Movement intentions of Iraqis displaced by Nasim Acuña

2014-2015

MOVEMENT INTENTIONS OF IRAQIS DISPLACED 2014-2015

The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IOM Iraq wishes to thank the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) for its continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses its gratitude to IOM Iraq’s Rapid Assessment and Response Team (RART) members for their work in collecting the data, often in very difficult circumstances; their tireless efforts are the groundwork of this report.

Written, Designed and Photographed by: The International Organization for Migration Iraq Mission © IOM Iraq,September 2015

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Email: rartinfo@iom.int Web: www.iomiraq.net Baghdad Main Office D2 UNAMI Compound Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq Tel: +962 65 659 660 Fax: +962 65 659 661 Erbil Office UN Compound Qazi Muhammed St. 100 Road Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Erbil Tel: +390831 05 2965 Basrah Office Baradiah, No.10/16/29, Basra

Tel: +964-7809418586 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Chief of mission’s foreword

ample, some ethno-religious minority groups who have found shelter in religious buildings in Kerbala, Najaf and other central governorates stated that they intend to remain in their current locations and rebuild their lives in the host communities. Host communities have given IDPs considerable support, such as provisional shelters and non-food items; however, the high number of IDP families who have arrived with few personal possessions remain in need of significant support from the international community to integrate fully and successfully without placing too high a burden on the communities who have so generously received them.

IOM Iraq Chief of Mission’s foreword In June 2015, there were more than three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq, representing one of the largest waves of displacement in the country’s history. Shifting frontlines have led to the displacement of populations whose situations are different and complex; while every displaced family has its own history and reasons for displacement, all struggle to meet their daily needs. IOM assessments reveal that most displaced Iraqis hope to eventually return to their former homes when conditions allow, although they acknowledge the realities of protracted conflict and the need to find effective solutions to the challenges of displacement before return becomes possible. While a significant number of displaced persons intend to return, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) indicates that nearly 250,000 IDPs are waiting on one or more factors before deciding on their future options. These individuals remain undecided, probably due to the volatility of displacement in conflict zones. Factors taken in consideration include the security conditions in the locations of origin; the overall security situation in Iraq; the ability to improve current standards of living; available assistance; and most importantly, whether employment can be found in the location of displacement. Integration in the host community has become a viable option for a small yet significant number of IDPs. For ex-

While civilians continue to flee the intense ongoing fighting in central and northern-central Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, aided by various Iraqi tribes and the international coalition airstrikes, are progressively retaking territory formerly controlled by armed groups (AGs). Return to these liberated areas has already started, creating fresh challenges: return can be very dangerous because in some areas, AGs have laid minefields or booby-trapped empty houses, creating potentially fatal obstacles. Many displaced families are returning to homes, properties and livelihoods partially or completely destroyed, and often dispossessed of personal belongings. In some cases, former homes are entirely uninhabitable, forcing returnees to seek alternative accommodation and sources of income. In many of these communities, the social infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, water and electricity supplies has also suffered widespread damage, adding yet another obstacle to the process of returning in safety and dignity. Understanding displacement patterns and IDP intentions, and their links to demographics and living conditions in displacement locations is crucial to developing a strategic response in the coming months. Such analysis is not only important for IOM, but also for informed planning and assistance delivery by the international community, in coordination with governmental actors. Thanks to the research presented in this report and the timely release of DTM data, IOM remains at the forefront of IDP relief efforts. This assistance aims to support IDPs in fulfilling their intentions, protecting the inalienable right of all individuals to determine their way forward and decide the most appropriate course of action to move past the extreme conditions and difficulties of displacement to a new, brighter future for themselves and their families. Dr. Thomas Lothar Weiss Director/Chief of Mission IOM Iraq in Baghdad

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Table of Contents 5

Chief of Mission Forward

Executive summary

Intent of Iraq 10

Recommendations

Introduction

Methodology

Background

Findings: Intentions of IDPs 2014-2015

Security and access to former residences

Housing conditions and movement intentions

Barriers to integration in the area of displacement

Barriers to return

Conclusions

tions qis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iraq is suffering from a massive displacement crisis that has had an unprecedented demographic, social and economic effect on the country. The majority of Iraqis (86.5%) who displaced due to the armed clashes that began in early 2014 intend to return to their places of origin when the security situation improves. Only 3 per cent of primarily Turkmen who live in Kerbala and Najaf governorates intend to remain in their current locations. A further 8.5 per cent are waiting for one or several factors before deciding their movement intentions. These factors generally concern shelter conditions, security, ethno-religious dynamics in the locations of origin, and whether or not IDPs have been able to find work. As stated above, the percentage of IDPs who intend to return is high. An even higher number (over 90%) of those who fled to areas close to their locations of origin were reportedly very committed to returning at the earliest possible opportunity (these groups are mostly from Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Thi-Qar governorates). While return is the primary intention, approximately 3 per cent of IDPs surveyed by IOMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s DTM intend to integrate in the HCs. Over 50 per cent of these are Turkmen who live in religious buildings in the central governorates and receive housing assistance; 11 per cent have various ethnic backgrounds and live in rented housing in Kerbala and Najaf; a further 11 per cent are Turkmen and Arab Shia living in hotels and motels in Kerbala. The intention to integrate is largely linked to whether or not IDPs have been receiving assistance, to their perceived ability to find jobs in their current areas, and to ethno-religious homogeneity with the HC. An additional 8 per cent of assessed IDPs were waiting on one or several factors to determine their future intentions. These are primarily Yazidis in Dahuk living in unfinished or abandoned buildings (24%), Arab Sunnis who rent houses in the Kurdistan region (12%), Turkmen living in religious buildings in Najaf, Kerbala and Wassit (7%) and Yazidis living with host families in Dahuk (6%). Notably, two thirds of IDPs in Basra governorate also fell into this category. IDPs displaced from Ninewa governorate-most of who belong to minority groups - were the most likely to be interested in options other than return: around 23 per cent intended either to integrate or were waiting to decide.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

A number of elements influence the decision making process, the most important of which being the security situation in the area of origin; the importance of this factor varies little when analyzed against others. IDPs usually face difficulties that include poor living conditions and lack of income. Both of these could cause further displacement, whether among shelter types within the location, to another location, movement in search of work, or possible emigration. IOM field staff in the central governorates have observed the IDPsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; tendency to move within south-central Iraq in search of jobs and better living conditions, settling in the first area that meets these conditions. Just over 21 per cent of IDPs reported that their primary need is employment, as sustainable income would be the most effective way of solving other issues such as food insecurity, lack of services and insufficient resources to rent adequate houses for their families. In parallel to prolonged displacement and new displacement waves, return movement to areas in central and northern Iraq reclaimed by Iraqi and Kurdish security forces began as of January 2015. By 10 September 2015, 374,244 IDPs had returned to their homes or surrounding areas, the majority from locations within the same governorate. The governorate that has received the highest number of returnees is Salah al-Din (34%) followed by Diyala (25%), Ninewa (25%), Anbar (14%) and Kirkuk (2%). These returnees face serious difficulties in rebuilding their lives in their location of origin, including issues related to security and accessibility of former residences, social tensions, widespread destruction of infrastructure and properties, and looted houses. The majority of returnees have been able to return to their former homes, although many were heavily damaged or looted. About 16 per cent of returnees were unable to return to their homes because they were destroyed or heavily damaged during the AGsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; occupation of their areas. Most returnees in Kirkuk were unable to return to their former homes and are now living in informal settlements. In addition, the destruction of schools, hospitals, roads, bridges and public services has created a very difficult return environment for many former IDPs, making many of them highly vulnerable. Another challenge facing IDPs is access to their loca-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

tion of origin, which is often restricted by security forces, militias or community members. Those hoping to return must wait for the ISF to complete security clearance procedures and formally announce it is safe to return. Despite these measures, there are still incidences of IDPs being killed or maimed by booby-trapped houses and leftover mines. Additionally, access is sometimes made difficult because of ethno-sectarian tensions with other returnees or with those who did not leave -the latter might be suspected of complicity with AGs. As an example, focus group discussionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (FGD) respondents in Anbar explained that they are in constant fear of being accused of association with AGs; many other respondents echoed this concern. Lastly, distrust towards the former fellow community members is a clear and widespread concern, especially among minority groups. Many IDPs of minority groups from Ninewa still hope to go back to their location of origin but doubt it is a viable option because of the perceived potential for ethno-sectarian conflict. While groups that were a majority in their areas of origin show more willingness to return as soon as the situation stabilizes, the concerns of minority groups will make their return to Ninewa less likely or only likely after very long period. In summary, IDPs in Iraq live in an unstable environment where future movement intentions are constantly changing. As the conflict continues, generating more IDPs and extending the time many people spend in displacement, it becomes increasingly important to assist IDPs by enabling them to act upon their intentions, whether they hope to eventually return or wish to remain in their new communities.

A displaced child living in an unfinished building looks over her baby brother in his makeshift cradle. Zakho, Dahuk, June 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Support community stabilization initiatives for IDP returnees by rebuilding homes, services, social cohesion, and livelihoods Numerous areas of Iraq such as Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala have been declared secure enough for the return of IDPs, and return movement is expected to continue growing in the coming months. Many of these areas have suffered massive damage to local infrastructure, services, farmlands and private homes, and some remain dangerous. Preliminary humanitarian assistance such as mine clearing, provision of temporary shelter solutions (e.g. tents for returnees who could not access their homes), technical guidance to families who are rebuilding their homes and infrastructure rehabilitation, is already underway. The central Government is also assisting returnees to rebuild their lives through programmes that address property loss: in cooperation with the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD), governorates experiencing return movements will establish a committee to assess damages (after the ISFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security approval) and report on the needed assistance. Upon return, MoMD grants IDPs four-million IQDs. To complement these efforts, this report suggests that IOM and the international community implement four immediate recommendations related to stabilization. First, transportation support is required for returning IDPs. In areas that are declared accessible and secure, facilitating the IDPsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; return by providing busses or other forms of transportation assistance is the first step in ensuring that they are able to reach their locations of origin. Second, providing temporary schools and medical clinics until social infrastructure has been rebuilt is important to support returning populations. Third, the provision of Non Food Item (NFI) packages to IDPs who have been able to return to their homes but found them looted -such cases are reportedly widespread - can support families to secure some level of comfort in their homes until they are able to locate their stolen belongings or refurbish their homes. Lastly, in coordination with MoMD, these and other assistance efforts need to be further researched to determine the post-conflict social dynamics, and the opportu-

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

nities for community stabilization projects in locations of return, specifically in ethnically mixed areas. Further returnee needs assessments are also required, because the problems encountered by the 250,000 IDPs who have already returned will become more prevalent as more IDPs begin the difficult process of returning to areas that have been ravaged by war.

2. Promoting IDP-HC cohesion through access to sustainable livelihoods The conflict is having nationwide effects on the Iraqi society and economy, impacting IDPs as well as the host communities. The unemployment rate among IDPs is high, even in relation to the significant unemployment rate in Iraq overall. IDPs of all intention types said that having access to sustainable income would be the best solution to the issues they face in displacement. Frequently, those who were waiting on one or several factors to decide on their intentions stated they would consider remaining in their locations of displacement if they found jobs and managed to secure better living conditions for their families. As 2014-2015 IDPs are a highly mobile population and largely intend to return, they would benefit from acquiring skills that they would transfer back to their location of origin areas once they return, such as vocational trainings, farmer trainings, and on the job trainings for both genders. In coordination with various bodies of the Government of Iraq (GoI) such as the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), the MoMD, and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), such training can empower IDPs with the needed skills to increase their chances of securing work during displacement and to rebuild and stabilize the economies in their locations of origin, many of which have been severely impacted by the conflict. On the other hand, HCs that have been affected by the IDP influx can also benefit from livelihood support such as in-kind grants to begin new businesses, business development services, and job placement. This would support local economies that have been strained due to conflict and displacement. Additionally, when conditions allow, providing business start-up support to IDPs who

RECOMMENDATIONS

intend to rebuild their lives in their new communities enables them to begin the long and often complicated process of integration.

3. Displacement tracking and research Accurate and accessible information about the locations, situation, and needs of IDPs is the first step in providing effective assistance. In addition to monitoring IDP needs, further in-depth research on topics such as conflict dynamics, protection issues related to return, youth radicalization and migration outflows should be undertaken by field experts in order to inform the broader humanitarian and government assistance strategy. Using the extensive network of the RARTs, IOMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Displacement Tracking Matrix maintains updated information about displacement trends, locations, shelter conditions, period of displacement, and areas of origin of IDPs on a bi-weekly basis. Additionally, this tool collects more detailed and comprehensive data on IDP intentions, ethno-religious backgrounds, and risk of gender-based violence indicators, among other features of displacement. By using the DTM for displacement information and assessment tools (both qualitative and quantitative), information needs can be met and gaps filled. This information should be the foundation of any future actions as it defines the sensitivities and challenges that IOM, humanitarian partners and governmental actors will face in the coming years.

