over the “Other” and self-grants a “mission to enlighten [and] civilize” the “Other.”6 With these distinct features, Orientalism undergirded the postwar imperialism of the US, which proclaimed its “manifest duty” to democratize the decolonizing world with a particular interest in Asia at the dawn of the Cold War in

1 Edward W. Said, “Blind Imperial Arrogance,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA), July 20, 2003, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-jul-20-oesaid20-story.html. 2 Said, “Blind Imperial Arrogance.” 3 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3. 4 Said, Orientalism, 12. 5 Shehla Burney, “Orientalism: The Making of the Other,” Counterpoints 417 (2012): 26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42981698. 6 Said, Orientalism, 256; Edward W. Said, “Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition,” in Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), 3.

1945 (Appendix A)7. For the next five decades of the Cold War (19451991), Orientalism served as the reductive system by which the US defined and built a new world order in three phases, each with a distinct impact on US race relations with Asians and Asian Americans. During the formative phase (1945-1947), the US defined the genesis of Communism as “Oriental,” grouping Asians with the Soviet Union as the antithetical “Other” to democracy.8 In the integration phase (19471980), the US exploited Orientalist stereotypes of the refugees from Asia to integrate them into American society in a show of its “racial egalitarianism,” casting Asian Americans as the naturalized yet different “Other.”9 Finally, amid escalating fears spurred by the economic war against Asia in the 80s, Orientalism challenged this trans-racial integration in the final phase (1980-1991), relegating the Asian American identity to the inimical “Other” through cultural appropriations and political discourses.10 A culturally-entrenched discursive instrument that enabled the US to lump Asians with racialized Communism as the “Other” and to exploit stereotypes of Cold War refugees from Asia to bolster the image of the “Self” as a racially tolerant society, Orientalism reinforced the perception of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners in American society during the Cold War.

During the formative phase of the Cold War (1945-1947), Orientalism underpinned a political discourse for Washington to racialize Communism as “Oriental” and to define it along with Asians as the antithetical “Other” determined to subvert the US mission of democratizing the world. In defining Communism as the Cold War enemy, the US government employed the familiar Orientalist discourse, which is rooted in a binary logic of unequal opposites: the “Other”

7 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Life Magazine, February 17, 1941, 65, https://oldlifemagazine.com/february-17-1941-life-magazine.html; Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 18. 8 Kim, Jodi, Ends of Empire, 57. 9 Madeline Y. Hsu and Ellen D. Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors’: Conditional Inclusion, Model Minorities, and the Pre-1965 Dismantling of Asian Exclusion,” Journal of American Ethnic History 34, no. 4 (2015): 60, https://doi. org/10.5406/jamerethnhist.34.4.0043. 10 Jason Crum, “‘Out of the Glamorous, Mystic East’: Techno-Orientalism in Early Twentieth-Century U.S. Radio Broadcasting,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 51; Yao Li and Harvey L. Nicholson, “When ‘Model Minorities’ Become ‘Yellow Peril’—Othering and the Racialization of Asian Americans in the COVID19 Pandemic,” Sociology Compass 15, no. 2 (January 16, 2021), https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7995194/. 43

characterized as “irrational,” “backward,” “uncivilized,” “childlike,” “depraved,” and “different,” and the “Self” characterized as “rational,” “virtuous,” “mature,” and self-evidently “normal.”11 In 1941, Henry R. Luce, an American media mogul, published an era-defining manifesto entitled “The American Century,” which advanced a widespread sentiment that the US must take on the global responsibility to lead the world of “conflict, disruption, and war” toward a peaceful future by democratization.12 As a shakeup of the world order loomed with the end of World War II, Luce’s vision for the US world leadership became realizable. To lead the world as the new superpower, the US swiftly “othered” its rival, the Soviet Union, by reductively lumping the Soviets with Asians, who had long been “othered” through a series of immigration restrictions starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.13 “In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy, possibilities of distorting and poisoning sources … are infinite,” US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan wrote of the Soviet government in his famous 1946 telegram from Moscow to Washington.14 Calling the genesis of Communism “oriental,” Kennan conveniently co-opted the familiar formation of the Orientalist dichotomy composed of “Anglo-Saxon” (the “Self”) vs. “Russian-Asiatic” (the “Other”) in an article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”:

[The Soviet] brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces.15

11 Said, Orientalism, 40, 206. 12 Luce, “The American Century,” 61. 13 An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to the Chinese, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58, (May 6, 1882), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/5752153; Bruce Cumings, “American Orientalism at War in Korea and the United States: A Hegemony of Racism, Repression, and Amnesia,” in Orientalism and War, by Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 43. 14 George F. Kennan to Secretary of State, “Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946 (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246), 7, https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/116178. 15 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs. An American Quarterly Review 4, no. 25 (July 1947): 3, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/ the_sources_of_soviet_conduct_from_foreign_affairs_july_1947-en-a0f03730dde8-4f06-a6ed-d740770dc423.html.

In the same article, Kennan derided the Soviet’s political personality using such Orientalist tropes as “immature, controlled by ‘instinctive desires,’ ‘impatience,’ and ‘impulses and emotions.’”16 With great enthusiasm, Washington received Kennan’s scathing diagnosis of the Soviet Union and his proposal of “firm and vigilant containment” of Communism.17 Upon his passionate advice, President Harry S Truman effectively declared the Cold War in a 1947 speech, now known as the Truman Doctrine, by placing “great responsibilities” upon the US to help the third world nations defend themselves from the “totalitarian regimes … [which] spread and grow on evil soil.”18 Subsequently, the National Security Council issued Report 68 (NSC 68), which echoed the construction of Communism as “antipathy … to freedom” standing at the “opposite poles” against democracy and further cast the Soviets as the “Other.”19 NSC 68 laid out concrete recommendations, including military means, against Communist forces, promulgating US world leadership and granting the US the task of democratizing—or imperializing—the world.20

