Larissa cadd by muhamad fairuz

Child Soldiers of Burma

by Larissa Jane Cadd Detmold

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Child Soldiers of Burma The importance in a name. I want to begin by clarifying a fundamental difficulty everyone eventually encounters when discussing Burma / Myanmar. I encounter frequently, when I discuss issues relating to Burma, whether the country should be referred to as Myanmar or Burma. This problem has been complicated by some nations adopting the use of Myanmar, and others retaining the use of Burma. Before deciding whether to adopt one term or another one should have regard to the history of the name. Until 1989 the country had always in some form been referred to as Burma because the dominant ethnic group was (and in fact remains) the Burmans. An earlier group had existed prior the mediaeval period, the Mon, but they were replaced at this time by the Burmans. Throughout British colonisation and empirical governance, the name was Burma. Whether as a province of India, or in its own right: Burma! When the country obtained independence in 1948, it became the Union of Burma until 1962 when it became the Socialist Republic of Burma. Finally in 1989 it became the Union of Myanmar: this followed the 8888 uprising (8 August 1988), which ultimately resulted in the Burmese military replacing the 1974 Constitution with martial law. Therefore, when the name was changed to Myanmar by the military it wasn’t by popular consent. There are arguments supporting each name being used: Myanmar indicates a break with British colonialism and is alleged to be more inclusive of other ethnic populations; Burma indicates pro-democracy support and is alleged to be more disrespectful of non-Burma ethnic groups it imposes the indigenous name for Burma’s rather than an

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anglicised version seen to be more inclusive. Since 1989 the difference in meaning between Burma or Myanmar has become more than indigenous language versus colonial interpretation. The name used now identifies allegiance either to military rule or democratic reform. Notwithstanding recent developments democracy remains a live issue for expat Burmese & supporters of full democratic expression in Burma. Finally, some argue that Myanma (with no ‘r’) is the indigenous word for Burma and therefore should be preferred to Burma. But Myanmar is in truth only the literary (or written) version of the name. Myanmar as a spoken indigenous word is in fact pronounced ‘Bama’. This lends some support to the argument that it should be pronounced Burma in any event, and that it does marginalise ethnic Burmese. Interestingly, “Myanmar” has no counterpart noun for its nationality: it is the Burmese live in Burma or Myanmar, there is no such word Myanmar-‘ese’ or Myanmar-‘ish’. This paper will use Burma from this point onward out of respect to the democracy movement and the non-Burma ethnic minorities.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CIVIL CONFLICT IN BURMA An unstable history of civil conflict and an unstable union

For the last 1000 years both re-unification and deunification has been a constant feature of Burma. There have been many dynasties, kingdoms & empires. Although Burma is predominantly Buddhist, Hinduism, Islam & Christianity are also practised in minorities. Between 1886 and 1937, Burma was a province of JUNE 2015 CRIMINALISE WAR

British India. Unrest continued throughout that time, mainly in the remote northern areas. In 1937 Burma was given a constitution under separate British rule from that of India. For all intents & purposes the British remained in control. The years 1948-1962 were a period of significant political upheaval : formal decolonisation & re-unification occurred. Regional armed rebel groups began to be established. These years were a period of significant unrest: formal de-colonisation & re-unification occurred. Military rule was imposed. Regional rebel groups began to be established: e.g. Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), Shan State Army (SSA). And since 1962 Burmese history has been characterised by various forms of oppressive rule, stagnated economic development & failed democratic reform.

State), Karenni (Kayah State), Karen (Kayin State) & Mon (Mon State) peoples. Each of these ethnic groups are dominant in their respective states. Seven of these states have active ethnic (rebel) armed groups: Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan. Many states have multiple armed groups active within them. Some of the main groups are listed below next to the state within which they are predominantly representative and active: there are many others that are not mentioned, and not recognised in ‘peace talks’ with the Burmese military. These are the civil conflicts within which child soldiers find themselves in Burma. They are recruited by many of the ethnic rebel groups, although focus has only really been on the existence of child soldiers in the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw Kyi (or Tatmadaw for short).

