Academic Preparation Kit | 33rd National Selection Conference of EYP Greece

EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT GREECE

Preparation Kit 33rd National Selection Conference – Athens 2016 Changing Europe: from people to politics

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Athens 2016 "Changing Europe: from people to politics" 33rd National Selection Conference European Youth Parliament Greece 2

CONTENTS Note from the session president ......................................................................................................................... 4 How to use this guide ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Committee on Foreign Affairs - AFET ................................................................................................................. 8 Committee on Climate Change - CLIM ............................................................................................................ 14 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs - ECON ............................................................................... 21 Committee on Employment and Social Affairs - EMPL ................................................................................ 26 Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection - IMCO ............................................................. 33 Committee on Industry, Research and Energy - ITRE ................................................................................... 39 Committee on Legal Affairs - JURI .................................................................................................................... 47 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs I – LIBE I .............................................................. 55 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs II - LIBE II............................................................. 61 Committee on Security and Defence - SEDE .................................................................................................. 67

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NOTE FROM THE SESSION PRESIDENT

Dear delegates, As the 33rd National Selection Conference of EYP Greece is fast approaching, this is a hand-crafted prototype of the session’s discussion themes for guiding your topic preparation. This Kit has been put together by the session’s chairs’ team and is a first taste of the different takes one can have on these themes. It consists of topic overviews written by your chairpersons, as well as curated lists of links for your topic. Use it, print it, copy and paste it, google it and pack it in your bag to the session.

The topic overviews are primarily meant as background material for your topics; they aim to identify the key issues at stake while synthesising the topic area. More specifically, each overview in this kit is comprised of the following sub-sections: ‘why does it matter?’, ‘who’s in play?’, ‘what has been done so far’ & ‘key conflicts and questions’. Additionally, we provide you with a list of keywords and definitions we highly urge you to research online.

The objective was to keep these overviews as balanced as possible, in line with the politically neutral topic questions. Yet they may not be completely impartial. It should be noted that the European Youth Parliament strongly encourages independent thinking, so feel free to disagree.

Form you own opinion and bring it with you in Athens, along with your desire to express and discuss it.

In that spirit, we can already tell you that we have very high expectations for the session and, naturally, for you. We expect heated debates, creative ideas, well-founded arguments and political dialogue. Those high expectations also have to do with the choice of committee topics you will find covered in the Kit. Indeed, it is fair to say that we are putting to you some of the most pressing questions Europe is trying to answer at the moment. Also some of the most technical and intricate.

Why should Europe help the refugees arriving in the Mediterranean? What way forward in the EUTurkey relations? What to do about the rise of ISIS? How does the notion of security emerge in transatlantic data transfers and how at home? How to ensure transparency in decision making processes of the European Union involving the corporate world and how in the Eurozone? How has the crisis affected the social policies of EU countries? What are these European values everyone is talking about? Does the EU have a moral authority in the fight against climate change?

What is the future of energy in the European project?

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Our question now is: Will you come prepared?

Put your topic and all topics into a curved, surprising perspective. Inject with personal experience, yet without any worship, as you will meet bright people and you will learn with and from them.

We know there is little time left, so this is our best effort to tell the relevant from the irrelevant.

TL;DR: Study your committee’s topic overview, read all the rest carefully, take notes and explore as many positions as possible. See you in a few weeks!

For the team of Chairpersons, Sofia Zafeiriou

President of the 33rd National Selection Conference of EYP Greece

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HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE What is a Topic Overview?

It is a short, objective introduction to the topic and its contextual and/or logical, philosophical, political, etc. background. It aims at to provide orientation for further research and is written by the Chairpersons for the Delegates.

How is it structured?

Why does it matter?

This is the introductory part that explains why the issue at stake is relevant and attempts to describe the ‘bigger picture’. As all committee topics are interconnected and interrelated, we highly encourage you to at least take a look at this section of all topic overviews.

Who’s in play?

This section briefly mentions and describes the actors involved and their positions. It also illustrates what the EU can and cannot do in the relevant fields. It should serve as a point of reference during Committee Work, as well as help you research further why each actor is in play.

Key conflicts and questions This is the main part of the overview. It breaks the topic down to questions and sub-problems which should be answered and approached during Committee Work in order to tackle the topic as a whole. Be careful though, the overview itself does not provide any answers to these problems; you need to think yourself and form your own opinion before you join us in Athens.

What has been done so far?

Some necessary background for your topic, to use as reference. You need to think; what did work and what didn’t?

Keywords Get your search engines to run!

Useful links for further research They mainly include official sources, news and analysis and some video suggestions. Use the first ones as reference for your research, dive into as many articles as possible and sit back and watch the videos.

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Do’s and don’ts Research – this guide is not the holy grail of knowledge. Search for as many opinions as possible and read relevant articles.

Get all sides of the story – check newspapers and accredited blogs for more points of view. Find the most used relevant hashtag and follow it until the session.

Don’t trust any uncertain or vague information – triple-check your sources, ensure things add up and make sense. This is particularly important for Wikipedia links or quotes – you can certainly use Wikipedia (and the like) in your research, but the information you find there must be very thoroughly verified.

Don’t panic – This Kit is here to provide you with all the necessary and sufficient knowledge in order to be able to discuss any committee topic. Take a deep breath, and read through it.

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS - AFET After a decade of accession negotiations, what should the political framework of EU-Turkey relations look like?

Turkey is a key partner, neighbour, and has been a candidate for EU membership for over 15 years. While the European enlargement project is stagnating, Europe is seeking further cooperation with Turkey in light of the refugee crisis, with an EU-Turkey action plan agreed in 2015 and the involvement of NATO in the Aegean Sea. At the same time, concerns have been raised over human rights and press freedom violations, combined with violence in the country’s eastern and south eastern regions. How can the EU remain committed to intensifying the political dialogue with Turkey, whilst keeping in mind the latter’s ongoing conflicts such as its involvement in Syria?

By Dimitra Karakioulaki (GR) & Christian Paratore (IT)

Why does it matter?

“I see Turkey’s future as being in Europe, as one of many prosperous, tolerant, democratic countries” —Orhan Pamuk, 2006 Nobel Literature Prize winner

Turkey is considered a key partner to the EU because of its strategic position as a bridge between Europe and Middle East. Additionally, given the country’s huge economic potential it has been a close trade ally and in a customs union with the EU since 1995. In fact, Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999 and the accession negotiations started in 2005.

Today, both the EU and Turkey are dealing with foreign policy issues of mutual interest. Following the increasing flow of asylum seekers fleeing Syria, Turkey and the EU have started negotiations aimed at better managing this unprecedented refugee crisis. During these negotiations, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, emphasised the fundamental role his country plays in EU policies. Consequently, he demanded a significant acceleration of Turkey’s application to join the EU in exchange for its collaboration. Davutoğlu’s position is further strengthened by the fact that most Syrians on the way to Europe have been passing through Turkey1.

Even though the EU has intensified the political dialogue with Turkey, the latter has been strongly criticised because of several violations over human rights and press freedom. The government has for example been criticised over taking control of Zaman, 2 the country’s biggest daily

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/european-leaders-gather-to-broker-migrant-deal/2016/03/07/1a676042-e24e-11e5-8c008aa03741dced_story.html 2 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/06/seized-turkish-opposition-newspaper-zaman-erdogan-government 1

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newspaper, and has been accused of using excessive force against the Kurds 3 . These kinds of actions, which violate Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, one of the basic EU eligibility criteria, make it harder for the EU and Turkey to make significant headway with the accession negotiations.

Furthermore, despite the great economic opportunity for the EU to extend its internal market with almost 80m potential customers, many political leaders expressed their concerns about the religious aspect of Turkey’s potential membership. Turkey has an Islamic cultural background. An estimated 96.5% of the local population is Muslim4. Additionally, the potential political influence of Turkey on EU policies is enormous, given that Turkey would have at least as many seats in the European Parliament as Germany, the largest Member State of the EU. Consequently, it would be the most represented country in this essential EU institution if it joined the Union 5.

Finally, the ongoing impasse between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, a Member State of the EU, caused by Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus Island since 1974, 6 complicates the general context.

All of these issues put both the present and future of Europe at risk, hence outlining a precise political framework for EU-Turkey relations is of vital importance.

Who’s in play? 

The European Council, gathering heads of state or government of the 28 Member States of the EU, sets the EU's common foreign and security policy taking into account strategic interests and defence implications.

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The Council (of the European Union) is composed of government ministers from each Member State, who meet to discuss, amend, and adopt laws, and coordinate policies in their respective fields. Furthermore, any accession proposal is directed to it. The Council has to act unanimously after receiving an absolute majority support from the European Parliament and receiving a positive consultation from the European Commission7.

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The European Parliament (EP) is the EU’s body directly elected by voters every five years. It gives the consent to the EU council to decide on the accession of a third country to the Union. This consent has to be given in the form of an absolute majority.

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The European Commission is the EU’s executive body responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions and upholding the EU treaties. It is also responsible for assessing the degree of preparedness of candidate countries to annexation by evaluating their compliance with the Copenhagen criteria as well as monitoring their medium-term economic intended to prepare

http://www.dw.com/en/turkish-forces-using-excessive-force-against-kurds-amnesty-international/a-18995026 https://joshuaproject.net/countries/TU 5 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-turkey-arguments-idUSL0669052820061207 6 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353%281974%29 7 For any legal questions regarding accession: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm 3 4

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the candidate countries for an eventual adhesion to the Economic and Monetary Union.

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It is of importance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs to consider Turkey, not solely as the object of the EU’s foreign policies, but rather as a state with its own objectives, including its views regarding human rights, the Kurdish issue, and the Cyprus dispute.

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The largest party in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is definitely an influential player since it has the majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with 317 members. In fact, it is the party supporting the current Turkish government and is headed by Prime Minister Davutoğlu.

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The United Nations, an intergovernmental organisation to promote international cooperation, is the only political institution which has constantly worked towards the resolution of the Cyprus dispute and has a presence on the island with a peacekeeping mission.

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Cyprus is a crucial EU Member State in any EU-Turkey foreign policy framework, as it fundamentally opposes Turkey due to the aforementioned Cyprus dispute. Additionally, it holds a crucial vote in Turkey’s accession process to the EU, keeping in mind that the latter requires the unanimity of the Council.

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The EU’s Member States have different opinions on what the political framework of EU-Turkey relations should be; France and Cyprus for example have vetoed opening numerous acquis chapters that form the basis of accession negotiations. Nevertheless, given the current refugee crisis the European Council and the Council are forced to find a common position in order to strengthen the EU’s political weight and clearly outline the future association with Turkey.

What has been done so far?

An evaluation of EU-Turkey relations starts at the Ankara Agreement in 1964, which aimed at the integration of Turkey and, back then, the European Economic Community 8. On this legal basis, a year later the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee was established, aiming at the collaboration between the EP and the Turkish Grand National Assembly 9 . In 1995 the trade interactions of the two parties were formalised, with the establishment of a Customs Union which deals with all industrial products- and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership -which settles free trade agreements with Mediterranean partners 10 . As far as the adoption of the EU membership by Turkey is concerned, the Council first adopted the Accession Partnership for Turkey in 2001, which was further revised in 2003 and 2008. Turkey’s compliance with the 33 Chapters that would make the country eligible for membership are portrayed at the Annual Progress Report, composed by the European Commission. Provisionally 14 Chapters are open, while Chapters 23 and 24 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights & Justice, Freedom and Security) remain closed and undefined. Some examples of action established on a European level to reinvigorate the accession process are the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, the The Ankara Agreement: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/history2004_turkey_en.pdf 10 EU Trade, Turkey: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/ 8 9

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Positive Agenda,11 the Action Plan on Prevention of Violations of the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as the adoption of the Democratisation Package. Furthermore, the EUTurkey readmission agreement, concerted with the visa liberalisation dialogue, 12 offered a new momentum to the EU-Turkey relations. The Delegation of the EU in Turkey cooperates closely with the government.

Another critical arrangement, coordinating the refugee crisis and the aftermaths of the Syrian war is the Joint Action Plan13, which was activated during the first EU-Turkey Summit on March 7th 2016. Yet, its implementation did not lead to a substantial decrease of the illegal entries from Turkey, which further stressed the need for a meeting of EU leaders with Turkey, which took place on March 18th14. Two of the commitments made during these meetings meeting were to return all migrants who arrived in Greece without international protection and the formation of NATO activity in the Aegean, with the aim to curtail refugee passages.

Lastly, since 1949 Turkey has been a Member of the Council of Europe, and thus has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights.

Key conflicts and questions In order to rethink the political framework of EU-Turkey relations, one should first deal with the core problem that lies within the question: how can a stable and prosperous political framework be formed, when the applications of Turkey are not compatible with the EU Law? The protection of human rights is considered to be one of the keystones of the EU Law, founded at the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which Turkey signed in 1959. Since then, though, 17% of cases discussed before the European Court of Human Rights involve Turkey, while 88% of the above judgements find at least one violation. Examining the practices of Turkey, one witnesses violations of the freedom of expression, violence by the state’s executive bodies, unfair judgment, 15 as well as allegations of corruption 16 and inefficient implementation of the rule of law17. How should the EU react towards Turkey’s violations of the ECHR? In addition, considering the country’s volatile geographic location, the recent attacks in Istanbul and Ankara and the ongoing terror due to tensions between the government and the Kurdish separatists, how can the Union best engage with Turkey? Hosting 2,503,549 refugees from Syria, the situation in Turkey is worsening. When a common European approach to the refugee crisis has yet to be agreed, can Europe deem Turkey as a necessary partner to this extend?

Positive EU-Turkey agenda launched in Ankara, 2012: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-359_en.htm Readmission agreement, statement of Commissioner: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-285_en.htm 13 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan Fact Sheet: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_el.htm 14 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/03/17-18/ 15 Human Rights Watch, Report 2015, Events 2014: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/turkey 16 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation 17 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html?_r=0 11 12

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In addition, Turkey’s foreign policy contradicts the EU’s position in certain cases. Central to the issue are the country’s dispute with the Republic of Cyprus, to the case of which Turkey refuses to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. This is also the reason why the Council decided that eight chapters of the acquis will not be opened18. How can a political framework, welcomed by all Member States of the EU?