To its detriment, the US was so steeped in Orientalism that it reductively grouped the people of decolonizing nations along with the racialized Soviet Union as the “Other,” resulting in its failure to gain popularity among the people of the decolonizing nations during the formative phase of the Cold War. An examination of the first major “hot” proxy Cold War battleground in Korea, regarded as one of “the biggest calamities of the Cold War” according to historian Odd Arne Westad, elucidates how Orientalism dictated the US democratization mission.21 On September 7,

16 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 2. 17 Robert C. Tucker, “The Long Telegram: An Act of Political Leadership,” The Princeton University Library Chronicle 66, no. 2 (2005): 295-6, http://www. jstor.org/stable/10.25290/prinunivlibrchro.66.2.0295; Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 6, 9. 18 Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” speech presented at Congress, Washington, DC, March 12, 1947, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/ address-president-congress-recommending-assistance-greece-and-turkey; National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-4 (July 26, 1947), https://www. dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947. 19 National Security Council, National Security Council Report, NSC 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, US National Archives (April 14, 1950): 7, http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191. 20 John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): 167, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2626672; National Security Council, NSC 68,” 7. 21 Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019), 159. 45

1945, only three weeks after World War II ended, the US military began its occupation of Korea, a decolonizing nation of twenty-six million. Even before he set foot in Korea for the first time, however, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the newly-appointed military governor of Korea, publicly declared Korea “the enemy of the state” based on his Orientalist preconception that the Koreans were “backwards,” “unruly,” and so susceptible to the Soviet Communist indoctrination that they had to be suppressed.22 To that end, he quickly instituted “power inequalities and prejudices inscribed in the basic discourses” in his government and subjected Korean civilians to extreme repression, foreshadowing McCarthyism.23 Widely known to be disinterested in and dismissive of Korean history and culture, Hodge resorted to such Orientalist tropes as “impetuous children” in describing the Koreans and subscribed to blind loyalty to anti-Communism in decision-making.24 Historian Charles Kraus writes,

[Hodge’s behavior was] a bellwether of the deeply entrenched attitudes and beliefs common among American policymakers … [and] also emblematic of the unequal power relations American observers developed and deployed in their rhetoric about Korea. These negative discourses about Koreans, as expressions of Orientalism, … created a ‘cultural distance’ or power imbalance between Koreans and Americans.25

To the detriment of the US relationship with the decolonizing nation of Korea, the Hodge government embodied American “imperial arrogance”—undergirded by the archetypal Orientalist process of knowledge construction and power anointment—causing an antiAmerican sentiment among many Koreans who wanted independence from all hegemonic forces after 36 years of exploitative colonial subjugation by Imperial Japan.

Meanwhile, in northern Korea, the Soviet Union invested heavily in building relationships with the Koreans, imbricating Communist indoctrination with anti-imperialist sentiments, with which to “enlist 22 James I. Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945—1948,” Korean Studies 19 (1995): 20, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/23719137; Charles Kraus, “American Orientalism in Korea,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 22, no. 2 (2015): 147, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/43898414. 23 Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 148. 24 Matray, “Hodge Podge,” 22. 25 Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 149-50.

the sympathy of the population.”26 In stark contrast to the Hodge government, which shunned Koreans for “[not being] ready for self-government,” the Soviets allowed “autonomy by entrusting the administration to the Korean Communists” by appointing exclusively Koreans in government posts, according to a 1947 CIA report entitled “The Situation in Korea.”27 At the same time, the Soviets built a close relationship with the Koreans through cultural exchanges in music, film, and literature—Soviet cultural policies in northern Korea “gave much more space and encouragement to Korean cultural expression,” garnering local support for the Soviet Union and Communism (Appendix B).28 Adequately informed that the Korean people desired independence above all else, the Soviet government backed Kim Il-Sung, an independence fighter-turned “national hero.”29 Meanwhile, relying exclusively on its own Orientalist image of Korea, the US spurned Kim Ku, a wellrespected independence veteran and President of the Korean Provincial Government, calling him the “wrong horse” on suspicion of his Communist ties.30 Instead, Washington backed anti-Communist, US- educated Rhee Syngman, whose recalcitrant penchant for dictatorship later proved to be antithetical to US desire to instill democratic values in Korea—a costly failure of US intelligence that became a symbol of its reductive Orientalist logic.31 In 1948, after the mysterious assassination of Kim Ku, Rhee became the first President of the Republic of Korea by excluding (“othering”) the people in the north for their ties with Communism in the nation’s first-ever election.32 By 1948, when the US military government handed the government of the Republic of Korea to 26 Byung-Moo Hwang, “Revolutionary Armed Struggle and the Origins of the Korean War,” Asian Perspective 12, no. 2 (1988): 124, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/42703920. 27 Central Intelligence Agency, The Situation in Korea, ORE 5/1 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1947), 1. https://catalog.archives.gov/ id/6924248; Mark P. Barry, “The U.S. and the 1945 Division Of Korea: Mismanaging the ‘Big Decisions,’” International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 4: 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24543683. 28 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (February 2003): 83, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/3096136. 29 “Soviet Report on Communists in Korea, 1945,” 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AGShVS RF. F. 172. OP 614631. D. 23 (1945): 26, accessed July 2, 2022, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/114890. 30 Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 149. 31 Edward C. Keefer, “The Truman Administration and the South Korean Political Crisis of 1952: Democracy’s Failure?,” Pacific Historical Review 60, no. 2 (1991):146, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3640489. 32 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010), digital file. 47

the Rhee regime, a civil war between the north (Soviet-backed “Other”) and the south (US-backed “Self”) seemed all but inevitable. In sum, the US Orientalist Manichaeism manifested itself in the creation of two Koreas—a dismal outcome reflected with a “considerable self-criticism” according to historian Charles Armstrong.33