Today Burma is one of the most impoverished countries in the world; despite recent limited reform it remains one of the poorest nations in the world: ranking 149th among 186 nations rated in the 2013 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. This is despite having significant natural resources from which wealth could be generated for the benefit of its people. Since 1948 there have been 16 states that form part of Burma. Many of these states are vying for outright independence for their ethnic (non-Burman) populations. At the very least they are seeking a more formal and democratic representation in Burmese government. Because of this internal unrest within Burma has largely centred on the dominance of Burman culture & language over other ethnic minorities within the country. Approximately 60% of the Burmese population is Burman, while the remaining 40% consists of seeveral different ethnic groups within different states: Arakanese & Rohingya (Rakhine State), Chin (Chin State), Ka c h i n (Kachin

CHILD SOLDIERS ACROSS BURMA Basic Numbers

It has been long standing international law prohibition to enlist anyone under the age of 15 unless they consent. There have been attempts for many years to make it unlawful to enlist anyone until aged 18 regardless of consent. Recruitment of children is a crime and the International Criminal Court can prosecute. The reality is it is very difficult to identify the individual perpetrators, and as long as Burma as a state continues to ‘talk the talk’ of preventing child soldiers it is unlikely that there will be any moves to prosecute the state. In 2002 it was estimated that Burma had the highest number of child soldiers in the world, some as young as 11 years old: of 350,000 soldiers in the Tatmadaw it was alleged that up to 70,000 may be children.1 In approximate terms that is up to 20% of the army being under the age of 18 years. However, there can be no exact numbers because of the various ways and reasons that such recruitment occurs: documentation is often forged or children are kidnapped and sold into the military, and extremely impoverished families indenture children for the income. As a result of international pressure, in 2012 the Burmese government signed an action plan with the UN to demobilise all child soldiers and cease recruitment. The Tatmadaw has formally stated it wishes to stop the recruitment of soldiers aged under 18 years. Practically, that has been and 1

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“My Gun Was As Tall As Me”, Child Soldiers in Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2002), p 3.

remains a very hard task. The scale of child recruitment has been large; the resources to identify and discharge the children are extremely meagre; it is likely that the demobilisation of such children will leave the Tatmadaw basic ranks depleted making it practically difficult to implement on the ground. To maintain recruitment and enlistment numbers the Burmese authorities have attempted to implement an exemption for children enlisted between 16 and 18 years of age who have completed a minimum of 10 years education.2 This attempt to bargain away the seriousness of child recruitment should be a target of all international organisations as contrary to the rights of the child. Between 2012 and the present, a total of 553 child soldiers have been released or discharged from the Tatmadaw.3 The last major release was in 2014 and was of 108 children. Yet the International Labour Organisation (the “ILO”) had identified 770 children between 2009 and 2012 alone. The number and identity of children in the Tatmadaw remains an extremely real and serious issue. The inability of the Tatmadaw to live up to its promise to demobilise and cease child recruitment is evidenced in the fact that less than 1% of the children estimated to be in the army have been identified and released. That lack of dedication to resolving this issue is apparent from the attitude the Burmese authorities have taken to UN access and age verification procedures : “The Burmese armed forces have prohibited the UN access to Border Guard Forces, former ethnic insurgent groups under nominal military control, who are reputed to have child soldiers in their ranks. UN access has also been denied to more than a dozen non-state armed groups, including those listed by the secretarygeneral for child soldier use, such as the Karen National Union and the Karenni Army, despite these groups being engaged in a ceasefire process with the central government for more than a year. “The Burmese army is not only dragging its feet in ending its use of child soldiers, but is also obstructing the UN from doing its job to verify its efforts,” Becker said. “On this basis alone the Security Council should hand the government a failing grade on its promised progress.””4 Once released there is always the risk of being taken again. To this end the ILO has been instrumental in providing documentation proving that the child is ineligible for recruitment. Such documentation is essential for protection in a country where birth records are informal at best, and birth certificates are not