4. Support for IDPs in vulnerable shelters and cash assistance for IDPs to rent houses One factor that has a clear impact on the IDPsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; quality of life is their type of shelter. In most cases, IDPs have expressed a marked need for shelter support, as they most often lack the necessary financial resources to find more appropriate accommodation. Providing shelter support is one of the best ways to prevent further displacement and premature return, and to ensure a basic level of safety and comfort for returning IDPs. In order to serve more IDPs and assist those who intend or are forced to change shelter types because of depleted finances and desperation, the shelter response plan is currently a three-tier action that needs to be expanded and supported.1 First, providing material support for newly displaced IDPs who settle in vulnerable shelter settings such as tents, tarpaulins, plastic sheeting, poles and ropes will ensure

a minimum standard of accommodation for the first months spent in displacement. Second, providing basic upgrades such as partitions, and improving the structural capacity of informal settlements, unfinished buildings, religious buildings and other vulnerable shelter types will enable IDPs to have some degree of comfort during their displacement. This is usually achieved through deals with the owners of these properties, whereby the buildings are upgraded in exchange for securing a stable tenure for the IDPs who live there. Providing upgrades and alternative options for IDPs living in critical shelters, such as offering potential host families cash or material incentives or securing spaces and financing IDPs to live in rental units, will enable them to find more suitable and comfortable shelter options. Most IDPs stated they wish to rent houses. Those who intend to integrate or expect spending a long time in displacement prefer and intend to work to secure rented housing in their area of displacement. Moving toward a cash-based assistance option to enable IDPs to rent houses is a good mid- to long-term solution for shelter-related problems for multiple reasons: this is the type of housing IDPs prefer, it can be as long or short term as necessary, it is relatively easy to hand over to the relevant government entities, and it lessens the pressure to establish and run expensive displacement camps. Programmes to provide cash assistance for shelter should be further explored, as they have the potential to increase the IDPsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ability to find sustainable solutions, regardless of how long they remain in their current locations.

5. Provision of psychosocial support Many communities who host IDPs or live in areas where return has been taking place are experiencing significant social tensions. Many IDPs have experienced psychosocial trauma because they have gone through war and displacement, loss of relatives and friends, and the destruction of their former communities. Targeting specific groups or individuals to receive support from psychiatrists or other psychosocial specialists, organizing support groups, as well as strengthening existing NGOs or school counseling programs within IDP communities will improve social cohesion and provide IDPs with the opportunity to begin the difficult process of psychological healing from the trauma they have experienced due to displacement and conflict.

1. As outlined in the shelter-NFI Strategy Proposal under the Humanitarian Response Plan, May 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. Support to Resettlement and Migration Management Programmes For some of the most vulnerable cases, resettlement should be considered an option. Well-managed resettlement, relocation and social integration programmes are essential to assist countries such as Iraq, which host large numbers of forced or irregular migrants, to minimize secondary or irregular movements. Such relocation schemes should follow a comprehensive model of identification, screening, selection, pre-departure assistance, travel, reception and integration. Effective resettlement programmes not only provide much needed international protection for the most vulnerable, but also a path to successful integration into new societies. Positive models include improving the refugees’ prospects for labour market integration and devoting a significant part of pre-departure orientation sessions to identify transferable skills, prepare refugees for job prospects, and promote language and vocational skills training after arrival. Along with efforts of other humanitarian partners, the GoI, and governments in the destination countries, IOM Iraq’s Movement and Assisted Migration programme can help stem the outflow of irregular migrants from Iraq and provide opportunities for extremely vulnerable Iraqis to rebuild their lives in a new environment. At the same time, the Government should be provided with the needed technical assistance to manage migration. As the GoI continues developing policies and procedures to manage the current displacement crisis, there are opportunities for IOM and other humanitarian actors to coordinate with the Central Government, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and municipal or local councils in order to improve the systems for registering and tracking displacement and the Government’s capacity to promote safe migration and raise awareness of trafficking in persons. This support would enable the Government to provide more efficient assistance, and improve border security; it also would diminish the potential for irregular migration.

7. Legal support for IDPs and returnees Proper legal documentation often determines an IDP’s ability to register as such, to obtain assistance, and in some cases, to rent housing. IDPs who intend to integrate stated that one of their primary concerns is transferring their legal documents from their governorates of origin to where they hope to resettle.

Likewise, returnees are likely to encounter challenges related to housing, land and property upon return, as armed groups (AG) have been expropriating properties and some IDPs’ homes in liberated areas are now occupied, either by other IDPs or the HC. Initial recommendations to address the legal barriers to return include conducting an assessment of the Baghdad Central Property Registry to determine to what extent the records of the areas affected by the current crisis are updated; providing support to the MoMD in using its decentralized structures to issue IDPs property documents and, where needed, personal IDs; conducting an assessment of the current housing situation in Iraq with a focus on conflict-affected areas; and ensuring the rapid re-establishment of land management institutions in areas that are experiencing return movement. To ensure that IDPs are able to begin claiming their rights according to the Iraqi and international legal frameworks, these legal assistance channels for IDPs and returnees should be established in coordination with other humanitarian actors as well as with the Government. IOM Iraq’s approach to complex migration flows out of Iraq In response to the increasing waves of migrants leaving Iraq for Europe, IOM has developed a plan2 that addresses complex migration flows in the Mediterranean and is based on IOM’s Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF), a flexible tool designed to improve and systemize the response to migration crises by bringing together different sectors of assistance in a pragmatic and evolving approach. In the Iraq context, MCOF is implemented in six ways: strengthening IOM’s knowledge of migration dynamics from Iraq; raising awareness about the potential risks of irregular migration and promoting safe migration; resettlement assistance to specific cases through the Movement and Assisted Migration (MAM) programme to third countries; addressing the roots of irregular migration through livelihood and community stabilization programmes; supporting the development of the GoI’s Integrated Border and Migration Management (IBMM) capacities; and promoting partnership, collaboration and dialogue between Iraq, countries of transit and countries of destination, facilitating the exchange of information and best practices. Through this holistic approach, IOM will promote safe and orderly migration while addressing the key causes of irregular migration from Iraq.

2. “Addressing Complex Migration Flows in the Mediterranean: IOM Response Plan”, June 2015

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Introduction Nearly 3.2 million people have been displaced since the onset of the 2014 Iraq Crisis3, the majority from Anbar and Ninewa governorates. As violence continues in many parts of central, central-north Iraq and Anbar, new waves of displacement take place and the people displaced over the past year and a half are gradually accepting that their situation could last. Consequently, jobless and vulnerable IDPs are constantly trying to improve their conditions by searching for work and better housing. Those who are unable to achieve solutions to displacement related problems are at risk of multiple displacements or attempting to leave the country using dangerous means.

This report provides an overview of the intentions of Iraqis displaced during the most recent conflict, with a special focus on the factors that influence the IDPsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; intentions, the barriers they face, displacement dynamics, and current living conditions. It is important to have a fuller understanding of these intentions, as assistance profiling differs based on anticipated future movement trends. This information will help the humanitarian assistance community in Iraq not to waste resources on poorly targeted assistance and to be well prepared when the conflict settles enough for IDPs to act on their intentions.

Women living in Dawdia Camp prepare food in a makeshift stove in a nearby field. Dawdia, Dahuk, January 2015.

3. According to IOMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Master List, 9 September 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Intorduction

To assess the real ability of IDPs to act on their intentions, these intentions must also be viewed in light of the security levels in the major areas of origin and displacement, and the political and socioeconomic conditions, among other factors. Therefore, this report’s primary research questions are: •

What are the intentions of IDPs displaced from 2014 to 2015?

•

What are the primary factors influencing the IDPs’ intentions?

•

How do intentions differ based on the security situation in the area of origin, period of displacement, ethno-religious background, geographic distance from area of origin, shelter type, and time spent in displacement?

•

Taking into account these elements, what is the IDPs’ ability to act upon their intentions?

This study aims to inform the Humanitarian Country Team’s assistance efforts in Iraq, the United Nations (UN) clusters and the targeting of IOM’s beneficiaries for a better livelihood assistance and emergency response. To suggest recommendations, the report will provide information on the HCs that will require support to integrate IDPs who wish to settle in their HC or have been displaced for a long time, on the specific needs of IDPs and returnees and on ways to prevent further displacement, irregular migration, and increased vulnerability. It will thus shed light on the best means of assisting people to return, of ensuring the protection of minority groups and of empowering IDPs to achieve durable solutions to displacement issues and prepare for when they are able to act on their intentions.

Key terms Intention: Indicates the desire to act or move in a certain way, not necessarily a plan to actually act upon the stated desire. Durable solutions: Are achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs linked to their displacement and can enjoy their rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. They can be achieved through: Return: Sustainable reintegration in the location of origin (hereinafter referred to as “return”); Integration: Sustainable integration (settlement) in another part of the country. It should be noted, however, that supporting IDPs in normalizing their situation at the site of displacement (helping them to find employment, their own home etc.) does not exclude the right to return.4 The following section explains the methodology used in this report, while chapter six explains the background of displacement in Iraq. Chapter seven presents its findings along the three main intention types and discusses the risk of irregular migration; chapter eight examines the impact of security and access to former residences on the IDPs’ ability to act upon their intention; chapter nine details living conditions and movement intentions. The last two chapters address the barriers facing IDPs who intend to integrate and those facing IDPs who intend to return, followed by a short concluding section.

4. As defined in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, April 2010.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

methodology This section describes the methodology applied to collect and analyze data for this study. A combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches was followed to identify and explain IDP movement patterns and intentions.

1. Target population This report focuses on Iraqis displaced between January 2014 and September 2015 from all 18 governorates of Iraq, with special emphasis on their movement intentions, origins and living conditions, focusing mostly on shelter type.

2. Data collection methods

partner NGOs), think tanks, media outlets, academic institutions and other key stakeholders. RARTs also regularly contribute data to the Information Management working group, to allow the UN Country Team in Iraq to coordinate and deliver the most relevant and pressing humanitarian assistance in a timely manner. DTM in Iraq currently includes three mobility-tracking components: •

Displacement baseline data

•

IDP Group Assessment

•

Emergency Tracking System

2.1. Quantitative data

Displacement baseline data

Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) The DTM is an IOM information management tool that gathers specific information on the status and location of displaced persons across Iraq. It monitors displacement and provides accurate data about the IDP population, movement patterns and priority needs. Data are collected though IOM’s Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs), composed of 140 staff deployed throughout the entire Iraqi territory.

Displacement baseline data are gathered using an extensive network of over 1,300 key informants (KIs) established through many years of IOM operations. The KIs comprise community leaders, mukhtars, local authorities and security forces. Additional information is gathered from government registration data and partner agencies.

RARTs are trained and equipped to carry out rapid individual assessments, community assessments and information collection and analysis to produce preliminary recommendations for livelihood and Community Assistance Projects. They are also trained in rapid assessment and response to the emergency and humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable groups in displacement and migration-affected communities. Since 2003, IOM has assessed and monitored the movements, needs, living conditions and intentions of populations throughout Iraq. These assessments provide valuable qualitative and quantitative data and information about IDP and returnee needs. These assessments are then compiled, processed and analyzed for public distribution to government officials, humanitarian actors (including the UN’s Country Team member agencies in Iraq and

RART staff continuously collect, verify, triangulate and validate baseline data, identifying the current location of IDPs and returnees, estimated number of displaced households in the location, place of origin and shelter arrangement. The data is used to form baseline IDP master lists and returnee master lists that are distributed widely to IOM stakeholders every two weeks. IOM works in close coordination with federal, regional and local authorities to maintain a shared and accurate understanding of displacement across Iraq; however, limited access and other operational constraints on the ground can limit information gathering and sharing. IDP group assessment An extended DTM tool, the IDP group assessment builds upon the collected baselines and investigates indicators more in-depth to understand the demographic, ethnic and religious composition of the IDP

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

methodology

groups5 living in different types of shelters, their movement intentions and sectorial priority needs. Emergency tracking system Another component of the DTM portfolio, the emergency tracking system is a reactive tool that provides real-time displacement figures for use in emergency events. Initial estimates are gathered through monitoring techniques including data gathering from KIs, on the spot visits and displacement-flow monitoring at checkpoints and bottlenecks. The information gathered through the emergency tracking system is further verified and finally incorporated in the DTM baseline data. This report used baseline data collected by DTM in September 2015 and accumulated data collected from January 2014 to September 2015. During this period, the DTM identified nearly 3.2 million IDPs, dispersed across 102 districts and more than 3,400 locations in Iraq. In addition, this report used data collected in the first cycle of the group assessment (Januaryâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;April 2015), which covered 2,599 IDP locations that host 82 per cent of the total IDP population in Iraq. 2.2.Qualitative data

The FGDs explored IDP perceptions and attitudes towards intentions to return to places of origin, stay in current location, move to another location within Iraq, or migrate beyond its borders. FGD participants were selected by maximum variation sampling and convenient sampling methods that select study units representing a wide variation in dimensions of interest and are available. In this case, respondents were selected based first on their movement intention and then on their current governorate of residence. To provide further specificity, an additional variable was used to select groups within the three most common shelter types of IDPs with the specified intentions per governorate, as shelter types are often connected to specific vulnerabilities such as access to services, health care and financial situation, which all affect intentions. To establish the FGDs, variables that are known to have a significant impact on the overall situation of IDPs were selected, such as the security context, ethno-sectarian composition and economic situation in these regions. Three additional FGDs were conducted with IDPs who had returned to their locations of origin in Anbar and Salah al-Din to collect information on their living conditions and problems.