After leaving Korea in a highly polarized state that embodied Orientalist Manichaeism in 1948, the US officially suffered its first major “loss” of the Cold War in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese Civil War by defeating the US-backed Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT). During World War II, the US Secretary of War Patrick Hurley had characterized the CCP as “not truly Communist” because of its espousal of “democratic ideals.”34 In an effort to save China as an ally, Hurley proposed to Washington in 1945 to help create a unified government in China, including the Communists, but the proposal was spurned by Washington, who viewed the CCP as the uncompromisable “Other” by association with the Soviet Union.35 After this breakoff, the Chinese Civil War resumed for four more years, ending in KMT’s loss in 1949. In less than a year after this “loss” of China and less than two years after the US celebrated the establishment of US-styled democracy in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the first major “hot” Cold War proxy war—the Korean War (1950-1953)—erupted in June 1950. Six months later, the Communist Chinese army entered the war in support of North Korea, fighting directly against the US military in the bloody conflict that took millions of lives, including those of forty thousand American soldiers. In his book The Cold War: A World History, historian Odd Arne Westad expresses the irony that the US, a country founded on its anticolonial heritage, “failed to prioritize decolonization” over fighting Communism during the postwar period and attributes the failure to the heavy influence of the “sense of a racial hierarchy” and the reductive Orientalist worldview held by the US government.36 Even before the destructive force of war befell the Korean peninsula, the US failure to appeal to the hearts and minds of Koreans on the cultural front of the democratization mission, coupled with intensifying Soviet propaganda against America’s “Achilles 33 Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War,” 75. 34 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 110. 35 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII 893.00/1–1049: Telegram, Document 135), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d135; Michael M. Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29 (1993):135-6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2949955. 36 Westad, The Cold War, 157.

heel” of racism, overdetermined the new US strategy of integrating Asians from decolonizing nations into American society (the “Self”).37

During the integration phase of the Cold War (1947-1980), Orientalism served as a hierarchical framework for integration, exploiting cultural differences to position Asian Americans as the naturalized “Other,” rather than an instrument of domination as it had during the pre-war period or the formative phase of the Cold War.38 The immigration reform was the first site of integration, but the relaxation of Asian immigration restrictions only masked the stubborn Orientalist undercurrent in US cultural diplomacy purported to appease the decolonizing nations. On the surface, the US swiftly proceeded with reforms. For example, Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act to promote “mutual understanding” between Americans and the people of the rest of the world in 1948.39 Subsequently, the first broad Cold War legislation to ease Asian immigration exclusion was advanced by Representative Walter Judd, who appealed to bring fairness to immigration laws to appease the third world.40 Judd’s efforts led to the Immigration Act of 1952 (McCarran- Walter Act), which repealed the “Asian Barred Zone” established in 1917.41 While these reforms promoted more Asian integration, they were hardly free of deeply-ingrained Orientalism.42 Even Judd himself wasaverse to an influx of Asians into the US, so he introduced a provision that limited persons of Asian ancestry in addition to keeping the quota low at 185 and 205 immigrants per year from Japan and China, respectively.43 The full removal of limits on Asian immigration finally

37 Michael G. Davis, “Impetus for Immigration Reform: Asian Refugees and the Cold War,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 7, no. 3/4 (1998): 143, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23612917; Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 37. 38 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 10-11. 39 US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80402, 62 Stat. 6 (Jan. 27, 1948). https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/oversight/ legislation/smith-mundt/. 40 Hsu and Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors,’” 49. 41 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. (June 27, 1952). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-66/pdf/STATUTE66-Pg163.pdf; Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 99; Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 20. 42 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 129. 43 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 227; Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 130.

came with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the Hart–Celler Act).44 However, even these removals had hidden barriers to entry. For example, worried that Asians might become a social liability, US immigration officials enforced preferential prioritization to skilled and educated Asian immigrants with political background checks to enter the country.45 In many cases, Asians had to wait for five years or more because of the low immigration quota compared to the large number of refugees trying to flee from political instability and economic woes of the third world.46 In sum, the immigration reforms made in support of the new integration strategy allowed Asians to become naturalized citizens, eligible to join the “Self” for the first time in US history; however, even these immigration measures were subjected to Orientalist hierarchization that kept Asians as the “Other” even after their joining the “Self.”47

Along with immigration relaxation, with the belief that true integration of Asians into the “Self” must happen at a family level, the US government promoted adoption programs of war orphans, yet only within a strict Orientalist construct of white parents raising Asian children. In 1950, Loy Henderson, US ambassador for India, publicly attributed the US’ weaker ties to Asia than to Europe to the fact that most Americans traced their ancestry to Europe and lacked such family ties with Asia.48 With a number of other political figures echoing his sentiment, the belief that the US must adopt war orphans into American families in order to build a sense of connection and sympathy between the US and Asian countries spread quickly among philanthropic organizations.49 For example, the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), founded by Presbyterian minister J. Calvitt Clarke in 1918, flourished during the Cold War with its sponsorship programs designed to improve, at least virtually, the “family” relations between America and Asia.50 Millions of Americans participated by donating “$10 a month” to save children from the brutal hands of Communism (Appendix C).51 A government agency called the International Social Service was reformed to collaborate 44 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (Dec. 1, 1965). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/ STATUTE-79-Pg911.pdf. 45 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 141; Hsu and Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors,’” 52. 46 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 141. 47 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 225. 48 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 145. 49 Arissa H. Oh, “From War Waif to Ideal Immigrant: The Cold War Transformation of the Korean Orphan,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31, no. 4 (2012): 35, https://doi.org/10.5406/jamerethnhist.31.4.0034; Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 145. 50 Oh, “From War Waif,” 35. 51 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 158.