Keywords Joint Action Plan, Accession Partnership for Turkey, Positive Agenda, EU-Turkey Summit, Northern Cyprus issue, EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Turkey Member of Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey progress report by the European Commission

Useful links for further research Official sources 

EU Enlargement Policy, chapters of the acquis:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-theacquis/index_en.htm

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Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Turkey-EU relations:

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa

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Treaty on European Union | Joining the EU

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al14536

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EU Enlargement Policy, Turkey:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/turkey/index_en.htm

News and analysis 

Debating Europe | Arguments for and against Turkey’s EU membership:

http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-turkeys-eumembership/#.VuQQ7X3hC1s

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The Guardian | EU-Turkey refugee deal – Q&A

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/eu-turkey-refugee-deal-qa

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Bridging Europe | EU Public Opinion and Turkey’s EU Membership

http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=true&treatyId=1561

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http://www.bridgingeurope.net/uploads/8/1/7/1/8171506/working_paper_on_eu_public_op inion_on_turkey_dagdeverenis_august.pdf

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Amnesty International | Annual report 2015-16, Turkey

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/

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COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE - CLIM In the aftermath of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21), what role should the EU play in the fight against climate change?

April 22nd will mark the ceremony of signing of the Paris Agreement against climate change. Is the EU in need of new and revised climate targets? How can its 2030 climate and energy framework and Emissions Trading Scheme be aligned with the Paris agreement? What is the road between the former and the 2050 energy roadmap? Taking a step back and evaluating the COP21 results, can Europe fight climate change with its current set of policies, both environmental and economic?

By Anastasia Antalaki (GR) & Arda Erdeniz (TR)

Why does it matter?

“No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change” —President Obama

There has been a balance in the atmosphere since the beginning of life on Earth; the balance between naturally produced CO2 and naturally removed CO2. This balance is so delicate, that even the smallest changes caused by human activity can have a great impact on it.

Naturally occurring CO2 and greenhouse gases 19 (GHG) trap heat in the atmosphere and keep Earth’s climate stable. However, human activities over the last century produced more CO 2 and greenhouse gas emissions than ever, causing the climate to destabilise. As the temperature of Earth rises, a wave of natural disasters, droughts and famine is expected to happen all around the world.

Greenhouse Gases are gases, such as CO2, that trap solar radiation into the atmosphere. When their amount exceeds a certain ratio, they induce global heating.

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Although key efforts have been made to reduce emissions, the lack of any serious legal or financial sanctions towards a greener economy is an obstacle in the way of reducing global warming to an acceptable level.

Figure 1. The Hanno graph used by the United Nations Climate Change Science Compendium 2009

The first large scale negotiation on climate change took place in 1992 in the first United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). After that, the United Nations (UN) continued to organise annual international conferences on climate change, called Conferences of the Parties (COP). Last December, the 21st COP was held in Paris, holding great importance and potential, since it got two of the biggest economies and carbon emitters, US and China, to talk about climate change.

Who’s in play?

The United Nations is the first organisation that brought up the topic of climate change and the primary platform where any relevant debate occurs on a global scale. It takes the lead in the fight against climate change by organising numerous conferences and putting significant efforts in raising public awareness. Apart from these direct approaches, the United Nations also has a key role in integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning.

Complementary to the UN’s efforts, the European Commission, mainly through its Directorate General for Climate Action (DG-CLIMA), has a strong influence, both within the EU’s Member States and the international arena, towards fighting climate change. The work of DG-CLIMA varies from formulating and implementing climate policies and strategies to monitoring national emission targets of the EU’s Member States.

The United States, China and India also play a key role, since they are top emitters 20 with strong economies that potentially have the strongest impact in the fight against climate change 21.

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http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/?q=en/emissions http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/30/world-climate-india-china-us-renewable-paris-climate-summit

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Since some of the countries that produce the highest levels of CO2 and GHG emissions are also countries with developing economies, in order to truly reduce their emissions without putting at risk their national economies, they are in need of financial aid. Thus, multinational banks such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank, as well as private sector funders, play a critical role in helping developing countries reduce their CO2 and GHG emissions.

Key conflicts and questions “Kyoto was a first attempt, a testing ground for all these various ideas including these mechanisms like emissions ratings and developing systems of accounting” —Jutta Brunnée, Environmental Law Professor at the University of Toronto

The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement with binding emission reduction targets. Its ultimate target was a 5% reduction of the GHG emissions of 1990 by 2020, burdening mostly heavily developed nations. These countries were principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, mostly due to their intense industrial activity. China and India, corresponding to 34% of the total global emissions, 22 never signed the treaty, whereas the US (16%) signed but never ratified the deal. Moreover, the 21 countries that met their emission goals were not among the high emitters. However ambitious this Protocol may have seemed at the beginning, global emissions are still scaling up. The question is, what went wrong?

While the Kyoto Protocol is in a second commitment period (2013-2020), the key conflict in the way of achieving a binding agreement is still there: economy or environment?

At the moment, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest a loss in competitiveness from climate change measures adopted in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 23 (OECD). However, in a number of developing countries economic arguments outweigh climate considerations. Many of the incentives aiming to reduce GHG emissions in energy-intensive industries have been nullified through special tax concessions, rebates and exemptions. Is there a way for developing countries to take a more active role in the fight against climate change, without compromising their economic development?

The purpose behind the Kyoto Protocol also makes way for developing countries to produce, trade and invest in cleaner technologies without compromising their economic growth. This situation goes in parallel with the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) negotiations on environmental goods and services since it has the potential to act as a stimulus for aligning trade with clean energy policies. This could help developing countries reduce their GHG emissions and adapt to climate change. Is it possible to induce a radical change in developing countries’ industrial structures? Can the EU work towards this through its development and international trade policies?

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https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/climatechangeandcompetitiveness.htm

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Another conflict concerns the way the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) functions. The EU ETS is the world’s largest scheme on trading GHG emissions allowances. Its main principle is called ‘cap and trade’. According to this principle, within the limits of the ‘cap’, companies are allowed to receive or buy emission permits and trade them, as needed. However, during its first phase, companies received 7% more allowances than they needed, resulting in significant windfall profits. For the second phase of the System, the EU set a 6% lower cap; however, as emissions were reduced, companies were left with a surplus of allowances and consequently with less incentives to invest in cleaner technologies. Moreover, the framework allows companies to invest their allowances via offsets in projects in developing countries that aim at minimising GHG emissions. Whereas the main goal of this incentive was to spread green technologies, many industries took advantage of it, investing in non-verified projects. Would it be possible for the EU’s most powerful weapon against climate change to backfire? And in case this was to occur, in what way could the EU prevent this from happening?

On a different note, the Paris Agreement, finalised at COP21, is a legal framework committing each of its signatory Parties to reach certain climate goals by 2050, including both binding and voluntary measures. The Member States of the EU will be signing the Paris Agreement as one united Party, which also needs to be ratified by the European Parliament, before the formal signing ceremony on April 22nd. However, several MEPs have raised concerns that, before signing the Paris Agreement, the Member States should first agree on how the effort will be shared24. How should the EU discuss effort sharing? Taking it a step further, could the Paris Agreement be enforced without the EU? One of the main objectives of the EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework, is a binding EU target of at least a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, compared to 1990. Germany and Austria have called for higher EU climate ambition 25, following the European Commission’s assessment that there is no need for review of the 2030 targets in line with the Paris Agreement. However, this subject is highly sensitive in countries like Poland, which relies by 60% on coal usage26. In what way could the EU share the effort and meet both its own climate action framework’s targets as well as the ones outlined in the Paris Agreement, keeping in mind its Member States’ interests?

http://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/could-the-cop-21-agreement-come-into-force-without-the-eu/ http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/03/04/germany-austria-call-for-higher-eu-2030-climate-ambition/ 26 http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=POL 24 25

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What has been done so far?

The Kyoto Protocol27 was first proposed in Japan, on December 11th 1997, but it was not until 2005 that it was put into force, due to its complicated ratification process. Whereas the UNFCCC of 1992 encouraged its parties to reduce their GHG emissions, Kyoto Protocol commits 37 industrialized countries, as well as the European Community, with binding emission reduction

Figure 2. Global CO2 emissions per region from fossil-fuel use and cement production

targets, for its first commitment period.

The Copenhagen Accord 28 of 18 December 2009 indicated the need for keeping the global temperature rise below 2°C and encouraged all Parties to undertake a number of “nationally appropriate mitigate actions”.

On December 2012, the Doha Amendment was adopted,29 establishing the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This period lasts from January 1st 2013 until December 31st 2020.

However the Doha Amendment has not yet come into force, due to its complex ratification procedure.

During 2012-2015, negotiations took place in the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Durban Platform (ADP), which was established at the 2011 Conference of Parties. The ADP was to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, which would be adopted at COP21. COP21 reached the Paris Agreement,30 which includes decisions concerning the national mitigation actions (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, INDCs), financial support for developing countries, in order for the 2 degree Celsius goal to be achieved fast enough. INDC refers to the number of measures and post-2020 climate actions each country

http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php 29 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php 30 http://www.cop21paris.org/ 27 28

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is planning to take under the new agreement. A total of 188 countries have communicated their INDCs, outlining specific climate action pledges.

The European Union, on its behalf, has formulated three climate change programmes. The 2020 Climate and Energy Package is a set of binding legislation, aiming at the achievement of the EU’s climate and energy targets for the year 2020. Its main goals are the reduction of GHGs’ emissions by 20%, a 20% improvement in energy efficiency and the production of 20% of the total EU energy by renewable sources31.

The 2030 Climate and Energy Framework is a legal framework for climate and energy, which sets the EU’s targets for the period between 2020 and 2030. Its main goals are a 40% cut in GHG emissions, compared to 1990 levels, an increase of the renewable energy consumption by 27% and an increase of the energy efficiency by 27%. In this strategy, the EU also plans to reform the ETS and create a more competitive and sustainable energy economy.

The 2050 Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe32 is a set of broader targets, on how Europe’s economy could be rendered sustainable. The roadmap focuses on the expansion of green economy and on resource efficient development, emphasising on the sectors of transport, buildings and industrial production.

Keywords energy system, energy efficiency, climate diplomacy, EU Emissions Trading System, COP21 results

Useful links for further research Official sources

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Tackling Climate Change: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/

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COP 21 Paris Climate Change Conference: http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21

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Kyoto Protocol: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

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Activities of the WTO and the challenge of climate change: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_challenge_e.htm

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http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020/index_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/environment/resource_efficiency/about/roadmap/index_en.html

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Videos to watch

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Confronting Climate Change, with Al Gore: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7ygf-puKm0

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Climate Change 101 with Bill Nye: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtW2rrLHs08

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What is COP 21 (2 Minute Guide): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJH2eUQVYwI

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS - ECON What steps should the EU take towards democratic accountability, legitimacy and institutional strengthening of the Economic and Monetary Union?

Since 2012, the EU institutions have presented various strategies towards a “genuine” Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with a “deeper and fairer” EMU currently being one of the ten priorities set by the Juncker Commission. Although they stress that any steps towards strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with ensuring democratic accountability and legitimacy, in times of crisis, regular procedures have been waived. As the lines dividing competences between the EU and its Member States in the area of economic governance remain blurred, which should come first, a deeper or a fairer EMU? Are these two mutually exclusive or could there be synergies hidden there?

How can the EU ensure transparency, improve openness and enhance citizen participation in the development of its economic policies?

By Ripa Hovsepyan (AM) & Dionysis Patriarcheas (GR)

Why does it matter?

In order to ensure economic stability, growth and prosperity, Member States of the EU coordinate their economic policies within an economic union. The progressive economic integration of countries in the EU with a common currency, the euro, transformed this solely economic union into an Economic and Monetary Union 33 (EMU). With the aim of sustainable economic development, the EMU draws an appropriate economic and monetary policy for Member States of the European Union, including the 19 Member States of euro area. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis leading to a debt crisis and economic recession, it was made evident that closer coordination of economic policies between the EU’s Member States is needed, in order to complement the euro and deliver jobs, growth, social fairness and financial stability.

Whereas a deeper and fairer EMU would foster growth, concerns have been raised. Since the adoption of the euro, a common monetary policy was implemented by all members of the Eurozone, leaving fiscal (taxation and public finances) and stabilising economic policies the only tools available for national adjustments. Evidently, economic imbalances between them led to a decline in economic growth and caused a significant loss in some countries’ income and citizens’ welfare. 16 out of 28 EU Member States reported debt to GDP ratios higher than Maastricht ceiling of 60%. At the end of 2014, Greece recorded the highest debt ratio at 177.1%, followed by Italy (132.1%), Portugal (130.2%), Ireland (109.7%), Cyprus (107.5%) and Belgium (106.5%) 34.

By adopting the 1992 Treaty on European Union (better known as the Maastricht Treaty), EU governments agreed to launch the EMU. Its goal was to complete the single market, establish the European Central Bank (ECB) and deliver a stable single currency by the end of the century.

34 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Structure_of_government_debt /Structure of Government Debt 33

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Concerns have also been raised regarding the legitimacy of these decisions. Whereas Treaties entitle Member States to administer their own economic and fiscal policies, the EU introduced sanctions for non-compliance, making recommendations binding and autonomous national action less feasible. Furthermore, looking back to the Greek negotiations during the summer of 2015, it became obvious that there are conflicting interests within the EMU, as it now consists of debtors and creditors. Considering that potential Treaty changes would require a considerable amount of time, what actions should the EU take towards democratic legitimacy within the Eurozone in this new situation?

Although the European Council has repeatedly expressed its intentions to ensure the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the decision making process, the people have still little or no say in the creation of economic policies, as steps towards increased legitimacy have not been made yet. As decision making takes place mostly behind closed doors and relevant minutes are kept confidential, requests for further transparency and openness of documents have been made.

Who’s in play? 

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the 19 Member States who have adopted the euro. It maintains inflation rates, price stability in the Euro area and preserves purchase power of the single currency. It is independent and functions without being directly controlled by any EU institution.



The European Commission initiates legislation regarding the EMU. It comprises of one Commissioner per EU country, nominated by each government.



The European Parliament as the institution responsible to vote and amend the legislative acts proposed by the European Commission. It is the only directly elected European institution directly or indirectly involved in the making of Economic and Monetary Policies.



Member States of the EU are adjusting their economic and fiscal policies in order to maintain financial stability and potential growth.



European Troika is a term popularised in Greece to refer to the decision groups comprising representatives from the ECB, EC and the International Monetary Fund, which in the case of Greece, as well as Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland, identified a fiscal gap and laid down austerity measures.