Narrative field reports Narrative reports were requested from RARTs in governorates experiencing instability, spontaneous return or hosting the highest number of IDPs. The reports aimed to provide background information on security, displacement, return movement, property status and intentions. The content of the narrative reports reflected the knowledge gained by the RARTs from their daily interactions with IOM stakeholders, KIs, IDP households and individuals, as well as their direct observations. The reports, submitted by 1 May 2015, covered the governorates of Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar, Baghdad, Dahuk, Salah al-Din and Ninewa. Focus Group Discussions In addition to the DTM, group assessment and narrative reports, RARTs conducted 31 FGDs in 16/18 governorates of Iraq excluding Diyala, which was not secure enough and Thi-Qar, which was adequately represented by the other two southern governorates.

5. IDP Groups is defined as a group of IDPs living in the same location, in similar shelter types and originating from the same governorate during a specific displacement wave

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

methodology

The table below describes FGDs by governorate, intention and shelter type.

Governorate Anbar Baghdad

Basra

Babylon

Dahuk

Intention of group

Shelter

# FGD

Return to origin

School building

Have returned

Usual residence

Return to origin

Host family

Return to origin

Camp

Locally integrate

Rented house

Host family

Camp

Host family

Return to origin

Host family

Return to origin

UF building

Camp

Awaiting 1+ factors

Rented house

Informal/collective

Total # FGDs 2 2

Erbil

Awaiting 1+ factors

Kerbala

Integrate locally

Religious building

Kirkuk

Return to origin

Host family

Awaiting 1+ factors

Host family

Integrate

School building

Integrate locally

Other

Integrate locally

Religious building

Return to origin

Religious building

UF building

Camp

Religious building

UF building

Rented house

Usual residence

Missan Muthanna Najaf Ninewa

Return to origin

Qadisiyah

Awaiting 1+ factors Awaiting 1+ factors

Salah al-Din Have returned Sulaymaniyah

Awaiting 1+ factors

Rented house

Wassit

Awaiting 1+ factors

Host family

2 1 2 2 1

TOTAL

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

methodology

Key informant interviews In addition to the 31 FGDs, 15 KI interviews were conducted: six with returnee representatives, six with UN representatives, and three with government officials. The KI interviews were conducted to provide information on returnees in areas inaccessible to IOM staff (4 in Diyala, 1 in Ninewa and 1 in Kirkuk) and to analyze the UN and GoIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s perspective on the situation of IDPs and their intentions.

3. Limitations This reportâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s topic is based on the perceptions of IDPs and their stated intentions rather than on their concrete plans. Its findings must take into account the sensitive nature of some of the information, such ethno-religious backgrounds and the security restrictions that limited data collection coverage and movement of IOM staff. Lastly, the precarious security in Iraq creates a changing environment and intentions are often influenced by the duration of displacement; therefore, this study must be viewed as a snapshot of the situation in mid-2015, and must be updated over time.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

A child waves from the bus window during a transport movement from Khabat to Ainkawa, Erbil. September 2015.

BACKGROUND The recent violent events are but another chapter in the struggle for power, territory and political and social control that has been affecting Iraq for decades. Forced displacement has been so recurrent that recent estimates put the total number of IDPs in Iraq throughout the past 30 years at nearly 6.2 million6, not including the millions of Iraqis who became refugees in neighbouring countries or abroad. Displacement has occurred for a number of reasons; at first concentrated in the northern Kurdistan region then in the central regions, it has shown varying return dynamics. However, a historical review of IDPs in Iraq shows that lack of security and its anticipated duration, the length of time spent in displacement and the ability to regain former properties strongly influence the future intentions of IDPs.

Three waves of displacement before 2014 Displacement in Iraq prior to 2014 took place in three distinct waves: before 2003 during Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime; after the 2003 US-led intervention; and between 2006 and 2008 due to increased sectarian violence. Those displaced by the Ba’athist regime were principally from the rural Kurdish north and Shia south, whereas sectarian violence following the Askari mosque bombing in February 2006 mainly displaced people from the urban centres of Baghdad, Ninewa and Diyala.7 Pre-2003 Throughout the reign of Saddam Hussein (1979-2003),

6. This figure was calculated using displacement data from multiple sources and can be broken down into four figures from defined waves of displacement in Iraq: a) pre-2003 displacement figures (1.1 million individuals) retrieved from The Internally Displaced People of Iraq, Brookings Institution, November 2002 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/11/20iraq-cohen b) displacement following the 2003 US-led intervention (250,000 individuals) retrieved from Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, October 2007 - http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index. pdf; c) displacement that occurred during the 2006-2008 surge in sectarian warfare (1,680,000 individuals) from Review of Displacement and Return, IOM Iraq, August 2010; d) figures concerning the 2014 to 2015 wave of displacement from IOM Iraq’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) as of 9 September 2015 (3.2 million individuals). 7. IDMC briefing paper on Iraq: IDPs and their prospects for durable solutions, June 2011.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Background

many policies and violent campaigns were implemented to consolidate power in Baghdad’s Central Government that created waves of displaced populations throughout the country. Between 1980 and 1988, the year of the Al-Anfal campaign that killed thousands of Kurds with chemical weapons, many villages in the Kurdistan region were destroyed and tens of thousands of families were forced from their homes into purpose-built communities. Suppression of Iraqi Kurds continued throughout the 1990s. A UN Habitat survey of northern Iraq in 2001 estimates that 805,505 IDPs were living in north Iraq, the majority in the lowland collective settlements established by the Government for Kurds expelled from their villages.8 Other displacement factors were the Ba’athist “Arabization” policy targeting Kirkuk and the surrounding areas; the Iran-Iraq war, which displaced at least 80,000 Iraqis living along the Iranian border; and the draining of the south-eastern Iraq marshes, traditional home of the “Marsh Arabs”, to eradicate Shia opposition movements in the early 1990s. Most sources agree that this generated at least 300,000 IDPs.9 The total number of IDPs resulting from the events in the Kurdish north and central and south Iraq during the Hussein regime is generally accepted to be 1.1 million. 2003 US-led Intervention In 2003, the displacement dynamics again changed when the US-led multinational forces/Iraq (MNFI) overthrew the Ba’athist regime. In the first three years following the arrival of the MNFI, IDPs were generally estimated at around 250,000 individuals.10 Displacement was primarily from urban centres of central Iraq such as Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra, Kirkuk, Mosul and Kerbala, and other scattered strategic areas where the MNFI sought to eradicate insurgents. Thousands of people were also displaced in Baghdad during this period, many because of MNFI operations, neighbourhood-targeted attacks, or direct threats by sectarian militias against other sects, all of which heightened during the following years.11 Report-

edly, the vast majority of IDPs from this period returned to their homes shortly after their displacement. By 2006, an estimated 470,000 IDPs had returned to their areas of origin, mainly to or within Anbar, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din. 2006-2008 Sectarian Violence In early 2006, the bombing of a mosque in Samarra, Salah al-Din governorate, is largely considered the trigger of the large-scale displacement that lasted from 2006 to 2008. During this period, an estimated 1.7 million Iraqis were displaced. Sixty-nine per cent were from Baghdad and 18 per cent from Diyala, 12 per cent from the other central governorates (Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk and Babylon) and 1 per cent from Basra12. Displacement within Baghdad was common during this period, often due to targeted sectarian attacks. Movement peaked in July 2006 and remained high through 2007, slowly declining in the last months of the year and throughout 2008.

Displacement from 2014 to 2015 Displacement in the period of January 2014 to September 2015 has become the largest displacement wave in Iraq’s history and continues to grow. As of 9 September 2015, nearly 3.2 million people have been displaced in Iraq, in five identifiable waves:13 1. Pre-June 2014: Anbar Crisis On 30 December 2013, military clashes began between Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and AGs, many of who were members or associates of the Islamic State of the Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in Iraq’s western Anbar governorate. Between January and June 2014, at least 526,536 Iraqis were displaced from their homes, 97 per cent from Anbar and the remainder from other central governorates. Clashes, largely in urban centres in Anbar such as Fallujah and Ramadi, caused mass displacement, mainly within the governorate. Residents sought more stable locations close to their homes or stayed with relatives; many incidents of multiple displacements ensued when

8. IDP Site and Family Survey: first report, UN Habitat, January 2001. 9. The Internally Displaced People of Iraq, Brookings Institute, October 2002. 10. Iraq Index, Brookings Institute, October 2007. 11. Neighborhood Sectarian Displacement and the Battle for Baghdad: A Self-Fulfilling Prophesy of Crimes against Humanity in Iraq, Northwestern University, 2013. 12. IDP Working Group Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq – Update (24 March 2008). 13. IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 9 September 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Background

the first location came under fire, forcing families to seek another safe haven or to return to their unstable locations of origin. Over half the IDPs who displaced before June moved within Anbar governorate. The remainder sought refuge in other governorates, most commonly Baghdad (18%), Kirkuk (16%), Erbil (7%) and Sulaymaniyah (6%). 2. June-July 2014: Lightning Offensive of Mosul and central Iraq On 10 June 2014, ISIL and allied AGs began a lightning offensive in the central and central-northern governorates, seizing Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and Tikrit. Fighting in Baiji, Tal Afar and other areas of Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala displaced 695,910 individuals between June and July 2014, the vast majority fleeing to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the Ninewa plains, Sinjar and areas of Ninewa governorate controlled by the Kurdish Peshmerga troops. Ninewa is a predominantly Sunni governorate with a population of 3.2 million.14 Historically, it was home to most of Iraq’s minority groups, such as the Kurdish Yazidis, Shia Turkmen, Shabak and Christians, many of who fled in recent years because of threats and regional and national instability. This displacement uprooted many of these minorities from their historic homes in the Ninewa plains. Most Christians and Yazidis who moved during this time fled to the KRI whereas the Shia Turkmen went to the central and southern governorates of Kerbala, Babylon and Najaf, where large populations of Turkmen have historically lived. 3. August 2014: Sinjar Offensive In August, ISIL expanded its operations to Sinjar city and the surrounding villages, marking the beginning of the Sinjar Crisis. More than half of those displaced were Kurdish Yazidis, primarily agricultural workers, who fled to the KRI. At least 200,000 civilians fled Sinjar city and its surrounding villages; 50,000 were trapped by ISIL in the nearby mountains until a humanitarian corridor to evacuate them, protected by the Peshmerga forces,

was opened on 4 August.15 By 13 August, the majority of those trapped in the mountains had been rescued and relocated to Dahuk governorate via the Peshkhabour border crossing.16 August saw the largest displacement wave over the shortest period. Dahuk, Iraq’s northernmost governorate administered by the KRG, became the governorate with the largest IDP population until the May 2015 Ramadi crisis in Anbar, discussed below. As of 9 September 2015, Dahuk hosted 407,604 IDPs, accounting for 13 per cent of the total IDPs in Iraq. By September 2015, displaced persons, including 97,691 Syrian refugees, represented more than half of Dahuk’s population.17 4. Post-September 2014 As Coalition, ISF and Peshmerga forces have begun reclaiming territory formerly occupied by ISIL, displacement has continued in conflict areas such as Anbar, Tikrit, Baiji in Salah al-Din (the site of Iraq’s second largest oil plant), Al-Shirqat district on the border of Salah al-Din and Ninewa, the Jurf-Sakhr district in Babylon, Ba’quba in Diyala and other parts of Kirkuk and Diyala. Between September 2014 and April 2015, at least 568,056 persons were displaced, primarily from Anbar, Salah al-Din and Diyala. In April, ISF liberated Tikrit city. Since then the Government has been slowly re-establishing public services, which were largely non-operational since the June ISIL takeover18. 5. Post-April 2015 In mid-April, heavy clashes between ISIL and the ISF and its allies began in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar governorate, triggering yet another large-scale displacement primarily toward Baghdad governorate and other central governorates. Reportedly, many of those who displaced because of these clashes had difficulty entering other governorates, as they were frequently required have sponsors; in some cases, they were sent back to Anbar. Similar to previous displacement from Anbar, most families fled to the nearest safe place where they had friends or relatives. In two weeks, an estimated 107,940 people had been displaced from Ramadi by 4 May 2015.19 At this point, Anbar overtook Dahuk again as the gover-

14. Figure from Central Statistical Organization – Republic of Iraq, 2009. http://cosit.gov.iq/en/population-manpower-staatistics/ 15. UN Security Council condemns attacks by Iraqi jihadists, BBC, 7 August 2014. 16 Militants’ Siege on Mountain in Iraq Is Over, Pentagon Says, The New York Times, 13 August 2014. 17. UNHCR, 10 September 2015. 18. IOM field reports from April 2015. 19. Daily updates from field staff for DTM after Ramadi Crisis, emails, 5 May 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Background

norate hosting the largest displaced population in Iraq: by September, the number of those displaced in Anbar since April increased to 564,270, 91% from Anbar, 5% from Kirkuk and 4% from Salah al-Din.