with volunteer programs on supporting children refugees from the Cold War battlefields.52 After the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, these sponsorships blossomed into full-fledged adoption programs, which were promoted as “missionary work through which ordinary Americans could support their government’s efforts to display racial liberalism in the face of Soviet propaganda and thus win the allegiance of newly decolonizing countries in Asia and Africa,” according to historian Arissa H. Oh.53 While adoption programs had humanitarian purposes, Orientalist imagery was still prevalent in their promotions by the media, which represented Asians as “backward-thinking people … in need of rescue by a dynamic and progressive United States of America” according to ethnic studies researcher Catherine Ceniza Choy.54 Further, historian Christina Klein believes that these adoption programs garnered enthusiastic participation from the American public because “the figure of the white parent to the non-white child” was already familiar Orientalist imagery that represented “‘natural’ relations of hierarchy and domination” (Appendix D).55 In a way, the adoption program was a microcosm of the US influence on Asia, reflecting America’s “manifest duty” to teach Asia to be a democratic region mirroring its American “parent.”56

During this integration phase, the US media played a crucial role in increasing cultural sensitivities through various forms of cultural production—a key aspect of Orientalism—further influencing the new Asian American identity as the inferior part of the “Self.” One of the most symbolic Orientalist productions that conjured anti-Asian image at the height of the Asian exclusion period (1882-1952) was the villain Fu Manchu in the 1932 movie The Mask of Fu Manchu (Appendix E). A diabolical “Oriental” villain “steeped in tradition yet extremely modern, proficient with Western technologies, ingenious at weapons development, and committed to expansionism,” Fu Manchu was one of the original cultural manifestations of the Asian fear, often dubbed “yellow peril,” according to media studies scholar Abigail De Kosnik.57

52 Catherine Ceniza Choy, “Race at the Center: The History of American Cold War Asian Adoption,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 16, no. 3 (2009): 165, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23613053. 53 Oh, “From War Waif,” 36. 54 Choy, “Race at the Center,” 166. 55 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 174. 56 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 176. 57 Abigail De Kosnik, “The Mask of Fu Manchu, Son of Sinbad, and Star Wars IV: A New Hope: Techno-Orientalist Cinema as a Mnemotechnics of TwentiethCentury U.S.-Asian Conflicts,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 93. 51

However, at the beginning of the integration phase (the early 50s), cultural production about Asia shifted accordingly to reflect the sense of connection. One notable example is the 1951 musical by Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II, The King and I, in which a British teacher, Anna, replaces local knowledge of Siam with Western—and implicitly superior—knowledge by teaching local Siamese children who are subordinate to her (Appendix F).58 Reflecting the new US strategy of integration, Anna is interested in “forging connections” with the children—by sitting together and enjoying the process of getting to know each other, “they create a new community that includes Asians and Westerners” on the same floor, according to Klein.59 This scene also illustrates the ideal approach to integration—proposed by Said in his book Culture and Imperialism—in which a well-integrated world appreciates the “hybrid” nature of different cultures and thinks “sympathetically” about other cultures.60 Despite its portrayal of amicable integration between the West and the East, this scene is still redolent of Orientalism: it clearly establishes an Orientalist hierarchy between Anna, representing the West (“Self”), who plays “an adult who dispenses knowledge,” and her Siamese students, representing the Orient (“Other”), who are “ignorant children subordinate to her authority.”61 The play, which was later made into a popular film in 1956, vividly idealized the naturalization process of the people of Asia into the Western “Self,” but the apparent undercurrent of Orientalism left a lasting image of Asians as the ignorant “Other” reinforced in the audience’s mind.

Long preconditioned to America’s conspicuous practice of racism and ostracization, the nascent Asian Americans themselves contributed to the perpetuation of their status as the “Other” by staying politically silent. Many years of racist and exclusionary policies and practices had sowed the fear in the Asian American mind that the US government could abruptly reverse its new friendly policies around Asia and AsianAmericans as it had in the past.62 For example, many Japanese Americans sported their military service during World War II in order to be accepted and recognized as Americans (Appendix G), but they kept rather silent about the injustice they had suffered through the Japanese internment—

58 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12. 59 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12. 60 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 317, 336. 61 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12. 62 Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture, Edited by Thomas C. Chen (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1999), 151.

the epitome of racial injustice executed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt through Executive Order 9066 in 1942.63 Likewise, the Chinese Americans were gripped with fear of retaliation by association when they heard that Communist China (the People’s Republic of China) entered the Korean War to fight directly against the US in 1950.64 Their fear turned true when the US government adopted the Chinese Confession Program, a race-profiling measure targeting the Chinese Americans on an Orientalist supposition—redolent of Fu Manchu’s famous Oriental witchcraft—that they were susceptible to indoctrination by Communist China (Appendix H).65 In constant fear of a resurgence of such racially targeted policies, the newly-formed Asian Americans picked up a “survival strategy” to portray themselves as outstanding American citizens by promoting stories about their traditional values as the cause of their success.66 Buttressed by such self-imposed social behavior, ethnic studies researchers began to attribute the Asian Americans’ apparent success to their cultural “difference”—or “ethnic virtue” such as “stoic patience, political obedience, and self-improvement”—according to ethnic studies scholar Robert G. Lee.67 The first of such research reports to gain notoriety was published in the New York Times with the title, “Success Story: Japanese-American Style,” written by sociologist William Petersen in 1966.68 While the article served as a Bildungsroman of the new minority group—Asian Americans—it unintentionally reminded the readers of the Orientalist imagery of Asians as “hyperefficient competitors,” with explicit comparisons to other racial groups: “By any criterion of good citizenship that we choose, the Japanese Americans are better than any other group in our society, including

63 U.S. President. Executive Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 3 C.F.R. 1092 (Feb 19, 1942):1092-3, https:// www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/executive-order-9066; Mikiso Hane, “Wartime Internment,” The Journal of American History 77, no. 2 (1990): 572, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2079186. 64 Wu, Color of Success, 111. 65 Lee, R., Orientals: Asian, 153. 66 Jeff Guo, “The Real Reasons the U.S. Became Less Racist toward Asian Americans,” The Washington Post (Washington, D.C), November 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/the-real-reasonamericans-stopped-spitting-on-asian-americans-and-started-praising-them/. 67 Robert G. Lee, “The Cold War Origins of the Model Minority Myth,” in Asian American Studies Now: A Critical Reader (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 256. 68 William Petersen, “Success Story, Japanese-American Style,” New York Times (New York, NY), January 9, 1966, 1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1966/01/09/356013502.html?pageNumber=180. 53

native-born whites.”69 In reality, Asian Americans’ collective penchant to succeed and to do it quietly resulted from their self-representation colored by mistrust and fear of the US government. In a way, Asian Americans’ political silence as a survival mechanism backfired, contributing to the perpetuation of their own status as the unassimilable “Other” in American society.