The Eurogroup is an informal term for the Eurozone finance ministers, exercising political control over the currency. They make sure that closer policy coordination is established.

Key conflicts and questions Since the establishment of the EMU, weak input legitimacy has always been undeniable. Namely, achieving satisfactory results has been a priority over democratic representativeness. With the 22

financial crisis constantly presenting new challenges, focusing on ad hoc and fast solutions was deemed more efficient, instead of ensuring full accountability of decisions. So far, the only way citizens are involved in this process is through the only democratically elected body in the EU, the European Parliament. It is involved in the voting and amending of legislation. Should the EU focus on better results or more democratic procedures? Is there a way to ensure both? Is the European Parliament the only instrument voicing the citizens’ opinions?

Until 2009, the EMU’s legitimacy used to derive from its output legitimacy, namely the results and the solutions from it. However, with the global financial crisis output legitimacy has, by definition, deteriorated by definition. This makes the economic and monetary system vulnerable, leading to less and less support by the citizens and therefore to a questioning of the EMU’s legitimacy.

Since the breakout of the crisis and the establishment of a debtors-creditors relationship within the monetary union, notable inequalities became apparent among its members, creating, for many, a North-South divide. Perhaps the answer to this problem lies in a common fiscal union allowing a truly shared and democratic decision making process. However, is it the only solution to divergent economies in the EU? Would a unified fiscal policy make things better in our time of globalisation or would it decrease the power of national parliaments?

Debate on a potential fiscal union has been going on for a long time. Supporters claim that the EMU is not sustainable without the coordination of fiscal policies and deeper integration.

However, opponents of the idea claim that local problems need local solutions. Furthermore, since national parliaments mostly decide upon national fiscal policies, it is evident that a Fiscal Union would only increase the democratic deficit. In response to that, supporters of the Fiscal Union claim that it will lead to an even greater union with increased efficiency and growth. Does efficiency or democratic accountability come first? Are the two necessarily antagonistic and/or mutually exclusive or is there a way to combine them?

Summing up, our time of crisis showcases that policies and tools have not adjusted smoothly across regions, countries and sectors, leading to accumulated loss of competitiveness and large external imbalances such as currency risk and increase in government spending which generates a current account deficit. Asymmetric needs, asymmetric behaviours and asymmetric crisis makes countries unable to rely on monetary policy or exchange rate, as these are set for the currency union as a whole. With asymmetric crisis causing asymmetric shocks (one country or set of countries being affected more than others), further integration is needed and structural reforms are probably a long term solution. The institutional strengthening of the EMU is needed, along with significant increase in legitimacy and accountability.

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What has been done so far?

One of the very first legislative measures taken in the context of the EMU is the Stability and Growth Pact. It was created to ensure the stability of the EMU through setting targets for national fiscal policies and through sanctions for non-compliance. It has received widespread criticism, with one side claiming that it is not flexible enough in order for Member States to adequately face their individual problems. On the other side, some economists have claimed that it is too flexible as it allows ineffective and undesirable fiscal moves. General criticism also deals with the unequal enforcement of sanctions and fines.

A set of rules for greater economic oversight was introduced with the so-called Six-Pack. It was later expanded through the Two-Pack, another set aiming to complete budgetary monitoring of Member States, increase coordination and strengthen economic integration. Whereas in times of prosperity it can increase growth and stability, in times of crisis this closer coordination pack also leads to shared risks and responsibilities.

Aiming to strengthen the EMU, the five presidents of five EU institutions and formations set out a plan with concrete proposals to be implemented by 2025 at the latest. J.C. Juncker (European Commission), D. Tusk (European Council President), J. Dijsselbloem (Eurogroup President), M. Draghi (ECB President) and M. Schulz (European Parliament President) propose measures concerning sharing of sovereignty among Eurozone members by creating a future euro area treasury and, all in all, move beyond rules to institutions in order to guarantee a solid and transparent architecture for the EMU. Documents aside, the European Union set up a financial assistance fund in 2012, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in order to assist Eurozone Members experiencing financial difficulties. Another non-documental measure is the European Semester, an annual cycle of policy coordination through which the European Commission analyses each Member State’s policies and recommends country-specific reforms.

Keywords fiscal union, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), European Central Bank (ECB), democratic accountability, EMU legitimacy, Five presidents’ report, Stability and growth in the Eurozone, Global financial crisis

Useful links for further research Official sources 

General review of the Economic and Monetary Union http://europa.eu/pol/emu/index_en.htm

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

Press release on the strengthening of EMU http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5874_en.htm



Five Presidents’ Report (pp 16-19 referring to democratic accountability and legitimacy) http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf



The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy (only pp 9,10,11) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eedp/pdf/dp015_en.pdf

News and analysis 

Debating Europe: Arguments for and against a Fiscal Union http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-fiscalunion/#.VugpouKLTIV



The Problems of European Monetary Union - asymmetric shocks or asymmetric behaviour? https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/analysis/emu



EU super state would have no democratic legitimacy, warns euro architect http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/03/03/eu-superstate-would-have-no-democraticlegitimacy-warns-euro-arc/

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COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS - EMPL A silent emergency in European metropoleis; how can the European Union work towards ensuring affordable, sustainable, and liveable housing for all its citizens?

With household costs rising, a growing number of young adults in Europe is living with their parents. The lack of affordable housing is the common denominator in the socioeconomic changes European urban areas are undergoing, such as gentrification, spatial segregation, and a rise in homelessness. Together with the lack of social housing, this also raises questions on the impact of the refugee influx, with challenges such as ethnic or racial stratification of the housing markets. Moreover, the house construction industry remains on the low; currently about 35% of the EU’s buildings are over 50 years old, thus less energy efficient. What long-term, system-oriented goals are needed to address these challenges? How should Europe rethink house property?

By Nikos Avramidis (GR) & Dilge İmer (TR)

Why does it matter?

After years of economic crisis, the EU seems unable to tackle the social problems the crisis brought to the surface. The number of people living in risk of poverty35 has grown significantly during the previous years, challenging their capacity to afford proper housing. Currently more than 50% of EU citizens do not own a house or are still paying a loan for their first residence36.

At the same time, debt linked to housing is having a significant increase, especially in countries most hit by the crisis, namely Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. Many of these households are overburdened by debt, unable to repay it and in danger of losing their property. This situation also poses a risk to the already unstable European banking sector. Some of the EU’s Member States, for example Denmark, encourage the re-negotiation of debts between the borrower and the bank, while others, like Greece and Portugal, have passed legislation that protects the primary residence of defaulted households.

Housing though has become a real struggle even for the middle class. It is estimated that in 2013 housing costs represented on average 22.2% of disposable income for the total population 37,

Eurostat. People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion. Raw data. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_50&language=en 35

Eurostat. Distribution of population by tenure status http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/File:Distribution_of_population_by_tenure_status_Fig2_2012.png 36

37

Housing markets and housing conditions in the EU. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3Yb8SWGTmE7NEN0MGFpVXY2ckU/view

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while this number goes up to 41% for people in the risk of poverty.38 Despite the fact that so many people face problems in securing housing, construction costs across the EU are still very high39, with the rental sector following the same track,40 which has led to the lack of affordable solutions. In turn, the generational phenomenon of young people aged 18-34 staying with their parents has spiked, with the rate reaching a maximum of 74% in Slovakia.

Another result of high construction costs is that most buildings in the EU tend to be relatively old, built before 1990,41 thus less environmentally sustainable or energy efficient. Households consume 26.7% of the total energy consumption, 42 making them the second most consuming category, behind transport. Apart from the environmental cost, this is also of social importance, as it is estimated that 50m-125m people cannot afford proper indoor heating43. At the same time, in some Member States of the EU a significant number of houses lack basic amenities, such as indoor toilets,44 or have a leaking roof. This is a clear indicator that owning a house does not guarantee the ability to bear household costs.

The above-mentioned issues stress the need for more and better social housing to be provided by national governments. The waiting lists for social houses have been extended across the EU. At the same time, its Member States have under-prioritised the development of social housing, with few exceptions, such as France. This situation is likely to deteriorate with the influx of refugees.

Who’s in play?

Despite having accepted UN housing rights obligations and adopted the European Social Charter in its original or revised version45, the EU’s Member States generally fail to put clearly defined and enforceable laws in the area of housing rights. Moreover, there is a downward trend in the share

The State of Housing in the EU 2015. Housing Europe. http://www.housingeurope.eu/resource-468/the-state-of-housing-in-the-eu2015 39 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Construction_producer_price_index_overview 38

40

See 37 above.

41

Laustsen, Jens, Paul Ruyssevelt, Dan Staniaszek, and David Strong. "Europe's Buildings Under the Microscope." Buildings

Performance Institute Europe (BPIE). http://www.institutebe.com/InstituteBE/media/Library/Resources/Existing%20Building%20Retrofits/Europes-Buildings-Under-theMicroscope-BPIE.pdf 42

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Consumption_of_energy

43

See 37 above.

44

See 38 above.

45

European Economic and Social Committee. "Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Issues with Defining

Social Housing as a Service of General Economic Interest’." EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012IE0597

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of social housing over the total housing stock, as well as increasing delegation of relevant competence to local governments 46.

Hence, federations and initiatives like Housing Europe play an important role in the future of the issue. Housing Europe which is the European Federation of Public, Cooperative and Social Housing, is a network of 43 national and regional federations that gathers a total of 43.000 public, social and cooperative housing providers in 23 countries 47. It not only works for providing access to decent and affordable housing for all EU citizens but also works for providing services such as domiciliary care and support services for residents with special needs, additional services for tenants and neighbourhood services.

Though the EU has no direct competence in the field of housing, many EU policies and legislation touch upon the issue. An interesting case is the Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) decision of the European Commission of 2009, which included a maximum income limit for the allocation of social housing. Conflicts between such European state aid rules and some Member States' policies for organising and financing social housing had even generated legal disputes 48.

What is the impact of EU policies on Member States’ domestic housing policies?

Last but not least, in order to properly address the issue of housing, one must also take into consideration the role of Europeans banking sector. In the years before the crisis, banks used to issue home loans recklessly,49 resulting in the so-called “housing bubble”. After the crisis broke out, many people were unable to service their debts. In such cases are often allowed to evict homeowners who have fallen behind on their mortgage payments. It is false, however, to only view banks as part of the problem, as they can be crucial for solutions as well. As the banking sector controls both debts linked to housing and the interest rates for home loans, they could possibly provide part of the capital needed for proper housing to be made available to more citizens.

Key conflicts and questions Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the real estate market has been severely damaged with the prices constantly falling in almost every Member State. At this point, a paradox state of affairs is reported. Despite the fall of prices, less Europeans are now able to buy a house for themselves. The prices for constructing a house in each Member State are still too high for the

Braga, Michela, and Pietro Palvarini. "Social Housing in the EU." European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Jan. 2013. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/492469/IPOL-EMPL_NT(2013)492469_EN.pd 46

47

"About Us." European Federation of Public, Cooperative and Social Housing. . http://www.housingeurope.eu/section-37/about-us

48

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Issues with Defining Social Housing as a Service of General

Economic Interest’. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012IE0597 49

http://www.housingeurope.eu/resource-144/about-time-to-stop-a-european-wave-of-evictions

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individual standards of each country, while renting a dwelling has also become more expensive.

At the same time, in certain Member States such as the UK, there are not enough houses to meet the demographic needs50. This lack of sufficient number of dwellings is possible to deteriorate in the near future, as more refugees are expected to arrive in the EU this year. What measures should the EU propose in order to deal with the crisis in the housing market and, hence, to make it more accessible for every citizen?

However, the life of those owning a house is not much easier. A high percentage of the population is struggling to bear household costs, which are also on the rise. Due to the low energy efficiency rating of many houses, many households cannot afford their energy bills. In many cases this results in lower house quality. It is thus evident that in order to make European houses sustainable, we have to make them “greener�. In addition many people still lack access to basic modern housing amenities, a factor that further decreases house quality rates. House quality problems are more common in poorer Member States, while they can be described as rare for the richer ones51. How can Europe guarantee that all its citizens have access to basic amenities? Can proper and liveable housing become a reality while keeping it both economically and environmentally sustainable?

Current housing situation has become more complicated due to the fact that a great number of people, who are paying their loan or a mortgage for their house, are unable to service their debt.

As described above, despite the measures taken by national governments the problem has not been solved yet. Many people do not to meet the requirements that apply for these measures, while the number of people living at risk of poverty is still increasing. How can the EU ensure that households overburdened by mortgages will not end up losing their property, without further risks for the already fragile banking sector?

Despite the need for extra social housing provisions, after the economic crisis struck the EU, the majority of its Member States have done little to respond to it, a decision closely linked with austerity dominating the economic policies of the previous years. In what ways could the EU help its Member States deal with the increasing need for extra social dwellings?

However, there is no common definition for social housing across Europe, with different rules and principles set in each Member State. This state of affairs makes it harder for common measures to be implemented.

Unfortunately, the problems do not stop there. Housing markets in the EU are characterised by great heterogeneity. There are, indeed, some common problems found in every country, but there are national, even regional, differences that determine each market. Even the same

50

"Typical Home Not Sold for 23 Years as Lack of Housing Bites." The Guardian.

http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/apr/10/typical-home-not-sold-23-years-lack-housing-stock-first-time-buyers 51

"Housing Conditions." Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Housing_conditions

29

problems are not of the same significance for each Member State of the EU. In this essence, it is believed by many that national authorities are more effective to handle the issue 52. Is there a need to harmonise the diverse social housing policies across Europe? In what extend can and should European institutions intervene in order to ensure sustainable, liveable and affordable housing for all?

What has been done so far?

It is necessary to first address the issue of housing rights in the context of international law. The right of access to adequate housing has been recognised by international law for a while now. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was adopted by the United Nations in 1948 recognised “adequate housing” as a right in Article 25 by stating “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” 53.

Other than this, in the General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing that was adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 1991, it was said that housing rights are of central importance for the enjoyment of all other economic, social and cultural rights 54. It also specified the minimum guarantees that actually constitute the right to housing as: legal security of tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; suitable location; and cultural adequacy.

Regardless of age, economic status or social status, these rights apply to everyone under public international law.

On the European level, the debate on housing has mostly developed after the 1990s. The right to housing was addressed in the European Social Charter by the Council of Europe in 1961 and was revised in 1996. By the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion that was dealt in Article 30 and the right to housing that was dealt in Article 31; obligations such as promoting access to housing at a certain standard, preventing and reducing homelessness and making the price of housing accessible were put on the shoulders of the Member States of the Council of Europe.