HISTORICAL AND PRESENT FEATURES OF DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ “‘Return’ and ‘returnees’ are not clearly definable terms. ‘Return’ can refer to the reclaiming of property, even if only to dispose of it later. Return can mean that some family members spend some time on the original property -to do part-time farming, to carry out repairs, or in the case of the elderly to live out the remainder of their lives -while maintaining a presence in the city. In other words, return should be viewed as not only the return of people to their land, but the return of the land to the people, so that they can decide how best to use it.”20 IDP decisions on whether to stay in the displacement area, move to another area, return to the location of origin, or attempt relocation via legal or irregular means, were historically based on a number of factors: security, political climate, shelter conditions, time spent in displacement, employment in the current location and property rights – all of which remain important to the current situation. Security and socio-political climate Stable security is clearly a crucial factor in deciding when and where to move: for example, before 2003, displaced Kurds were deterred from returning to their original villages because of fears that the Hussein Government would once more endanger their lives and force them to move again. In addition to fear of institutionalized threats, inter-communal tensions and discriminatory movement restrictions also prevented IDP returns. Following the 2003 displacement wave, aid organizations reported a general decrease in communal tensions, yet IDPs were fleeing traditionally mixed areas to locations where they could rely on the protection of their own community21. Usually, when this is not possible, there is the risk of increased vulnerability. UNHCR also noted a similar pattern among IDPs in 2008: returnees mostly returned to the neigh-

bourhoods, districts and governorates controlled by members of their ethno-religious group. As of late 2008, only few families had returned to areas under the control of another group. No members of minority groups such as Christians, Sabaean-Mandaeans and Yazidis were reported among the returnees.22 According to a UNDP study on conflict in Iraq from 2004 to 2015, social violence in tribally homogenous communities is 56 per cent less likely.23 Security and its durability are usually the strongest influences on IDP intentions. Other factors are ethnic and religious homogeneity between the HC and IDPs, whether the location of origin remains controlled by the same group as prior to displacement and whether integration in the existing location is possible. Of IDPs assessed nationwide by IOM in March 2008, 31 per cent had displaced due to direct threats to their lives, 26 per cent because of generalized violence and 21 per cent because of fear. Those displaced between January 2013 and May 2014 stated that the primary cause for displacement was generalized violence, followed by direct threats to family and ethno-religious persecution;24 the same problems still prevail throughout Iraq, although the present security situation is arguably worse. Shelter conditions in the area of displacement Appropriate and sustainable accommodation is a strong element in comfort and contentment levels both in the areas of origin and displacement. If shelter conditions are inadequate and IDPs have exhausted their savings in rent, they tend to move in pursuit of better conditions. This in turn generates smaller, more complex displacement waves between locations and different shelter types, as well as premature returns. The scale of the shelter problem for the Iraqi IDPs and the general population is considerable and debilitating. Though rented housing remains the most common form of shelter for IDPs, this type of accommodation is often extremely crowded, with an entire family renting one room. It is also common for IDPs to pay rent to live in unfinished buildings. Hundreds of informal settlements

20. The Internally Displaced People of Iraq, Brookings Institution, October 2002. 21. Iraq: insecurity and lack of shelter exacerbate internal displacement crisis, Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2005. 22. IDP Working Group Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq – Update, 24 March 2008. 23. UNDP Conflict Analysis: Iraq 2004-2015. 24. UNDP Conflict Analysis: Iraq 2004-2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Background

across Iraq are still common destinations for IDPs from all displacement waves and for returnees, many of who have trouble accessing electricity and other infrastructure services. Too often, even shelter conditions that appear stable, such as rented houses or host families, are also vulnerable. Although shelter type has not been historically influential on IDPs’ intentions to return or integrate, it is an important factor in the risk of secondary displacements. Access to land and property Resolution of property and land disputes has been a key step to achieving durable solutions for previously displaced persons in Iraq and a crucial element in preventing further displacement. Prior to 2003, properties belonging to Kurds displaced by the Ba’athist regime were occupied by Arabs in and around Kirkuk; many of them believed they had acquired the property legally, as the Government at the time encouraged it; however, 75 per cent of displaced Kurds believed they were still the owners of their properties and their primary need became finding new shelters.25 Another consequence is that returning IDPs can prompt the displacement of other populations. A number of IDPs displaced after the fall of the Ba’athist regime were forced out because other displaced groups were returning to their areas of origin: for example, in 2003, displaced Kurds living in KRG-administered Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah began returning to their places of origin below the “green line”,26 in the provinces of Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Ninewa. Thousands of Arabs who had been resettled in these areas in the framework of the “Arabization” project began to flee: they feared retaliation and the original owners of the houses they had been occupying were now reclaiming them. 27 As ISIL has reportedly been systematically expropriating the homes and possessions of residents who have left ISIL-controlled territories and destroying properties, it is reasonable to assume that secondary displacements caused by return are possible. When the political power changes hands or is threatened by AGs, establishing

a system to ensure that everyone receives full property rights becomes extremely challenging. This is likely to be a crucial issue of current return and resettlement patterns, as more areas of Iraq are liberated. Changing needs during displacement As IDPs spend more time in displacement, they become more receptive to remaining in these areas for a number of reasons: people achieve better conditions, find better accommodation, enroll their children in school and even marry members from the HCs. This makes the decision to return more difficult, as IDPs are increasingly uncertain they will be able to rebuild their lives in the areas of origin. Many of those who left prior to 2003 had been displaced for so long that only 45 per cent of IDPs surveyed by UN Habitat in 2001 intended to return, despite the active encouragement of the KRG.28 As an additional indication of this trend, in the immediate aftermath of the 2006–2008 displacement, 45 per cent of IDPs wished to return to their original locations, but just 6 per cent maintained this intention four years later.29 As well, 24 per cent of IDPs who had moved in 2013 -many from Ninewa’s ethnic minorities who had moved due to targeted violence in central Iraq- intended to integrate. In contrast, only 5 per cent of the IDPs who fled in the first months of 2014 (primarily due to violence in Anbar) intended to integrate in their HCs.30 IDPs who have been recently displaced may not yet have accepted that their displacement could be for the long term and thus more express an intention to return. Changing intentions and movement patterns create changing needs for IDPs. Living conditions and income during displacement influence the IDPs’ level of contentment in their area of displacement. This is consistently reflected in IOM’s displacement monitoring over time; according to the previously mentioned UN Habitat survey of Iraqi IDPs in 2001, the most important variables influencing the decision on whether to remain or return were the level of crowding (families sharing the same

25 IDP Site and Family Survey: first report, UN Habitat, January 2001. 26. Nominal 1991 demarcation line between the Kurdish northern provinces of Iraq and the remainder controlled by Saddam Hussein. 27. Iraq: insecurity and lack of shelter exacerbate internal displacement crisis, Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2005. 28. IDP Site and Family Survey: first report, UN Habitat, January 2001. 29. Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assessments, IOM Iraq, 2012. 30. Ongoing Displacement: A Profile of Iraq 2013-2014, IOM Iraq, September 2014.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Background

dwelling), job loss, unsuitable working conditions or underemployment.31 If IDPs find solutions to poor living conditions and lack of sustenance, then stable income tends to strongly influence whether integrating is perceived as viable. After security, income was the primary reported factor that had encouraged post-2006 IDPs to integrate in their HCs.32 For IDPs assessed in 2007, shelter was the reported primary need, followed by food and work; however, by 2012, employment had become the first priority, indicating the desire to stabilize and showing a willingness to remain in the HC.33 Income is a strong factor because financial stability improves access to more and usually better services.

31. IDP Site and Family Survey: first report, UN Habitat, January 2001. 32. Barriers to Integration, IOM Iraq, December 2013. 33. Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assessments, IOM Iraq, 2012.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

FINDINGS: INTENTIONS OF IDPS DISPLACED IN 2014-201534 This section presents a general overview of the intentions of IDPs affected by the most recent violence and displacement; most of them are struggling with similar issues to those displaced by previous conflicts. These issues generally include accepting the possibility of protracted poor security in their areas of origin, inadequate living conditions in their areas of displacement, lack of services and often very high rates of unemployment, all of which hinder achieving a reasonable standard of living during displacement and increase the risk of further displacement. Intention to return to the former residence Overall, IDPs in Iraq reported an overwhelming desire to return to their former locations: 86.5 per cent of those displaced between 2014 and 2015 intend to return for many reasons, including the desire to regain their homes, their former jobs, the farmland that once provided many of them with income and the schools where their children were enrolled. However, there is an important distinction between the intention to take action and the perceived capability of doing so, which varies according to the different circumstances and characteristics of the IDP population. While some groups, notably those displaced in Anbar, Babylon, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk reported that they intend to return immediately once their areas of origin stabilize and have not considered other options, others who live in the southern governorates and the KRI

stated that if certain conditions were met in their areas of displacement, most notably suitable shelter and sustainable income, they would consider remaining there. Those who fled to areas close to their location of origin, such as in Anbar governorate, Salah al-Din and neighbouring Kirkuk, were reportedly very committed to returning at the earliest possible opportunity. Between January 2014 and May 2015, 1,918,005 IDPs displaced within their governorate of origin or to a bordering governorate; 90 per cent of these intend to return, suggesting that IDPs who have been displaced close to their location of origin are highly likely to return. This might explain their decision to move to areas close to their homes, as it allows them to return to their former residence more easily than IDPs who displaced further away. Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Thi-Qar governorates have the highest number of IDPs intending to return to their areas of origin. IDPs in Anbar and Baghdad were primarily from Anbar, whereas all IDPs in Ninewa and the vast majority in Thi-Qar were from Ninewa. Most IDPs in Diyala were displaced within the governorate, mostly from urban centres in Al-Khalis and Al-Muqdadiya districts to the Peshmerga-controlled Khanaqin district, while those in Kirkuk had the most diverse areas of origin: 35 per cent from Anbar, 32 per cent from Salah al-Din, 14 per cent from within Kirkuk, 10 per cent from Diyala and the remainder from Ninewa.

Return to place of origin

OVERALL INTENTIONS OF IDPS IN IRAQ

86%

Waiting on one or several factors

Uknown

Locally integrate in current location

Resettle in a third location

<1%

Return to Area of Past Displacement

<1%

Moving and integrating in a different location outside of Iraq

<1%

34. All quantitative data in this section has been taken from the DTM Group Assessment round 1, which data collection was completed on 25 May 2015. See Chapter 5 for more information on this methodology.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

findings

Regardless of their place of origin, all IDPs in Kirkuk intend to return, except for a small group of Arab Sunnis in Daquq district who were undecided, waiting for developments in one or several issues. Over 90 per cent of IDPs displaced in these governorates intend to return. Since many of the former areas of origin for IDPs from Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al-Din were either reclaimed by ISF in the spring of 2015 or are current conflict zones, many IDPs have begun returning to these areas. Many others who remain displaced believe they will be able to return as soon as security forces have cleared the area and announced that it is safe to return. The most important indicators of whether IDPs will return to their former homes are the governorate of displacement and the governorate of origin. As previously stated, those displaced to areas close to their governorates of origin are very likely to return. It is also reasonable to expect high rates of return to governorates where return has historically happened: for example, there was a very high rate of return to Anbar following the 2003 and 2006 displacement waves. There were also significant waves of return to Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din after the 2006 displacement. Based on the current data regarding intentions and these historical trends, it is reasonable to anticipate large waves of return to Anbar and the central governorates once these areas are secured. Ethno-religious dynamics also play a significant role in determining whether IDPs will return: for example, displacement and return dynamics in and to Ninewa are complex, as 77 per cent of IDPs from this governorate belong to minority groups.35 This population was the most likely to be interested in options other than return; around 23 per cent of IDPs displaced from Ninewa intended either to integrate or were postponing a decision, indicating significant hesitation to return. Those displaced from Mosul and the surrounding villages -who had mostly fled to Kerbala, Najaf, or KRI- appear more prepared for the possibility of spending a long time in their displacement areas. Many displaced Christian and Yazidi families living in Dahuk wish to leave Iraq for another country and believe that there is no possibility of return unless ISIL is eradicated from Iraq; even if ISF control of Ninewa were restored, resettling would be hindered by property damage, fear of threats and new displacement, and lack of trust in

their former communities. Turkmen minority IDPs from Ninewa, who displaced to the central governorates, largely intend to integrate in their current locations due to similar concerns. While groups that represent a majority in their location of origin are more willing to return as soon as areas are stabilized, the return of minority groups to Ninewa is less likely. Although large scale returns to Anbar and the central governorates are anticipated once hostilities cease, the UN does not expect massive waves of return while the conflict continues and has not included this possibility in contingency planning for the near future. Rather, it anticipates a slow trickle of IDPs returning to areas reclaimed by the ISF or the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, especially

GOVERNORATES WHERE IDPS INTEND TO RETURN Dahuk Ninewa Erbil

Kirkuk

Sulaymaniyah

Salah al-Din Diyala Baghdad Anbar Percentage of total IDPs with the intention to return by governorate

Kerbala

Babylon

Wassit

Qadissiyah 19.90%

Dahuk

16.97%

Anbar

14.66%

Kirkuk

12.97%

Baghdad

7.74%

Erbil

6.22%

Diyala

6.02%

Ninewa

4.50%

Najaf

3.36%

Sulaymaniyah

2.42%

Babylon

2.20%

Salah al-Din

3.05%

Other

Missan

Najaf Thi-Qar

Basra Muthanna

35. This figure accounts for all ethno-religious groups other than Iraqâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s three largest ethno-religious: Arab Muslim Sunnis, Arab Muslim Shias, and

26 Muslim Sunnis. Kurdish

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

findings

to the above-mentioned areas. This return movement will be complicated by new waves of displacement caused by the military clashes to reclaim Anbar province, Mosul and the villages of the Ninewa Plains, as well as the continuing clashes along the access route between Baghdad and Mosul, which goes through Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala. To some degree, this return movement has started and will be discussed in the chapter “Barriers to Return”. Intention to integrate in the area of displacement While most IDPs hope to return, approximately 3 per cent of those surveyed by IOM’s DTM stated their intention to integrate in the communities of displacement.