In the 60s, to further showcase the strength of American racial egalitarianism to the Soviet Union and buttress its claim to world leadership, the US government exploited Orientalist stereotypes through the “model minority” myth. As the war of propaganda and psychology escalated and the competition with the Soviet Union heated, the US government started to valorize Asian Americans in an attempt to counter Soviet propaganda with a message: “people of all races can make the same achievement as Asian Americans do through hard work, which proves the United States is not a racist society.”70 In their book Empire, authors Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri introduce an imperial instrument that “integrates others with its order and then orchestrates those differences in a system of control.”71 Deploying this exact method, the US government integrated the Asians (“Other”) into American society (“Self”) across color lines. Once the integration started—forming Asian Americans—the US harnessed the “difference” of the Asian Americans for its hegemonic war against the Soviet Union. Educator Nicholas D. Hartlep asserts that the US government “intentionally selected” Asian Americans as a self-made, hardworking “model minority” to insulate itself from domestic and international “accusations that AfricanAmericans were unsuccessful due to racism and discrimination in the United States.”72 The intention of the US government aside, media

69 Petersen, “Success Story,” 180. 70 Eun Hee Kim and Kay Ann Taylor, “The Model Minority Stereotype as a Prescribed Guideline of Empire: Situating the Model Minority Research in the Postcolonial Context,” Journal of Southeast Asian American Education and Advancement 12, no. 2 (June 8, 2017): 2, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jsaaea/ vol12/iss2/4. 71 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 195, quoted in Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 10. 72 Nicholas D. Hartlep, “The Model Minority Myth: What 50 Years of Research Does and Does Not Tell Us,” Diverse Issues in Higher Education, April 29, 2013, https://www.diverseeducation.com/opinion/article/15093076/the-modelminority-myth-what-50-years-of-research-does-and-does-not-tell-us; Kenneth Hough, “Demon Courage and Dread Engines: America’s Reaction to the RussoJapanese War and the Genesis of the Japanese Invasion Sublime,” in TechnoOrientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, comp. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 33.

outlets started touting Asian Americans as a “model minority,” ostensibly influenced by the Cold War political climate. For example, concomitant to Peterson’s New York Times article, the widely-read 1966 U.S. News and World Report article entitled “Success Story of One Minority in the US’” extolled the success of Chinese Americans in “business, science, architecture, politics and other professions.”73 Despite anecdotal evidence that pointed to the progress of Asian integration, the claim of Asian Americans’ asymmetrical success was overblown with an aim to bolster the US claim of world leadership as a multiracial society.74 For example, the fact that only 3.4 percent of Chinese Americans took part in federal welfare programs in the 60s—a rate well below the national average—was frequently cited as a sign of their economic independence, but the metric did not tell the whole story because a full 15 percent of Chinese Americans lived in poverty at that time.75 Regarded as a “contemporary [and] contextual representation of the West’s latent view of Asia and Asians rooted in Orientalism” according to authors Eun Hee Kim and Kay Ann Taylor, the “model minority” myth flourished for the next two decades throughout the integration phase.76 Numerous reports were published, and reports were published, setting a popular discourse in ethnic studies around anecdotes of Cold War refugees selfsufficiently achieving their American dream after fleeing the brutalities of Communism, instilling firmly in the American mind Orientalist imagery of the “model minority” possessing an “inhuman” capability to succeed.77

The Orientalist construction and subsequent proliferation of the “model minority” myth resulted in cementing the Asian American identity as the “Other” in American society and creating a fissure in race relations among minority groups. In their book Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, authors Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein introduce the concept of reward hierarchy as a form of social control.78 According to this hierarchy, the “model minority” label appeared to be a “reward” and an upgrade compared to “yellow horde,” a common Orientalist trope describing Asians during the Asian exclusion period (1882-1952);

73 “Success Story of One Minority Group in U.S.,” U.S. News and World Report, December 26, 1996, 7, https://www.dartmouth.edu/~hist32/Hist33/US%20 News%20&%20World%20Report.pdf. 74 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2. 75 Lee, R, Orientals: Asian, 151. 76 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2, 15. 77 Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America: A History (Simon & Schuster, 2015), 374. 78 Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1991), 32-33, quoted in Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 11. 55

however, this “reward” must be only contrapuntally interpreted because it was predicated on the Asian Americans’ cultural difference, which perpetuated their image as the “Other.”79 Further, the harmful effect of such labeling manifested itself in tension between Asian Americans and other minorities, especially Black Americans. In ethnic studies scholar Timothy P. Fong’s words, the “model minority” myth became conservative propaganda with the message: ‘‘all racial minority groups can succeed just like Asian Americans if they work hard, don’t cause trouble, and assimilate into mainstream American life.”80 Unfortunately, this propagandic myth of Orientalist origin was dissonant with the costly rehabilitation programs that the government was promoting for Black Americans as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty” initiative in the 60s.81 In 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor, led a government report on the economic plight of the Black Americans at the direction of President Johnson. Moynihan believed that the way to correct the “cultural deprivation” suffered by Black Americans was to rehabilitate the families—a stance widely unpopular among the American public.82 The 1966 U.S. News and World Report article reflected the public opposition to Moynihan’s proposal by specifically comparing the success of Chinese Americans to the poverty of Black Americans: “At a time when it is being proposed that hundreds of billions of dollars be spent uplifting Negroes and other minorities, the nation’s 300,000 Chinese Americans are moving ahead on their own with no help from anyone else.”83 Ethnic studies scholar Robert G. Lee believes this article presented a pivotal point at which the “model minority” myth started to create tension among minority groups by casting Asian Americans as the inimical “Other.”84 In sum, the Cold War strategy to showcase America’s racial liberalism resulted in the formation of Asian American identity as a “model minority,” which represented the new form of Orientalism with far-reaching consequences on race relations among minority groups after the 70s.