Another crucial reference on the topic would be the European Parliament Resolution on the Social Aspects of Housing, which was launched in March 1997. The reason for its importance

52

See 46 above.

53

See 46 above.

54

See 46 above.

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comes from the fact that it was a report calling for the development of a housing policy at European level, which will be based on the efforts to provide housing for all. This report also expressed the need “to include within the Treaty provisions which lead to the progressive realisation of the fundamental social rights of people living in Europe, those rights to include the right to decent and affordable housing for all”55. This commitment was taken to life in 2000 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and was amended later in 2007. In its Article 34, “the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices” 56 . The Charter is legally binding and incorporated in the treaties, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009.

Furthermore, decent housing is consequently formally recognised as a right by the EU. The issue of housing is also a part of the Europe 2020 Strategy under the objective of social inclusion. The target is to have at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2020, which will most likely to help decreasing the sum of persons who are severely materially deprived. The housing issue is thus recognised at both the international level and the EU level. Over and above, it is agreed on that decent housing is a right and prerequisite for the social inclusion of individuals and families.

Keywords social housing, Housing Europe, European house market, housing costs, debt linked to housing

Useful links for further research Official sources 

Report on the social housing in the EU: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/492469/IPOLEMPL_NT(2013)492469_EN.pdf



Report on the overall housing condition in Europe: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Housing_conditions

News and analysis 

An article on the lack of housing supply in the UK: http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/apr/10/typical-home-not-sold-23-years-lack-housing-

55

See 46 above.

56

See 46 above.

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stock-first-time-buyers



Observations on the state of housing across the EU: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3Yb8SWGTmE7NEN0MGFpVXY2ckU/view



Housing Europe Observatory that contains 15 countries’ profiles in social housing: http://www.housingeurope.eu/section-14/research?topic=&type=countryprofile&order=datedesc



An opinion on the changes that need to be made on the status of house evictions, by Housing Europe: http://www.housingeurope.eu/resource-144/about-time-to-stop-a-european-wave-of-evictions

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL PROTECTION - IMCO

MARKET

AND

CONSUMER

In the aftermath of the Volkswagen scandal, how can the EU reinforce the credibility, accountability, and effectiveness of its regulations?

In order to improve regulation, it is important to recognise that no internal market is complete without effective and independent oversight. However, how can regulators be equipped with the technical expertise so as not to be hoodwinked into writing loopholes and grey zones into the rules, whilst taking corporate concerns into account?

In order to ensure that the burdens regulations imposed are proportionate to their aim of societal benefit, the European Commission has introduced the ‘Better Regulation’, a mechanism aimed at cutting administrative burdens at the EU level. In a world without clean Volkswagens, will Better Regulation lead to more credible, accountable, and effective regulations, whilst avoiding a next Diesel-gate?

By Patryk Kulig (PL) & Andreas Loutzidis (GR)

Why does it matter?

The EU’s Member States not only share common democratic and human rights values, but also a large and intricate common legal framework. EU law plays a key role in the inner workings of the EU, setting common standards for all its Member States by affecting directly or indirectly their domestic legislation57.

The hierarchy of EU legal acts precisely describes both which of them prevails over another as well as which comes into force directly (e.g. EU Treaties, Regulations), indirectly i.e. requiring implementation of given act by each Member State separately by national parliaments (e.g.

Directives), or those acts that do not constitute any legal obligations but present opinions and statements (i.e. so called soft law: e.g. declarations, resolutions, etc.).

Domestic schemes are often overlapping with EU schemes calling for similar measures, 58 which confronts the Member States with a number of different legal acts passed by the EU Institutions 59

57

Exact numbers differ from each of the EU28. See: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/13/europeanization-of-public-policy/

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/11456614/Most-of-our-laws-are-not-EU-made.html 58

EU as an “intergovernmental union” does not have its executive power (domestically executive power is governed by either

government or the head of state, or both - depends on established solutions).

59

Key role in EU legislative procedures play in particular the Commission, the Parliament and the Council.

33

requiring frequent and profound cooperation with other relevant stakeholders. High complexity of EU legislation and often the importance and difficulty of issues to be regulated, leads inter alia to legal contradictions, interpretation problems and doubts.

On the other hand, increasing the number of different legal acts regarding issues regulated on the EU level at the same time diminishes the role of the principle of subsidiarity,60 which leads to further political implications e.g. the referendum on Brexit. A transparent, coherent common legal framework should therefore set standards for further cooperation between relevant EU institutions, Member States and other relevant stakeholders.

The European Single Market has been the core basis for founding the European Communities in the early 1950s and still remains one of the most important pillars of mutual trust, understanding and prosperity in the EU nowadays. Free movement of services and goods based on common standards not only boosts trust between the Member States and citizens of the EU, but also unlocks innovation, greater competitiveness and prosperity, resulting in a win-win situation for both business and consumers61. Worth mentioning is also the fact that the mechanism does work reciprocally, as businesses competitiveness can be boosted on the European Single Market by its standardisation62.

The transparent, fair and simple entrance and exit regulations to the European Single Market and public policy of EU’s Member States relates in particular to protection of weaker parties (i.e. consumers), as well as protection against serious unfairness in particular situations on the market between relevant stakeholders (breaches of competitiveness, loopholes and grey zones).

An independent and transparent oversight over the European Single Market constitutes a major challenge, mainly because of the huge number and different interests of particular stakeholders.

At the same time, it plays a key role in ensuring a non-discriminatory and free market among the EU’s Member States. Lack or inadequate oversight over the European Single Market might cause infringement of the rule of competitiveness, as well as lack of coordination of national economic policies, which may in turn result in uncertainty and mistrust between relevant stakeholders.

60

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aai0017

61

"A well-run single market can be the key to unlocking prosperity, innovation and greater competitiveness in Europe, which will

benefit businesses and consumers. Misdirected, it can stifle entrepreneurship and create a clipboard culture in business." Vicky Ford, chair of European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (see: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/feature/committee-guide-imco-single-market-key-boosting-eu-growth ) 62

https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/event/standardisation-boosts-european-business-competitiveness

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Who’s in play?

European Commission, European Council and European Parliament The three EU institutions play the leading role in every EU legislative procedure and therefore are capable of introducing new transparent standards and independent and merits-related oversight over the European Single Market.

European standardisation organizations EU aiming at setting common standards and frameworks proposes using appropriate instruments, to the most relevant ones belong: European Committee for Standardisation (CEN); European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC); European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

Consumer and Business federations, unions, etc.

They represent the main stakeholders and users of the European Single Market.

Key conflicts and questions How should the EU and its Member States provide an understandable and simple legislative framework and what is the key for a coherent and transparent cooperation between the Commission, Council and Parliament? How could such potential frameworks improve accountability, effectiveness and credibility on the European Single Market? Which instruments should the EU indicate in order to combine simple and understandable law making with its enforceability on the European Single Market?

As mentioned above, the EU has a complicated legislative system which does not only lead to misunderstanding and overlapping responsibilities between the EU institutions, but also makes conformity of the EU law with domestic legal systems of each Member State rather challenging. A transparent and simple framework is key to providing better quality and, in result, lower quantity of legal acts. How might the simple and understandable legal framework improve effectiveness and trust among the stakeholders on the European Single Market? Questionable is if and in what extent and using which instruments should current situation be cured both at the law making and enforceability level.

In what extend should the European Single Market be regulated on the EU level in light of the principle of subsidiarity? What should be the proportion between harmonised and nonharmonised sectors on the European Single Market?

The Treaty on European Union (TUE) 63 does provide in Art. 5 a so-called Subsidiarity Principle, which states that “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 63

One the two most important EU Treaties, see: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm

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only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.� Does further integration lead to diminishing of the role of Member States in areas of shared competence between them and the EU? Questionable is the extent of the exclusivity of the EU in providing solutions in areas of its exclusive competences. Should the EU have exclusivity over more areas?

In what extend should the EU protect consumers on the European Single Market? In what extent should the voice of different lobbyists (representing business sector i.e. goods and services providers) be heard and accepted by the EU? How to improve trust between stakeholders, representing both consumers and business, on the European Single Market and balance the free market with regulatory oversight?

Consumers play a vital role in the economy, as they pay to consume goods produced and services provided within the market. Without consumers’ demand, producers would lack one of the key motives to produce: selling to consumers. Therefore consumers are the most exposed stakeholders on the market to be misled or deluded. On the other hand, protection over consumers shall not undermine proper actions of producers on the market. The huge number of both consumers and producers on the European Single Market makes appropriate and adequate oversight a challenging task.

Going back to the law/policy making procedures, the European Commission conducts public consultations early on in every legislative procedure. Interest groups are invited to take part early on, thus making lobbying in the EU a recognised activity. This influencing of policy and decisionmaking has the potential to benefit legislation, by providing expertise and legitimacy through civil dialogue. However, it is crucial to ensure transparency in the process and ensure that lobbying methods and goals are made clear.

As it is often the case, very competitive relations on markets between producers willing to sell their products or services at the possibly highest price and volume, might lead to noticing a noncompetitive behaviour of some of the stakeholders. One of the most viral and biggest infringements has been detected on the US market when Volkswagen showed his noncompetitive behaviour while deliberately misleading on VW Group car’s low CO2 emissions 64.

Should the EU proceed with e.g. the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 65 and other international free trade agreements with third parties or focus entirely on improvement of the European Single Market? Does one contradict the other?

EU28 being aware of all positive impacts of the European Single Market as well as increasing competitiveness of other economies in the world, tries to establish other international

64

http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772

65

See: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/questions-and-answers/

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agreements aiming at setting common legal frameworks mirroring the EU provisions. One of advantages of signing such agreements is a consequence of having the same control over products produced in non-EU economies. Questionable is if concluding such agreements by the EU28 does have a positive impact also regarding improvement of inner regulations of the European Single Market or leads instead to further misunderstandings and its destabilisation.

What has been done so far?

The European Commission has come up with the Better Regulation Guideline66 (BGR) presenting inter alia key principles and concepts of BGR, providing tools for carrying out the Impact Assessments, summaries of how to facilitate and verify the transposition and conformity of EU law, which also describes how to establish monitoring systems. The BGR complies with a bigger picture of the EU Standardisation Policy67 playing the leading role in creation and functioning of the European Single Market, balancing the market-based competition with operability of products and services on the ESM. Worth noting is also establishing of the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA), responsible for assessment of scientific and technological Policy Options for the European Parliament,68 as well as the New Legislative Framework aiming to improve market surveillance, boost the quality of conformity assessments, and create toolbox of measures for use in product legislation.

Keywords EU legislative procedures, New Legislative Framework, principle of subsidiarity; EU Standardisation Policy; European Single Market, Single Market for Goods, Single Market for Services; interest group representation, lobbying, public consultations, expert groups; Better Regulation Guideline, Regulatory Cooperation (TTIP)

Useful links for further research Official sources 

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/new-legislative-framework/



http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm

66

Better Regulation Toolbox: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf

67

See: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/policy/index_en.htm

68

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/

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

http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf



http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4988_en.htm



http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/vademecum/index_en.htm



http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/key-players/index_en.htm



http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers



http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN



http://www.europarltv.europa.eu/en/player.aspx?pid=e9721a9f-1dbf-44f5-8481-a090010ad7d1

News and analysis 

http://bruegel.org/2015/03/the-whys-and-hows-of-a-single-market-for-europe/



http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/home

Videos to watch 

http://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies/2014/11/corporate-lobby-tour

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COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY - ITRE Catching up with the digitalisation of the energy sector; how should Europe address the challenges rising from the integration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) to the electricity grid and ensure secure, sustainable, and affordable electricity for its citizens?

The road to ‘energy transition’ not only covers the re-design of all key end-use sectors electricity, heating, and transport- from production to consumption, but also their convergence in technological, societal, and economic terms. This vision is built around the modernisation of the electrical grid, with the gradual development of ‘smart grids’, which use information and communication technologies (ICT) to manage electricity more efficiently while adding new nodes to the electrical grid such as RES, thus turning households into consumer-producer-hybrids. The promise of the smart grid is to enable a new paradigm with reduced energy costs and the environmental benefits of RES. Can the EU pave the way for decarbonisation with this concept of decentralised energy? With the new technological developments in energy storage, is the future closer than we think?

By Nena Grammenou (GR) & Tim Keegstra (NL)

Why does it matter?

“By 2030, renewables will be the dominant player in the electricity system, smart technologies will be the norm, and consumers will be the ones driving the market forward” —Commissioner Arias Cañete

Even though Europe is becoming more energy efficient every year, demand for electricity does not dramatically decrease. The era of large-scale, centralised power plants dominating electrical power generation is slowly but steadily gives way to the emerging reality of decentralised energy systems. This profound change, often referred to as energy transition, is primarily driven by the deployment of Renewable Energy Sources (RES)69. With renewables powering almost 15.5% of

69

Renewable energy: Any energy resource that is naturally regenerated over a short time scale and derived directly from the sun (such as thermal, photochemical, and photoelectric), indirectly from the sun (such as wind, hydropower, and photosynthetic energy stored in biomass), or from other natural movements and mechanisms of the environment (such as geothermal and tidal energy).

Renewable energy does not include energy resources derived from fossil fuels, waste products from fossil sources, or waste products from inorganic sources. For more info on RES, visit : http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/energy_resources/energy_rev2.shtml

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the EU energy sector in 2014,70 their share in EU’s total electricity consumption is expected to rise up to 17% by 202071. This scenario could further favour decarbonisation, by reducing the share of fossil fuel energy sources while limiting Europe’s dependence on external suppliers 72 and vulnerability to supply shocks. Moreover, it provides a breeding ground for the creation of an internal energy market that encourages active consumer participation.

Key conflicts and questions A typical electric grid is designed to produce, transmit and distribute energy. Power generation starts at a power plant station through electric generators. The high-voltage power travels through transmission lines, which cover great geographical distance, prior to reaching power sub-

Figure 3. General layout of electricity networks. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_grid

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The deployment of renewables in the energy sector refers to their usage for covering heat, electricity and transport demands a presented at the COP21 brochure: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/cop21-brochure-web.pdf 71

Statistics on Energy from RES: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-

explained/index.php/Energy_from_renewable_sources 72

The EU was reported 53% dependent on energy imports in 2014: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/eu-53-

dependent-energy-imports-2014 40

stations. In these sub-stations, high voltages are stepped down to distribution voltages and distribution lines ensure that electricity becomes available for consumption.