Most of them are Turkmen living in religious buildings in Kerbala and Najaf governorates, often receiving housing subsidies, food and sometimes cash from religious organizations. However, this intention involves complications: religious buildings are not sustainable shelters; there have been evictions; the local government usually plans to move the IDPs elsewhere and there are problems in transferring residency from the municipalities of origin, without which it can be difficult to rent houses or buy land. Also, local governments have regulations and policies on IDP integration that often complicate the process. Kerbala governorate has the largest population of IDPs (69%) who intend to integrate in their current location.

GOVERNORATES OF ORIGIN FOR IDPS WHO INTEND TO RETURN Dahuk

99%

Ninewa

Erbil

Sulaymaniyah

Kirkuk

Salah al-Din

Diyala

Baghdad

Babylon

Anbar

Najaf

100%

18%

26%

31%

2% 4%

41%

36%

25%

10%

12%

3% 2% 1%

18%

33%

94%

97%

49%

11%

24%

11%

6% 1%

16%

14%

61%

97%

1% 2%

99%

%100 Anbar

Babylon

Baghdad

Basrah

Diyala

Erbil

Kirkuk

Ninewa

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Salah al-Din

findings

MOST COMMON GOVERNORATES OF DISPLACEMENT FOR IDPS FROM NINEWA AND THEIR INTENTIONS*

Dahuk Erbil Ninewa

Kirkuk

Sulaymaniyah

Salah al-Din Diyala Baghdad

Anbar

Wassit Kerbala Babylon Qadissiya

Missan Thi-Qar Basrah

Najaf Muthanna

79% 18% 2% 1%

Dahuk

% of IDPs from Ninewa.

94% 5% 1%

Ninewa

% of IDPs from Ninewa.

Locally integrate in current location

81% 19%

Erbil

% of IDPs from Ninewa.

Return to place of origin

Total number of IDPs from Ninewa

70% 27% 3%

Najaf

% of IDPs from Ninewa.

73% 25% 2%

97% 3%

Kerbala

Baghdad

% of IDPs from Ninewa.

Waiting on one or several factors

Other

168,601 IDP individuals**

* These 6 governorates account for 86% of IDPs from Ninewa, with smaller populations residing primarily in Kirkuk, Babylon, Wassit, Sulaymaniyah, Qadissiya. ** This figure is according to DTM data from 9 September 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

findings

CASE STUDY OF IDPS FROM NINEWA IN NAJAF AND KERBALA NAJAF

INTENTIONS BY SHELTER TYPE

ETHNORELIGIOUS MAKEUP OF IDPS FROM NINEWA 2,276

58,951

Turkman Shia Muslim

DISPLACEMENT FROM NINEWA OVER TIME

Religious Building

Shabak Shia Muslim

Hotel/Motel

Turkman Sunni Muslim

Rented housing

IDP INDIVIDUALS

Arab Shia Muslim

Host Families

GRAND TOTAL 142,375

Other

58,403

Unfinished/ Abandoned building

22,745

100,000 IDP individuals

Locally integrate in current location

Aug 15 '15

Apr 10 '15

May 24 '15

Mar 26 '15

Jan 29 '15

Feb 26 '15

Dec 25 '14

Oct 26 '14

Nov 25 '14

Sep 28 '14

Jul 16 '14

Aug 24 '14

Apr 1 '14

ETHNORELIGIOUS DATA FOR IDPS FROM NINEWA

Return to place of origin Waiting on one or several factors

INTENTIONS BY SHELTER TYPE 4,038 66

1749

61298

DISPLACEMENT FROM NINEWA OVER TIME

Other

Turkman Shia Muslim

Religious Building

Shabak Shia Muslim

Host Families

Kurdish Shia Muslim

Hotel/Motel

IDP INDIVIDUALS

Arab Shia Muslim

Rented housing

GRAND TOTAL 67,151

100,000 IDP individuals

Aug 15 '15

May 24 '15

Apr 10 '15

Mar 26 '15

Feb 26 '15

Jan 29 '15

Dec 25 '14

Nov 25 '14

Oct 26 '14

Sep 28 '14

Jul 16 '14

Aug 24 '14

May 1 '14

Apr 1 '14

0 Mar 1 '14

KERBALA

May 1 '14

Mar 1 '14

Locally integrate in current location Return to place of origin Waiting on one or several factors

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

findings

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IDPS WITH THE INTENTION TO LOCALLY INTEGRATE BY GOVERNORATE Kerbala

78%

Dahuk

Najaf

Basra

Diyala

Other

More than 25 per cent of IDPs in Basra governorate intend to integrate, while figures are lower yet significant in other southern governorates such as Najaf, Muthana, Missan and Thi-Qar. There are several reasons for this trend: beyond instability in the areas of origin, FGDs respondents in Kerbala and Najaf stated that access to assistance from the HC, access to income as well as shared ethno-religious background are the primary incentives to remain. The Shia governorates of Kerbala and Najaf have both historically hosted a large number of Turkmen and 21.5 per cent of the 226,329 Turkmen Shia displaced in 2014 to 2015 intend to integrate. Nearly 75 per cent of these live in religious buildings, usually “husseiniyas,” small buildings commonly used as prayer rooms for men. More Turkmen intend to integrate in Kerbala governorate than in Najaf, where the majority still intends to return. Both governorates benefit from religious tourism and strong agricultural economies - Najaf to a larger extent than Kerbala. The ethno-religious dynamics between the Turkmen and Shabak ethnic minorities who migrated en masse to the husseiniyas on the Kerbala-Najaf road are a possible explanation for this difference. The entire Shabak minority living along the Najaf stretch of the Kerbala-Najaf road intends to return to the areas of origin, while almost half of the Turkmen living along this road (both in Kerbala and Najaf) intend to integrate and 19 per cent are postponing a decision, possibly implying that Turkmen are more comfortable with their situation. IOM field

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

staff in Najaf also observed that there is friction between the two groups and the Shabak are frustrated because many wish to purchase land but do not have the means to do so and believe they have have not received as much support as Turkmen. However, both ethnic groups living in Kerbala’s urban areas are strongly motivated to integrate, as work and government assistance are available. Those in more urban locations in Najaf intend to return, while many have postponed any decision. This suggests that government support and perceived better job possibilities in Kerbala’s urban centres may partly explain why Kerbala is a more attractive integration option. Waiting on one of several factors to determine intention Regardless of the intention to return, remain in displacement areas, or emigrate to another country, the IDP population generally acknowledges the volatile situation, where new complications might hinder movement, or where areas of origin might remain contested or under the control of AGs for an extended period. At least 8.5 per cent of IDPs surveyed said they are waiting for developments in one or several aspects before deciding their future intentions. The primary factor is security in the area of origin, but other factors are taken into account to determine the best option, such as security, affordability of housing and other amenities, availability of work, HC relations and possible assistance from humanitarian organizations, the HC and/or the Government. Most of the populations postponing their decision are ethnic minorities who live in unstable shelter types: Yazidis in Dahuk living in unfinished or abandoned buildings (24%), Arab Sunnis renting houses in the KRI (12%), Turkmen living in religious buildings in Najaf, Kerbala and Wassit (7%) and Yazidis living with host families in Dahuk (6%). This confirms the observation that ethno-religious groups and those living in unsustainable housing are more hesitant to return and at high risk of further displacement. Notably, two thirds of IDPs in Basra governorate wait for developments in one or several factors before making a decision. They generally want to return to their areas of origin but are waiting for improved security and say that their current low standard of living reinforces their intention; however, this population remains less committed to return. Other IDPs living in Basra reported that if they could secure adequate income and thus rent suitable housing, they would remain in their areas of displacement. Overall, this sentiment was echoed by FGD re-

findings

spondents in many other governorates in Iraq. The other governorates where a significant proportion of IDPs await developments in various factors before deciding their future intentions include Wassit (22%), Najaf (21%), Dahuk (19%), Salah al-Din (19%), Sulaymaniyah (18%), Qadissiya (14%), Erbil (10%) and Missan (10%). IOM field staff in the central governorates observed that IDPs tend to move around in the areas of south-central Iraq, searching for jobs and better living conditions and settling in the first area that meets these conditions. IDPs in Wassit reported that after nearly a year living with a host family, they began to feel burdensome and were currently seeking alternatives. IDPs from minority groups living in the KRI reported they intend to move to Baghdad if they cannot find jobs in Kurdistan, while IDPs in Missan intend to go to Kurdistan because they cannot find jobs in Missan. One IDP in a Dahuk camp explained, “Because we are IDPs, we do not live normally. We have plans one day but the next, they change”. Once displaced, IDPs continue to move in search of better living conditions, and this could eventually prompt them to leave the country. Finding employment is important to IDPs of all intentions, thus sufficient income and improved shelter conditions can be considered the top factors for those who are currently undecided.

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IDPS WHO ARE WAITING ON ONE OR SEVERAL FACTORS BY GOVERNORATE Dahuk

45%

Najaf

18%

Erbil

10%

Sulaymaniyah

10%

Salah al-Din

Wassit

Basra

Kirkuk

Kerbala

Qadissiya

Other

Risk of irregular migration Many IDPs of all intention types, as well as HC members, will consider the option of migrating abroad, particularly to Europe, when possible and affordable. Although IDPs do not tend to explicitly express their desire to emigrate, when displacement is prolonged, opportunities arise via smugglers and others who have successfully made the journey encourage them, there is evidence of increased outflows of Iraqis heading to Europe, mostly via Turkey. This movement is not specific to the IDP population, as it has been observed that non-displaced individuals, who often are more able to afford the trip than their IDP compatriots, also make the journey. Young men, who travel alone or with one child and hope to eventually unify their families at the final destination, represent the largest demographic group of Iraqis who leave Iraq for Europe. The main reasons give for such movement include lack of security and safety; lack of trust in the Government due to continuous corruption, poor administration and sectarianism; poor living conditions, particularly in relation to unemployment, lack of education opportunities, –(especially higher education); inability to afford marriage and establish a family; and the unsuccessful search for respect and dignity in the current displacement locations. With many areas still controlled by ISIL and longstanding lack of improvement in the IDPs and other vulnerable populations’ situation, Iraqi youth and families will continue to move, seeking safety and better living conditions not only within the country but also abroad.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

SECURITY AND ACCESS TO FORMER RESIDENCES While security in the area of origin is the primary factor affecting IDP plans, there are others such as the Government’s policies on how and when IDPs can return, whether an area is deemed secure and, if so, whether it is accessible: all these elements influence the current patterns of displacement and return. Feeling safe in the area of displacement and the initial reason for displacement also affect IDP intentions. Deterioration of security in the displacement area prompts continued movement, a very common situation in Anbar governorate, where some of the fiercest battles have taken place and where ISIL controls the majority of the governorate. About 15 per cent of all IDPs said they did not feel safe in their displacement areas, nearly all of which were located in Anbar. FGD respondents who returned to their original residences in Anbar governorate reported that they had returned because the displacement area also came under attack. “There is no preference between the [areas of origin and displacement]”, said one man who had re-

turned to his home in Anbar. IDPs in Anbar are in the direst situation in the country, as this governorate has been experiencing the highest level of conflict for the longest period of time. A FGD respondent in Anbar explained that the “return journey is too long because there is no direct road. People have to cross many checkpoints, as these side roads are still under the control of governmental forces or armed groups.” There are constant accounts of indiscriminate bombing and confusion about which group controls which areas, as well as widespread fear of being accused at a checkpoint of association with one group or the other and be possibly arrested or killed. IDPs in this governorate face extreme difficulty in moving and accessing basic services, both in the location of origin and of displacement, and are also frequently denied access to other governorates. They should be considered among the most vulnerable in Iraq.

A man who was recently able to return with his family to his home in Anbar. June 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

SECURITY AND ACCESS TO FORMER RESIDENCES

Improved security also affects IDP decisions to return

nal residences: for example, those displaced because of

or remain in the current location; however, assessing

the fighting that began in Ramadi in April 2015 were

whether security in the area of origin has sufficiently im-

required to have a local sponsor to enter the central

proved can be can be difficult or dangerous, if based on

governorates. Many were denied such access and were

unreliable information. One important factor for those

instead sent to transit camps in the Bzaibar area on the

waiting to make a decision and those intending to re-

border of Anbar and Baghdad to wait for the decision

turn is the ISF notification that their former areas are se-

to either allow entry or return to Anbar. There are many

cured. The GoI has reportedly implemented a procedure

similar reports of IDPs being denied entrance to Bagh-

to support the return of IDPs to areas recently reclaimed

dad, Babylon and Kerbala and of a high degree of con-

by the ISF, whereby security forces close off the area to

fusion about who was allowed to enter and to where.

clear explosives from roads, public spaces and residenc-

Security forces have reportedly established a database

es and ensure they are suitable for return. This process

of suspected terrorists against which IDPs’ names are

can take up to a month and IDPs cannot access their

checked. IDPs have expressed concern that they may be

homes until it is complete. Among others, FGD respon-

arrested or denied entry because of database errors or

dents in Salah al-Din corroborate this, saying they not

names being confused.

only await improved security to return, but also the ISF decision. Once this decision is issued it applies to everyone in most governorates receiving returns; however, according to a FGD respondent, the perception in Salah al-Din is that the ISF are implementing a staggered return, prioritizing the families of ISF officers, followed by the families of government civil servants and lastly all other residents.