During the last phase of the Cold War (1980 - 1991), when the fear of Japan’s economic dominance reached its peak, Orientalism re-emerged as the central discourse regarding Asian Americans in the US, evolving

79 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 11. 80 Timothy P. Fong, The Contemporary Asian American Experience: Beyond the Model Minority, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2002), 57. 81 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2. 82 US Department of Labor, Office of Policy Planning and Research, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), 4, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/webid-moynihan. 83 “Success Story,” 6. 84 Lee, R., Orientals: Asian, 150; Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2.

into a form that stereotyped Asian Americans as automata that could subvert white supremacy. The rapid economic rise of Japan, one of the closest US Cold War allies and the exemplary protege of the larger democratic “Self,” caused a revival of anti-Asian fear that extended to Asian Americans during the 70s.85 As the US economy worsened, countless politicians and scholars started publishing materials on Japan’s eventual economic conquest of the world.86 Ironically, with their own “love affair” with Japanese products, the Americans felt betrayed that Japan was outpacing the US—the mentor in the Orientalist representation of racial hierarchy—who had helped Japan’s economy revive from the rubbles of World War II.87 According to historian M. J. Heale, the Americans internalized Japan’s rapid economic expansion as “an attempt to do financially what they had been unable to do through military means” during the colonial period.88 As Japanese electronics and automobile products started to overtake their American counterparts, the old Orientalist images of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the “demonic” and “machine-like” Orientals are fanatically “charging en masse” to defeat the West, crept back into the American psyche (Appendix I).89 This fear revived a particular form of Orientalism, dubbed techno-Orientalism, a cultural “phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo or hyper-technological terms in cultural productions and political discourse” for effecting an image of “automaton whose inhuman efficiency” would displace white supremacy.90 In 1980, as beleaguered President Jimmy Carter dubbed the nation’s economic woes “a crisis of confidence,” his presidential opponent Ronald Reagan demanded Japan to halt the “deluge” of car exports, calling

85 M. J. Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare: Yellow Peril Politics in America, 1980–1993,” Journal of American Studies 43, no. 1 (2009): 20, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/40464347; Lee, E., The Making, 402. 86 Stanford M. Lyman, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 13, no. 4 (2000): 722, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020056. 87 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22. 88 Brandon P. Seto, “Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War,” Asia Pacific Perspectives, Summer 2015, 72-73, accessed December 27, 2021, https://www.usfca.edu/center-asia-pacific/perspectives/v13/seto. 89 Hough, “Demon Courage,” 33. 90 David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu, “Technologizing Orientalism: An Introduction,” Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 2; Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 18. 57

Japan “a part of the problem.”91 Sociologist Ezra Vogel published a bestseller entitled Japan as Number One, fueling the public fear of Asian economic hegemony and colonization in a reversal of the Orientalist worldview.92 Between 1980 and 1982, the percentage of Americans who had unfavorable sentiment toward Japan almost tripled.93 The fear was corroborated by the record US trade deficit of $50 billion against Japan in 1985.94 With inflation increasing out of control and the massive illegal immigration on top of the social agenda, the US public began to put the Cold War strategy of integrating Asian allies into the “Self” into question and started “othering” Asian Americans for the economic ills by Orientalist association.95

The Orientalist cultural production took a similar turn, depicting Asia, Asians, and Asian Americans in the revived techno-Orientalist light and constructing the Asian American image as the “Other” within the “Self.” The massively-popular 1977 movie, Star Wars IV: A New Hope, for example, is filled with Orientalist tropes and symbolism.96 Most notably, the Imperial spaceships, representing the US military, are many generations ahead in their technological firepower compared to the Rebel’s counterparts, which represent the Communist Vietnamese guerrilla fighters.97 This hypo-technological representation of Asians in the 70s quickly reversed into a hyper-technological representation in the 80s, as the focus of the American public shifted from fighting Communism to fighting an economic war, especially in ways that Japan was depicted as the greatest “challenge to the US economic hegemony.”98 Primary examples include Ridley Scott’s 1982 film Blade Runner and William Gibson’s 1984 Neuromancer, both of which depict the Japanese 91 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Vows to Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos,” The Washington Post (Washington, DC), September 3, 1980, 3, https://www. washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/09/03/reagan-vows-to-try-to-haltdeluge-of-japanese-autos/823d292a-e017-42ef-9db2-ad38f43e93f4/. 92 Timothy Yu, “Oriental Cities, Postmodern Futures: ‘Naked Lunch, Blade Runner’, and ‘Neuromancer,’” MELUS 33, no. 4 (2008): 46, http://www.jstor. org/stable/20343507. 93 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22, 23, 24. 94 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 24 95 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22. 96 De Kosnik, “The Mask,” 97. 97 De Kosnik, “The Mask,” 98. 98 Aimee Bahng, “Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 164; Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 98.

as “unfeeling aliens[,] … cyborgs and replicants,” who are expeditiously adaptive to technology and influential as the “largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world.”99 Blatantly showing the fear of the times, Blade Runner depicts Los Angeles in the gloomy, technoOrientalist imagery of a multicultural dystopia inhabited by “hordes of Asian immigrants.”100 Similarly reflecting the anxiety spurred by Japan’s technological advancement, Neuromancer casts Japan, represented by the “Night City,” as a space of “freewheeling and lawless exchange, the competitive market reduced to its most brutal form.”101 In its sequel, All Tomorrow’s Parties, Gibson portrays an Orientalist caricature of the Asian store clerk in a character named Mr. Park, who appears “unfeeling, profit-driven, [and speaking] broken English.”102 In sum, the focus of the Orientalist cultural productions evolved according to the shift of public fear from the geopolitical dominance of the Soviet Union and Communist China to the economic dominance of Japan. The 80s posed a real test to American society whether the Cold War measure of integrating Asians into the “Self” could transcend the Orientalist lineage of the Asian American identity.