Since electrical energy cannot easily be stored at a large scale, it needs to be produced the moment it is consumed. Without large-scale energy storage, a central problem is that during peak demand times, larger amounts of energy need to be produced and supplied to customers.

New non-dispatchable renewables have highly fluctuating, intermittent levels of electricity generation dependent on varying geographical and weather factors. These variations often do not match with the moments of key demand, thereby hindering the development of RES-E73 and stressing the need for flexibility in RES storage. Latest developments in the field allow, in case of surpluses, energy to be stored at a large scale and returned dynamically, using for example pumped hydro storage or batteries, thus limiting outages and energy waste.

Whilst several Member States opt for investing in renewable energies, technological challenges hinder the progress of the RES-E. It has been reported74 that in several Member States, such as Belgium, Greece and Hungary, the insufficient grid infrastructure renders the connection of new plants to the grid impossible. Moreover, isolated grids such as those of islands, remote communities or remote industrial operations are typically cut off from larger grid infrastructure.

This ‘energy insularity’ places these regions at an economic, social and environmental disadvantage, as they are often heavily dependent on fossil fuels 75 . The upgrade of existing networks is highly costly and burdened by a major lack of national incentives, given that the EU is still trying to recuperate from a severe financial crisis.

In parallel, the EU’s Member States have launched various support schemes, such as feed-intariffs, in order to enhance the penetration of RES. Nonetheless, in a well-functioning energy market, investments in generation should be driven by market considerations rather than subsidies.

In addition, the EU aims to create a “liquid”, liberalised European single energy market, 76 which prompts to “market coupling” 77 and grid cooperation. Subsequently, cross-border flows

73

Electricity generated from Renewable Energy Sources.

74

Report on integration of renewable energy sources (RES-E) in the European grids and markets, conducted by Eclaeron in association with Öko-Institut (2012):

http://www.eclareon.eu/sites/default/files/res_integration_final_report.pdf 75

The largest isolated power system in Greece is the power system of t Crete, which is highly based on diesel generators. A paper that highlights the penetration of RES into the electric grid to achieve energy efficiency, storage and interconnection between the central energy grid and the isolated ones can be found here: http://users.ntua.gr/pgeorgil/Files/J51.pdf 76

The definition of liberalised market: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html

77

Market coupling is a method for integrating electricity markets in different areas. With market coupling, the daily cross-border transmission capacity between the various areas is implicitly made available via energy transactions on the power exchanges on either side of the border. It means that the buyers and sellers on a power exchange benefit automatically from cross-border

41

of electricity from regions of noticeable electricity surplus to the points of demand could be facilitated.

Limited cross-border trade in electricity among EU countries not only decreases the incentives for investments in the RES-field but also provokes significant variations in the electricity prices among Member States. With the Germans and Danish paying for energy three times more than Hungarians and Bulgarians,78 price convergence across Europe is a real challenge. Even though transmission and distribution networks charges make up a substantial part of the total bill, so do taxes and levies which are subject to national policies.

The urgent need for modernisation of electricity grids to integrate least-cost RES along with the potential of the single energy market empowered the development of smart grids and meters.

Smart grids are considered as state-of-the-art electricity networks that could readily enhance the integration of renewables into the electricity market, regulate the distribution of generation and demand in real time, enable two-way digital communication between the consumer and the supplier and introduce energy storage capacity to store electricity from variable renewables generation when production exceeds demand. From a realistic technological perspective, smart grids will primarily be installed locally, allowing inter-community energy transmission.

Figure 4. Source: http://www.vettecorp.com/solutions/cooling_solutions_for_smart_grid.php

exchanges. The system of market coupling has been in use since 2006 (trilateral market coupling between the Netherlands, Belgium and France) and has proven very successful.

78

The reality of electricity prices in Europe: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/video/electricity-prices-in-europe/

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As for most consumers energy has long been considered a passive purchase, smart grids enable them to manage energy usage -via the use of smart metering systems- and connect their power generation technologies, such as solar panels, to the grid. Simultaneously, they provide a platform for traditional energy and ICT companies, including SMEs, to develop innovative energy services, and an incentive for consumers to sell their home-made energy to the grid operator and achieve a better deal in energy pricing. The transition from consumer to prosumer79 does not only constitute a ground-breaking entrance of consumers as active market players but it also widens the scope of the EU’s competitiveness in the energy market.

However, the protection of the data shared through smart grids, 80 the social acceptance risk,81 as well as the creation of a legal framework to ensure fruitful competitiveness between big suppliers and home-made production are issues the EU shall be prepared to address.

As the European solar market grew by 15% and the European wind industry connected a total of 12.8 GW of new wind capacity to the grid in 2015,82 RES-E paves the way for a sustainable, secure and low-carbon energy market. What remains to question is the readiness of the EU energy grids to reap the benefits of a decentralised energy system, whilst being politically, technologically, socially and financially challenged.



Should the EU’s Member States decide individually their approach to transforming their electricity infrastructure? When the EU has a shared competence with its Member States in the field energy, how can the EU best assist its Member States towards further interconnectivity of electricity grids?



How to fund new technologies in development stage and ensure successful?



To what extent are support schemes fostering RES grid integration?

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How can home produced energy be priced and taxed to both keep a fair market for all players, whilst also promoting the usage of renewable energy?



Is the deployment of smart grids currently paired with reliability of systems, security and data protection?



Are consumers sufficiently informed about their advanced, dynamic role in the new paradigm?

79

The definition of prosumers, convergence of the words; consumer and producer : https://www.smartgridlibrary.com/tag/prosumer/ 80

EU agency mulls cybersecurity measures for ‘vulnerable’ smart grids : http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-agencymulls-cybersecurity-measures-for-vulnerable-smart-grids/ 81

EU is worried about waning public image of renewables: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-worried-aboutwaning-public-image-of-renewables/ 82

Figures on wind and solar capacity in Europe: http://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/10/european-solar-wind-

capacity-skyrockets-2015/ 43

Who’s in play?

The European Commission in February 2015 launched a proposal for a forward-looking energy strategy, the energy union. With the aim of providing secure, sustainable, competitive, affordable energy, the strategy is centred upon five pillars:



Security of supply



A fully integrated energy market



Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand



Decarbonising the economy



Research, innovation and competitiveness

Furthermore, as energy is a shared competence between the EU and its Member States, the latter still decide on their national energy policies and energy mixes 83. As a result, disparities and conflicting interests exist between the 28 Member States. For instance, Germany has decided to abandon nuclear power and invest in wind and solar energy and launched Energiewende, 84 an energy portfolio dominated by renewable energy, energy efficiency and sustainable development.

Additionally, the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) are responsible for the operation of the electricity-distribution system and the Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are responsible for the transmission system from the power plant to the distribution networks. The European Distribution System Operators' Association for Smart Grids (EDSO) is the key-interface between Europe’s DSOs and the European institutions, promoting the development and large-scale testing of smart grid models and technologies, new market designs and regulation, whereas the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), currently plays an important role in coordinating Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and developing network codes.

Since grid integration of RES necessitates digitalisation and technological advancement, DSOs, TSOs, as well as several private stakeholders are challenged to invest in research innovation and profit in the long-run. Smart grids also place individuals at the core of energy systems. Energy consumers with the power of smart grids and meters in hand will need to be, apart from informed citizens, enterprise and community leaders.

Lastly, as for the EU smart grids deployment goes hand in hand with the creation of a single European energy market, market integration and the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks fall into the services of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), a European

83

The distribution of the energy sources used for the energy consumption is called an energy mix.

84

Energy transition, the German Energiewende: http://energytransition.de/

44

Union agency created to further progress the completion of the internal energy market and guarantee cooperation among European energy regulators.

What has been done so far? 

The European Commission’s Renewable Energy Directive sets out to supply 20% of our energy supply through renewables by 2020. The policies used by Member States to reach their respective targets are laid out in national renewable energy action plans. In the long-run, the European Parliament’s resolution titled “Energy Roadmap 2050” emphasizes the continued pursuit of smart grid and smart meter Research & Development (R&D) and Demo & Deployment (D&D) after 2020.

Additionally, the resolution recommends the education of smart consumers for smart meters to have a real impact and calls for the development of strong consumer data protection and calls upon Member States to create incentives for investment into smart grid and meter R&D and D&D. In an effort to keep track of the on-going changes in the increase of renewables share in the energy system, leading the way to sustainability, efficiency and security, the EU countries have agreed on the 2030 Framework for climate and energy, as proposed by the EC, which works as a bridge between 2020 and 2050 EU energy targets and policies.



Directive 2009/72/EC also known as the 2009 Electricity Directive recommends the roll-out of smart metering systems across the European Union, however, seeing the aforementioned competence, does not include binding targets.



The Smart Grid Task Force is an organisation set up by the European Commission to advise on the implementation and development of the Smart Grid.



As of the most recent review from 2014 by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, there are currently 459 smart grid projects of which 211 are in R&D and 248 are in D&D.



Funding at a European level for smart grid projects is ensured through, amongst others, the European Regional Development Plan, and the Horizon 2020 program. This funding is meant for both R&D and D&D.



At national level research is supported through government programmes, such as the E-Energy Programme in Germany, or through national regulator programmes, such as low carbon network fund (LCNF) in the UK.



Furthermore, Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) oversees the implementation of transnational projects of common interest (PCI) aimed at developing the infrastructure in the energy sector in the EU.

Keywords Smart grid, RES-E, smart meters, energy market, electricity surplus, electric power distribution, prosumers, data protection, energy islands, RES penetration, energy storage

45

Useful links for further research Official sources 

“Smart Grids: from innovation to deployment”: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011SC0463&from=EN



“The Citizen’s Energy Forum”: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/citizens%E2%80%99-empowerment-key-energy-union



European Commission Press Release on “Renewable Energy progress report”: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5180_en.htm

News and analysis 

“Consumers unaware of smart meters ahead of EU-wide roll-out”: https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/consumers-unaware-of-smart-metersahead-of-eu-wide-roll-out/



Opinion on “Digitisation, Energy and the Future of Europe”: http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240235070/Digitisation-energy-and-the-future-ofEurope

Policy reviews 

“Connecting Smart Grids Initiatives - Moving Towards 2020”: http://www.gridplus.eu



Paper on challenges and solution on the Integration of Intermittent Renewables into the EU electricity system issued by Eurelectric: http://www.eurelectric.org/media/45254/res_integration_paper_final-2010-030-0492-01-e.pdf



Review on “Energy policies of International Energy Agency (IEA) countries; European Union”: https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/EU2014SUM.pdf

Videos to watch 

Video on Smart Grid Technology: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4L31dHXP6i0



Video on Smart Grid deployment in Denmark: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqfMwEQ2pbc

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COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS - JURI What Europe needs to do after Snowden versus what Europe needs to do after Paris; in light of the new EU-US ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement, on what legal basis can the EU guarantee the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection of its citizens?

In October 2015 the European Court of Justice declared the ‘Safe Harbor’ agreement, a previous agreement governing the collection, handling, transfer, and storage of user data between the EU and the US, illegal. Based on concerns raised after Edward Snowden’s leaks on US mass surveillance programmes, the court ruled that the US side not only has to become compliant with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also produce legislation “equivalent” to European law in the commercial sector. In an attempt to fill the legal gap, the European Commission has now presented the ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement. Can the EU protect the privacy and data of its citizens within this new framework? Are EU data protection laws enforceable in practice? Can EU fundamental rights be respected and transparently enforced against tech giants over the Atlantic?

By Ilija Jerković (RS) & Triantafyllos Kouloufakos (GR)

Why does it matter?

The topic revolves around the security versus privacy dilemma. Both the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Privacy Shield Agreement are attempting to balance between them.

The Snowden leaks85 have alarmed many mainly due to the fact that it exposed privacy violations and mass surveillance on the grounds of national security. Regardless of the different opinions about the topic, and Snowden, it cannot be denied that it has brought these issues to the front lines. Snowden and his supporters turn against the exploitation of personal private data; thus, his criticism for the Privacy Shield Agreement 86 . Voices that have joined him claim that by using loosely-defined terms such as national security, the State gathers more and more control over people’s data, something that could lead to Orwellian situations.

The other side though has considerable arguments. States and state mechanisms ought to put security of their nations before everything. In cases of emergency (e.g. terrorist attacks), personal data either from corporate databases or from governmental surveillance operations may be used,

85

In 2013 Edward Snowden with the help of other whistle-blowers leaked to the public classified files of the National Security Agency

of the United States (US) and of other US agencies, which proved that the US government was maintaining a secret surveillance programme which targeted US citizens and also foreign nationals, mainly political figures.

86

Relevant tweet on Snowden Official Twitter Account 2nd of February 2016

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with or without citizen’s consent. One step further are mass surveillance practices, which are mainly used from the US side. In the EU this field is regulated heavily. According to Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, everyone has the right for their personal data to be protected and that they may be processed only by reasons of law or the person’s consent whilst this process must be conducted by an independent authority 87 . The Privacy Shield Agreement, as its predecessor the Safe Harbor, attempts to introduce a comprehensive and clear framework regarding user data transfer between the EU and the US. In that pretext it must be taken into account that with another agreement coming up, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which will have a great impact on the transfer of data, the issue is becoming even more imminent to resolve.

What has been done so far?

The old Safe Harbor Agreement For better understanding and evaluation of the new Privacy Shield Agreement one must first take a brief look at the Safe Harbor Agreement and the way it functioned. Safe Harbor set principles for the protection of EU and Swiss citizens’ data to which US companies self-certified to conform:



Notice - Individuals must be informed that their data is being collected and about how it will be used. They must provide information about how individuals can contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints.



Choice - Individuals must have the option to opt out of the collection and forward transfer of the data to third parties.



Onward Transfer - Transfers of data to third parties may only occur to other organisations that follow adequate data protection principles.



Security - Reasonable efforts must be made to prevent loss of collected information.



Data Integrity - Data must be relevant and reliable for the purpose it was collected for.



Access - Individuals must be able to access information held about them, and correct or delete it if it is inaccurate.



Enforcement - There must be effective means of enforcing these rules.