routine (especially in rural areas). The ILO is certainly one of the major organisations trying to ascertain the numbers and identity of child soldiers remaining in the Tatmadaw. Between 2009 and 2012 the ILO identified 770 child soldiers recruited before the age of 18 years.5 The driving factors behind Tatmadaw child recruitment The reasons underlying why there is so much child recruitment are complex. They include economic issues (extreme poverty), self-interest, and avoidance of punishment in a brutal military system. At the core of this is the unfortunate fact that children routinely fail to attend or finish school due to the cost of education. Kindergarten alone can cost 1,000-2,000 kyat each month; school 15,000-20,000 kyat. This is when incomes are very low: day labourers can earn 100-300 kyat per day; a private’s salary in the Tatmadaw is 4,500 kyat per month. In that context basic schooling for one child can cost up to a third of an adult’s annual income, without considering the other necessities of life. In such an environment, even basic education is not a right but a privilege of few. Because of the lack of affordable schooling, children go out to work to earn money for the family when they are younger than 10 years old (and sometimes even younger). Some jobs see children working in places where they become obvious targets for recruitment: train stations, bus stations, markets, near public buildings, and other public areas. They can be tricked with promises of good jobs, kidnapped or trafficked into the military. Selling children into the military is a form of income for child traffickers; and it can provide desperate money for some families. In 2002 a child soldier could be sold for between 1,000-10,000 kyat with a bag of rice between 15-50kg. In today’s money that is the equivalent of MR36.00, US$9.70, or AU$13.00. Such is the extreme poverty that fuels the sale of children into military life. Although less common, because of extreme poverty or social deprivation, families will believe that the survival of the family as a whole requires selling one of their children to either the military directly or through traffickers. Sale of a child can also occur to obtain the ongoing income of a soldier to help the whole family survive. Soldiers regularly recruit and kidnap other child soldiers. If they have been in the Tatmadaw for at least 5 years upon the recruitment of 5 soldiers they become eligible for discharge themselves.6 Enticements such as

Human Rights Watch, Burma: Failing to Demobilise Child Soldiers, 28 May 2013, (http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/28/burma-failing-demobilize-child-soldiers). The Irrawaddy, 25 January 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/contributor/child-soldiers-ongoing-battle-burma.html). Human Rights Watch, Burma: Failing to Demobilise Child Soldiers, 28 May 2013, (http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/28/burma-failing-demobilize-child-soldiers). 5 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Failing to Demobilise Child Soldiers, 28 May 2013, (http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/28/burma-failing-demobilize-child-soldiers). 6 My Gun Was As Tall As Me”, Child Soldiers in Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2002), p 4. 2 3 4

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this encourage rather than discourage the recruitment of children: it can be practically very difficult to recruit adults, children on the other hand are very easy prey. Soldiers take children in public. The children are threatened in many cases with gaol and other abuses if they do not sign up. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to identify the children in the ranks from a review of enlistment paperwork. A major reason for the demand for child soldiers is to fulfil recruitment quotas:

and carrying out executions. Human Rights Watch interviewed two boys, ages 13 and 15 at the time, who belonged to units that massacred a group of 15 women and children in Shan State in early 2001.”10 The unfortunate child soldiers involved in such acts are threatened with extreme violence, or even death, if they do not obey and engage in crimes against humanity. Armed Rebel Groups

“In mid-2006 a senior general called for the recruitment of 7,000 new soldiers a month, four times the actual recruitment rate of a year earlier. Battalion commanders failing to meet their recruiting quotas are subject to a range of disciplinary action including the loss of their command posting.”7

At various times there have been, or are, up to 37 rebel armed ethnic groups11 : it is a constantly fluctuating number. The Military (Tatmadaw Kyi) has been fighting against those groups in a civil armed conflict that has lasted for over 70 years. In 2014 the UN referred to only 8 armed groups in Burma, including the Tatmadaw Kyi12:

Finally, there are the soldiers who to avoid extreme corporal punishment (e.g. beatings, confinement etc) for infractions to military discipline (e.g. absent without leave etc) provide the military with trafficked or kidnapped children as recruits. Again, the brutal system within the Tatmadaw encourages the recruitment of vulnerable children.8

• • • • • • •

Life Of A Child Soldier in the Tatmadaw9 Children recruited into the Tatmadaw must undergo basic training just as their older adult counterparts. This can be a particularly brutal time for them because they are regularly beaten and made to undertake tasks that there small bodies are not yet grown enough to do. If a child is caught trying to escape the punishment can be extremely brutal. Children have been beaten to death. Children have been permanently disfigured and crippled. Children have been psychologically damaged. Completion of basic training results in allocation to a battalion and essentially placed with conflict zones. Some children will be given jobs as porters, servants to officers, and other non-combat roles. These are tasks generally given to those children not yet physically developed enough for combat. Nevertheless, children do fight on the ‘front line’. There is anecdotal evidence that children have even been coerced to take part in war crimes and crimes against humanity: “Once deployed, boys as young as 12 engage in combat against opposition groups, and are forced to commit human rights abuses against civilians, including rounding up villagers for forced labor, burning villages,

Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) Shan State Army South (SSA-S) Tatmadaw Kyi (including integrated border guard forces) • United Wa State Army (UWSA). These 8 groups were listed on the basis that they had been listed in the UN annexes for at least 5 years. Accordingly, new groups that came into existence or had not been listed for that length of time by the UN have not been included and hence the discrepancy with the number of known armed groups. Each of the above groups is known to use child soldiers. The recruitment of child soldiers by armed rebel groups is, by its nature, very hard to quantify. However, given the grass roots nature of the ethnic rebel armed groups it is not surprising that they also rely on large numbers of children to bolster their ranks.

MOVES TOWARD INTERNAL PEACE Recent Draft Ceasefire Agreement

If peace can be achieved within Burma, then the continued recruitment of child soldiers will not be imperative for rebel groups, and the Tatmadaw Kyi will be in a situation where it does not require such a large armed force. Therefore, any moves towards internal peace, and cessation of civil war is to the benefit of the children who are most at risk. The Guardian reported on 31 March 2015 the following headline: “Burmese government signsdraft ceasefire deal with rebel groups”. The agreement was made between the Tatmadaw and

Burma: Sold to be Soldiers – The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma, (Human Rights Watch, 2013), p 7. My Gun Was As Tall As Me”, Child Soldiers in Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp ii-iii. 9 See Appendix to this paper for two short stories of child soldier fears and experiences. 10 Human Rights Watch, Burma: World’s Highest Number of Child Soldiers, 17 October 2002, (http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/10/15/burma-worlds-highest-number-child-soldiers). 11 My Gun Was As Tall As Me”, Child Soldiers in Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp ii-iii. 12 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (A/68/878–S/2014/339) issued on 15 May 2014; (https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/myanmar/). 13 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Failing to Demobilise Child Soldiers, 28 May 2013, (http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/28/burma-failing-demobilize-child-soldiers). 7 8

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16 of the rebel groups including the KIA. The UN made the following statement regarding the ceasefire which took over 12 months to negotiate. “The signing of an NCA is a first step towards a larger dialogue for settling the political and military issues that will pave the way for an inclusive and harmonious future for Myanmar,” the statement continued. … Today’s agreement is a signal that new levels of trust, confidence and cooperation are possible between former enemies and that the seeds of change in Myanmar are beginning to sprout. … Mr. Nambiar [Special Advisor for Myanmar] added that while many concerns and difficulties would nonetheless remain on the ground in the country, the reaching of an agreement on the NCA text remained cause for celebration as it laid the groundwork for achieving “a genuine and lasting peace in the country.” It is significant that many of the larger rebel groups have signed up, especially the KIA which has historically been one of the largest and most active and troublesome groups. But there remain many large tensions to be resolved as this is very much a small step towards peace. Some groups have not been included as they are not recognised by the Tatmadaw or government. The Irrawaddy newspaper explained the reasons for this: “[Commander-in-Chief Snr-Gen] Aung Min told the press pack that Tuesday’s agreement would be remembered as a historical day for the country and a milestone in the government of President Thein Sein. At the same time, he reiterated the government’s refusal to negotiate with ethnic armies outside of the NCCT members it has granted official recognition. … There were 16 members of the NCCT when we began our peace talks with them. We only accept these 16 groups for participation in political dialogue,” he said. “Firstly, we will talk with these 16 groups. It will take a long time for us to accept new members. Our government does not have time for this.” … On Tuesday, Aung Naing Oo, a government advisor at the Myanmar Peace Center, told the Los Angeles Times that the Kokang conflict had no bearing on the signing of a “nationwide” ceasefire agreement. … “It’s possible to have a nationwide ceasefire and still be fighting the Kokang—they are considered a renegade group,” he said. ” Basically, the draft ceasefire is not (and cannot be) a complete solution for the region’s conflicts. Armed rebel groups not included in the draft plan will continue

to fight until either included in the peace process or their interests are recognised and met. The draft ceasefire plan is a small but significant step towards permanent reconciliation between some of the marginalised minorities and the government. While it does pave the way towards peace, the experience of civil conflict in Northern Ireland shows that this will be a long and complicated process, with the potential for dissidents to remain belligerent. As long as the risk for civil war acts exists, the risk of children being involved in ‘soldiering’ is greater.