In the 80s, reflecting the economic war within the “Self” waged against the Asian Cold War allies, primarily Japan, American society experienced various racially-motivated hate crimes against Asian Americans. The most noteworthy is the 1982 hate-motivated murder of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, who was brutally bludgeoned to death for “job stealing” by two displaced white autoworkers in Detroit.103 Emblematic of its times when the US auto industry was facing growing threats from Japanese competitors, this incident caused an uproar in the nascent Asian American community, especially after Judge Charles Kaufman let the two perpetrators of the heinous hate crime walk away with a $3,780 fine on probation.104 Kaufman, who had been a POW at a prison camp in Japan during World War II, stated the reason for the effective acquittal of the two murderers:

99 Bahng, “Cruel Optimism,” 164. 100 Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 85. 101 Yu, “Oriental Cities,” 61. 102 Julie Ha Tran, “Thinking about Bodies, Souls, and Race in Gibson’s Bridge Trilogy,” in Techno-orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, by David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta Niu (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 141. 103 Mia Tuan, Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites?: The Asian Ethnic Experience Today (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. (AE98/99)), 40; “Racial Violence against Asian Americans,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993): 1928, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341790. 104 Tuan, Forever Foreigners, 46.

We’re talking here about a man who’s held down a responsible job with the same company for 17 or 18 years, and his son who is employed and is a part-time student. These men are not going to go out and harm somebody else. I just didn’t think that putting them in prison would do any good for them or for society.105

Missing in Kaufman’s Orientalist logic was justice for the slain American, Vincent Chin, interred in American history as the permanent “Other.”106 In 1989, in Stockton, California, a white man named Patrick Purdy killed five and wounded thirty Southeast Asian refugee children on their school playground with his semiautomatic rifle (Appendix J).107 As the then California Attorney General John Van de Kamp announced, his motive was “festering hate” of Asians, but the post-incident activism was focused on gun control, not anti-Asian racism.108 In fact, both of these events were dismissed as isolated incidents—first committed by two “responsible” men and second committed by a “deranged” person with a love for guns—under the pretense that Asians were a “model minority” free from racism.109 These events, including the Orientalist construction of the “model minority” myth itself, were manifestations of Asian American identity as the perennial “Other” even as part of the extended “Self.”

By the late 80s, the source of American anxiety was replaced by an ongoing economic war, which reframed the Asian American identity from the Cold War-conscious “model minority” to the fear-led, technoOrientalist “yellow peril.” The era-ending event that bared the stature of Asian American identity was the 1992 Los Angeles Riot, which began as a protest of the brutal beating of a Black motorist named Rodney King by four white cops but ended in mass violence following the acquittal of the cops. The event that symbolized police brutality somehow ended up destroying more than 2,300 local businesses owned mostly by Korean Americans and inflicted almost half-billion dollars of property damage on Korean American business owners.110 The event, known as “Sa-i-gu”

105 Chris Fan, “Vincent Chin: Some Lessons and Legacies,” Hyphen: Asian America Unabridged, June 25, 2015, https://hyphenmagazine.com/ blog/2012/6/25/vincent-chin-some-lessons-and-legacies. 106 Li and Nicholson, “When ‘Model Minorities’ Become.” 107 Gustavo Arellano, “Column: A Deranged White Man Aiming His Bullets at Asians: The Urgent Lesson of 1989 Stockton Massacre,” Los Angeles Times (USA), March 20, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-03-20/ stockton-school-shooting-atlanta. 108 Arellano, “Column: A Deranged.” 109 Arellano, “Column: A Deranged.” 110 Lee, R., Orientals, 375-6.

(“April 29,” the day of the LA Riot, in Korean), was cast by countless media reports as a fait accompli of ongoing racial tension between Black Americans and Korean Americans rather than as a result of LAPD’s abandonment of Koreatown for three days while the Koreatown stores were getting destroyed by rioters.111 Some reporters even rationalized LAPD’s failure by evoking the familiar techno-Orientalist image of Korean Americans, such as that of mercenary Mr. Park in All Tomorrow’s Parties: “foreign intruders deliberately trying to stifle African American economic development,” according to Elaine H. Kim, a Korean American faculty member at the University of California at the time.112 Upon protesting such a skewed media focus, Kim herself received many hate mails, one of which read, “If you are so disenchanted, Korea is still there. Why did you ever leave it?”113 A year after the LA Riot, only 28% of the burned businesses reopened while a number of the victims repatriated to South Korea—back to where they were not considered “aliens” and taunted to “go back.”114 One victim interviewed in a Sa-igu documentary states, “I realize that they [the US government] don’t feel any obligation to help us … because we are Koreans.”115 All the interviewed victims describe the revelatory event, in which their own law enforcement (LAPD) abandoned them, in terms of “misrecognitions, misrepresentations, and cognitive dissonance”—evoking questions about whether Sa-i-gu was a chilling reminder that the people of Asian descent would never be integrated into American society (Appendix K).116

In 1992, after the Cold War was officially over, the US media took on a distinctively Orientalist voice, relegating the status of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners. Legal scholar Lisa Ikemoto describes the voice as a “master narrative” and defines it as “white supremacy’s prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and privilege in a way that maintains intergroup conflict.”117 That