FGD respondents in Anbar feared that any return movement would cause authorities to associate them with AGs, and said that they are “helpless and unable to afford living in other areas”, while many young IDP men from the Ramadi displacement wave that began in April were reportedly being denied access and told they should “go back and fight [ISIL] for their country”.36 As the conflict generates an increasing number of IDPs,

There have been other reports of staggered returns or se-

some governorates are overwhelmed by their IDP popu-

lectivity; these are discussed in the “Barriers to Return”

lation and have begun enforcing security measures and

section on page 46.

entry requirements, or restricting movements for those

Even when security forces declare an area secure and

attempting to displace or return.

begin allowing returns, there are other possible security

All these are examples of obstacles to return caused by

risks such as booby-trapped houses, communal tensions

volatile security situations, difficult access conditions

and destroyed property and infrastructure. Despite se-

and challenging or unclear screening processes for IDPs

curity clearance procedures, there have been accounts

who intend to return or to move to a different location.

of premature returns and of returnees being killed or in-

Security, access and protection issues are factors that

jured by mines and booby-trapped houses, especially in

determine the ability of IDPs to carry through their

the former homes of minority groups and GoI employees,

movement intentions, but they are almost always beyond

who are targeted in such attacks.

IDP control.

Screening systems or entry requirements for movement or return can also create problems for IDPs intending to leave their current locations or to return to their origi-

36. Account of IOM field staff from Babylon governorate.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS While shelter type does not greatly influence IDP intentions overall, each presents its own challenges to attaining a reasonable level of comfort during displacement and can be an indicator of further displacement or inter-shelter movement. According to the DTM Master List of 9 September 2015, the most common shelter types for IDPs across Iraq were rented housing (40%), host families (29%), unfinished buildings (9%), camps (8%), informal settlements (5%) and religious buildings (4%), with lower numbers living in hotels/motels, schools and other accommodation. The shelter types with the highest percentage of IDPs intending to return are schools (95%), camps (94%) and host families (93%). Those living in unfinished buildings, informal settlements and the “other” category are most likely to be undecided, while those in religious buildings, hotels and motels were the most likely to intend to integrate. This section describes the most common IDP shelter types in Iraq and how they influence movement intentions.

Rented housing Rented housing is the most common shelter and IDPs living in other housing situations regard it as the most preferred option during displacement and for potential integration. As of 9 September 2015, an estimated 40 per cent of IDPs were renting houses37. Conditions for all IDPs in this category, even with housing assistance, are often extremely difficult. Many families share the same flat without adequate furniture, and the HC complains that demand is increasing the price of rent. In Dahuk, 40 individuals from 6 families were sharing a three-bedroom flat.38 At the same time, many IDPs wish to move into rented housing, but cannot because it is unaffordable: “In the current situation, some of us have no plan to move to another place because we cannot afford to rent a house,” said a displaced man living in a camp in Basra governorate. One important observation, however, is that excluding

IDP intentions by shelter type LOCALLY INTEGRATE IN CURRENT LOCATION 62%

Intention

WAITING ON ONE OR SEVERAL FACTORS 31%

29%

RETURN TO PLACE OF ORIGIN 36%

25%

Rented housing

Shelter types of IDPs with this intention

Host Families

37. DTM Master List as of 9 September 2015. 38. Firsthand field observation.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Camp

School Building

Unfinished/Abandoned building

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS

those who have been recorded as living in rented houses,

the overall Iraq average of 86 per cent; however, they

the categories of rented housing, informal settlements,

anticipate their displacement will continue, especially

unfinished buildings and religious buildings are often

in the KRI and the central-southern governorates. They

obscured by unclear land ownership, tenancy stipula-

are also concerned about their ability to continue paying

tions and financial agreements. For example, many IDPs

rent.

have to pay to live in unfinished buildings or informal settlements, although these frequently lack water and electricity and are structurally unsound. On the other hand, some religious groups, notably churches, Shia organizations in Kerbala and Najaf and various mosques in Baghdad have been paying the rent for their coreligionist IDPs who live in their areas. These nuances must be acknowledged when considering the difficulties facing IDPs living in rented housing: while some are depleting their savings to live in poor conditions, others are receiving assistance. Whether IDPs are receiving this assistance influences their perception of the viability of staying in their current areas, at least in the short-term. This is the case in Kerbala, where many IDPs have received shelter support from the Government.

Rented housing has been mentioned as the most desirable option for IDPs as it means independence, privacy and sustainability. The biggest challenge for IDPs is to secure enough income to pay for rents; otherwise they risk being displaced again, either within the country or abroad, and/or having to move into critical shelters. Host families Living with host families is the second most common form of shelter for people displaced in Iraq from 2014 to 2015. As of September 2015, at least half of IDPs in this shelter type had spent more than a year in displacement.39 The majority intends to return to areas of origin, but according to FGD respondents, also seeks alternatives, because a family is usually accommodated

Of those living in rented housing, the percentage intend-

in one room, or even in extended shelters in the yards

ing to return to the original residence is consistent with

of the host families, relying on the household for water,

18%

12%

16%

11%

15%

11%

3% 1%

4% 1% 1%

3% 2% 1% 1%

100% Informal/random/irregular settlements or collective shelters

Other

Religious Building

Hotel/Motel

Unknown

39. DTM Master List as of 9 September 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS

electricity and food, as witnessed in Anbar governorate. IDPs living with host families also reported significant food vulnerability, naming food as their third priority after work and shelter/housing.

the Kerbala branch of the MoMD40. These groups, however, are vulnerable: the entity supporting them could stop doing so or could initiate their transfer to less preferable places. For instance, in Ker-

IDPs from Anbar represent the largest population living

bala, 1,178 families (approximately 7,068 individuals,

with host families, mostly within Anbar, Baghdad or oth-

or 88 per cent of IDPs accommodated in hotels) were

er central governorates. Reportedly, these IDP families

living in the MoMD-funded hotels until July 2015, when

usually stay with relatives or members of their tribes in

the Ministry started to move them into a camp because

safer areas of the governorate. The second largest popu-

contractual agreements with the hotels had ended.41 Al-

lation is that of IDPs from Ninewa, who mostly live in Da-

most half of the families were told to relocate to a camp,

huk. However, IDPs begin to feel burdensome after some

which still lacked proper electricity and WASH42 infra-

time: “Relations between HCs and IDPs are complex.

structure. Unsurprisingly, only a fraction of these fam-

When IDPs first arrive there is often an expression of sol-

ilies relocated to the camps. Reportedly, some moved

idarity and support, as friends or family members help

with their relatives to mosques along the Kerbala – Najaf

them to get settled. But such good will is often short-

road or to rented houses in Kerbala city. Some who re-

lived due to the limited resources of the HC,” explained

mained in the hotels simply began paying to live there.43

an IDP from Ninewa living with a host family in Wassit.

According to a MoMD official, the Government has also

As well, according to IOM field staff, after a while some

been building complexes to accommodate IDPs and re-

host families ask IDPs to contribute to the rent. The high

turnees in Basra, Missan and Kerbala. Reportedly, IDPs

number of IDPs accommodated by host families points

in critical shelters -such as schools and religious build-

to the need of targeting HCs for assistance as well, since

ings- will be moved to these complexes.

hosting is often financially burdensome. Without this support, IDPs could be expelled from the host family’s home when the financial burden becomes too heavy, or when communal tensions between IDPs and host HCs become too great. Religious buildings, hotels, motels and government complexes IDPs receiving social, financial and shelter support from their respective religious communities, local governments or UN entities are more likely to intend to integrate in comparison to others. Over 50 per cent of IDPs who intend to integrate are Turkmen living in religious buildings; an additional 11 per cent are from various ethnic groups who live in rented housing in Kerbala and Najaf and a further 11 per cent are Turkmen and Arab Shia living in hotels and motels in Kerbala, financed by 40. DTM Group Assessment cycle 1. 41. Per account of IOM field staff from Kerbala, June 2015. 42. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. 43. Field reports from Baghdad, July 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Over 3,000 Chaldean Christian IDPs living in religious buildings in Dahuk intend to integrate. Just as the religious organizations operating the husseiniyas in Kerbala, churches in Kurdistan are supporting displaced Christians by paying their rent, providing food and collecting in-kind donations from their communities. These groups intend to integrate, and the support from such organizations and the local government has encouraged them to do so. These IDPs have a strong desire to resume their normal lives by finding jobs and renting houses. A male IDP from Ninewa currently living in Kerbala plans to integrate, explaining: “Some [of the IDPs] intend to change their housing type and are looking for jobs that will allow them to rent houses, so that the family can enjoy privacy.” Housing assistance from local governments or other gov-

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS

ernmental or non-governmental bodies helps IDPs in the

host families; however, some IDPs are more willing to

initial stages of displacement to find shelter. However, it

move than others. The KRG is reportedly encouraging

also means that an IDP’s situation is largely dependent

IDP movement out of schools and unfinished buildings

on the continuation of that assistance, the duration of

and primarily into camps, an initiative that has already

which is often unknown. Dependency on charities, the

affected thousands of families.

government, or religious organizations to secure housing can lead to uncertainty and instability if assistance ends and IDPs are unable to find other shelter options they can pay for themselves. Unfinished buildings/informal settlements About 16 per cent of all IDPs living in unfinished buildings and/or informal settlements are undecided about their intentions, while the remainder intends to return.44 This is largely because the population, mainly Yazidis in Dahuk, feel very uncertain and insecure about their possible return to Ninewa; however, they hope to change their current situation as soon as possible.

This move creates further challenges, as even those living in centrally located unfinished buildings still believe they have a better chance of finding work than those living in camps, implying that perceived access to jobs is a more important movement intention factor than uncomfortable shelters. Another concern is that IDPs living in rented houses and other more sustainable options who stop receiving assistance, exhaust their savings or are unable to find jobs to pay for rent, may revert to shelters such as unfinished buildings. Camps Approximately 8 per cent of IDPs in Iraq currently live in

As the buildings usually lack basic utilities and are often

camps,45 mostly in Ninewa, Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, Di-

far from city centres where there is a greater possibility

yala and Kirkuk. This number has increased significant-

of employment, IDPs in these shelter types express a

ly since 2014, but will probably level off over the next

strong desire to leave, while firmly believing they will not

twelve months, due to the specifications of UN shelter as-

return to their areas of origin in the foreseeable future.

sistance policy under the Humanitarian Response Plan,

FGD respondents living in unfinished buildings in Zakho

covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 2015.

city, Dahuk governorate, confirmed this: “Because we

FGD respondents had mixed feelings about camps: they

are living in unfinished buildings, we really want to move

are often far from urban centres, causing concern among

to a better shelter that is more comfortable and more

some IDPs that moving in would decrease job opportu-

secure.” A group of little girls told staff that they were

nities; on the other hand, camps provide largely stan-

“desperate to go back to school”.

dardized and centralized access to utilities, schools and

Between the summer of 2014, (the time of displacement for most IDPs in unfinished buildings) and the summer of 2015, there has been significant IDP movement from unfinished buildings to rented houses, as they either find financial solutions themselves or receive assistance. Also, the Government and local authorities

health centres. Many IDPs are reportedly interested in moving to camps to access these services, as a significant number of IDPs has been displaced for over a year and has not received such support. IDPs living in rented houses in Dahuk said that they would choose camps when they run out of money to pay rent.

have been prioritizing shelter solutions for IDPs living in

A number of social problems are also associated to

critical shelter conditions, including moving IDPs into

camps: they are usually established to accommodate

camps, government-funded housing complexes, or with

IDPs from specific displacement waves, and placing new

44. DTM Group Assessment Round 1. 45. DTM Master List as of 9 September 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS

IDPs in camps sometimes causes frictions with other

schools are more likely to consider shelter assistance

IDPs who have been displaced for a longer period and

their primary need, indicating the need for immediate

face difficult conditions but have not had the opportuni-

shelter assistance.

ty to move into camps. Other issues involve tribal or sectarian tensions when IDPs of different backgrounds live in the same camp, as was the case in one of the informal camps in Baghdad that accommodated IDPs from different tribes in Salah al-Din. There are also some cases where IDPs in camps have limited mobility due to security measures. Lastly, the perception that IDPs from certain displacement periods or groups have received more assistance than others is widespread, causing damage to the Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s image or that of international bodies in the camps. In addition to these issues, camps are extremely expensive to run and the UN and its governmental counterparts can only accommodate a small number of IDPs out of the heavy current caseload. While many IDPs may hope to move into camps, a few will succeed and the rest will need to prepare for alternatives. Alternative shelter and service solutions will need to be explored, as camps will continue to accommodate a relatively small IDP population. Concluding factors Affordability, perceived possibility of accessing jobs in the location of displacement, overcrowding, poor quality of living, tensions with host families and threat of eviction are the main shelter issues influencing IDP intentions to move or stay, affordability being the most pressing concern as it hinders finding better overall solutions. Housing assistance also encourages people to integrate: many claim that if they could achieve sustainable shelter, they would consider integration, especially in the KRI, Kerbala, Najaf and the southern governorates. The DTM confirms that after income, the second most frequently reported need is shelter assistance, with 19 per cent of IDPs saying it is their primary need. IDPs living in religious, unfinished and abandoned buildings and

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

In some areas, governmental and other entities have been providing IDPs with shelter support for at least a period of time, usually in hotels, camps, complexes, sports centres and other shelters, which is helpful in the short term; however, this assistance creates dependency on the assistance provider and because it is often intermittent, IDPs remain at risk of being evacuated or forced to move into shelters they did not choose or prefer, or that are less sustainable. Most IDPs prefer to rent or own houses as it gives a feeling of greater stability; however, they are often unable to rent homes because they cannot afford it or lack the necessary documentation.