The strike down of the Safe Harbor Decision; Case C-362/14 ECJ Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner The case started between Max Schrems, a privacy activist, and Facebook, whose European headquarters are located in Ireland. Schrems’ Europe v Facebook group 88 filed a complaint 87

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT

88

http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html

48

against Facebook Ireland Ltd, after having made a request for the company’s records on him, using his “right to access” as an EU citizen. When the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, the person responsible for the enforcement and monitoring of compliance with data protection legislation in Ireland, rejected the case refusing to investigate Snowden’s claims of Facebook’s mass transfer of personal data to US National Security Agency, Schrems took the case before the Irish High Court which in turn referred it to the European Court of Justice, to rule whether the Safe Harbor Agreement should be re-evaluated in light of EU data protection fundamental rights. In its landmark ruling, the European Court of Justice declared the Safe Harbor Agreement invalid.

The Court in this case based its reasoning on a legal opinion that was put out by the Advocate General Yves Bots in September 2015, arguing that the Safe Harbor Agreement was no longer effective and even more, invalid, as the case of Snowden leaks have proven its inefficacy. The Advocate argued, among others, in its opinion that even under the Safe Harbor Agreement the Member States’ respective authorities have the right to examine EU-US transfers when it comes to private data. The Court, despite the fact that such opinions are not binding, followed it and ruled that the Safe Harbor Agreement was invalid.

The period of uncertainty; temporary measures taken and the reaction of firms “In essence, if Facebook, Google et al. wish to continue sending Europeans’ personal data over the Atlantic they will just have to guarantee an adequate level of protection in line with EU rules.”

—Monique Goyens, director general of the European Consumer Organisation

The decision in the Schrems case was published on October 6th 2015, causing an uprising in the corporate world as the domain of EU-US data transfer was left unregulated. The deadline agreed for a new agreement to be drafted between the EU and the US was the end of January 2016; a limited timeframe due to the implications of the absence of regulation in the area. In particular, US companies could no longer rely on the general framework of data transfer, set by Safe Harbor, which allowed them self-certification, meaning that US companies themselves could verify they complied with the framework, and had to use “model contract clauses”. Model contract clauses are issued by the European Commission and ensure that additional safeguards would be provided with respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights.

Drafting the Privacy Shield Agreement On February 2nd 2016 the European Commission (EC) approved the political agreement that was reached between the EU and the US and called EC Vice President Ansip and Justice Commissioner Jourová to prepare the necessary steps for the new agreement to be finalised. On February 29th the Commission issued a Draft Adequacy Decision as well as released the texts that will constitute the new framework, including the principles companies will have to abide by and relevant

49

commitments made by the US Government. In brief, the new framework includes the following guarantees:89



Strong obligations on companies and robust enforcement



Clear safeguards and transparency obligations on US governmental access



Effective protection of EU citizens’ rights with several redress possibilities:





Complaints have to be resolved by companies within 45 days.



A free of charge Alternative Dispute Resolution solution will be available.



EU citizens can also go to their national Data Protection Authorities, who will work with the U.S. Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission to ensure that unresolved complaints by EU citizens are investigated and resolved.

An annual Joint Review Mechanism

Key conflicts and questions Safe Harbor versus Privacy Shield Is Privacy Shield different from Safe Harbor?

The two legal frameworks have some significant differences. In general the EU with Privacy Shield aimed for “strong obligations for US companies”, as well as “robust enforcement” mechanisms to ensure that such obligations are complied with. More specifically, changes were made in the following sectors:



Regarding data transfer to third parties, Privacy Shield sets a host of strict requirements that must be met for the transfer to take place, and it moreover holds the organisation that agreed to the transfer, liable, if the party that receives the info uses it in a manner inconsistent to the agreement.

The Safe Harbor just required a written agreement in which the third party certified the same level of privacy protection as required by the relevant principles.



In addition, the Privacy Shield Agreement installs an Ombudsman mechanism and limitations for intelligence practices in the United States, regarding private data.

Despite these steps, doubts have been raised about their efficacy, as the Ombudsman will not have independent investigative or enforcement powers.

Another issue that arises is the multitude of choices that individuals can make regarding dispute resolution. The interested parties may choose between raising a complaint to the organisation

89

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm

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itself, 90 local Data Protection Agencies 91 (DPAs), an independent recourse mechanism 92 or a process of binding arbitration93. What is more, bodies responsible for enforcement are not defined by the Agreement and thus a gap of enforcement is expected, with possible contradictions potentially allowing national Data Protection Agencies to play a greater part filling this gap.

The procedural changes have evidently been altered, but does this consist an actual change? Is the Privacy Shield Agreement a “slightly better copy” of Safe Harbour and, in that case, is it probable that another ECJ ruling strikes it down?

Can Privacy Shield achieve something where the Safe Harbor couldn’t and guarantee data protection and privacy rights?

The Privacy Shield Agreement has been praised by the European Commission for offering a solid framework concerning data protection and privacy 94 . However many have raised doubts concerning the level of data protection it will actually provide95 and whether it is adequate. On one hand, the requirements for US and EU-based companies are significantly augmented. In addition a process of transparency and safeguards has been negotiated in correlation with an annual joint review mechanism that will monitor the functioning of Privacy Shield. Moreover, the European Union’s Article 29 Working Party will give its opinion before a final decision by the European Commission. In addition, in the USA the relevant Acts are being prepared and will be signed to law by President Obama.

However, concerns have been raised over the very nature of the Privacy Shield Agreement. More specifically, it is not legally binding yet as an agreement something which bothers a lot of people who have doubts concerning its future. Some have also supported that it was a sloppy and fast work,96 as the European Commission had announced it on February 2nd 2016.

In addition, the efficiency of the Privacy Shield and the degree of protection it will provide, is also questioned. Described as “Safe Harbour all over again” by Max Schrems, Privacy Shield raises

90

The organisation is obligated to answer within 45 days.

91

The local data protection agencies may work with other factors, such as the Department of Commerce of each country, to resolve

the dispute.

92

The Shield requires organisations to provide an independent recourse mechanism that will investigate and expeditiously resolve

complaints and disputes at no cost to the individual.

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This option is open to individuals who have raised their complaint with the organisation, used the independent recourse

mechanism, and/or sought relief through their DPA, but whose claimed violation still remains fully or partially unremedied.

94

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm

95

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/privacy-shield-riddled-surveillance-holes

96

http://www.infoworld.com/article/3029969/privacy/eu-us-privacy-shield-offers-flimsy-protection.html;

http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/privacy-shield-riddled-surveillance-holes

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concerns about state surveillance and access to private data as well as inadequate institutional support, bearing in mind the narrow competences of European Ombudsman, in order to respond to complaints by individuals who believe their privacy has been disrupted.

The commercial sector also faces the problems with internal regulation of data usage, but it is likely that companies will manage to find loopholes, enabling themselves to formally comply with regulations, but maintain extensive freedom when it comes to obtaining personal information and handling.

The key issue at stake though remains mass surveillance. For Privacy Shield to be aligned with the ECJ’s ruling on Safe Harbor, the US legislation has to be “essentially equivalent” with EU law.

Although the European Commission claims mass surveillance is not tolerated and out of the table with Privacy Shield, the US government has formally stated that it constitutes US practice in certain cases, even within Privacy Shield. Finally, considering the previous ruling of European Court of Justice, it is yet to be seen whether Privacy Shield will indeed avoid judicial disputes, as many critics see Privacy Shield as a merely diplomatic move to ensure balance in both sides of the Atlantic, without providing any real solutions.

Who’s in play?

Judiciary The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the highest judicial body within the European Union regarding European Union law. As a part of the Court of Justice of the European Union it is tasked with interpreting EU law and ensuring its equal application across all EU member states.

The EU and US negotiators The European Commission is the main actor for the drafting of the Privacy Shield Agreement from the EU side. It was the institution responsible to find a solution for the transfer of data, after Safe Harbor was invalidated. It issues all the relevant legal texts and conducts all negotiations from the EU side regarding the Privacy Shield Agreement.

US government: Mainly the conduit through which the companies have access in the discussions but also an influential player in the issue. The US government is doing the negotiating from that side of the Atlantic. It is vital for EU-US relations for a relevant and well-formed agreement to be concluded. More specifically the US Department of Commerce and the US Trade Commission are the responsible in the government and of course the United States Congress which will have to approve the agreement which will later be signed into law by president Obama.

Data protection authorities Article 29 Working Party: The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was set up under the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24th 1995 on the 52

protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. It is composed by a representative of the supervisory authority (DPA) designated by each EU Member State, a representative of the authority established for the EU institutions and bodies and a representative of the European Commission. It has advisory status and acts independently. In the current issue it is expected to give an opinion regarding the new Privacy Shield Agreement.

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is the independent EU body responsible for monitoring the implementation of data protection rules within the European institutions.

Individuals can complain directly to EDPS, which has the competence to investigate complaints, ensure that the Regulation 97 is applied and advise EU institutions on the issues regarding processing personal data.

The national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) in the Member States of the EU are supervisory authorities for data protection. They will work closely with individuals using the dispute resolution mechanism of Privacy Shield.

Industry leaders and activists US companies: The main actor in this issue, from the other side of the Atlantic. They are multinational companies with relevant interests in the topic, as their business activities include transfers of user data from the EU to the US. They were the ones that pressed the European Commission and the US government to conclude an agreement within the agreed timeframe, after the fall of Safe Harbor.

Privacy activists, such as Max Schrems’ “Europe v Facebook” group, play a crucial role as one could argue they were the spark that started the fire. Regardless of whether Snowden can be considered an activist, to a large extend it was because of his revelations that the ECJ decided to rule against the Safe Harbour.

Keywords Privacy Shield, Safe Harbor, EU- US data protection Umbrella Agreement, Max Schrems case, Draft adequacy decision for privacy shield, Article 29 Working Party

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Summary of the regulation on personal data management and protection of citizens’ rights: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/en/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32001R0045

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Useful links for further research Official sources 

Press release of the European Commission regarding the evolution of negotiations for the Privacy Shield Agreement and the step by step measures taken until the 29th of February 2016 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm



The decision of the European Court of Justice which strikes down the Safe Harbor Agreement http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=169195&doclang=EN



A factsheet of the European Commission concerning the http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_euus_privacy_shield_en.pdf

new

agreement

News and analysis 

Article about the general conditions and timeline of the Privacy Shield Agreement negotiation http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisabrownlee/2016/02/08/ec-announces-privacy-shield-timeframeconditions/#e090afb284c5



A breakdown of the new Privacy Shield Agreement and its contents http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/2016/03/160303privacyshield



Article giving basic information about the Max Schrems case which brought down the Safe Harbor Agreement http://uk.businessinsider.com/ecj-safe-harbor-ruling-bots-expected-2015-10



Article about the consequences of Privacy Shield Agreement in the business and data transfer world https://hbr.org/2016/02/the-business-implications-of-the-eu-u-s-privacy-shield

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COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS I – LIBE I Refugees in a fortified world; what steps should the EU take towards a common European asylum policy?

While the EU Member States have failed to address the consequences of the refugee crisis, over 3,700 refugees and migrants have lost their lives trying to reach the European coasts in 2015. With the dysfunctional European asylum system (see Dublin Regulation) having collapsed, and the proposed quota schemes for the redistribution of refugees having failed so far, the Schengen Agreement is now showing signs of unravelling (reintroduction of border controls, erection of border fences). While the EU is focusing on measures to keep refugees away or accelerate their return to their countries of origin (joint action plan with Turkey, reinforcement of Frontex), the demand for safe passage is more relevant than ever. Is the political game of Member States between indifference, hostility and solidarity set to last?

By Athina Firtinidou (GR) & Markos Merkouris (CY/HU)

Why does it matter?

“European states have a long tradition of providing a safe haven to the persecuted.”98 The notion of European countries being a safe haven for those in need, Europe's economic welfare as well as its geographical location are the main factors that have made Europe a prime destination for refugees and asylum seekers. The conflict in Syria is the main reason for the immense number of people reaching Europe on a daily basis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that over 135,000 of them have entered Europe since the beginning of 2016 99 . However, the inhumane conditions of travelling, lack of coordination and proper reception has led to thousands of people losing their lives in the Mediterranean, while those who arrived to the Balkans are stuck in unofficial and official camps with substandard living conditions.

Without a common strategy, the EU’s Member States are handling this influx of refugees in various ways, ranging from welcoming policies to absolute lockdown. Hungary declared a state of emergency regarding its borders and even raised physical borders with Serbia and Romania, unwilling to host any more refugees. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) decided to close its borders as well, leading to three people losing their lives, as hundreds of refugees tried to cross the borders through the river, unable to withstand the conditions in the 98

http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/what-we-do/ensuring-legal-protection/eu-asylum-policy.html

99

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911

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village of Eidomeni any longer. As the EU is struggling to deal with the overflow, concerns rise for an impending humanitarian crisis. With the number of refugees increasing rapidly, the need for effective and efficient policies regarding their reception and care increases as well.

The current crisis is not only of humanitarian nature though. The inability of European states to find a common denominator has magnified the cracks within the European Union to a previously unheard level, giving further traction to right wing, Eurosceptic movements. Thus, the results of this multidimensional crisis not only will affect the near future of European societies, but is also a test to the solidarity of the Union and will be a turning point for the future of the idea of a unified Europe.

Who’s in play?

The EU’s Member States still hold the main competencies regarding asylum applications processing and it is in their discretion to determine their relevant policies. This has created a number of different approaches across the EU, depending on the situation and the location of each Member State. While Greece and Italy are some of the countries dealing directly with the overflow of immigrants, Hungary and Slovenia are no longer accepting asylum seekers and Austria is limiting refugee flow, while Germany is still accepting refugees.

Neighbouring states of the EU, mainly FYROM, are major stakeholders in the issue. The recent shutting of FYROM’s southern border with Greece has led to a hike in the number of refugees stranded in Greece, since the only route remaining towards the north goes through Albania for the time being. Albania itself has tightened its security measures on the Greek-Albanian border as well, with support from Italy, an EU member state, in order to prevent refugees moving through the Adriatic into Italy100.

The EU remains an important stakeholder on the issue, however. The European Commission, and more specifically its Directorate General (DG) on Migration and Home Affairs, has been working towards coordinating the necessary action the EU needs to take. This concerns especially policies regarding transit countries, such as Turkey or African States. One of the main milestones the DG has been working on is the Common European Asylum System 101 (CEAS).