111 King-kok Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice: The 1992 Los Angeles ‘Riots’ and ‘Black-Korean Conflict,’” MELUS 30, no. 3 (2005): 35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30029771. 112 Elaine H. Kim, “Home Is Where the Han Is: A Korean American Perspective on the Los Angeles Upheavals,” Social Justice 20, nos. 1/2 (51-52) (1993): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766728; Lee, R., Orientals, 376. 113 Kim, E., “Home is Where,” 9. 114 ‘Sa-I-Gu’: From Korean Women Perspectives, directed by Catherine Choy and Dai-Sil Kim-Gibson, produced by Elaine H. Kim, Center for Asian American Media, 1993, https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/ bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C3155438; Kim, “Home is Where,” 9. 115 ‘Sa-I-Gu’ From Korean Women Perspectives. 116 Jinah Kim, Postcolonial Grief: The Afterlives of the Pacific Wars in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 53. 117 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 4. 61

seemingly objective and deftly non-engaging “master narrative” not only fuels “minority vs. minority” conflicts but also reinforces the archetypal Orientalist positioning of whites as the normative master that mediates as the adult, according to language critic King-kok Cheung.118 A landmark case of “master narrative,” Sa-i-gu was analogous to the 1966 US News and World Report article that had pitted Chinese Americans against Black Americans—that which had ignited the “model minority” myth in the first place. One key difference is that in 1966, the Chinese Americans were valorized as part of the extended “Self,” reflecting the Cold War strategy of integration at the time, while, in 1992, the Korean Americans were scapegoated for the plights of Black Americans, reflecting the Asian fear of the times bolstered by techno-Orientalist cultural productions cementing their image as mercenary “poison-pushing merchants.”119 From the perspective of these Cold War refugees, the Cold War did not end with the Berlin Wall crumbling down; rather, it ended in the streets of Los Angeles with a stark realization that their role as a pawn in the war of showoff of superiority was no longer needed—that they had been duped into joining the “Self” only in the US ostentation of racial integration and now abandoned after the war as useless “Other,” forever deemed alien and ineligible for true integration.

A progenitor of American imperialism, Orientalism enabled the US to identify itself as a superior “Self” while defining the Soviet Union as the Manichaean “Other” in the formative stages of the Cold War. In further defining the “Other,” the US government reductively grouped people of decolonizing nations with Communism as the enemy on Orientalist presupposition that they are susceptible to Communist indoctrination. In fortifying the “Self,” US policymakers, with help from scholars and media, strategically formed the Asian American identity as a “model minority,” showcasing Asian Americans’ success in countering Soviet propaganda against US racism. In so doing, the US exploited the cultural differences of Asian Americans, perpetuating their “otherness” even amidst the glorification of their status. As the waning Cold War gave way to economic war against Japan as the main source of American anxiety in the 80s, Orientalism took the most pernicious form, re-instilling in the American psyche an image of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners trying to subvert white supremacy. In conclusion, Orientalism played a significant role in US race relations with Asians and later-formed Asian Americans, whose vacillating images during the 45-year span of the Cold War—ranging from the primitive people susceptible to Communism, to the “model minority,” and back to the “yellow horde” aiming to take over the world with inhuman technological prowess—must be contrapuntally 118 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 5. 119 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 11.

interpreted. Consistent throughout the period was the way in which the US viewed itself as the “Self” and people of Asian descent as the perpetual “Other.”

APPENDICES

Appendix A: A 1947 map showing the locations of decolonizing nations contested between the US and the Soviet Union for hegemony. Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 35.

Appendix B: Cho-So Chin-Sun (Korean-Soviet Friendship), a newsletter published by the Soviet Union in Korean to build close friendships with the Korean people, January 1950. Source: Charles K. Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (February 2003): 84, https://www.jstor. org/stable/3096136.

Appendix C: Advertisement for Sponsorship of a Child in Asia for Christian Children’s Fund. Courtesy Christian Children’s Fund Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 169.

Appendix D: A white parent is “forcefully” teaching her adopted children from Asia how to mind her in the 1958 film, South Pacific. Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 167.

Appendix E: Fu Manchu in the 1932 movie, The Mask of Fu Manchu. Source: Clarence Sinclair Bull, Boris Karloff as Dr. Fu Manchu in ‘The Mask of Fu Manchu’, 1932, photograph, https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/ search/portrait/mw169833/BorisKarloff-as-Dr-Fu-Manchu-in-TheMask-of-Fu-Manchu.

Appendix F: Anna, presenting the “Self,” is imparting the Siamese children, representing the “Other,” of the Western Knowledge in the 1956 Film, The King and I. Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 2.

Appendix G: A 1945 photograph features a Japanese American soldier, holding a pamphlet highlighting the “patriotism of Japanese American soldiers.” Source: Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 84.

Appendix H: A 1951 photo showing a parade by the San Francisco Six Companies’ Anti-Communist League, holding anti-Communist placards, one of which says, “Chinese Americans are Loyal Citizens.” Source: Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 117.

Appendix I: Japanese pilots chasing German airplane crew in H. G. Wells’ novel War in the Air (1908), reflecting the Asian fear spurred by Japan’s unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese war. Source: Kenneth Hough, “Demon Courage and Dread Engines: America’s Reaction to the Russo-Japanese War and the Genesis of the Japanese Invasion Sublime,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, comp. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 37.

Appendix J: The New York Times article reporting the 1989 Stockton Massacre, California, juxtaposed with another article that focuses on the weapon used by the gunman as opposed to the hate-based nature of the crime. Source: Robert Reinhold, “After Shooting, Horror but Few Answers,” The New York Times (New York, NY), January 19, 1989, sec. B, 6, https://timesmachine. nytimes.com/timesmachine/1989/01/19/issue.html.

Appendix K: A Korean-American shop owner after her shop was burned down by rioters in the LA Riot, 1992. Source: ‘Sa-I-Gu’: From Korean Women Perspectives, directed by Catherine Choy and Dai-Sil Kim-Gibson, produced by Elaine H. Kim, Center for Asian American Media, 1993, https://www.pbs.org/pov/watch/saigu/

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