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENT INTENTIONS

A displaced woman and her daughter in their container in Dawdia Camp. Dawdia, Dahuk, January 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

An unfinished building hosting IDPs that lacks basic services. Zakho, Dahuk, June 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF DISPLACEMENT Integration, as a durable solution to protracted displace-

ment area and present two documents that verify IDP

ment, is the process through which IDPs obtain the

status. Usually these documents are proof of residency

same rights in their area of displacement as those of the

from the area of origin and/or the PDS cards, which also

autochthonous community. The intention to integrate

identify them as residents. Once the family has received

is the first step in this process. “Integration”, as refer-

the key card, they can withdraw a cash grant funded by

enced below, occurs when people decide to stay in their

the MoMD from local banks and qualify for other gov-

new areas and begin to take steps to do so. This decision

ernment assistance, such as non-food items and food

does not necessarily imply that IDPs are integrated, as

item distributions. This assistance is then encoded in a

the integration process is more complex and can be hin-

database to avoid overlap. Many UN agencies reportedly

dered by factors such as the absence of the necessary

also use these key cards to coordinate their assistance

documentation to enable IDPs to register as displaced

efforts, underscoring the need for all IDPs to have ade-

or rent houses, difficulties in finding sustainable and af-

quate documentation.

fordable shelter, social and cultural differences between IDPs and their HCs and the challenge of finding jobs. Documentation IDPs that have chosen to integrate have faced difficulties in transferring administrative documents, such as ID cards and Public Distribution Services (PDS) documents, from the governorate of origin to the new place of residence. Additionally, the system that grants IDPs access to governmental and UN benefits requires specific documentation to prove IDP status. Without these documents, IDPs are often unable to qualify for assistance, increasing their vulnerability. People will often need to go back to their insecure areas of origin to get these documents, risking their lives in the process. An IDP in Kerbala who intends to integrate explains: “Our major concern is that of transferring government documents and other legal documents, which is really hard to do unless we go back to our area of origin. Many of us have no intention to return, but still we need to in order to obtain documentation or paperwork.”

Many IDPs hope to eventually become residents of their governorate of displacement, which is reportedly an extremely difficult process. In the long term, as non-residents they may have difficulty in registering to vote in municipal elections, owning property, or legally renting houses. Lack of documentation hinders IDPs from seeking assistance regardless of their intention, and can be an even bigger obstacle for those who intend to remain in their new locations, as becoming residents involves a more complicated procedure. Housing procedures and living conditions Most IDPs intending to integrate suffer from poor living conditions in unsustainable shelter types, namely religious buildings. Resolving the lack of suitable housing is therefore a primary concern. Renting or owning a home is clearly the preferable option for IDPs who are able to afford it; however, the required procedures can be complicated, especially for those without the necessary documentation. Additionally, policies on whether IDPs are allowed to rent or purchase homes vary from one

Valid documentation is generally needed for IDPs to

governorate to the other and can sometimes become an

impediment. As an example, non-resident IDPs in Ker-

Currently, registration is processed via a key card sys-

bala need approval from three bodies -the local securi-

tem through MoMD also used to register IDPs from the

ty unit, the MoMD and local authorities-to rent houses.

2006-2008 sectarian conflict. This system requires

Additionally, they must present their National ID, PDS

IDPs to go to the nearest MoMD office in the displace-

and MoMD registration cards and get the approval of the

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF DISPLACEMENT

local mukhtars. In the past, these procedures were hard

minority groups such as Turkmen and Shabak, both of

for IDPs and many were not approved; however, the local

which have their own languages and are seeking to inte-

government of Kerbala has now reportedly reviewed this

grate in the central governorates with their Arabic speak-

policy and agreed to allow the IDPs who are registered

ing host communities, has created difficulties. Najaf had

with the MoMD to rent houses in any location. These

the largest IDP population reporting education as a prior-

policies are constantly changing and are often not trans-

ity need, most likely due to language barriers for its large

parent.

population of Shabak and Turkmen IDPs. The economic

Approval to live in the KRI can reportedly also be difficult for IDPs coming from outside the three Kurdish governorates. Assaij Kurdish Security must approve the documentation, review the case and make a decision, a process that some IDPs perceive as discriminatory.

skills and traditions of the rural IDPs who were farmers in their areas of origin, coupled with the urban nature of the displacement areas in the central governorates, are other integration hurdles. One Turkmen FGD participant living in Baghdad said that he intends to return because “we miss our relatives and friends. The difference in

Some security forces and local authorities are not sym-

traditions between rural and urban communities is very

pathetic to IDP integration. Reportedly, some local coun-

clear, and many of us can’t cope well in cities”.

cils in the central-southern governorates ask IDPs to sign an agreement stating that they will not return to their locations of origin until the ISF issue a security clearance for their areas; in a separate agreement, IDPs also state they will not integrate, regardless of their documentation status or whether they want to return or not, which relegates them to a state of powerless transience. These policies might be a response to fears of significant demographic changes occurring in the central-north governorates, particularly in Ninewa.

Many IDPs believe there is discrimination against IDPs based on class: those who have desired professions or enjoy a better financial situation are favoured over those who are less well situated. Reportedly, in Kerbala IDPs who were government employees in their areas of origin are able to transfer their jobs to their displacement location. Teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and other desired professionals are often granted permission to stay, but even then are reportedly instructed to settle in certain areas. Many of those who were impoverished

Sustainable, adequate housing solutions are likely to re-

prior to their displacement now find themselves in a

main an issue for integrating IDPs. If they are forced to

more vulnerable situation and face more difficulties in

live in inadequate accommodation, they will be at risk

joining their new communities than their middle and up-

of either continuing to move in search of housing and

per class counterparts, especially as they are often the

employment -increasing their instability and that of Iraq

groups who compete with the poorest of the HC for the

overall- or of remaining in vulnerable situations for a lon-

same unskilled jobs.

ger period of time, leading to more complex and difficult

Unemployment

integration, or to forgo this option.. Social and cultural barriers

Many IDPs in central Iraq and the KRI emphasize having an employment strongly influences their decisions, as

IDPs intending to integrate encounter varying degrees of

they are more likely to remain in the areas where they

cultural and social obstacles, including language, diffi-

can find viable jobs. Unsurprisingly, the primary need

culties to adapt to an urban economy and class-based

reported by 21 per cent46 of IDPs displaced during

discrimination. The language barrier between ethnic

2014 to 2015 is employment, as sustainable income

46. DTM Group Assessment, May 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF DISPLACEMENT

is the most effective way of resolving other issues such

ra reported similar sentiments, stating that “if we find

as food insecurity, lack of services and renting suitable

good and suitable job opportunities here, then we will

houses for their families. Finding jobs in the areas of

sell our properties in our areas of origin and come back

displacement is complicated for multiple reasons: IDPs

to integrate with the host community.” FGD respondents

have been more affected by the general economic crisis

frequently said that employment is the main factor that

in Iraq, they have to compete for jobs with the HC (es-

would encourage currently undecided IDPs to integrate.

pecially for unskilled work) and they face employment

A young Yazidi boy living in Dahuk clearly explained:

discrimination. These difficulties must be understood in

“the liberation [of Ninewa] may take a long time and

the context of a country that already suffered from high

emigration may be hard. All we want is jobs.”

unemployment rates before the current conflicts in Iraq and Syria. In 2013, national unemployment was estimated at 16 per cent.47 IDPs suffer from higher unemployment, even compared to the often-impoverished HCs. According to a 2014 survey of the households of IDPs displaced between the beginning of 2013 and mid-2014, over 41 per cent were either unemployed or underemployed.48 It is clear from FGDs with all intention types that IDPs struggle to find jobs and believe that employment would be the best way to improve their difficult situation, increase the likelihood of integration, and prevent irregular migration. At the same time, HCs generally perceive that an influx of IDPs means greater competition for jobs, especially for daily wage work, because IDPs might work for lower pay. Equally, there are reports of job discrimination against IDPs, as business owners might consider them as outsiders and burdens on the local economies. In some cases, due to certain cultural stereotypes, IDPs are reportedly prevented from obtaining jobs in certain employment sectors, such as restoration. In contrast, some IDPs intending to integrate in the southern and central governorates are hopeful because of job opportunities in their new provinces. An IDP from Ninewa now living in Missan said “we are optimistic about the coming years because the province of Missan offers a lot of job opportunities due to the stable security and political situation and the large number of projects and companies located here.” FGD respondents in Bas-

47. International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, retrieved from World Bank 48. Ongoing Displacement: A Profile of Iraq. IOM Iraq, September 2014.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO RETURN The majority of Iraqis intend to move back to their ar-

or settle elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Government is en-

eas of origin, and this movement has already begun be-

couraging IDPs to return, not only because of the per-

cause parts of central and central-north Iraq have been

ceived burden IDPs put on the services and economies

reclaimed by ISF and the Peshmerga forces. As of 10

of their governorates of displacement, but because there

September 2015, 374,244 IDPs had returned to their

is concern that they could generate imbalances in re-

homes or surrounding areas; the majority of them came

gional ethno-religious and demographic distribution if

back from locations within their governorate of origin.

they do not.

Salah al-Din governorate has received the highest number of returnees (53%) followed by Ninewa (17%), Di-

Social issues associated with return

yala (19%), Anbar (11%) and Kirkuk (1%).49 Return-

Closely related to accessibility issues, the social compo-

ees face serious obstacles to re-establishing their lives

sition of the communities of origin and ethno-religious

in their hometowns, including security, access to their

tensions strongly influence whether an IDP can success-

residences, looted houses, social tensions and the wide-

fully return. The ethno-religious identity of IDPs is an

spread destruction of infrastructure and properties.

important factor in the decision to return, as most IDPs

Accessibility of former area

are returning to areas where their own religious group constitutes a majority. In all governorates except Nine-

Some IDPs have difficulty in regaining their homes, usu-

wa, almost all returnees are Arab Muslim Sunnis. In con-

ally due to security policies and ethno-sectarian tensions

trast, the majority of the 63,138 returnees to Ninewa

with other returnees or with those who did not displace.

are Kurdish Muslim Sunnis who came back to Telefar

Security procedures affecting returnees and access to

and Tilkaif districts. About 25 per cent of these were

former residences vary by governorate. In many cases,

Arab Muslim Sunnis who returned to Rubeya sub-dis-

local authorities screen IDPs attempting to return to

trict on the far western border of the governorate and to

their areas of origin to ensure that they have no connec-

Tel Afar sub-district after the liberation of the villages

tions to AGs. The screening usually involves obtaining

surrounding Tel Afar in April 2015. This was the only

the approval of the areaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s religious or political leaders,

tracked return movement of Arabs to Ninewa, and UNDP

as is the case in Ninewa. In other areas such as Tikrit

confirms that most Arabs from mixed villages have yet

(liberated in March), only those who can provide proof

to return due to protection, security and property dam-

of residency in the governorate are allowed to return;

age issues.51 According to a UN source based in Dahuk,

even then, approval is not guaranteed. According to KIs

fewer returns are anticipated to areas where there were

working in the liberated areas of Ninewa, Zumar, Rubeya

multiple ethno-sectarian groups.

and Wanna sub-districts, some IDPs are not allowed to return because of their ethno-sectarian belonging.50 In some villages of the Ninewa plains and certain areas of Kirkuk that were formerly inhabited by a mixture of ethnic groups, the first returning group prevents the return of other groups, often forcing them to remain displaced

Similar issues have been reported in liberated areas in Kirkuk that are now controlled by Kurdish forces. This ethnically diverse governorate suffered from widespread ethno-sectarian conflict in the past, so it is not surprising that returning groups prevent others from coming back. There are reports of various AGs and militias raiding

49. Displacement Tracking Matrix Returnee Master List, 10 September 2015. 50. According to ICRC source located in Dahuk city. 51. UNDP Recovery and Stabilization Needs Assessment for Newly Liberated Areas in Ninewah Governorate, May 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO RETURN

villages formerly controlled by ISIL in Salah al-Din and

difficult topic to address, it cannot be overlooked or un-

Kirkuk and destroying properties that belong to certain

derstated when planning any assistance, as it affects

ethno-religious groups or to perceived ISIL supporters.