THE FUTURE

International Assistance not Condemnation: Changing Systems & Behaviour The international community, and in particular international organisations must keep the pressure up on the Tatmadaw and Burmese authorities to continue to release children from the armed forces. I would not suggest economic sanctions against Burma or its citizens: the poor economic status of Burma is one of the fundamental driving forces of child recruitment. Any such suggestion would be misguided and compound the issue. However, allowing the international community to help the Tatmadaw and Burmese authorities identify those children within the ranks is essential: “Allow the UN [and other international organisations such as the ILO] full and unimpeded access to all military bases, barracks, training facilities, recruitment centres and other relevant military sites, including the Border Guard Forces … . Accelerate the identification, registration, and release of all children from the Tatmadaw and the Border Guard Forces … . Implement effective mechanisms to prevent recruitment of all children under the age of 18, without exception.”13 Positive steps which can be taken with help from the international community, nations, NGOs are more likely to produce tangible result. Some of the more obvious changes include positive reinforcement and positive systems to avoid the abuse of these children. Import changes needed include: • • • •

Helping Burma implement a reliable births, deaths and marriages registration system. Modernising the Tatmadaw military systems of justice removing the emphasis on corporal punishment. Punishing those who traffic, kidnap, or force children into the Tatmadaw using the civil criminal justice system. Rewarding people who identify child soldiers.

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Grassroots A question I like to ask myself is, “What can I do to make a difference?”. Part of my answer to that question is that I am here today raising these issues. And I ask this question because this is my problem too, not just Burma’s. It’s my problem because I am a citizen of this increasingly accessible global world. I am a part of it. And You are a part of it. The most important two questions of this entire paper are: “Are you a global citizen?” “What are you going to do to help solve these problems?”. • • •

Rewarding military officers who identify and assist in the demobilisation of children in the ranks. Seeking peace between the authorities and the armed groups. Moving towards a reliable and honest justice system.

These are just the most obvious changes that the international community as a whole can help Burma achieve. The task as a whole is large. But it is not insurmountable with the will that the international community can bring to bear. Offering help is a much more likely way to achieve longstanding change, working together with the Burmese authorities, rather than adopting a paternalistic attitude characterised by dictation of terms. Helping child soldiers upon discharge However, removing children from the Tatmadaw is only the first task. Once the children are free there remain risks and needs that must be addressed. • • • •

Prevention of re-recruitment once released. Contacting and establishing re-connection with family. Providing educational opportunities lost by recruitment and service. Providing emotional and psychological care to enable adjustment back into civilian life.

These children have lost their chance for a childhood, lost their chance to learn basics such as reading, writing, basic maths: lost their innocence. They will return damaged by their experience, and it is up to the international community, the Burmese community and not least the Burmese authorities to give these children the opportunities they deserve.

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Appendix The following is just two short stories of child soldiers (names changed) reported in Burma: Sold to be Soldiers – The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma, Human Rights Watch, Report, October 2007, at p 5. I By the time he was 16, Maung Zaw Oo had been forcibly recruited into Burma’s national army not once, but twice. First recruited at age 14 in 2004, he escaped, only to be recruited again the following year. He learned that the corporal who recruited him had received 20,000 kyat,a sack of rice, and a big tin of cooking oil in exchange for the new recruit. “The corporal sold me,” he said. The battalion that “bought” him then delivered him to a recruitment center for an even higher sum—50,000 kyat. When his aunt learned that Maung Zaw Oo had been recruited a second time, she and his grandmother made a long trip to his battalion camp to try to gain his release. The captain of the battalion company offered to let Maung Zaw Oo go, but only in exchange for five new recruits. Maung Zaw Oo said, “I told my aunt, ‘Don’t do this. I don’t want five others to face this, it’s very bad here. I’ll just stay and face it myself.’” By age 16 Maung Zaw Oo seemed resigned to his fate. When his unit went on patrol, he would volunteer for the most dangerous positions, walking either “point” at the front of the column, or last at the back. He said, “In the army, my life was worthless, so I chose it that way.” II “Than Myint Oo, for example, was first recruited at 14, escaped the army, but was captured and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for desertion at age 15. He escaped from prison, was captured and re-recruited to the army, and eventually deserted again and reached Thailand. Now 19, he no longer dares return home.