FRONTEX is an EU Agency that promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU Fundamental Rights Charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management102.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is an agency working under the auspices of United Nations (UN) and is mandated to protect and support

100

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/italy-to-help-albania-in-securing-borders-03-15-2016

101

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

102

http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/

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refugees at the request of a government or the UN itself and to assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. The UNHCR closely follows EU asylum law and policy and gives its views to the EU’s institutions and Member States on a wide range of asylum issues. The Refugee Agency also issues reports, proposals and observations on EU asylum law and policy.

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is a pan-European alliance comprised of over 90 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), with the goal of promoting and protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Its mission is to inform and persuade European authorities and the public, monitor and denounce human rights violations while proposing and promoting fair and effective durable solutions103.

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is an Agency of the European Union that plays a key role in the development of the Common European Asylum System. Its establishment aims to enhance practical cooperation on asylum matters and help the EU’s Member States fulfil their European and international obligations to give protection to people in need.

As a transit country, Turkey is another important actor in the effort to deal with the refugee crisis.

The recently signed EU-Turkey joint action plan aims at increasing cooperation on the issue104.

However, concerns have been raised that the action plan is actually violating international and EU law regarding the rights of refugees105.

Key conflicts and questions In the past years, the EU has invested a vast amount of resources to create high-tech security systems and enhance the border patrol system. However, far less has gone into asylum establishments and preparations for the influx of refugees. At the same time, more and more people are arriving in Europe as a result of the seemingly endless conflict in Syria. While the number of refugees seems rather large, neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have accepted over 95% of Syrian refugees. With far less resources than EU countries, overcrowded and undersupplied camps are set up to deal with the situation. At the same time, the EU is merely accepting less than 5% of the refugees and is still struggling to find the means to alleviate the crisis with its Member States being unwilling to reach a common solution.

On grounds of religious consistency, there are Member States of the EU that refuse to accept Muslim refugees, claiming that Christianity and religious uniformity is crucial to the national

103

http://www.ecre.org/about/this-is-ecre/about-us.html

104

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/backgroundinformation/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf 105

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/12187576/EU-Turkey-deal-on-refugees-would-contraveneinternational-law.html

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credibility and strength. On top of this, the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and Turkey also present a controversial fact, as some people tend to link them with the influx of refugees. This has led to more security regulations as well as further suspicion, with the example of the Netherlands closing down its borders recently. This makes certain Member States of the EU even more reluctant to accepting refugees.

All of the above are closely linked with the fact that the EU’s Member States are able to act as they see fit in light of such a crisis, with the level to which they share their competences with the EU in border controls and asylum policies ranging. Some say that a united Europe needs to also have a united approach in crucial issues in order to be more effective and powerful. On the other hand, some argue that the need to maintain Member States’ sovereignty is equally important, especially in issues that immediately affect their future.

Considering the differences in their domestic legislation, should the power of dealing with asylum applications remain in the competence of the Member States or should the EU move towards a more centralised approach to create a Common European Asylum System? If so, how?

Is it possible for the Member States of the EU to cooperate and work towards finding a common solution regarding the fair distribution of refugees amongst them? Could the Dublin Regulation provide the necessary legislative framework for the acceleration of the process or is it a system which has ultimately failed? Does the EU need to revise its relevant legislation?

With the conflict in Syria still raging on, many more waves of refugees are bound to reach transit countries and the EU. How can the EU respond to provide protection and sustainable solutions both in the short-term and the long-term?

What has been done so far?

Quotas for redistribution of immigrants In an effort to alleviate the countries that mostly suffered from the overflow, the EU presented Quotas for redistribution of immigrants. The scheme was adopted in September and it refers to relocating 160,000 Syrian, Iraqi and Eritrean refugees from Greece and Italy; only 885 people have been moved to other Member States since then 106.

(Suspended) Dublin Regulation The Dublin Regulation establishes the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application. It prevents applicants from submitting applications in multiple Member States, while it also reduces the number of “orbiting” asylum seekers. An asylum seeker has to 106

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/eu-urges-member-states-6000-refugees-month-160310181509562.html

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apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter and if they cross borders, after being fingerprinted, they can be returned to the former. However, in the light of the crisis several Member States have suspended the regulation, as they argued they could not support any more refugees.

Common European Asylum System The Commission has presented its plan for a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) aiming at quicker, fairer asylum decisions, which will ensure the safety and protection of refugees. This would include a number of directives and regulations set to improve the current legislative framework. The revised Asylum Procedures Directive sets out the general rules for the entire asylum application process. The revised Reception Conditions Directive ensures that there are humane material reception conditions, such as housing, for asylum seekers across the EU and that the fundamental rights of the concerned persons are fully respected, while the revised Qualification Directive clarifies the grounds for granting international protection for refugees.

The revised Dublin Regulation will also clarify the processes and establish the state responsible for asylum applications. Finally, the revised Eurodac Regulation will allow law enforcement access to the EU database of the fingerprints of asylum seekers. This will be possible only under strictly limited circumstances in cases of serious crimes, such as murder and terrorism.

Keywords Dublin regulation, redistribution of refugees, EU-Turkey action plan, EU’s Member States’ approach, frontline EU countries, transit countries, asylum shopping

Useful links for further research Official sources 

The Commission’s fact sheet for the CEAS http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/ceas-fact-sheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf



Commission’s priority actions on the crisis http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/02/20160210_en.htm

News and analysis 

CNN on the distinction between a refugee and a migrant crisis http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/08/world/what-is-difference-migrants-refugees/



Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911

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FYROM-Greek border closes down http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-macedonia-idUSKCN0WB0Z0

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COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS II - LIBE II A crisis of liberal values in Europe; how should the EU’s Member States respond to the rise of Islamophobia, violent extremism, and hate speech?

In a union that claims to be ‘united in diversity’, the refugee crisis was yet another factor in a developing increase in hate crimes and xenophobia. The rise of far-right movements, as well as their political legitimisation through elections, raise questions about the limits in freedom of expression. How does Europe place religion in the public sphere? How secular are the EU’s Member States? The complexity of the issues at stake go beyond tackling religious and ethnic intolerance, as they share an intricate relation with the economy, culture, and politics.

By Fabian Eiden (DE) & Eva Tsoukala (GR)

Why does it matter?

When the EU took its first steps and abstract ideas of a unified Europe turned into concrete action, the memory of the horror that had been the second world war was still fresh and alive in the minds of the contemporaries. The 20th century, from colonial conflicts up until the Yugoslav war that reached into the new millennium, has made one lesson painfully obvious; that to ensure peace and improve the living conditions of the community, it is necessary to create a strong, emancipated civil society in which racism and discrimination have no place.

Equality of individuals lies at the core of all democracies; it is the fundamental idea that all human beings have the same right to participate in the state they live in and that their human rights 107 cannot be infringed upon because of their race, religious beliefs, gender, sexual orientation or political views. Within a democracy, there is the opportunity for political opponents to come together, discuss and reach a consensus. If some members of a society are excluded from exercising their rights, then the dēmos, the people, are no longer in power. Therefore, modern democracies cannot exist without taking a strong stance against racism, discrimination and xenophobia.

The early years of the 21st century, however, have seen social and political developments that threaten and question these beliefs. Terrorist attacks, the rise of extremist parties, but also the unprecedented influx of refugees have caused many citizens to doubt the core values of a

107

Universal declaration of human rights as laid out by the United Nations: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-

rights/index.html

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democratic union. At the so-called birthplace of democracy, Athens, the delegates of the Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs II will debate on how Europe will maintain and strengthen its civil society to fend off racism and protect the liberties which Europe has fought long and hard for.

Who’s in play?

Far-right political parties play a leading role in the issue, exploiting European citizens’ ignorance towards cultures or religions different to their own as well as their insecurity that comes from the politically and economically unstable period we are going through. Examples of these are the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), France’s Front National party, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland party or Greece’s Golden Dawn party. Among the common practices of such political actors is highlighting extreme aspects that a culture or religion other than the dominant one can have, which causes phenomena such as hate speech, fear and Islamophobia. The European Parliament, which is the only directly elected body of the European Union and therefore represents the opinion of EU voters, is deeply affected by the participation of far-right parties accused of violent acts and hate speech against immigrants in it, since this contradicts its core ideas and hinders its even function.

On the other hand, religious groups also contribute to the problem, either representing the religious majority, or the various religious minorities that exist in Member States of the EU. They often perpetuate anachronistic attitudes and practices and sometimes choose extremism 108 in order to impose their will upon society.

Finally, the EU’s Member States have great involvement in the crisis discussed in this topic, since it is them that are responsible to resolve the conflicts created and maintain social cohesion. Our topic focuses on their competence to deal with freedom, justice and security issues. With the European Union aiming to be “united in diversity” as a society, its Member States recognise the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and ought to strive for their integration and for social cohesion.

To sum up, freedom of thought, speech and religion, equality, justice and dignity 109 are fundamental rights recognised under EU law, but the action the EU’s Member States take in order to protect civil liberties is mainly built upon them. These rights have been violated several times as the extreme voices of the political and religious sphere are rising. At this point, the role of the European Court of Justice should be underlined, since its main responsibility is to make sure that the EU legislation is applied equally by all Member States.

108

How ISIS laid out is plans to export chaos to Europe http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/25/isis-plans-export-chaos-

europe-paris-brussels 109

According to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm

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Additionally, the Council of Europe, whose goal is the promotion of human rights and democracy in its Member States, has its own court, the European Court of Human Rights, which has an advisory character and enforces the European Convention on Human Rights. All Member States of the EU are also members of the Council of Europe.

Finally, the European Commission, as the executive body of the European Union, runs various programmes for the promotion of the above-mentioned values and liberties. It has recently established the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), in order to combat extreme ideas and ensure a safe and peaceful life for all EU citizens.

Key conflicts and questions As Europe’s refugee crisis unfolds and the economic crisis is challenging the Eurozone, xenophobia has risen. Hate speech towards the ‘unknown’, centred around Islam, the ‘different’ religion; a myth perpetuated in society about all Muslims being terrorists especially by fundamentalist Christian organisations 110 and far-right political parties, so as to bring over supporters and voters.

It is true that there is a fundamentalist and extreme aspect of Islam that supports armed conflict111, war against the non-believers and has recently taken a political character, through the establishment of the Islamic State. However, Islam is a religion that has proven it can coexist peacefully in European societies, given that there is a very high percentage of European Muslims that are integrated in the European way of life 112. This is achieved on the principle of respecting democratic values, and human rights regardless of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or religion. On the other hand, a lot of people support the idea that the violent Islamic outburst in Europe can be interpreted as a result of the oppressive attitude that Europe had for years towards Muslims and of the discrimination they, both as ethnic and religious groups, have faced for years.

Far-right parties continue their rhetoric against people of different religion, culture, beliefs or sexual preferences, with an extreme take on the notion of national sovereignty, and influence voters who feel insecure or indecisive. They target their rhetoric of hatred against minority groups and/or use various forms of violence against them. The participation of such parties in the European Parliament is not according to the European Union’s principles and, unfortunately, threatens democracy.

With such a culturally and religiously diverse population, what should the EU’s approach be when supporting its Member States in matters of religious education? Is violence inherent to religion or

The Christian anti-muslim propaganda http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/britain-firsts-holy-war-home-office-condemns-anti-muslim-propaganda-petition-calls-group-1540893 111 The endless wars of Islam http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/12/williams-the-endless-wars-of-islam/ 112 Five facts about the Muslim population in Europe http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/ 110

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does it bear socioeconomic characteristics? How can the principle of respecting one’s individuality and choices be applied in such a pluralist society? Is Europe united in diversity?

What has been done so far?

The EU can act on several levels against racism and discrimination and there is already a number of measures in place. First of all, there are legal measures taken, with the aim of making racism and hateful speech a criminal offense in the public sphere. The base for this is laid in the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. The purpose of this document is to create a common approach towards the prosecution of racism in the criminal law of the Member States. Since direct legislation would be outside of the competences of the EU, this framework only calls for measures to be implemented without specifying in which way this should be done113.

The EU also grants financial aid to organisations and programmes that strengthen civil society and educate citizens. A frontrunner project was the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme which was in place until 2013, which funded educational projects directed against homophobia, child abuse as well as racism. Aiming specifically at its young citizens, the EU’s Youth in Action programme (2007-2013) funded projects that promote actions against hate speech against minorities. The European Youth Parliament, for example, has received funding for many of its events. The continuation of Youth in Action is Erasmus+, which many students are familiar with because of the large exchange network between Universities and internship placements it has created and the intercultural dialogue it has promoted.

The EU also supports its stance towards human rights by fostering information exchange on good practice, meaning that the Union facilitates expert groups and data networking 114 that make information on the fight against anti-democratic forces more readily available to all of its Member States (for example under the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights).

Finally, the EU is active in what it calls ‘setting the scene’. Namely, apart from the European Union’s democratic founding principles, EU officials are expected to take a public stance against hate speech or when a debate touches upon this topic. An example of this was the appearance and speech of Commissioner Věra Jourová before the European Parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee on 21 January 2015 in reaction to the attacks on Charlie

113

E.g. “each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the following intentional conduct is punishable:(a)

publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. […]each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the conduct referred to in Articles 1 and 2 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.”, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, §§ 1 and 3.

114

For example the following project: http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2015/fundamental-rights-survey

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Hebdo early last year115. Another example occurred recently when the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, ordered a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn to be excluded from the session after he had made blatantly racist remarks116.

Keywords Islamophobia, hate speech, extremism; far-right, nationalist parties, Front National, UKIP, AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), Golden Dawn; religion, liberal values, Fundamental Rights; migration, crisis, Euroscepticism

Useful links for further research Official sources 

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm



The European Commission on racism and xenophobia http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/racism-xenophobia/index_en.htm



Council Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:328:0055:0058:en:PDF



The European Commission on the dialogue with churches, religious associations or communities and philosophical and non-confessional organisations http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/dialogue/index_en.htm



Erasmus+ programme http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/index_en.htm



Commissioner Věra Jourová's remarks before the European Parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee - 21 January 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/commissioner-verajourovas-remarks-european-parliaments-civil-liberties-justice-and-home-affairs_en

115

http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/commissioner-vera-jourovas-remarks-european-

parliaments-civil-liberties-justice-and-home-affairs_en 116

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yv_5v32Apkk

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News and analysis 

A liberal crisis in Europe? https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/analysis/liberalism



Islam and the Crisis of Liberal Values in Europe https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-02-02/elephant-room



The rise of Europe’s far-right and the anti-islam tide http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/the-rise-of-europes-far-right-and-theanti-islam-tide/

Videos to watch 

President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz orders a member of the European Parliament to be excluded from a session on grounds of racist remarks: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yv_5v32Apkk

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COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE - SEDE Revisiting the Common Security and Defence Policy; how should Europe act to ensure peace, stability, and security in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region?