perceptions of humanitarian assistance efforts. It also

Human Rights Watch reports that in total, destruction

has important and profound effects on any community

of buildings in at least 47 predominantly Sunni villages

stabilization programming. Further research is required

was methodical, driven by revenge and intended to alter

to ensure that IOM and the international community ap-

the demographic composition of Iraq’s traditionally di-

proach this issue in the most appropriate, sensitive and

verse provinces of Salah al-Din and Kirkuk.52

effective way possible, especially in light of the shifting

Reportedly, village residents who did not flee are under suspicion; often these are Arab Sunnis who remained in their villages near the front lines of battle and who now face difficulties in accessing services such as schools, hospitals and public utilities. There have even been reports of certain villages and properties being deliberately targeted and destroyed after liberation. FGD respondents from Ninewa confirmed this underlying tension, expressing the belief that “our ethnically mixed society is over”. Distrust in the members of the autochthonous community is a clear and widespread concern, especially among minority groups. FGD respondents belonging to minority groups were extremely concerned about returning to their homes in Ninewa, even if these were liberated, because they would be unable to trust their former neighbours. A Christian woman living in Dahuk explained she would feel uneasy returning to a place where Arabs are present, with many other participants echoing this sentiment. Other FGD respondents who have not yet returned expressed fear of retaliatory attacks should they return: “We cannot return to our areas of origin because we fear that conflict will continue and that our homes will be

displacement and return dynamics. Land and Property Issues ISIL’s systematic and widespread practice of demolishing, confiscating, expropriating and looting the homes of those who fled, as well as the general effects of war, have destroyed infrastructure and left former properties in poor condition and in some cases, forces them to settle in the homes. This situation makes it difficult for IDPs to access services and regain looted personal possessions. The majority of returnees have been able to return to their former homes although many are significantly damaged. About 14 per cent of returnees were unable to return to their homes for various reasons, mostly destruction and damage sustained during the AGs’ occupation. No returnees in Kirkuk have been able to regain their former homes and now occupy informal settlements. These settlements include tents provided by IOM and other organizations, set up in the vicinity of their former homes. These returnees reportedly intend to remain in this temporary accommodation until their homes are rebuilt or demined.

destroyed and our sons killed. [This conflict] has cre-

IDPs from Salah al-Din have also been unable to return

ated hatred between us and the other religious groups

to their former homes: 400 families are living in informal

and we cannot go back to live in such environment. We

settlements and an additional 445 are living in rented

are afraid our children will face revenge and assassi-

houses. In Diyala, more than 5,300 returnee families,

nations,” said one IDP from Ninewa living in a school

many of which had been displaced to camps and other

building in Missan.

areas of Khanaqin district under Peshmerga control, are

The current crisis has profoundly exacerbated pre-existing tensions in Iraq and is effectively redrawing its ethno-sectarian configuration. While this is a sensitive,

either living nearby with their relatives or in unfinished or abandoned buildings; the same applies to 400 families in Ninewa. Reportedly, just as in Kirkuk, these returnees are unable to access their former houses, which are often

52. “After liberation came destruction: Iraqi Militias and the aftermath of Amerli”, Human Rights Watch, March 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

22 Sep ‘15 374,244 individuals returned

2015

• Zummar district of Ninewa is liberated. Security forces begin clearing the area for families to return.

330,168 individuals returned

331,746 individuals returned

04 Sep ‘15

28 Aug ‘15

1 Jan ‘15

1 Dec ‘14

25 Oct ‘14

• 12 October 2014 and later: Violence in Heet district of Anbar forces families who had displaced to this district to leave Heet and return back to their hometown • Rubeya sub-district in Ninewa is liberated. Security forces begin clearing the area for families to return.

1 Nov ‘14

01 Oct ‘14

1 Oct ‘14

2014

Timeline of liberation and return 2014-2015

295,866 individuals returned

268,008 individuals returned

11 Aug ‘15

1Aug ‘15

1Sep ‘15

13 Jul ‘15

01 Aug ‘15 • Al Sa'diya and Kifri sub-districts of Khanaqin district are declared secure by ISF. Families begin returning. • Residents of two villages south of Baiji city began to return in limited numbers. Reportedly, they remain in a critical situation because there are still heavy clashes between ISF and ISIS in Baiji city center and in Al Siniyah sub district of Baiji district, while the areas north of Baiji city remain controlled by ISIL.

10 Jul ‘15 • 10 July 2015 and later: Military clashes and heavy bombardment of the city of Saqlawiyah (10 Km to the north of Falluja district) begin, causing another significant wave of displacement in Anbar. • Simultaneity and as a direct result of the above events, there had been an unwilling movement of return. A lot of families, who were previously displaced in Al-Saqlawiyah, returned back to their origin houses in Fallujah. These families have no alternative but to return to their residences. There were a lot of people preferred to return to home rather than sleeping on the streets.

**Numbers in the graph reflect when these populations were assessed, not necessarily when they actually returned, as in some areas return began before the tracking system was implemented and some areas became more accessible over time, allowing staff to properly identify return. Post-April, there is strong chronological correlation, but returnee populations corresponding to each date is not necessarily reflective of actual return.

Anbar

25 Dec ‘14

01 Mar ‘15

01 Feb ‘15 • Residents begin returning to Rubeya district, Ninewa.

• Return begins to Kirkuk district. • Return begins to Sinuni district, Ninewa. • Al-Mansouriya subdistrict of Diyala is secured Return movement to Diyala begins, with returnees coming voluntary, village by village, due to coordination with their community leaders and with the army forces to ensure these areas are free of AG and expolisives.

22 Jun ‘15

• On April 1, ISF gains full control of the Tikrit city in Salah al-Din, which had been captured by ISIL the previous June. Mass return movement begins. As of September, Tikrit was the district with the most returnees Iraq-wide. • Return begins to Wana subdistrict, Ninewa.

1 Mar ‘15

1 Feb ‘15 222,504 individuals returned

Salah al-Din

1Apr ‘15

• Samarra and Al Dhuluiyah of Balad, Salah al-Din are liberated. The majority of residents began returning at this time. • Tilkaif district in Ninewa, specifically the town of Zummar, along with other villages in the Ninewa plains north of Mosul are mostly liberated by Pesh merga forces. Return movement begins.

Ninewa

01 Apr ‘15

• The vast majority of residents had returned to Zummar. • Wana Sub district of Ninewa is liberated. Security forces begin clearing the area for families to return.

01 Jan ‘15

02 Jul ‘15

Kirkuk

25 Jan ‘15

• Sinuni sub-district of Ninewa liberated. Security forces begin clearing the area for families to return.

246,774 individuals returned

Diyala

180,384 individuals returned

145,764 individuals returned

04 Jun ‘15

116,850 individuals returned

07 May ‘15

21 Apr ‘15 • Heavy clashes between ISF and ISIL begin, displacing thousands of civilians to Baghdad.Reportedly, these people returned a few weeks later, with many families claiming that they returned due to threats they faced during their time in Baghdad.

IOM returnee tracking begins

1May ‘15

01 Jun ‘15 • Jalawla sub-district of Khanaqin district in Diyala is declared secure by ISF. Families begin returning.

25 Apr ‘15

01 Jul ‘15 • The majority of returnees had returned to Sinuni and Wana subdistricts, Ninewa.

1Jun ‘15

1Jul ‘15

25 Apr ‘15

BARRIERS TO RETURN

booby-trapped, demolished or severely damaged. The extent of damage to homes and structures varies among areas. While much of this destruction can be attributed to general damage sustained in battles, ISIL reportedly targeted homes and structures known to belong to Kurds, Turkmen and other minorities, and to individuals connected to the Iraqi and Kurdish Governments or police. Some of these persons might therefore be at a higher risk of returning to booby-trapped or completely destroyed houses. KIs in liberated areas of Diyala estimated that about 80 per cent of the houses have been damaged by shelling and needed lesser repairs, such as new windows and doors and that the rest have either

The UNDP assessment completed in May reports serious and debilitating damages to the infrastructure of the liberated Zumar, Wanna, Rubeya and Sununi sub-districts of Ninewa: 24 of the 26 healthcare centres damaged and vital equipment looted; 112 schools damaged and reportedly only 40 per cent of children attending school; extensive damage to 50 kilometres of the electricity grid; 4,166 houses destroyed; 30 local authority buildings damaged, 22 of which completely destroyed; and reportedly, widespread planting of improvised explosive devices on agricultural land. The rural Sununi sub-district, a primarily Yazidi area, was reportedly the most affected, where 13 per cent of all buildings had been destroyed.53

been partially or completely destroyed. According to the

Since infrastructure damage has been so widespread,

UNDP report on the liberated areas of northern Ninewa,

many governorates face challenges in restoring ser-

69 per cent of assessed damaged houses had been com-

vices. Hospitals, healthcare centres and schools have

pletely destroyed.

been destroyed or damaged and reportedly much of the

Damaged infrastructure is another factor that prevents returnees from regaining their former standard of living.

equipment inside has been looted; also, many former staff have been displaced. Returnees indicated that the electricity and water networks have suffered significant

IOM assessed the significant damages incurred to the households of returnees in Jalawla, Diyala. April, 2015.

53. UNDP Recovery and Stabilization Needs Assessment for Newly Liberated Areas in Ninewah Governorate, May 2015.

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

BARRIERS TO RETURN

damage and need to be rebuilt. Many IDPs intending to

displacement was the primary factor that forced them

return stated they were waiting for reconstruction before

to return. It can be inferred that whether or not IDPs

starting the return process; reportedly, women are more

have been able to secure sustainable shelter situations

likely to prefer this option.

in their displacement areas and their financial situation

ISIL had a centralized and effective system of seizing IDP property for their supporters, and of looting personal belongings from IDP homes. Reportedly it is common for

are both good indicators of which IDPs will return first and which are at risk of premature return or further displacement.

these homes to have been reallocated to ISIL supporters, or used as administrative military buildings, weapons caches, medical centres or even body repositories (the latter was the case of an FGD participant from Salah al-Din). One Christian IDP woman living in a camp in Dahuk informed IOM staff that her former house was now occupied by her neighbours, while others said that according to neighbours who had remained, “a car came to [their] house and the armed men took everything inside”. Returned IDPs in Anbar confirmed that they came back “to protect their homes” from such looting. IDPs from Salah al-Din also reported that IDPs from other areas of Salah al-Din had occupied their homes for some time. IDP properties have clearly been severely damaged and as return movement continues, these problems will likely become more widespread.. Involuntary return Involuntary return is defined as IDPs returning to their locations of origin, often to suboptimal conditions, because of their poor living conditions in their displacement areas. As an example, many KIs observed that the first to return, even when security conditions were compromised, were those living in the worst shelter conditions and the poorest. There is a strong likelihood of premature involuntary returns to areas of origin. A key informant from Muqdadiyah, Diyala, an area with significant returns, confirmed that many IDPs wanted to return to “get rid of the burden of rent”, while another in Salah al-Din said that “physical conditions” in their areas of

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

CONCLUSIONS The review of the historical and current displacement

expelled from the host familyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s home when the financial

trends and dynamics in Iraq reveal that insecurity, the

burden becomes too heavy, or when communal tensions

anticipated duration of displacement, the time spent in

between IDPs and HCs become too great.

displacement and the ability to regain former properties strongly influence the future intentions of IDPs. When displacement is prolonged IDPs move in search of jobs and solutions to shelter, land and property issues. This search can lead to greater social instability, potentially prompt them to displace multiple times within Iraq or to leave the country. Displaced groups, especially those from ethno-religious minorities and those living in unsustainable housing conditions, are at a higher risk of such movement, as many believe there is no possibility of returning to their locations of origin unless ISIL is eradicated from Iraq. Even if this were the case, mistrust in the community members of the areas of origin lead to a persisting fear of unstable and tense social conditions.

Improving the shelter conditions of the most vulnerable is another key condition to decrease the risk of multiple or irregular displacements. However, such initiatives are complex, because IDPs will often opt to remain in poor shelter conditions if they think they can access jobs in the area surrounding the shelters. Many families claim that if they had sustainable shelter -that is, rent or own their home without having to share with other families-, they would consider integration, especially in the KRI, Kerbala, Najaf and the southern governorates. However, they often cannot afford this option and/or lack the necessary documentation to do so. If they are forced to live in inadequate accommodation for a long time, they risk moving again in search of housing and employment

The volatile security situation, difficult access conditions

-increasing their instability and that of Iraq overall- or

and challenging or confusing security screening process-

considering irregular migration.

es hinder the IDPs who intend to return or move to a different location. Security, access and protection issues are among the most important factors determining the ability of IDPs to implement their movement intentions; however, these are almost always beyond their control. As well, whether or not IDPs receive shelter and material or financial assistance influences their perception on whether staying in their areas of displacement is viable, at least in the short term.

According to IDPs and the GoI, return is the most desired movement. However, those who have returned have faced many problems because of insecurity, inaccessibility of the areas of origin, damaged infrastructure and properties, and ethno-sectarian problems; these issues, which affect the standard of living will become more pressing as more IDPs return. For return to become a durable solution, it is important to ensure that IDPs are able to access their former properties, have access to

While many IDPs are receiving this type of assistance

basic services, can generate income, and feel safe. In

from humanitarian organizations or the GoI, the most

order to prevent increased vulnerability, multiple dis-

common form of assistance is provided by host families

placements and/or irregular migration, IOM and other

and communities. The high number of IDPs accommo-

humanitarian and governmental actors must be prepared

dated by host families indicates that HCs need to be tar-

to support IDPs to follow through their intentions as ear-

geted for assistance as well, since hosting is a financial

ly as possible.

burden. Without support for the HCs, IDPs risk being

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015

Concluaion

An elderly man sits in front of a caravan in Dawdiya camp, Dahuk. January 2015

INTENTIONS OF IDPs DISPLACED 2014-2015