As the EU is struggling to handle the migration flows at its borders, and hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing from war, is Europe de facto in need of a strategy to tackle the enemies of the West in the Middle East? While the possibility of the Kurdish population to realise some sort of statehood or independence remains open, is the call for a ceasefire going to de-escalate the Russia-Turkey tensions? Are the security threats presented by the likes of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)/Daesh a call to rethink the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?

By Kristin Verpe (NO) & Christos Zois (GR)

Why does it matter?

The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region is a region with an estimated population of more than 300 million people, and consists of a great diversity of people and cultures 117 . The conflict level in the region rose with the waves of revolutionary movements known as the Arab Spring beginning in 2010. In Libya, the Arab Spring was a bloody affair that ended in the toppling and subsequent killing of the country’s dictator Muammar Gaddafi. The NATO-led intervention managed to remove Gaddafi, but Libya remained in a state of unrest and one can question if the country is better as of today than before the revolution. In Syria peaceful protests escalated into a full-scale civil war and a humanitarian disaster, as more than 250, 000 Syrians have lost their lives. Furthermore, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al -Sham (ISIS), a jihadist terrorist group claiming religious, political and military authority over people and territory in the region is intensifying the unrest.

The MENA region is now filled with conflicts and chaos, leading to casualties and the destruction of critical infrastructure. As millions of people are fleeing their homes we are now witnessing the biggest refugee crisis since WW2, with almost 1.3m people applying for asylum in the EU-28 in 2015. At the same time, the security threats presented by the emergence of ISIS is causing the European authorities to react. While the EU is supporting the US-led global coalition, the level of commitment and contribution to the fight against ISIS is still up to the individual Member States of the EU. This is evident by the absence of European support when France began bombing Syria after the Paris attacks in 2015, as well as the lack of coherence to be seen in the EU’s response to 117

http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/overview

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the Arab Spring in 2011, when the EU High Representative’s voice was lost in all the different responses from the Member States.

To act together and efficiently respond to global conflicts and crisis in a unified manner, was the rationale behind creating the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 118. The idea of a common defence policy has been around for more than 60 years, as an unsuccessful attempt to establish the European Defence Community, a multinational military capacity, happened already in 1952. The Balkan wars in the late 1990s again triggered a common willingness of Europeans to act together to develop instruments to respond to conflicts. This eventually led to the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As of today there are 19 ongoing missions, with four of the missions in the MENA region. One of these missions is the European Union military operation on the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), that was launched in June 2015 in order to tackle the human emergency in the Mediterranean and fight human smugglers.

It is evident that the EU is making an effort to ensure peace and stability in the MENA region, however, looking at the level of conflicts as of today, it is maybe more important than ever to think carefully about the reliability and effectiveness of the CSDP. The question is if it is good enough as it is, or if it should be developed in order for the EU to take a more prominent role in global conflicts that also directly affect the EU itself.

Who’s in play?

ISIS/Daesh119 In the past five years, the already existing tensions in the Middle East and North Africa region have escalated rapidly. In the period during 2010-2013 the civil conflicts and social revolutions against the authoritarian regimes governing several countries in the region, supported in some occasions

by European and US military forces, were the main reason of instability and turmoil in the region.

In those countries, namely Syria, Libya and Egypt, the post conflict unrest has led to new tensions between different ethnic groups fighting for power. However, in 2013 it became obvious to the international community that the situation had become far more complicated, as a new actor, known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Daesh or the Islamic State (IS), was militarily involved in the conflicts and started occupying major territories of the country. The self-proclaimed caliphate of Islamic State (IS) has declared the sacred war against the western culture and conducted many terroristic attacks in the past three years targeting European metropoleis, while at the same time it has been occupying large parts of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and North Africa by the use of military means.

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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aai0026

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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277

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European Union Although theoretically the European Union has exclusive competence as far as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is concerned, since the latter is not into full effect –yet- the Union has the ability to call its Member States to follow a more co-ordinated and cohesive response to international crises, without this call being binding for them. In order for the Union to have the exclusive competence on the matters of a fully integrated foreign and security policy, the Council should reach a unanimous decision specifically on the creation of fully integrated EU foreign policy. So, it is obvious that the establishment of a common foreign policy is a matter of political will and the Union can rely solely on its Member States’ present and future external policies.

The EU’s Member States are –for the time being- maybe the most important actor on the issue of defence and security. This happens because the Common Security and Defence Policy has not been put into effect yet due to the lack of the prerequisite unanimous decision of the Council.

Moreover, in order for the Common Security and Defence Policy to be implemented each Member State of the EU must publish the respective decision in compliance with their constitutional provisions. Therefore, for now it is in each State’s discretion to contribute to any mission conducted by one or more Member States of the EU either by civilian and/or military means.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy participates in three institutional bodies of the EU: the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. She is responsible for coordinating the foreign, defence and security policy of the Union and represents it in the various international fora and organisations, such as the United Nations, while trying to build consensus among the Member States on matters of foreign policy.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) was created by the Lisbon Treaty and was formally launched in January 1, 2011. Consisting of officials from various EU institutions, this body has played a major role in implementing and launching many EU operations regarding peace building, stability and neighbourhood policies, while at the same time it assists the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to carry out the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Other countries and international organisations The EU cooperates tightly with the United Nations (UN) on the creation of a more coherent and active response to the threat of ISIS, since two of its Member States are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Moreover, the two organisations are working closely with the aim to achieve peace in the MENA regions that are in turmoil or war by using political and diplomatic means and, at the same time, try to relief the populations in those areas from the consequences of war and terrorism.

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On a regional level, the EU cooperates closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and especially with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). These co-operations have helped the EU form a more coherent defence policy and work actively on creating a stable and safe environment in the MENA region.

Last but not least, Saudi Arabia plays an important role in the region, as it took the initiative to create a coalition of 34 Islamic States that will assist the international community in the fight against ISIS 120.

Key conflicts and questions National sovereignty is a key aspect to consider both in regard to the EU’s Member States and to the states in the MENA region. National defence remains at the core of even the most modern concepts of national sovereignty. While some Member States of the EU wish for a stronger and more integrated Europe, it is clear that others are unwilling to give decision making powers regarding their security and defence capabilities to the EU. While studying the CSDP in the MENA region, it is important to realise that the EU’s Member States have diverse approaches to foreign policy, and acknowledge that this can make it difficult for the EU to act as a single entity under the CSDP. Furthermore, when considering what actions the EU should take in the region it is important to bear in mind the principles of non-intervention and non-violence. The principle of nonintervention is built on the respect for a state’s sovereignty and an intervention of external actors in a state’s territory can only be exercised after a decision made by the United Nation’s Security Council on an issue jeopardising international peace and security. On the basis of the principle of nonviolence every State is obliged to refrain from the use of any kind of violence against any other State, with the only exception being the right of defence in case of any external military attack.

Political or military Solutions?

The EU’s foreign policy is closely connected to the exercise of soft power, and this is especially evident by the way the EU acts in the MENA region. The EU is a leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis, contributing with humanitarian, economic and stabilisation assistance. In the fight against ISIS, High Representative Federica Mogherini calls for the global community to unite, and that a solution has to be political 121 . Meanwhile, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy are contributing with more aggressive targeting on the military side of the fight against ISIS. Having some of the EU’s Member States participating in airstrikes and

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http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/14/middleeast/islamic-coalition-isis-saudi-arabia/

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http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2016/020216_small-group-of-the-global-coalition-to-counter-daesh_en.htm

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contributing in military matters does not necessarily have to be in conflict with the EU’s focus on a political solution, yet it does indeed question the unity of the European response.

The need for a more integrated European defence?

A key question is what direction the development of the CSDP should take. Should the EU stick with its use of mainly soft power, or develop its own hard power capabilities? While it is likely that the EU’s overall influence would increase with a strong, unified response, it all comes down to its Member States’ willingness to give up an important aspect of their sovereignty.

What has been done so far?

EU policies On the issues of security and foreign affairs the main policy of the European Union is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It was established by the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and its aim has been the progressive creation of a common European defence system (Article 22, TEU). It is the most important element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the field of European defence. Its results will be put into effect should the Council reached a unanimous decision on that matter. This policy has enabled the Union to take a leading role in international peacebuilding, conflict prevention, peace and security in the past years with the many turmoil that have been created especially in the region of Middle East and North Africa.

Since the outbreak of the civil turmoil in Syria five years ago, the EU has made major efforts to achieve peace and stability in the region by ensuring the transition to a democratic and longlasting regime. However, the sudden rise of ISIS 3 years ago and its constant expansion ever since have provided the Union with new challenges in those regions. The main rationale behind each of the EU’s actions in the MENA region is to achieve long-term peace and stability in its neighbouring countries, by assisting them in creating democratic regimes. On the issue of the fight against Daesh, the High Representative Federica Mogherini called all countries to show a strong sense of unity and will of cooperation while pointing the need for international cooperation.

EU missions122 In its effort to achieve a peaceful and sustainable environment in the whole region of MENA, the EU launched, under the concept of the Common Security and Defence Policy, an operation in the South Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED)123 which is mandated to prevent the smuggling of people through sea by the use of military and non-military means. Under the same policy, the

122 123

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm

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EU enabled on May 22, 2013 the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya124 as part of its coordinated approach towards the reconstruction of the country after the turmoil that followed the death of Muammar al-Gaddafi. This is a mission supported by civilian means and aims to help Libyan authorities enhance and develop the country’s border security, especially after the involvement of major ISIS forces in the battles. With a fully integrated common foreign as well as security policy not having been implemented so far, the EU has not collectively taken any military measures in the MENA region.

The EU Battlegroups They are formed for military crisis-management, and so-called rapid reaction, which refers to the capability to rapidly deploy troops in case of a crisis. Although the Battlegroups have been in readiness since 2007, however, they have never been used in operations in the MENA region or elsewhere. However, the EU aims to achieve a long-term political solution on the Syrian crisis by establishing a stable political system based on democracy, with many EU officials expressing their strong belief that a political solution of the Syrian crisis can be the most effective means to stop the expansion and growth of ISIS.

EU’s Member States’ positions Some of them have decided upon intervening in ISIS occupied regions by using heavy military means, showing their unwillingness to follow the EU’s proposal and belief for a purely political solution. In the past months, France and the UK decided to escalate their military presence in the regions of Syria and Iraq in order to deal with the threat of ISIS on a more aggressive and direct way. On November 16, 2015 the French President Francois Hollande declared that “France is at war (against ISIS)” and on January 2016 mentioned that “The pace of the interventions will be accelerated and France will play its role in this”125. Moreover, since September 2014 the United States of America created a coalition of States that would participate actively in the fight against ISIS with the majority of the EU’s Member States being part of it. Once again, UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands play the most important military role.

United Nations actions The EU has declared once again that it stands as an active member of the US-led International Syria Support Group and the UN Envoy in Syria. Moreover, the Union has announced its full compliance and commitment to the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) regarding the creation of a “Roadmap for Peace in Syria”. On November 20, 2015 the Security Council published the Resolution 2249 condemning every form of terrorism and allowing the 124 125

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-to-ramp-up-air-strikes-against-isis-says-president-francois-hollande-

a6824781.html

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organisation’s willing Member States “to take all necessary measures” to coordinate their efforts to suppress terrorism.126 On the same pace, the Russian President Vladimir Putin, announced on March 14, 2016 his decision for a withdrawal of the country’s military troops from the Syrian territory. Furthermore, the ongoing UN peace talks on Syria (known as Geneva III Conference on Syria) that officially started on February 1, 2016 prepared the intended talks by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) that on February 11, 2016 resulted in the decision upon a partial ceasefire regarding every operation in the region of Syria and on an effort for a political solution to the turmoil and loss of human lives.

EU-NATO cooperation127 Lastly, the adoption of “Berlin Plus” arrangements in 2003 has created a closer cooperation between the EU and NATO, by allowing the EU to make use of the latter’s (civilian and military) capabilities. This measure is rather important because it could provide the EU with the necessary military assets for a more active response to the threat that ISIS poses in the region, especially since it has no cohesive military part, yet.

Keywords MENA, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), ISIS, national sovereignty, EUNAVFOR MED, EUBAM, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Neighbourhood Policy 128 , EU-NATO cooperation, US-led coalition against ISIS, hard power129, soft power130, smart power131

Useful links for further research Official sources 

European Commission Fact Sheet on the EU Support in response to the Syrian Crisis

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http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12132.doc.htm

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http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

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As provided by the Article 8 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) the European Union aims to create closer and special

political cooperation with its eastern and southern neighbouring countries. The main goal of the Union is to create a neighbourhood of peace and stability based on the European ideals, the principles of democracy and human rights.

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Hard power denotes the material capabilities of a state – its size, population, wealth, and very crucially its military capacity.

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Soft power can be seen as the ability to shape the preferences of others. It is made up of values an organization or country expresses

in its culture, by internal practices and relations with other actors 131

Smart power is the ability to combine hard- and soft power into effective strategies.

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http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-222_en.htm

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EU Factsheet on EUNAVFOR MED http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavformed/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

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European Council: Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq, and ISIS http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-council-conclusions-euregional-strategy-for-syria-and-iraq-as-well-as-the-isil-daesh-threat/

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United Nations Security Council’s Resolution on the fight against terrorism http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/war-on-isis-un-in-rare-unanimous-votecalls-on-world-to-unite-against-jihadist-group-a6742951.html

News and analysis 

Saudi Arabia’s response to ISIS http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-sends-troops-and-fighterjets-to-military-base-in-turkey-ahead-of-intervention-against-a6871611.html

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John Kerry at the Munich Talks February 2016, Partial Syria Ceasefire http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/syria-ceasefire-munich-talks-us-russia

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Who’s doing what in US-led coalition in the fight against Islamic States http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35102555

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What does the future hold for Libya? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35790985

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A New Phase of the fight against ISIS https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/20/fight-against-the-islamicstate-enters-a-new-phase-with-pledge-from-seven-countries/

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About the current state of Libya: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/libyas-arab-spring-the-revolution-that-ate-itschildren

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